I.

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
A. Police Power
Pasei v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958| June 30, 1988
Police Power - Deployment Ban

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI,for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges
the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1. The measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills. Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING
THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS

DOCTRINE: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of
(1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property,
(2) in order to foster the common good

ADDITIONAL NOTES: What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women
domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case.

Ichong v. Hernandez
G.R. No.L-7995| May 31, 1957
Police Power - Business licenses

Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180 Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1)
a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging
directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens
actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless
their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law.

DOCTRINE: the SC held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic
independence is none of less legitimate.

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 Lutz v. Araneta
G.R. No.L-7859| December 22, 1955
Police Power - Exercised through taxation

This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of the taxes
imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. due to the threat
to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffie
Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; wherefore, the
national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by
the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the
eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the
export taxes."

Section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of
sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactures.

Section 6. All collections made under this Act shall accrue to a special fund in the Philippine Treasury, to
be known as the 'Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund,' and shall be paid out only for any
or all of the following purposes or to attain any or all of the following objectives, as may be provided by
law

DOCTRINE: Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for
in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly
of section 6 will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an
exercise of the police power.

Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419 | December 18, 1986
Police Power - B.P. 22

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." An essential element of the offense is
"knowledge"

DOCTRINE: BP 22 addresses the problem directly and frontally and makes the act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting
them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law.

The police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been
cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the
police power of the state.

Checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day
and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and
therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The

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mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest.

DECS v. San Diego

G.R. No. 89572 | December 21, 1981
Police Power - NMAT Regulation

“A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) for the fourth time”

The private respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego (San Diego) is a graduate of the University of the East
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The San Diego claims that he took the NMAT three times
and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule

DOCTRINE: The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every
citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.

The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.

Police power is validly exercised if:

(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and

(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

ADDITIONAL NOTES: the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74457| March 20, 1987
Police Power - Carabeef Regulation

Ynot in effect challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A the then President Marcos
had given an order prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of the Executive Order as amended was subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos

DOCTRINE: The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing. considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there.

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The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio where a law
regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of
property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The
conviction was affirmed.

Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta

G.R. No. L-34915 | June 24, 1983
Police Power - Confiscation of Land

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 "Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not
later than six months from the date of approval of the application."

DOCTRINE: Police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation
of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general
welfare.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: It is not police power but an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain

B. Power of Eminent Domain

Association of Small Land Owners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742 | July 14, 1989
Eminent Domain - Agrarian Reform

Title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, that the assailed
measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected

DOCTRINE: the requirements for a proper exercise of the power of eminent domain are: (1) public use
and (2) just compensation.

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There is compensable taking when:
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of
value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment
in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who
can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time."

Manila Memorial vs. Secretary of DSWD

G.R. No. 175356 | December 3, 2013
Eminent Domain - Senior Citizen Discount

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension.

DOCTRINE: The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution
affords preferential concern. The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally
regarded as police power measures.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: SC sustains ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation that the 20% senior citizen
discount and tax deduction scheme are valid exercises of police power of the State absent a clear showing
that it is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila

G.R. No. 14355 | October 31, 1919
Eminent Domain - LGU Exercise of Power

The courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an-issue
properly presented, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact,
for some public use. The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it.

DOCTRINE: Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a
case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity
for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, and the
consequent necessity of taking the lands selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.

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But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how much may be taken, then the
necessity of taking private property is a question for the courts.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground
can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. The city of Manila is not authorized to
expropriate public property.

Republic of the Philippines v. PLDT

G.R. No. L-18841 |January 27, 1969
Eminent Domain - Trunklines

It is unquestionable that the real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of
right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different.

DOCTRINE: The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: when the Bureau of Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant
knew or should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all embracing in
nature and the acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, implies assent by the defendant
to such extended use. To uphold the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to
the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive
franchise.

People v. Fajardo
G.R. No. L-12172 | August 29, 1958
Eminent Domain - Local Ordinance

The State may not, under guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community

Where an ordinance of a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit
the mayor's action; expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no conditions
for its grant or refusal; and entirely lacks standards thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful.

DOCTRINE: however, the power of the municipal council in this case, to require the issuance of building
permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds
of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this
case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards
for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance
in question. Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was
beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: A valid ordinance cannot contravene the laws or the constitution.

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 Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi
G.R. No. L-20620 | August 15, 1974
Eminent Domain - When does taking take place?

'Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property
for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a
public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."

As a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to
the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the
community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (just compensation)

DOCTRINE: Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, or from the moment of taking whichever comes first.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: See the requisites of taking in Association of Small Land Owners vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform

Amigable v. Cuenca
G.R. No. L-26400 | February 29, 1972
Eminent Domain - How to determine just compensation

Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through
the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
without its consent.

As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession
of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it has
been and is now being used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago.

The owner of the land is entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government.

DOCTRINE: To determine the due compensation for the land appropriated by the Government, the basis
should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The just compensation is based on the fair market value of the property to be
expropriated during the time of the taking or expropriation complaint whichever comes first, which is
based on the price the owner offers and the price the government is willing to pay.

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 Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119694 | May 22, 1995
Eminent Domain - Print Space

The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space
at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes.

DOCTRINE: The unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the
power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec
must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. . . . Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain
ADDITIONAL NOTES: To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2722 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private
personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation.

The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory "donation,"
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in
non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.

An expropriation complaint shall state with certainty

1. The right and purpose of the expropriation. (must be for public use)
2. Describe the real or personal property to be expropriated

Sumulong vs. Guerrero

G.R. No. L-48685 | September 30, 1987
Eminent Domain - Socialized Housing

The use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The
lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to
provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.

DOCTRINE: Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare.
The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be
occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:

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 Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 106440 | January 29, 1996
Eminent Domain - Felix Manalo

The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late
Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation
of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use

DOCTRINE: public use' is one which confers some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many
members of public, a 'public advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.

But each and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and
directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.

It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a
particular individual.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation
of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

EPZA vs. Dulay

G.R. No. L-59603 | April 29, 1987
Eminent Domain - Commissioner Appointment

the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of
1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.

DOCTRINE: The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: 'The owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating
authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by
the province, plus consequential damages — including attorney's fees — from which the consequential
benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the
owner from and after the date of actual taking.'

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 Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corp
G.R. No. 127820 | July 20, 1998
Eminent Domain - Ordinance requirement

A local government unit, like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and
clearly requires an ordinance or a law for the purpose.

DOCTRINE: Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down
the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows: "Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government
unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: . . .

ADDITIONAL NOTES: 'A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint for expropriation which
was based on a mere resolution.

The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise
the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata.

Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone
of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.

NPC v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. L-60077 | Jan 18 1991
Eminent Domain - Right of way Easement

While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed.

DOCTRINE: The acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme
Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.

The easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Petitioner NPC only sought an easement of right-of-way, and the power of eminent
domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator. Which entitles the owner
to fair and full just compensation even though the property is just condemned for public use.

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 Sps Cabahug v. NPC
G.R. No. 186069 | January 30 2013
Eminent Domain - Right of way Easement

Where the right of way easement, as in this case, similarly involves transmission lines which not only
endangers life and limb but restricts as well the owner's use of the land traversed thereby

It has been ruled that the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if, as
here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights
through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the
property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or increase
the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary.

DOCTRINE: Sps. Cabahug were given legal interest since,The landowners are entitled to the payment of
legal interest on the compensation for the subject lands from the time of the taking of their possession up
to the time that full payment is made by petitioner. . In accordance with jurisprudence, the legal interest
allowed in payment of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use is six percent (6%) per
annum.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial
function and no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's findings.

Measured not by the taker's gain but the owner's loss, just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.

C. Power of Taxation

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

G.R. No. L4817 | May 26 1954
Taxation - Feeder Roads

Where the land on which projected feeder roads are to be constructed belongs to a private person, an
appropriation made by Congress for that purpose is null and void, and a donation to the Government,
made over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of the Act for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality" to the appropriation, does not cure the basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation

The projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the
main highway"; that is the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision.

DOCTRINE: Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private
interests, and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of
public money."

"It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenues for anything but a
public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion

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ADDITIONAL NOTES: The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although such advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.

Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila

G.R. No. L4817 | May 26 1954
Taxation - Double Taxation

Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing
it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation
tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law
authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax
on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under
section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance
No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing
it.

DOCTRINE: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its
discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for
the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside
from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political
departments.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state
and the political subdivisions thereof.

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

GR No. L-19201| June 16 1965
Taxation - Exemption from tax

In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality as
intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donor’s gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner issued an
assessment for donee’s gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the assessment and
requested the withdrawal thereof.

DOCTRINE: The phrase “exempt from taxation” should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all
kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property
taxes as distinguished from excise taxes.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: A donee’s gift tax is not a property tax but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos (while living). It does not rest upon general ownership, but an excise
upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of receiving the properties. The
imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of
the Constitution.

12
 Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-39086| June 15 1988
Taxation - Tax Exemption Lease of First Floor

The residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of
incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose — educational, the lease of the
first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.

The school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of
the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor
thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

DOCTRINE: The term "used exclusively" considers incidental use also. The tax exemption in favor of
property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually
indispensable' therefor but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, 'a school for training nurses, a nurses'
home, property used to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other
members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents

ADDITIONAL NOTES: reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated
by law, nor by jurisprudence. the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation
cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.

Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta

130 SCRA at 661
Taxation - Reasonable Classification

Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that its provision (Section 1) unduly
discriminated against him by the imposition of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it
amounts to class legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

DOCTRINE: The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity,
similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause and
is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories, such as recipients of
compensation income as against professionals.

13
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make deductions for income
tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead expense, while professionals and businessmen have no
uniform costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. There is ample justification to adopt the
gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income
taxation as regards professional and business income.

Tolentino v. Sec of Finance

GR No. 115455 | Aug 25 1994
Taxation - VAT as a necessary tax measure

Congress enacted RA No. 7716, which sought to widen the tax base of the existing Value Added Tax (VAT)
system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

The VAT is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of service. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.

Several petitioners, including Arturo Tolentino, Raul Roco, the IBP, the Philippine Press Institute, PAL,
Kilosbayan, and Liwayway Chato, among others, challenged the constitutionality of said law.

DOCTRINE: Contrary to petitioners' assertion that RA 7716 is regressive, the SC held that the law in fact
distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those which are within
the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: A tax measure, like the expanded VAT law, is enacted by Congress and approved
by the President in the exercise of the State's power to tax, which is an attribute of sovereignty. And
while the power to tax, if exercised without limit, is a power to destroy, and should, therefore, not be
allowed in such form, it has to be equally recognized that the power to tax is an essential right of
government. Without taxes, basic services to the people can come to a halt; economic progress will be
stunted, and, in the long run, the people will suffer the pains of stagnation and retrogression.

PPI v. Fertiphil Corporation

G.R. No. 1660066| March 14 2008
Taxation - Tax for a Private entity

In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was
an invalid exercise of the State's power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and
constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount
collected under the levy was remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the latter used to
advance its private interest.

The method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the
public welfare. The government's commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued
viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute's
impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the
general interest of the country's farmers or even the Filipino people in general

14
DOCTRINE: To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived
from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private
individuals.

There are two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the
constitutional limitations.
1. The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose.
2. Taxes may not be levied for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for
the redress of private wrongs.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private
company. The levy was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the
LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote the general
welfare of the people or public interest

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co.

51 SCRA 189
Taxation - Human Rights above Property Rights

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front
of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about about PBMEO's plans, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. called for a meeting with the
leaders of the union. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by PBMEO, which
noted that the demonstration was not a strike against the company. PBMEO stated that the planned
demonstration was an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances against police indignities.

The company asked PBMEO to cancel the demonstration, noting that the same would constitute an
interruption of the normal course of their business which may result in loss of revenue. The company also
threatened the workers that they would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the demonstration.

A second meeting took place where the company stressed that those from the 1st and regular shifts should
not absent themselves to participate in the demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed.

The officers of PBMEO were eventually dismissed by the company for violation of the "No Strike and No
Lockout" clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

DOCTRINE: The company’s contention that it would suffer loss by reason of the absence of the employees
from 6 AM – 2 PM is a plea for the preservation of merely their property rights. While the Bill of Rights
protects property rights, human rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and petition, are
supreme over property rights. Infringement on human right requires a more stringent criterion for
validation, as compared to impairment of property rights.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact
that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

15
 Simon v. CHR
G.R. No. 100150| Jan 5, 1994
Taxation - Tax for a Private entity

In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was
an invalid exercise of the State's power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and
constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for public purposes. It reasoned out that the amount
collected under the levy was remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the latter used to
advance its private interest.

The method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the
public welfare. The government's commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued
viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt to mask the subject statute's
impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the
general interest of the country's farmers or even the Filipino people in general

DOCTRINE: To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived
from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private
individuals.

There are two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the
constitutional limitations.
3. The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose.
4. Taxes may not be levied for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for
the redress of private wrongs.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private
company. The levy was imposed to pay the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the
LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote the general
welfare of the people or public interest

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003.
Interregnum

Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government
following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum

DOCTRINE: the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

16
An interregnum is a period of discontinuity or "gap" in a government, organization, or social order

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,
assumed responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is
a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant
(Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence." The Declaration (the Universal Declaration of Human)
Rights,to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.

II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Banco Espanol v. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, JMarch 26, 1918.
Procedural Due Process - Acquiring Jurisdiction

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives out of the Islands and refuses to appear otherwise
submit himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the mortgaged
property, with respect to which the jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the property is
located within the district and that the court, under the provisions of law applicable in such cases, is
vested with the power to subject the property to the obligation created by the mortgage. In such case
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is nonessential and in fact cannot be acquired.

The failure of the clerk to send notice by mail to the nonresident defendant in a foreclosure proceeding,
as required by an order of the court, does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court over the mortgaged
property.

DOCTRINE: due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely;

1. There must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
2. jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in
every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts,
it is evident that the actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.

17
The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity
for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly
unreasonable to hold that the failure to mail the notice was fatal.

Galvez v. CA
G.R. No. L-11390, JMarch 26, 1918.
Procedural Due Process - Dismissal

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11

DOCTRINE: It is a general rule that dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before
he is called on to plead is not equivalent to an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense. A dismissal is different from an acquittal. Furthermore, an acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance. For dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the
effect of acquittal.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new
informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it
affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.

Galvez v. CA
G.R. No. L-11390, JMarch 26, 1918.
Procedural Due Process - Dismissal

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11

DOCTRINE: It is a general rule that dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before
he is called on to plead is not equivalent to an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent prosecution
for the same offense. A dismissal is different from an acquittal. Furthermore, an acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance. For dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the
effect of acquittal.

18
ADDITIONAL NOTES: Such dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.
Since jeopardy had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not prejudiced by the filing of the new
informations even though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not yet become final. Neither did it
affect the jurisdiction of the court in the subsequent case.

State Prosecutors v. Muro

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918.
Procedural Due Process - Newspaper announcement

Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila basing his Order/decision on
a mere newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of lifting
or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as
he has no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution,
dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard on the matter.

DOCTRINE: Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not
the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.

Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. the fact remains that he
gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of
the accused. to repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. More
importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the
President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should dismiss the
cases

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in
criminal cases is denied due process. . . .

19
 Carvajal v. CA
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918.
Procedural Due Process - Newspaper announcement

The petitioner Carvajal was afforded an opportunity to present witnesses and he did present three.
However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness stand even when the trial court ordered
the submission of the parties' memoranda which signified the termination of the proceedings. Because he
acquiesced to a the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the witness stand

DOCTRINE: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity
that is repugnant to due process, the client is generally bound by the acts of his counsel Petitioner has
not shown at all that his previous counsel had acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive
him of effective representation, or of due process.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: It has been held that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence with respect to
the It has been held that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein and other matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration
proceedings.

Perez v. Estrada
AM. No. OI-4-O3-SC, Sept. 13, 2001.
Procedural Due Process - Media in Court Trial

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Supreme Court believed that there should be an
audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but
for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan
shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains.

DOCTRINE: By delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the
proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of
their roles the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases
can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court
of justice can render its own will be avoided

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Elaborated that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor
of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled
to information, and live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

20
 Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635

Procedural Due Process - Requirements in Administrative Cases

The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision.

DOCTRINE: There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
administrative character:
1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented

3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.

4. the evidence must be "substantial." (Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.")

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6. Tribunal must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision

7. Tribunal in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Elaborated that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor
of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled
to information, and live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.

Summary Dismissal v. Torcita

330 SCRA 153
Administrative proceeding -

The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative hearings before the Summary
Dismissal Board of the PNP. These complaints were consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct
unbecoming of a police officer". Notably, the question lies whether the conviction of an offense for which
he was not charged constitute a violation of the procedural due process of law.

Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita
was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged.

21
DOCTRINE: Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of notification of
the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and
the filing of an answer, together with supporting documents. However, notification of the charges
contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to
know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could
traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is
not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court

Office of the Ombudsman v. Coronel

493 SCRA 392
Administrative proceeding - Substantial evidence

In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present
case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to
show that the respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is
inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.

SC found the evidence presented by the complainant insufficient to support his serious charge that she
was dishonest. The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of the original Official Receipt (OR) No.
0736, and a photocopy of the original duplicate of that receipt.

DOCTRINE: In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence; that is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theory
that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed
been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not
carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.

Sec. of Justice v. Lantion

343 SCRA 377
Administrative proceeding - Extradition

As a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty, private respondent contended that he should
be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting documents even
while he is still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice.

22
DOCTRINE: The constitutional right of an extraditee as granted by the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked
when the extradition documents are still in the evaluation stage. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceeding. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers
are still undergoing evaluation.

Private respondent's plea for due process . . . collides with important state interests which cannot also be
ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority.

Gov!t of USA v. Puruganan

GR 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
Administrative proceeding -

DOCTRINE:

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

C. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

Gov!t of USA v. Puruganan

GR 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
Administrative proceeding -

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enroll."

Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, as students, have the right among others "to freely
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation, except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."

Petitioners were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in violation of the
admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that "(n)o penalty shall be imposed upon any

23
student except for cause as defined in . . . (the) Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.

DOCTRINE: The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.

D. DEPORTATION

Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756

Deportation Proceeding - Proof required

While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to require an
alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so
required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a
previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and
required to register as aliens.

DOCTRINE:Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to
determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Under Section 37 (c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended, it is provided:

"c" No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without
being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration."

E. FIXING OF RATES AND REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS

24
 Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218

Procedural Due Process - Temporary rates

(Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications
does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, the questioned order violates
procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction
it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.

Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety,
public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.

DOCTRINE: While respondents NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, . . . which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service; . . . .

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion.

Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31

Procedural Due Process - Regulation of Professions

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation.
Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire
at the end of that period.

DOCTRINE: pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law

As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process,
are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the
performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them
to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right.

25
 F. DISMISSALS, SUSPENSIONS, REINSTATEMENT, ETC
G. CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
H. VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31

Procedural Due Process - Void for Vagueness Plunder

The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained.

DOCTRINE: "void-for-vagueness" doctrine - The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld.

Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31

Procedural Due Process - Void for Vagueness Plunder

The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the
acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained.

DOCTRINE: "void-for-vagueness" doctrine - The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to

26
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld.

Southern Hemisphere et al v. Anti-Terrorism Council

Procedural Due Process - Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth

the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

Vagueness - A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:

(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and

(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle

Overbreadth doctrine - meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms

DOCTRINE: the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing
to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases Under no case may
ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Supreme Court reminded the litigants that judicial power neither
contemplates speculative counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

People v. De la Piedra 350 SCRA 163

Procedural Due Process - Insufficient Charge

A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished
is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between
the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. . . . In
this case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms were
embraced by the definition of "recruitment and placement" that would render the same constitutionally
overbroad.

27
DOCTRINE: A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group

Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information — Araneta, Modesto
and Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as
among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment and
placement of persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee
would violate her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was
offered, and the purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not include the proving of the purported
recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.

The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduced the
penalty imposed upon her.

III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

United States v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85

Substantive Due Process - Requisites

The prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food,
even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously
affected.

branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, All this, manifestly, in order
to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain them in his possession or to
dispose of them to others

DOCTRINE: Substantive due process requires a lawful object attained through lawful means which is
reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive.
ADDITIONAL NOTES: This is different from Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court because it does not
prohibit the slaughtering of large cattle but regulates it, through a reasonable means to achieve its lawful
objective.

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 Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Substantive Due Process -

Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.

Considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal.

DOCTRINE: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same
would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated.

Churchill v. Rafferty

Substantive Due Process -

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed
upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the
provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and
are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.”

DOCTRINE: It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe
regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the
community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law.”

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Balacuit v. CFI

Substantive Due Process - Price reduction

29
Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal
Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to
minors from 7-12 years old.

DOCTRINE: There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The
petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur
is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for
both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally
voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is
also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the
contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he
pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or
other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the
state constitution securing the right of property.

Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD

Substantive Due Process - Price reduction

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”

Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of
twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property.

DOCTRINE: the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners
and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the
active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related

ADDITIONAL NOTES: A tax credit scheme under the Philippine tax system, necessitates that prior
payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from
his/her income tax due

Under R.A. No. 9257, on the other hand, provides that the establishment concerned may claim the
discounts under Section 4 (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction from gross income, based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered.

30
 NDCNA v. PVB

Substantive Due Process - Credit

The public interest supposedly involved is not identified or explained. It has not been shown that by the
creation of the New Agrix, Inc. and the extinction of the property rights of the creditors of AGRIX, the
interests of the public as a whole, as distinguished from those of a particular class, would be promoted or
protected. The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater number has not been established. On the
contrary, it would appear that the decree was issued only to favor a special group of investors who, for
reasons not given, have been preferred to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX

DOCTRINE: The oppressiveness is patent on the face of the decree. The right to property in all mortgages,
liens, interests, penalties and charges owing to the creditors of AGRIX is arbitrarily destroyed. No
consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued interests and other charges
are simply rejected by the decree. The right to property is dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to
the private interest violated and, worse, in favor of another private interest.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the
protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested
rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to
another without just compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not
permitted under the constitution.

AgustIn v. Edu

Substantive Due Process -

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning
device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles
without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety.

DOCTRINE: The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no
unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to
promote public safety.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was
no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the

31
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255

Substantive Due Process - PAGCOR

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy
embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to the
operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.

The PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved
as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.

DOCTRINE: Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

Requisites for a valid ordinance:

1. Must not contravene the constitution or a statute

2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. May not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy
6. Must not be unreasonable

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Corona v. UHPAP

Substantive Due Process -

Phil. Ports Authority General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92, which put a one-year cap on
all appointments to all harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts. This meant that all pilots shall be
subject to an annual performance review to determine whether or not their employment will be renewed.

On August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92, which specified the criteria to be used
in the annual performance reviews.

Prior to the issuance of the AO and MO, all duly licensed pilots had security of tenure until they reach the
mandatory age of retirement (70), unless at any point they have been found to be physically or mentally
unfit.

32
DOCTRINE: In order for an act to qualify as a deprivation of another party's right to due process, two
conditions must concur: (a) there is a deprivation, and (b) such deprivation is carried out without proper
observance of due process. Both of these conditions are present in this case.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Difference between procedural and substantive due process: the former refers to
the "method or manner by which the law is enforced," while the latter "requires that the law itself, not
merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just."

IV. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Valmonte v. General de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665

Search and Seizure - Checkpoint

A routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without
interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during
which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited
to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search.

DOCTRINE: A warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas
of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public
interest, safety, and necessity. a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival
and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it
is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 62

Search and Seizure - Saturation drives

Are the saturation drives in question lawful and legitimate? No, because the arrests were not accompanied
by a judicial warrant. Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination
with Tondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness, will not validate them.
The lack of a warrant makes them, per se, illegal.

"Saturation drive", "zoning", or "zona" - (as used in the vernacular) are unofficial terms describing the
military or police operation in which an area is cordoned off while the homes within are searched and
suspects arrested.

33
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper arrest or
search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him, in which case, action is
justified and necessary. The majority would have the exception to be simply, the general rule.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

People vs. Andre Marti

Search and Seizure -

Andre Marti, was charged with violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti,
with his common-law wife, went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes
alleged to contain books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland. The
husband of attendant Anita Reyes, Mr. Job Reyes, opened the boxes for inspection as part of the SOP
before delivery to the Bureau of Customs. Reyes discovered bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves allegedly marijuana.

The trial court convicted Marti for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11
and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

In his appeal, Marti argues the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and
3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.

DOCTRINE: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: “This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure)refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

Bache and Co. v. Ruiz

Search and Seizure -

Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, and authorizing a Revenue Examiner to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter. Whether a corporation is entitled to protection against
unreasonable search and seizure?

34
DOCTRINE: A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such a body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded
against by due process of law, and is protected against unlawful discrimination.

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Search and Seizure -

No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed
specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws

DOCTRINE: a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. no warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of
these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrant.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: “This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure)refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

A. PROBABLE CAUSE

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Search and Seizure - Probable Cause

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that
there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as money- lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of
the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles in question, which he did.

but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue

35
DOCTRINE: The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: “This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure)refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

B. PERSONAL DETERMINATION

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1988)

Search and Seizure - Meaning of Personal Determination

The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.

DOCTRINE: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: “This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure)refers to the
immunity of one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

C. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION

D. WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

36
 People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)

Search and Seizure - flight leading to probable cause

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

DOCTRINE: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a private person

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

E. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)

Search and Seizure - Plain view doctrine

The NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the
bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their
"plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed
that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.

DOCTRINE: The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It has also been suggested
that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and
found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when

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they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of
the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag

F. STOP AND FRISK

People v. Solayao

Stop and frisk - Meaning of Personal Determinatio

He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group. After SPO3 Niño
told the accused appellant not to run away, the former identified himself as a government agent. The
peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm.

DOCTRINE: As with Posadas, where this Court ruled that the search and seizure brought about by the
suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable
cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made. . . ., this case constitutes an instance
where a search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to
"stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: while the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was
seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license
or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized
to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish
the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence, like a certification
from the government agency concerned."

G. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES

Papa v. Mago

Search of moving vehicles

Acting upon reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port and loaded on two
trucks, police officers intercepted and seized said trucks.

DOCTRINE: Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.

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ADDITIONAL NOTES: The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203
of theTariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure,warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or a person on board, or to stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant insaid cases.

People v. Sapla

Search of moving vehicles

An unnamed officer at the Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text
message from an informant (concerned citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from
Kalinga to Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the text message) then relayed the
information to the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA. Based on this information, a
checkpoint was organized by the PNP.

The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they saw the person described in the text message
they received. They approached said person and asked him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The
person answered yes. The police officers then requested the person to open the blue sack. The person
hesitated but he eventually complied. The content of the blue sack was four bricks of marijuana.

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip is not sufficient to
engender probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his senses. The
police officer must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with his/her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely
on the information passed on to him/her.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter
how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

H. EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

People v. De Gracia

Emergency Circumstances

Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a
brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at EDSA, together with his
team and was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said
establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. After
a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.

39
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought
cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.

Whether in a state of emergency circumstances exist, the arrest of the accused involved in rebellious act
is valid without securing an arrest and search warrant.

DOCTRINE: Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.

I. CHECKPOINTS

Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988 May 24, 1990

Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain

DOCTRINE: as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to
a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Aniag v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)

Search and Seizure - Compliance with Comelec regulation

Only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver
Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen
conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have
marshaled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle.
In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.

DOCTRINE: An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting
the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a
law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a
crime in the vehicle to be searched.

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ADDITIONAL NOTES: It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their
locations, and the reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor
did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its
operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason
behind the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the
motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny.

J. WARRANTLESS ARREST

Espano v. Court of Appeals

Warrantless Arrest - Flagrante Delicto

The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and Pandacan
Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of drug pushing.
The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there found with him 2
tea bags of Marijuana.

Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he
got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana.

DOCTRINE: Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police
officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.

People vs. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 109633, July 20, 1994]
Warrantless Arrest - buy bust

Veneracion Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a
marked 100 bill and then returned to the police station and informed the raiding team that he had already
bought the shabu from accused-appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of
accused-appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the prosecution is highly incredible.
The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers did not make any attempt to arrest accused
appellant at the time he allegedly sold the shabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by another
police officer

The version foisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary to human experience in the ordinary
course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police officers to arrest

41
the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the
every reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust" operation

DOCTRINE: — The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and
seizure of ".. the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu
and its paraphernalia Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularly, in the search warrant. Neither
may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accused-appellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the
same is not admissible in evidence.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Stonehill vs. Diokno. The Constitution expressly ordains the exclusion in evidence of
illegally seized articles. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.(Section 3 [2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines).

Umil vs. Ramos

Warrantless Arrest - Subversion

the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot
wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a
member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.

As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.”

DOCTRINE: Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense.

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 Webb v. De Leon 247 SCRA 652

Arrest Warrant Preliminary investigation

The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the
investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it
is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront
and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence

DOCTRINE: The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by
no less than Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. The aforequoted provision deals with the
requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance of warrants of arrest and search
warrants

In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence:

1. that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and
2. that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular
person be implicated.

in arrest cases there must be

1. probable cause that a crime has been committed and

2. that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any
3. showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control

ADDITIONAL NOTES: With respect to warrants of arrest, Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon
filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In
contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is more defined.

Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence

People vs. Rodrigueza

Warrantless Arrest -

A confidential informant told the police officers that there is an on-going illegal traffic of prohibited drugs
therein Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct buy-bust operation. CIC Taduran acted as poseur buyer
and was able to buy 100grams of marijuana from appellant. The CIC Taduran reported to Major Zeidem
that he was able to purchase marijuana. Based on the information they have formed a team to apprehend

43
appellant. The Officers were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the
three accused.

In some instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even
without a search warrant

1. when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion;
2. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
3. when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws;
4. when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws;
5. when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or
6. in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations, a search may be validly made even without a search warrant

The raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any
search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases.
Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for
quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily
could, have first secured a search warrant during that time

DOCTRINE: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto
requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or
any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Go. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992

Arrest Warrant Preliminary investigation

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected
"when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover,
none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the
gunman who had shot Maguan

DOCTRINE: Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

“Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information

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may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation

ADDITIONAL NOTES: Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police
Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication
he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.

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