It has proven challenging to define a general test for the actus reus part of an endeavor.

The
main question is, "When does a series of acts leading up to the commission of an offense
become an attempt in law?" Common law courts had a difficult time defining "attempt" precisely.
The method that was suggested was the "proximity test", which has been mentioned by a large
number of reliable sources. However, in certain instances, courts applied a strict interpretation
of the proximity standard, resulting in erroneous acquittals. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts
Act of 1981 (CAA 1981) states that once the Law Commission made revisions, Parliament felt
obligated to adopt a legislative definition of an attempt. The Act does not, however, define the
actus reus of an endeavour.

The ancient common law was unwilling to consider mere preparatory acts to be efforts, but
proximate acts were. As Parke B originally stated in Eagleton (1855) Dears CC 515, the
landmark case that established the proximity test, activities immediately related to the action of
the offence are to be seen as such. activities remotely leading to the action of the offence are
not considered as attempts to do so.Baron Parke stated that if any additional activity on the part
of the defendant had been necessary, the act of the defendant wouldn't have been sufficiently
near. This type of test was known as the 'last act' exam. Due to this limited perspective,
defendants who had "very far" progressed towards committing the crime but had not yet
completed it would be declared not guilty. In the Robinson [1915] 2 KB 342 decision, it was
decided that actions "immediately connected with the commission of the full offence" did
constitute an attempt while actions "remotely connected with the commission of the full offence"
did not. Later cases involving the proximity test include Comer v. Bloomfield (1971) 55 Cr App R
305 and DPP v. Stonehouse (1977) 2 All ER 909. In order to be unable to go back on his word,
a defendant has to have "crossed the Rubicon and burnt his boats," as Lord Diplock put it in
DPP v. Stonehouse.

A different set of authorities, which relied on Stephen, J.F. (1887), A the latest of the Criminal
Law, chose a different strategy in contrast to the 'final act' strategy utilised by the previously
mentioned authorities. London: Macmillan. also, "an attempt to commit a crime is an act done
with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its
actual commission if it were not interrupted!" This tactic was approved in the cases Hope v.
Brown (1954), 1 WLR 250, and Davey v. Lee (1968), 1 QB 366.

The Criminal Procedure Act of 1981's (CAA 1981) subsection (1) states that an attempt occurs
when the defendant takes actions that go beyond just preparing to commit a crime. The judge
will make a preliminary determination as to the question of whether there can be sufficient proof
that the accused did conduct an act that was more than simply preparatory: section 4(3), CAA
1981. This is a factual issue for the jury to decide.According to Glanville Williams, the test didn't
reveal any new facts. It was merely an affirmation of long-standing common law. Attempting the
law of wrong turns (Williams, G., 1991). This section makes no attempt to define such an act for
us, not even in the broadest sense. Criminal Law 416, p. The Act does not provide any
additional guidance on what constitutes "mere preparation" or whether a defendant has gone
beyond "mere preparation" to conduct an offence. As a result, it is up to the courts to determine
whether the actus reus of an attempt has been met on a case-by-case basis.
In accordance with suggestions made by the Law Commission, the Act does away with the term
"proximate" when defining an effort. The text of the Act, in Lord Lane's reading (Gullefer [1990] 1
WLR 1063 at 1066), attempts to find a compromise between the two methods used in
conventional common law.Such effort, in Lord Lane's opinion, arises when the defendant
"embarks on the crime proper" or "actual commission of the offence." This compromising, in
Smith's opinion, "hardly advances the matter in any constructive manner" and "would be as
onerous as requiring the defendant's "last act"." Proximity in attempt, Crim L 576, Smith, J.C.
(1991).Although the structure of the clause may not be as stringent as the "proximity test" under
the old common law system, the case law after 1981 appears to have taken a strict stance when
interpreting section 1(1)."The the defendant's sentence was overturned in Campbell (1991) 93
Cr App R 350 on the grounds that 'A number of acts remained undone' (Watkins LJ), despite the
fact that he was caught outside a post office with the tools necessary to commit
robbery.''Williams (1991) argues that closeness is tantamount to needing more than just
preparation, which supports the Act's claim that its scope is limited. A proximal action was one
that required more than just planning, and vice versa.

Smith (1991) suggests that the Court of Appeal "provide the lower courts with a collection of
illustrations" on the subject after criticising station regulation for effectively allowing the courts to
con-true "more than merely preparatory" work alone. Dennis makes a similar argument, claiming
that the test was "imprecise" and that it proved "undesirable to give no further guidance to either
judge or jury on its application," since doing so might "carry risks of perverse and inconsistent
verdicts." The author is I.H. Dennis.The legislation Commission rejected the "substantial step"
approach employed in the United States because it could not be further clarified and since it
was worried that it could unnecessarily enlarge the legislation (Law Commission® (1980)
Report, Attempt: The Impossible is Attempt, Conspiracy, and Incitement No. 102. But according
to Williams, "this is not correct of the substantial step test," and instead, "the commission's
objection is impressively true of its own test... which is to be left without any statutory examples"
(Millams, G., 1991, p. 422).

In conclusion Despite the greatest attempts of Parliament to "rationalise" the law through
legislation, it appears that there is no set standard for establishing whether an act qualifies as
an attempt. To determine whether the actus reus of an attempt has been met, each unique
instance must be assessed on its own merits.