Thesesdissertations 5837 OBJ

IN SECURITY: HOW POST 9/11 U.S.
DOMESTIC ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY HAS
IMPACTED THE SAFETY AND IDENTITY OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA
By
Fait Atli Muedini
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
In
International Affairs
Chair:
Julfe M ertus
Paul Williams
D ean Louis W. G oodm an
ate
. I 2srdC
2006
American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
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© COPYRIGHT
by
FAIT ATLI MUEDINI
2006
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
DEDICATION
To Atli and Myxhever Muedini
Whose immigration to the United States and a life of work allowed me the
privilege to attend and finish college.
To Kaltrina:
For your love, support, encouragement and patience during this entire process.
IN SECURITY: HOW POST 9/11 U.S. DOMESTIC ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY
HAS IMPACTED THE SAFETY AND IDENTIY OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA
BY
Fait Atli Muedini
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact U.S. domestic anti-terrorism security
policies following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 have had on the feelings of
safety and identity amongst Muslims in America, and in turn overall Muslim
identity in relation to the international system. The Bush administration
implemented policies such as the PATRIOT Act in order to protect the United
States, and in turn make Americans feel safer. This has been done, however, at the
expense of the civil liberties of Muslims in America. The alienation of Muslims in
America has resulted in a closeness amongst Muslims, and in particular the
Muslim American youth, who have been alienated by the non-Muslim American
society. These feels of insecurity have Muslims in America re-examining their
individual and communal identity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to begin by thanking The Creator, for without The One God, none
of this would even be possible. I am so grateful for life. I would like to give great
thanks to my committee members, professor Julie Mertus and professor Paul
Williams for their advice and guidance during this process. They have always been
there to discuss any issues I had pertaining to my thesis topic. I would also like to
thank Professor Christos Kyrou for his wisdom and knowledge about life, in addition
to the hours spent discussing my research interests. I would like to thank my mentor,
the late Dr. Feinstein, for teaching me about much more than just politics, for
educating me through example to live life passionately for a cause. I will never forget
the way he changed our lives as students, the talks he had with us in his office, and
how he seemed to make even the most difficult political situations understandable and
manageable. I would like to thank my fiancee Kaltrina for her support and constant
love, and for motivating me to continue to work on this book day in and day out.
Without you, I would be nowhere. You are my every heartbeat. Lastly, I would like
to thank my parents Atli and Myxhever Muedini, who immigrated to this country,
leaving their lives behind in order to give me the best life possible. May God also
give credit to my parents for any of my work that may impact a life in a positive way.
For without their sacrifice; I would not have had an opportunity to expand my heart
and soul, and would have not been in a position to work to change the world.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................................................................................... iii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 1
2. RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS........................................... 4
3. CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS:
LEGITIMATE CONCERN OR HYPE?......................................................... 15
4. ISLAM AND IDENTITY................................................................................. 30
5. MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE

AMERICAN CONTEXT................................................................................. 45
6. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WESTERN MEDIA,

MUSLIMS AND ISLAM................................................................................. 59
7. ISLAM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION............................................. 77
8. POST 9/11 U.S. DOMESTIC

SECURITY POLICIES.................................................................................... 89
9. MUSLIM YOUTH IN AMERICA................................................................125
10. MUSLIM AMERICAN STUDENT RESPONSES:

FOUR YEARS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11™, 2001.................................. 135
11. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................163
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................... 168
iv
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed (and
implemented) new legislation aimed at better protecting the American Homeland (ISPU,
2004). The purpose of these new laws was to give greater power to government officials
to combat any future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. The argument is that these new
security policies will protect the United States against another attack of terrorism, and
thus making Americans feel safer (ISPU, 2004). But while the Bush Administration—
along with many other government department officials—argue that these new policies
were implemented to make Americans feel safer, the grim reality is that many of these
new laws have trampled on the civil liberties of American citizens without positively
impacting the security of the United States homeland (LCHR, 2002). Furthermore, the
post 9/11 anti-terrorism policies have extremely damaged the overall civil society in the
United States (Cainkar, 2004). The results of such policies have seemed to
disproportionately target one minority group in particular, the American Muslims, which
has led to fear and backlash in their daily lives (ISPU, 2004). Numerous human rights
reports have demonstrated the proportionate selection of Muslims as a result of these new
anti-terrorism policies.
This research aims to demonstrate how U.S. post-9/11 domestic security policies
2
have impacted the civil liberties, safety, and identity of Muslims in America, making
them feel insecure in the United States. Chapter one begins with a literature review
discussing the importance of religion in international politics. Chapter two is a literature
review of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization theory. In this chapter, I discuss
Huntington’s claim that wars will be fought along cultural lines (Huntington, 1996) by
looking at various studies in the field of international studies that have examined wars
and reasons why states go to war. Chapter three discusses the importance of identity in
human beings. I then relate individual identity to the context of Islam, examining the
notion of identity in Islam. Chapter four discusses Muslim identity specifically in the
context of Muslims in the United States. In chapter five, I examine the role U.S. foreign
policy has in shaping the sentiments of Muslims around the world and in the United
States. In this chapter, I also discuss the role Western media plays in its portrayal of
Muslims and Islam. Chapter six examines the debate within the Muslim community as to
whether political participation is permissible in Islam. Next, I discuss the political
participation of Muslims in the United States, primarily focusing on the 2000 elections
and afterwards. Chapter eight discusses the post September 11th, 2001 U.S. security
policies and their impact on the feelings of safety of Muslims in the United States.
Chapter nine discusses my findings in relation to interviews conducted with Muslim
college students in the United States. These interviews cover a number of issues, ranging
from post-September 11th U.S. domestic security policies, how the media portrays
3
Muslims, U.S. Muslim youth identity, and the relationship between the U.S. government
and Muslim Americans. I attempt to show that the United States has alienated the
Muslims in America, and must make the effort to understand the situation of Muslims in
the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. government, in order to end tensions and restore
trust between them and Muslims in America (and Muslim youth especially), must
understand the situation and concerns of Muslims in America and adequately address
their needs. I will conclude this discussion with a summary of the main points.
CHAPTER TWO
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Religion plays an important role in the shaping of current international politics (Fox,
2001). But despite this, it has been largely overlooked (Fox, 2001; Sachedina, 2001;
Philpott, 2002). Even when religion is discussed as a factor in international affairs, it is
often included as part of another component, and not as its own entity. Daniel Philpott
(2002) stresses the significance of religion in international relations by reminding us of
its importance in the ideology of those who perpetrated the attacks of September 11th,
explaining that those attacks could not be accounted for under a realist school of thought,
as it was not carried out by a state actor’s self interest. Furthermore, the attacks were not
committed by a national organization. While one may argue that the perpetrator was a
“transnational actor,” it was an actor whose actions were inspired by an ideology, and not
for economic gain. Those who attacked the United States on September 11th, 2001 did so
because of the importance of religion to them, an issue overlooked by scholars (Philpott,
2002).
Peter Mandaville (2001) argues that from the conception of the term “international
relations,” scholars, and primarily those within the realist school of thought have focused
only on actions between states. Mandaville (2001) explains that this “[s]tate-centrism,
usually identified as a fetish of realist thought, actually predates the latter insofar as the
state was already coded as the centre of gravity for international political life well before
5
the disillusionment of the interwar years that gave rise to what we recognize today as
classical realism.” Mandaville (2001) takes issue with the realist worldview by saying:
“My major complaint about dominant theories of international relations such as

neo-realism is that they persist in working with a relatively unproblematic
understanding of the nation-state despite the veritable upheavals in citizenship,
ethical capacity and sovereignty.. .Where these transformations are recognized,
they tend to be marginalized in favour of an image of IR which reproduces
political realism’s ‘timeless wisdom’. More specifically, traditional modes of
theorizing IR see the nation-state as the focal point of international politics, and,
indeed, operate with an understanding of the political as something which only
legitimately emanates from the state. In doing so, however, realism and its more
recent incarnations effectively ignore the fact that there are many other layers and
spaces of politics. Indeed, within the unproblematised nation-state that IR sees as
central there are at least three complex political dynamics at work: (1) a politics of
inclusion, exclusion and national narration; (2) a politics in which the state
attempts to distil national identit(ies) into a (usually singular) ‘national interest’;
and (3) a meta-politics which seeks to maintain the fusion of nation and state as
the most effective logic by which to order the international system” (7).
While many international relations scholars will suggest that they have “moved
beyond...obsession with the state” (Mandaville, 2001), the state is still prevalent when
discussing international politics (Mandeville, 2001). Now while the “state is a very
important actor in world politics [,]” international relations scholars must begin to take
into consideration “the nature and location of the political [,]” which can be described as
identity (Mandaville, 2001).
In the midst of these developments following the end of the Cold War, we have seen
significant influence of the constructivist international relations worldview, as new
“agencies” (such as religious and ethnic identities) have had influence in the international
system (Khan, 2004). Identity, according to Khan (2004), “has emerged as the most
important property of global agents and increasingly theorists are focusing on it.” In fact,
while scholars are highlighting its recent emergence in international relations, identity
“[has been] an important element of world politics,” and particularly in Islam, with the
later introduction of the concept of “House of Islam” and “House of War” (Khan, 2004)
(which will be addressed in depth in a later chapter).
But regardless of the call for a consideration of identity (and in the context of this
work religion) in international relations, social sciences throughout recent history have
focused on what they consider “rational explanations” for behavior and events, and thus
have dismissed religion as a component of international politics (Fox, 2001). We saw
with the introduction of modernity a move to minimize religion to a private manner
(Mandaville, 2001). This notion of reducing religion in the face of modernity can be seen
with the “secularization theory” (from the 1950s), the belief that “[m]odernization
necessarily leads to a decline of religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals
[,]” which had its origins in the age of Enlightenment (Berger, 1999). Twentieth century
thinkers such as Emil Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Max Weber suggested that religious
systems would cease to exist, and that the new global system would be a “modern secular
system” (Fox, 2001). Proponents of secularism argued that it would eventually “occur in
all of its forms—in private belief, in outward practice, and in public expressions of
religion” (Philpott, 2002). They saw secularism as “irreversible, absorbing, and global,
eviscerating beliefs in Jehovah, Allah, Christ, and the Hindu gods alike” (Philpott, 2002).
7
Fox (2001) adds that other scholars in the mid 20th century were convinced that religion
would diminish with the rise of modernity.
Now while “modernization has had some secularizing effects” (Berger, 1999),
scholars explain that previous arguments suggesting that modernity (“which determines
what is understood as the religious or the secular”) (Van Der Veer, 2002) would replace
religion has not been the case (Berger, 1999; Fox, 2001). Regardless of efforts to
promote original or “rephras[ed]” secularization arguments, we have not seen a decrease
in the influence of religion to the individual (Berger, 1999), nor has “there [been].. .much
evidence of the disappearance of religion or its marginality in public life in most
societies” (Van Der Veer, 2002). In fact, a “resurgence of religion” has occurred as a
result of modernization (Fox, 2001). Religious institutions have gained success in the
international system without “tr[ying] to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of
a secularized world” (Berger, 1999). Failed attempts of modernization have caused
people to connect stronger with their religious traditions (Fox, 2001). Because the age of
modernity often views Islam, for example, as a “pre-modem [condition] that include
allegiance to God-centered worldviews [which] are seen as binding or even enslaving the
human being” (Hermansen, 2004, in Islam and the West Post 9/11), Muslims thinkers in
turn, as Hermansen (2004) argues, have used modernity for Islamic revival movements,
particularly in “[m]uch of twentieth and twenty-first century.” Muslims at the time of
colonialism believed that “emancipation from the colonial project involved the loss of the
world of enchantment as embodied in societies whose allegiance was to the supernatural
[,]” and that, according to modernism, “[t]radition too came to be regarded as
anachronistic” (Hermansen, 2004).
Scholars such as Philpott (2002) (citing Stark (1999)) explain that “there is a
profound compatibility of the Islamic faith and modernization.” Islam has been
successful even in cities that are known to have “a high degree of modernization”
(Berger, 1999). In fact, modernity has actually allowed religious movements to
participate in the political realm of their own respective states. Lastly, modernity itself
has broken down the “monopoly” of religion in a particular society. With this new room
for a choice of faith, people have become more religious (Fox, 2001). Berger (1999)
reminds us that “counter-secularization is at least as important a phenomenon in the
contemporary world as secularization.”
Fox (2001) suggests that religion has also been neglected amongst international
politics scholars, and particularly by Western scholars (and Fox suggests those from the
United States are especially prone to this) because religion has not been in line with that
their “classical liberalism” worldview, and in particular the separation of faith from state
(Fox, 2001), which may at times “marginalize communities of faith and thus push them
toward militancy, aggression, and separatism” (Sachedina, 2001). But regardless of such
consequences, scholars are accustomed to ignoring the importance of religion (Fox,
2001), and instead, continuously focus on the secularization model, which has not only
9
been viewed by thinkers during the age of Enlightenment as “a good thing, at least
insofar as it does away with religious phenomena that are “backward,” “superstitious,” or
“reactionary” (Berger, 1999), but which also has “nicely corroborated” the liberalist and
realist view (which depicts states as “a distinct political entity with distinct interests” of
international relations (Philpott, 2002)). This can be seen in early realist worldviews of
political philosophers Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes’, whose philosophies were “ a
departure from classical Christianity and from its political embodiment in medieval
Christendom” (Philpott, 2002).
A final reason why religion is ignored in international relations is its difficulty to
measure (Fox, 2001). In quantitative studies, for example, religion does not easily
produce variables that can be used. In order to be able to develop variables, there must
be extensive literature in the field on religion, something that is currently lacking (Fox,
2001). In addition, we find an importance placed on the thoughts of individual political
leaders when discussing religion in international politics. And since one cannot
accurately gain clear insight into one’s minds, scholars often ignore using religion in their
studies (Fox, 2001). But while religion is often ignored in international politics among
social scientists, it is nonetheless important. Fox (2001) explains of its importance on
three various levels:
Religion influences international politics in three ways. First, foreign policies are
influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their
constituents. Second, religion is a source of legitimacy for both supporting and
criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. Third, many local
10
religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across

borders or otherwise become international issues” (59).
On a personal level, religion influences human thought (Fox, 2001). According to Fox
(2001) (citing Geertz, 1973), “most people.. .find religion necessary to interpret the world
around them...”. Religion can therefore “influence the outlook and behavior of
policymakers” (Fox, 2001). For example, leaders use Islam and thus identify with the
faith through several different actions such as naming “Islam as the state religion”
(Schwedler, 2001), or, in an effort to connect with their constituents, heads of state define
the title of their leadership position in religious terms (such as “the President-Believer” in
the case of Egypt and Anwar Sadat) (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996). This can also be
seen in various monarchies in the Middle East, where the ruling family claims ties to the
Prophet Muhammad for further credibility (Schwedler, 2001). With these issues in mind,
their religious views may convince them to create certain types of policy, often
“intractable policies,” as it is built upon personal fundamental beliefs. Fox (2001) cites
Laustsen and Waever (2000), saying that one’s beliefs “result in particularly extreme and
intractable responses because “religion deals with the constitution of being as such.
Hence, one cannot be pragmatic on concerns challenging this being”.” Secondly, religion
is used to establish a government’s actions, both on a domestic and international level.
While governments use religion to justify their policies at home, religion can also be used
in international politics. For example, the term jihad (defined by some as a holy war), a
religious concept in Islam, can be used by states against other actors (Fox, 2001). This
term is not solely used by state actors, for as we have seen non-state actors such as
terrorist organizations using religion to justify their cause (Fox, 2001). Lastly, religion
can supersede international state boarders, thus causing conflicts once contained in a
particular state to become international (Fox, 2001). Fox (2001) cites the transnational
cooperation of ethnic Albanians during the 1999 war in Kosovo as evidence of support
from outside Kosovo. In additional to ethnic Albanian support, Fox (2001) explains that
a number of Islamic nations offered support to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. While
some have studied this concept in terms of ethnicity (Fox, 2001 citing Gurr, 2000), Fox
(2001) argues that religion can also supersede borders.
Religious fundamentalism is prevalent in “most religions and regions of the world
(Fox, 2001, citing Marty and Appleby), and such “movements often seek to break the
barrier between religion and the state where such barriers exist, as well as to export their
movements elsewhere” (Fox, 2001). For example, particular religious fundamentalism,
and in this case “radical Islamic revivalism”, the ideological source of al-Qaeda, “directly
challenges the authority structure of the international system”. And because of these
developments, Philpott (2002) calls for scholars to “direct far more energy to
understanding the impetuses behind movements across the globe that are reorienting
purposes and policies, alignments and dilemmas.”
Fox (2001) raises a final point in his discussion of the importance of religion in
international politics by citing Huntington’s (1996) well-known Clash o f Civilizations
12
theory that suggests religious civilizations such as Islam are “a serious potential threat to
the West and one of the greatest sources of violence.” Now while this theory will be
discussed further in a later chapter, the Clash of Civilizations theory is important to note
here because of its impact on the field of religion and international relations, as several
scholars have argued against this notion that Islam is more prone to violence, suggesting
that Islam has more conflicts (within other Muslim states) than with non-Muslim states,
in addition to arguing that “Islamic fundamentalism is waning” (Fox, 2001, citing Kader,
1998). Nevertheless, those who subscribe to Huntington’s theory “are more disposed to
perceive religious Muslims as enemies than as friends” (Fox, 2001).
Culture
In order to understand religion in the context of international relations, we must
examine the importance of culture. Mandaville (2001) asserts that “culture is certainly
one of the most widely (ab)used concepts in social analysis.” While many scholars are
“[c]all[ing] to “bring back” [the notions of] culture and identity” (Pasha, 2003) in the
study of international politics, it must be noted that such concepts of “.. .are already [in
IR]; they [just] must be rediscovered” (Pasha, 2003). Upon examining the relationship
between culture and society by focusing on concepts such as identity, we can see the
effects of culture on international politics (Suyuan, 2003). In fact, Mandaville (2001)
views culture as “a way of being, a mode [,]” while suggesting that culture should not
13
focus on history, but rather on current “ongoing, active (‘organizing’) processes
(Mandaville, 2001).
Quoting constructivist theory, culture
“refers to international norms, international institutions and international rules

shared by different state actors through state-to-state interaction and social
learning.. .[C]ulture refers to socially constructed shared knowledge, that is,
shared concept. This kind of individually shared and interrelated concepts and
knowledge include not only belief but also desire” (Suyuan, 2003,1).
Scholars (such as Huntington (1993), in Wedeen (2002)) argue that every civilization has
its own “primordial culture identity.” Each civilization’s respective identity is what
causes groups to have different economic and social ideologies. Other scholars take issue
with this definition of culture, however, suggesting that such an approach “ignores
historical conditions and power relationships” which are factors that cause ethnic conflict,
in addition to religious revivalist movements (Wedeen, 2002). In the case of the Middle
East, such a categorization of culture neglects other factors such as origins of political
movements, reasons for their current popularity, and other issues such as “what makes a
Muslim a Muslim, what Islam means, and what, if any, its political role should be”
(Wedeen, 2002).
Such distinctions also fail to address communication and exchange of ideas between
various groups, neglecting to give attention to a history of “cross-fertilization of ideas and
practices” (Wedeen, 2002). Wedeen (2002) says of the way culture is handled in the
scholarly field, that “by ignoring historical processes and specific relations of political
14
power, the treatment of culture in political science.. .has downplayed the heterogeneous
ways in which people experience the social order within and among groups while
exaggerating the commonality.. .of intragroup beliefs and values.” And that because of
this, “cultural essentialist explanations of political outcomes such as ethnic or religious
violence tend to naturalize categories of groupness, rather than exploring the conditions
under which such experiences of groupness come to seem natural when they do”
(Wedeen, 2002). Moreover, although an individual may be influenced by a particular
civilization, those “civilizations do not act on the human stage” (Eickelman and Piscatori,
1996). Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) explain of Islam and Muslim politics, that
“Muslim politics is sufficiently complex that any attempt to reduce it to a single

formula leads to mystification; rather than being monolithic, Muslim politics,
while aspiring to ummah-wide universals, derives its force and significance from
the specific contexts, times, and localities in which it takes place. “Islam” cannot
thus be a threat, any more than the “West” can be for Muslims” (Eickelman and
Piscatori, 1996, 163).
CHAPTER THREE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS:
LEGITIMATE CONCERN OR HYPE?
In order to address whether Islam is a threat in and of itself, it is important to discuss
Samuel Huntington’s (1996) theory on the “Clash of Civilizations.” The “Clash of
Civilizations” theory suggests that the future of the new world order will consist of
various cultural identities, with conflicts occurring based on “clashes” between
“civilizations” (Huntington, 1996). Huntington (1996) argues that a number of post-Cold
War conflicts have been fought along cultural lines. Despite the apparent evidence of
conflicts to support this hypothesis, however, numerous scholars claim that such evidence
is due to Huntington’s simplified definition of “civilization” (Hansen, 2000; Henderson,
1998, Russett, Oneal, Cox, 2000). Scholars also state a second problem in “the clash of
civilizations” theory, claiming that factors other than religion account for wars; this is
applied to both Pre-Cold War and Post-Cold war conflicts (Gray, 1998; Henderson, 1998;
Hanson, 2000; Russett, Oneal, Cox, 2000). Several empirical researches have been
conducted, demonstrating the effect that civilization and differences of religion have
upon conflicts, compared to other factors, such as ethnicity, contiguity, and power
(Henderson, 1997, 1998; Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000). Such research places
Huntington’s theory (1996) of the “clash of civilizations” under a microscope, looking
for either legitimate data to support his hypothesis, leading to a new reality in the future
15
16
center stage, without empirical support.
“Clash of Civilizations”
Samuel Huntington (1996) explains of a new world order forming in the post-Cold
War era based on culture. According to Huntington (1996), the international system sees
an emergence of “multicivilizations” which is rising as a result of these cultural ties
(Huntington, 1996). With the end of the bipolarity in the world system, citizens are
identifying themselves along cultural distinctions, therefore creating a multi-polar system
(Huntington, 1996). Huntington (1996) suggests that the “clash of civilizations” has to
do with the decline of the Western “influence,” along with the rapid growth of Asian and
Islamic societies, which will therefore lead to conflicts that involve these civilizations.
Nation-states are basing more of their actions upon ethnic and cultural identity, using the
political process for these means of advancement of identity (Huntington, 1996). Such
cultural differences shape policies of various states, each holding to their respective
norms (Huntington, 1996).
Civilization
According to Huntington (1996), people “identify themselves” by a variety of ways,
such as culture, religion, language, history, and values, with culture and religion begin the
primary components in unifying groups of people into a “civilization”. The concept of
17
civilization has many characteristics; civilization is first “a cultural identity,”
encompassing “language, religion, [as] a way of life” (Huntington, 1996). The primary
part of a civilization is religion, which has been used as a primary identity, and thus
overrides factors such as race and physical characteristics in shaping a group
(Huntington, 1996). Authors argue that religion has held the loyalty of citizens, being the
primary unifier among people (Juergensmeyer, 1995), while also suggesting that
civilization is the largest and most “global” characterization, (Juergensmeyer, 1995)
being “.. .the broadest level of cultural identity people have...” amongst one another
(Huntington, 1996, 43), although there can be subsets, often based on nationalism within
these civilizations (Juergensmeyer, 1995). Some scholars have even used these subsets to
explaining the competition between the religious and “secular nationalism,” often with
the secularists coming out in front, especially in the civilization of the “West”
(Juergensmeyer, 1995).
Huntington argues that two primary civilizations exist, the Islamic and the Christian
(“Western”) civilizations (Huntington, 1996; Juergensmeyer, 1995). Other civilizations
include the Latin American, African, Sinic, Orthodox, Japanese, and the non Islamic or
Christian religious civilizations of Hinduism and Buddhism (Huntington, 1996;
Juergensmeyer, 1995). In Huntington’s (1996) breakdown of civilizations, the West, or
“Western Christendom” can be best explained as encompassing the United States and
Canada, the majority of Europe, and other countries such as Australia and New Zealand,
although Huntington (1996) suggests that the culture within North America may be
different from the culture of Europe. The Islamic civilization is categorized as various
groups of people that follow the religion of Islam, including much of the Arab world,
parts of South East Asia, and even Albania (Huntington, 1996).
Scholars take issue with such characteristics given to what makes a civilization in
the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, suggesting that Huntington fails to go in depth
within the definition of civilization; this definition of civilization, labeled merely based
on religion is to “simplistic” (Hansen, 2000). Scholars suggest that distinctions need to
be made between the terms “culture” and “civilization,” for although they share some
similar characteristics (e.g. religion, language), civilizations, again, are the broadest of
identities (Huntington, 1996; Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000). Hansen (2000), and also
Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) criticize Huntington’s belief that each civilizations is
“uniform” within its own group, arguing obvious differences such as race differences and
classifications within these civilizations (Hansen, 2000). Scholars also claim that
civilizations change over time, and can never be defined concretely; people can often
“redefine their identities” allowing shifts in overall civilizations (Huntington, 1996).
Civilizations are never static, as they change, and often outlast political movements and
governments (Huntington, 1996).
Scholars have also argued against using terms such as the “West” and “East”
(referring to Islamic and Sinic civilizations), suggesting that these terms neglect the
19
traditions and differences within the labels given (Rahme, 1999). Such “bipolar
concepts” disregard the complexities and richness of the various cultures and groups of
people (Rahme, 1999), instead categorizing a variety of cultures and beliefs into one
grouping (Gray, 1998). Furthermore, the terms “East” and “West” have not been
consistently used, as they have been applied differently depending on the political
situation of the times (Gray, 1998). For example, the “East” has been used to describe
the Soviet Union, Eastern Christianity and now the Islamic/Sinic traditions, while the
“West” is often the label used to reference the United States during the Cold War,
Western Christianity, and now again the United States, in addition to most of Europe
(Gray, 1998).
Religion
Samuel Huntington (1996) explains that religion is “the central force” in the world.
Henderson (1997) cites Huntington (1993) to argue that religion cannot be easily altered,
and in fact, this classification of identity is “more clearly defined than ethnicity”
(Henderson, 1997). Huntington (1996) argues that “fault lines” between various groups
are based on different religious identities, since “.. .religion.. .is the principal defining
characteristic of civilizations... [,]” adding that religion has been “downplayed” in
describing the actual causes of wars.
Huntington’s (1996) Clash of Civilization hypothesis suggests that the Muslim
20
civilization is involved in the majority of wars examined. He claims that Muslims have
had “problems” living alongside Non-Muslims. Huntington (1996) cites Gurr’s (1994)
analysis of conflicts involving Muslims, explaining how within conflicts between 1993-
1994, Muslims fought in over half of these conflicts, the most as a single civilization.
These findings further suggest that “...two-thirds.. .of these intercivilizational conflicts
were between Muslims and others...” (Huntington, 1996, from Gurr, 1994). This
evidence of violence amongst Muslims with other civilizations leaves Huntington
suggesting that Muslims tend to have “bloody borders” (Huntington, 1996).
Authors who have examined religion as a factor for war suggest that religion is
“negatively correlated with war incidence” (Henderson, 1997). These findings seem to
support Huntington’s hypothesis that as states are “religiously similar,” the amount of
conflict between them decreases (Henderson, 1997). Errol Henderson (1997) also
indicates that religion has more than “twice” the significance as a factor for conflict as
opposed to contiguity. Henderson’s (1997) findings—of which he concentrated on the
religion variable—show a rise of “4 % increase” in war among states. These figures tend
to stay relatively constant (2.8-4%) when Henderson (1997) examines wars from the time
period 1820-1989 and from 1950 to 1989.
Authors who have examined nationalism as another possible explanation for the
causes of conflicts have different views as to exactly how much of a factor religious
national and ethnic identities play in wars, suggesting that a significant number of wars
21
have been fought primarily because of nationality (Gray, 1998). In the critique of
Huntington’s Clash of Civilization theory, Gray (1998), argues that the Clash of
Civilizations theory cannot explain various conflicts such as Iran siding with Armenian
Christians against Azerbaijan, which happens to be a Muslim-majority. In addition, Gray
(1998) points to “intra-civilization” conflicts such as the Iraq-Iran war and the conflict
between Hutu and Tutsis to discredit Huntington’s hypothesis.
Moreover, authors who have examined ethnicity in conflict explain that many of the
conflicts cited by Huntington suggest that ethnicity is not a key proponent for going to
war, as civilization lines are not any more “important as a source” for wars (Gurr, 1994;
Henderson, 1997; 1998). Henderson (1997) explains that conflicts are often grouped as a
“cultural” or “ethnic” because different cultures are present. This method is to simplistic
for labeling wars, often because underlying causes of these conflicts exist. Often time
conflicts are mistakenly classified as “ethnic” only because of statements from leaders
claiming that the reasons for fighting are “ethnic” (Henderson, 1997).
Henderson’s (1997) research addresses the significance culture (religion and
ethnicity) has had on inter-state wars from 1820-1989. In his findings, Henderson (1997)
concludes that wars are more likely to occur not primarily because of religion, but rather
between those of closer geographic location with one another, regardless if they are
culturally similar or not. Further findings seem to support the notion that although
ethnicity is a partial factor in conflicts, a much larger factor is “contiguity” (Henderson,
22
1997). Henderson (1997) iterates that while culture is a factor, ethnicity is hardly a factor
in war. Instead, the findings suggest that an increase in wards can be pinned more to
“contiguity” in that similar ethnicities tend to be situated alongside one another,
supporting the theory that geographic “proximity” is related to inter-state wars
(Henderson, 1997). Ethnically similar people “residing in neighboring states” tend to
“fight one another” regardless of nationality (Henderson, 1997). Henderson (1997)
concludes his findings by saying that “.. .the most dangerous dyads are religiously
dissimilar, territorially contiguous, and ethnically similar pairs of states.” It must also be
noted that Henderson’s (1997) study of the Middle East wars suggest they should not be
labeled as “ethnic conflicts,” since in these wars “religious dissimilarity...outpaced
ethnic dissimilarity... ”.
Democracies and Peace
Some authors have also argued that the problem with conflicts is not (primarily) due
to religious differences, but rather due to a lack of “peace among democracies” (Russett,
Oneal, Cox, 2000; Henderson, 1997; Henderson, 1998). Studies show that democracies
will not go against one another (in war) based on a difference of culture or religion
(Maoz, Russett, 1993; Russett, Oneal, Cox, 2000). Maoz and Russett (1993), and again
Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000), suggest that democracies are actually more peaceful” to
other democracies than to non-democracies, and are thus less likely to engage in war.
23
Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) test several of Huntington’s hypotheses, studying
the impact of geographical location, the effects of “bilateral balance of power,” and
economics within a democracy, determining how other factors besides “civilization” have
an effect on interstate wars. Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) also examine “realist and
liberal influences” to conflicts that are thought by Huntington (1996) to be caused by
religious and cultural factors, researching wars that occurred from 1950-92. This study
was done to test the “frequency” of these intercivilizational conflicts, since Huntington’s
hypothesis faces criticism for a lack of “empirical testing” (Russett, Oneal, and Cox,
2000). Their findings, similar to Henderson’s (1997), show the significance that
geographic location has as to why states go to war with one another. According to their
data, “.. .contiguity is 17 times more influential than a civilization difference...” (Russett,
Oneal, and Cox, 2000). When studying various types of dyads, the statistics show that
democracies are the least type of government to fight one another, “.. .while democracies
and autocracies were prone...” to wage war (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000).
Furthermore, in regards to conflicts between civilizations, the empirical data shows,
contrary to Huntington’s hypothesis, that when taking into account factors such as
economics, and other “realist” and “liberal” ideas, states belonging to opposing
civilizations “.. .are not more prone to become involved in serious conflicts...” (Russett,
Oneal, and Cox (2000). From their statistics, Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000) do not find
any information whatsoever to support Huntington’s claim of a likelihood of wars
24
occurring based on a “clash of civilizations” (1996).
A second methodological test conducted by Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) looks
for the number of interstate disputes among a similar civilization versus wars fought by
opposing civilizations. Their findings suggest “little” evidence to support Huntington. In
this test, similar to their earlier study, they found that “continuity” and “democracy” as
being significant variables in detecting causes for interstate wars (Russett, Oneal, and
Cox, 2000). In addition, the study suggests that states of the “Western” civilization are
less likely to fight, as opposed to states in the “Islamic” “Hindu” and “Orthodox”
civilizations (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000). Furthermore, “Islamic,” “Hindu,” and
“Orthodox” civilizations show “greater” occurrences of “conflict among their
members...” (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000). This leads Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000)
to suggest that if Islam has ‘bloody borders’ (Huntington, 1996), it is not with just outside
civilizations, but “also bloody internally” (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000).
The third focus of their study examines the proportion of conflict between the
“Western” civilization versus other civilizations (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000). In their
findings, Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) suggest that the “West” and the “Islamic”
civilizations have a slightly higher percentage of fighting between them, although they
classify the number as “insignificant.” This number, according to Russett, Oneal and
Cox (2000), is even less when taking out the conflict between Israel and Arab nations—
because, in Huntington’s (1996) classification of civilizations, Israel is not part of the
25
“West”. So, according to Huntington’s definition of civilizations (Huntington, 1996), the
number representing wars caused by factors of civilization is “negative” (Russett, Oneal,
and Cox, 2000). Their findings show the lack of importance civilization is to causing
conflict, especially opposed to other non-cultural factors (Russett, Oneal, and Cox, 2000).
In a response, Huntington argues that their study focuses mainly on conflicts during the
Cold War, in addition to the lack of focus of “ethno political” post-Cold War conflicts,
therefore not significantly addressing his hypothesis (Huntington, 2000). In a counter
article to Huntington, however, Russett and Oneal (2000) cite that Huntington (1996)
used pre-Cold War conflicts as evidence for his “clash of civilization” hypothesis, while
lacking empirical testing to justify his hypothesis.
Errol Henderson (1998) further analyzes the relationship between democratic states
and the likelihood of going to war. His study focused on the historical period of 1820-
1989. Henderson (1998) found that democracy between two states is a strong, “negative”
and “significant” indicator of a lack of cause to war (Henderson, 1998). Further
experimentation suggests that “major power status,” “contiguity,” and “ethnic similarity”
are positive factors in interstate wars (Henderson, 1998). The positive relationship of
“ethnic similarity” conflict is an indicator that wars are not fought because of a “clash of
civilizations,” but rather a “clash of siblings” (Henderson, 1998). In Henderson’s (1998)
“multivariate analysis,” again, his strongest findings show that democracies have a less
“likelihood of war” between one another, while “contiguity” along with “major power
status” has a greater cause in the “likelihood of war”. Henderson (1998) does find that
opposing religions factor into “an increased probability of war” (Henderson, 1998)
indicating that religious difference is the primary “cultural correlate” (Henderson, 1998)
in war between civilizations. Furthermore, he suggests that “joint democracies” decrease
“the likelihood of war,” regardless if these democracies share a common religion or not
(Henderson, 1998). Henderson (1998) concludes by arguing that regardless of any
religious or cultural factors in war, they “do not vitiate the democratic peace
relationship”.
Authors who claim that the clash of civilizations is prevalent in the post-Cold War
era cite various conflicts to demonstrate how ethnic and religious lines shape wars,
primarily the 1993 conflict in Bosnia between Christian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and
Croatians in Yugoslavia, the ongoing conflict between Armenians and Turks, the conflict
between the Russian Orthodox government and the Chechen Muslim insurgency groups,
and the bombing of Iraq by the United States in 1991, which was not supported by many
Muslim states (Huntington, 1996). Huntington (1996) claims that other conflicts such the
conflict Kashmir, the conflict between Jews and Palestinians, and tribal wars between
Muslim and Christian groups in Nigeria are evidence that Muslims cannot live alongside
other civilizations. Huntington (1996) also points to other less obvious differences
between the West and other civilizations, such as the differences of defining culture
between U.S. and “Islamic and Confucian” governments at the Vienna Human Rights
27
Conference, weapons sales from China to Pakistan, and talks of allowing Christian
European states (Poland, Hungry, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) into NATO, to
further demonstrate the problems between civilizations (Huntington, 1996).
As mentioned, Huntington cites the post-Cold War conflicts in the Balkans to
further support his theory of the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). Huntington
(1996) claims that the civilization “fault lines” are easily recognizable in these various
conflicts; the war between Bosnian Muslims, Catholic Croatians, and Orthodox Serbs, the
struggle between the Orthodox Serb government and the Albanian Muslims in Kosovo,
and the battles between Albanian and Greek governments over protection of minorities
support his “clashes between civilizations” theory. According to Huntington (1996), the
Balkans are becoming more polarized, turning the region into the Orthodox Christian
civilization and a Muslim/Islamic civilization. Discussions of an Orthodox alliance
amongst various Balkan states against the Islam of Albania and Bosnia, along with
outside alliances (Russia for the Serbs, Muslim nations for Albania and Bosnia) are
indicators of the potential “clash” that could evolve from the region (Huntington, 1996).
Authors who have looked at the recent wars in the Balkans explain that the Balkan
conflicts should not be categorized specifically as merely religious wars, because by
doing so, these states would not look to any other interests other than religion to guide
their policy decisions (Hansen, 2000). Studies done following the end of the Bosnian war
in 1995 ended in show that, contrary to Huntington’s hypothesis, the war was due to
28
“political-nationalist” tendencies, and “not cultural or religious” reasons (Hansen, 2000).
The war showed how the Bosnian Muslims were viewed as promoting a “European
ideal,” instead of the Christian Serb government (Hansen, 2000). Lene Hansen (2000)
cites the Carnegie Endowment report of 1992 to explain how the war proved that two
different civilizations such as the United States of the “West” and the Bosnian Muslims
of the “Islamic” civilization fought together dispels Huntington’s theory. The
intervention by the United States was not merely on terms of humanitarian intervention,
but rather, due to their “strategic intervention” (Hansen, 2000). The positions taken by
the United States and the civilization of the “West” did not act accordingly to
Huntington’s hypothesis that wars will be carried out between civilizations (Hansen,
2000).
Conclusion
In sum, although Samuel Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” hypothesis
seems to have merit based upon previous conflicts, empirical research suggests other
factors besides civilization differences are stronger variables in factoring into causes of
war. Throughout the literature, we find a lack of evidence to support a “clash of
civilizations” theory, suggesting instead that “contiguity” and a “lack of democracy” have
a much more significant play in wars, or the prevention of wars. In the data, however, we
find sufficient evidence to suggest that religious differences are a factor in increased
29
conflict (albeit not a strong role) between states. Having said this, future data will have to
be conducted examining all Post-Cold War conflicts to accurately demonstrate the
validity (or lack of validity) of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. While
Huntington’s theory may be “flawed,” it has caused a “resonance around the world” due
to “the emergent importance at this historical moment of civilisational identity as a potent
political, moral and psychological category that is an aspect of a more multi-faceted
challenge to the hegemonic, almost monopolistic, dominance of statist identity bound up
with the role of the state in the modern world order system” (Falk, 1997), “underscoring]
the notion that nation-states are no longer the sole source of identity of politics”
(Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996).
CHAPTER FOUR
ISLAM AND IDENTITY
Before looking at the role of Muslim identity in the specific context of the United
States, it is imperative to first discuss the overall concept of identity, followed by a
discussion of Muslim identity as an overall ideology. Identity, while a product of human
imagination and “the product as well as the medium of human consciousness” (Khan,
2000), is an important component of an individuals’ (and groups’) place in society (Khan,
2000), and “is how individuals and groups define themselves and their relation to others”
(Schwedler, 2001). Khan (2004) says of the importance of identity to the self:
“The first object of human consciousness is the self, and the first awareness is that
there is a self. Once the existence of a self is recognized, the self and
consciousness become entangled in a dialectic relationship. The self becomes
more and more aware of the self (reflexivity), and along with this self-awareness
grows the consciousness of other things. The consciousness of things other than
the self is different from the consciousness of the self. The consciousness of
things other than the self is mediated through the consciousness of the self. The
existence as well as the nature of things other than the self is constringent on the
existence and the cognitive capability of the self. Things may exist by themselves,
but they can exist for the self only through the meaning they hold for the self. The
self is necessary for the assimilation, appreciation, as well as construction, of
meanings. Thus, while the self is a product of human consciousness, it is also the
medium of human consciousness” (72-73).
Bloom (1990) (citing Erikson) explains that we find a “.. .fundamental importance of
identity in the health of the individual” and that “identification is.. .a social act as much
as a private psychological one” (Bloom, 1990). Bloom (1990) explains that “[t]he
methodological capacity to argue from the individual through to the aggregate is provided
30
31
in the proposition that: “[t]hrough a shared identification, individuals are linked within
the same psychological syndrome and will act together to preserve, defend and enhance
their common identity.”” According to Ibn Khaldun (1967), man cannot survive without
a group. For man to survive, he must have a connection to others outside of himself
(Khaldun, 1967). Khaldun (1967) explains that “it is necessary to have the co-operation
of his fellow man... [,] [that] social organization is necessary to the human species.
Without it, the existence of human beings would be incomplete.” And in this, “[i]dentity
connects the individual to the collective; it establishes relations whose nature is political
and which is known as “identity politics” (Khan, 2000). Identity, and particularly certain
“ascriptive identities..., [such as religion]...trump identities determined at birth”
(Schwedler, 2001).
Khan (2000) explains identity as the “I” and the “we”, and relates these distinctions
to politics. Identities are formed and changed based upon “the encounter with the
‘other’” (Mandeville, 2001). In the global arena, ethnic and religious
identities/differences have been used as “a driving force” (Khan, 2000). People with
similar identities will work together and “act as one unit” (Bloom, 1990). Bloom (1990),
describing the philosophy of Erik Erickson, also explains in his work that the
“notion...[of] ‘identity’, ‘secure identity’ and ‘identity crisis’ can be applied to groups.”
Similar to the idea that a change in identification will change an individual, a similar
response will occur at a group level (Bloom, 1990). Bloom (1990) explains of the
32
similarities of individual and group identification:
“At an individual level, there will be identity diffusion, insecurity and anxiety,
and there will also be the behavioral imperative either to protect the already held
identification or to resynthesise a new and secure identity. This syndrome, of
course, will be shared by all the individuals within the group that share the same
identification. Theoretically, each individual may separately resynthesise a new
identity or bolster the old one in isolation from her/his fellows who share the same
situation” (39-40).
Bloom (1990) adds that the amount of a unified reaction by a group “will depend upon
certain historical and existential bonds within the group: geographical propinquity, length
of time passed together, class, ethnicity, religion, and ritual and the degree to which that
particular identification is crucial to the general identity.”
Muslim Identity
We find the importance of identity in Islam, as identity formation is found both on
the individual and on the communal level of the faith. On a communal level, actions such
as communal prayers, similar clothing, food, and meeting places (such as the mosque)
“give the [Muslim] community its meaning or identity” (Khan, 2000). The unified
practice of the five pillars of Islam allows for the establishment of “the foundation for a
universal Islamic identity” (Schwedler, 2001), as “practice is the key to identity
formation” (Schwedler, 2001) (paraphrasing the argument of Bernard Lewis). And while
we cannot clearly observe one’s individual identity based on this overall group identity
(Schwedler, 2001), the group identity and collective action is still significant in helping to
33
establish one’s individual identity, since overall group identity stems from a collection of
each individual identity, beginning with him/herself (Khan, 2000).
In Islam, similar to other religions, we find a distinction between one who is and
who is not of the faith (Esack, 1997; Khan, 2000), a distinction which can be applied to
Muslim identity politics, particularly when discussing the relationship between the
Muslim community to the non-Muslim world, in addition to the makeup and identity
within the Muslim community itself (Esack, 1997). The first is the distinction between
Muslim identity and non-Muslim identity, which is often seen as Muslims, or those with
iman (faith) (Esack, 1997), opposite the “external other,” the unbeliever” (Khan, 2000,
90) or kufr (Esack, 1997). In fact, the word iman is very important in Muslim doctrine,
as its meanings are numerous, such as ‘“being secure’ and or “trusting in[,]’” which have
been related to the entire Muslim community (Esack, 1997). The word kufr, itself
meaning disbelief (Esack, 1997), along with the “other” can refer to other faiths, states, or
“even a group of states like the West” (Khan, 2000). Esack (1997) explains that the term
kufr “has become the term most pregnant with all that is despised in the rejected Other”.
The term kufr has been used several times in different contexts in the Quran.
According to Islam’s final scripture, “[t]he Quran portrays kufr as an important factor that
both shaped a bloated image of the Self and manifested itself in it and in the
accompanying contempt for the weak Other” (Esack, 1997), although it must be noted
that “the majority of the references to “unbelievers” (kuffar) in the Koran, which are
34
usually generalized by the fundamentalists to include any and all unbelievers today, are
expressly directed at pagan Arabs and their hostility to the Prophet’s mission before
finally succumbing to Islam’s growing prestige” (Sachedina, 2001). On a note,
Sachedina (2001) explains that “[s]uch a generalized extrapolation of the historically
circumscribed term unbelievers can defeat the very purpose for which the Koran was
revealed, namely, to guide humanity toward faith in God through persuasion rather than
coercion.”
The Muslim community, in addition to distinguishing between the believer and
unbeliever, itself sets the criteria for what it classifies as being a Muslim. Establishing
who does and does not belong is a major part of group identity (Khan, 2000), since
people cannot exist with the “recognition] of self and other” (Mercer, 1995). Mercer
(1995) argues that “[c]ategorization is a cognitive necessity [,] [and that humans] cannot
act until we have simplified.. .our social environment [;]” classifications allow humans to
do this (Mercer, 1995). According to Mercer (1995), “[c]ategorization explains
comparison. When we categorize, we accentuate similarities without our own group and
differences between groups. Creating categories demands comparisons.” He adds that
“[b]ecause our social group defines part of our identity, we seek to view our group as
different and better than other groups on some relevant dimensions” (Mercer, 1995).
According to Social Identification Theory (SIT), self-esteem and “positive self-
identity” is gained by a person upon affiliation with a particular group. The actions of
35
this group, “in comparison to the out-groups” allow one’s self esteem to correlate with
social identity (Mercer, 1995). The self-esteem is lifted, therefore, as one “feels better”
to be a part of the particular group s/he belongs to (Mercer, 1995). Social Identity Theory
argues that once individuals are placed into groups, regardless to what degree, those
within the group, in attempt to gain their “positive social identity... [differentiate]
between their group and the other group...” (Mercer, 1995). Now while self esteem may
not be the only motivation—as some argue, it is nevertheless important (Mercer, 1995).
Khan (2000) addresses a variety of sources that are used to form a distinct individual
and communal Muslim identity. A Muslim can, through personal introspection and
reflection of past events, understand her/his role as a Muslim living in the West. In
addition to individual effort, organizations that have formed under a particular mind-
frame on a particular set of issues help guide a Muslim population. This “shared
interpretation” of the faith “give[s] [a group] a distinct identity that is the consequence of
commonly shared values and experiences” (Khan, 2000). Khan (2000) identifies three
other sources used to form identity: Ideal sources, which are “beliefs and practices which
in every Muslim mind define the Islamic identity, based solely upon an individual’s
Islamic beliefs and practices[,]” structured sources, an identity which is “primarily
political in nature and [is] based on the distribution of power and resources in society” (A
prime example of this, as Khan notes, is the concept of nationalism), and historical
sources, “the differences that have emerged in the historical construction of the meanings
36
and significance of Islamic values, symbols, and events.” A combination of these sources
leads to an identity of a Muslim individual (Khan, 2000).
We see in the very pillars of Islam the relationship of the individual to the collective.
A Muslim cannot follow the pillars of Islam (“bearing witness” to the Oneness of God,
almsgiving, fasting, praying, and making the Hajj to Mecca) without thinking in a
collective mindset (Ramadan, 2004). Islam calls for a society responsibility “at every
moment” in one’s life (Ramadan, 2004). In fact, Islam states that “to be with God is to be
with other people” (Ramadan, 2004). Therefore, slam stresses a middle point between
one’s complete individual wants and a full “priority to the group and to the society”
(Ramadan, 2004). Islam calls on the believer to submit to God, and by this, “bear[ing]
responsibility for his or her community life” (Ramadan, 2004).
Although Islam’s message for the “celebration and sanctification of human diversity”
and call for “pursue justice” (Abou Fadl, 2004) for all of mankind is evident in its overall
doctrine, SIT theory would have us believe that Muslims (just as any other collective
identity) would be even more generous to their own group, therefore more than likely
favoring a fellow Muslim when it comes to assistance. Social Identification Theory
explains that while a strong in-group “leads to sharing, cooperation, perceived mutuality
of interests, and a willingness to sacrifice personal interests for group interests” (Mercer,
1995), it does have an opposite correlation with the “other”. Mercer (1995) explains that
this close association with our own group causes us to “differentiate our group from other
37
groups... [which] leads to between-group com petition^” and allows for “intergroup
discrimination” (Mercer, 1995). He explains the problem with this by quoting a group of
psychologists who suggest that “[competition in collective cultures is among ingroups,
not among individuals. In individualistic cultures individuals [are the ones who] achieve;
in collectivist cultures, groups achieve” (Mercer, 1995). One can look at the norms in the
study of Polynesian children cited by Mercer (1995). In this study of the Polynesian
children, they tended to be more giving to their own group, as opposed to the other group.
While they were helpful to both groups, they gave more help to others of similar
identification (Mercer, 1995). And since the Polynesian society is known to be based on
“generosity and cooperation,” even those who are brought up on values of “altruism”
have favorites towards those within their own group (Mercer, 1995).
An equally important dynamic of Muslim identity to Muslim identity in relation to
the “other” is the relationship between Muslims within the overall Muslim community.
Such differences within the Muslim community are often formed on the lines of
“ethnicity, interpretation, of Islamic law, interpretation of Islamic history, and
nationalistic fervor” (Khan, 2000). We find many examples in the Muslim world that
illustrates this component: The distinction between sects and branches of Islam, and
differences over Muslim leadership (as is the case with African-American Muslims in
regards to the reformation of the Nation of Islam) are just two examples of inner identity
politics within the Islamic community (Khan, 2000). Khan (2000) suggests that while
38
Muslim unity is a top priority for the Islamic world, “Muslim states seem not to be able to
resolve the tensions between interests and identity.”
This disability to form a cohesive unity is also prevalent within the context of the
American Muslim community. Muslims in the United States, not considered as a
significant political force within the United States, often devote their efforts to their
origin Muslim ethnic homelands. The individual focus on these different issues by the
American Muslim community leads to further divides within the American Muslim
community itself (Khan, 2000). Muslim Americans have allowed their national identity
to interfere with the overall effort to unify Muslims under one banner. An important
international situation, the state relations between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran have
had implications in the American Muslim community. The Muslim American Shia and
Sunni relationship, already with a history of differences, has been “exacerbated” by the
“Iran—Saudi Arabia tension” (Khan, 2000). Khan (2000) also says that students
connected to their homelands have engaged in heated discussions within their own
Muslim community when nationalistic issues arise, such as those between Bangladeshi
and Pakistani Muslim students. Although many of the students’ families have been in the
United States for decades, their interest in their original ethnic homeland politics have
took precedent, and thus took focus away from “issues of identity and interests in the
American context” (Khan, 2000).
39
Islamic Identity as a Worldview
Important to understanding the notion of group identity in terms of international
politics, and for the focus of this paper Islam, we must look at the notion of assabiyya,
which Ibn Khaldun (1967) defines as “solidarity” or “group consciousness.” Assabiyya
is used to describe those who are connected by either an ethnicity or a tribe, but can also
mean, and this is of primary importance to Islam, a solidarity “shared by people not
related to each other by blood ties but by long and close contact as members of a group”
(Khaldun, 1967). In regards to Muslim “solidarity”, we find a significant importance
placed on a unified Muslim ummah, which means community or group (’AbuSulayman,
1987; Khan, 2000). The concept of the Muslim community can be traced back to the
year 622 c.e., of which the Prophet and his followers migrated from Mecca to Medina,
forming the first Muslim community under Shariah (Islamic law) (Mandaville, 2001)
(The notion of the Muslim ummah will be further discussed in a later chapter).
According to an Islamic worldview beginning in the 8th century (Sabet, 2003), the world
is divided into two categories, Dar al-Islam and Dar-Al Harb (’AbuSulayman, 1987;
Gabriel, 2004; Khan, 2000; Ramadan, 2004; Sabet, 2003). Dar-al-Islam, a House of
Peace (Khan, 2000), or what some refer to as “territories in which Muslims are free and
secure (’AbuSulayman, 1987) is where Muslims control the land, or, what is an “Islamic
polity” (Khan, 2000). Dar al-Harb (the House of War), on the other hand, a concept
which is often given many different explanations by scholars (Ramadan, 2004), is usually
40
any location that is against this Islamic rule (Khan, 2000) or a location which endangers
the safety of Muslims (’AbuSulayman, 1987). Ramadan (2004) explains that scholars are
in full agreement when saying that it Dar al-Harb describes a place that both “the legal
system as well as the government [is] non-Islamic.” Some have even suggested that Dar
al-Harb (the house of War), particularly in early implantations, “was the territory yet to
be brought from the ‘state of nature’ into the fold of the Divine” (Sabet, 2003).
In addition to the terms Dar al Islam and Dar al-Harb, we find the existence of
terminology for situations that do not fall within one of these two first categories. For
example, the phrase Dar al-‘Adh (coined by al-Shafi‘i”) (’AbuSulayman, 1987) or a
House of Alliance, refers to those who have peace with this Islamic polity (Khan, 2000),
or “non-Muslim territories involved in treaty agreements giving sovereignty to a Muslim
state but maintaining local autonomy” (’AbuSulayman, 1987). It must be noted that the
ideas of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb are nowhere to be found in the Quran or in the life
of Muhammad (Ramadan, 2004). Ramadan (2004) explains that “they do not belong to
the fundamental sources of Islam, in which principles are essentially given for the
universe (lil-alamin), for all times and across all frontiers.” In fact, “[i]t was the ulama
who, during the early centuries, when considering the state of the world—its geographical
divisions, the powers that were in place across religious affiliations, and their influence
and the forces at work in changing allegiances—began to classify and define the various
areas in and around the places in which they lived.”
41
Despite this classification, scholars argue that the world is not that simply broken
down into a “house of war” and a “house of peace” (Khan, 2000). Akbar Ahmed (2003)
believes ihat the idea of conceptualizing the world as Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb has
“collapsed”. He explains that these terms are irrelevant to the lives of Muslims, because
Muslims can live their faith comfortably in areas traditionally not thought of as houses of
peace, while they are discriminated against in Muslim countries (Ahmed, 2003). As
mentioned, scholars have identified other categories, with terms such as “Dar al-kufr,’’’
the “neutral realm,” and Dar al-sulh, “the “realm of truce,” a title often assigned to the
West (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996). While Muslims may be against the foreign
policies of Western states such as America, no Western country has stated that their war
is directly against Islam (Khan, 2000). In addition, international structures such as the
United Nations are further proof that the term “house of war” is not fitting for modern-
day international relations (Khan, 2000). Mustapha Kamal Pasha (2003) argues that in
order to establish a new system of “overlapping sovereignties in which human purpose,
intentionality, and social life are embedded in concentric spiritual and secular pursuits”
there must be “an ability to transcend the reductionist cartography found in mainstream
renderings of the Islamic conception of international relations in the binary construction
Dar al-Islam (realm of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (realm of war)” (Pasha, 2003). Despite
this, and “[d]espite obvious and unrelating transformations in the nature and stmcture of
the global system, the classical paradigm endures as the realm of recurrence and
42
repetition... [I]t continues to shape and influence Muslim consciousness, even as it
increasingly comes under heavy strain” (Sabet, 2003).
As already mentioned, as far back as the early 8th century c.e., Islam has “divided
the world into two opposing domains,” Dar al-Islam (The House of Peace) and Dar al-
Harb (The House of War) (Sabet, 2003). This idea has been “developed” and used
throughout this history of Islam, with “its full expression under the Abbasid Dynasty
(750-1258 AD) . . The notions of Dar al Islam and Dar al-Harb “ .. .came to acquire
some kind of ‘sacrosanct soundness’ as part of the Shariah itself... Islamic external
outlook thus came to be persistently based on perceptions of foreign relations as guided
and heavily influenced by a religiously based ‘domestic analogy’” (Sabet, 2003). The
Islamic view of the relation to the state (similar to Western thought) (Sabet, 2003) has
been concerned with three “common themes” which are: (1) the causes and justifications
of war and the conditions of peace, security, and order; (2) power and position as an/the
essential actor (unit of analysis) in the community of nations; (3) conceptions and images
of the international system and of the role of the ‘state’ in that system” (Sabet, 2003).
The idea of the Muslim ummah is important in relation to modem international
politics, because, according to the definition of the ummah, it is above all elements,
including the nation-state. Fuller (2003) explains that the ummah is “blessed by God,” as
opposed to the nation-state, which “is not” (Fuller, 2003). Sabet relates the function of
assabiyya, a term originated from the thinker Abdel-Rahman bin Khaldun (Sabet, 2003)
43
which “constitutes in the Islamic theory of nations what the concepts of power and
capability are to realism and structural neo-realism” in relation to the international state
system when he says:
“Just as ‘power’ serves the purpose of bridging the gap between international
structures and processes, so is the concept of assabiyya crucial in linking
international-global understanding to Islam. Such linkages help incorporate a
religio-political theory about the part that can be ‘played by conceptions of the
world and their associated values’ in bringing about a desired change...(Neo)
realism and Islamic theory, together with their concomitant concepts of
power/capability and assabiyya respectively, do not only comprise analytical
devices, but are in fact constituted and constitutive elements of distinct
philosophical and religious discourses which influence and structure both
conceptions and actions...[I]n other words, [these terms] infuse power with
differentiated substantive bases of action and hence reflect two categories of
political behavior. The former constitutes ‘relational power’, which seeks to
maximise values, influence behavior and control outcomes from within a given
institutional structure or regime... [while] the latter.. .refers to efforts and behavior
that seek to change existing institutional structures and alter the rules of the game
” (Sabet, 2003, 183).
Sabet (2003) argues that Islam, “[m]uch like globalization, ...merely induces a particular
conceptualisation of the meaning of state. It does not necessarily negate statehood as
such even a it challenges its territoriality, but rather contests the association of identity
formation with bounded territory.”
Several European nation-states, for example, struggle with such a realization,
worrying about the political loyalty of Muslims who while being citizens of this
European nation-state, also carry citizenships with their previous “the nation-state of
origin” (Van Der Veer, 2002). In the case of the Netherlands, we find specific concern in
regards to citizens who have immigrated from Turkey and Morocco. With the Muslim
44
citizens’ religious ties to their previous nations, in addition to their dual citizenship,
“these states make concerted efforts to control the appointment of.. .imams.. [in
addition to] controlling the education of such officials” (Van Der Veer, 2002).
CHAPTER FIVE
MUSLIM IDENTITY: THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
In the previous chapter, I discussed the importance of a unified Muslim community
and identity which expands beyond state borders. While this notion of Islamic
commonality is prevalent in order to establish a unified Muslim identity, what is crucial
to this book is the examine and highlight the importance of individual experiences of
different Islamic communities (based on their particular history and political situation),
and how such experiences lead to different identities, since “[a]gents have an identity,
[and] not a naturally given identity” (Khan, 2004). The understanding of different
Islamic identities due to a Muslim group’s particular situation needs to be addressed in
order to understand my argument regarding the specific case, situation, and identity
facing Muslims in America. While the belief of a unified Muslim community regardless
of state location, nationality, etc.. .may be popular (Pasha, 2003), Islam itself “provides
shelter to a wide range of commitments” (Pasha, 2003). Schwedler (2001) argues that
(with the use of different case studies of the increased Islamic identity in Iran and
Afghanistan), identity itself, instead of being a uniform characteristic of a particular
civilization, is not identical across the board. But rather, religious identity is different
because of “particular contexts” to each respective situation (Schwedler, 2001). This can
also been seen in Skerry’s (2001) comparison of American and European Muslims,
where he notes that while the Muslim population figures are similar in both the U.S. and
45
46
Europe (at about three percent), the Muslim population is much more diverse in the
United States (Skerry, 2001). This leads to a difficulty in setting policy by U.S. officials,
in addition to establishing a unified Muslim political action much more difficult (Skerry,
2001). Skerry (2001) explains that “Muslim diversity and fragmentation greatly
complicate the administration of policies affecting Muslims, and also place obstacles in
the path of Muslims seeking to organize for political action.”
Focusing on the economic situations of American and European Muslims, Skerry
(2001) notes that while the Muslim population in Europe has remained “working class”,
the American Muslims by in large are considered “well-educated professional and
business people, far more affluent than their co-religionists in Europe” (Skerry, 2001).
The lack of socio-economic status, Skerry (2001) adds, is the reason why we find
“Muslim depressed economic zones” in Europe, which “makes Muslims in the cities of
Europe much more visibly “a problem population” than in the United States.” From
these examples we see that “the Muslim ummah is by no means a monolith; there is
considerable diversity in the Muslim world not only ethnically but also in approaches to
other faiths, to religious conversion, to politics, war and a host of other aspects (Gabriel,
2004), which is often due to a variety of other factors such as “locality, ethnicity, class,
occupation or language” (Pasha, 2003).
Known as “the mother of all issues” (Haddad, 2000), Muslim identity in the United
States has been highly discussed by scholars and by members of the Muslim community
alike. Yvonne Haddad (2000) argues that the issue of identity has been prevalent since
the creation of the nation-state, but has been strongly on the minds of American Muslims
as of the 1950s. It was the relationship between the United States (as a colonialist power)
and Muslims that allowed for American Muslims to contemplate issues of identity and
their role in western society. Feeling “inferior” to Western powers, Muslims looked for
ways in which they could adapt and live in the West (Haddad, 2000). From this, we must
understood that identity politics “[undermine] the role of “material and rational interests”
in determining group behavior” (Khan, 2000). Muslims, often “caught up in this “us vs.
them” mind set...become identity groups whose politics are determined by their
perception of “who they are,” and “what they want and must do.” We further notice that
“[t]his type of politics characterizes the identity politics of self vs. “external other,” of
which is now reproduced in Muslim politics in America, manifesting itself in the
dichotomy of America vs. Islam” (Khan, 2000).
While most immigrants to the United States face identity issues, Haddad (2000)
argues that the situation of Muslim immigrants is far different than of any other
immigrant community. The Muslim immigrant, while sharing similarities with other
immigrants—such as questions of what identity will be formed within the new
environment and how to keep their ethnic language and their faith with their children, is
faced with a different circumstance to that of non-Muslim immigrants (Haddad, 2000);
Muslim immigrants must adapt in a society that has a disposed fear of Islam. Thus, they
48
must worry about whether they and their families will be included in the American
society (Haddad, 2000).
Working to find a place within Western society, American Muslims have turned to a
variety of political ideologies throughout their history in the United States, beginning in
the 20th century. During colonialism, Muslims became aware of the West and their
ideals. While such ideals were available to the Muslim public, the overall majority did
not freely adhere to such ideology (Fuller, 2003). Following the independence of these
states, leaders of the new nations “quickly subverted” the ideals of the previous colonial
power (Fuller, 2003). In the early 1900s, many within the Muslim community turned to
nationalist movements. By “[drawing] on an identity of shared history, language, and
culture” (Haddad, 2000), they hoped to “create a shared vision and commitment to
helping bring about the independence from colonial hegemony” (Haddad, 2000). Arab
nationalism was particularly popular among Muslim Arabs from the 1950s until the
1970s where it quickly became associated with the military loss to Israel in 1967 (Fuller,
2003). The inability of completely liberating from the West colonial powers led to
support for Socialist movements, which focused on a specific economic system. This
system, a direct opposite to the capitalist system of the West, was popular among those
who saw the ability of Socialism to solve issues of the Third World (Fuller, 2003).
Following the end of Socialism, Muslims turned to “Islamism, an ideology based on the
hope of restoring the transnational Islamic empire, grounded in Islamic history and law”
49
(Haddad, 2000). Despite Graham Fuller’s (2003) belief in Liberal Democracy ultimately
triumphing in the Middle East, most Muslim nations have not adopted it, partially
because Liberal Democracy does not deliver on addressing Third World issues.
According to Fuller (2003), “political Islam at the moment still remains the only realistic
major alternative movement to most of today’s authoritarian regimes” (Fuller, 2003).
Haddad (2000) explains that searching for Muslim identity within the environment of
the United States is actually “part of the American experience, as each generation of
immigrants has brought a certain sense of self which appears to undergo constant revision
and redefinition in the context of the American melting pot [,]” and that U.S. Muslim
identity is based on several factors, such as U.S. policy towards Muslim states, the
makeup of the Muslim community in America, the location where they have settled, and
relations with other Muslim Americans and non-Muslims (Haddad, 2000), in addition to
the consideration and special attention needed on differences within the Muslim
American community itself, particularly its wide range of ethnicity and economic status
(Haddad, 2004). While many Muslims in the United States are immigrants, the U.S.
Muslim population also has a substantial African-American Muslim population, known
as “indigenous” Muslims (Mazrui, 1996), who account for roughly 30 percent (Haddad,
2004) to 42 percent of the overall Muslim American population (Maznui, 1996). The
remaining Muslim American population is composed of Muslims of Arab descent, who
account for about 25 percent of the population, and Muslims from South Asia, who make
50
up about the remaining one third of the total U.S. Muslim population (Haddad, 2004).
Amina Waddud (2003) argues that while the “hyphenated formula” of various
American Muslims may
“eventually become a symbol of unity... [a]t the present, however, it obscures

profound and unrecognized differences across ethnic and racial backgrounds. It
refers to an Islam that Muslims in America have in common, while
simultaneously erasing breakdowns and the hegemony of immigrant Muslim
leadership and representation in the American context. These latent prejudices
have yet to be directly addressed in community discourse, and this has resulted in
further divisions” (270-271).
Discussion has arisen between indigenous and immigrant Muslims in America following
September 11th, 2001 in regards to Muslims’ role in the U.S. public sphere. These, along
with other issues, have lead to “divisions among American Muslims across racial and
doctrinal lines...” (Hermansen, 2004).
A major divide within the American Muslim community is between the Muslim
immigrants and the African-American indigenous Muslim population. Several factors
are hindering a solid relationship between the two groups within the overall Muslim
community. For example, communication between the groups is not highly prevalent, and
allows for a high level of misconceptions between the groups (Wadud, 2003).
Furthermore, Ali A. Mazrui (1996) suggests that while African-American Muslims are
more concerned with domestic policies, immigrant Muslims pay more attention to U.S.
foreign policy. Wadud (2003) also addresses that leadership of the Muslim American
organizations, suggesting that most of the positions are expected to be filled by
immigrant men, ignoring African-American Muslims, both men and women, often
because immigrant Muslims rely upon what they see as their long history of being
Muslim. Furthermore, many in the African-American community feel as if the Islam
addressed by the immigrants as evidence of their superiority is more on a cultural
foundation (as often many immigrants have knowledge of Arabic, the language of which
the Holy Quran of Islam was revealed), as opposed to the spiritual and “personal
religious” elements of introspection of the faith, while we also find a strong sentiment
amongst American Muslims that “[m]any Muslims suspect that Islam’s traditional lands
have less to teach us than they think...” (Hermansen, 2004). Indigenous American
Muslims have often accused immigrant Muslims as having “arrogated to themselves the
right to define what was Islamically normative” (Hermansen, 2004 citing Jackson).
Wadud (2003) argues that a second factor, the financial status of immigrant Muslim
Americans, has lead to “hegemony over leadership roles” with relation to the African
American Muslim community. Mazrui (1996) explains that there is a higher proportion
of “low-income families” in the African-American Muslim community. While this is the
case with the “indigenous Muslims” (Mazrui, 1996), immigrant Muslim families have
more of its members in the “professional class [,]... [possibly] about the national
average.” In fact, according to Khan (2005), “[t]he easiest and often the only way for
[immigrant] Muslims to come to America was through the route of higher education.”
Muslim immigrants, with more economic resources than many African American
52
Muslims, use these resources to establish and build new mosques. Now while most
African Americans do not have the economic capabilities of the Muslim immigrants,
those that are economically on par tend to be associated with the Islamic centers of the
Muslim American immigrants. Wadud (2003) suggests that “affluent immigrant
Muslims will not participate with the same fervor in grassroots mosques established by
economically struggling African Americans.” Mazrui (1996) expresses similar
sentiments about African-American Muslims in America, suggesting that while they are
“economically weak” compared to the immigrant Muslim community, they continue to
“have considerable potential political leverage”. While this may be the case, the
economic inferiority leads African Muslims to feel as “second-class citizens” even within
Islam in America (Wadud, 2003).
A further distinction between Muslims in the United States is the organization styles
of African-American Muslims compared to that of the immigrant Muslim community. In
the immigrant Muslim community, the mosques are centered around “major financial
contributors” (Wadud, 2003). Furthermore, women tend to serve a back role to the men
in the organization of the mosques. In fact, many times the women are excluded from
most of the positions (Wadud, 2003). Many of the women do not challenge the roles they
have, and thus allow the male Muslim immigrants in the mosque to continue with the
head roles (Wadud, 2003). Moreover, the imams (or heads of the mosque) in the
immigrant community are not from the United States community directly, as often times
they are brought in from overseas. And because of this, imams are “often unfamiliar with
U.S. and local circumstances [,]” and therefore may not have the experience or tools to
participate and effectively communicate with Americans of different faiths (Wadud,
2003). On a final point, the imam, since he works fo r the community, often makes
decisions based on what those from within the community demand, as opposed to having
the freedom to decide issues by him (Wadud, 2003). This differs from the African
American Muslim community mosques, where the imam is from within the community,
and thus has the authority to make individual decisions. In the African-American mosque
structure, if the imam chooses to seek advice from the council, it will be from a council
specifically organized to handle particular issues in an “ad-hoc” form based upon what is
pertinent at the time (Wadud, 2003). Also in the African-American Muslim community,
women have a large role in the decisions made for the mosque, as they are the ones who
create committees within the community to handle the issues of the overall Muslim
community (Wadud, 2003).
Upon examining the dynamics of how these respective groups see and approach
Islam, as in the case of the United States, we see that an important distinction in the
tendencies between the African-American Muslim community and the immigrant Muslim
community lies in their views on what associates one’s identity with being Muslim.
Haddad (2000) cites Beverly McCloud when she explains that Muslims within the
African-American community complain that the Muslim immigrants believe that the
Islam they practice is the “true” Islam. Although most of the African-American Muslim
converts result from conversation missions from other African-Americans, “immigrants
persist in regarding themselves as the authority on issues of conversion and do not
consult with African-Americans on da ‘wa [missionary] methods and goals” (Haddad,
2000). This has also lead to a disagreement about ways to interpret the Quran, as many
in the African-American Muslim community support individual interpretation, while
those from the immigrant Muslim community believe such freedom will lead to break off
Muslim groups (Haddad, 2000). Furthermore, Haddad (2000) explains that McCloud
also accuses immigrants of saying that Islam is free from racism and ethnic superiority,
but in reality, they carry an “ .. .innate racism, preferring the conversion of whites to Islam
and totally disregarding African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Native Americans
[,]” and that such racism has strongly hurt the inter-Muslim relations in the United States,
and thus any hope of unity. Such a division within the Muslim community has been used
by the American system which “has taken advantage” of the differences. The focus on
ethnicity has divided the Muslim American community (Haddad, 2000).
The divide within the Muslim community in the United States is just one example of
differences within Muslim communities, and the fact that while there may be a unified
Islam on some levels “represent[ing] a single collective identity, that identity is
characterized by so many complexities and diversities...” (Schwedler, 2001). This
identity is not constant across the board, as we notice that a group’s Islamic identity
55
varies (Schwedler, 2001). Schwedler (2001) explains that “Islamic identity is also the
product of many different historical, political, and social processes. To understand
particular instances of Islamic identity, one must therefore look at discrete political,
social, and economic contexts through which particular Islamic identities have been
forged.”
The particular identity of Muslim Americans has been partially shaped by the United
States’ feeling towards immigrants in general (Haddad, 2000). Haddad (2000) explains
that while America is made up of immigrants, it “nonetheless [is] not particularly fond of
them, no matter where they come from or what they believe in” (Haddad, 2000). But
while this may be so, America allows a better chance for immigrants from Europe to mix
within America, as opposed to those from Asia. A reason for this is the standards of
assimilation “defined by the Protestant ethos” (Haddad, 2000). The push for a Protestant
America in the 1800s led other faiths to feel vary uncomfortable in their place in America
(Haddad, 2000). While the United States moved closer to the idea of a “melting pot” in
the mid-1900s, this idea seemed to address “Protestants, Catholics, and Jews with no
apparent place for other religions” (Haddad, 2000). And with this focus on the
togetherness of the Christian and Jewish faiths, the phrase “Judeo-Christian” has been
used by many Americans in order “to define themselves” (Haddad, 2000). Those who do
not belong to this Judeo-Christian group feel that they fall outside of this “exclusive
club.” Furthermore, those outside of the Judeo-Christian group worry that in order to
56
belong, they will have to adapt to the interests of this group (Haddad, 2000). Throughout
the history of the United States, we have noticed the defining of a particular group as the
“outsider” or “enemy.” The group now being labeled as the “outsider” or “enemy” is the
Muslim (Haddad, 2000). American Muslims therefore take issue when elected leaders
use the term “Judeo-Christian,” as it “affirms that America is a Judeo-Christian country”
(Haddad, 2000). Furthermore, Muslims look at the acceptance of a Jewish state by
America, and its hope for Muslims to “renounce” their aspirations for the idea of an
Islamic state as further proof that America does not fully follow the call of pluralism.
Lastly, Muslims feel that Christian values are constantly broadcasted through television,
but America is quick to call for pluralism when speaking to Muslims (Haddad, 2000).
Khan (2005) explains that anti-Islamic comments by Christian evangelical leaders allow
one to believe that American culture “encourages anti-Muslim prejudice to thrive in the
Conscientious Public Forum.”
American Identity
To understand the identity of Muslims in America, we must look at what it means to
be American. The idea of “what it means to be American” (Schildkraut, 2002) has been
discussed in the United States following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Brewer and
Li, 2004) and even before the attacks occurred (Schildkraut, 2002). Schildkraut (2002)
suggests that while “ ...ethnoculturalism—the idea that American identity is defined by
57
white Protestantism rooted in Northern European heritage and ancestry...has been widely
criticized and challenged over the years, it continues to play a powerful role in shaping
what people think of as “American””. Now while such a view is not as strong in the
present day as in other moments in the history of the United States, Americans still
associate what it means to be American “along ascriptive lines” such as religion.
(Schildkraut, 2002). Schildkraut (2002) further explains that in the United States there
exists a thought that a citizen of the United States is “a white Christian.” While such a
concept is often criticized, it still “shapes the thinking of many people toward non
whites” (Schildkraut, 2002). Schildkraut (2002) cites a “ 1996 General Social Survey” to
illustrate the extent to which ethnoculturalism (in terms of religion and nationality) is
placed on American identity. According to the survey, a majority of Americans polled
believed that being Christian was part of what it means to be an American. An even
larger majority (70%) believed that being bom in the United States was important to
being American (Schildkraut, 2002). And while the participants did not openly say that
those not bom in the United States were not or could not ever be American, “their words
revealed a tendency to assume that people who do not fit into ethnoculturalism’s ideal
type are foreigners” Schildkraut, 2002).
Schildkraut (2002) cites Conover’s work (1999) to explain that this identification
arises because “it is difficult to conceive of the concept of “citizen” without the influence
of ethnoculturalism”. In addition, “people have a tendency to form ingroups and
outgroups and to discriminate accordingly, whatever the group identity may be”
(Schildkraut, 2002) (citing Tajfel and Turner (1986)). Therefore, race and ethnicity are
often used to distinguish between these groups because “physical appearance” allows one
to “easily do so” (Schildkraut, 2002). The idea of who is and is not a “citizen” is best
understood when people use definitions and distinctions such as race and ethnic
background in order to “[determine] boundaries” (Schildkraut, 2002), and what further
reinforces this distinction is a specific physical threat (such as a terrorist attack by
someone of a Middle Eastern ethnicity) (Schildkraut, 2002).
While we see a notion of ethnocentrism in describing who is considered an
American, it must be mentioned that positions such as the “incorporationist” view which
calls for “celebrating ethnicities” do exist (Schildkraut, 2002). Incorporationism does not
focus on the similarities of citizenship between all Americans (immigrants and
indigenous Americans), but calls for allowing a environment for this celebration. This
position is the middle-ground between differentialism and full assimilation (Schildkraut,
2002). In a survey done by Wisconsin Public Television in 1997 (Schildkraut, 2002)
asking Americans what they considered make America unique, a vast majority of
respondents (82%) replied that it was “the blending of many different cultures into one
culture” (Schildkraut, 2002). Schildkraut (2002) adds that focus groups conducted show
that many Americans connect themselves with an immigrant history, and believe
diversity is America, and “are wary of too much assimilation” (Schildkraut, 2002)
CHAPTER SIX
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WESTERN MEDIA,

MUSLIMS AND ISLAM
A primary issue for Muslims in America has been the U.S. foreign policy towards
Muslim regions and states (Haddad, 2000). Haddad (2000) argues that the Muslim
Americans have not been influential in changing U.S. policymakers’ actions on many
international issues that involve Muslims such as situations in Israel, Kashmir, and
Chechnya (Gabriel, 2004; Haddad, 2000) Furthermore, Muslim Americans hear the
United States’ call for pluralism and human rights, but see something entirely different in
the U.S.’ practice of foreign policy (Haddad, 2000). Richard Falk (1997) explains of this
“double standard”:
“To varying degrees the Arab-Israeli conflict has been dominant over many years,
fostering an impression that Israeli violence against Palestinian refugees and
others is generally acceptable.. .while Palestinian violence is treated as ‘terrorism’
of a character that undermines whatever political and moral claims may exist to
support the Palestinian struggle. Other conflicts that have involved Islamic
victims of violent abuse, such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir, are
confirmatory of the accusation of double standards to the extent that it is probable
that, if the identities of the victim and perpetrator were reversed, the international
response would have been altered. Such a pattern exists, and although each
instance can be partially explained by other factors..., the cumulative weight of
instances and the selective reliance on international law to condemn and condone
gives the accusation of double standards a rather strong presumption of validity”
(Falk, 1997, 15-16).
In addition, the treatment of Muslim nations, categorizing them as “rogue” states has
further portrayed Islam as “the main irritant to the world order” (Falk, 1997). The United
59
60
Iraq, will be “dealt with as aggressively as possible” (Falk, 1997). This differs from U.S.
policy towards non-Muslim “rogue” states; “non-Islamic states that violate basic norms
of international law and offend the global conscience.. .are dealt with by way of
‘constructive engagement’, either formally or informally” (Falk, 1997).
In Thorsten Funke’s (2002) interviews with Muslim Americans following the
attacks of September 11th, 2001, he noticed that the Muslim Americans were most upset
at the foreign policy of the United States, and not the U.S. domestic policy in monitoring
and registering Muslim immigrants. In his report, Funk (2002) notes:
“The most striking point I got from my interviews was the fact that everybody
would not—as I had expected-talk about hate crimes in the first place. What seems
to bother Muslims in the USA most is not US domestic policy towards
immigrants but US foreign policy towards their homelands. In every conversation
I had, this problem was reached very quickly” (4).
The reason for this is illustrated by a quote from Lorraine Ali, when Ali says:
“It is more difficult for Arabs and Muslims to feel home here, because the United
States have been nearly constantly at war with their homelands” (Funke, 2002, 6-
7).
Gabriel (2004) argues that the most important issues in the relationship between the West
and Islam “are political issues that centre on the Palestine question.” Funk (2002) found
that the interviewees felt most strongly about the U.S. support of Israel in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict; they felt that “Washington takes side against the Palestinians.”
Muslim Americans view President Bush’s foreign policy in the Middle East as
“disappointed” and “scared” (Liu, 2005). Students expressed concern that the United
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States would try to involve itself in various Middle Eastern states, acting like “the global
police” (Liu, 2005). Students interviewed mentioned Syria and Iran as other countries
the United States may address and even “invade” (Liu, 2005). The interviewees also
feared that such involvement would lead to a further “backlash” on American Muslims
(Liu, 2005). Because of the wars on Iraq, Muslims in Liu’s (2005) findings viewed Bush
as a “racist” and that the war in Iraq is “an attack on Islam” (Liu, 2005), a view also held
by the Muslim isolationists (Khan, 2005). Furthermore, Liu (2005) found that the
participants see a double-standard in attacking Iraq, while avoiding a military situation
with states like North Korea (Liu, 2005), and thus have lost trust in the administration.
Professor Cole has went as far as to say that the Bush administration “is simply Anti-
Muslim” (Liu, 2005).
As a result of debate within the world Muslim community, Khan (2000) argues that
the constant rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy labeling elements related to Islam as
“fundamentalism,” alongside efforts to combat Islamism have led many Muslim
Americans to believe the U.S. government is against Islam. For this reason, many
Muslim Americans have refrained from adapting to the overall U.S. society. In order for
American Muslims to feel comfortable in the United States, America must end its
negative treatment of Islam during confrontations with Islamic nations (Khan, 2000).
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U.S. Media and Islam
The American media has had an interest in covering international events related to
Islam, events which are also of particular interest to the United States, beginning as early
as the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 (Noakes, 2000; Said, 1981). Now while the
media has devoted extensive coverage on Muslims, this coverage of Islam by American
media outlets has been “little short of dismal” Noakes, 2000). In fact, the media has had
“a growing tendency” to paint Muslims as the ““other, as terrorists” while reporting
Islamic values to be against the lifestyle of the West (Haddad, 2004; Khan, 2005). Such
a projection of Islam has contributed to discrimination of American Muslims and their
practices in religious practices in the United States (Khan, 2005).
Edward Said (1981) explains that while the American media has broadcasted and
reported events related to Islam, “ma[king] [Islam] “known”” to the American public, in
reality, the media “has given consumers of news the sense that they have understood
Islam without at the same time intimating to them that a great deal in this energetic
coverage is based on far from objective material.” All this takes place within media
coverage that “is presumed to be fair, balanced, responsible coverage of Islam” (Said,
1981). But upon looking at the history of America and Europe in its relation to the news
coverage of Islam, Said (1981) observed that the “failures” of the Western media’s
accurate representation and understanding of Islam were a part of the “attitude” of the
West. In fact, Said (1981) comments of how this relates to the coverage of Islam when
63
he said:
“I have not been able to discover in any period in European or American history
since the Middle Ages in which Islam was generally discussed or thought about
outside the framework created by passion, prejudice, and political interests” (22).
Said (1981) attributes this to the Orientalist tradition of which has caused an
inaccurate understanding of Islam. Said (1978) explains that, as one meaning of
Orientalism:
“Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for

dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing
views about it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short;
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority
over the Orient” (3).
According to Said (1981),
“...Orientalist thought is an imaginative and yet drastically polarized geography

dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger, “different” one called the
Orient, the other also known as “our” world, called the Occident or the West.
Such divisions always come about when one society or culture thinks about one
another, different from it.. .Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to
the Orient, its particular fate within the general structure of Orientalism has been
looked at first of all as if it were one monolithic thing, and then with a very
special hostility and fear” (4).
Said (1981) explains the relation of the West’s representation and view of Islam and
Orientalism when he says that
“[i]t has been an unexamined assumption that since Europe and the West
advanced into the modern scientific age and freed themselves of superstition and
ignorance, the march must have included Orientalism.. .Orientalist scholars have
tended to use their standing as experts to deny—and sometimes even to cover—
their deep-seated feelings about Islam with a language of authority whose purpose
is to certify their “objectivity” and “scientific impartiality” (23).
64
This perception of Islam is not recent; from as early as the Middle Ages, Islam has been
viewed as a “demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy, and obscurity” (Said, 1981).
Muhammad, the final messenger of Islam, was portrayed by Christians as “a false
prophet, a sower of discord, a sensualist, a hypocrite, an agent of the devil” (Said, 1981).
Said (1981) argued that Islam, so believed contrary to those in the West, represented to
the West “.. .everything that one most disapproves of from the standpoint of civilized,
and Western, rationality.”
American Muslims have believed (for some time) that the media does not portray
them positively (Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2002). In a poll conducted by Nacos and
Torres-Reyna (2002) asking American Muslims about U.S. media coverage the two
months following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, over 68 percent found the media to
show Muslims and Islam unfairly, while over 75 percent felt that Hollywood portrayed
Muslims and Islam incorrectly (Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2002), a similar poll conducted
by Funke (2002) found that “68 percent [said] that the media does not fairly portray
Muslims and Islam, and 77 percent say that Hollywood doesn’t ...”. This overall
sentiment was made more evident in 2002 when a group of Arab-American merchants
(Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2002) began a boycott against the New York Post for what
they perceived as the New York Post’s “anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stance and a
constantly pro-Jewish/pro-Israel coverage...” (Nacos and Torres-Reyna, 2002).
Now although some Muslim Americans suspect that the U.S. government heavily
65
controls the U.S. media and its reporting of Islam (Liu, 2005), the conspiracy theories
surrounding the portrayal of Muslim by the American media are not considered “useful”
(since there are many different outlets covering Muslims) (Noakes, 2000). While such
theories may not be valid, “[n]evertheless, the number of sources for reporting on the
Middle East and the Muslim world is limited, and there is a great deal of overlap among
media outlets” (Noakes, 2000). For example, very few news outlets have specific
reporters to cover issues that maybe related to the Middle East. The three main networks,
ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN, in addition to newspaper sources such as the New York
Times and The Washington Post carry such reporters (Noakes, 2000). Most other
sources, however, do not have specific reporters for the region, and thus use sources like
the Associated Press and Reuters for international news (Noakes, 2000).
Noakes (2000) explains that the stories that are broadcasted on Islam and Muslims
are often those that are “sensational,” which usually include stories on “...political
upheavals, acts of violence carried out by extremist groups claiming to act in the name of
Islam, perceived threats to American national interests, poor treatment of women, and
outrageous human-rights abuses” (Noakes, 2000). The focus on a negative image of
Islam has been prevalent since the reporting of the Iranian Hostage crisis.. .’’(Nacos and
Torres-Reyne, 2002). Although a wide range of stories exist in the Muslim world, the
media seems to only focus on these “sensational” types of stories. And by doing this, the
media neglects to capture the wide-range of opinion and intellectual movements within
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the Muslim world (Noakes, 2000).
The selection of stories covered by the Western media is not the only factor for the
media’s negative portrayal of Muslims, as the types of pictures and footage themselves
taken by the American media has added to the negative image of Islam (Noakes, 2000).
Noakes (2000) argues that the media often uses “recurring photographic or videotaped
images that tend to dehumanize and depersonalize Muslims”. Such images range from
“hundreds or thousands of anonymous Muslims at prayer or the ubiquitous photos of a
disembodied, upraised hand clutching a Qur’an high over the heads of a protesting crowd
[,]” while images that show Muslims in a different light are rarely used (Noakes, 2000).
In fact, Noakes (2000) explains that “[w]hen individual Muslims are shown [in the
media], they are typically radicals” (Noakes, 2000).
In addition to photographic and video images, the media language used to describe
Islam and Muslims is “similarly reductive, relying on certain ill-defined words both to
convey certain concepts to an audience and to avoid closer scrutiny or definition of
groups, individuals, and events” (Noakes, 2000). Words like jihad are often mis-defined
in the media (Liu, 2005). The word jihad “is [actually] defensive and is for protecting the
cause of Allah...” (Gabriel, 2004). The term is used to define striving (Gabriel, 2004) or
a “constant struggle” (Liu, 2005) of a Muslim in her/his everyday life, yet is often
reduced to mean “a holy war” (Gabriel, 2004; Liu, 2005). Noakes (2000) adds that the
most misused word when referring to Muslims is the term “Islamic fundamentalism.”
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The term “fundamentalism” is incorrectly used to describe Islam, since its origin was in
reference to describe Evangelical Christians in the 1800s who believed in the infallibility
of the Bible (Noakes, 2000). The term should not refer to Islam in particular, but rather
“a...designation for “all religiously motivated individuals [in modem age], drawn
together into ideologically stmctured groups, for the purpose of promoting a vision of
divine restoration”” (Sachedina, 2001, citing Lawrence, 1989).
A much deeper problem with the language used in media coverage stems from the
use of the terms “Western” and “Islam” (Said, 1981). These “labels,” according to Said
(1981), allow for gross “generalizations” upon the deep history of Islamic and “Western
tradition.” Now while both terms are mis-used, the terms are used against one another in
order to make “Islam” seem inferior. Said (1981) explains of the use of the term “West”
versus “Islam,” as opposed to “Christianity” against “Islam” because the term “West” is
“[assumed] [to be] greater than and has surpassed the stage of Christianity, its
principal religion, the world of Islam—its varied societies, histories, and languages
notwithstanding—is still mired in religion, primitivity, and backwardness.
Therefore, the West is modem, greater than the sum of its parts, full of enriching
contradictions and yet always “Western” in its cultural identity; the world of
Islam, on the other hand, is no more than “Islam,” reducible to a small number of
unchanging characteristics despite the appearance of contradictions and
experiences of variety that seem on the surface to be as plentiful as those of the
West” (10).
In describing the information non-Muslims in the West receive on Islam, Noakes
(2000) explains that since the information often come from editorials found in U.S.
newspapers, and because these pieces take a particular stance on an issue, they often
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“convey only one side of an argument; seldom is it the Muslim perspective that graces
the editorial pages of the Times or Post” (Noakes, 2000). Therefore, the view of Islam
and Muslims to Americans is “somewhat lopsided” (Noakes, 2000). The American
viewer often sees Muslims portrayed in horrible lights, often as “irrational and confused,
and vaguely threatening in their unpredictability” (Noakes, 2000).
In addition, the Islam presented to the American people is often general, and not
detail. Noakes (2000) argues that giving a general description of the overall faith of
Islam is inaccurate, since Muslims (who number about one in five in the world) have
different interpretations and practices of Islam. Furthermore, news outlets often send
reporters to foreign lands who have little or no knowledge of the region to foreign lands
to cover stories which are related to Islam (Said, 1981; Noakes, 2000). In these cases,
“[m]ost journalists assigned to the Middle East beat have no particular background or
training in the area; have no personal contacts in the region; and do not speak Arabic,
Farsi, Urdu, Turkish, or Hebrew” (Noakes, 2000). Networks also often reassign
journalists after months—so as to “move fresh faces into sensitive postings periodically”
(Noakes, 2000). This leads to a lack of sufficient language abilities, which in turn leads
to similar and basic accounts of the story; reporters without language proficiency, unable
to investigate deep into a story, often “[take] hold of what is nearest at hand, usually a
cliche or some bit of journalistic wisdom that readers at home are unlikely to challenge”
(Said, 1981).
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“American Media Structure”
The way the American media is currently setup has a profound effect on the way
Islam and events in the Middle East are portrayed (Noakes, 2000). As previously
mentioned, the U.S. media often focuses on events that are of particular importance to
U.S. interests. Thus, a current event in a particular state may get the majority of press,
and yet after the events passes, the country may not be heard from for a long while. This
method of reporting has a profound impact on Islam and Muslims because, by the media
reporting only events of “violence and upheaval” in the Islamic world, this “gives
Americans the impression that these calamitous events are the rule, rather than the
exception of daily life in the region. The American media outlets provide the public with
very little evidence to contradict that widely held, yet baseless assumption” (Noakes,
2000). Moreover, because of the “shrinking resources” of the American media outlets,
news outlets first cut back by limiting the number of “far-flung foreign operations” that
are covered (Noakes, 2000).
Another factor resulting in the negative image of Muslims in reporting is the overall
lack of ability for American media to report on stories that have religious elements within
them (Noakes, 2000). While there are a select few journalists that have the ability to
cover issues of religion, their reporting is mostly tailored to covering issues of “Protestant
70
denominations and the Roman Catholic Church” (Noakes, 2000). Furthermore, when
religion is covered, it is often restricted to a once-a-week-printing; the only news network
that “maintains a full-time religion reporter” is ABC (Noakes, 2000).
A final factor in the way news is reported is the medium itself in which the
American public receives its news. Since more Americans receive their news from the
television, these citizens are being exposed to reports that “are often almost
instantaneous” and “more ephemeral than print journalism” (Noakes, 2000). This may be
as a result of Americans becoming “less involved in community life” and thus, their
views on people and places are much more prone to the influence of media (Nacos and
Torres-Reyne, 2002).
In the condensed structure of television reports, one finds little room for extensive
research. Few of the international reports on the television networks are extensive; “only
a handful.. .are more than two minutes long” (Noakes, 2000). The media therefore has to
“contextual[ize] frameworks of reference” (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002). By doing
this, the media works off of already-conceived thoughts about a group or topic, which has
implications to Americans and their thoughts about those issues (in this case, Islam and
Muslims) (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002). This factor was also found to be prevalent in
Liu’s (2005) findings among American Muslim youth. Many of the youth felt that the
media didn’t clearly explain the situation they were reporting. In fact, one student went
on to say that the media outlets
71
“[are] portraying the Muslims as terrorists and suicide bombers...as undemocratic

heathens and they don’t show the other side.. .If that’s what people see day in and
day out, that’s how they’re going to think. They don’t go deeper into context—is it
a background issue, historical issue, why the Middle East is the way it is today,
who put Saddam in power, how Iraq got to the point it was—they don’t show you
that. They just show you: Arabs_no democracy_barbarians. That’s all people
associate [with] when they think of the Middle East” (Liu, 2005, 35).
To sum up how the U.S. media controls the Islam that non-Muslims in the west see, Said
(1981) states that
“For most Americans.. .the branch of the cultural apparatus that has been
delivering to them for the most part includes the television and radio networks,
the daily newspapers, and radio networks, the daily newspapers, and the mass
circulation news magazines; films play a role, of course, if only because to the
extent that a visual sense of history and distant lands informs our own, it often
comes by way of the cinema. Together, this powerful concentration of mass
media can be said to constitute a communal core of interpretations providing a
certain picture of Islam and, of course, reflecting powerful interests in the society
served by the media... .(43).
Said (1981) goes on to add that
“...what the media produce is neither spontaneous nor completely “free”... [And]
since.. .tacitly agreed-upon rules serve efficiently to reduce an unmanageable
reality into “news” or “stories,” and since the media strive to reach the same
audience which they believe is ruled by a uniform set assumptions about reality,
the picture of Islam.. .is likely to be uniform.. .It ought to go without saying that
the media are profit-seeking corporations and therefore, quite understandably,
have an interest in promoting some images of reality rather than others. They do
so within a political context made active and effective by an unconscious
ideology, which the media disseminate without serious reservations or
opposition” (44-45).
While one can assign blame to different actors for the negative portrayal of
Muslims, Noakes (2000) also blames Muslims themselves for part of the problem of
negative media coverage towards Islam, stating that Muslims themselves “must also bear
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some responsibility for this sad state of affairs.” Noakes (2000) explains that Muslims
abroad distrust the outside media. Leaders of Islamic nations overseas echo such
sentiments of their respective populations, unless they themselves are projected in a
positive manner by outside media. Thus, we find a lack of accessibility by foreign media,
which has resulted on their dependence “on second-hand information for their stories”
(Noakes, 2000). Heads of state or ministers of information find it difficult to complain
about inaccurate reporting if they refuse to talk to reporters or allow them to do their jobs.
On the other hand, it is unclear that simply allowing journalists to come to a Muslim
country and providing them with access to local and national officials and other
personalities will necessarily make media coverage more sympathetic” (Noakes, 2000).
Along with blaming leaders of Muslim countries and organizations, Noakes (2000)
also blames the American Muslim community. In regards to the Muslim American
response to the media, Noakes (2000) explains that many Muslim Americans do not take
any actions to address the concerns that they have with the media. In fact, very few
groups are working with to change these problems, although groups such as the Council
of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the American Muslim Council (AMC) and the
Muslim Public Affair Council (MPAC) are active on issues of the perception of Muslims
in the media. While a number of Muslims in America believe the media negatively
portrays them and Islam, few have taken steps such as contacting the networks or
newspapers to express their distaste (Noakes, 2000). Others suggest that it is the
responsibility of American Muslims to work to educate their fellow Americans about the
truth of Islam (Liu, 2005). Criticism is often hurled at many American Muslims from
within their own community by those who are upset at the fact that many Muslims hide
their faith and Muslim identity from Americans (Liu, 2005). Scholars attribute some of
this to the types of career positions Muslim American parents expect of their children.
While the American Muslim community has so many issues with the American media,
few parents encourage their children to pursue a career in journalism. Many continue to
push their children towards careers in medicine and engineering (Noakes, 2000).
While the media has paid negative attention to Islam and Muslims, (Noakes, 2000),
Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) suggest that a shift occurred in the way news media
covered Islam in America immediately following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. In
their study of four major newspapers in New York (The New York Times, the New York
Post, the Daily News (NY), and USA Today), they found a “shift from a fairly limited and
stereotypical coverage.. .to a more comprehensive and inclusive news presentation” in
these respective newspapers (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002). In addition, the reporters
from these papers used Muslims and Arabs as sources for their stories much more often
than before September 11th, 2001 (Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002). This, along with
more in depth stories and an increase in analysis pieces and reader comments in the form
of letters to the newspaper has allowed the situation of Muslim Americans to be
discussed while giving readers a clearer picture of the situation, which has lead readers to
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“make their judgments on a more educated basis” (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002).
Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) found that the most significant positive difference
in the way the newspapers covered Islam and Muslims was in regards to what issues were
reported, in addition to the manner of which the stories were told. While the issues
reported about Muslim American prior to the attacks were in regards to their political
participation, the direction of the topics covered changed after September 11th towards
issues of “civil liberties and civil rights” in relation to the Muslim American community
(Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002). Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) compare the issues
reported by the media before and after September 11th by saying that
“After 9-11, the predominant themes, namely the status of civil liberties and civil
rights of American Muslims and Arabs, were hardly less problematic with respect
to reinforcing the stereotypical image of these minorities. After all, these issues
arose in the aftermath of an unprecedented terrorism attack that was perpetrated
by Arab Muslims. But after 9-11, the newspapers carried more pleads for a better
understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States, more
assurances that most Muslims have nothing to do with terrorism and that Islam
does not preach violence. Just as important, as mentioned above, there was
significantly more support to protect the civil liberties and rights of American
Muslims and Arabs than calls to curb their freedoms in the mass-mediated
discourse” (Nacos and Torres-Reyne, 2002, 11).
From their data, Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) concluded that American-Muslims, in
the eleven months following September 11th, 2001, were viewed in a “more favorable”
light than before the attacks.
While Nacos and Torres-Reyne (2002) found that Muslims were seen in a “more
favorable” light after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, a 2004 report conducted by
Erik C. Nisbet and Janies Shanahan (2004) of The Media & Society Research Group at
Cornell University shows the opposite, that Islam and Muslims are perceived in a
negative light by non-Muslim Americans. Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) conducted 715
phone interviews, with topics that ranged from terrorism, to civil liberties, to one’s
perception on Islam and Muslim Americans. Among the results, Nisbet and Shanahan’s
(2004) found that “[n]early half (47% of respondents believe that Islam is more likely to
encourage violence compared to other religions... [and that] [t]hat percentage rises to
sixty-five percent among highly religious respondents.” They also found that only
twenty-seven percent of the respondents “believe that Islamic values are similar to
Christian values” (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004).
On the issue of civil liberties, Nisbet and Shanahan (2004) found a strong support
for the restriction of civil liberties. According to their findings, “[n]early half (47%) of
respondents support greater power for the government to monitor Internet activities,
while nearly two-thirds (63%) agree that the government should be able to detain
indefinitely suspected terrorists” (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004). The response numbers
were even higher among interviewees who were identified as “Christians with a high
level of religiosity... [as they] are almost twice as likely to agree that the government
should have more power to monitor Internet activities (61%), that the government should
outlaw some un-American actions (43%), and that the media should not report criticisms
of the government in times of crisis (44%)” (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004).
Questions of civil liberties and American Muslims produced similar results. In the
study, 44% believed that the government should restrict at least one civil liberty for
Muslim Americans (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004). In addition, “[f]orty-two percent of
highly religious respondents believe that Muslim Americans should register their
whereabouts with the federal government” (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004). These numbers
were higher among those who had a higher level of fear of an attack. (It must be also
noted that “[tjwice as many respondents who pay a high level of attention to TV news
(18%) feel personally in danger from a terrorist attack, as compared to Respondents who
pay a low level of attention to TV news (9%”)” (Nisbet and Shanahan, 2004).
CHAPTER SEVEN
ISLAM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Most scholars argue that Islam does not separate the private religious life from the
political (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996), although, “in practice...[there is] a de facto
separation between the religious and temporal realms of human activity...” (Sachedina,
2001). Muslims in America are not major players in the political sphere (Haddad, 2001).
In fact, the political participation of the Muslims in the West has been labeled “very
variable” (Ramadan, 2004). Among the reasons for this lack of influence includes
diversity within the community, little experience in the political process, along with
successful efforts by “Christian Right” and “Zionist” groups “to keep them out of the
mainstream” (2001). While we have seen an increase of Muslims organizations in the
West, in addition to increase of attention Muslim students have given attention to politics,
Muslims in the West still rarely vote (Ramadan, 2004).
An important reason for a lack of political participation in the United States stems
from debate within the Muslim American community itself, as whether or not Muslims
should be involved in this process (Nimer, 2002). While most Muslim Americans favor
political participation, we also find many within the community that are opposed to such
an idea (Nimer, 2002). Those against the union of religion and politics have argued that
“involvement with politics may mislead or corrupt believers” (Eickelman and Piscatori,
1996). The “isolationists” are those who are against the idea of Muslim political
77
78
participation (Nimer, 2002). They believe that Muslims should not associate themselves
(politically) with a system that “do[es] not follow Islamic precepts” (Nimer, 2002, 169).
In fact, many consider the United States as “an evil empire dedicated to global
domination” (Khan, 2005). Often times Quranic passages and in particular verse 5:49 are
cited to encourage Muslims not to participate in such systems (Nimer, 2002). Verse 5:49
states:
And this (He commands): Judge thou among them by what Allah hath revealed.
And follow not their vain desires, but beware of them lest they beguile thee from
any of that (teaching) which Allah hath sent down to thee.” (Nimer, 2002, 169-
170).
While many who follow this thought are not opposed to the American system as a whole
(as many Muslims with this position have businesses in the United States), nonetheless
they carry with them a fear that the American Muslim will be internally corrupted of the
American as a result of involvement in the American political process (Nimer, 2002,
170).
The origins of isolationist thought did not originate in the United States, but was
rather supported by leaders of foreign Islamic groups and organizations (Haddad,
2001...Muslims in U.S. Politics). In fact, the political participation of Muslims in
America was first largely influenced by Muslims outside the United States. Muslims
who were being targeted for the political beliefs in their native countries left their
respective nations and came to the United States. Upon arriving, Muslims used the
freedom granted in America to further the influence of the Islamic movements that they
79
were affiliated with in their countries of origin (Haddad, 2001). The interaction with
Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood was thus influential in forming
Islam in America (Haddad, 2001), even though such messages were often “contrary” to
the American lifestyle (Haddad, 2001). Haddad (2001) cites a speech by Abu al-A’la
Mawdudi, when he “advised Muslims not to fall victim to the economic allures of North
America. Mawdudi warned about its social problems and urged Muslims to return to
their homelands before they lose their souls” (Haddad, 2004). Having visited the United
States, Mawdudi’s message consisted of warning Muslims about the dangers of living in
the West (Haddad, 2004), all the while urging Muslims to fight “the modern jahiliyyah
[(which is referred to the state or ignorance of the time before Prophet Muhammad)]
spread by the West” (Philpott, 2002). Other Muslim thinkers such as Said Qutb expressed
similar thoughts of creating a Muslim state, while resisting any country that mistreated
Muslims (Haddad, 2004). Qutb, known as the most influential thinker to many Islamic
fundamentalist movements, at first worked to conceptualize democracy within an Islamic
context. He abandoned this idea, however, upon being imprisoned by President Gamal
Abdel in Egypt (Philpott, 2002). Qutb, highly influenced by the writings of Al-Mawdudi,
believed that “religious and secular people could not coexist in peace” (Philpott, 2002).
In fact, he argued that Muslims must ignore laws created by man, which were leading to a
modern day jihiliyyah. He explained the duty of Muslims by saying
“. ..The true believers, the elect, must organize themselves into vanguard groups
apart from the new society of ignorance and repeat the original establishment of
80
Islam through withdraw/migration, jihad, and conquest of power” (Philpott, 2002,

88).
Syed Abu al-Hassan Ali Nadvia, another influential Muslim thinker, stressed a “separate
community” for the Muslims while living in the West. Commenting on the role of
Muslims in America, he said,
“You, therefore, are in America not merely as flesh and blood, not simply as
Indians, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Syrians...but as Muslims, one community, one
brotherhood. You are Ibrahimi and Muhammadi. Know yourself. You have not
come here to lose your identity and get fitted into this monstrous machine or to
fill your bellies like animals” (Haddad, 2004, 31).
The isolationists often describe the morality of the U.S. society as “immoral,” “greedy,”
and “sexually decadent” (Khan, 2005).
In addition to attacking the American lifestyle, isolationists criticize the foreign
policies and “imperialistic tendencies” of the United States (Khan, 2005). Muslim
isolationists suggest that the United States’ involvement in conflicts in the Middle East
(such as the Iraq-Iran war, the current Iraq war, along with its position on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict) are for economic gain, and that the United States have “utter
disregard for Muslim lives and Muslim society” (Khan, 2005). Furthermore, isolationists
accuse the United States of preaching for the protection of human rights, while
themselves not fully abiding by their own speech, citing the treatment of the Palestinians,
along with domestic laws such as the PATRIOT Act as evidence for the lack of
fulfillment of these rights (Khan, 2005). This ideology of the isolationists, to turn away
from American ideals in favor of a focus on the original county or origin, while pressed,
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has not been strongly adhered to in the United States (Haddad, 2001). And for this
reason, Muslim immigrants in the United States are in America permanently, and thus
urge voices from overseas to understand their new role of participation within the United
States political system (Haddad, 2001; Khan, 2005).
Those against political participation tend to be from traditionalist schools and under
the belief that Islamic principles cannot be “contextualized” or “open to interpretation”
(Ramadan, 2004). Traditionalists who oppose participation in politics express their
argument in “five points” (Ramadan, 2004). Tariq Ramadan (2004) lays out these five
points as such:
(1) There are no “elections” in Islam (it is not a Qur’anic term, and the relation
between the individual and the political leader is a contract of allegiance [baya]);
(2) One may not desire [political] office, on the basis of the Prophetic tradition
(among others) “We do not give (political) authority to those who ask for it or
ardently desire it”; (3) A Muslim can give allegiance only to a Muslim and must
otherwise abstain from all political involvement; (4) A Muslim must respect the
political authority exercised by a Muslim, even if it is not ideal, on the bases of
the Qur’anic verse that commands Muslims to obey God, his Prophet, and “those
who exercise (political) authority”; (5) The democratic system (the criteria of
shura), and a Muslim in the United States or Europe, outside his natural home
(dar al-Islam), must distance himself from any support for a system opposed to
Islamic values” (Ramadan, 2004, 159).
The United States political system, according to the isolationist argument, would thus be
considered “kufr, ” “a system against the laws of Allah and the Islamic Shariah [(law)]”
(Gabriel 2004; Khan, 2005), which, according to Muslims, is considered “all-
encompassing” (Gabriel, 2004) and is made up of revelation (i.e. The Quran,) Hadith, and
the Sunnah (which are the recordings of actions of the life of Muhammad)
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(’AbuSulayman, 1987; Gabriel, 2004) (’AbuSulayman, 1987). The vision of the
isolationists is to ultimately unite Muslims politically under the Khilafah, or Islamic
Caliphate (Khan, 2005).
Ramadan (2004) notes how this interpretation of political participation put forth by
the isolationists is highly “restrictive” and “out of context”. Scholars in opposition to this
interpretation have looked at the idea of political participation in light of these points and
suggest that political participation is in fact acceptable. To them, the rules listed “are
known [,] but need to be reconsidered in light of the actual situation...” (Ramadan,
2004). Therefore, ijtihad, “literally “effort,” has become a technical term meaning the
effort accomplished by a jurist, either to extract a law or a ruling from an inexplicit
scriptural source or to formulate a specific legal opinion in the absence of texts of
reference” (Ramadan, 2004). Ijtihad is used by scholars to issues fatwas (“specific legal
ruling”) to support Muslim involvement in the political process (Ramadan, 2004).
Others who argue that Muslims (and thus Muslims in American) can and should be
involved in the political process due so by pointing to the Islamic law concept of maslaha
(benefit)—(Nimer, 2002; Sachedina, 2001) (or “consideration of public interest”)
(Ramadan, 2004). The idea of maslaha used in this particular context serves to best aide
the American Muslims (Nimer, 2002), and thus, makes it necessary for one to be engaged
in politics. Scholars explain that “maslaha (benefit)... legitimizes action in pursuit of the
best collective interest of Muslims (Nimer, 2002), while “encourag[ing] human reasoned
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judgments of right and wrong” (Sachedina, 2001). Proponents believe that full political
participation is in the best interest of American Muslims, who constitute a growing
community with a distinct religious identity. The Muslim absence in public debate has
left the community vulnerable to scapegoat and alienation” (Nimer, 2002). In the United
States, Muslims who have taken this position in favor of political participation and have
embraced the opportunity for religious practice in the United States are known as
“Muslim Democrats,” (Khan, 2005). Observing that previous Muslims who came to the
United States may have “[lost their] Muslim identity” (Khan, 2005), and building on the
opportunity to freely practice Islam, Muslim Democrats have encouraged Muslims to
follow their vision of a Muslim society within the United States (Khan, 2005).
A third point raised by Muslims who favor participation in the U.S. political process
is in regards to Muslim American tax dollars, dollars that directly go to the government in
the form of taxes. And because these dollars go to the government, the argument is that
Muslims should therefore work to influence the government in the ways of which their
tax dollars are being spent. To those with this philosophy, the idea of “[I]solationism is
an illusion because of compulsory taxation, intrusive state laws, regulations and policies,
and the globalization of economic and political interactions (Nimer, 2002). Those in
favor of political participation in the United States argue that even the isolationists,
critical of the American system as kufr (Khan, 2005), still participate in the system by
working and paying taxes (Khan, 2005). From this argument, it will then be “necessary”
for American Muslims to work through the various channels of action (such as voting and
lobbying) in order to become influential as a minority group (Nimer, 2002). Nimer
(2002) points to cases of Muslim minority involvement in Hindu-majority India, in
addition to other nations where Muslims are the minority such as Kenya and Guyana as
models of successful interaction and change by the Muslim minority in terms of holiday
recognition, family law, and halal food preparations.
Following these latter arguments in favor of political participation, many Muslim
scholars believe being involved in politics is “legitimate, and even a duty, for Muslims in
the West” (Ramadan, 2004). Thus, in order for American Muslims (and Muslim
organizations) to become successful in their political objectives, they must
“institutionalize their work and improve its management” (Nimer, 2002). Scholars suck
as Muqtedar Khan (2005) suggest that the American Muslim community is not only
willing to become involved in American politics in the future, but have already done so,
and have already been successful in the “Civic and Conscientious Public Forums” (Khan,
2005). Scholars also suggest that Muslims can influence public debate, especially in
reference to the perception of Muslims in America, in addition to the voter turnout from
the overall American Muslim population (Nimer, 2002), although they must “.. .realize
that the game of power in America is dependent on money and votes, which, because of
the relatively small size of the Muslim community and its recent experience in political
participation,.. .Muslims are not likely to become a significant political force anytime
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soon” (Nimer, 2002).
Regardless of the isolationist argument to refrain from political participation,
Muslim Americans have taken an active role in participating in politics and in the
community (Haddad, 2004), although the events following September 11th, according to
Khan (2005), have allowed isolationists to return to the discussion about the Muslim role
in America. While this may be the case, Thorsten Funke’s (2002) research indicates that
while a majority of those American Muslims interviewed feel discriminated against
following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, roughly 93 percent of those expressed
willingness to participate in the American political system. Evidence following
September 11th, 2001 shows that Muslim Americans have organized and been involved in
the community on many levels, both in response to the tragedies of September 11th, 2001,
(Arab American Institute, 2002) and afterwards (Haddad, 2004). Realizing the
importance of upholding the freedoms that the United States offers, Muslim Americans
have increased in number-establishing organizations in order to “steer the United States”
back to these liberties promised to the American citizen (Khan, 2005). In fact, the
increase in participation has grown “exponentially” (Khan, 2005), as Muslims are
donating time and money working to address issues important to them in American
society. And because of the discussions about Islam and Muslims in America, Muslims
are using the United States as an environment to promote and protect ideals (such as civil
liberties and various social issues) (Khan, 2005).
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Haddad (2001) explains that the Muslim Americans voted in large numbers in the
2000 election, and were truly significant in the state of Florida, where, by some estimates,
roughly 70,000 Muslim votes went for George W. Bush. American Muslims also worked
extensively for the campaign with several on-the-ground political activities (such as voter
registrations and financial donations), activities largely due to the work of the Muslim
Democrats (Khan, 2005). During the 2000 elections, the Muslim Democrats worked to
register fellow Muslim Americans to vote. And because of this push, the Muslim
American community is now considered “a significant voting bloc” (Khan, 2005). While
the Muslim Democrats were convincing Muslims to participate, the isolationists’ vision
of a Khilafah “lacked credibility” (Khan, 2005) to American Muslims because they
already were believers in the freedoms and rights guaranteed in the U.S. system (Khan,
2005).
Several Muslim and Arab organizations supported George W. Bush in the 2000
presidential elections. Prior to Election Day, George W. Bush met often with Muslim
leaders, “assur[ing] [Muslims] that he would be president for all” (Haddad, 2001).
George W. Bush even “questioned the fairness of the profiling of Arabs and Muslims”
during a presidential debate (Haddad, 2004). As Bush paid heed to the issues of Muslim
Americans, A1 Gore “ignored them” (Haddad, 2004). But following George W. Bush’s
election victory, many Muslim began to “doubt” his intention to uphold this promise
(Haddad, 2001). Several people from the Muslim-American community were particularly
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disturbed when no Muslim imam was represented during the inauguration ceremonies.
They were further upset when President Bush said nothing in regards to “hate speech”,
specifically in regards to Reverend Jerry Farwell’s comments (Haddad, 2001; Khan,
2005) “condemning ” the participation of Muslims in President Bush’s “faith-based
voluntary work initiative to be undertaken by churches, synagogues, and mosques”
(Haddad, 2001).
A second incident that upset American Muslims was the cancellation of the
announcement of Eid-ul Adha, which comes at the end of the Hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca.
While President Bush was scheduled to meet with Muslim American leaders for Eid,
many suggest that he chose to not host the dinner due to pressure from those who viewed
Muslims as “terrorists” (Haddad, 2001). These actions by President George W. Bush left
Muslims questioning their loyalties to the President and his administration.
Muslims were also angry with the President Bush appointment of Daniel Pipes to the
United States Institute of Peace (Haddad, 2004) “despite vigorous opposition” from the
Muslim American community (Haddad, 2004). Pipes has been “perceived by Muslims as
the pro-Israeli provocateur who has initiated a relentless campaign against
‘militant/extremist/terrorist Islamists’ in the process calling for what could be considered
a new Inquisition reminiscent of what obtained in Spain during the fifteenth century”
(Haddad, 2004). Scholars such as Yvonne Haddad (2004) argue that “[h]is views on
what constitutes ‘moderate Islam’ are noted for their inconsistencies.” Haddad (2004)
explains that “Pipes sets out to distinguish between ‘real and phony moderation’” and
thus believes in “a need to question Muslims regarding their views on a variety of
issues...” which include a Muslim’s thoughts on the meaning of jihad, takfir (which
translated means “condemning fellow Muslims one has disagreements [with] as
unbelievers”), in addition to “[challenging] the Muslim view of modernity, expecting
them to renounce specific teachings of the Quran regarding women and the right to resist
occupation by foreign troops who expel Muslims based on religious discrimination, in the
process denying their right to choose and identity their own religion and culture”
(Haddad, 2004). Haddad (2004) says about Pipes that “[he] asserts that to be considered
moderate, Muslims have to renounce certain teachings of their faith.”
Now while Muslims were angry with such events, what really affected and alienated
Muslim Americans was the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress passing bill HR
3162, known as the U.S. PATRIOT ACT, (Haddad, 2004; Liu, 2005) which gave U.S.
government officials the ability to “[monitor]... individuals, organizations, and
institutions without notification” (Haddad, 2004). Muslims have also taken issue with
security measures viewed as “anti-Muslim, rather than anti-terrorism” (Haddad, 2004).
Muslims have also taken issue with government efforts to redefine the “Muslim
definition of the role of women in society” (Haddad, 2004), in addition to raids against
Muslim groups and organizations (Haddad, 2004).
CHAPTER EIGHT
POST 9/11 U.S. DOMESTIC SECURITY POLICIES
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001 and even prior, government transparency
was highly discussed within Congress (LCHR, 2002). Public criticism was directed
towards the government, accusing them of not openly sharing information. These
charges were further magnified after September 11th, 2001 as reports surfaced saying that
the Bush Administration withheld several documents from numerous committees within
Congress (LCHR, 2002). The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, was
designed to allow the public at large to monitor government actions, “providing] the
ultimate check against arbitrary government” (LCHR, 2002). The FOIA allowed
documents and other information to become available to U.S. citizens. Furthermore,
government officials were also responsible for releasing documents themselves if asked
for by citizens. Now while exceptions to releasing particular documents was a
possibility, all documents refused to be granted could be taken to court (LCHR, 2002).
All this changed on October 12, 2001, when “Attorney John Ashcroft sent a
memorandum to the heads of all federal departments and agencies setting out a new
policy on FOIA requests. The administration’s new policy encouraged a presumptive
refusal of requests, through a restrictive interpretation of the act” (LCHR, 2002). Before
Ashcroft’s call, the Department of Justice only defended a denial to release a document if
“the information would result in “foreseeable harm”” (LCHR, 2002). The position of the
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Department of Justice began to change, however, defending any government refusal to
release information, as long as it was based on ““sound legal basis,” a much lower
standard” (LCHR, 2002).
Because of these changes, several government officials began to “fully consider” the
implications of releasing any information, and its relation to the possibilities of hindering
homeland security efforts (LCHR, 2002). With a mindset against releasing documents,
government officials used these new laws to “[cover] all government information, most
of which ha[d] absolutely no connection to national security or law enforcement”
(LCHR, 2002). The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR, 2002) argue that
“[b]y encouraging agencies to “consider the value” of keeping agency communication
confidential and ensuring that in virtually all circumstances the government would
oppose claims made by individual citizens, the Attorney General [Ashcroft] has
effectively reversed FOIA’s presumption that citizens have a right to access government
information...”. They sharply add that “[Ashcroft] has established a policy by which
government information will presumptively remain secret, setting the clock back nearly
forty years” (LCHR, 2002).
The strength of the FOIA was further reduced in November 2002, when Congress
added “an expansive new “critical infrastructure” exemption in the Homeland Security
Act. Under Section 214 of the Act, “critical infrastructure information” voluntarily
provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not subject to disclosure
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under FOIA” (LCHR, 2003). This exemption, according to the LCHR (2003), “is far-
reaching. The term “critical infrastructure” encompasses a broad sweep of private and
governmental systems that include (but are not limited to) telecommunications, energy
production, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services.”
This allows companies to submit information to the DHS, thus keeping any wrongdoing
out of public ears. In short, it allows the companies to dodge public accountability
(LCHR, 2003). It must also be noted that none of the information given to the DHS by
these companies can be used against them in court, “shielding themselves [further] from
civil liability” (LCHR, 2003).
Whistleblower Act
The Whistleblower Protection Act was signed in 1989 by President George H. Bush
to strengthen “the rights of federal employees who challenge government betrayals of the
public trust” (LCHR, 2002). The purpose of this act is to establish a safe environment,
aiding and “protecting” one who speaks out against any illegal actions taken by the
government agencies (other than the FBI and CIA) (LCHR, 2002).
This protection changed after September 11th, however, as President Bush and his
administration called for an “exemption” for the Homeland Security Department from the
Whistleblower Act. The Bush administration argued that it was necessary to exempt the
Department of Homeland Security for reasons of protecting national security, since it was
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possible that the implementation of the Whistleblower Act may potentially lead to a
release of crucial information that would put America at risk of terrorism (McClintock,
2002). But with the exemption of the entire Department of Homeland Security, nearly
170,000 employees were affected, although many of the “agencies to be consolidated
ha[d] nothing to do with national security” (LCHR, 2002). The LCHR (LCHR, 2002)
argue that “it would make no sense to exempt all DHS employees, whatever their
responsibilities, from the important protections of the WPA.” They go on to add that
“...it seems that applying WPA protection to DHS employees is particularly important,
given that they are uniquely positioned to uncover essential information about agency
failings which might put our national security at risk” (LCHR, 2002). By not allowing
the DHS employees to fall under this category, protections are not granted to citizens
who are working to expose irregularities, all because of a fear of information “leaks”
(LCHR, 2002).
Several member of Congress began calling for amendments to the original act,
demanding the addition of Whistleblower protection in anti-terrorism security laws.
Senator Chuck Grassley introduced an amendment preserving the whistleblower
protection for Department of Homeland Security workers (Grassley, 2002; LCHR, 2003)
calling for whistleblower protection, as “whistleblowers are the key to exposing a
dysfunctional bureaucracy. The worry was that “Government agencies too often want to
cover up their mistakes... the information whistleblowers provide is all the more
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important when public safety and security is at stake”” (Grassley, 2002).
The US PATRIOT Act
Following the attacks on September 11th, United States House and Senate members,
after a mere six weeks (Cato Handbook, 2003) passed a bill known as The PATRIOT
Act, a piece of “legislation [written] to grant sweeping new power to both domestic law
enforcement and international intelligence agencies” (ISPU, 2004). The goal of the
PATRIOT Act was to increase the powers of federal officials to combat terrorist
activities in the United States (ISPU, 2004). While many argue that parts of the
PATRIOT Act are fair and beneficial to the welfare and protection of America, several
sections, while aimed to protect the U.S., do so at the cost of American civil liberties
(Cato Handbook, 2003).
One of the implications of the PATRIOT Act was the affect the Act has had on the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment “guarantees of the individual’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure [and] is a requirement that the government give notice before searching through
or seizing an individual’s belongings” (LCHR, 2002). Furthermore, the Fourth
Amendment states that officials must declare themselves before beginning a search
(LCHR, 2002). But as a result of section 213 of the PATRIOT Act (Chang, 2001),
government officials were granted authority to bypass “giving notice” in order to conduct
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their searches. It was only after the completion of the search that officials were required
to notify the citizen (Chang, 2001). Section 213 allows authorities “the delay of notice of
the execution of a warrant to conduct a seizure of times where the court finds a
“reasonable necessity” for the seizure.” Moreover, prior to the PATRIOT Act, Rule 41
(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required any property that was taken from
the search to be reported and documented with a receipt. But with the introduction of the
PATRIOT Act, federal officials conducting searches have the power to “delay” the notice
for longer than a week (Chang, 2001).
Section 218 of the PATRIOT Act was written in relation to Foreign Intelligence
gathering, and in specific, “amend[ing] the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
of 1978, enacted to establish a separate legal regime for the gathering of foreign
intelligence information” (LCHR, 2002). The 1798 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to gather information and intelligence of
foreign states or actors. While the FBI acquired such powers for foreign intelligence
gathering, its authority was limited to just that; spying on U.S. citizens was strictly
prohibited (LCHR, 2002). But with the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act, warrants
were granted “in situations where the gathering of foreign intelligence [was] merely a
“significant purpose” of the warrant” (LCHR, 2002). This allowed the “primary
purpose” of the investigation to not involve a foreign element, but rather “the collection
of information for a routine domestic investigation” (LCHR, 2002). Through the use of
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the PATRIOT Act, federal officials could use information gathered towards domestic
criminal cases (LCHR, 2002). Chang (2001) argues that such policy “gives the FBI a
green light to resume domestic spying on government “enemies”.
The USA PATRIOT Act, under section 215, gives the government the ability to
access personal records of U.S. citizens, as long as they take the appropriate measures to
do so, which entails a court order. This court order must be granted as long as the FBI
explains that the search will aide in an ongoing international terrorism case (LCHR,
2002). Information that may be obtained includes library checkouts, bookstore purchases,
or internet usage at a public library, all without the U.S. citizen being informed that an
investigation is occurring (LCHR, 2002). Furthermore, according to “Section 216...,
courts are required to order the installation of a pen register and a trap and trace device to
track both telephone and internet [activity] anywhere within the United States when a
government attorney has certified that the information to be obtained is “relevant””
(Chang, 2001). While officials cannot specifically review material searched on websites,
the PATRIOT Act is unclear in its explanation of “where the line should be drawn
between “dialing, routing, addressing and signaling information” and “content”” (Chang,
2001).
Several members of Congress responded to the powers granted to officials by the
PATRIOT Act by proposing new legislation calling for a change to such policies. Bill S
1552 (introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski on July 31st, 2003) was written to
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“strengthen protections of civil liberties in the exercise of foreign intelligence
surveillance authorities under Federal Law” (S 1552 IS, 2003). This bill addresses the
issue of FBI agents requesting materials and surveillance under the title of “foreign
intelligence” (S 1552 IS, 2003). S 1552 (2003) states that when requesting surveillance
permission, an agent must “include a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon
by the applicant to justify the applicant’s belief that the person to whom the records
pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power...”. Upon suspicion, S 1552
(2003) can be applied to acquire one’s activities in their everyday life, such as going to
the video store, the library, or when searching the internet.
In 2002, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court heard a case involving the
implementation of FISA. In its ruling, the court found that the “[Bush] administration’s
interpretation of the amendment would turn the entire purpose of FISA on its head
(LCHR, 2003). The court restricted the Bush administration from implementing such
actions according to their original interpretation of the act. The administration appealed
this decision to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, a court that was
created to hear appeals brought by the federal government. In this ruling, the earlier
decision against the administration’s interpretation was overturned. This allowed the
administration to conduct the intelligence in the manner they have been accustomed to
post-September 11th, as long as the investigations had “some purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence information [,]... even if the government’s primary purpose was to prosecute
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a crime, provided that the crime, itself, was a “foreign intelligence crime” (such as
espionage or terrorism)” (LCHR, 2003). The court did make a specification, however,
that the administration could not use this to go after crimes that did not involve an
international element. This does not include cases that may be “intertwined” with both
domestic and foreign elements, however, which will be able to be permissible, to gather
intelligence on account of FISA (LCHR, 2003).
Surveillance on US Groups
In 1976, the FBI stopped monitoring activities of United States citizens after the
U.S. Congress found the FBI spying on various organizations and political activities who
were legally protesting the Vietnam War. But under section 802 of the PATRIOT Act
(Chang, 2001), FBI officials are now given power to continue such monitoring activities,
regardless if the group being observed had ties to terrorist activity (LCHR, 2002).
According to Section 802, domestic terrorism is defined as “acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws” if they “appear to be intended.. .to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion” (Chang, 2001). Chang argues
(2001) that such a “vague” definition allows federal authorities to monitor those who are
opposed to actions of the government. Moreover, the simple act of protest can now,
under this law, be viewed as “domestic terrorism” (Chang, 2001). While “[t]he First
Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint-bases discrimination, section 802 allows the
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government to keep watches on specific individuals/groups (Chang, 2001) without a
timeframe of which to conduct such inquiries on these groups (LCHR, 2002).
To prevent further terrorist attacks through the use of airplanes, the Bush
administration established surveillance through the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). The TSA, in efforts to combat terrorism, set up two lists which
entail names of potential terror suspects: the “no-fly list” and the “selectee” list (CAIR,
2005; LCHR, 2003). The “no-fly” list is a list of names of those who are restricted from
flying in and out of the United States, while the “selectee” list is a list of names of people
who must be searched before boarding an aircraft. While the TSA list was intended to
focus on terror suspects, on several occasions the list has been used to keep out
individuals with no proven ties to terrorism. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy was
often stopped because his name resembled a name of another Edward Kennedy whose
name was on the list (CAIR, 2005). Another prime example of the abuses of the fly lists
is the case of Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan, which shows the inefficiencies of the
program.
Tariq Ramadan, professor of Islamic Studies from Switzerland, was scheduled to fly
to Indiana where he accepted a teaching position at the University of Notre Dame (CAIR,
2005). Ramadan’s original visa application was processed. Then, in a matter of days
before his departure, “his visa was revoked without any explanation at the behest of the
Department of Homeland Security...” (CAIR, 2005). After inquiry, it was found that
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Ramadan was not allowed to enter the United States because of “section 411 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, which bars entry to foreigners who have used a “position of
prominence.. .to endorse or espouse terrorist activity” (CAIR, 2005). Despite the high
reputation that Ramadan has by fellow academics, in addition to honors such as being
named one of Time magazines 100 greatest innovators, he was still denied entry (CAIR,
2005). The Council on American-Islamic Relations (2005) explained that the treatment
of “high profile cases against American Muslims [,]” cases similar to that of Ramadan
“further stigmatized the American Muslim community” (CAIR, 2005).
In continuing its surveillance, the TSA established other monitoring systems such as
the “Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPS)”, and CAPS II (CAPS
II) (LHCR, 2003). CAPS II was created to “identify” those who may have “potential”
links to terrorism (LHCR, 2003). This system would rank individuals based upon their
threat. CAPS would then evaluate the threat based on information collected from
“commercial data providers” along with government intelligence (LHCR, 2003). CAPS
II works by comparing the information received by data agencies to TSA information.
Following this information, “CAPS n...generate[s] a “numerical risk score,” setting the
level of screening to which a passenger must be subjected. The score is calculated by
checking the commercial identity information against” outside intelligence collected by
government agencies (LHCR, 2003).
In 2002, a new government policy known as TIPS, or the Terrorism Info and
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Prevention System, called upon millions of U.S. citizens to contact government agencies
if they noticed any “suspicious activity” by their fellow Americans (LCHR, 2002).
Policymakers such as Senator Patrick Leahy highly criticized TIPS, suggesting that “[t]he
average citizen has little knowledge of law enforcement methods, or of the sort of
information that is useful to those working to prevent terrorism. Such a setup could have
allowed unscrupulous participants to abuse their new status to place innocent neighbors
under undue scrutiny” (Leahy, 2002). Leahy’s worries extended further to include racial
profiling, explaining that “it was crucial that citizen volunteers receive training about the
permissible use of race and ethnicity in their evaluation of whether a particular
individual’s behavior is suspicious, but the Justice Department seemed not to have
considered the issue” (Leahy, 2002). Although several elected officials and newspapers
spoke out against the TIPS policy, the government in 2002 proposed to move ahead with
the program, as it planned to look for companies to help with implementing the system
(LCHR, 2002). Although the government discussed ways to implement TIPS, it was
eventually left out of the final draft of the PATRIOT Act (LCHR, 2003)
Following the Terrorism Information and Prevention System, the Bush
administration began working on what was known as the Total Information Awareness
program (TIA) (LCHR, 2003). This program was “... a comprehensive data-mining
project, powered by a computerized system that would tap into, integrate, and extrapolate
data from thousands of public and private databases” (LCHR, 2003). These databases
would include information regarding one’s health, work, school, and library records, in
addition to information on shopping purchases. The TIA program was created without a
single Congressional hearing on the matter, as its creation flew under the public scope.
Once the public got word and began to inquire about TIA and its function, information
about TIA began to “disappear” from government websites (LCHR, 2003). In fact,
LCHR (2003) reports that even the slogan and symbol (“Knowledge is Power,” by a
symbol of an eye on a pyramid watching the world) were taken off of the website.
Members from Congress and intelligence officials alike iterated public concerns
(LCHR, 2003), concerns that included the erosion of civil liberties, the questioning of the
actual effectiveness of TIA (which was renamed to the Terrorist Information Awareness
program in April of 2003) in halting future terrorist plans of attack, and the worry of an
increase in “identity theft” on account of the new information gathered (LCHR, 2003).
The Senate took steps to prohibit the use of TIA, “adopting a provision eliminating
funding for TIA research and development, while also requiring specific congressional
authorization for the deployment, implementation, or interdepartmental transfer of any
component of the TIA program” (LCHR, 2003). The House of Representatives also took
action against TIA. Although it continued to fund the program, the House of
Representatives required “congressional authorization” for any actions taken under TIA
(LCHR, 2003). And due to such public outrage, TIA was temporarily stopped (LCHR,
2003).
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In January of 2003, a new “initiative with a much lower profile, the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC)...[was formed], [having] the same potential to achieve the
same invasions of privacy without transgressing those new legislative restrictions”
(LCHR, 2003 Assessing). The TTIC was the location where new information regarding
intelligence on terrorism would be gathered and reviewed. The TTIC, being under the
Director of Central Intelligence (the head of the CIA), would grant the CIA access to
information unavailable to them in the National Security Act (LHCR, 2003). Moreover,
since the TTIC was under the DCI and not the Department of Homeland Security, “its
authority will not be subject to the crucial oversight provisions of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002. The LCHR explains (2003) that the “TTIC is subject to no restraints.
TTIC, in short, seems to assume duties the Congress explicitly allotted to DHS, without
adopting the oversight controls that Congress provided for DHS.”
National ID Cards
Following the attacks of September 11th and the PATRIOT Act, the idea of a
National Identification card system was being discussed, in effort to keep America more
secure from those who enter the U.S. illegally (Cato Institute, 2003). While ID cards
would be used to spot illegal immigrants, the Cato Institute argues (2003) that the ID card
system is not “foolproof... [as] there are several ways that terrorists will be able to get
around such a system.” For example, terrorists can hire people to work at the locations
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that produce the identification cards. They may also “bribe” workers to make fake cards
(Cato Institute, 2003). The Cato Institute (2003) argues that the implementation of the
National Identification card will do nothing other than “dilute civil liberties.” The
application of National Identification cards would lead to a “national police force, and
much greater military involvement in law enforcement” and would under other
circumstances would be considered “un-American” (Lynch, 2002). The Fourth
Amendment protects one from illegal seizure. Under the Fourth Amendment, police
must obtain a warrant before detaining a suspect. But the national identification system
could lead to an environment where police will demand suspects to show their
information, as opposed to a voluntary system (Cato Institute, 2003). Nevertheless, there
has been little “meaningful political opposition” to such plans (Lynch, 2002).
Those who support the National ID system suggest that such systems are already in
place in states such as France. This being so, critics of the system explain that “National
ID cards simply do not deliver security that is promised” (Cato Institute, 2003), and that
such a system would just grant more power to the government at the cost of civil
liberties.” Furthermore, since U.S. officials such as ““Donald Rumsfeld” ha[ve] already
warned us to expect more terrorist attacks,.. .it is a safe bet that more anti-terrorism
proposals will emerge in Congress” (Cato Institute, 2003). This includes the ID card
system, which will make Americans feel safer until, as the Cato Institute (2003) argues,
“America will be attacked again [,]” which will then lead to questions about the
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effectiveness of such a program. In short, such a system “expands the power of
government over law-abiding citizens, but it will not really enhance security” (Cato
Institute, 2003).
Post 9/11 Terror Suspects: Detentions
The United States government and Attorney General John Ashcroft called for the
detainment of thousands of non-U.S. citizens (and many U.S. citizens) following the
attacks of September 11th, 2001(Amnesty, 2002; LCHR, 2002; LCHR, 2003;). The U.S.
government failed to release information about why the detainees were being held,
explaining only that such measures were “an important step in the antiterrorism
investigation” (LCHR, 2002). While the U.S. government argued for the necessity of
such detentions for homeland security, others have pointed out that most of those
detained were never charged with a crime (LCHR, 2002).
Under the United States Bill of Rights, exceptions can be made to the rights that
American citizens have in being informed of the charges brought against them, their right
to a quick trial, in addition to “protection against torture” (LCHR, 2002). With the post-
September 11th detentions, John Ashcroft called for a 48 hour holding window for
detaining individuals, an increase from 24 hours (LCHR, 2002). Furthermore, according
to the new policy, a detainee may be held up to six months with a charge; even a
“technical immigration violation” was sufficient under this policy (Cato Institute, 2003).
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According to the LCHR’s (2002) report “A year of Loss,” “317 were held without charge
for more than 48 hours. In 36 of those cases, individuals were held for 28 days or more
before being charged... [t]hirteen people... for more than 40 days... and nine were held for
more than 50 days.” Following Section 412 of the PATRIOT Act, federal officials may
detain a non-citizen for up to a week without any charges filed against the detainee (Cato
Institute, 2003). While the PATRIOT Act states a mandatory limit of seven days, INS
actions suggest that the seven-day limitation was being ignored, as several detainees were
held without charges “for months” (LCHR, 2002).
Another provision issued by the INS was the rights of detainees to post bond. Before
the recent changes from the INS, only under certain conditions could the INS interfere
with a judge’s ruling of bond for a detainee. Previously, when the judge granted bond,
the INS only could ask for a “stay” regarding only serious convictions (such as a felony).
But under this new “automatic stay” (LCHR, 2003) policy, INS officials could override a
judge’s ruling, so long as the detention occurs while the individual’s case is in the
removal proceedings or if the bond was listed as above 10, 000 dollars (LCHR, 2002). In
addition, individuals who were first able to be released on bond were now “denied.”
Such cases were denied because an individual did not pass a “clearance,” which was used
as a check to ensure that the detainee was not involved in terrorist activity (LCHR, 2002).
By establishing a “clearance,” it allowed the government to suspect guilt. LCHR
explains (2002) that according to this, “[ejssentially, a detainee is presumed guilty until
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proven innocent.”
While individuals were held under detention, numerous human rights reports
suggest that detainees were denied the basic rights such as telephone calls and legal
representation. According to “INS detention standards...[the] detainees should [have]
be[en] given a list of organizations able to provide pro-bono or other representation, and
that they should be allowed to make telephone calls to legal service
providers...’’(Amnesty, 2002). But according to reports (Amnesty, 2002; LCHR, 2002),
detainees were denied access to legal representation, telephone calls, and other
information. Several of the detainees claimed to not have received the right to a phone
call for over a week (Amnesty, 2002), while others said that information and contact lists
given to them were outdated and inaccurate (LCHR, 2002). Some even had to wait a
whole other week if their call they made was not answered (Amnesty, 2002).
Those who were fortunate enough to receive legal counsel had new standards by
which the conversations between them and their attorney took place. Following
September 11th, 2001, John Ashcroft called for “the government to listen in on attomey-
client conversations in situations where it suspects the communication may facilitate
criminal crimes” (LCHR, 2002). While such powers were already in place, the new
action allowed officials to make such decisions “without oversight by the judiciary”
(LCHR, 2002). While the government must inform the attorney and client that the
conversation will be monitored, such actions may restrict a free exchange of thoughts and
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procedural options for the client without a fear of monitoring from federal officials”
(LCHR, 2002).
Government officials withheld the names of those detained following September 11th,
2001, claiming that such actions were necessary to preserve intelligence regarding
terrorist activity. The media, non-governmental organizations, and members of Congress
were also denied the names of the detainees (LCHR, 2002). While human rights
organizations filed lawsuits against the Department of Justice for the release of detainee
names, the Department of Justice did not respond to the requests (Amnesty, 2002). In
fact, John Ashcroft escaladed the level of secrecy by the Department of Justice with
regards to the detainees when he “close[d] immigration hearings to the public, including
families of the detainees, in cases of “special interest” to the government (LCHR, 2002).
In addition, the government failed to explain what cases would be classified as “special
interest” cases (LCHR, 2002). Moreover, when the hearings concluded, only the attorney
of the client was able to have access to the sealed file (Amnesty, 2002). While the
Department of Justice claimed that such actions were necessary to “protect the privacy of
detainees” (LCHR, 2002), several lawsuits were carried out against the secrecy of the
hearings (Amnesty, 2002). In two particular cases, one involving imam Rabih Haddad,
and the second case entitled “New Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft,” (LCHR, 2002), both
district judges ruled that the Department of Justice did not support their claim that
secrecy in these hearings would be beneficial to the defendants (Amnesty, 2002; LCHR,
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2002). The Department of Justice appealed the case of Rabih Haddad to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, only to find the judge uphold the previous ruling
(LCHR, 2002). LCHR explains (2002) that although the government claimed to have the
interests of the detainees in mind, “[m]any of the detainees did not want this protection
and felt disadvantaged by the policy.” In response to such rulings, however, it must be
noted that the Department of Justice “issued a new regulation attempting to ensure its
ability to hold secret hearings” (LCHR, 2002). Under these regulations, judges could
withhold information at the recommendation of the Department of Justice on certain
individual cases (LCHR, 2002).
Material Witness Law
The Material Witness Law, which allows the U.S. government to detain an
individual under the condition that a detainee’s “testimony is needed for a criminal
proceeding and who is likely to flee instead of testifying” (HRW, 2005), has been used
by the U.S. government following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 to hold and
question those whom they suspect of being involved in terrorist activities. In order to
receive permission to hold someone under the Material Witness law, “the Department of
Justice must file an application with a federal district court establishing that (1) an
individual has information that is material to a criminal proceeding, and (2) it is
impracticable for the government to secure the witness’s presence at a criminal
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proceeding by a subpoena.. (HRW, 2005). And only if both requirements are proved,
should a warrant be issued (HRW, 2005).
Human rights advocates have questioned the governments actual intentions related
to those detained by the Material Witness Law following September 11th. Groups explain
that “[m]any of the detainees were never actually required to testify in any court
proceeding, and depositions were not sought to secure their testimony, raising doubts
about the legitimacy of the government’s assertions that they were held as material
witnesses to crime” (LCHR, 2002). In addition, many of the detentions were not carried
out with a subpoena, but rather were held as “special interest” suspects on various other
charges because of their “suspected” ties to terrorism (HRW, 2005).
It must be noted that Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2005) found that the majority of
material witness detainees immediately following September 11th were Muslim; “[a]ll but
two [of the detainees] were Middle Eastern, African, or South Asian descent, or African-
American. Seventeen were U.S. Citizens.” Human Rights Watch (2005) specifically
claims race and nationality are distinct motives for these detentions, particularly those of
Middle Eastern of South Asian nationalities. They explain that officials have paid
particular attention to people from such backgrounds. For example, people of Middle
Eastern or South Asian ethnicity have been suspected of illegal activity for activities as
simple as taking pictures of buildings or activities early in the day (HRW, 2005).
Furthermore, Government officials detained many of these witnesses with information
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that “was often quite general in nature, such as a landlord reporting suspicious activity by
an Arab tenant” (HRW, 2005). What makes these material witness cases ironic is that
“[b]efore their arrest, more than two-thirds of the material witnesses arrested in
connection with post-September 11 counterterrorism investigations had either initiated
contact with the FBI, or when asked, had really agreed to be interviewed” (HRW, 2005).
These interviews will be discussed will be further addressed under the section entitled
“NSEERS”.
The PATRIOT ACT B
In February of 2003, “the Center for Public Integrity released a leaked copy of the
“Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” better known as PATRIOT II” (LCHR,
2003). If implemented, PATRIOT II would have “[swept] away constitutional checks on
executive power that are fundamental to American democracy. [It]...“would wall off
from judicial oversight precisely those areas in which the courts have questioned the
constitutionality of the administration’s actions in the first 18 months after September
11th” (LCHR, 2003).
Many worried about such a bill. And when the Department of Justice was asked
about the new act prior to February of 2003, they denied such a report existed. General
Ashcroft was questioned about PATRIOT II during a hearing on March 4, 2003. At this
hearing, several senators (including Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Russ Feingold)
Ill
directly asked John Ashcroft about the existence about such a proposal (LCHR, 2003). In
response to their questioning, the Attorney General guaranteed that his department had no
intention of introducing such a proposal, although he did admit that “the administration
was continuing to “think expansively” about these issues, and did not rule out the
possibility that any of the proposals contained in the Patriot II draft might be submitted to
Congress in the future” (LCHR, 2003).
A number of new proposals were detailed in PATRIOT n. The draft called for a
reversal of a court order that called for the reporting of names of those detained by the
U.S. government following the attacks of September 11th. In addition, the PATRIOT II
considered sending trials (including those of U.S. citizens) to locations where “the United
States [did] not have extradition treaties—countries that include Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Libya, China, Yemen, and Indonesia [,]” “upend[ing] a fundamental principle of
liberty.. .that the executive power may not deliver a person to prosecution by a foreign
government except pursuant to treaty or explicit statutory authority” (LCHR, 2003).
Another major change that was proposed in the PATRIOT II draft was its call to strip
U.S. citizens of their citizenship. Some compare[d] this to “Soviet Practices at the height
of the cold war” (LCHR, 2003). U.S. law makes it very difficult for a person’s
citizenship to be taken away from them. The major exception to this is those who are
fighting for a state’s army who is at war against the United States. The LCHR (2003)
explains that “even in those cases, the government must prove that there was a specific
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intention to relinquish American citizenship by engaging in that conduct.” According to
PATRIOT II, a person’s citizenship may be taken if they are shown to have given
“material support” to a terrorist organization. The LCHR (2003) argues that such a term
is “vague and appears to include political association and speech that is protected by the
Constitution.”
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Additions:

FISA Expansion
As previously mentioned, the administration won a major appeals case through the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, allowing them to gather intelligence
about criminal cases if they were tied to a foreign factor (LCHR, 2003). According to
PATRIOT n, the administration wanted to further increase their powers on this issue.
The aim of PATRIOT II was to redefine the term “foreign power,” which would allow
them to increase their jurisdiction on the types of information they were allowed to
gather. Before PATRIOT II, “foreign power” was understood as “either a federal
government or a foreign organization (ranging from a foreign political organization to a
group engaged in international terrorism” (LCHR, 2003). But according to PATRIOT II,
this would now also include “individuals .. .including U.S. citizens and permanent
residents suspected of engaging in international terrorism, but who have no known links
to any foreign government or to any group engaged in international terrorism” (LCHR,
2003). By placing individuals under the definition of a “foreign power,” the
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administration may receive a warrant without actually “without even establishing that
there is probable cause” a person is part of a foreign power (LCHR, 2003).
In addition, the Bush administration also proposed—in PATRIOT II—to erase the
distinction between those who are “U.S. persons” compared to “Non-U.S persons.”
According to FISA, the administration must prove that a citizen is engaged in activities
that ““involve or “may involve” some violation of law” (LCHR, 2003). When pursuing a
non-U.S. person, the government does not have to prove such a claim. Therefore, by
disregarding the differences between a U.S. person and a Non-U.S. person, government
officials will be able to obtain a warrant equally for both categories of persons, a clear
reduction of rights of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident (LCHR, 2003).
Also worth noting is the administration’s desire to “sidestep the FISA courts
altogether, using its FISA powers without any judicial review” (LCHR, 2003). Under
current law, federal officials may act without FISA permission for a period of fifteen
days after Congress declares war. Through PATRIOT II, however, these fifteen days of
action would exist “after Congress authorizes the use of military force or after an attack
on the United States by “creating a national emergency”” (LCHR, 2003). It must be
reminded that it would fall under the powers of the President to decide when the United
States was in a state of “national emergency” (LCHR, 2003).
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“Voluntary” Interviews/Registration
The U.S. government began conducting “volunteer” interviews in November 2001,
focusing on “5000 men between the age of 18 to 33 who had legally entered the United
States on non-immigration visas in the past two years and who came from specific linked
by the government to terrorism” (CAIR, 2005; LCHR, 2003). These interviews were
followed with further interviews in 2002 where 3000 legal U.S. residents of Middle
Eastern, South Asian Muslim countries were targeted (CAIR, 2005). Muslim American
leaders worried such interviews “would aggravate growing fears” within the Muslim
community (LCHR, 2003) and further create an “isolationist” mentality within the
Muslim community (LCHR, 2003). Furthermore, those who participated in the
interviews felt as if they did not have much of a choice to speak, questioning just how
“voluntary” the interviews actually were (CAIR, 2005; LCHR, 2003). The Justice
Department (DOJ) (GAO 2003) backed this response with their own conclusions,
reporting that “the interviewed aliens did not perceive the interviews to be truly voluntary
because they worried about repercussions, such as future INS denials for visa extensions
or permanent residency, if they refused” (also reported in LCHR) (2003). The DOJ
(2003) also cited concerns from officials conducting the interviews, questioning “the
quality of the questions asked and the value of the response obtained in the interview
project.”
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NSEERS/INS
In 2002, the Bush Administration began implementing a program titled the “National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System,” or NSEERS (IPC, 2004; LCHR, 2003). The
goal of NSEERS was to bring in males who were primarily of Middle Eastern nations—
from the ages of 16 to 45--to register with the INS. This registration involved a process of
fingerprinting, having their photographs taken, and questioning (LCHR, 2003). The two
stages of the NSEERS were: the “Special Call-In Registration... and Port-of Entry
Registration” (IPC, 2004). The purpose of the Port-of Entry Registration was to
document foreign visitors from specific countries entering the United States. The
countries listed included “Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria” (IPC, 2004). During this
registration, these visitors would be required to supply fingerprints, in addition to being
photographed by government officials. Individuals were then required to come back
within “30-40 days of their POE registration and another follow-up interview within 10
days of the one-year anniversary of their registration” to check in with officials (IPC,
2004). This registration process also called citizens of various Muslim countries (and
citizens of North Korea) to register with the INS by fingerprinting and photographing
these individuals. Similar to the Port-of Entry Registration, those who registered in 2002
also had to re-register within days of their anniversary (IPC, 2004).
The Immigration Policy Center (IPC) (2004) explains a number of failures existed
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on behalf of the INS when implementing NSEERS. They argue that the rules to register
were “complex, confusing, and poorly publicized” (IPC, 2004). Individuals registered in
this system had deadlines within which to return for the follow-up interviews; this was
determined based on the country of origin of the person. Before November 1st, 2003,
those who were late for registration were allowed to “show there was misadvice,” and if
this was correct, and one provided supporting documents, he would be allowed to register
(IPC, 2004). IPC explains (2004) that the process changed drastically after the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took control of NSEERS. Under the ICE,
anyone who registered late was “getting put into [removal] proceedings” (IPC, 2004)
from the United States back to their home countries.
Another problem with the distribution of NSEERS information had to do with the
fact that “the rules of NSEERS were disseminated primarily via publication in the
Federal Register” (IPC, 2004). And because of this, individuals who did not check the
Federal Registrar for updates to their situation ended up “unintentionally violat[ing]”
rules, giving the INS grounds for deportation (IPC, 2004; LCHR, 2003). Flight
attendants would also give incorrect information to passengers regarding departures,
failing to make the passengers aware of mandatory check-ins with the INS (LCHR,
2003).
The government themselves gave out false information to those looking to register
(IPC, 2004). IPC (2004) cites American Civil Liberties interviews and reports which
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explain that “many people received no information, and that many people received some
information but not all the information they needed for compliance.” [In addition] [,]
“many call-in registrants were given papers designed for port of entry registrants, and
were therefore given misleading and inaccurate information”” (IPC, 2004).
While the administration believed this was a necessary step for homeland security,
others argued that “[a]s a response to terrorism,.. .NSEERS has achieved little or nothing
in the way of demonstrable results—not one of the people who registered has been
convicted of terrorism-related criminal offenses-and may have hurt anti-terror efforts by
deeply alienating Muslim and Arab communities in the United States and Abroad” (IPC,
2004). The Council of American-Islamic Relations reported (CAIR, 2005) that while
13,470 people were placed in deportation, “not a single one of these individuals were
ever charged with a terrorist crime.”
One of the greatest problems with the installation of NSEERS has been the belief
that it has specifically targeted Arab Muslims (IPC, 2004). IPC (2004) reports that
NSEERS has not specifically targeted Arab Americans, since “[m]ore than 80 percent of
people of Arab origin in the United States are U.S. Citizen who are not subject to
NSEERS,” but rather that those “most affected by NSEERS are in fact non-Arab
Muslims, in particular Pakistanis and Bangladeshis” (IPC, 2004). Figures suggest that
thousands of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have been processed under NSEERS, and that
many more thousands have fled “before the registration deadline” (IPC, 2004). The
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government has unequally used immigration laws against Muslims, “applying
immigration laws in a highly selective and discriminatory manner” (IPC, 2004). Several
cases show that the Department of Homeland Security was looking for even past
violations of those who married U.S. citizens in order to deport these Muslims (IPC,
2004). In addition, numerous reports suggest that many called into register were not
offered translators, while others were not allowed to be accompanied by their lawyers
(IPC, 2004). Moreover, “[m]any were physically and verbally abused by corrections
officers, held in cells with 24-hour lighting, blocked from access to their attorneys and
families for weeks at a time, and held for more than a month without charge.. .Many [of
which] were eventually deported for minor immigration violations” (IPC, 2004).
The Ineffectiveness of Restricting Civil Liberties
Timothy Lynch (2002) of the Cato Institute explains that following a terrorist attack,
the U.S. government is quick to implement anti-terrorism measures aimed at preventing a
future attack. Elected officials argue that by restricting civil liberties, they can better
combat terrorism, and thus propose such legislation as a response to an attack. Their new
domestic security policies are considered “very popular” by the American public, who,
after an attack often feel “a deep sense of anxiety [,]” and are looking to feel “safe and
secure” (Lynch, 2002). These new domestic policies often viewed as sufficient to
calming the fears of the American public, who now feel that new domestic protection will
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secure another attack from occurring (Lynch, 2002).
Lynch (2002) argues that regardless of what types of domestic anti-security laws
exist, . .it is only a matter of time before the next attack.” Therefore, it is unnecessary
to restrict the freedoms of Americans on the assumption that doing so will result in a
safer environment from future terrorism on American soil. Furthermore, the American
public must understand that implementing new anti-terrorism measures by officials will
not stop future attacks (Lynch, 2002). Through a historical investigation of domestic
laws implemented by Congress following a terrorist attack, Lynch (2002) sees “a
disturbing pattern em erging].” Lynch (2002) notices that Congress, seeing an inability
of police to prevent an attack, took it upon itself to establish laws that “alter the balance
between liberty and security.” They feel that such new measures will help stop terrorist
attacks (Lynch, 2002). Following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center,
“Congressman Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) proposed the Terrorism Prevention and
Protection Act of 1993” which called for the use of “secret evidence in deportation
proceedings, and increased the surveillance powers of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation” (Lynch, 2002). Following the 1995 attack in Oklahoma City, President
Clinton asked Congress to pass similar policies, which led to a anti-terrorism proposal
called “the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.” Clinton felt that with the
Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995, officials had enough to prevent
another attack (Lynch, 2002). Yet, within two years, the United States saw another attack
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on its soil during the Summer Olympic Games, which resulted in the loss of two lives.
The Clinton administration’s response to this was yet more anti-terrorist security laws, in
hopes of “giv[ing] the FBI more tools so there will be no more bombing like at the
Olympics (Lynch, 2002). After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, we noticed a similar
response by the Bush Administration (Lynch, 2002). Weeks after the attacks, President
Bush and John Ashcroft introduced the “Antiterrorism Act of 2001” on the assumption
that these new anti-terrorism powers would allow officials to combat terrorism before it
happens again (Lynch, 2002). Despite these measures, anthrax letters sent to members of
Congress, in addition to Richard Reid’s ability to make it onto a plane with explosives
hidden in his shoes illustrate the inability for Congress to prevent attacks (Lynch, 2002).
In order to “break the recurring cycle” of implanting anti-terror laws on the false
assumption that they will prevent future attacks, Lynch (2002) proposes that
policymakers “thoroughly examine the question of how well the government has utilized
the powers that it already wields [,]” and not rush to pass new legislation. Since the
administration itself has admitted that Americans should be prepared for future attacks,
and that anti-terrorism measures cannot guarantee America’s safety from terror (Lynch,
2002), they should devote their time to focusing on preserving the fundamental right of
freedom, since while terrorist attacks are bound to occur regardless of anti-terror
legislation, “the adoption of certain policies [that]... limit the power of and scope of
government...[can] consequently increase the sphere of individual freedom...” (Lynch,
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2002). By ignoring the importance of freedom, it will be just a matter of time before the
increase of power the government has will lead to policies such as “national identification
cards, a national police force, and more extensive military involvement in domestic
affairs[,]” which will affect all Americans (Lynch, 2002).
Muslim Response to Post 9/11 Policies
Three main “perspectives” have arisen from the Muslim American community in
response to the Bush Administration’s post-September 11th homeland security policies
(Cainkar, 2004) from the Muslim community. First we find those who believe that the
domestic policies of the Bush administration were “irrational,” while failing to have a
clear understanding about Muslim Americans. And because of this, they believe that the
government did not utilize Muslim Americans as positive resources for the fight against
terror on U.S soil, arguing that such uninformed and “misguided” policies have
“damaged the fabric” of Muslim Americans, leaving them feeling afraid (Cainkar, 2004).
Cainkar (2004) notes a second view from the Muslim American community, namely
those who feel that the post-September 11th domestic policies were “well-intended” but
“went too far for too long”. They believed that once it was known that American
Muslims did not assist in the attacks of September 11th, the Bush administration and
members of Congress should have turned to American Muslims for assistance in
domestic security, and not target Muslims. Similar to the first group, these Muslims also
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felt that such policies gave a negative image of American Muslims, perceiving them as “a
security threat” (Cainkar, 2004). Louise Cainkar (2004) explains of the implications of
neglecting to include American Muslims by saying,
“By not involving [American Muslims] in the process of policy-making and

implementations, the government represented American Arabs and Muslims as
enemies of the nation instead of law-abiding citizens who are part of the fabric of
American society” (4).
The third response to the domestic security policies was by those who thought that
the policies were “well-thought out” and used even before September 11th, but were
“expanded” following the attacks (Cainkar, 2004). Those with this opinion suggest that
such policies are “in the context of the history of American racism, while others see them
in the context of US foreign policy” (Cainkar, 2004).
While the Bush administration’s post-September 11th, 2001 policies have aimed to
make Americans feeler safer, many leaders within the American Muslim community
believe that such policies have actually “been ineffective, counterproductive, and
damaging to the fabric of their [Muslim] communities” (Cainkar, 2004). Muslim leaders
felt that they should have been called upon by the United States government to aide in
United States security. But instead of being used positively by the United States
government, they have been targeted and labeled as a “security threat” (Cainkar, 2004).
Cainkar (2004) found that Muslims would have “appreciated” openness by the Bush
administration when conducting their domestic policies. In an interview with a Muslim
American, she explained that
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“[The administration] should have been upfront, and frank with the Muslim/Arab
community, instead of the covert operations they’ve been carrying out. They were
just hiding, beating around the bush, and upsetting people more in the process.
They should have met with community leaders and not be abashed about it. The
honesty would have been appreciated by the communities, instead of the
hypocrisy. Yes it would have created fear. But it’s good because they would have
been up front with the community and they could have gotten more done”
(Cainkar, 2004, 6).
The effects of the NSEERS have not been positive, especially for American Muslims
in their everyday lives. While anti-terrorism measures are meant to make Americans feel
safer, “NSEERS has had wide-ranging economic and social impacts on the targeted
communities” (IPC, 2004). IPC (2004) explains that NSEERS disrupted many Muslim
families, as “their main source of income” was lost because “in [these] Muslim, Arab and
South Asian families, the male is often the primary breadwinner” (IPC, 2004).
In addition, the registrations, detentions, and deportation caused a “shock of
separation” and trauma for many of the family members (IPC, 2004). IPC (2004)
explains that these policies affected the Muslim community more than just in the family
households, especially on a psychological level. Muslims were often afraid of going out
of the house, even to school and even public parks. Furthermore, Muslims would refrain
from using their Muslim names, using nicknames in order to avoid harassment, both in
everyday life, and when seeking jobs. This overall fear has led to seclusion of the Muslim
and South-East Asian community. People within the community are less-likely to share
personal information, or even engage in conversations with those outside the community.
IPC (2004) also found that this Muslim community tends not to trust local law
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enforcement officials, since Muslims have described many instances where they felt they
had been racially profiled by police
officers (IPC, 2004).
CHAPTER NINE
MUSLIM YOUTH IN AMERICA
“It is striking to note that [like Europe] [,] no such fears about Muslim youth are
on the minds o f Americans. Instead, we are preoccupied with the possible
connections between Muslims here and terrorist activities. But such concerns
also, inevitably, come back to Muslim youth—particularly to the sons and even
daughters o f immigrants, the so-called second generation. Such concerns are not
totally misplaced: with more immigrant groups, the biggest problems arise not
with the first generation o f newcomers, but with their children, who heightened
expectations are not always easily met by the host society” (Skerry, 2001,42).
Important in the discussion of the emotional and political reaction by Muslim
Americans to the post September 11th, 2001 security policies are the sentiments of
Muslim American youth. In his discussion on the status of Muslim youth in Europe and
the United States, Skerry (2001) notes that while the Muslim youth issue is a major
concern amongst Europeans (particularly in states such as Britain and France), the issue
is has not been a major concern for Americans. Skerry (2001) explains two particular
routes that American Muslim youth can follow in regards to their place in U.S. society.
The first category is what he calls “bummed out in Buffalo”. This term is in reference to
a group of U.S. bom Yemenis Americans who were “raised in the depressed industrial
belt around Buffalo who were.. .convicted of involvement in terrorist related
activities.. Now while this situation is more likely to be a problem in Europe than in
the United States (considering the socio-economic conditions of Europe as previously
discussed), it nonetheless is still a potential road that upset youth may follow. The
second and more likely situation for American Muslim youth is what Skerry (2001) calls
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“Born again in Berkeley.” Skerry (2001) defines “Bom again in Berkeley” as
“the familiar pattern whereby members of various immigrant groups born and
raised in this country are readily absorbed into the mainstream and consequently
lose identification with their ethnic, cultured, or religious origins. When such
upwardly mobile youth find themselves in college, they begin to question what
has happened to them and often go to some lengths to recapture the cultural
identity they feel they have lost. This has now become a pattern with many
Muslim youth” (42).
Several students who were asked about their faith prior to, and during college explained
affirmed the “Born Again in Berkeley” term.
Ludmila Zamah, a PhD Candidate in Religious Studies at the University of
Pennsylvania explained her experience of becoming closer to Islam:
“[Identity] was actually a big issue.. .After meeting a student for the first time as a
freshman at Penn, I felt compelled to figure out how to explain my background.
Saying I was from Kansas City was not good enough for some people, who would
then ask, “No, where are you really from?” Well, I was born in Ottawa and spent
four years of my childhood in Toronto, so maybe I was really from Canada.
Apparently that answer was not good enough either.. .1 later learned that when
someone asks me where I am from, I need to be prepared to give any or all of the
following information: “I am from Kansas City, and so is my accent, but I was
bom in Ottawa, lived in Houston and Toronto... At some point, these ethno
cultural definitions made me disillusioned, and I sought to define myself in a way
that transcended these labels. Islam filled this need in philosophy, and the Muslim
Students Association at Penn did so in practice (Muedini, 2006).
She added,
“Although my family is Muslim, I was not raised with Islam or a religious

community as my focus in my life. As a college student, I did not even know the
prayer times or the basic tenets of fasting. I started there in my search for
religious knowledge and continued with classes on creed at a local mosque in
Philadelphia.. .1 only started learning about Islam seriously in college. I started
taking Arabic my freshman year just because I wanted a language other than
French, and I haven’t stopped studying Arabic since then. Still learning the
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language and the religion—a never-ending process” (Muedini, 2006).
Skerry (2001) explains that while Muslim unity is one of the key challenges for the
Muslims in the United States, U.S. anti-terrorism policy has allowed Muslims to come
together. He gives an example of Iranian Americans and their efforts to work with other
Muslim Americans, explaining that Iranian Americans before September 11th, 2001 were
often “downplay[ing] their Islam. But following the U.S. officials’ classification of
Iranians as Muslims, Iranian Americans have begun to cooperate with Muslim groups on
Islamic issues (Skerry, 2001). Other events such as ethnic profiling of Muslims have also
been factors in furthering the cooperation between Muslim Americans of different ethnic
backgrounds (Skerry, 2001).
Muslim Youth Reaction
Interviews conduced by Emily Liu (2005) on Muslim American youth reveal that a
majority of these youth believe that Islam’s image has been misrepresented by the media.
Furthermore, the students felt that the media strongly affects the way American’s view
Islam, although not all students suggested that the media was specifically against Islam.
The media, focused on dramatic images, airs more stories on war, and thus may show
Islam in a negative manner (Liu, 2005). One student interviewed explained their concern
about the media and its images of war by saying,
“I understand the media have to cover the war and the immediate events, but
that’s just dangerous because it’s not comprehensive and Americans are getting
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the short-stick. They’re not getting the whole story” (Liu, 2005, 34).
Liu (2005) found that several Muslim students interviewed believed that President Bush’s
PATRIOT Act was “a key factor” for the way Muslims have been viewed in American
society. The students felt that the PATRIOT Act was the reason why most of them were
discriminated against. The students cited the incident in December 2004 where Muslim
students were stopped and searched before entering the United States from Canada, after
an Islamic revival conference. In this particular incident, border officials would not
allow the students to leave without fingerprinting them, and were quoted as telling the
student that “they [had] no rights” (Liu, 2005). The report also suggested that customs
officials had stopped and searched every car that said they were at the conference because
they feared that the conference could have been used for “terrorists to promote their
cause” (Liu, 2005). Other incidents such as raids on Muslim families in Colorado and
Seattle were mentioned by the Muslim students as well (Liu, 2005).
Marcia Hermansen (2003) examines the situation Muslim American youth in the
United States, and their attitudes towards Islam following the attacks on September 11th,
2001 by arguing that, contrary to the common belief that American Muslim youth would
be very interested in the “progressive” movement (which Hermansen explains is an
“outlook as one based on informed understanding of the tradition in its historical and
multicultural context as evolving to address the needs and issues of the time in a way that
is both spiritually and politically empowering”), American Muslim youth are turning to a
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conservative Islam. In addition, they are becoming more critical of those who do not
practice this form of “internationalist, “identity” Islam” (Hermansen, 2003).
Hermansen (2003) explains that the Muslim American youth are becoming largely
intolerant of diversity in terms of Islam, largely rejecting the progressive outlooks of
Islam. Furthermore, American Muslims youth are, in large, “moving in a direction that
negates interpretation and diversity altogether, one that rejects historical development and
cultural context. Furthermore, it privileges certain external markers of identity and is, in
the process, anti-intellectual.” Hermansen (2003) argues that this attitude is both
“arrogant” and “destructive,” and that this “nasty energy.. .has been allowed to run
unchecked and uncivilized, and has even been encouraged among youth by mainstream
Muslim organizations in America” (Hermansen, 2003).
A main reason for Muslim youth activities in the United States stems from their
concern with identity (i.e. how they see themselves within a western environment)
(Hermansen, 2003). Several factors have helped shape identity for Muslim American
youths in America: First of all, a large part of the Muslim youth in America are sons and
daughters of recent immigrants. This has left the Muslim American youth to find
themselves within a Western society that has (in the last thirty years) portrayed Islam and
Muslims as “the enemy or threat” to America (Hermansen, 2003). Hermansen (2003)
continues to suggest that while the “West” has carried this negative portrayal of Islam
and Muslims, an “internationalist Islamic ideology” was being formed. This
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“internationalist Islamic ideology” was covering political as well as religious aspects,
which was leading to an Islamic “revivalism”. Hermansen (2003) explains that with the
creation of this Islamic ideology, alongside the place of Muslim youth in America,
Muslim children were being taught to turn their backs to the culture of the U.S to
embrace another culture, all the while never being quite able to adopt in full another
homeland. Hermansen (2003) says of the issues facing American Muslim youth:
“One can well imagine the identity dilemma of a Muslim teenager brought up
largely in the American environment who has been encouraged by parents,
Islamic groups, and extended family to dis-identify with American cultural and
political contexts and to imagine himself or herself as being from somewhere else
(Pakistan or Palestine, for example) as a critical or opposition stance. At the same
time, this young person is probably never going to make it as an authentic citizen
of the imagined homeland, since he or she faces substantial inadequacies in
language competency, historical knowledge, and even cultural and social
assumptions about the idealized place of origin” (Hermansen, 2003, 308).
Such an “alienation” from both the Western culture and that of their parents, according to
Hermansen (2003), leads many Muslim youth to embrace a ““culture-free, global Islamic
militancy.”
A major problem with Muslim Western youth is their attempt to “reject the culture”
of the West (and in this case the United States) (Hermansen, 2003). According to the
Islamic Internationalist ideology, Islam is free from culture. Furthermore, Islam is said to
be “pristine,” working on the idea that the society within it is completely content, and that
this system should implemented around the globe (Hermansen, 2003). Several
movements around the world (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) have embraced
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and used this idea of a culture-free Islam. American Muslim immigrants have also
supported such ideologies because it was in accordance with their worry that their
children would become part of the American culture, forgetting their Muslim identity
(Hermansen, 2003). This has led immigrant Muslim Americans to go against several
United States cultural practices such as Halloween and high school proms. Hermansen
(2003) argues that this rejection of such events is not due to issues Muslims may have
with the holidays “commercial and commodified nature [,]” but rather merely due to a
feeling of “religious superiority.”
Leonard (2002), in her study focus on American Muslim youth, explains that the
direction that American Muslim youth will take in regards to leadership roles of Islamic
organizations is unclear. Leonard (2002) notices several changes among Muslim
American youth (both with immigrant Muslims and American-born Muslim youth).
According to Leonard (2002), many Muslim American youth are losing their ethnic
languages. Furthermore, differences are arising between Muslim parents and their
children over assimilation into the American society. Moreover, Muslim American
women have a much larger public presence as opposed to their previous Muslim
countries. With these factors combined, Leonard (2002) believes that while such
“changes may cause tensions within Muslim immigrant families,... [it will] probably
augur well for the future of American Islam, since the youngsters are converging,
forming American Muslim identities more alike than different” (Leonard, 2002).
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In regards to whether American Muslim youth are becoming more interested in
Islam, Leonard (2002) found mixed opinions in her research, explaining that
“Some will be lost to Islam, and some are “returning” to mainstream Arabic Islam
through their study of the Qur’an and the Hadith. Certainly, many are moving
from ethnic or national origin identities to a religious identity, and their
formulations of Islam may be “grassroots,” rather than guided by ISNA or the
MSA. Islam is taught to the young people in the United States not through
everyday immersion in Arab or South Asian contexts but primarily through texts
and texts taught in an American societal context. On one hand, this can result in
greater standardization and “orthodoxy” as the non-Muslim majority societal
context reduces diversity among American Muslims, especially among young
people. Yet, many of the “texts” are new ones, as young American Muslims rely
heavily on books, cassettes, videos, and Internet materials produced in the United
States” (Leonard, 2002, 241).
The use of the Internet, in addition to other “mediums not necessarily deemed orthodox
by [Muslim] elders” continue to be a popular reference for American Muslim youth
learning to become further connected with Islam (Leonard, 2002).
Muslim Student Solidarity

Immediately Following September 11th
Peek (2002) found that Muslim students tended to more closely interact with other
Muslim students following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. In her research, Peek
(2002) found that this was due to a feeling of “isolation” from the rest of the country.
Peek (2002), citing Goffman (1963), explains that those in a “stigmatized” group often
“come together into small social groups whose membership derives from the
stigmatization.” Furthermore, because feeling “excluded” from the U.S. community, the
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Muslim students turned to other Muslims.
Following the attacks, Muslim students felt as if they were not included within the
overall American community, feeling portrayed as ““the enemy” or the other”” (Peek,
2002). As American non-Muslims blamed American Muslims for the attacks, this “led
Muslims to feel disconnected from others” (Peek, 2002). Muslim students interviewed
were further alienated when they explained that expressed their discomfort when trying to
grieve with their fellow Americans following the attacks on September 11th, 2001. The
Muslim students felt that they could not act as “normal” Americans, as they were being
identified not as Americans, but as a “Muslim” (Peek, 2002). Such isolation led Muslim
American students to fear for their lives. Many would receive information from others to
stay home, as they feared a severe backlash (Peek, 2002). Other students became sick,
and missed weeks of school, because of the fear and stress (Peek, 2002).
Because of the decreased level of comfort within the overall American community,
American Muslims began to turn to one another for support (Peek, 2002). This “group
solidarity among Muslims” is not new to groups who have been discriminated against.
Scholars explain that groups tend to turn to each other within the group during an outside
threat (Peek, 2002). In regards to the Muslim American situation, Peek (2002) found a
“therapeutic community” that arose within the Muslim Americans. Fellow Muslims
turned to one another for support (Peek, 2002). Although a sense of closeness and unity
within the Muslim youth community was already present, the feeling of rejection from
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the rest of American society caused Muslim American youths to became even closer with
fellow Muslim youths; they were able to “share similar fears and uncertainties [,]” in an
environment where they felt safe to share their emotions (Peek, 2002).
While the fears of the American Muslims students “decreased over time [,]” many
were unsure if “things would ever “return to normal” (Peek, 2002). Peek (2002)
concludes by suggesting that the Muslims, while affected by the attacks just as non-
Muslim Americans, were further affected by the sentiments of non-American Muslims
towards them in the time following September 11th, 2001. Peek (2002) therefore argues
that allowing minority communities an environment to “enhance public dialogue—before
disaster strikes” thus “decreas[ing] social isolation.. .particularly in light of the
unprecedented severity of the backlash that followed the September 11th, attacks is of the
utmost importance (Peek, 2002).
CHAPTER TEN
MUSLIM AMERICANS STUDENT RESPONSES:

FOUR YEARS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11th, 2001
Interview Method
Beginning in January 2006 until the end of March 2006,1 interviewed twenty
Muslim students studying in the United States. I used the convenience sampling method
of choose my participants. Due to a lack of financial resources to conduct a random
sampling, I began by calling acquaintances and fellow student colleagues. From there, I
asked them to spread the word of my research, asking them to inform others about my
project. Next, I went to a Friday Jummah at university campuses to ask for participants.
Furthermore, I went on list-serves such as the Middle East Islamic Studies Graduate
Students (MEISGS) to ask for willing participants. I also contacted several Muslim
Student Association group executive board members around the United States via email,
sending them my project description and interview request form. Many then posted my
request on their respective list-servers.
The one research method I used was individual interviews. The interviews were
conducted and recorded in a variety in ways. Some of my interviews were done in
person, recorded by personal hand notes and my computer (with the permission of the
interviewee). Other interviews were conducted over the telephone, since some of the
interviewees were out-of-state. A third group of interviewees wished to see the
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questions, answering them on their own time, and then returning their responses. They
offered to discuss any questions or clarifications over the email. A last method I used to
conduct the interviews was through an online Instant Message system.
In total, I conducted twenty interviews that lasted from fifteen minutes to 2 Vz hours.
Many of the participants decided to enclose their name with the interview. There were
others that decided to remain anonymous. If the interview was conducted online, I took
out any personal information (such as their screen name) and kept the interview in a
document form. In this paper, their names will be changed to grant their request for
anonymity.
Before discussing my findings from this research, I believe it imperative to briefly
discuss the limitations that one must take into consideration with these interviews. As
previously mentioned, I conducted the interviews in a number of forms. The four
different ways I conducting the interviews were: (1) One-On-One interview in person; (2)
One-on-One interview over the telephone; (3) One-On-One interview through the
internet, using a instant chat messaging system, particularly AOL AIM instant
messaging; (4) Email interviews.
Because the interview method was a convenience sample, I also had to use a variety
of methods to obtain these interviews. While I was able to physically travel to meet some
of the students for the interviews, this was not the case for every interviewee. As
previously mentioned, I asked for volunteers through email and list-serves throughout the
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United States; I received responses from several parts of the country. I did not have the
financial ability to conduct all of the interviews face to face. Furthermore, both myself
and the students interviewed did not have the ability to set common times to meet. It was
easier for the students who lived away to where I was located to conduct the interviews in
another method besides in-person interviews.
The second method I used to conduct the interviews was through the use of a
telephone. Several students asked for this method, when I proposed the possible ways to
conduct the interview. Doing an interview over the phone was convenient, as students
could set the time best for them. In addition, the telephone may have been more
comfortable for the interviewee, as they did not have to feel the discomfort of being
isolated to an in-person interview. While all of the methods were conducted in the most
“professional” manner, conducting an interview over the phone may have felt less formal,
and thus allowing the interviewee to feel more relaxed in answering the questions asked.
While I found several advantages to conducting the interview over the telephone, I
also found negatives in conducing interviews in this manner. First of all, by not being in
person, the interviewer (in this case, myself) is unable to read the facial and body
language of the interviewee. All I could go off of was the pitch and vocal emphasis, in
addition to the actual words. Second of all, the interviewer must allow the interviewee to
finish her/his thoughts before proceeding to the next question, not interrupting the person
who is responding to the questions. This was a bit more difficult to successfully
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accomplish on the telephone, as the interviewer cannot see when the interviewee is
finished answering that particular question. In addition, as with any technology, one has
to prepare for technology failures. In this case, it was important to have as much service
with the telephone, as to not have the low service—which may cut the telephone
conversation. This was of particular importance in this case, as the phone interviews
(from at least my end) were done with a mobile telephone.
The third method used for conducting the interviews was with an instant messenger
chat system through the internet. This method was unfamiliar to me prior to my
interviews. Not widely used in interviews, I requested and received permission from
Professor Chuck Call of the School of International Service at The American University
(USA) to conduct the interviews through this method. I noticed many advantages and
disadvantages with the instant messaging method. The advantages of conducting the
interviews through instant messaging were plenty. To begin, many students had access to
the instant messaging system. Next, the interviewee could give the interview in the
comfort of her/his home, thus taking the pressure away from a face to face interview.
With this interview method, the students were able to take their time to complete their
responses, as no pressure from the interviewer, with verbal or physical signals were
prevalent, expecting the interviewee to give an immediate response. I reminded the
interviewees that they had the ability to take as much time as they needed to respond.
Some of the interviewees, after completing a response, asked if it was long or short
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enough. Reminding them that their responses can be at any length they wish, this may
have allowed further comfort, as there was not pressure to keep the response at a
particular length. Because the interviewer waits until a response is complete (I asked the
participants to use the * character after a finished answer), interruptions were rare, thus
adding a level of comfort for the interviewee.
With this messaging system, another advantage was the fact that all of the responses
were already typed. With a mere click of the save button, the entire conversation—word
for word—was saved. This made it easy to recall the interview, finding the exact words
for quotations; there was no possibility of misquoting, or incorrectly transcribing the
interviews if they were recorded, hand-noted, or typed. Another wonderful advantage
with this system was the ability for me, the interviewer, to have a firmer control/handle
on the flow of the interview. Depending on the interviewee’s response, I had extra time to
prepare in advance to dictate the next question, without the pressure of following a
particular format, which would have been the case with a personal face to face interview,
or an interview over the phone. I was able to make several notes at my desk (where the
majority of the online instant messaging interviews were conducted), and thus follow the
notes according to the direction the interview was going. This allowed me to ensure that
I covered all the necessary topics for my research.
While I found several advantages with the instant messaging system, one faced
several disadvantages that need to be addressed. First of all, since the system is
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connected to the internet, one must be mindful that the information exchanged can be
viewed from an outside party. This may have affected those that decided to give their
name, or those that wished to remain anonymous. Furthermore, as with the phone
interviews, the instant messaging system did not allow the interviewer to see the facial
and physical reactions of the interviewee. In addition, one was unable to even hear vocal
emphasis on the comments. Thus, all the interviewer has to work with is the actual words
typed. Furthermore, the interviewee had to type the responses out, as opposed to merely
speaking her/his thoughts. This may have been less convenient for the interviewee,
although everyone interviewed chose the method most comfortable for them given the
circumstances (as I could not travel to personally interview many of the interviewees, due
to financial and time constraints). All in all, I found the instant messaging system a
valuable method to conduct interviews.
The last method used to conduct the interviews was through email. A few students
wished to receive the questions in advance, and take a few days to respond. They
explained that with this method, they could get to the interview at their own convenience.
Furthermore, it allowed them to clearly articulate their responses.
I found many disadvantages to this method, and thus was the least used method of
the four interview methods. The first disadvantage of this method was the obvious lack
of communication I had with the interviewee at the time of the interview. Since the
interviewee took the time to answer the questions on their own time, I was unable to lead
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or direct the interview. Similar to the problem with instant messaging, I was unable to
see or hear their reactions to the questions, and was unable to get any more information
other than what they replied. This method is very impersonal. While each interviewee
offered to clarify any of their answers after they completed the interview, this method
was not as effective as if the interview was conducted in person, through a telephone, or
instant messaging.
Post 9/11 U.S. Domestic Security Laws
I asked the students about post 9/11 domestic security laws in the United States four
years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The overwhelming majority of the
students interviewed, when asked about which post September 11th domestic security
polices they were familiar with cited the USA PATRTIOT Act, while only one
specifically mentioned PATRIOT Act II. A large number of students mentioned overall
surveillance, wiretapping, and airport security, with one student even mentioned
“mandatory fingerprinting and picture[s] for all entering foreign nationals.” The Muslim
students interviewed described the problems they had with the PATRIOT Act. Students
felt “shocked” that the laws were passed through Congress without much thought. One
student studying at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor explained that he felt the
passing of the PATRIOT Act was “controversial” since “[tjhere wasn’t enough time for
all the Congress.. .to have read the whole [PATRIOT Act].” Another student, Amina,
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who attends university at a large school in the Midwest, compared the laws and the
implementation of the laws with “Big Brother.” She expressed her feelings when these
laws were passed, and its relation to Muslims when she said that
“the Patriot act [caused] an increase in observing/spying on Muslims in

Amerca.. .The airport security changes.. .were needed to begin with, but they are
selective about whom they search which does not make me feel safer. I remember
thinking how Big Brother like it was with the other things being
implemented,...about being able to track down the books people would check out
from libraries was a little over the top.. .1 still think the laws are too selected and
target Muslims—rather than any possible person who could be a threat.”
Another student, Dania, aged 25, who is a student at the School of International Service
at the American University in Washington D.C., explained her dissatisfaction with the
PATRIOT Act when she said that she is
“completely against everything the PATRIOT ACT stands for. It really is an act
that has managed to rid many Americans, especially Arab and Muslim
Americans.. .of their basic civil rights. The government, especially the Bush
Administration, has used the fight against “terrorism” to stretch the boundaries of
government surveillance in order to, as they claim, protect Americans. In reality it
is only further perpetuating the anti-American sentiments that many people hold,
not just Arabs and Americans, because this Act has shown that no one’s civil
liberties are guaranteed. It’s also created an us against them attitude [,] inside and
outside the US.”
Discrimination
Several Muslim students interviewed shared stories of when they had been
discriminated against because of being Muslim following the attacks of September 11th,
2001. While not all Muslim students who were asked if they were discriminated against
personally experienced discrimination, many of the respondents knew someone that had
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experienced some sort of discrimination. Christopher, a senior at George Mason
University, told of what happened to him when returning to the United States from Israel:
“At the end of July 2003, when I was returning from a month of study at The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s summer academic program with a Jewish
friend of mine, [I was with a].. .single suitcase, which contained a Qur’an and a
prayer rug. When we were leaving Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, my bags
(suitcase and my carry-on backpack) were thoroughly searched after I said I had
been to the Palestinian Territories. While the Israeli security officials were
checking my suitcase, they saw the Qur’an and the prayer rug, as well as some
academic (not religious/sectarian) books on Islam, including Amal Saad-
Ghorayeb’s Hizbu’llah: Politics & Religion. In fact, one of the Israelis asked me
specifically about why I had Saad-Ghorayeb’s book, to which I replied that I had
taken courses on political Islam and the Middle East peace process at Hebrew
University. I cannot say for sure that the Israelis recognized the prayer rug, but
frankly, I don’t know what else someone could think it was. When my friend and
I arrived in New York City (we flew straight from Tel Aviv to JFK on El A1 Israel
Airlines), his bags came through and mine were missing... [I]t took one month for
me to get my suitcase. While it was missing, I checked with the 2 airlines I flew
on (El A1 & Delta) and received a confusing amalgamation of reasons as to what
happened to it. From the pieces of information (or misinformation) I received
over this period of time, my suitcase went to Britain, though I have no idea why,
since I have never set foot in the U.K. When I finally received my suitcase back,
everything in it was jumbled, though from what I could tell nothing was missing.
My prayer rug, however, smelled awful, like urine, which made me feel that
someone had defiled it. I wrote formal letters of complaint to my U.S. senators,
congressman, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, President George W. Bush,
Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Daniel Ayalon, El Al, Delta, and Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon.. .1 received responses from a U.S. congressman (Tom
Davis of Virginia, who is not my representative but who received my letter in
error), Delta, and El Al. The Delta and El Al letters apologized, and the El Al
letter said that they would “investigate” the matter. That is the last I heard from El
Al” (Muedini, 2006).
Another Muslim student described an incident where he was out late on a Friday
night in Albany, New York. He was visiting his friend who owned a store, when another
friend whom he described his demeanor as “calm” came running into the store asking for
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a bat because somebody called him a terrorist. When he went out with his friend to
confront the person who called him a terrorist, twenty people attacked him and his friend.
In addition to being hit, he was spit on by the group. While he explained that he was
physically hurt, it was the physiological pain that he remembers, that was “most
damaging on... [his] mind and body.”
Safety and Security
The yast majority of Muslim students interviewed felt their experiences, in addition
to the Post 9/11 security laws such as the PATRIOT Act, contrary to arguments by the
Bush administration, did not made them safer. Many students explained that such
policies have helped create an “atmosphere of fear,” and, using the “fear atmosphere,”
“the government seems to have taken advantage of the situation and has allowed itself to
take liberties and powers at the expense of civil liberties.” Shazi, age 25, explained that
“. ..many of the new laws that have been put in place after September 11 are
hardly effective in making us citizens safe. On the contrary, I believe that
infringements on the rights of us citizens and the freedoms previously granted to
visa holders who respect the laws of this country only helps perpetuate this
atmosphere of fear that is in actuality counterproductive in allowing the US to be
well informed and in control of its future. The government seems to have taken
advantage of the situation and has allowed itself to take liberties and powers at the
expense of civil liberties. And the fear atmosphere legitimizes the
administration’s right to do so.”
Others felt that such policies have caused in them a feeling of “paranoia.” Kheireddine
Bouzid, a student at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor explained that he was “now
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more skeptical when.. .making a phone call or using a public computer, or at a bookstore
or library...”. Furthermore, he is suspicious of “strangers walking around... [the
Mosque], and non-Muslims sitting in cars in the parking lot between prayer times, and
this is after the Patriot Act’s enforcement has allegedly lessened.” Other students
expressed feeling less safe because, as Azam Khan, aged 25 explained, a young Muslim
man “may fit the profile of those profiled.” Asking if Muslim students could ever feel
safe, an anonymous student from the Washington DC area (here given the name Rabia),
responded that she could “not really [feel safe since]...something like this is not a
containable issue.” She added that “[One]...can’t control something like [this]. [T]he
factor of feeling unsafe will always be present.” Students explained that their stress
levels have increased following what happened after September 11th, 2001. Sekeena, a
masters candidate at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS),
explained that it has affected her stress level, in addition to the overall psychological
effects it has caused the American Muslim community. In her case, being a Muslim
woman who wears hijab, her experience has been difficult. Because she classified
herself as a practicing Muslim being around those who do not know anything about
Islam, there is level of stress because, one in this situation is a representative of the faith.
Being a Muslim wearing hijab, one has to “deal with the stereotypes post 9/11” to non-
Muslims who are unaware of Islam.
Other Muslims expressed fear because of having a Muslim name. Dania, when
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asked if she feels safe as a Muslim in America explained that she felt safe only
“sometimes, depending on where I am. There are certain times when I worry that
getting my name called out loud may have repercussions. Or if I travel to a town
in the middle of nowhere and people find out I am a Muslim, if they will react
negatively. I try to give people the benefit of the doubt, but at the same time I
realize the current situation and that many my judge me because I’m Muslim.”
Msyara, age 32, a Ph.D. student in Anthropology at The American University in
Washington, D.C., iterated the impact it has had on him and the Muslim community. He
explained that the discrimination has affected Muslims in “every manner, socially,
economically, spiritually.” He explained that he has met people who are afraid to admit
their faith, saying that they are not Muslim. Or when they response to questions of
religion, they quickly explain that they are “not practicing Muslims.” There is a
“tendency [by some] to disassociate [one’s self] from Islam [,]” he explained.
American and Muslim Identity
The impacts of such laws have Muslim students thinking about their identity and role
into American society. When I asked Muslim students if the Muslims in America
feel/consider themselves as American, a large majority of those interviewed believed that
Muslims do in fact consider themselves as Americans, and that “most Muslims are proud
to be Americans and really just want people to see them as Americans and nothing else”
(Muedini, 2006). I continued by asking “What should be done for Muslims to feel more
American,” since many Muslims want to be considered American. One student
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responded by explaining that “Muslims need to be involved in civic life. PTA public
schools, showing their faces in every activity that affects the community... [Muslims] live
in an isolated place and [are] isolated in society. [They need to] go out, show their names
and religion” (Muedini, 2006).
When discussing the Muslim American identity in the United States, it must be
noted that several students commented on the different identities of Islam within the
United States itself. The students saw differences between African American Muslims,
Arab Muslims, South Asian Muslims, and “White” Muslims, both from European
ancestry, and “white” converts. While students believed that these different groups of
Muslims “ha[ve] [their] own Muslim culture” (Muedini, 2006), they also highlighted the
importance of a unified Muslim ummah, embracing the differences. Amina explained a
unified Muslim identity is difficult when
“we are constantly trying to prove which one of us is right and who is wrong [,]
and what is the “correct” way to follow Islam.. .We have a long way to go as
Muslims to accept and embrace each other for who we are, and to recognize that
our diversity is our strength.”
While this is the case for some Muslims, especially those that had converted to
Islam, several Muslim students expressed that they did not believe they were viewed as
Americans. Rabia, a student in the DC area, explained that “the Patriot Act has divided
America into two groups [,] the “real Americans” and then the other group that probably
has more patriotic people to this country but [that] the only difference is [that] they
originate from other countries but are.. .US citizens.” Similar to Peek (2002), some
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Muslim students interviewed commented that the alienation and discrimination Muslims
in America faced following September 11th, 2001 both by non-Muslims and by the U.S.
government actually brought “solidarity” amongst Muslims. Azam Khan, age 25,
explained that Muslims all face the same hostilities, which brings them together. In
addition, different Muslim communities pull their resources to help one another. While
they may not have had much interaction with one another prior to the attacks, they began
to work together following the laws passed in response to September 11th, 2001, since
they were/are faced with similar situations, whether it is an imam being arrested, or some
other incident. He explains that “before [Muslims] didn’t care about their brother. But
now we want to be there for them.”
According to Kheireddine Bouzid, such discrimination has “brought [Muslims]
together.” He explains:
“[W]e have a mutual feeling of being resented.. .Those of us just trying to live our
lives and get on with the post-9/11 era have.. .developed a commonly accepted
understanding of the new system. In essence, it gives us a common cause to strive
against, and so, in its own strange way, strengthens our bonds.”
Peter Van Der Veer (2002) explains how migrant groups become more religious within
the “pressures of assimilation.” He explains that migrants,
“since they are often challenged in a multicultural environment to explain their

beliefs and practices they tend to become more aware of them. Such awareness
can lead to receptivity towards ideological reifications that take cultural and
religious elements out of the daily flow of life and make them into markers of
identity in a plural society” (101-102).
He adds that
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“[t]he observation that migrant groups have to become more aware of their
religion and culture due to their constant interpellation by ‘established’
communities is undoubtedly correct. It is also valid to assume than an ideological
apologetics, based on a conscious awareness of one’s ‘culture’ in order to be able
to defend one’s practices, may follow from this” (Van Der Veer, 2002, 102).
Foreign Policy
Muslim students interviewed expressed great distain for the U.S. foreign policy
towards Muslims and Muslim nations. Students believed that the Bush administration
has not legitimately considered diplomacy in the handling of U.S. foreign policy. One
student said of the United States’ foreign policy that “American foreign policy is bullying
and we have lost the art of diplomacy [;]” “.. .diplomacy is not there.”
Students also felt that the Bush administration was “antagonistic” while “bullying”
other nations, citing North Korea and the axis of evil, suggesting that these countries
would not adhere to the requests of the United States, particularly if “Bush [was] telling
them in an arrogant way.” Another student, Ludmila, explained that the United States
“acts as if it is the best place on Earth and as if it owns the world and [thus]
should have access to its resources at a low price. I’m not advocating an absolute
isolationist policy, just less selfishness.”
Similar to Falk’s (1997) explanation of a “double standard,” students also expressed what
they felt was a double standard in U.S. foreign policy. Chris, a senior at George Mason
University, explains that
“U.S. foreign policy is seriously flawed. On the one hand, successive presidential
administrations say that the U.S. supports freedom and democracy while still
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supporting repressive regimes all over the world, from Egypt to Saudi Arabia to
Russia and Pakistan. I feel that the U.S. government sends contradictory and
mixed, or even two-faced messages as to its true intentions with foreign nations. I
feel that the U.S. is slanted toward supporting Israel, though not to the extent that
many Muslims in the U.S. and abroad feel. I believe that the U.S. government is
more concerned with Israeli desires than with Palestinian ones.. .1 feel that this is
apparent when one looks at U.S. policy toward the expansion of Israeli
settlements, the construction of the barrier-wall, and debate about an Israeli
withdrawal to the lines of pre-June 4, 1967.”
Another student, Nadia, age 25, also mentions the “double standard” by the Bush
Administration in its foreign policy. She says, for example, that
“[t]he U.S [government] is for democracy, but [also] supports] authoritarian

regimes in Egypt and Pakistan... [The U.S.] won’t tilt the wagon when it serves
their agenda (like in Pakistan). [The] U.S. isn’t saying much because they have
interests that are carried out by Musharrev.
She goes on to add that
“People are questioning why they aren’t standing up for democracy.”
Media
The majority of Muslim students interviewed who were asked about the media said
that it negatively portrayed Muslims and Islam. One student felt that the media portrays
Muslims as “animals.” Shazi, age 25, explained that U.S. foreign policy and the Western
media were two prime factors that were causing fears within Muslims in America. When
I asked “Do you think there is anything that can be done to address these fears (that he
mentioned earlier in the interview) Muslims in America have,” he explained,
“I think these fears are legitimate. The only way to address them is to address the
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way this administration portrays Muslims and the way the media tends to depict
them.”
When I followed with the question, “Do you think that is possible,” he thought that
“Ideally, it’s possible. However, I hardly think that anything is going to happen
soon. If the administration gives Muslims more acknowledgment of their
freedoms and wants and does not play this [W]est vs. Islam cowboy international
diplomacy perhaps society would not see Muslims in such a bad light. This
probably sounds a little paranoid but I do believe that the administration has put a
black out on some topics for the media. This censorship displays certain hotspots
are places of Muslim unrest and reactionary actions. Chechnya is rarely depicted
as it truly is-Russia is seen as a victim, rather than an oppressor by focusing only
on a few horrible terrorist acts. The same goes for Israel and India/Pakistan”.
Students felt that the media’s impact has hindered Muslims being included in American
society. Dania, 25 explained that many non-Muslims in the United States do view
Muslims as American. But she added that while this may be true,
“...what’s scary is that middle America, who watch Fox News and were the ones
to re-elect Bush probably think that we aren’t Americans and that we should “go
back home” as one man yelled at me once.”
Furthermore, when specifically asked about the media, she explained that it
“definitely [has had] a negative impact. Just as Muslim extremists have distorted
Islam, U.S. media had done just as much damage, if not more. The media here
seems to feed off of the negative images that the extremists perpetrate, either
through flag burning the beheadings in Iraq, the violence in Palestine, or the
discrimination of women across the Muslim world—Afghanistan is a great
example of this. They never show the positive aspects of Islam and all the good
and moderate Muslims that live peacefully beside Jews, Christians, Hindus and all
other religions. W e’re always portrayed as the angry bearded men who fire guns
in the air and bum the U.S. flag. That all Americans know about us and that’s
why so many Americans have such a wrong impression about us and our
religion.”
A 21 year old Pakistani-American student who wished to remain anonymous suggested
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that Muslims will always be portrayed negatively in Western media, as they are often
associated with words with a negative connotation. He explains that Muslims are
“most definitely [portrayed] in a negative light. The word “terrorism” and

“radical” are always attached to word Muslim. No matter if the terrorist acts were
performed out of political or religious motives, the word Muslim will be attached.
Images of the Middle East are always portraying violence, conflict, and unruly
people. [Furthermore, U S]... groups as the CBN will outright say that Islam
teaches terrorism.”
Furthermore, the media has controlled and manipulated the emotions of American
citizens by portraying Muslims and reporting stories in a certain manner. Groups whose
agenda is to continue to view Muslims in this light will use what the media says for their
own gain (Muedini, 2006). Sekeena, age 25 explains that “the media portraying Muslims
does not bring a holistic view; it does not show both sides of the story. [The media
portrays Muslims as] villains and bad guys.. .Propaganda and psychology is in the
media.” She added that if people wake up here [in the United States] to [media reports
of] 50 here, 100 here,” and they see experience this sort of reporting, they begin to lose
focus on the importance and value of a life. The media “keep[s] people under [this]
certain mentality throughout the year.” This “psychology keeps people angry” which may
lead to people voting a particular way.” She felt that the media has a “control over
people.”
Overall Muslim Communitv/Ummah
One student, age 21, who wished to remain anonymous, believed that the word
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ummah is more than just a word to describe the world of Muslims. He explains that
“The word ummah means community to me, not just [a] group of believers. A
community is something that you are a part of, and contribute to. The feeling of
community gives a sense of strength and security. The ideal ummah would be a
community that supports its fellow members and equal support in return .
Community is also something that needs to be invested in, in order to continue to
prosper. Helping the community assures that your own offspring will likely
prosper and continue the process. The sense of ummah or community is very
important to me, because the ummah played a large role in my life. When I sensed
the disassembly of ummah within my community, it was like a piece of me was
starting to weaken and crumble. I feel like that is one of our most crucial issues
facing Muslims in America, and one that we need to establish.”
This issue of a Muslim community, according to one student (Kheireddine), “is definitely
weakening.” He felt that this was due to “a world of predominant and prevailing
nationalism...[since] [t]oday, many Muslims see themselves as a Lebanese, or a
Pakistani, or as a Syrian before a Muslim. While the bond [of Islam] is still there, with
respect to nationalism, the bond [of being Muslim] is only second-class” (Muedini,
2006). This issue was discussed further in relation to military participation for a non-
Muslim nation fighting a Muslim country.
Muslim Participation in U.S. Military
Immediately following September 11th, 2001, Muslim imams addressed ““the
permissibility of the participation of Muslim military personnel in the US armed forces in
the war operations and its related efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere in other Muslim
countries”” (Nafi, 2004). This issue was important to discuss for the Muslim community
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because the number of Muslims in the United States military is said to range from 4100-
15,000 thousand people, depending on which reports one believes (Nafi, 2004). Such
inquiry by American Muslim imams on whether Muslims could, under Islam, fight for
the United States military resulted in fatwa ruling. This fatwa began by stating that “[the]
question presents a very complicated issue and a highly sensitive situation for our
Muslim brothers and sisters serving in the American army as well as other armies that
face similar situations” (Nafi, 2004).” The fatwa explained that Islam condemns all
killing, and that “[a]ll Muslims should be united against all those who terrorize innocents,
and those who permit the killing of non-combatants without a justifiable reason” (Nafi,
2004). Furthermore, the authors of the fatwa “[found] it necessary to apprehend the true
perpetrators of [the] crimes, as well as those who aid and abet them through incitement,
financing or other support” (Nafi, 2004). Those who have committed the attacks of
September 11th, 2001 “must be brought to justice” (Nafi, 2004). The fatwa urged that
this Islamic position be made clear to military officials by the Muslims soldiers (Nafi,
2004).
The authors of the fatwa expressed the difficulties and “uneasiness” confronting the
Muslim soldiers in non-Muslim armies, but stated that
“[t]he Muslim [soldier] must perform his duty in this fight despite the feeling of
uneasiness of ‘fighting without discrimination.’ His intention (niyya) must be to
fight for enjoining the truth and defeating falsehood. It is to prevent aggression
against the innocents or to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
He is not responsible to other consequences of the fighting, even if they may
result in the personal discomfort, since he can neither control it (the war) nor
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prevent it. Furthermore, all deeds are evaluated [by God] according to their
intentions. God (the Most High) does not burden any soul except what it can
bear...” (Nafi, 2004).
The scholars add that, if Muslim soldiers choose to, and have the option of “serving in the
back lines[,]” if it does not bring about suspicion, or asking to work in the back lines does
not “[raise] doubts about their allegiance or loyalty,.. .harms their future careers, raises
misgivings about their patriotism,” then they should ask for this (Nafi, 2004).
The result of this fatwa is significant because, according to Nafi (2004), it
“addresses a new development in the field of international relations, the position of
Muslim minorities living in the modern state, and the nature of the relationship between
the Muslim individual and the non-Islamic state.” With the scholars issuing a fatwa that
permits Muslims to fight in non-Muslim armies against Muslims, it indirectly addresses
whether one’s “loyal[ty] [should be].. .to the Muslim ummah as a whole or to his
country” (Nafi, 2004). With this ruling, the Muslim scholars “...responding positively to
this question, the issuers of the fatwa suggest that the allegiance of the American Muslim
soldier in a time of war is to his country, even if the war being fought between the United
States and a Muslim country. The issuers of this fatwa thus recognize the sovereignty of
the nation-state as fully legitimate and, in principal, deserving of allegiance” (Nafi,
2004).
Nafi (2004) argues that while the decision favored fighting, this decision was made
because those that caused the attacks of September 11th, 2001 needed to be caught; the
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use of military strength was therefore justified. A different result would have arisen “if
the American cause were not justified... the American Muslim’s participation in a war
launched by the US government would not be permitted” (Nafi, 2004). While the fatwa
recognizes the importance of the nation-state, “it is not the sovereignty of the state or the
obligation of allegiance that justifies a Muslim’s participation in his country’s war but
rather the justness of the war itself (Nafi, 2004).
The Muslim ummah was not in uniform acceptance of this ruling; several Muslims
“expressed opposition to the fatwa” (Nafi, 2004). Some scholars argued that a Muslim
should always side with another Muslim (Nafi, 2004). Opponents of the fatwa, referring
specifically to the war in Afghanistan, viewed military action in Afghanistan “as a more
harmful outcome than the possible deterioration of the position of the American Muslim
community” (Nafi, 2004). It must be noted that the four scholars who ruled on this issue,
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa, Tariq al-Bishri, and Fahmi Huwaidi
have been classified by some as “representatives of variant trends of liberal Islamic
thought” (Nafi, 2004). Nafi (2004) argues that this discussion about the correctness of
the fatwa “.. .was not only about politics, but also about intellectual diversity within
Salafi Islam[,] [since] both the issuers of the fatwas and its opponents share Salafi
backgrounds.”
I was interested in seeing how the Muslim students’ new evaluation of identity
would affect whether these students believed that Muslims would serve in the United
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States military, and in particular if the United States was fighting a war against a Muslim
nation. (I did not mention this fatwa to the students). Upon asking this question, several
of the Muslim students pointed out that Muslims already are a part of the United States
army. The response to whether Muslims would join the army if called upon was mixed.
Some students understood and believed that some Muslims would “gladly aid the U.S. as
they see themselves part of this country [;]” they would join because they would “believe
it’s their dutyf,]” (Muedini, 2006).
But many of the students did not think that Muslims, especially the older generations
of Muslims would fight against a Muslim nation. As one student, Dania, 25 explained,
“How do you fight your brother?” Others explained that it would be “difficult for a lot of
people to accept” fighting a Muslim nation” (Muedini, 2006). Furthermore, as one
student Robert Coolidge added, “American Muslims have a very bad taste in their mouth
because of Afghanistan plus the Iraq wars. Those... [wars] will detract from American
Muslim involvement in the military” (Muedini, 2006).
Asked if there is anything the government can do to change this mentality, students
again expressed that Muslims will not be keen to fight for the United States military
when they do not trust the administration. Furthermore, with an administration that does
not act in the interests of Muslims, it will be difficult for Muslims in America to fight in
the United States military. This is true unless Muslims notice a change in the foreign
policy of the United States, instead of the U.S. government saying one thing and acting in
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the opposite matter (e.g. the U.S. relationship with Israel, in addition to its relationship
with Saudi Arabia, and its double-standard towards Iran). Robert explained Muslims in
America may wonder:
“What is the point of fighting and putting your life on the line for a government
that is not telling the truth?” “People just don’t believe [the Bush administration].
They don’t trust him. They think he has these other intentions...” (Muedini,
2006).
Other students felt that Muslims would be more likely to fight in the military if the U.S.
government presented that Muslim nation it was fighting as “an aggressor and [that
Muslim nation was] killing innocent people,.. .if it was presented [this] way, then there is
a possibility that Muslims would fight, although the government would need to have
influential Muslims who called for the legitimacy of the war” (Muedini, 2006).
In relation to the young Muslim Americans, there was a mixed feeling about the
younger generation, as some believed that the younger generations of Muslims—as
opposed to the older generations—are more likely to participate in the military, fighting a
Muslim nation. Dania, 25 explained,
“Many Muslim-Americans of the younger generations aren’t really practicing

Muslims or know anything about Islam or the politics involved with Muslim
countries.
Others believed that the government would be able to influence young Muslims with the
use of propaganda. The youth may not share the same values as their parents, and
because of their assimilation in American society, they may not have the “proper
knowledge of Islam to see what’s right and wrong” (Muedini, 2006). Still others thought,
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however, that the youth was knowledgeable and it was the youth that was working to
fight discrimination, “speaking out about discriminatory policies and acts, and working to
educate others.” (Muedini, 2006).
Steps to Make Muslim Americans feel Safer
When I asked, “What can be done to grant rights to Muslims in America?” I
received various responses. I found two particular distinctions with this topic. First I
found is the issue of what the U.S. government can do to make Muslims in America feel
safer. The second issue is what actions Muslims themselves can take to feel included in
the United States, and thus make them safer. When I asked “what the U.S. government
can do to make Muslims feel safer,” many interviewed believed that the government can
do things to help the situation, although Muslims in America will not be convinced until
we see a different approach to foreign policy, particularly of Muslim immigrants who
“have sympathy with these [Muslim] places” (Muedini, 2006). Nadia, age 25 felt that
“the government is trying, but foreign policy is negating [the effort]. Their foreign
policy is speaking louder than anything else.”
Students who expressed hope that specific actions by the government would change the
feelings of Muslims in America—moving them from alienation to a part of the society-
explained that the government could begin by “initiat[ing] conversations, invit[ing] their
Muslim neighbors to their homes or to join their organizations. The government can
easily seek out members of different ethnic and religious communities and seek their
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input” (Muedini, 2006). Furthermore, the government should hire religion experts who
understand the intricacies of religion (Islam), and who can understand both the mentality
of extremists, and those of the majority of Muslims who call for peace and who condemn
the terrorists (Muedini, 2006). In addition, the government should work with different
Muslim and “civil liberties” organizations.
When discussing what Muslims in America themselves can do, Amina, aged 26, a
student at a large Midwestern University explained that in order to help Muslims gain
more rights, believed that Muslims must
“.. .keep open lines of communication with the American community at large, to
keep participating in interfaith dialogues, and being active in their community
whether that be by volunteering [,] etc... [B]ut by participating in all walks of life
rather than separating themselves and hanging out only with Muslims. I think this
helps others see that Muslims are people also, and are involved with similar
causes. Plus it gives Muslims a chance to teach others about Islam, not formally
but by example and modeling.”
I found a call by Muslim American students for Muslims to “break down the stereotype
[of] what makes one American.” Students explained that a standard for what it means to
be American should be applied equally to everyone, and that “[i]f a person covers these
areas...they should be American, regardless” (Muedini, 2006).
One way to do this is through interfaith dialogue. Dialogue was very important to
the students interviewed. The students called for the importance of dialogue as an effort
to show that Muslims are “not too much different than” non-Muslim Americans
(Muedini, 2006). As one 43 year old man I met and interviewed from a .Tummah I
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attended (who chose to remain anonymous) explained that “If we as Muslims interact
with people, there will be a lot of change. Americans are even more open than
Europeans. Muslims must [make] more effort.” He added that “American people are
genuine people. When you get to know them, they are open. Their mind and behavior
will change” (Muedini, 2006). These dialogue meetings must differentiate and set the
“distinction between the terrorists and Muslims. Just because those terrorists happened to
be Muslims, there should be no reason as to why they should be associated with everyone
else...” (Muedini, 2006).
In addition to dialogue, students also proposed Muslims continue to become
educated through secular as well as religious avenues. This sort of education allows a
“person [to become] more open minded, [and thus] have an ability to decipher and
analyze [issues].” And with an increase in education, negative “attitudes [will] vanish”
(Muedini, 2006). By Muslims reading various sources on a particular issue, they begin to
understand the debate more clearly. This can be applied to working with government
officials or non-Muslim Americans alike (Muedini, 2006). Furthermore, Muslims should
utilize their individual talents, working in their own individual ways to make a difference.
For some people, as a student Nadia explained, this can mean writing articles, while
others can work directly in the government to make a difference. She explains that the
“[m]ost profound differences are small” (Muedini, 2006). Ultimately, as one student,
Sekeena explained,
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“no one will change until Muslims and other people get involved in the system,
bridging the gap between the secular and non-Muslim society. We [Muslims] are
part of this country as well. [It is] our responsibility to get in the system and let
them know where they [non-Muslims] are wrong. People do want to work, [to]
establish dialogue” (Muedini, 2006).
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSION
This research is crucial to understanding the state of Islam and the Muslim
community in the context of U.S. domestic politics, in addition to the overall
international political stage. This particular study of Muslim identity in the United States
has importance on both the domestic and international level because the situation of
Muslims in America is just one case within a broader spectmm encompassing the Muslim
world ummah. One student, Robert Coolidge explains in his interview the importance of
the American Muslim experience and its relation to the overall Muslim community when
he says:
“American Muslims are an example, just part of the world.. .this paradigm
between Muslims in the West and the Muslim world. Who knows where its going
[to go]? Undoubtedly, people have taken into account trying to come to terms
with “Can you be American and Muslim. Does one trump the other? This is a
question for Muslims in every country. No one has a perfect answer of how to
relate with [their] respective governments” (Muedini, 2006).
He adds that
“Some don’t want to be part of [that] government, [while] some [do] want to be a
part of it, and be in the State Department, and totally engage in society [as]
Muslims in a pluralistic democratic state. Then there are Muslims in traditional
countries who think their governments are not good, and don’t know what it
means to be citizens of those countries. National and religious belonging, identity,
is a very complex question of which American Muslims are a very small part of.
American Muslims are one example of a larger phenomenon of 9/11...”
(Muedini, 2006).
In terms of this book, we arrive at several conclusions. To begin, we must be
163
164
recognized that religion is re-shaping the way we view international politics. Next, we
must understand the importance of the bond that exists between Muslims throughout the
world, even if minimally on fundamental principles of the faith. But while the
identification of being Muslim is strong, it is not singularly universe; identities differ with
different experiences. By understanding this, we can understand why different Muslim
groups may react differently to different situations. It would therefore be irresponsible to
assume a universal Muslim reaction to an event. States must therefore work to learn
about their respective Muslim populations in order to understand the particular concerns
of the Muslims, and not to assume that all Muslims have the same exact needs, regardless
of their commonality as being Muslim.
Looking at the identity of Muslims in the United States, we see that the specific
identity of Muslims is shaped both by experiences that are similar to other Muslims
around the world, and experiences specific to the American context. As mentioned,
Muslims in the United States express a bond with Muslims around the world. This can
be seen in their comments of the foreign policy of the United States, in addition to their
sentiments about fighting fellow Muslims. American Muslims, as this book examines,
have faced several challenges, challenges which are unique to their specific situation.
The U.S. domestic security policies following September 11th, 2001 have reshaped the
identity of Muslims in America. The American Muslim post 9/11 experience, in addition
to the specific politics and makeup of the Muslim American community itself are factors
165
that have created a unique U.S. Muslim identity.
This book has aimed to show that, despite the fears and insecurities facing Muslim
Americans in regards to the domestic security policies following September 11th’2001,
Muslim Americans have nevertheless embraced the notion of participating in the U.S.
political system, and want to be considered as Americans. Furthermore, we have seen in
the Muslim American community, and more importantly in the Muslim American youth
community a willingness to dialogue, to participate and be included in American society.
Despite reports and works suggesting that American Muslims are turning to extreme
interpretations of Islam, we find that many educated American Muslim youth who are
neither against the “West” nor the culture of the “West”. But what they have done as a
result of their fears and worries is more strongly embracing Islam. A withdrawal from
society Muslims fear has brought them closer to one another. Therefore, the U.S.
government, with the help of Muslim organizations (and they have a responsibility to aid
the government in this process), must embrace and adequately address the differences
and concerns of American Muslim youth. The U.S. government must work with
American Muslim youths, since we see the willingness for dialogue amongst American
Muslim youth. But in order to gain the trust of the American Muslim youth, the United
States government must stop any discrimination in their domestic security policies,
whether this is in regards to Muslims or anyone else for that matter. They must take into
consideration the suggestions of Muslim American youth voices as to how “Muslims can
166
feel safer” and “what steps the U.S. government can do to make this happen.” As
suggested by those interviewed, the government should hire scholars who are familiar
with Islam and the political situation of Muslims in America. Furthermore, they should
invite Muslim Americans, and Muslim American youth to dialogue and discuss issues
that are important to the Muslim community. By listening to the suggestions and
concerns of American Muslims, in addition to creating avenues of dialogue, we can only
hope that Muslims in America will begin to feel safe again.
Limitations/Further Research
In order to adequately compare and understand the situation of Muslim youth in the
United States to Muslim youth in other Western countries, further studies need to be
conducted to address Muslim sentiments on more international issues, comparing those
responses to sentiments of Muslims abroad. Furthermore, studies need to be conducted
to view the thoughts of Non-US Muslims on the situation of Muslims in America.
Lastly, research should be conducted using questions from this study to view European
Muslims in their own respective contexts and how living in their respective European
countries has shaped their feelings of safety, security and identity (with themselves and
with fellow Muslims).
In terms of the methodology, future research should aim to conduct complete
random samples to ensure the most accurate and unbiased results. The questions being
167
asked should also be adapted to each respective European Muslims’ state and situation
(history, current issues, etc.. This will allow us to see a broad range of perspectives,
and observe any possible relationship as to whether domestic anti-terrorism policies in
each respective Western nation have common effects on the formation of identity and
feelings of safety of Muslims in western states. May this book help in creating a format
to compare the American Muslim experience with the situation and sentiments of
Muslims minorities in other countries. May it allow the U.S. government to review and
change any policies that have negatively impacted Muslims in America, while aiming to
create a level of trust between the U.S. government and the American Muslim
community, and particularly the American Muslim youth community.
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IN SECURITY: HOW POST 9/11 U.S.

DOMESTIC ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY HAS

IMPACTED THE SAFETY AND IDENTITY OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA

Fait Atli Muedini

Faculty of the School of International Service

the Requirements for the Degree of

D ean Louis W. G oodm an

Washington, D.C. 20016

_ ,ilC A N UNIVERSITY LIBRARY a

All rights reserved.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

FAIT ATLI MUEDINI

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

To Atli and Myxhever Muedini

HAS IMPACTED THE SAFETY AND IDENTIY OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA

Fait Atli Muedini

This thesis examines the impact U.S. domestic anti-terrorism security

identity in relation to the international system. The Bush administration

expense of the civil liberties of Muslims in America. The alienation of Muslims in

America has resulted in a closeness amongst Muslims, and in particular the

society. These feels of insecurity have Muslims in America re-examining their

individual and communal identity.

thanks to my committee members, professor Julie Mertus and professor Paul

2. RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS........................................... 4

4. ISLAM AND IDENTITY................................................................................. 30

5. MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE

6. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, WESTERN MEDIA,

7. ISLAM AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION............................................. 77

8. POST 9/11 U.S. DOMESTIC

9. MUSLIM YOUTH IN AMERICA................................................................125

10. MUSLIM AMERICAN STUDENT RESPONSES:

discussing the importance of religion in international politics. Chapter two is a literature

review of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilization theory. In this chapter, I discuss

whether political participation is permissible in Islam. Next, I discuss the political

Chapter nine discusses my findings in relation to interviews conducted with Muslim

RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Philpott, 2002). Even when religion is discussed as a factor in international affairs, it is

(2002) stresses the significance of religion in international relations by reminding us of

because of the importance of religion to them, an issue overlooked by scholars (Philpott,

“My major complaint about dominant theories of international relations such as

identity (Mandaville, 2001).

significant influence of the constructivist international relations worldview, as new

(which will be addressed in depth in a later chapter).

have dismissed religion as a component of international politics (Fox, 2001). We saw

with the introduction of modernity a move to minimize religion to a private manner

would diminish with the rise of modernity.

promote original or “rephras[ed]” secularization arguments, we have not seen a decrease

evidence of the disappearance of religion or its marginality in public life in most

international system without “tr[ying] to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of

a secularized world” (Berger, 1999). Failed attempts of modernization have caused

particularly in “[m]uch of twentieth and twenty-first century.” Muslims at the time of

[,]” and that, according to modernism, “[t]radition too came to be regarded as

anachronistic” (Hermansen, 2004).

(Berger, 1999). In fact, modernity has actually allowed religious movements to

reminds us that “counter-secularization is at least as important a phenomenon in the

contemporary world as secularization.”

consequences, scholars are accustomed to ignoring the importance of religion (Fox,

political philosophers Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes’, whose philosophies were “ a

Christendom” (Philpott, 2002).

A final reason why religion is ignored in international relations is its difficulty to

2001). In addition, we find an importance placed on the thoughts of individual political

social scientists, it is nonetheless important. Fox (2001) explains of its importance on

three various levels:

religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across