MARRIAGE CASE DIGESTS

Article 1
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
“Supernumerary Project Worker,” for a fixed period until the return of Tenorio who went
on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner
company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the
agreed period. In another period, Grace’s services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave and
pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated after the said
period. Grace was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that
was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil
status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier. It appears that Grace made the same representation in the two successive
reliever agreements which she signed few weeks after her marriage.
When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor sent to
Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum,
she was reminded about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for
employment. In her reply, Grace stated that she was not aware of PT&T’s policy
regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden
her true civil status. Still, she was dismissed from the company.
Thus, Grace initiated a complaint for illegal dismissal.
LA
- Grace who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by petitioner.
NLRC
- decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace
de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the
dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned.
ISSUE
Whether or not the policy of the petitioner of not accepting married woman was valid.
RULING
NO.
an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment,
all aspects of employment, “from hiring to firing,” except in cases of unlawful
discrimination or those which may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right
against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less
than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed Grace from
employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with
the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
- memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch
supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter,
that “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women
employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.”
Grace’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company.
The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted
by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage.—It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting
married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman
employee merely by reason of marriage.”

Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 162994. September 17, 2004.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS
Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.
Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees
to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. The Employee Code of
Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a
conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employee’s
employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products. Subsequently, Tecson entered
into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals 3
(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that
area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District
Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might
engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy
After several delays due to Tecson’s requests, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan
City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson defied the transfer order and
continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his salary, but was
not issued samples of products which were competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra.
NCMB
- declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees
and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s
right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
CA
- Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.
ISSUE
Whether or not Glaxo’s policy prohibiting its employees from having personal
relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives.
RULING
YES.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially
so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying
down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. Significantly, the company actually
enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy.
Indeed, the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner,
with due regard for the lot of the employee.
From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook,
it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships
between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to
cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company
merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company
that may arise out of such relationships

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol

G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006.
PUNO, J.:
FACTS
The petitioner is a corporation engaged in trading—principally of paper products.
Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department
while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
The evidence for the petitioners show that respondents Simbol, Comia and Estrella
were all regular employees of the company.
Simbol was employed by the company on October 27, 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also
an employee of the company, whom he married on June 27, 1998. Prior to the
marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of
them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated in 1995, viz:
1.New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd
degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2.In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a
friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one
of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Simbol resigned pursuant to the company policy.

Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she
married. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy, one must
resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned later.
Estrella was hired. She met Zuñiga, also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a
married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her
services due to immorality but she opted to resign.
Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to
resign in view of an illegal company policy. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and
contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code.
LA
- Dismissed the complaint
- The company policy was a management prerogative
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
ISSUE
Whether or not the policy that in case of two of our employees both singles, one male
and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign was valid.
RULING
NO.
Since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employer’s no-
spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts.
There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other
than the discriminatory practice. 32 To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the
employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
Here, the Court found no reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. Petitioners’
sole contention that “the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is lame.
In the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were
asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda
Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard
Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient.

Article 2

Falcis III vs. Civil Registrar General

G.R. No. 217910. September 03, 2019
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS
In 2015, Jesus Nicardo Falcis filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 seeking to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional for
depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due process of law. As a
consequence, the petition further seeks to nullify Articles 46(4)2 and 55(6) of the same
Code. To support his claim, Falcis argued that following:
1. Like opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples are equally capable of founding their own
families and fulfilling essential marital obligations;
2. Contrary to Chi Ming Tsoi vs Court of Appeals, procreation is not an essential marital
obligation because there is no necessity to limit marriage as only between a man and a
woman;
3. There is a violation of the equal protection clause since there is no substantial distinction
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples;
4. Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence of "individuals belonging to
religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage" and that they have a "right to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions;”
5. The religious weddings conducted by these denominations have been denied civil
recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics and Muslims.
The Civil Registrar, through the OSG, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the
grounded on the following, among others:
1. Falcis has not proven that the issues in this case are of such transcendental importance,
there being no law or facts contained in his Petition to determine any principles
concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in the Philippines;
2. The issues raised in the Petition are political questions, saying that marriage's legal
definition is a policy issue for Congress to determine, and that any amendment to the
definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code should be addressed to Congress.
3. Since the Constitution only contemplates opposite-sex marriage in Article XV, Section 2
and other related provisions, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are constitutional.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the parties are entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
2. Whether or not limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples is unconstitutional.
RULING
1. NO. The present petition does not present an actual case over which can be the
proper subject of the power of judicial review. Petitions before the Supreme Court that
challenge an executive or legislative enactment must be based on actual facts for a
proper joinder of issues to be resolved.
In this case, the Petition is woefully bereft of sufficient actual facts to substantiate its
arguments as the substantive portion of the Petition merely parrots the separate
concurring opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno wherein the retired Justice referred to
submissions made by petitioner Ang Ladlad Party-List before respondent COMELEC on
the "unequal treatment" suffered by the LGBTQI+ community. However, those
submissions cannot be recognized by the SC in this case, since they were made by a
different party, in a different case, on a different set of facts, for a different subject
matter, concerning a different law, to a different governmental body. These are not
"actual facts' sufficient to engender a justiciable controversy in the case at bar. Hence,
the Petition stays firmly in the realm of the speculative and conjectural, failing to
represent the very real and well-documented issues that the LGBTQI+ community face
in Philippine society.
Even the petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual case or
controversy. He claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent
because "it is the instrumentality of the government that is tasked to enforce the law in
relation with marriage. However, the Respondent Civil Registrar General was not
involved in the formulation or enactment of the Family Code. No factual antecedents
existed prior to the filing of the Petition apart from the passage of the Family Code
because Falcis has never applied for a marriage license nor has he even visited the
premises of Civil Registrar. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion in this case, as no
discretion was ever exercised by the respondent.
2. NO. From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict marriage on the
basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression. Article XV,
Section 2 of the Constitution lacks a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage,
the Constitution is capable of accommodating a contemporaneous understanding of
sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC).
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the
complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples,
whether opposite-sex or same-sex.
Marriage grants numerous specific rights and privileges that affect most, if not all,
aspects of marital and family relationships. This bundle of rights are granted by the
Family Code, Civil Code, National Internal Revenue Code, Revised Penal Code, Labor
Code, Rules of Court, and other related laws. On the other hand, marriage also imposes
certain duties on married couples and even limitations on their actions.
In this case, however, the petitioner failed to present laws that provide for the benefits
and burdens which he claims are being denied from same-sex couples as the petition
was merely confined to a superficial explanation of the symbolic value of marriage as a
social institution. The SC held that a great caution must be exercised in making a
spectrum of identities and relationships legible in our marriage laws, paying attention to
"who and what is actualized when the LGBT subject is given a voice.” Thus, an
immediate announcement that the current marriage laws apply in equal and
uncalibrated measure to same-sex relationships may operate to unduly shackle those
relationships and cause untold confusions on others.
Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn
state recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many
issues that may arise. Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal
framework, and enforceable according to legal rules. Law stands at its very core. Due to
this inherent "legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be secured
simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the
law itself must create the "thing" to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry
necessarily imposes an affirmative obligation on the state to establish this legal
framework.

Silverio vs. Republic

G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
Silverio alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as “male.”
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to
“Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
RTC – in favor of petitioner
CA – in favor of the Republic
- the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the
change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery
ISSUE
Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the live birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.
RULING
No. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Silverio’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
The petition in the trial court insofar as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as
the change of his first name was concerned.
In sum, no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment.

Republic vs. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan (Cagandahan) filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC Siniloan, Laguna. She alleged that she was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics; that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen (13), tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital.
The medical certificate stated that respondent’s condition is known as CAH which
supported the claims of petitioner.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition based on clear and convincing proofs as it was
medically proven. It was likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia), and change her
name under the Rules.
RULING
NO.
The Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly
‘female’." The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. Where
the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the absence of
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirms
as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a
male. The Supreme Court more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, it respected
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, the Court held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, the Court found merit in respondent’s change
of name in conformity with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.

Republic vs. Albios

G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.*
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS
Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. Two years later, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage
as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. At the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule.
RTC
- declared the marriage void ab initio, RTC opined that the parties got
married out of convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship, in
consideration therof, she paid Fringer $2000.00.
CA
- Affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
ISSUE
Whether or not a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship is void ab initio.
RULING
NO.
Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given
and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices
of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. None of these are present in the case.

Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.

G.R. No. 187417. February 24, 2016.*
REYES, J.:
FACTS
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.
at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006. The cause of
suspension was Cadiz’s Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to Unwed
Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed
the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with law.
Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cadiz’s premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting
pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality.
RULING
NO.
The Court ruled in Leus that the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or
immoral involves a two-step process: first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis-à-vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally
considers moral and respectable.
In this case, the surrounding facts leading to Cadiz’s dismissal are straightforward —
she was employed as a human resources officer in an educational and medical
institution of the Episcopal Church of the Philippines; she and her boyfriend at that time
were both single; they engaged in premarital sexual relations, which resulted into
pregnancy. The labor tribunals characterized these as constituting disgraceful or
immoral conduct. They also sweepingly concluded that as Human Resource Officer,
Cadiz should have been the epitome of proper conduct and her indiscretion “surely
scandalized the Brent community.”
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Brent’s Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not
define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for
disciplinary action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition
of fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz’s acts fell
under such classification, thus constituting immorality.
Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be
gauged — it is public and secular, not religious.
The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz
committed acts of immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single
and had no legal impediment to marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral
conduct. In fact, they eventually married

Art. 4
Abbas vs. Abbas
G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*
VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS
Syed filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. In the Marriage
Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was presented to the solemnizing officer.
Syed allegedly was at his mother-in-law’s residence when his mother-in-law arrived with
two men. he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that
he had never resided in that area. He went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The
Municipal Civil Registrar issued a certification to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria was void for lack of a valid marriage
license as required by Article 4 of the Family Code.
RULING
YES.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license.
To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there
that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. The Court held that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply. “The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.”
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage
license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.

Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr.

G.R. No. 201061. July 3, 2013.*
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS
Benjamin married Azucena and had three children. When Azucena left for the US, he
developed a romantic relationship with Sally. Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. In order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be
registered.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada. She
then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid.
RULING
NO.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the
time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was
no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by proper authorities. (Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts; and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of
The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no
the National Statistics Office.)

marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally “was made only in jest” and “a simulated marriage, at the
instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives.” In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license.

Kho vs. Republic

G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.*
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS
A Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed by petitioner alleging that:
 petitioner’s parents summoned then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent. Petitioner
and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony.
 Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license
 Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer’s office was told to obtain the pertinent papers so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was
celebrated, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby
rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the
most essential requisite;
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license
issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1,
1972.
ISSUE
Whether or not the marriage between the parties was null and void for lack of marriage
license.
RULING
YES.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3)
consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a
civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages.
Petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract.
The presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
Petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no
record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho
[petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on
June 1, 1972.” Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. As
found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract,
or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties. Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to
show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well
be that his motives are less than pure — that he seeks a way out of his marriage to
legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner.

Vitangcol vs. People

G.R. No. 207406. January 13, 2016.*
LEONEN, J.:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration
of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the
judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the
first marriage.
FACTS
Norberto married Alice on December 4, 1994. After some time, Alice “began hearing
rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman. She eventually
discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina on July 17, 1987, as
evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting
valid marriage with Gina, the Regional Trial Court convicted Norberto of bigamy.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.27 He presents
as evidence a Certification28 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite,
which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his
favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential
requisite of marriage — the marriage license — the prosecution fails to establish the
legality of his first marriage. Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first
marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.
ISSUE
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish that Noberto was guilty of bigamy
beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice.
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was
solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines
became effective on August 3, 1988. Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines govern the validity of his first marriage.
Under the Civil Code, the fourth requisite — the marriage license — is issued by the
local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, “the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract,
or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.”
Petitioner presented a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
After a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage
License and License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found
on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of
MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17,
1987.
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without
a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No.
8683519 does not exist.
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the
marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina.

Other cases
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro was originally an action for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage. As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that
states that the marriage license “cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear
from [the local civil registrar’s] records.”
This court held that “[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil
registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.” This court further said that “unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil
registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting parties.”
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The
certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there
being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves
a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion,
the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for
bigamy.
This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño. In Cariño, the marriage
contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage
license number. In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any
marriage license issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao. This court declared
Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license
number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as
well as by their solemnizing officer.

The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution
suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior
marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere
presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license
was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.
There is no evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not
likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses
issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the civil
registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these
vital documents. This would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the
originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance
of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy.
Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina
judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. The second element of the
crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

The origin of Article 40 of the Family Code

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al. that:
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity,
the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a
second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording
Article 40 of the Family Code:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an

element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes
useless.
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he
subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994. As for the last element of
bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is
presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently
married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void.64
With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted
of the crime charged.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.
PER CURIAM:

FACTS
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of
marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of
an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees
from exempted entities.
ISSUE
Whether or not the complainants were found guilty of the charges.
RULING
YES.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage,
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal
marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of
respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal
Code provides that “(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil
authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course,
within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on
respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of
illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart, but
actually trifled with, the law’s concern for the institution of marriage and the legal effects
flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses
charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of
misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly
require a higher penalty.

 Art. 7

Keuppers vs. Murcia,

A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 3, 2018
BERSAMIN, J.:
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction
violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which
emphasizes that the place of the solemnization of a marriage by a judge like him should
only be in his office or courtroom. The only exceptions to the limitation are when the
marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the complainant
and her husband, or in remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family
Code.8 or where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the
solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated
by them in their sworn statement to that effect.
FACTS
Keuppers filed a complaint against Judge Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte. She
thereby charged respondent Judge with estafa; violation of Republic Act No. 6713; and
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The complainant averred that she and her husband went to the Local Civil Registrar's
Office (LCRO) of Davao City to apply for marriage license because they wanted to get
married before Peter's departure; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO,
explained the process for securing the license, and apprised them it would be virtually
impossible to solemnize their marriage before May 22, 2008 because of the requirement
for the mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage license; that
Gasatan then handled a note with the advise for the couple to proceed to the office of
DLS Travel and Tours in Sandawa, Matina, Davao City to look for a person who might
be able to help the couple; that in the office of DLS Travel Tours, Lorna Siega, the
owner, assured that the couple would immediately get the original as well as the
National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate;
Respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the
DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on
handed to the couple the copy of the marriage certificate for their signatures; that on the
following day, the couple picked up the documents as promised by Siega; they were
surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage certificate as well as on the
application for marriage license, specifically" (a) the certificate stating "Office if the
MTCC Judge, Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the solemnization of
the marriage although the marriage had been solemnized in th office of the DLS
Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement in the application for marriage
license that she and her husband had applied for the marriage license in Sta.
Cruz, Davao City on May 8, 2008 although then had accomplished their
application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours; and (c) the
statement in their application for marriage license on having appeared before
Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, which was untrue.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge was guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the
complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office
premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
RULING
YES.
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7 of the Family
Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxxx
Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband in the
office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing provision
of the Family Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue other than the judge's
courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chamber of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in by which case the marriage may be solemnized
at a house or placed designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
(57a)
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant
after she has supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was soon returning to
Germany and wanted to bring with him the certified copy of the marriage certificate din
not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier attitude
towards express statutory requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of
marriages from abuse.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which
emphasizes that the place of the solemnization of a marriage by a judge like him should
only be in his office or courtroom. The only exceptions to the limitation are when the
marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the complainant
and her husband, or in remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family
Code.8 or where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the
solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated
by them in their sworn statement to that effect.
 Art. 21
Garcia vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments;
hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
FACTS
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Later, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Austrian family court.
respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of Australian
Citizenship” issued by the Australian government. Petitioner—a Filipina—and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared
as “single” and “Filipino.” Later, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy—respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married
ISSUE
Whether or not Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of divorce obtained aborad.
RULING
YES.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code
allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it
was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Still, respondent has the burden to prove Australian divorce law. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Respondent’s Legal Capacity to Remarry
Divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimony, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty
party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
Thus, the case was remanded to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence
which conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties’ marriage void on the ground of bigamy.

 Art. 26
Tenchavez vs. Escaño
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of
age, exchanged marriage vows with. Pastor Tenchavez, 82 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the
said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
Due to her family’s refusal of their relationship, Vicenta continued living with her parents
while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. They continued communicating until her
letters became less frequent as the days passed.
The newlyweds were already estranged, Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There,
a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
marriage. She did not sign the petition, thus, was dismissed without prejudice because
of her non-appearance at the hearing.
without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application
that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application' was approved, and she
left for the United States
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." Which a decree of divorce,
"final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal. Mamerto and Mena
Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor. Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California. Later, she acquired American citizenship.
Pastor later filed a complaint against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño.
ISSUE
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in the US was valid.
RULING

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-
appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our
civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the
age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent
witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law
to solemnize marriages. The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from
the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
law.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation.
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence
that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved.
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's
marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the
Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the
innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not
so declaring, the trial court committed error.
Summing up, the Court rules:
1. That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 886), is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country;
2. That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
3. That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
4. That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does
not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

Republic vs. Orbecido III

G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines on May 24, 1981. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same.
ISSUE
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
RULING
YES.
ART. 26. (2)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence. Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Bayot vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 155635. November 7, 2008.*
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in
Agana, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.
Rebecca, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96, ordering
the dissolution of the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements,” but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree
No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26,
1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approval of the motion to
withdraw the petition. Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating
under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City
RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of
lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application
for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is
no valid divorce to speak of.
ISSUE
whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
RULING
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
At the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American
citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agana, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is
followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born
there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport. And as aptly
found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the
marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the
divorce from the Dominican Republic.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. However, such
recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of
Justice of Rebecca’s recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
 The ID indicated “(3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on
October 11, 1995”
 however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation
only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There
is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet
Recognized as One
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily
withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the
Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino
citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date
January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in
question.

Validity of Divorce Decree

VALID.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship
to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the
text of the Civil Decrees
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated
through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96
was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97
issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by
force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6,
1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996.
For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given
a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed;
they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. Consequent to the dissolution of the
marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband’s obligation under the Civil
Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to Rebecca.

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks,
under the premises, cause of action.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*
BRION, J.:
FACTS
Gerbert was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married Daisylyn, a Filipina. Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for
divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January
8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved. Daisylyn offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances.
RTC
 - denied the petition
- Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not Gilbert cannot avail of the relief under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code.
RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws
do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert
Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
- We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the
bench and the bar to what had been done.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In
the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Further, the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
- Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest must be made parties to the proceedings;9 and that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
This ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact

Noveras vs. Noveras

G.R. No. 188289. August 20, 2014.*
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS
David and Leticia were married on 3 December 1988. They resided in USA where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. During the marriage, they acquired the
properties in the Philippines and in the USA.
The Sampaloc property used to be owned by David’s parents. The parties herein
secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. Due to business reverses,
David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia
executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce
with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court
granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June
2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as
all the couple’s properties in the USA.
Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same.
ISSUE
Whether or not the divorce decree was validly recognized by the RTC.
RULING
NO.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce
were not presented. Further, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.” In this
case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree
was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a
different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino
citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
Property relations
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was
not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties. The records of this case
are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a
year and that reconciliation is highly improbable.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year,
the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of
the Family Code, thus: Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death
of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage
is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during
the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction
over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code
clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties. We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as
the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.*
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets
of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was a partner at Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife
EUGENIA. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT”
Later, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA. Also in
Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another
marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to
the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner. LUPSICON through ATTY.
LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-
Ledesma Condominium Project. The CCT was registered in the names of:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100)
x x x”

Later, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De
la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
These properties became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their
joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA should have recognized the Dominican Republic court’s approval
of the Agreement;
RULING
NO.
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty.
Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even
if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did
not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death

Republic vs. Manalo

G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.*
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

In Re: Petition for Judicial Recognition of Divorce Between Minuro Takahashi and Juliet
Rendora Moraña
Moraña vs. Republic
G.R. No. 227605. December 5, 2019.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married. Ten (10) years later, the couple got
estranged. Because of her persistent demand for financial support, her husband
suggested they secure a divorce so the Japanese government would give financial
assistance to their children and send them to school. Believing it was for the good of
their children, petitioner agreed to divorce her husband. Consequently, they jointly
applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, Japan. the Office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and issued the
corresponding Divorce Report.
petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court-Manila an action for recognition of the
Divorce Report.
RTC
- The trial court held that the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters
cannot take the place of the Divorce Decree itself which is the best
evidence here.
- Besides, the authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese
government was not even included in petitioner’s formal offer of evidence
aside from the fact that it was a mere photocopy and was not properly
identified nay authenticated in open court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the relief must be granted to petitioner.
RULING
YES.
These documents are equivalent to the Divorce Decree itself. In any case, there is no
difference between a “Divorce Decree” and the “Divorce Report” she presented in court.
The Divorce Report itself bears the fact that she and her husband obtained a divorce in
Japan. More, although the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters are mere
photocopies, the same were duly authenticated by the Japanese Embassy.
As for the Divorce Certificate, the Court of Appeals said that the same was not properly
offered as it was submitted to the court merely via a Manifestation. The Court of
Appeals, however, failed to consider the fact that the Divorce Certificate was given to
her counsel by the Japanese Embassy only after she had presented her evidence and
after she had gone back to Japan to care for her children. The belated availability of the
Divorce Certificate was, therefore, beyond her control.

A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the Philippines although it was the
Filipino spouse who obtained the same
Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who initiated and
obtained the divorce decree, the same may be recognized in the Philippines,

Were the Divorce Decree itself and the Japanese law on divorce sufficiently proved in
this case?
On several occasions, the Court relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial justice.
More so here because what is involved is a matter affecting the lives of petitioner and
her children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance of the Divorce Certificate was
not due to petitioner’s fault; and the relaxation of the rules here will not prejudice the
State.
Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the
Japanese law on divorce and its English translation. There was no proof at all that these
printouts reflected the existing law on divorce in Japan and its correct English
translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a printout from a website to prove a
foreign law.
In Racho v. Tanaka, 868 SCRA 25 (2018), the Japanese law on divorce was duly proved
through a copy of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the
authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee.
At any rate, considering that the fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher
interest of substantial justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly
prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may be eventually
freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party. In Republic v. Manalo,
862 SCRA 580 (2018), the Court, too, did not dismiss the case, but simply remanded it
to the trial court for reception of evidence pertaining to the existence of the Japanese
law on divorce.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 29, Manila for presentation
in evidence of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce following the procedure in Racho
v. Tanaka.

Rivera vs. Woo,

G.R. No. 248355 November 23, 2021
LOPEZ, J., J.:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
FACTS
A petition for Judicial Recognition of the Foreign Judgment/Divorce was filed by Maricel
L. Rivera (petitioner). Petitioner alleged that she entered into a contract of marriage with
Woo Namsun (respondent), a South Korean national, on April 18, 2007. They lived in
South Korea as husband and wife. However, respondent became physically and
emotionally abusive towards petitioner. Petitioner left for the Philippines but returned
after a month. Petitioner was surprised to discover that respondent had filed for divorce,
which was approved by the Seoul Family Court on the same year. On the basis thereof,
respondent eventually remarried Kim Seonyeo, a Chinese national, on November 8,
2011.
RTC
- petitioner's evidence to prove the Judgment of Divorce, consisting of an
Authentication Certificate issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila (DFA), attaching therewith a Letter of Confirmation issued by the
Embassy of the Republic of South Korea, and the Judgment rendered by
the Seoul Family Court, conformed to Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which laid down the requirements to prove the authenticity of a
foreign judgment.
- Similarly, the law upon which the judgment was based, the Civil Act of
South Korea, was also properly authenticated and proven, by virtue of an
Authentication Certificate issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), a Letter of Confirmation by the Embassy of the Republic of South
Korea, and a copy of the law, as confirmed and produced by Counselor
and Consul Chin Hyun Yong of the Embassy of the Republic of South
Korea.
CA
- petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the fact of divorce according to
pertinent laws in South Korea. To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner
presented and offered as evidence a judgment of divorce by the Seoul
Family Court. However, such evidence was clearly not an official
publication of the document, but a mere copy; neither was such copy
attested to by the legal custodian thereof as required by the Rules. While
records show that the document was attested to by Chin Hyun Yong, no
sufficient evidence was presented to prove that he is the legal custodian of
the Judgment. The CA also reached a similar conclusion as to the
evidence presented to prove the Civil Act of South Korea, whose
existence was again attested to by Chin Hyun Yong, who, to reiterate, was
not the legal custodian thereof from South Korea.
ISSUE
1. Whether the foreign divorce decree and the national law of Woo Namsun recognizing
his capacity to obtain divorce were proven during trial; and
2. Assuming the foreign divorce decree and the national law of Woo Namsun were not
proven, whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for reception of
evidence.
RULING
1. NO
The evidence to prove the judgment of divorce and the divorce law of South Korea does
not conform with the requirements of Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
As the foreign divorce decree allegedly issued by the Seoul Family Court, as well as the
Civil Act of South Korea purports to be official acts of a sovereign authority, they may be
established by complying with the requirements of Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
The Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications; or (2) copies attested by
the officer having legal custody of the documents. Should the copies of official records
be proven to be stored outside of the Philippines, they must be (1) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (2) authenticated
by the seal of his office. If copies are offered into evidence, the attestation: (1) must
state that it is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof; and (2) must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under such seal of said court.
In Fujiki v. Marinay, this Court further enunciated that "a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage." It is outside
of the province of Philippine courts to conclude what the foreign laws are, under which
the foreign judgment was rendered; neither can they substitute their judgment on the
status, condition, and legal capacity of the foreign citizen under the jurisdiction of
another State. Necessarily, Philippine courts may only recognize such foreign judgment
as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements.
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented notarized copies of the said judgment
with both English and Korean translations. Attached thereto is a letter of confirmation by
the Embassy of the Republic of South Korea in the Philippines, which was signed by
Chin Hyun Yong, as counselor and consul, as well as an Authentication Certificate by
the DF A. This Court cannot deny the insufficiency of the evidence presented. While
Chin Hyun Yong may be a counselor or consul of South Korea, his capacity as such
cannot be construed by this Court to mean that he is an officer having legal custody of
the judgment of divorce.
On the other hand, to prove the law of South Korea as a fact, petitioner offered in
evidence a copy of the Civil Act of South Korea, a letter of confirmation from the
Embassy of the Republic of South Korea in the Philippines, and an Authentication
Certificate from the DF A. The law suffers the sa1ne fate as the judgment. Aside from
being authenticated by Chin Hyun Yong, who to reiterate, is in no position to ensure its
existence, there is no implication that the signature appearing thereon is genuine.
2. YES.
The case may be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and the
reception of additional evidence.
the validity of the judgment of divorce and the existence of the pertinent laws of South
Korea are indubitably questions of fact, as it necessitates a reevaluation of the evidence
presented before the courts a quo. In no uncertain terms, it has been repeatedly held
that such questions of fact are clearly beyond the ambit of a petition for review on
certiorari. so in such a petition, the Court may only entertain questions of law, as
jurisdiction over factual questions has been devolved to the trial courts as a matter of
efficiency and practicality in the administration of justice.
this Court agrees with petitioner and deems it appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence. Given that petitioner's marital
and family life is at stake, this Court finds no reason to withhold exercising liberality.

In Re: Ordaneza vs. Republic,

G.R. No. 254484 November 24, 2021
CARANDANG, J.:
FACTS
Janevic Orteza Ordaneza assailed the decision of the CA through a Petition for Review
on Certiorarl under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The CA ruled that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 108. The
CA explained that since the end sought to be achieved in the petition was the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the Civil Registry (i.e., change of civil status
from "married" to "single"), Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 108 should strictly be observed.
The CA noted that the petition should have been filed in the RTC where the Civil
Registry in which the entry sought to be cancelled or corrected is located, Pasay City,
and not Kidapawan City. The Local Civil Registrar, the Civil Registrar General, and other
parties who would be affected by the grant of a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries were also not impleaded.
The CA also held that there was no compliance with the requirements under Article 26
of the Family Code. The CA pointed out that while the Japanese law on divorce
provides that a husband and wife may divorce by agreement, the Japanese husband's
capacity to remarry was not sufficiently established. There was nothing in the copy of
the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan that Janevic submitted that states that the
Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry once the divorce decree is obtained.
Janevic argues that the main action of her petition is the recognition of the foreign
judgment on divorce that she and her Japanese husband validly obtained. While the
Petition specifically prayed that her civil status be changed from "married" to "single,"
she insists that this is merely incidental to her main prayer of judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE
1. Whether the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce should be treated as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108; and
2. Whether Janevic sufficiently established that her foreign divorce decree complied
with the requirements of Article 26.
RULING
1. NO
Janevic's petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce decree should not be treated
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,
the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registrv ~ one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entrv under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact
The import of the recent rulings of the Court is that there is more than one remedy to
judicially recognize a foreign divorce decree in the Philippines and availing one remedy
does not automatically preclude the institution of another remedy.
Here, it is clear from the prayer that Janevic intended to cancel or correct her civil status
entry in the civil registry aside from the judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The
cancellation or correction of her civil status cannot be done through a petition for
recognition under Article 26 (2) without complying with the requirements of Rule 108.
An individual seeking the change of his or her civil status must adhere to the
requirements governing a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108.
While the change in Janevic's civil status is an expected consequence of the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce, it does not automatically follow that the Petition she
filed is the petition contemplated under Rule 108.

2. NO
The foreign law capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry must be proven as a fact
during trial and in accordance with the Rules.
Here, Janevic was able to prove the Japanese law permitting her and Masayoshi to
obtain a divorce by agreement. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code of Japan that
was properly presented during trial states: Article 763. A husband and wife may divorce
by agreement.
While Janevic was able to allege and prove as a fact the divorce by agreement and the
Japanese law supporting its validity, the OSG insists that the provision of the Civil Code
of Japan capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry was not properly alleged and
proven in accordance with the Rules.
Janevic alleged in her petition, though not properly presented and proven during trial,
that there are restrictions to remarrying in Japan but these restrictions apply only to
women, and not the male foreign spouse. Similar to the case of Racho, the fact remains
that the divorce by agreement severed the marital relationship between the spouses
and the Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry. Moreover, the official document
Janevic submitted to prove the fact of divorce, the Divorce Notification, did not indicate
any restriction on the capacity of either spouse to remarry. Therefore, the Court deems it
prudent to adopt its ruling in Racho, which involved the same foreign law, in holding that
the capacity to remarry of the foreign spouse had been established.

Accordingly, the petition of Janevic is granted only insofar as her foreign divorce decree
by agreement is recognized. The other relief prayed for, that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single" cannot begiven due course and awarded in this pet1t1on. This
ruling is without· prejudice to the filing of a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in compliance with the requirements outlined in Rule 108 where the appropriate
adversarial proceeding may be conducted.
 Arts. 27-34
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were “separated.”
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
affidavit.
ISSUE
Whether or not legal separation is included in “without legal impediment to marry”
RULING
NO.

Article 34 of the Family Code on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties
must have no legal impediment to marry each other, 3. The fact of absence of legal
impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties
must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
are without legal impediment to marry
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that
in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent
Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
“separated.”
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. The
fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a
long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who
have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This
holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven
years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at
least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license

OCA vs. Judge Necessario, et al.

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013
PER CURIAM:

FACTS
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA
reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City. Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators"
for instant marriages.
Among others, the court staffs herein required no marriage license from the parties,
their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the
marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209".
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the
documents presented to him by contracting parties. He claims that marriages he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of
cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by
other judges even before he became a judge. He avers that he ascertains the ages of
the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry. He also
asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents
of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the argument of Judge Necessario is tenable.
RULING
NO.
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period
of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the
marriage.
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The
actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the
required documents and qualifications.

De Castro vs. Assidao-De Castro

G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
City. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995
stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and
did not live together as husband and wife.
respondent gave birth to a child. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner. In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has “reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her “as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
child.”
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void
ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and
that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child
ISSUE
1. whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
2. whether or not the marriage between the parties was validly celebrated without the
required marriage license.
RULING
1. YES.
The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.
2. NO
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had
been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The aim of Art. 34 of the Family Code is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no “scandalous
cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
Thus, failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab
initio.