THE LITTLE ENTENTE— AN ATTEMPT AT SECURITY

BY SMALL NATIONS

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of International Relations

University of Southern California

In partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by
An&rextf F. Bonacieh

January 1951
 UMI Number: EP59899

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP59899
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 06- 1346
X !'51
This thesis, w ritte n by

ANDREW F. BONAGICH

under the guidance o f hXM...Faculty C om m ittee,

and approved by a l l its members, has been
presented to and accepted by the C o uncil on
G raduate Study and Research in p a r tia l f u l f i l l ­
ment of the requirements f o r the degree of

......... MASTER. OF.A R M ............

.................... .HAmy„J....pETOL.....
Jr.

D a te Januar.jr...l.9-51-.. ,«.

Faculty Committee

fl .
Chairman
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1

II. FORMATION OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE . . . . . . 5

Background 3

Purpose 8

Treaties . • • • . • « . . . • . 11

III. THE LITTLE ENTENTE IN OPERATION . . . . . 21

The Formative Period . . . • • • « . 21

The Problem of Austria . . . . . . 21

The Problem of Poland . . . . . . . 27

The Problem of Hungary . . . . . . 31

The Reconstruction of Hungary . . . . 39

The Early Little Entente Conferences . . 42

France, Italy and the Little Entente . . 50

The Hungarian Optants Case . . . . . 56

The RothermereC a m p a i g n ................. 60

The Middle Period 62

The St. G-otthard Incident . . . . . 63

Reparations and Debts . . . . . . . 67

The Little Entente Conferences: 1925-1929 73

'VPolitics vs. Economics . . . . . . 84

The Little Entente HPact of Organization11 93

The Economic Entente . . . . . . . 97

CHAPTER PAGE

The Little Entente and the Four-Pox^er

Pact . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Strengthening the Little Entente— 1933 . 106

The Little EntenteConferences— 1933 . . 110

The Little Entente in the Year 1934 . . 114

The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente 122

The Little Entente in the Year 1935 . . 129

The Decline and Death of the Little Entente 143

The Year 1936 . . . . . . . . . . 143

The Question of Central European

Consolidation . . . .. . . . 143

Yugoslavia and Rumania and German

Penetration in the Balkans . 14?

The Little Entente Conferences of 1936 . 151

The Year 1937 . . . . *. . .. . 156

1938— The Fateful Y e a r ............. . . 161

IV. CRITICAL EVALUATION . . ....................... 169

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................ 176

A P P E N D I X ................................
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history the position of small nations has

been a precarious one. Their existence has always been

dependent, in some manner, upon larger states. Many small

nations maintained their entity by alliance with a pre­

dominant power; others played off one state against another;

some became vassal states, under the control of a great power

In all but name only; and some small states aligned them­

selves together in an effort to preserve their security.

The Little Entente belongs in this last category.

This study is' the complete story of the Little Entente

from its inception to its demise. It records the struggles

of the member states— Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania

— in their attempt to make the Little Entente a permanent

organization. Rumania was the only one of the three states

which existed before World War I, but its territory was

almost doubled as a result of that war. Therefore, the three

states had difficult internal problems with which to deal.

In spite of this they formed an alliance which was successful

in defeating all attempts to restore the Hapsburg monarchy

in Hungary.

In the middle period, the economic troubles of the

world had an almost__crippling. effect.upon -the- Little-Entente.-

This, coupled with the vacillating attitude of France and

Great Britain, allowed Germany and Italy to menace the

status quo of the Balkans and Central Europe and, conse­

quently of all Europe. All this, in addition to the in­

effectiveness of the League of Mations proved too much for

the Little Entente.

In spite of these ominous threats, the Little Entente

maintained its organization and pursued a joint poliGy where

ever there was field for agreement. But the Munich Pact of

1938 was the death blow to the alliance. Munich destroyed

the cornerstone of the Entente— Czechoslovakia— and the

entire structure then toppled.

Much of the source material consisted of hooks and

articles written by men directly connected with the Little

Entente— Benes, Jonescu, Masaryk and others. Other sources

were articles and books written concurrently with the ex­

istence of the Little Entente. Also consulted were works

written by specialists in the region of the Balkans and

Central Europe, such as Joseph S. Roucek, Felix J. Vondracek

and Hugh Seton-Watson.

It is the purpose of this study to show that the

status of small states has not changed with the passage of

time. The Little Entente was chosen for a case study be­

cause of its recent existence, and because the lessons

learned may be beneficial to the present-day situation.

 CHAPTER0!!

FORMATION OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE

BACKGROUND:

BThe‘ Little Entente was a politieal organization,

created after World War I, which bound together three

Central European states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and

1
Rumania, for purposes of their common interest.**

The Little Entente, .though, had its origin in a

series of political acts and declarations dating back to the

nineteenth century. In the Austrian half of the Hapsburg

Empire, the representatives of the small nations in the

parliament in Vienna formed a unified opposition to the

centralizing system of the Empire. This system was oppres­

sive to the non-Germanic peoples. In the Hungarian part of

the Empire, the oppressed Slovaks, Serbs, Groats and

Rumanians in 1848 protested against Magyar imperialism; they

did so again in 1895 at Budapest. In 1905, ten non-Magyar

deputies, of the Budapest parliament formed a club expressly

p
for purposes of protest.

“^Edward-Benes and Harry Nicholas Howard, **The Little

Entente,** Encyclopaedia Britannica. 14th edition, XIV, p* 219.

^Loc. cit.
 In the year 1917 a meeting of representatives of the

Austro-Hungarian nations took place in Kiev, Russia. This

imeeting produced a special committee to fight German and

Austro-Hungarian Imperialism. A major role in all these

actions was played by the Czechs, Yugoslavs and Rumanians,

supported by the Poles, by the Italians of wItalia

Irredenta” and finally by the Ukranians. The cooperation

between the first three nations was particularly close, and

toward the end of World War I they acted in concert with

regard to diplomatic action.

In April, 1918, a congress of oppressed Austro-

Hungarian peoples was held in Rome, and in America in the

autumn of that year there was formed the Central European

Democratic Union. Thomas G. Masaryk, while in the United

States, was elected president of this Union.

In his book, The Creation of a State. Masaryk em­

phasized that the form of the future Little Entente was

beginning to take shape in Paris in 1918. He states that:

I first talked about it with Take Jonescu,

and the latter then took me to Venizelos. The
situation at the time led us to contemplate a
elose entente with the Yugoslavs, Poles, and
Rumanians, as well as the Greeks, who, since the
Balkan War, had had a treaty of friendship with
the Serbs. We clearly recognized the diffi­
culties which lay ahead of us . . . at any rate
the idea of the Little Entente was, as they
say, in the air.5

5New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1927, p. 364.

 Dr. Edvard Benes, as Czech Foreign Minister, engaged

in tentative negotiations with Jonescu of Rumania, and with

Pasich and Trumbich of Yugoslavia, with regard to coopera­

tion among their respective countries. These attempts

proved premature. The three countries were involved with

the immediate problem of securing the best possible settle­

ment from the current peace negotiations at Paris. There­

fore, the three small powers temporarily dropped their

project.

At the termination of the First World War, Benes

welcomed the exile of Emperor Charles to Switzerland and the

separation of Austria and Hungary; but he expressed anxiety

during 1919 at the symptoms of reactionary tendencies,

particularly in Hungary.

After the end of the war between the Czechs and the

Hungarians over Slovakia, and the consequent overthrow of

the Communist regime of Bela Kun, Archduke Joseph came into

power in Budapest. To Benes, this event was ominous. It

might presage a Hapsburg restoration which would threaten

the peace of Central Europe. He protested to the Supreme

Council, which, on August 21, 1919 issued a note to Budapest

making it clear that no Hapsburg could be included in any

Hungarian government. This action resulted in Archduke

Joseph1s resignation. He was in power for less than three

weeks.^ The specter of a Hapsburg menace made clear to the

small, victorious powers that some manner of closer cooper­

ation was inevitable.

Czechoslovakia reopened negotiations with her two

prospective partners when Benes offered alliances to Trum­

bich in Paris on December 30, 1919, and to Vaida-Voevod at

Bucharest on January 5, 1920. Yugoslavia was more enthusi­

astic toward this advance and direct negotiations between

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were begun during February.

Two events— the Kapp Putsch in March and the

military and diplomatic flirtation of France and Hungary

during July— made it clear that no time could be lost in

the formation of an alliance to preserve the Central Euro­

pean status q u o .

The Kapp Putsch was an abortive attempt by monarch­

ists in Germany to control the government. Dr. Kapp's

government was a short-lived one; but it seemed serious at

the outset, especially when considered in conjunction with

what was going on in monarchist circles in Austria and

Hungary.

The flirtation on the part of France and Hungary was

the more serious situation of the two. Czechoslovakia had

4Felix John VoncLracek, The Foreign Policy of Czecho­

slovakia (Hew York: Columbia University Press, 1937),p. 163.
refused to aid Poland in the Russo-Polish war of 1920.

France had considered Hungary1s offer to send four divisions

to aid Poland. But France refused Hungarian intervention

because such intervention would have taken place only at the

cost of territorial compensations which would have neces­

sitated a revision of the peace treaties. Such revision

would have been to the detriment of Czechoslovakia, Rumania \

and Yugoslavia. Realizing that Hungarian aid would have

been too costly, France herself aided Poland.

However, before France made her choice, many communi­

cations had been exchanged between Paris and Budapest. These

communications were more or less secret, but Hungary*s

neighbors were aware of them. Benes was alone in trying to

dispel alarm because he felt that France would do nothing

inimical to Czechoslovakia1s interests. In spite of this,

Czechoslovakia feared that, should Hungarian troops cross

Slovakia on their way to Poland, they would do everything

possible to increase irredentism. About 2,500,000 Magyars

resided in the four neighboring states, and these minorities

were susceptible to nationalist appeals from Budapest.

During September, other alarms were propagated by the

Vienna Arbeiter Zeitun^ and the Prague Pravo Lidu, both of

which published repeated “revelations11 of Magyar plots,

supposedly directed from bases at Vienna and Szombathely

against Austria; from Vienna, Miskolcz and Gyor against

Czechoslovakia; and from Kaposvar, Pecs and Czeged against

Yugoslavia, Undoubtedly these “revelations* were inspired

as much by anti-Magyar feeling as by Hungarian actions.

But, they were effective in hastening action toward the

formation of an alliance among Hungary*s neighbors.

PURPOSE:

The national and international policies of the new

Danublan sta,tes were determined by the circumstances under

which they were formed. Three of these states— Czecho­

slovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia— were on the victorious

side, and consequently gained from the new situation es­

tablished by the peace treaties. The other two— Austria

and Hungary— were on the side of the vanquished, and lost

heavily in territory and prestige. Therefore, the first

three countries were vitally interested in maintaining the

new status quo effected by the peace treaties; while the

latter two countries were equally determined to change the

peace treaties in order to regain their lost power.

The three victorious nations, from their very begin­

ning, were fearful that the new era produced by the peace

treaties might not prove permanent. This fear permeated

5Ibia.. p. 165.
their whole national life, and was encouraged by the spirit

of resentment only too apparent in the defeated countries.

The defeated nations manifested no assurance that they

accepted the peaee settlements as final. Austria, Hungary

and Bulgaria signed the treaties of peace under protest.

Resentment against the peace settlements was most

pronounced in Hungary. A great blow to Hungary was the

separation of Slovakia and Transylvania, particularly be­

cause of the fact that in each of these territories lived

large numbers of Hungarians— over one and one-half million

in Transylvania alone.. Hungary refused for several years

to consider officially the loss of these territories. For

example, the official statistics of Hungary*s trade with

Rumania and Czechoslovakia distinguished between the trade

with “Territories separated from Hungary“ and “the rest of

6
Rumania11 or “the rest of Czechoslovakia.”

The opposition in Austria centered around the con­

viction that the Republic of Austria created by the Treaty

of St. Germain was not capable of independent existence.

Austria did not have any delusions of a territorial re­

adjustment which would enlarge her boundaries. Therefore,

her policies were directed toward a union with Germany.

Leo Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism o f 'the Danublan

States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 19387, p. 67.
 10
But such a union was forbidden by the Treaty, except with

the consent of the League of Nations Council, and it was .

also opposed by the victor nations.

With this spirit existing in the defeated countries,

the victors did not feel secure, despite the fact that

actual military danger was at that time practically non­

existent because of the effective disarmament imposed on

' i
the defeated countries. Their apprehensions centered upon

Hungary because of her violent and undisguised opposition

to the peace treaties, and because Hungary alone became the

focal point of efforts made for the restoration of the Hap­

sburg dynasty. This latter point greatly hastened cooper­

ation between the victors.

Each of the three victors had special problems of its

own. Rumania more than doubled her territory and population.

She acquired Transylvania and other areas from Hungary, the

Dobrudja from Bulgaria and Bessarabia from Russia. Hungary

and Bulgaria both had signed the peace treaties under

protest and Russia never formally acknowledged the loss of

Bessarabia. Therefore, her relations with these three

nations were strained.

Czechoslovakia acquired Bohemia and Moravia from

Austria and Slovakia from Hungary. She also had minor

boundary grievances with Poland. As long as Austria was

 11
militarily and politically weak, but independent, and as

long as Germany did not again become a strong and belliger­

ent power, Czechoslovakia1s main problem lay with Hungarian

revisionism.

Yugoslavia^ greatest problem also was Hungary. Of

minor importance was Austria, and Yugoslavia had reason to

be concerned about Italy. Italy, although a victor nation, ,

felt that she had not received her share of the spoils of

the war. She took advantage of Yugoslavia^ disorganization

and the unsettled conditions which existed immediately after:

the First World War and took possession, by force, of

several portions of Yugoslavia^ Dalmatian coast.

From the above review, it is evident that Czecho­

slovakia and Rumania each had problems peculiar to itself;

but-they all had a mutual fear of Hungary. This desire for

the containment of Hungary was to be the chief purpose for

the formation of the Little Entente.

TREATIES:

Czechoslovakia, through Its very able Foreign Minister

Edvard Benes, took the initiative in the formation of the

Little Entente. Benes was well aware of the divergent in­

terests of the prospective partners and he believed it

necessary to negotiate, step by step, a series of bilateral

 12
treaties in order to form an effective alliance.

On August 14, 1920 at Belgrade, Benes for Czecho­

slovakia and Nlncich for Yugoslavia, signed a defensive

7
treaty of alliance. Article One specified that each state

was to aid the other against an unprovoked attack by Hungary.

In Article Two, the method of assistance was to be deter­

mined by a later agreement between the competent technical

authorities, i.e. by a military convention. Article Three

stated that an alliance with a third power by either sig­

natory power could not be completed without previous noti­

fication of the other partner. Article Four stipulated a

two-year period for the Treaty, and that it could be renewed.

If denounced upon expiration, it was to remain effective for

another six months. Article Five required registration of

the Treaty with the League of Nations. Article Six arranged

for an exchange of ratifications at Belgrade as soon as

possible.

Benes was always an opponent of secret diplomacy.

Therefore, he desired publicity for the alliance so that its

objectives might not be misunderstood.

On September 1, 1920, he presented a lengthy statement

to the Czechoslovak parliament. His first reason for the

formation of what he styled Bthe so-called Little Entente®

r>
See Appendix WA M for full text of Treaty.
 13
8
:was the unrest prevalent throughout Europe. As a result,

the small states in Europe felt insecure as to their future

as long as each remained isolated. His second reason was

economic. He believed that political contacts would lead

ultimately to economic cooperation. Thirdly, he desired

domestic stabilization of the states concerned so that each

might work out without Interference its own political and

social reforms. Many people regretted the destruction of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire because of the law and order it

provided for the diverse peoples of Central Europe. Benes

hoped that the realization of these first three objectives

would remove any such regrets. Fourthly, the immediate

reason for the formation of the Little Entente was Hungary1s

attitude toward the new status in Central Europe. The fifth

and final reason was related to the general European situa­

tion. Although he had faith in the League of Nations and

the Great Entente of Great Britain and France, Benes felt

that the policies of both should be reinforced and made more

o
effective by special “regional understandings.11

8
Robert Maehray in The Little Entente, pp. 105-6,
states that a Budapest newspaper on February 21, 1920, spoke
“Contempuously of the small and insignificant Little Entente
as a ridiculous analogue of the Big Entente.11 The expression
la Petite Entente soon became popular and the name was adopt­
ed by the three states which comprised it.
9
Vondracek, op. cit.,'pp. 166-7.
 14
The second link in Benes1 chain— an.alliance with

Rumania— required more careful preparation. The two peoples

had little in common. Except for Masaryk1s visit to Rumania

late in 1917 and mutual cooperation at the Paris peace con­

ferences, the two countries had practically no contacts*

Predominantly Latin in language and culture, Rumania had .

little sympathy for the Slavophil tendencies of her two

prospective partners.

Take Jonescu had, since 1919, advocated closer co­

operation and ties among the Allies. He deserves to rank

with Benes as a co-founder of the Little Entente. After

becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs in June, 1920, Jonescu

secured in the Rumanian Parliament a majority which favored

his policies. When Benes reached Bucharest from Belgrade

on August 17, 1920, Jonescu had already drafted a treaty

analogous to that between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Rumania's inclusion would give territorial continuity

to the Little Entente, but it would also present many new

problems. The solution to some of these problems was sought

by the two mixed commissions appointed at Prague on October ;

30, 1920; one to delimit their common frontier in Ruthenia,

and the other to make recommendations upon economic questions.

Italian objections to the new alignment were removed

by the defensive agreement of November 12, 1920, between

 15
Italy and Yugoslavia (the Treaty of Rapallo), and by an ex­

change of notes, on February 8, 1921, between Benes and

Gount Sforza regarding their common interests. Italy, in

her negotiations with both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia,

agreed to insist upon the enforcement of the Treaties of

St. Germain and Trianon, and upon the exclusion of the

Hapsburgs.
Benes and Jonescu had different conceptions of the

scope of the Little Entente. Jonescu feared not only

Hungary, but Bulgaria and Russia. Benes desired a treaty

that would, apply only Hungary. This divergent policy

between Rumania on the one hand and GzechoSlovakia and

Yugoslavia on the other as to Russia was appreciated by each

state and, therefore, kept in the background. Jonescu

desired particularly a guarantee in order to retain Bessar­

abia, to which Benes would not agree. Jonescu envisaged a

belt of small states from the Aegean to the Baltic Seas

patterned after France*s contemplated tfcordon sanitaireT11

which would cooperate on all international questions and

have the force of a great pox^er. To this end, he desired

to include Greece, and particularly Poland. On the other

hand, Benes reasoned that Poland*s geographic position and

her peculiar problems— particularly her hostility to Russia,

which was shared by the other Baltic states— should exclude

this whole group from anything more than cooperation with

the Little Entente. Also, he was not concerned with

Rumania’s and Yugoslavia’s relations with Bulgaria and

Greece. Their inclusion would give too much of a Balkan

character to the organization, he helieved. Any attempt to

include too many questions, he maintained, would weaken any

hloc which might be created. He won his point. Consequent­

ly, the Little Entente became more limited in its scope;

but as a result, more effective.

Before the Czechoslovak-Rumanian negotiations were

completed, the exiled ex-Emperor Charles of Austria-Hungary

made his first attempt to regain the Hungarian throne.

Charles attempted his first coup d* etat on March 27, 1921.

The Rumanian army of occupation in Budapest withdrew on

November 14, 1919, and then there came into power the ’’White

government of Admiral Horthy. Charles expected every assis­

tance from Admiral Horthy, but he was disappointed. At

once the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy,

Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia protested against the

presence of King Charles In Hungary. Czechoslovakia and

Yugoslavia in particular considered it a casus belli and

proceeded to invoke the clauses of their treaty that pro­

vided for such an emergency.

The Hungarian National Assembly met in extraordinary

 session and approved Horthy1s actions as strictly consti­

tutional. On March 31 it replied to the Allied protests

with a promise that King Gharles would he forced to leave

Hungary. Benes, who helieved that the Hungarian government

was unduly passive, was not convinced of its good faith and

on April 3, sent to Budapest an ultimatum in which he

threatened to take immediate measures if Charles were still <

on Hungarian soil hy 6 p.m. of April 7. The measures to he

taken would he a declaration of-blockade, which was to he

followed, if neeessary, hy a military demonstration. Benes

\ !
had planned the cooperation of friendly powers, hut he

helieved the situation required haste and, therefore, -felt

Justified in taking independent action.

On April 4, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia

i
issued a Joint ultimatum. In it, Yugoslavia suggested that

King Charles he granted three days of grace. This was ac­

cepted hy hoth Czechoslovakia and Rumania. On the-same day

the Conference of Ambassadors presented its note to Hungary.(

Charles was already preparing his departure; hut in spite of

this fact, Benes instructed the Czechoslovak Minister at

Budapest to present the text of the ultimatum to the Hun­

garian government. This act, technically, was independent

since the Ministers of Rumania and Yugoslavia, in the absence

10
of instructions, failed to protest Jointly.
10I M d . r p . 170. _ _ j
 18
King Charles1 attempt to regain the Hungarian throne

hastened the negotiations necessary to complete the Little

Entente. On April 23, 1921, Czechoslovakia and Rumania

concluded their alliance on essentially the same terms as

the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Treaty, except for an additional

Article.1*1' This Article (Pour) stated that, win order to

coordinate their efforts on behalf of peace, they would

consult with one another upon all questions of foreign

policy that concerned their relations with Hungary.11

In conjunction with these political negotiations,

economic discussions were inaugurated. After extensive

preliminary negotiations, a commercial treaty was signed

between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on October 18, 1920,

whereby fixed amounts of goods were to be exchanged. This

Treaty was to continue until June 30, 1921, at which time

new clauses might become effective or the old agreement

might be renewed. The original agreement drew a distinc­

tion between annual contingents and special permits. It

allowed free mutual exports of agricultural and industrial

products only to the extent of the domestic requirements

of both states. Trade was to be facilitated by the mutual

granting of most-favored-natlon advantages, a reduction of

customs formalities, freedom of transit, rapid transpor­

tation facilities, fixed import duties, and the permission

^ S e e Appendix “B 11 for full text of. Treaty.. _ .
 19
for the nationals of each to establish branches of indust-
12
rial concerns in the territories of the other.

In a similar vein, Czechoslovakia and Rumania signed,

at Bucharest, April 23, 1921, the day of their political

treaty, a commercial agreement stipulating reciprocity and

most-favored-nation treatment. In general, Czechoslovakia

exchanged industrial products, particularly machinery and

other metallic goods, for raw materials, especially for

cereals, naphtha, and crude and refined oils.*^

The third link in the Little Entente chain, the

treaty between Rumania and Yugoslavia, still remained to be

concluded. Direct negotiations were begun on June 7, 1921,

and concluded ten days later. During these negotiations,

both nations were harassed by bands of Macedonian comitadjis.

Bulgaria seemed unable to prevent these raids, and Rumania

and Yugoslavia were both dissatisfied over the reluctance

with which Bulgaria was carrying out the disarmament and

reparations clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly. Therefore,

the new treaty, was a counterpart of its two predecessors

except that it included clauses against Bulgaria as well as

against Hungary.

^Vondracek, op. pit., pp. 171-2.

13 lbid. , p. 172.
■^See Appendix T,CTt for full text of Treaty.
 20

The Little Entente treaties were supplemented by mili­

tary conventions: Czechoslovakia-Rumania on July 2, 1921;

Czeehoslovakia-Yugoslavia on August 1, 1921; and Rumania-

Yugoslavia on July 23, 1922. These stipulated the signator­

i e s 1 mutual obligations against unprovoked attacks from Hun­

gary or Bulgaria; the military preparations to be made in

defense of their territorial integrity; and the mutual guar­

antee of the Treaties of Trianon and of Neuilly.

Take Jonescu, writing in the Living Age, December 10,

1 *5
1921 includes in the Little Entente system another treaty,

the defensive alliance between Poland and Rumania. These

two nations had exchanged mutual guarantees of their fron­

tiers on the east. Poland1 s eastern frontiers had been ag­

reed upon at Riga with Russia; and R u m a n i a ^ frontier at the

Dniester River was recognized by France, Great Britain, Italy

and Japan in October, 1920. This treaty intended to meet any

attack which might come from the Soviet Union.

Poland never actually joined the Little Entente. But

she was a frequent observer at its conferences, and at times

she actually entered the discussions.

The three bi-lateral treaties described above made the

Little Entente a reality. Now it had to prove its effective­

ness in the international sphere.

l^Take Jonescu, "How the Little Entente Began," The
Living Age, GGCXI (December, 1921), p. 627* _ _
 CHAPTER III

THE LITTLE ENTENTE IN OPERATION

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD

THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA:

The Little Entente, and more specifically Benes of

Czechoslovakia, felt that if the constructive value of the

new organization was to he enhanced, other small states in

Central Europe who were willing to cooperate must he drawn

into its orhit. Austria was the most promising of such

prospective additions. In fact, Austria of all the new

.states needed assistance most. Her survival as an indepen­

dent state hung in the balance#

In despair, Austria looked to anschluss with Germany

as her only hope. But the victors, especially France,

would not allow this move which might strengthen Germany.

The World Court even handed down a decision which prevented

the formation of an Austro-German Customs Union. Austria

also failed to regain her German minorities. Militarily

impotent and surrounded hy hostile neighbors, Austria ac­

cepted her fate. She was compelled to embark on a desparate

struggle for Independent existence.

The Peace Conference, aware of Austria1s plight,

sought to alleviate her situation by allowing broad powers

to the Reparations Commission, which was entrusted with the

 22

supervision of the enforcement of the economic and financial

clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain. On March 1, 1919, a

loan of $30,000,000, which was increased eventually to

$48,000,000, was made to Austria so she might purchase food­

stuffs for her starving population. Great Britain, Prance

and Italy took equal shares in the loan. This measure pro­

vided only temporary relief. In April, 1 9 2 0 , .the Repara­

tions Commission was aided hy the newly created International

Relief Credits Committee, which, operating from Paris, at­

tempted to take charge of Austrian relief. One of its first,

acts was to authorize Austria to issue honds with national

assets and monopolies as security. This became sort of a

first mortgage upon all Austrian revenues.

In the Austrian situation, the Little Entente saw not

only an opportunity for service, but a grave political and

economic menace to its own security. Public opinion in

Czechoslovakia, which was most concerned, was still hostile

toward Austria because of the hatred created during the

process of separation. Most Czechoslovaks failed to realize

that in aiding Austria they would eliminate the possibility

of anschluss T and would create a prospective customer for

Czechoslovak goods. Benes expressed the opinion that

because of her position, Czechoslovakia was best able and

^Vondracek, op. cit., pp. 173-4.

 23
should he most eager to aid Austria in the economic, finan­

cial and, perhaps, even in the political field. For this

opinion, Benes received much criticism in his own country.

Direct negotiations between Austria and Czecho­

slovakia began in January, 1920, when the Austrian Chancel­

lor, Dr. Renner, accompanied by technical experts, visited

Benes in Prague. The preliminary conferences concerned

two major questions: economic relations and the problems

arising from the enforcement of the Peace Treaties. Benes1

domestic opponents took advantage of the adverse public

opinion to stress Czechoslovakia1s own needs. Czecho­

slovakia was then in the midst of domestic stabilization.

They also pointed out the impracticability of aiding a

former enemy when the need at home was still great.

On the other hand, the Great Entente, as well as

Czechoslovakia^ prospective partners in the Little Entente,

favored Benes1 policy because of fear that Austria1s plight

might drive her into a union with Germany. But even Benes

seemed to have lost patience during the negotiations when

on February 13 he asserted that Austria must help herself

in order to improve her condition.

On June 17, 1920, the Treaty of Brno was signed

between Austria and Czechoslovakia. It provided for mutual

protection for the respective minorities and for the clari-

 24
fication of the respective definitions of citizenship.

Several minor points still remained in doubt, therefore the

Treaty was amplified by a supplementary protocol of August 3.

Perhaps the most important part of these two treaties was

the provision for a special Court of Arbitration which was

to try all disputes which might arise either from the rights

of citizenship or from questions concerning the educational ;

facilities that were provided for minorities.

Between November, 1920, and June, 1921, Great Britain,

France and Italy offered several suggestions for aiding

Austria, but few of them produced any lasting results.

Czechoslovakia preferred to negotiate directly with Austria.

As a result, a new commercial treaty was signed at Prague

on May 4, 1921. This treaty was to become the first step

for the mutual reduction of control over foreign trade.

A distinct change in Czechoslovak public opinion

regarding Austria caused this treaty to be drawn up. In

1919, Benes had been subjected to most severe criticism for ,

his attitude toward Austria; but less than two years later

his people accepted his policy.

On May 25, 1921, in answer to questioning before the

Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, Benes

asserted that his Austrian policy was directed to preserve

the peace treaties and to prevent a plebiscite whereby

 25
Austria might unite with Germany. He also stated that he

had made his position clear to both the Austrian minister at

Prague and to the Czechoslovak representative at Vienna.

Czechoslovakia1s Industrial situation had caused the

change in her feeling toward Austria. When it was realized

that Austria could no longer afford to purchase Czecho­

slovakia1^ coal or industrial products, aid became a neces- ,

sity if the alternatives of anschluss or anarchy were to be

avoided.

Czechoslovakia’s two Little Entente partners, Yugo­

slavia and Rumania, shared her desire to aid Austria. Be­

fore the war, about seventy per cent of Serbia’s exports

had been absorbed by Austria. The war drastically changed

this trend of trade. As a consequence, on June 27, 1920,

Austria and Yugoslavia concluded a provisional treaty of

commerce which, after four renewals, became a definitive

treaty. Under its terms, Austria agreed to purchase most

of Yugoslavia’s exports of wheat, meat, prunes and live­

stock. Rumania was also willing to aid Austria. Although

her economic contacts with Austria were few, the two

countries had few interests that clashed.

In view of the generally favorable sentiments, it

became relatively easy for Czechoslovakia to associate

17I M d .. p. 176. ;
 26
Austria with the policy of the Little Entente, President

Masaryk, who shared Benes* attitude toward Austria, effected

a loan of 500,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns to Austria. He

negotiated with President Hainisch of Austria at Hallstatt

on August 10, 1921. The rapprochement was completed at

Prague on December 16, 1921, when the Presidents and Prime

Ministers of the two states— Masaryk and Benes for Czecho­

slovakia and Hainisch and Schober for Austria— signed the

Treaty of Lany. Under this treaty the two states agreed

on the following points:

1. To carry out fully all the stipulations of the

Treaties of St. G-ermain and Trianon;

2. To guarantee to each other the territorial status

assigned to them by these treaties;

3. To observe neutrality in case of a conflict with

third parties;

4. To prohibit in their territories the formation

of any political or military organization
directed against either of them;

5. To aid each other in their opposition to any

plan for the restoration of the former regime;

6. To settle disputes among themselves by arbitra­

tion;

7. To communicate to each other the political or

economic agreements with third parties which
either had made;

8. Not to conclude any agreement in contradiction

of the treaty.^-®

18
Machray, op. clt.. p. 181.
 2?
Benee stated that the Treaty did not make Austria a

member of the Little Entente, but it manifested an agreement

of policy between Austria and the Little Entente*

The Treaty was well-received in all the Little

Entente countries, but the pan-Germanic element in Austria

expressed disapproval. Schober, Austrian Foreign Minister,

successfully replied to all protests by the pan-Germans.

He reminded tham that Austria had several times already

undertaken to execute loyally the Treaty of St. Germain, and

that the Treaty of Lany merely reaffirmed the undertaking.

It introduced nothing new* 57

THE PROBLEM OF POLAMD:

As he had done with Austria, Benes hoped to associate

Poland with the policies of the Little Entente. Toward this

end, he inaugurated negotiations with Poland dealing with

economic problems. The boundary disputes were handled by

separate negotiations. The first agreement of August 21,

1919, sought to regulate temporarily the trade of Czecho­

slovak coal and Polish naphtha. This agreement was de­

nounced by Poland because she thought it disadvantageous.

Likewise, the second agreement of March 12, 1920 was also

of a temporary nature, but remained in force. Both treaties

19Ibld.. p. 182.
 28
were inadequate because they merely dealt with limited

aspects of commercial questions of mutual interest.

In Prague on September 24, 1920, a new and more

general treaty was signed in regard to problems of trans­

portation, customs and passport procedure. Three days later

another agreement specified that Czechoslovakia should ex­

port to Poland 37,000 tons of coal and 15,000 tons of coke

every month. In addition, if Poland made the necessary

application, an additional 10,000 tons of coal and a pro­

portional tonnage of coke might be added to the monthly

quotas. In return, GzechoSlovakia was to receive 7,083 tons

-of raw naphtha and 1250 tons of naphtha derivatives per

month. Payments to be made in advance at the prices then

current in the exporting states. This agreement was to be

of temporary duration, until the G-erman-Polish dispute over

Upper Silesia should be terminated.

In the meantime, France used her best efforts to

effect a rapprochement betxveen Czechoslovakia and Poland,

She realized that both of these countries were essential to

her plan to encircle G-ermany with a ring of friendly states.

The first step was a Franco-Polish political agree­

ment signed at Paris on February 19, 1921. This was fol­

lowed quickly by a similar agreement between .Poland and

Rumania which was signed at Bucharest on March 4, 1921 by

 29
Sapieha for Poland and Jonescu for Rumania. The essence of

this last agreement was negotiated with the approval of the

military leaders of both countries and provided for mutual

assistance against an unprovoked attack from the East. It

also provided for consultation prior to the drafting of any

new alliances.

In spite of these preliminary agreements, the next

step, a Czechoslovak-Polish treaty proved much more diffi­

cult. The friction over Tesin did not diminish until

Poland had accepted the decision of the Supreme Gouncil.

Also, Poland was not especially interested in the primary

objectives of the Little Entente. To her the Soviet Union

and Baltic problems were preeminent.

A change in Poland*s attitude came in the summer of

1921 when Prince Sapieha was succeeded as Foreign Minister

by Skirmunt. The new Foreign Minister desired to renew,

with both Jonescu and Benes, the policy of cooperation which

had been inaugurated at the 1918 Congress of Oppressed

Nationalities at Rome. The outcome of Skirmunt*s visit to

Prague was the signing of a defensive treaty, November 6,

1921. This treaty was intended to effect the rapprochement

between the two states and the collaboration of Poland with

the Little Entente. It provided that the two states would:

1. Respect one another*s territorial integrity;

 2. Maintain a benevolent neutrality in the event of
an attach by a third state;

3. Permit the free passage of war materials;

4. Proclaim disinterestedness in Slovakia on the

part of Poland and Galicia on the part of Czecho­
slovakia;

5* Conclude a new commercial treaty;

6. Arbitrate points in dispute;

7. Communicate to one another treaties negotiated

with a third state;

8. Recognize treaties already concluded;

9. Suppress propaganda direct against oneanother;

10. Conclude the present treaty for five years.20

Much to Benes1 regret, Poland never ratified this

treaty. To some extent, Poland cooperated with the Little

Entente, but her rapprochement with Czechoslovakia remained

to be effected at a later date.

The object of Benes* various Central European

maneuvers was to prevent the recreation of Austria-Hungary

In any form. At this time, he and the Little Entente part­

ners opposed the formation of a Danubian Confederation which

might be dominated by Vienna and Budapest.

20Vondracek, op. cit. . p. 180.

 31
THE PROBLEM OF HUNGARY:

Reconciliation %dth Hungary seemed hopeless at the

moment, but the Little Entente was determined to make an

attempt in order to avert any future coups on the part of

ex-King Charles. Benes, as usual, took the lead. After

notifying his people of the plan, he met Teleki the Hungar­

ian Premier and Gratz the Foreign Minister on March 14,

1921, at Most nad Litava (Bruck). There it was decided to

appoint four commissions which were to apply gradually the

principles of the Treaty of Trianon which pertained to

economic.matters common to both countries. But, in the

midst of the negotiations, King Charles made his first

attempted coup on March 27, 1921. This act caused a sus­

pension of discussions until the matter was resolved.

In this crisis, Benes* actions were most vigorous

and resulted in the speedy ejection of King Charles by the

Hungarian government. After King Charles* first failure,

Teleki was succeeded by Count Bethlen and Gratz by Banffy.

Still optimistic,' Benes resumed negotiations with Hungary

at Marianske Lazne (Marienbad) late In June. A joint anti-

Hapsburg agreement was the only accomplishment of this

meeting because further negotiations were once more post­

poned by the Burgenland crisis.

By the Peace Treaties, Burgenland had been trans-

ferred, without a plebiscite, from Hungary to Austria. This

procedure had been resented by the Hungarians, especially

those living in Odenburg (Sopron). On August 29, 1921, the

cession date, instead of evacuating the area, the Hungar­

ians drove out the Austrians who had come to take posses­

sion. The Allied Powers protested, but Hungary answered by

requesting direct negotiations between Vienna and Budapest.

The Oonference of Ambassadors informed Hungary that before

any agreement could be made with Austria, an immediate

evacuation of the region had to be made.

Hungary requested Czechoslovakia to mediate, and

Benes, on September 10, called upon the Conference of

Ambassadors for a speedy solution of the controversy. In

interviews with Banffy of Hungary and Schober of Austria he

attempted to arrange a compromise whereby Austria would

yield a part of the disputed area. On September 26, at the

Conference of Brno, he reopened negotiations with Hungary

for the third time.

Rumania welcomed Czechoslovakia*s mediation, but

Yugoslavia did not. The latter feared that Austria*s

cession of Odenburg might lead to further modifications of

the Treaty of Trianon. Czechoslovakia*s action was resented

by yet another nation— Italy. She had already arranged that

Hungary should request her to mediate instead of Gzecho-

 33
Slovakia. Italy1s Initiative produced results. The Con­

ference of Ambassadors followed their usual policy of re­

garding small states as powers with merely limited interests.

It approved the Protocol of Venice of October 13 which pre­

scribed a plebiscite for Odenburg. The plebiscite of

December 14-15 resulted in 15,334 votes for Hungary and

21
8,227 for Austria. Thus, Hungary regained Odenburg.

Benes objected to the undue interference in Central

Europe by the Great Powers. These objections acquired more

force because of the manner in which the Great Powers

handled a similar dispute over Baranya, a region at the con­

fluence of the Danube and Drava Elvers.

Serbia occupied this region in 1918, but she did not

proceed In this area as she did In others where she was

certain of possession. She merely appointed the chief of­

ficials and left the details of local government to the

residents. The Treaty of Trianon awarded her only the

southern part, two communities in the region of Darda.

Hungary suggested to the Conference of Ambassadors that the

two disputes be linked together, and that Yugoslavia eva­

cuate Baranya before she evacuated Burgenland. The Con­

ference of Ambassadors acceded to Hungary1s request and

sent a note to this effect to Belgrade. This manifestation

of favoritism to Hungary caused great public resentment in

21rbia.f p. 183.
 34
Yugoslavia. Despite tills, Yugoslavia obeyed the order.

If any disharmony existed within the Little Entente

over the Burgenland and Baranya affairs, it quickly disap­

peared as a result of King Charles1 second attempted coup.

Charles, who had spent the time since his first attempt in

Switzerland, flew to Hungary and landed near Sopron on

October 20, 1921. This act constituted a breach of faith

as to Switzerland, whose neutrality he violated. He tried

to Justify his behavior by stating that obligations placed

on him by foreigners were secondary to those of his own

country, which, in its troubled condition, needed his

guidance. Evidently he did not reckon with one fact— the

Little Entente was fully prepared for the emergency he

created. On October 22, both Ententes— Great and Little—

through their representatives in Budapest demanded the ex­

pulsion of King Charles.

The course of events in Hungary evidently had ex­

hausted Benes 1*patience. He asserted that the return of

Eing Charles constituted a casus belli. Benes then pre­

sented to Hungary five specific demands:

1. Strict execution of the territorial and military

clauses of the Treaty of Trianon;

2. Disarmament;

3. Definitive solution of the Hapsburg question.

 35
4. .Indemnity for the costs of Czechoslovak mobili­
zation; and

5. Annulment of the Austro-Hungarian agreement of

Venice regarding Burgenland.

On October 23 he warned the Oreat Powers that the Little

Entente would intervene militarily and alone, if necessary.

Immediately, both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia began

to mobilize. Regarding the situation as hopeless, the Hun­

garian government captured King Charles and on October 26

opened with him negotiations for his renunciation of the

throne. He refused to take this step. The Little Entente

appealed to the Conference of Ambassadors which in turn sent

an ultimatum to Hungary warning her that she alone would be

responsible for the consequences if she failed to heed the

demands of the Little Entente. A similar warning was given

to Count Banffy by Benes who also pointed out that military

intervention could be avoided only if Hungary agreed in

writing to abide by the Treaty of Trianon and deprive the

Hapsburgs of their rights to her throne.

At the same time, Benes requested that the Great

Powers grant the Little Entente representation on the special

sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission for Hungary and

that the latter pay at least a nominal indemnity to cover

the costs of mobilization. (The mobilization had cost Czecho-

2%achray, op. cit. f p. 179.

 36
Slovakia 450,867,935 crowns, or almost #10,000,000.) On

the following day, the Conference of Ambassadors demanded

that Hungary proclaim the deposition of King Charles and

surrender him to the commander of the British Danubian fleet

for removal to a place of exile to be determined by the

Powers, When Hungary agreed to these terms, the Glowworm

took King Charles to Madeira where he died on April 1, 1922.

Even after the removal of King Charles, the Little

Entente was not satisfied because the questions of the

dynasty and the indemnity still awaited solution. Benes

continually demanded that Hungary comply with these points,

especially if military intervention were to be avoided. But

Benes denied ever having sent an ultimatum directly to

Hungary, as was charged by some.

Hungary, though, decided to risk her fate at the

hands of the Great Powers rather than at the hands of the

Little Entente. On October 30, the Conference of Ambas­

sadors sent a note to Benes in which they warned him against

any hasty action without first consulting the Great Powers.

Also denied was his claim for an indemnity because the

Hungarian government had captured and had expelled King

Charles by its own unaided efforts. But, they agreed to

insist upon the deposition of the Hapsburgs. Reluctantly,

Hungary agreed to pass the required deposition law within

 37
eight days.

The proposed act of deposition, which contained all

the points except the indemnity, was presented to the Hun­

garian parliament on November 3. Benes raised the further

objection that the document mentioned only King Charles, and

permitted the possibility of some other Hapsburg regaining

the throne as a result of a free election. The Conference

of Ambassadors took the same view, and on November 10,

obtained from Hungary an additional declaration that no

Hapsburg could ever become a candidate for the Hungarian

throne, and that no candidate could be selected without a

prior agreement with the Great Powers. This satisfied the

Conference of Ambassadors, but to satisfy Benes it pro­

claimed the law an “International Act.1* In their estima­

tion, this would provide a guarantee superior to that of

any act which might be passed at some future date.

The Little Entente, through Benes, was obstinate in

its insistence upon every legal safeguard in guaranteeing

!the deposition of the Hapsburgs, because it wanted to pre­

vent Hungary from relying upon the so-called “juridical

argument.11 When, late In 1918, King Charles went into exile,

he had not abdicated, but had merely suspended his royal

throne and had left Hungary the right to act as she saw fit.

Since he had not signed the Peace Treaties, his own rights
and those of his heirs as well, by the juridical argument,

still extended over the territories which had belonged to

Hungary in 1914, even though large portions of it now were

included in the Little Entente countries. Benes feared

that, in the eyes of the Hungarian Legitimists a Hapsburg

restoration would automatically abrogate the Treaties of St.

Germain and Trianon and legally justify Hungary’s claims to ,

these areas. The Little Entente, and rightly so, felt that

their existence as independent states would be menaced by

a Hapsburg restoration.

King Charles1 second attempted coup had been the first

real test for the Little Entente. From all outward appear­

ances, Hungary had yielded to the Great Powers, but in the

last analysis her compliance had been brought about by the

insistent pressure of the Little Entente.

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had adopted identical

policies, whereas Rumania*s policy had been unique. Ruma­

n i a ’s sincerity had been above question. Mot only ha,d she

proclaimed her solidarity with her two partners by a note of

October 26, 1921, but she had mobilized six divisions of

infantry and two of cavalry. After the intervention by the

Great Entente, she had agreed to demobilize before the

termination of the crisis. She made no demands of Hungary *

for compensation for the costs of mobilization, but she

supported the demands of her two partners. Italy, on

October 24, also promised to support the Little Entente in

a strong policy against Hungary, but advised diplomatic

methods to terminate the dispute. Even Poland cooperated

with the Little Entente. She warned Hungary not to depend

upon former friendship for aid.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HUNGARY:

In the process of reconstruction of the small states

of Central Europe, the Little Entente felt that assistance

i

to Hungary would be the last step. Although willing to re­

habilitate Hungary after the fashion of Austria, it felt

that additional safeguards should be required. Benes was

willing to have Hungary*s national revenues released from

the terms of the Treaty of Trianon as collateral for a new

loan, but he-desired to assure himself that the new funds

would not be used for either military or propaganda purposes.

To that end he suggested that the Little Entente safeguard

itself through a commission of control. Since his own direct

negotiations with Hungary during 1922 had produced only a

non-ratified commercial treaty, he thought that the problem

of Hungary should be submitted to the League which had

functioned so well in the case of Austria.

Hungary*s position was not as desperate as Austria*s

had been. But, her rapidly depreciating currency, un­

balanced budgets, unemployment and general economic dis­

tress were serious enough to make it improbable that any

great Improvement could be effected solely through her own

efforts. On April 22, 1925, Hungary admitted her inability

to save herself, and on that date she requested that the

Reparations Commission release, as security for a new loan,

the national resources that had been impounded by Article

180 of the Treaty of Trianon. The Little Entente, which

held considerable reparations claims against Hungary, agreed

not to oppose this measure provided that none of the new

funds were for military or propaganda purposes. Also, it

wanted to be given ,,most-favored-nationtt treatment by Hun­

gary in reparations payments, and to be given guarantees of

good faith by Hungary, and that she disarm definitely and

agree to a protocol on the Austrian model.

At the Fourth Session of the Assembly of the League,

on September 29, 1923, the Little Entente proposed that the

Council authorize the Financial Committee and the Secretar­

iat to inaugurate the procedure necessary to begin the re­

construction of Hungary, a proposal which was immediately

approved. This was done with the understanding that the

Little Entente should be represented on the Council during

deliberations concerning Hungary. The Reparations Commis-

 41
sion agreed on October 17, but only on the condition that

the states with claims against Hungary be associated with

the League in the process of reconstruction.

After further investigations and conferences, the

plans for the reconstruction of Hungary were embodied in

two protocols of March 14, 1924. The first signed by both

Ententes (Great Britain, Prance, Italy, Czechoslovakia,

Yugoslavia, Rumania) and Hungary, required that Hungary ful­

fill voluntarily the clauses of the Treaty of Trianon. This

was a result of Benes* hard work. In fact, despite Italian

opposition, he had insisted throughout these negotiations

upon a favorable treatment of Czechoslovakia*s financial

obligations before he would consent to the plan for Hungary.

He won his point. The second protocol, which was signed

solely by Hungary, listed her financial obligations as a

good neighbor. On May 1, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., a prominent

Boston financial tycoon, became the Commissioner-General.^3

During June, a loan of 11,000,000 pounds sterling was

floated successfully in the identical manner and under the

same auspices as that of Austria. There was one marked

difference— Hungary*s own national resources were declared

sufficient security and, therefore, required no foreign

guarantee.

^3Vondracek, op. c l t .. p. 208.

THE EARLY LITTLE ENTENTE CONFERENCES:

The Little Entente members realized that the success

of 1921 had been the result of cooperation. Therefore, they

resolved to make their policy felt beyond Central Europe.

They hoped to create something more than a mere defensive

alliance. The whole continent, not only Central Europe,

was then in the process of reconstruction. The main issues

were: the recognition of Russia; the economic reconstruc­

tion of Europe; and the relations between Great Britain and

France. All these issues were vital to the Little Entente

whose members planned to hold a series of preliminary con­

ferences In order to arrive at a general understanding and

present a united front at the Genoa Conference.

Each of the three partners viewed the Russian problem

in a different light. Rumania, as well as Poland, had

serious disputes with her; whereas both Czechoslovakia and

Yugoslavia had the Slavophil idea of friendship. Although,

the former would have preferred a Russian republic and the

latter a monarchy. Also, the Little Entente wanted to ayoid

being forced to make a choice between Great Britain and

France who seemed to differ strongly on Russia and Germany.

The first preliminary conference was held at Bucha­

rest on February 20-24, 1922. In attendance were Premier

Pasich and Foreign Minister NIncich of Yugoslavia; Premier

Bratlano and Foreign Minister Duea of Rumania; and Czecho­

slovakia was represented by Veverka, the Czechoslovak mini­

ster to Rumania. Benes was on a trip to Paris and London

at this time in order to determine the attitude of these

Powers toward the Little Entente. The representatives took

advantage of the bethrothal of King Alexander of Yugoslavia

and Princess Marie of Rumania to bind the two states more

.closely together.

The chief results of the conference were the solution

of a boundary dispute between Rumania and Yugoslavia in the

Banat of Temesvar and an agreement of common action for the

conference at (Genoa. When Benes returned from the west, he

conferred at Bratislava with Hincich, and expressed approval

of the results of the Conference of Bucharest. The two

partners decided to broaden the program of the Little

Entente for the coming (Genoa conference. They were very in­

terested in recommending the participation of the League of

Mations in the coming deliberations; in opposing any dis­

cussions regarding the revision of the Peace Treaties; and

they desired to reopen commercial and economic relations with

Russia, regardless of the question of recognition.

The final preliminary conference was held at Belgrade,

on March 9-12. Yugoslavia submitted a memoir which sought

to improve economic conditions by a general reestablishment

 44

of international communications and transportation, by

.financial stabilization and by balancing budgets. This was

adopted as the basis for the work of the various Commissions

set up at Genoa. Of more practical value was the decision

by the Little Entente to hold future, regular periodic con­

ferences at which to discuss all new problems which might

arise.

The Conference of Belgrade was of interest also be­

cause Poland participated in the discussions, whereas at

the Conference of Bucharest in February she was Just an

observer. Because of fear of isolation, Poland appeared

willing to collaborate with the Little Entente upon ques­

tions of common interest, although seemed not too anxious

for an intimate connection. As stated before, Poland had

many interests foreign to those of the Little Entente. She

was convinced that no solution of the Russian problem was

possible without the involvement of her territory, and pos­

sibly the loss of some of it. In order to form a closer

alliance with the Baltic States, Poland, called the Con­

ference of Warsaw on March 17, 1922. Finland, Estonia and

Latvia sent delegates. The results of the conference were

agreements to aid mutual commerce and to recognize the Peace

Treaties which ended the war with Russia. All these re­

solutions proved futile when Poland disavowed her pleni-

 45"
potentiaries. Thereupon, the Baltic states held another

conference at Riga on March 30. Here they agreed on united

24
action for the Genoa conference.

At the Genoa Conference, the recognition which the

bloc of the Little Entente and Poland received was due again

to their solidarity. In spite of thig, many observers still

considered such close collaboration of a temporary nature.

Benes was disappointed because Poland had sent just

an observer to the Conference at Belgrade. He considered

her relations with the Little Entente sufficiently intimate

for a closer connection, but Poland refused to consider the

affair as a quadruple affair even though Yugoslaviafs Nin- ^

cich spoke of a Quadruple Entente.11 However, Poland re­

mained consistent in her attitude and continued to send

observers to some of the Little Entente conferences, but

did not become more closely identified with it.

For Central Europe, the primary significance of both

the Genoa Conference and of the preliminary conferences

which had preceded it was the fact that the small powers

considered the possibility of renewal of relations with

Russia while still adhering to the French stand of the In­

violability of treaties.

Prague was the site of the first regular periodic

24 I b l d . . p. 200.
meeting of the Little Entente, This Conference met on

August 25, 1922, and present were Benes of Czechoslovakia,

Duea of Rumania, Pasich of Yugoslavia and Piltz, the Polish

Minister to Prague. The discussions centered around two

topics: the attitude of the four states at the Third League

Assembly which was to open on September 4, and the renewal

'Of the Gzechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. On the

27 and 28, there were- introduced also the questions of the

reconstruction of Austria; the admission of Hungary to the

League; the treatment of minorities; the delimitation of

the Austro-Hungarian and Austro-Yugoslav frontiers; the

danger of having to make a choice between Great Britain and

France; and the rumors of a Bavarian Wittelsbach restoration

in Germany. After due deliberation, the Conference agreed

■to endorse Benes* policies regarding Austria and the Western

i-

Powers; to proclaim against the Wittelsbach restoration as

less favorable than the status quo: and to permit Hungary

to enter the League provided she accepted the situation

created by the Treaty of Trianon.

At Marianske Lazne where Pasich had gone for his

annual mineral bath treatment, the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav

treaty of alliance was renewed and amplified on August 31.

The original treaty of August 14, 1920 was extended again

for five instead of two years, and all the other treaties
 47
which each state had negotiated (Czechoslovakia with Ruma­

nia, Austria and Poland; Yugoslavia with Rumania and Italy)

were approved. Also agreed upon was a mutual "basis to be

found for economic, financial and transportational colla­

boration; mutual political and diplomatic assistance was

to be given in international relations; and consultation

was to take place on all matters which might affect common

interests.

The Prague-Marianske Lazne Conferences marked an

Important phase in the evolution of the Little Entente.

The New bloc was converted into a power to be reckoned with

in all European problems. In spite of this, the Little

Entente had decided defects. Automatic and united action

could only be had on limited questions, and the Gzecho­

slovak-Yugoslav link was far stronger than the other links

in the chain.

Benes considered the former weakness of more impor­

tance, and stressed that the manner of union was of secon­

dary importance. Although, he admitted that the existing

system of fragmentary bilateral treaties could be improved

by further treaties after the model of that of Marianske

Lazne.

In an attempt to settle the problems of Southeastern

Europe, a conference took place at Lausanne beginning on

 48

November 20, 1922. The Little Entente was evident in the

background. Benes did not arrive until the 28, and allowed

his two partners a free hand in the discussions. He was not

interested in the Greco-Turk question, but was desirous of

a rapprochement between the Little Entente and Bulgaria and

Greece. Nevertheless, he was willing, in order to accom­

modate his partners, to allow Greece and Bulgaria to Join

the Little Entente. Benes merely desired collaboration

with them.

In spite of the dynastic ties among Greece, Rumania

and Yugoslavia, Greece1s inclusion in the Little Entente

25
could not be effected. Take Jonescu, to his dying day—

June 21, 1922— longed for this to become a reality.

Greece and Yugoslavia were bound by a military and.

political alliance dating from May 19, 1913. This treaty

was for a duration of ten years. Greece wanted very much

to renew it, but Yugoslavia was cool toward a renewal. In

October of 1915, when Serbia’s position was desperate,

Greece decided not to aid her. So, when General Dousmanis,

an original signer of the treaty, arrived in Belgrade in

February 1922 to negotiate a renewal, he met a reserved

reception. Greece offered special commercial rights to

^El i z a b e t h of Rumania married King George of Greece;

Marie of Rumania, King Alexander of Yugoslavia; and Helen
of Greece, Carol of Rumania. (Vondracek, op. cit., p. 202.)
 49
Yugoslavia via Salonika, but in spite of this the treaty-

failed of renewal. Rumania requested reciprocal economic

advantages from Greece. Inasmuch as these might have nul­

lified the special advantages for Yugoslavia, this may have

been another factor which prompted Yugoslavia not to renew

its treaty with Greece. (Yugoslavia definitively denounced

the treaty on November 15, 1924.)

Bands of Macedonian comitad.lis continued their raids

across both the Greek and Yugoslav frontiers, a fact which

prevented a reconciliation with Bulgaria. Nothing but

amicable exchange of views was effected. Therefore, the

year 1922 resulted in the strengthening of the Little

Entente, but the closing months produced future uncertainty.

The rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Italy, effected by

the Treaty of Rapallo, and later treaties of October 23,

1922, seemed uneasy. This uneasiness was provoked by the

rise to power of a new regime headed by Benito Mussolini.

The Gzechoslovak-Rumanian treaty was renewed on

May 7, 1923. This new treaty was for a duration of three

years, but it was not strengthened like the one between

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

The second regular annual conference took place on

July 26, 1923 at Sinaia, the Rumanian royal summer palace.

The Conference decided to do nothing about Russia for the

 50
present; and to exclude both Greece and Bulgaria from

active membership. It agreed with Benes that Hungary was

still the chief problem of Central Europe, and despite her

stubborness, should be reconstructed as was Austria. The

most important permanent result of Sinaia was the strength-

i
ening of the bilateral system of treaties on September 14,

1923. This was done by a tripartite military convention

which provided for mutual cooperation in the event of a

casus foederis. The three military staffs were to begin

work immediately on the procedures to be used.

FRANCE, ITALY AND THE LITTLE ENTENTE;

France had nothing to do with the origin of the

Little Entente; she was even opposed to its organization in

the b e g i n n i n g . ^ With the growing solidarity of the Little

Entente, though, France changed her policy toward it.

From the time the peace treaties were signed, France

sympathized with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Her support of the Little Entente had a single purpose— to

preserve the status quo. At first, French support was

limited only to political encouragement and financial assist­

ance. One definite commitment incurred by Paris was an

alliance, later implemented by a military pace, with Czecho-

^ E d v a r d Benes and Harry Nicholas Howard, op, cit.,

p. 220-A. „ _ . .J
Slovakia on January 25, 1924. The Pact provided for mutual

consultation on problems threatening the status q u o f and

stipulated common action against Hapsburg restoration or any

attempt against Austrian independence or any German, aggres­

sion.
In 1926 Prance signed a similar alliance with Rumania

and with Yugoslavia in 1927. But these were never genuinely

implemented. Together with the French alliance with Belgium

in the west and with Poland in the east, the French-Little

Entente connection made up the total of the French postwar

system of alliances.

Benes again had taken the initiative in these' nego­

tiations with the western powers. The Little Entente part­

ners welcomed this opportunity to strengthen their security

by closer alliances with the Great Powers. They felt that,

because of their solidarity and prestige built up by per­

formance, they could establish financial and political re­

lationships with large nations without becoming mere tools.

The dream of the Little Entente was to become one of the

four major European blocs along with the U.S.S.R., Germany,

and the Western Powers.

Hew issues were needed to combat rumors that the

Little Entente was on the verge of dissolution because the

reconstruction of Hungary had destroyed the only reason for

 52
its existence. Therefore, Czechoslovakia^ alliance with

France met with the approval of the other partners. Now,

the Little Entente was bcssadening its quest for security

to include powers outside Central Europe.

On January 10-12, 1924, the Little Entente held the

i
Conference of Belgrade to discuss the problems of security

confronting the member states. There were exaggerated i

rumors to the extent of the rapprochement with France. Al­

though Benes was alleged to have prepared Franco-Yugoslav

and Franco-Rumanian treaties parallel to the Franco-Czecho-

slovak alliance, he did not present them.

When the Conference actually opened, it approved the

action taken regarding the reconstruction of Hungary, from

which satisfactory guarantees were exacted. Then it turned

* 4
to the problem of relations with the Great Powers. At that

time, the Great Powers were contemplating de ..lure recogni­

tion of the U.S.S.R., and Benes felt .it necessary to clarify'

the position of the Little Entente regarding that nation

because the question could not be kept in the background

without danger of destroying the unity of the three nations.,

i
Benes did not oppose the immediate recognition of the U.S.S.R.

because of principle, but because he thought the action might

be premature. Herwas prepared to do so if Moscow would stop

the dissemination of foreign propaganda. Yugoslavia con­

 53
sidered the Soviet matter for each government to handle

separately, Rumania, as a prerequisite to recognition, de­

manded Russian recognition of her title to Bessarabia.

Rumania was adamant in her opposition to Soviet recognition,

and Benes did not press the matter further even after

Yugoslavia’s Hincich stressed the joint Czechoslovak and

Yugoslav interests in a strong Soviet Union. To have done

so would have alienated Rumania which was already resentful

of the fact that, in event of war between herself and the

Soviet Union, the support of her partners was not sure. In

such a conflict, her only ally would be Poland. Poland,

though, did not attend the Belgrade Conference because she

feared that she might be called upon to commit herself on

this touchy situation. Therefore, the Conference decision

was that each nation should retain freedom of action re­

garding the Soviet Union. This was the only basis upon

which continued cooperation could be guaranteed.

In the meantime, Mussolini was growing uneasy because

of France’s activities in Central Europe. In order to

counteract the threat of French preponderance, through

control of the Little Entente, he decided to use similar

methods. As a result, there developed between France and

Italy keen competition for the favor of the members of the

Little Entente and Poland. At the time of the Conference of

 54 ,
Belgrade, Mussolini, through negotiations with Yugoslavia,

drew closer to the Little Entente with the signing on Jan­

uary 27, 1924, the "Pact of Rome.** This Treaty was designed

to minimize friction between the two countries. The Treaty

provided first, a "Pact of Friendship and Cordial Coopera­

tion11; secondly, a protocol which stated that the new agree­

ment contained nothing that did not agree with Yugoslavia's .

i

earlier treaties with the Little Entente partners, that it

was non-aggressive in that it guaranteed the Peace Treaties

and promised mutual neutrality in the event of an unprovoked

attack by a third power, that it promised mutual cooperation

and diplomatic support against external threats of violence,

and that it would last for five years; and, thirdly, a

supplement which recognized the annexation of Fiume by Italy

and ceded to Yugoslavia Port Baros and the delta immediately

adjacent.

Benes, speaking for the Little Entente, welcomed the

Treaty. He and Nincich had kept each other informed of

their respective negotiations with Italy and France, and

both strove to point out that the Little Entente did not in- ■

tend to commit itself to France alone for friendship. Never­

theless, Yugoslavia's alliance with Italy was precarious and

unnatural. Within Yugoslavia, any treaty between the two

countries was unpopular, and provoked public indignation.

 55

Yugoslavia would have preferred alliances with either Paris

or Moscow, whose military strength was greater and whose

friendship she considered more sincere.

Yugoslav suspicions of Italy were not ill-founded,

and soon Italy, through Mussolini, manifested her real in­

tentions in Southeastern Europe. She concluded the Italo-

Albanian Pact at Tirana on November 27, 1926, and a defen­

sive alliance a year later. These showed without a doubt

that Italy considered the Balkans her legitimate sphere of

influence. As will be shot-m later, time and time again

Mussolini tried to assume the dominant role In the Danubian

basin and the Balkans, and through the Little Entente, tried

to dislodge France from her position of influence in these

areas. But, French hegemony was never seriously threatened.

Large Italian purchases from Yugoslavia, generous overtures

to Bulgaria, maritime cooperation with Greece, and the

stressing of Latin cultural ties with Rumania failed to over­

come distrust caused by obvious Italian plans for expansion

in these areas.

Rumania, dissatisfied because of her relative in­

security, and her rebuff to France by rejecting on January 22,

1924, the proffered loan of 100,000,000 francs, reopened

negotiations with her the following April. She desired from

France a guarantee of Bessarabia. France was willing to

 56
assume this, provided Yugoslavia would do likewise, Yugo­

slavia, though, on April 23 refused such a guarantee. But,

Benes asserted that, in the event of a war over Bessarabia

between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania, Czechoslovakia would

assist Rumania only in the event that Hungary should aid the

U.S.S.R.

Benes and Nincich met at Bled, Yugoslavia from Hay 13

to 15, 1924 to discuss the .possibility of a four-power

treaty. In this project, Yugoslavia was to adhere to the

Franco-Czechoslovak alliance and Czechoslovakia to the one

i
between Italy and Yugoslavia. This treaty would have made

more secure each power concerned; but Benes, abiding by his

principle of avoiding strictly Balkan commitments, refused

to guarantee the Treaty of Neuilly in addition to those of

St. G-ermain and Trianon.

:THE
i
HUNGARIAN OPTANTS CASE:

This ifas a long and bitter dispute between Hungary

and Rumania which had to do with expropriations of property

of Hungarians owning land In Transylvania who co-opted in

favor of retaining their Hungarian citizenship after the war

In 1923, the Hungarian government appealed to the

League Council, stating that the expropriation of the lands

of Hungarian Optants in Transylvania constituted a flagrant

 57

violation of the Treaties. This appeal stipulated that

Rumania he forced to act in conformity with the Treaties and

that the injured parties should receive full compensation.

M. Titulescu, speaking for the Rumanian government,

countered by asserting that the provisions regarding absentee

owners were applied with strict impartiality. He also char­

ged that the Hungarian government was not asking for equality

of right, hut for privileges in Transylvania to the profit

of Hungarian nationals and to the detriment of Rumanian

landowners. The Rumanian government considered the Optants1

property under the jurisdiction of the laws of a sovereign

state, especially since the laws were in force prior to the

signing of the Peace Treaties.

Hungary also requested that the dispute be referred

to the Permanent Gourt of International Justice, but Rumania

rejected this proposal. The basic argument of Rumania was

that certain political and social reforms were involved.

Hungary argued that the whole principle of arbitration was

endangered by Rumania*s stand. M. Adatci, Japanese Ambas­

sador at Brussels and acting President of the League Council,

invited representatives of both governments to meet in

Brussels. This meeting resulted in a compromise which was

signed on May 26, 1925. But the Hungarian government dis­

avowed the act of its plenipotentiary.

 Within the next two years, a number of applications

from Hungarian Optants were lodged with the Mixed Rumano-

Hungarian Tribunal. Because of these actions, the Rumanian

government denied the competence of the Tribunal on agrarian

(i.e. internal) questions. When the Tribunal decided to

the contrary, the Rumanian arbitrator was formally withdrawn.

On March 7, 1927, the Hungarian government tried a

new angle when it requested the League Council to abide by

i
:its obligation in such an emergency and appoint substitute

arbitrators to the Tribunal to enable it to proceed with

the consideration of the claims of the Optants. But the

Council did not think it wise to press the issue in this

manner, and it created a sub-committee, under the chairman­

ship of Sir Austin Chamberlain, for the purpose of bringing

the disputing parties to terms. The resulting report main- ,

tained the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal, under

■certain stated conditions, to hear claims arising out of the

application of the Rumanian Agrarian Law to Hungarian Op­

tants .

Following this report, there ensued before the Council

a brilliant contest of cunning and intellect between Count

Apponyi and M. Titulescu. They so tore apart the recommend- ■

ations of the sub-committee that the Council devoted itself,

thenceforth, only to applying pressure on the contesting

 59
parties to reach an understanding.

In the autumn of 1928, M. Maniu, leader of the

Rumanian National Peasant Party, came to power and the dead­

lock seemed hopeless. But soon thereafter, the two govern­

ments resumed direct negotiations, and an increasing modera­

tion was evidenced on both sides. In the fall of 1929,

further negotiations took place at Paris with the purpose

of coming to a settlement before the second Hague Oonference

began. At Paris the parties disagreed over two fundamental

points: the amount of the indemnity to be paid to the

Optants, and the procedure for payment. The Rumanian govern

ment proposed that the compensation be deducted from the

Hungarian reparation payments, while Hungary held that

Optants should be paid directly.

In 1930, the Hague Oonference reached the basis of an

agreement between Hungary and the Little Entente states over

the claims of Hungarian Optants arising out of the land re­

form acts of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. During

these discussions, the representatives of Italy worked- with

the Little Entente Foreign Ministers, and it was the so-

called wBrocehi Plan11 which finally laid the basis for the

compromise agreement.

The settlement reached at The Hague stipulated the

definitive regulations of all financial claims affecting

 60
agrarian questions and state properties. Two funds were

created to handle such claims. Fund A, dealing exclusively

#

with land claims, had a capital fixed at ahout $45,000,000,

which sum represented the maximum compensation available for

distribution to the Hungarian Optants. Fund B covered all

other claims, such as those put forward by the House of.

Hapsburg, churches, railways and industrial properties, its

capital being put at $20,000,000. The working capital for

these Special Funds until 1943 was to be in part provided

through deposits from England, France and Italy, and during

the period 1943-1966, exclusively by Little Entente states

out of Hungarian payments. The settlement stipulated that

the three sets of Mixed Tribunals (Rumano-Hungarian, etc.)

enjoyed no further competence to hear financial claims

against Little Entente states. From now on, their function

27
was to be only Juridical.

THE ROTHERMERE CAMPAIGN:

Hungarian resentment against the Peace Treaties: had

an ardent supporter abroad in the person of Lord Rothermere.

In June, 1927, his neifspapers came out in favor of the Hun­

garian cause In the Optants dispute. Using.this case, the

27John Oliver Grane, The Little Entente (New York:

The MacMillan Company, 1931), pp. 167-8.
 61
Rothermere Press viciously attacked the governments of the

Little Entente for maltreatment of Magyar minorities, and

demanded territorial revisions in favor of Hungary.

The anti-Trianon campaign acquired another supporter

in the person of Mussolini. The Italian Premier, in March,

1928, as the result of a personal interview with Lord

Rothermere himself, made some remarkable statements regard- :

i
ing the Hungarian question and the revision of the Treaty

of Trianon. He asserted that the inviolability of treaties

should be Maintained, but that this principle should not

prevent a modification of the details of a treaty if, after

study, such a modification is desirable.

Mussolini then stated his theory as to the difference

between the Hungarian boundaries as drawn by the Treaty of

Trianon and the Austro-Italian boundaries as fixed by the

Treaty of St. Germain. His theory held that it was neces­

sary to leave a quarter million of Austro-Germans inside

Italy in order to make a geographic frontier, which he

called Ma guarantee of international peace11; but that Hun­

gary, which could not have a geographic frontier, could at

least have an ethnographic one.

The Rothermere campaign came to a climax in May,

1928, when Mr. Harmsworth, eldest son of Lord Rothermere,

visited Budapest where he was enthusiastically feted. There

.were some, who were in close touch with Lord Rothermere,

who maintained that he once toyed with the idea of being

called to the vacant throne of St. Stephen. Respite this,

his anti-Trianon campaign more than once prevented nego­

tiations between Hungary and her neighbors. More often than

PR
not, his antics were a source of annoyance to Budapest* °

THE MIDDLE PERIOD

In its formative period, the Little Entente had

proved itself effective within its geographic area. It was

now a united political entity, and was beginning to make

itself felt in general European matters. Each of the three

partners had its peculiar “big-neighbor11 problem; a factor

which prevented complete unity in all respects. This was

its great weakness; but what alliance does not have its

“Achilles heel?11

In its middle period of existence, the Little Entente

astonished the skeptics with its effective performance.

—
Ibid.. p. 37.
 63
THE ST. GOTTHABD INCIDENT:

In 1928, the relations between Czechoslovakia and

Hungary were very strained, and almost reached the breaking

point by an incident which occurred at St. Gotthard, Austria.

At the Austrian frontier railway station of St. Got­

thard, on January 2, 1928, Austrian railroad officials dis­

covered five freight cars loaded with machine-gun parts

shipped from Italy across Austrian territory ostensibly

destined for Czechoslovakia. These cars were shipped from

Verona and declared to contain machinery. It was believed

that these machine-gun parts were really meant to reach

Hungary. This was contrary to Article 180 of the Treaty

of Trianon, which specified that “the importation of arms,

munitions and war material of all kinds is strictly for­

bidden. “ This shipment was consigned to Berkovics Bros.,

at Slovensko-Nove-Mesto (Satoralja-Ujhely or Satorlajay-

gtely); and it was proved that this firm, which denied any

knowledge of the shipment, was actually located across the

border in Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon had awarded the

railway station to Czechoslovs.kia, but most of the town

remained in Hungary.

If true, these actions would have constituted a

violation of the Treaty by both Italy and Hungary. Austria

was only interested in the violation of her regulations and

 64

the loss of revenue. Arms carried higher rates than

machinery. The discovery was an accident, the result of

suspicions provoked hy the haste with which the cars were

being connected to Hungarian engines. The Austrian o f fi - '

cials did not attempt to stop the cars, because they were

already in Hungarian hands. The Austrian government was

notified promptly of the incident, but it regarded the affair

i
only as a minor border question which could be handled

adequately by the Ministry of Railroads.

The little Entente, though, was not willing to treat

.the incident so lightly. Since the signing of the Italo-

Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitra­

tion, on April 5, 1927, Yugoslavia had been uneasy because

she found herself almost surrounded with states within the

Italian sphere of influence* To Yugoslavia, as well as

Czechoslovakia, the attempts of Italy and Hungary to mini­

mize the whole affair constituted indications of guilt.

Benes stated that he did not want to make an international

issue of the affair, but warned that such an attempt must

not be repeated. The Little Entente, he added, would not

remain inactive in case of a repetition. On February 1,

1928, all three members of the Little Entente brought the

matter before the League Council in order to fix respon­

sibility for the incident, but Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia

 _ go
were apparently distressed by the indifference of Rumania.

Before the League Council met, several events took

place. When no consignor appeared to claim the guns by the

middle of February, Hungary announced that they would be

sold at auction. First, they would be made useless for

military purposes. In spite of the request of the League

Council that Hungary delay the sale until further investi­

gation could be made, the auction was held on February 24,

according to Hungarian reports; but the parts continued in

the hands of Hungarian officials.

Soon it was found that on February 20 Hungary had

destroyed the five carloads of arms which were to be in­

vestigated. Now, the Little Entente was more than deter­

mined to probe the matter to the fullest. Also proved false

was Italy’s claim that the guns had been manufactured by a

private firm which was also in charge of shipping them. A

detailed investigation had proved that Italy had captured

the guns during the war, and that, beyond all doubt, she

still had possession of them at the time of shipment. It

was felt that when Rome became convinced that evasion was

useless, she applied pressure upon the Hungarian government

29
The Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies, by a vote of
165 to 44, passed a proclamation considering the St. G-ot-
thard incident as an attempt to detach Slovakia'and to de­
stroy the integrity of the Re-public. (Vondracek, pp. p i t . ,
p. 140.)
 66
rto destroy the arms. Therefore, Italy, the real culprit,

thus avoided responsibility and tried to make the League

helpless by destruction of the evidence.

The forty-ninth session of the League of Nations be­

gan on March 5, 1928. The Council decided to send a com­

mittee of three, representing the Netherlands, Finland and

Chile, to investigate the incident. Their report was due

on March 10, but was not presented, because all the docu­

ments were not available. After continued delays, in­

vestigators were sent to Basel to examine the original way­

bills, but even then the ultimate destination of the gun

parts could not be ascertained.

Finally, on June 7, 1928, the investigators made two

reports. In general, it stated that no satisfactory evi­

dence had been unearthed. The ultimate destination of the

weapons had' not been ascertained, and, therefore, Hungary

was not to be held responsible for any intent to violate

the Treaty of Trianon. But Hungary was censured severely

for the illegal possession of war material and for the

hasty destruction of it. Thus, the final judgment was in­

conclusive in that Hungary was neither acquitted nor con­

victed.

In spite of the ineffectiveness of the League of

Nations in this matter, two important facts were brought

 67
out. The suspicions of the Little Entente were aroused as

to the motives of Italy and Hungary, and the growing soli­

darity of the Little Entente was manifested.

REPARATIONS AND DEBTS:

The problem of Central European reparations had been

a bitter one for a decade. It came to the fore again In

1929. The Succession States complained that the League had

so concerned itself with the problem of German reparations

that it neglected the reparations of Austria, Hungary and

Bulgaria. The supposedly final settlement of the German

reparations question caused the Succession States to demand

a similar, definite solution to their problems.

Benes became the spokesman for the Succession States

when he urged the Little Entente to adopt a unified atti­

tude on the question. His plan was that all the states of

Central Europe should associate their respective financial

and political problems with the issue of German reparations

and with the Young Plan. At the Little Entente Conference

at Belgrade on May 20-21, 1929, the three partners came to

an agreement in which they were joined later by Poland and

Greece. They agreed to withhold their approval of the

Young Plan#. and of the reduction of German reparations until

their own reparations problems with Austria, Hungary and

 68

Bulgaria had been solved. These five states formed a bloc

which acted as a unit at the Hague Conference in August,

1929, and at the second session in January, 1930, until its

;deraands were conceded. They took a similar stand at the

Paris Conference on non-German reparations during September-

Hoveraber, 1929.

The settlement reached at the Hague Conference on

January 20, 1930 represented one of the most important

events in post-war Europe since the Peace Treaties.

Austrian reparations to Poland and Czechoslovakia

were abrogated. This cancelled Article 177 of the Treaty of

St. Germain. Czechoslovakia objected to the burden imposed

by the Powers of a debt of approximately $150,000,000 for

“Costs of Liberation11 until Hungarian reparations were fixed

at a figure which she approved. The total “Costs of Libera­

tion11 for all the Succession States totalled approximately

# 2 ,00 0 ,000 ,0 0 0 .
The difficult problem was not direct reparations, but

the claims which arose for former crown properties of

Austria-Hungary and for the estates which were being broken

up as the result of the new agrarian reform policies which

the Little Entente states were inaugurating. Italy cooper­

ated with the Little Entente in the adoption of a compromise

— the Brocchi Plan— for Hungary. Under this Plan, two

separate funds were created: Fund A, about $45,000,000, for

■land claims; and Fund B, about $20,000,000, for the claims

of the Hapsburgs, of churches, of railroads, and of in­

dustrialists. To the year 1945, the operating capital for

these funds was to be raised partially through deposits

from Hungarian payments made by Great Britain, France and

Italy. But, from 1943 to 1966, the funds would come

entirely from the states of the Little Entente from Hun­

garian payments which xfould accrue to their benefit. The

Mixed Tribunals (Hungarian-Gzeehoslovak, Hungarian-Rumanian

and Hungarian-Yugoslav) xfould exercise merely juridical

functions, but could no longer handle financial claims

directed against these three states.

The Czechoslovak contributions to the Allied fund

for crown property, about 25,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns,

were cancelled. The “Costs of Liberation11 were reduced to

about one-fourth and were to be represented by thirty-seven

annual payments of 10,000,000 Reichsmarks each (a little

over 80,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns). Czechoslovakia was

granted also a share of Bulgarian and Hungarian reparations,

about 25,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns.

On March 31, 1920, the agreements reached at the

second Conference were signed at Paris by the Commission for

Eastern Reparations, composed of Bethlen for Hungary, Benes

 70
for Czechoslovakia, Marinkovich for Yugoslavia and Titu-

lescu for Rumania. The Great Power representatives signed

it on April 28, 1930. These agreements set up four con­

ventions concerned with: first, the reparations agreements

between Hungary and the Creditor Powers; second, the settle­

ment of land reform; third, the settlement of Mixed Arbi­

tral Tribunal questions; and fourth, the Powers of the

special fund.

The three states of the Little Entente desired to

further discuss before the League the questions of disarm­

ament, war debts and German reparations. They seconded the

initiative of Great Britain, which had attempted to call an

economic conference at Lausanne, Switzerland on January 18,

1932. Throughout the year, Benes struggled with the

question of world disarmament, but without success. The

negotiations on disarmament, because of the insurmountable

details, took him over a wide area; not only into every

European political conflict of Importance, but even to a

declaration against Japanese aggression in China. Benes

was not concerned with the merits of the Manchurian situa­

tion, but only with the fact that Japan*s defiance of the

League had greatly reduced the prestige and influence of

the League.

By the middle of the summer of 1932, France was

 71
almost certain that she would never receive extensive re­

parations from G-ermany. At the Lausanne Conference, on

July 9, 1932, the Young Plan, which called for reparations

in the amount of 34,000,000,000 gold marks payable in annui­

ties until 1988, was replaced. The new plan merely called

for 3,000,000,000 gold marks (about #714,600,000). Other

agreements arrived at were the extention of the Hoover

moratorium on inter-Allied debts, financial assistance to

the distressed states of the Danubian area, the appointment

of a commission to examine the agricultural problems of the

Danubian area, and the calling of a world economic con­

ference under the auspices of the League of Nations.

The Little Entente states, throughout 1932, had been

watching with concern the increase of revisionist sentiment,

both among their own discontented minorities and in the

members of the revisionist bloc.

The hastily-called special Little Entente Conference

of January 22-23, 1932, at Montreaux, Switzerland for the

purpose of evolving a unified policy with regard to the

questions of disarmament, reparations and revisionism, was

successful, and prompted the three Foreign Ministers to make

plans for another during the latter part of the year.

Benes, Titulescu and Yevtich met at Belgrade on

December 18-20, 1932, to discuss, primarily, a common line

of action regarding the threats of revisionists. The

discussions also dealt with disarmament, reparation payments

of G-ermany's former Allies, and an economic reorganization

of the Little Entente. The Lausanne agreement had. altered

the financial clauses of a peace treaty, military clauses

of all the peace treaties were being subjected to threats

of revision, only the territorial clauses seemed to retain

any indications of permanence— these facts caused alarm

which was not dispelled by the fact that the disarmament

conference had been a failure thus far, and had been ad­

journed until January 19, 1933. The Conference of Belgrade

closed with an official communique which indicated the

solidarity of the Little Entente. It proclaimed the erea-

:tion at G-eneva of a permanent committee of the three Foreign

Ministers and of a permanent secretariat. No declaration

was issued against the propaganda of revisionists, much to

the disappointment of Yugoslavia, which desired some such

declaration against Italy. Welcome to the Little Entente

was the solidarity of Rumania. The other two partners had

feared that Italian influence might have had an effect on

her. Shortly after the close of the Conference, Benes

summarized the future hopes anf fears, not only of Czecho­

slovakia, but of the Little Entente as well, when he warned

the Great Powers that the Little Entente would continue to

 73
advocate disarmament and to oppose any revision of the

Peace Treaties.

The tendency to default on the debts due to the

United States became involved in the question of the so-

called ”Eastern reparations.” Before the special Conference

of the Little Entente met at Belgrade, the three partners

were informed by the Great Powers that the latter would no

longer continue to advance the deposits which would be nec­

essary to administer the special funds which had been

created by the agreements of The Hague and Paris. This

decision meant that Hungary and Bulgaria would receive no

longer any money payments in compensation for the terri­

tories which they lost by the Peace Treaties, and on the

other hand, that they would consider themselves absolved

from further reparation payments. Thereupon, the three

states of the Little Entente, agreed that their January in­

stallment of #10,000 would be their last, and they would

consider themselves released from any further reparations

obligations.

r
„ LITTLE ENTENTE CONFERENCES: 1925-1929:

At Sinaia, Rumania, on August 15-18, 1925, the Little

Entente agreed to hold a conference ”of the press” for the

purpose of coordinating the public opinions of the three

 74

states. There was created at this Conference a central

bureau consisting of a committee of the official press

bureaus of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. This

committee was expected to meet regularly.

In spite of the creation of this agency, the ties

among the members of the Little Entente tended to become

weaker rather than stronger. An indication of this new

;trend was manifested at the Conference at Temesvar, during

February, 1926. This was a special meeting called for the

purpose of determining a unified policy with regard to the

Hungarian forgeries. During the discussions, it developed

that only Czechoslovakia was interested. Her two partners,

apparently satisfied with the degree of security which had

already been attained, desired to await the results of the

regular judicial inquiry. Consequently, Czechoslovakia had

to proceed without the help of her two partners in her

attempt to show the connection between the forgery scandal

and the Hungarian government. Benes issued no useless ac­

cusations. He merely stated that he thought Hungary,

ultimately, would have to be added to the Little Entente;

but only after she had exhausted every other possibility.

There were also current rumors that, at Temesvar, a-Balkan

pact to include Greece was discussed. Nothing materialized

from these rumors, though.

 75
Regardless of the lack of cooperation in the matter

of the Hungarian forgeries, the three partners were willing

to renew their treaties of alliance. On June 13, 1926,

Czechoslovakia and Rumania, at Bucharest, extended their

alliance of April 23, 1921, which had already been prolonged

for three years on May, 1923. On the same day, Rumania and

Yugoslavia renewed again their alliance of June 7, 1921,

which had already been renewed on July 7, 1923. The third

link, the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Treaty, did not require

renewal at this time*

At Bled, Yugoslavia, during June, 1926, was held the

regular Little Entente Conference. The Conference ended

abruptly as the result of Rumania1s announcement that she

had concluded x^ith Poland a defensive treaty on March 26,

j!926, against the U.S.S.R. From all outward appearances it

appeared that the Little Entente states were drifting

further apart. Benes of Czechoslovakia and Nincich of Yugo­

slavia disapproved of the Treaty, because they desired

Soviet friendship and complete freedom of action regarding

the Soviet Union. Also, they interpreted this Treaty as

being anti-Russian, and not anti-Bolshevik.

During the next year, 1927, the states of the Little

Entente strayed further apart. The three Foreign Ministers,

Benes of Czechoslovakia, Mitilineu of Rumania and Marin-

 76
kovich of Yugoslavia, held their regular Conference at

Jachymov on May 13-14, 19S7. Here they were to decide the

future policies of the Little Entente. After two days of

exhausting discussions demonstrated that solidarity existed

only a few political issues, the three Ministers decided i

to postpone all attempts to strengthen politically their

alliance. Instead, they decided to devote their efforts

|
towards a cultural, economic and commercial union. Such a

decision was inevitable if the Little Entente was to be

preserved as an efficient organization.

Yugoslavia failed to interest her partners, especi­

ally Rumania, in the dangers inherent in the Italo-Hungarian

rapprochement. Rumania, on the other hand, feared the Soviet

Union. The interests and alliances of Rumania and Yugo­

slavia conflicted. Confronted with such a situation,

Czechoslovakia preferred to evade the issue until the posi­

tion of Germany was settled. Also, what she considered at

that time to be of chief concern to her— an Austro-German

union— was of no particular concern to either Rumania or

Yugoslavia.

By avoiding any definite statements as to their

respective foreign policies, the Foreign Ministers of the

Little Entente decided to retain their union. All three

Ministers sought to reduce friction with Hungary. Recog-

 77
nizing the increased economic recovery of Austria, they

agreed to unite with France in objecting to an Austro-

G-erman union. However, on Poland’s question as to whether

German economic pressure upon her would not be a danger to

all Europe, the Ministers refused to commit themselves;

stating that this question was by far beyond their scope,

and one for the League of Mations to consider. The con­

cluding statement of this Conference asserted that the

Little Entente was stronger than ever and necessary for the

preservation of European peace.

Benes was very perturbed at the insistent rumors that

the Little Entente was on the verge of collapse, and he

decided to do something to counteract them. To this end,

he granted, on January 5, 1928, a special interview to

representatives of the Chicago Daily Mews. In this inter­

view he expressed his belief that it would be impossible for

another great war to break bout for at least ten years, at

which time the older generation would have disappeared and

the younger generation would still be ignorant of the

horrors of war. In his opinion, any alliance of defeated

states would provoke war; whereas any union of states led by

France would tend toward peace. The Little Entente would

be a vital part of any union designed for peace. Benes also

predicted that the recent Franco-Yugoslav alliance was a

 78
great deterrent to Italian militarists, and the increase of

such treaties might lead to total disarmament. The Russian

i
question might also he solved by individual treaties, a

process in which the Little Entente might become the con­

necting link between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers.

1/ Benes looked forward to a treaty uniting the U.S.S.R., Pol­

and and the Little Entente. Such a treaty was heretofore :

impossible because of the bitter conflict between Warsaw

and Moscow, and between Rumania and the U.S.S.R. over

Bessarabia. Benes* most important point was that the Little-

Entente was not on the verge of dissolution and that it had

not fulfilled its mission, but that it still had an impor-

tant role to play in European affairs * w

During the year 1928 the activities of the Little

Entente gave evidence that it still had vitality. The St.

Grotthard incident did much to consolidate the bloc. In the

spring the three states organized an air service to operate

between their important cities. Duca, the Rumanian Minister

of Foreign Affairs, invited Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to

a conference at Bucharest to discuss the hostile attitude

of Mussolini toward the Little Entente. He issued his call

early in April, but the other two Foreign Ministers did not

find it feasible to accept immediately, and the conference

was not held until June.

50Ibld., pp. 291-2.
 79
At this Conference of Bucharest, June 20-21, 1928,

the loosening ties of the Little Entente were greatly

strengthened, Poland, as usual, sent an observer to this

meeting, Benes proposed a Central European Economic Locarno,

without any attempts being made to convert it into a

i
Danubian Confederation, He also suggested that Austria be

the first accession. This proposal was favorably received, |

but no steps were taken at that time to make it effective.

Decided, also, was the policy that each state should remain ■

free to adopt an independent attitude toward Italy and

Italian anti-Slav agitation. This decision did not cause

Yugoslavia to gravitate closer to her two partners. But

the main pronouncement of the Conference was that the Little

Entente, although.it desired friendly relations with Hungary,

had not changed its earlier attitude. It was still united

in its opposition to any attempts to revise the Peace

Treaties.

During the autumn of 1928, Yugoslavia and Czechoslo­

vakia negotiated a series of treaties which welded more

firmly their long-standing friendship. The question of

mutual claims and debts contracted before and during the

World War was still unsettled. A treaty of September 29,

1928, prohibited legal procedure for all claims and debts

in former Austro-Hungarian crowns contracted before

 80

February 26, 1919, in which the currency was contestable,

and relegated such questions to a later treaty, which was

signed at Prague on November 7, 1928. A consular conven­

tion was signed on the same date.

In the meantime, the negotiations for a new commer­

cial treaty were threatened by a “pig w a r ” between the two

countries. Yugoslavia produced more hogs than all the other|

Balkan countries combined, and, therefore, had been able to '

undersell all European competitors. The Czechoslovak

farmers demanded protection against Serbian pigs, but Yugo- •

slavia insisted upon most-favored-nation treatment in return

for similar privileges that had been granted to Czechoslovak

31
industrial goods. The new treaty of commerce and navi­

gation was signed at Prague on November 14, 1928. Yugo­

slavia gained her desire for most-favored-nation treatment, !

but with the reservation that prohibitions might be imposed

on trade for purposes of public health, safety, morality or :

finance. It was agreed that any restrictions on state ,

monopolies would be mutual. Citizens of either state would j

be exempt from military service in the other or from contri­

butions in liew thereof. Other clauses provided for numer­

ous exemptions from duties, for freedom of transit by rail,

for equal railway rates, for seagoing vessels to have equal !

31
Ibid., p. 199. ,
 81
rights in both countries and for postal communications to be

as rapid as possible.
Specifically, the acts which strengthened the Little

Entente were the renewals of the treaties of alliance and of

the defensive military conventions that supplemented them.

The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty of alliance was renewed in

September, 1928, as a part of the series of treaties between

the two states, and was ratified by Czechoslovakia on

February 12, 1929. The alliance was to remain in effect

until a year after notice of termination had been given.

At Belgrade on May 20-21, the regular Little Entente

Conference was held. At this meeting, the renewal of all

the treaties of alliance was effected. On May 21, Czecho­

slovakia and Yugoslavia changed the terms of their recently-

renewed alliance in order to make it the same as the treaties

of the same date between Czechoslovakia and Rumania and be­

tween Rumania and Yugoslavia. Each of the three treaties

i
was extended for five years, with renewal automatic at the

end of each such period unless the treaty should be de­

nounced six months earlier.

During the discussions at this Conference there arose

the question of substituting the bilateral agreements with

a tripartite alliance. Benes had always defended the bi­

lateral method as one of strength rather than of weakness.

 82
He was influenced a little in his opinion because, to

Czechoslovakia, the bilateral system was more advantageous.

From the Czechoslovak point of view, the increase in the

defensive strength and the cohesion of the Little Entente

by a tripartite pact might be offset by an increase in

obligations and by a decrease of freedom in the conduct of

foreign policy, particularly in questions which might con- i

cern the Balkans.

Czechoslovakia obtained a compromise on May 21, 1929,

in the form of a general treaty of conciliation, arbitra­

tion and judicial settlement. This act reflected the basic

principles of both Locarno and of the Kellogg Peace Pact

which the League was then sponsoring.. According to this

new treaty, the three partners agreed that all disputes, of

whatever nature, were to be either conciliated, arbitrated

or subject to judicial decision. There was to be no inter­

ference with already established judicial procedure. All

disputes as to the respective rights of the three states

were to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal or to the

Permanent Court of International Justice. All disputes,

though, might be submitted to conciliation before resorting

to arbitration. After three months1 notice, direct appli­

cation by any party could be made to the Permanent Court

of International Justice to settle any dispute. At.the

 83

request of one state, a Permanent Conciliation Commission

would be set up within six months. This Commission was to

be composed of five members, one from each disputant and

the other three from three different countries. In the

conciliation procedure, if a third Power had an interest in

the dispute, it might have the approval of the disputants to

intervene. The advantage of this general treaty was that

it strengthened the ties of the Little Entente by providing

for the peaceful solution of any dispute without increasing

32
.the obligations of its members*

The Conference closed with a resolution for closer

economic alliance among the three states. This was one of

the most constructive conferences ever held by the Little

Entente, and one which was expected to greatly aid in safe­

guarding the new status q u o *

On August 20, 1929, Czechoslovakia ratified the

treaties which had been signed at the Conference of Belgrade.

On the same day, the newspaper Ceske Slovo caused a sen­

sation with the statement that the treaties were supple­

mented by a secret military treaty among the three count­

ries of the Little Entente. A retraction of this assertion

in the following issue failed to dispell the rumors. This

newspaper was always considered as Benes1 mouthpiece, and

32
See Appendix “D 11 for full text of Treaty.
 84
its editor, Dr. Jaroslav Kopecky, had accompanied Benes to

the Conference of Belgrade— two facts which caused Czecho­

slovak public opinion to disregard any denials of a secret

military pact. The fact that no G-erman member of the

Czechoslovak cabinet had been present at the meeting which

had ratified the treaties gave added strength to the rumors.

If any doubt remained in the minds of some, that doubt

disappeared when, late in August, 1929, at the Czechoslovak

army maneuvers Marshall) Petain of France and the Chiefs of

Staff of the anmies of Rumania and Yugoslavia, together with

their assistants, were present as observers.

POLITICS vs. ECONOMICS:

The negotiations which the Little Entente partners

conducted during 1930 and 1931 offers one of the best ex­

amples of the interplay of politics and economics.

The 1930 conference of the Little Entente was held

at Strba (Strbske Pleso), In the Tatra Mountains of Slovakia

on June 25-28, 1930. Present were the three Foreign Mini­

sters: Benes of Czechoslovakia, Marinkovich of Yugoslavia

and Mironescu of Rumania. Rumors persisted that a coup

d 1etat on the part of Archduke Otto (ex-King Charles1 eldest

son) was about to take place In Hungary. The Conference

^Vondracek, qv. cit.. p. 296.

concentrated on this threat, and the Little Entente warned

Hungary against any attempt to restore the Hapsburgs or to

revise the Treaty of Trianon, Other matters concerned the

application of the Pact of Paris, the fact that Poland sent

no observer to the Conference and the menace of Franco-

Italian rivalry. Benes desired a renewal of Franco-Oerman

friendship. Also, he expressed pessimism regarding the

success of an economic Little Entente, because of the high

degree of economic nationalism still existing.

On June 26, 1S30, the Prague Vecer caused some ex­

citement at the Conference by publishing a statement by

Dr. Viskovsky, the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defens

to the effect that Central Europe was in more danger of war

than it had been at any time in the past ten years because

of Italian and Hungarian intrigues and because of the con­

sequent increase in armaments in Europe.^4 Nevertheless,

the Conference was optimistic when it adjourned, because

of the signing of a new Czechoslovak-Rumanian commercial

treaty in spite of domestic objections in both states and

by the evidences of unity on major issues and interests of

the three partners.

On July 21, 1930, at Bucharest, there was held a

conference between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary for the

34rbld., p. 320.
 86
purpose of creating an agricultural bloc in Central Europe,

Early in the discussions a limited degree of cooperation was

.attained on the questions of erecting grain elevators and

of financing harvests. For a time, Czechoslovak newspapers

expressed resentment because of Czechoslovakia1s exclusion.

But nothing of importance was accomplished, because no agree

ment could be reached upon the question of a unified mono­

poly of exports. Rumania and Yugoslavia would not assent,

because they feared that the agency might be controlled by

Hungary.

Of greater importance were the conferences held at

Sinaia and Warsaw. On July 22, 1930, at Sinaia, Ruaiania,

representatives of Rumania and Yugoslavia met to attempt

to make the Little Entente as efficient economically as it

was politically. It was desired that Rumania and Yugo­

slavia could establish economic contacts with the U.S.S.R.

similar to those of Czechoslovakia. On August 1 the Con­

ference recommended a more complete agreement between their

agriculturalists and the Czechoslovak manufacturers. It

was agreed that much could be accomplished by long-term

bilateral commercial treaties, but the states concerned

feared that the concessions given might not be greater than

the benefits which would be received.

The Conference of Warsaw met on August 28, 1930, and

 87
was attended by representatives from Poland, Estonia, Bul­

garia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and

by observers from Finland and from the League of Nations.

Signed were a series of international agreements between the

agricultural and industrial states, as well as agreements

based upon collaboration between states economically similar.

The Conference decided to advocate the formation of an

economic United States of Europe based upon mutual pre­

ferential tariffs on agricultural products. Recommended,

also, was the immediate abolition of export bounties and of

discriminations which tended towards indirect protection.

Because of the objections of overseas states and the un­

willingness of the industrial states to grant concessions

to the agricultural states, the creation of a successful

economic organization xfhich might spread throughout Europe

was prevented.

The most important problem of the Little Entente in

1930 was the fact that its members were in political accord,

but in conflict economically. A manifestation of economic

conflict was that before 1930, Czechoslovakia had no tariff

treaties with either of her partners. The difficulty in

creating an economic unit lay in the fact that Czechoslovakia

was primarily industrial yet semi-agricultural, and that

both Yugoslavia and Rumania were predominantly agricultural,

 88
yet industrially ambitious. Added to this must be the geo­

graphical position of the Little Entente states. To create

an effective economic bloc, Austria and Hungary would have

to be included; but such a combination was impossible due to

nationalistic and political reasons.

New rumors appeared during the spring of 1931 which

predicted the immenent dissolution of the Little Entente.

Prince Nicholas of Rumania made a visit to Budapest early

in April. This event provoked reports that his brother,

King Carol II, had sent him in order to obtain Hungary’s

reaction to the union of the crowns of Hungary and Rumania,

under Carol. Under this set-up, Nicholas would become

governor of Transylvania. Nicholas1 visit also was supposed

to be the preliminary act to the withdrattfal of Rumania from

the Little Entente, and to her transfer from the French to

the Italian camp. On the other hand, Yugoslavia and Czecho­

slovakia strengthened their ties with a new commercial treaty

signed on March 30, 1931,

At Benes1 insistence, the regular 1931 conference of

the Little Entente was held at Bucharest early in May before

the May meeting of the League Council in order to determine

the views of the three states regarding the proposed Austro-

G-erman Customs Union. Rumania’s attitude toward the matter

was an evasive one with the excuse that discussions on it

 89
might touch on delicate economic problems. The new Rumanian

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grhika, stated that in view of

the recent cabinet crisis in Rumania, no definite policy on

this matter had been evolved.

The Bucharest Conference was conducted in secrecy

behind closed doors. The Little Entente was confronted with

its gravest internal crisis. The announcement at the end

of the first da y1s discussions, May 3, 1931, stated that

the object of the Conference was the winning of Hungary to

the side of the Little Entente, and preventing her accession

to the proposed Austro-G-erman Customs Union. If such an

event became a reality it was feared that complete Cerman

hegemony over Central Europe would result. To avert such a

calamity, proposed to Hungary were considerable reductions

in tariff rates to permit the importation of Hungarian wheat

into the states of the Little Entente, a cooperative pooling

of Hungarian, Rumanian and Yugoslav wheat and a uniform

system of credits for farmers. The situation was desperate

for the Little Entente, and rumors told of the offer to Hun­

gary of,full partnership in the Little Entente. But desper­

ate as the situation was, these rumors were denied because

the Little Entente was fundamentally a defensive alliance

against Hungary, and such a step would eliminate its raison

d 1etre.
 After the final session on May 6, 1931, definite

statements were issued. Resolutions were passed condemning

the proposed Austro-German Customs Union and urging Czech­

oslovakia to forego the collection of duties on Rumanian

and Yugoslav agricultural products in return for preferen­

tial duties on Czechoslovak manufactured goods. In spite of

the secrecy of the Conference, it was quite evident that

Yugoslavia and Rumania were aligned against Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia emerged victorious when political consider­

ations triumphed over economic ones. During the Conference,

a meeting between King Carol of Rumania and King Alexander

of Yugoslavia was held at Ternsevar. This meeting caused

concern, not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in France

which was supporting her against her two partners.

Czechoslovakia was predominantly industrial and had

interests opposed to those of Rumania and Yugoslavia. For

instance, she had a well-developed agricultural system,

and for this reason she could not import much of the agri­

cultural exports of her two partners. The large and hungry

population of Germany looked like a promising market for

the agricultural products of both Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The projected Austro-German Customs Union, the nightmare of

Czechoslovakia and France, posed no menace to Rumania and

Yugoslavia; in fact, they welcomed it as an abolition of

 91
tariff barriers against their agricultural products. Trade

with the proposed Union would flow both ways under more

favorable conditions to them than would trade with Czecho­

slovakia or the U.S.S.R., both of which had less need for

agricultural products.

Benes1 ability and influence were directly respon­

sible for R u m a n i a ^ and Yugoslavia1s continuance in suppor- i

ting the preservation of the economic as well as political

status quo. French support in this crisis was deeply ap­

preciated by Czechoslovakia, in spite of the fact that

France had an equally vital interest in the continued exis­

tence of the Little Entente.

The crisis showed the interdependence of international

politics and economics. Rumania and Yugoslavia were un­

justly forced to make a fateful choice. They had to choose

between friendships and policies of the War which were of

known value, or a new policy which might lead to economic

advantages for the moment and possible consequent political

disadvantages. Czechoslovakia did her utmost to. minimize

the points of difference within the Little Entente, thus

the reason for secrecy. At the close of the Conference,

G-hika, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, asserted the absolute

solidarity of the Little Entente. The alliance hs-d

weathered its most severe crisis.

 92
Benes* project for an economic Danubian Confederation,

having for its nucleus Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary,

was abandoned by France in January of 1932. It was abandon­

ed because of German and Italian opposition. But in March

of the same year, it was revived and embodied in the so-

called Tardieu plan for a Danubian Confederation of Austria,

Hungary and the Little Entente. In general, public opinion

was favorable. In Czechoslovakia, the desire was that the

new bloc would not be a resurrection of the Dual Monarchy.

Ceske Slovo. Benes* supposed official organ, recommended

that the plan first be studied by economic experts, then by

the various Czechoslovak political parties and finally by

the May conference of the Little Entente. On March 25, 1932,

Benes approved the project in the hope of improving Central

Europe*s economic status, but he felt that the united sup­

port of the Great Powers would be essential for its success.

France secured the approval of Great Britain on the same

day.

The regular conference of the Little Entente was

held at Belgrade on May 13-15, 1932, with Foreign Minister

Zaleski of Poland and Foreign Minister Michalakopoulos of

Greece present as observers. Of chief importance at this

meeting was the announcement against supernationalism as

manifested by each state* s desire to adopt a selfish economic

 93
policy. To counter such policies, the Conference went on

record as recommending temporarily the five-Power Danubian

Confederation, until a more extensive agreement could be

reached. This recommendation was denounced by Count Bethlen

of Hungary, and by both Italy and Germany. Bethlen undoubt­

edly felt that the best interests of his country lay in a

policy of revisionism.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE “PACT OF ORGANIZATION":

The proposed Austro-German Customs Union was set

aside by the Hague Court as contrary to existing treaties.

The year 1931 brought out the continual deterioration in

the economic condition of Germany and other continental

states. This produced revolutionary changes in the internal

political situation in Germany by its renunciation of the

policy of Locarno after the death of Briand, and above all,

by the occurrence of sharp setbacks at the Disarmament Con­

ference.

Europe was again divided into hostile camps. Because

of the economic and political confusion, the revision move­

ments received a powerful impetus. If it were not for the

Little Entente*s actions since the First World War, the

economic and political problems of Central Europe might h a v e '

caused dire consequences throughout Europe. In spite of

 94
continual difficulties, the Little Entente pushed forward,

and its newest constructive act was the uPacte d 1Organisation

de la Petite Entente.H which was prepared at the Belgrade

Conference of December 19, 1952 and signed by Benes of

Czechoslovakia, Titulescu of Rumania, and Yevtich of Yugo­

slavia at Geneva on February 16, 1933. This Pact definitely

established the political and economic unity of the Little

Entente.5^

The Pact intended to strengthen the economic rela­

tions of the three states both mutually and with other states

of Central Europe. In addition it also stressed the neces­

sity of maintaining peace in all circumstances and of en­

couraging and confirming the movement towards the definite

stabilization of Central European relations.

To accomplish this, a common organization was to be

set up to form an international unit which could be joined

by other states. This organ was to consist of the three

Foreign Ministers, who were to form the permanent council

and who were to make none but unanimous decisions. This

permanent council was scheduled to meet at least once every

three months in the capital of each of the three countries

in turn.

35
Gerhard Schacher, Central Europe and the Western
World (London: G. Allen & Unwin,, Ltd., 1936), p. 31.
 95
The principle of complete equality of the three

states was to be followed. Any political oreconomic treaty

which altered in any way the situation of any state of the

Little Entente with an outside state must be submitted to

the Council of the Little Entente for unanimous approval.

There was created also an economic council whose

purpose was to bring about agreement as to the economic

interests of the three states, both in their relations with

one another and with third parties. This Economic Council

would be composed of experts, and would act in an advisory

capacity to the Permanent Council of the Little Entente in

general political meetings.

Any policy pursued by the Permanent Council was to

be determined by the general principles laid down in the

great post-war treaties, especially the Covenant of the

League of Nations, the Treaty of Paris, and G-eneral Arbi­

tration Agreement. Under no circumstances would there be

permitted anything conflicting with the principles and pro­

visions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Apart from administrative and technical provisions,

the Pact la:@ down the principles of absolute unity in

foreign political negotiations for both political and econ­

omic treaties, and of the closest cooperation of the three

states with each other in the creation of economic unity.

 This Pact was immediately registered with the League

of Nations,, and the general reaction to it was very favor­

able. France, Great Britain and the former neutrals saw in

it an instrument of great constructive value to the poli­

tical and economic situation in Europe. The greatest

objectors were Hungary and Italy, and to a lesser degree,

Austria and Germany. Although, the democratic elements in

the latter two countries favored it as they looked forward

to an early rapprochement between France and Germany.

Elimination of conflict in Centra.! Europe was looked upon

as a preliminary to peace in Europe.

The only official objection came from Italy. Signor

Suvich, the Italian Secretary of State, stated that the Pact

appeared to the Italian government to be a military alliance,

and as such contrary to the League of Nations Covenant. To

this opposition, Benes answered that the Pact was registered

with the League, that it prolonged all the already existing

agreements between the three states which were also regis­

tered at Geneva, and above all, that it explicitly declared

itself to be subject to the sanctions mentioned in Article

16 of the League Covenant. Mutual assistance among the

three states could only come into question under the Pact

if the obligations contained in the statutes of the League

of Nations were not carried out. The text of the Pact was
 97
unusually clear on this point. In view of the completely

unambiguous wording on this point contained in Article 10

of the Pact , Signor Suvich and M. G-ombos, representing Italy

and Hungary respectively, allowed their objections to lapse.

THE ECONOMIC ENTENTE:

Central Europe, in the years after the First World

Was was characterized by the faet that every nation wanted

to produce and sell without dependence on other nations.

This striving for self-sufficiency only provoked impover­

ished economic systems. Little by little it wass recognized

that this was the wrong policy, and that an integration of

the several national economies was necessary. A plan was

needed whereby the political as well as the economic factors

could be reconciled.

Cognizant of the situation, Benes first suggested an

economic Little Entente in 1927. The existence of an ef­

fective political alliance among the three states was a

reality, but the formation of an economic alliance which

would have made the Little Entente a well-rounded organi­

zation had to be postponed due to the impact of the economic

depression during the two following years. Also, it was

Benes1 idea that the Little Entente should form the nucleus

of a larger Central European economic union. In November,

 98
1933, he explained at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the

Chamber of his own country that he did not regard the Econ­

omic Little Entente as a panacea which would come about

immediately, but rather that it was only a beginning from

which to start. It should not be repudiated, he went on,

just because the agricultural export surplus of Yugoslavia

and Rumania and the surplus of manufactured goods of Czeeho-,

Slovakia could not be completely absorbed within the Little

Entente

The Economic Little Entente was built on the basis

of provisions contained in the Pact of Organization, con­

cluded on February 16, 1933. Article 7 of this Pact visual­

ized the creation of an Economic Council whose aim was to

bring into agreement, step by step, the economic interests

of the three states, and in particular their economic

relations with each other and with third states.

The first meeting of this permanent Economic Council

of the Little Entente took place in Zagreb in January, 1934.

Its program was much more modest than was usual in many

great international economic conferences. It was clearly

indicated from the beginning that no sensational results

were to be expected.

The goal, namely that of building into a single

56Ibia.. p. 49.
economic unit first the states of the Little Entente and

afterwards the whole of Central Europe, was not considered

as purely an economic process. From the beginning of the

construction of the Little Entente, it was made clear that

there was to he no attempt to replace the aspirations toward

self-sufficiency of the smaller states by the construction

of a large self-sufficient unit.

The original plan stipulated that the total turn­

over of goods between the three countries should be in­

creased by fifty per cent in 1934 and seventy-five to 100

per cent in 1935. During the depression, decrease of

foreign trade of the two Balkan states was so great and the

total volume of foreign trade was so small, that even a

fifty or 100 per cent increase could not bring about real

recovery.

In spite of its efforts, the Economic Council of the

Little Entente had little success in stimulating the mutual

trade of its members. In 1935, Czechoslovakia took thirteen

per cent of Yugoslavia^ exports and provided fourteen per­

cent of her imports; while she took six per cent of Rumania *s
3*7
exports and provided ten per cent of her imports. The

relative importance to Czechoslovakia of these transactions

3*7Bulletin of International News (London: Royal In­

stitute of International Affairs, July 1936-June 1937),
Vol. XIII, p. 562.
 100

was much smaller; while the trade between Rumania and Yugo­

slavia was negligible. The basic difficulty was that Czecho­

slovakia could not absorb the agricultural surpluses of

Rumania and Yugoslavia; a situation which was intensified

the more she replaced sugar betts by other crops. It is

interesting to note that during these years Czechoslovak

imports from Rumania and Yugoslavia dropped nearly as much

as her imports from Hungary. This decrease is significant

because Czechoslovakia had no commercial treaty with Hun­

gary as she had with her two partners. The reason for the

decrease was the development of agrarian protection in

Czechoslovakia.

R u t , Yugoslavia and Rumania had abundant supplies

of metals and oil, respectively, which Czechoslovakia used

in great quantities. The metals industries in Yugoslavia

were little developed, but Czechoslovakia, at the time,

had little ca-pital for investment in foreign countries.

Also, Czechoslovakia did not desire to antagonize such

countries as Poland, from, which she drew considerable sup­

plies of metal.

Regarding the trade between Yugoslavia and Rumania,

the difficulty was that both countries were predominantly

agricultural. Therefore, little progress was made to in­

crease their trade.

 101

THE LITTLE ENTENTE AND THE FOUR-POWER PACT:

With Hitler's rise to power in the early 1930's,

European politics underwent a drastic change. By March,

1933, among the interesting consequences of Nazi Germany's

resurgence of power were the reorienta/fcions of foreign

policy on the parts of Italy and Poland. Mussolini, in

order to enhance the prestige of Italy, desired to play the

role of an arbiter between Prance and Germany— to hold the

balance of power between the status quo and revisionist

blocs. Poland, on the other hand, wanted to continue her

support of the status quo bloc only in return for specific

new advantages. Czechoslovakia believed that Mussolini

desired to dominate Central Europe in order to attain his

objective, and that in Italian eyes a strong Little Entente

or an extension of either French or German influence into

this area were equally undesirable.

On March 22, 1933, Mussolini made public the details

of a Four-Power Pact. Through an agreement among Great

Britain, France, Germany and Italy, necessary revisions

would be made and the peace of Europe preserved for the

next decade. The small victor states were greatly dis­

turbed at being excluded from discussions so important to

their future. Poland was particularly angered because her

pretensions of becoming a great power were ignored. For a

 102

time, she considered full membership in the Little'Entente,

but after some deliberation she decided to return to her

policy of prestige. The Polish Dictator, Pilsudski, who

had long opposed such a step, came to the conclusion that

close cooperation with the Little Entente would provide

adequate security against the German menace.

During April, 1933, the Polish Foreign Minister,

Beck, made a series of visits to the capitals of the Little

:Entente states in order to ascertain their policies. Be­

cause of this trip, rumors had it that France, Poland and

the Little Entente had signed an agreement against Mus­

s o l i n i ^ Four-Power Pact, a rumor which was denied by the

Polish Foreign Office. Nevertheless, Mussolini’s threat

of reviving the Triple Alliance which was intended to hasten

French acceptance of his plan, had, perhaps, some influence

,in crystallizing public opinion in the status quo bloc.

After a lengthly discussion in its Permanent Council

at Geneve on March 25, 1933, the Little Entente lost no

time in taking a firm stand in denouncing Mussolini’s plan

and in warning against any attempted revision of the Peace

Treaties. The Little Entente was confident that France

would fully protect its interests, but as added precaution,

it sent Titulescu as its representative to Paris, There

he received assurances that France would continue to oppose

 103
unreservedly all revisions, particularly those territorial

in nature.

Czechoslovakia*s attitude toward the Four-Power Pact

was presented to the parliament in a report by Benes on

April 25, 1933.38 He summarized the growth of revisionism,

and showed how Mussolini’s project represented the culmina­

tion of a decade of efforts to control Central Europe, and

to reduce the small countries of that area to pawns of the

Great Powers. In Benes* opinion, such a step would not be

one of forward movement; but one back to the dangerous

situation which existed before the war. In his evaluation,

a strong Little Entente functioned as a balance-wheel which

helped stabilize Europe. It was neither purely anti-

Hungarian, nor was it a mere satellite of France. Any

territorial changes at Czechoslovakia*s expense would mean

war; revisions of the Peace Treaties were possible only

under the terms of Article 19 of the League Covenant.

Minor frontier rectifications might be accepted by Czecho­

slovakia, but only after peaceful negotiations without

threat of foreign pressure, and with the understanding that

adequate compensation would be given her in return. Other­

wise, he asserted, Czechoslovakia, out of desperation, might

be compelled to leave the League of Nations. Finally, he

3Q
Vondracek, op. cit.. p. 362.
 104
advocated the doctrine of equality of states— the elimina­

tion of distinctions betifeen large and small states, and

between victor and vanquished. So long as these distinc­

tions remained, he felt, no reconciliation was possible;

nor could any general European organization function properly

without the participation of the small states.

As the Four-Power Pact negotiations continued, it

was generally conceded that the result would be a synthesis

of the views of the £reat Powers. Hitler, on May 18, 1933,

pledged his support of Mussolini1s plan to preserve peace,

and stated his belief that war would not improve existing

conditions. Four days later, the negotiating Powers agreed

in principle to a plan. This news was received calmly by

the Little Entente, which mlso gave its approval on May 30.

A Little Entente communique accepted the Four-Power Pact

because of French assurances that the original proposal

had undergone drastic revision, especially that unanimous

consent by the League Council would continue to be required

for any treaty revision. It stated further that the Little

Entente would not tolerate any organization which would

allow any Creat Power to make decisions regarding the in­

terests of other states. France, in reply to these ob­

jections, promised that the Four-Power Pact would concern

only the signatory Powers, and that it would exert no

pressure for frontier revisions upon the Little Entente.

The final draft, which was a compromise of the views

of France and Italy, was initialed on June 7 and signed on

July 15, 1933. Under it, Italy and Germany were denied

colonial compensation by Great Britain and France. France

insisted on several points: that the four Powers deal only

with their own interests and abandon all attempts to revise

present territorial boundaries, and that the prestige and

authority of the League of Nations be permitted to remain

intact. As a result, the final draft retained vague pro­

visions for revision of the Peace Treaties; and in event of

the failure of the Disarmament Conference, for a gradual

attainment of armament equality by Germany.

On June 7, France sent almost identical notes to

Poland and the Little Entente reiterating her attitude and

promising that nothing in the Pact would affect their ex­

isting treaties with her. Particular attention was called

to the fact that Article 2 of the Pact permitted revisions

only under Article 19 of the Covenant of the League. Never­

theless, France did not ask the other three Great Powers to

accept her interpretation of the Pact, and she could not

bind them by her action. France, thus, kept her faith with

her small allies. Only Poland, of the small victor states

of Europe, remained dissatisfied and grieved. She felt that

 106
France had not adequately supported her claims for recog­

nition as a great power.

STRENGTHENING THE LITTLE ENTENTE— 1933:

Again, there arose the problem of illegal arms ship­

ments to Hungary. On January 9, 1933, forty carloads of

arms (40,000 to 50,000 rifles and 200 machine-guns) were

shipped from Italy to Hirtenberg, Austria. These were

allegedly to be repaired in Austria in order to furnish

labor for unemployed machinists, since the weapons were

pre-war Austrian equipment. The Arbeiter Zeitunsc charged

that the weapons were not repaired in Hirtenberg, but with

the aid of the Austrian government, they were merely loaded

39
into trucks and transshipped into Hungary.

Almost immediately the Little Entente was aroused.

This latest incident made many believe the rumor that there

•existed a secret alliance between Italy, Austria and Hun­

gary. Benes issued a warning against any propaganda aimed

at revising the Peace Treaties. France, on January 20,

decided to support the protest of the Little Entente against

the shipment of arms from Italy to Hungary. Benes, acting

as spokesman for the Little Entente, demanded action, either

by the League of Nations or by a cooperative effort of Great

39
Ibid., p. 356.
 107
Britain and France. He stressed that the Hirtenberg affair

was not an isolated incident, but that, in all, Italy had

shipped to Hungary 180,000 rifles, 200 machine-guns, and

unknown numbers of aeroplanes and trucks, the latter of

which could be transformed into tanks. He asked for a ces­

sation of Italo-Magyar intrigues, but to no avail. Nothing

effective was accomplished to check such activities, be­

cause a Oreat Power was involved.

This incident, plus Germany*s new challenge to the

status q u o . was answered promptly by the Little Entente.

On February 16, 1933, the three Foreign Ministers— Benes of

Czechoslovakia, Titulescu of Rumania and Yevtich of Yugo­

slavia— signed at Geneva a new treaty which strengthened

their ties. This was the 11Pact of Organization*1 which has

already been described.

Benes, in a lengthy report on March 1, 1933, before

the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Czechoslovak Senate

and Chamber of Deputies, stated the reasons why the new

Pact had been negotiated. In his estimation, a stronger

union was a necessity for two reasons. First, because of

the chaotic condition of Central Europe, particularly since

each of the three Great Powers which were immediate neigh­

bors of the states of the Little Entente were undergoing

internal political revolutions; and secondly, because the

 108
Little Entente dreaded the outcome of the 1933 Disarmament

Conference. He also stressed that the reorganized Little

Entente was not directed against Italy.

The reorganized Little Entente was a powerful entity,

hut not without weaknesses. The military provisions of the

new agreement remained unpublished and unknown, but the

Little Entente was known to have, at that time, the third

largest military establishment in Europe— after the U.S.S.R.

and France. Its area, among the continental powers, was

second only to the U.S.S.R., whereas its population, approxi­

mately 48,500,000, exceeded that of either France or Italy.

On the other hand, she also had weaknesses. Approximately

one-fourth of the population consisted of minorities, and

Czechoslovakia was the only industrial member. Her Skoda

Works, the only arms manufacturing establishment lay in an

extremely exposed and vulnerable position. And, finally,

■the armaments of the three partners, particularly those of

Rumania, were fast becoming obsolete. In view of these

facts, the military effectiveness of the Little Entente in

a major war remained a question mark.

The strengthening of the Little Entente met with

varied opinions in the foreign press. France approved it

most heartily, but Great Britain was a little glee's reserved

in her approval. Poland and Russia both considered it a

 109
constructive step toward the preservation of peace in Cen­

tral Europe. Austria and Germany disapproved, whereas Italy

and Hungary objected violently. The Italian press de­

nounced certain alleged secret clauses in the treaty. But

the most bitter denunciation of all was the Berlin speech

of March 8 of ex-Premier Bethlen of Hungary. In the course

of calling attention to the common interest of Germany,

Italy and Hungary in trying to prevent too intimate a union

between Northern and Southern Slavs, he asserted that the

Peace Treaties, as evidence of a rotting status q u o . could

not be maintained. The many disapprovals and the many false

allegations mounted so high that it provoked, within Czecho­

slovakia, heated retorts from high government officials.

Benes denied the authenticity of a French charge that, on

August 7, 1932, G-ermany, Italy and Hungary had drawn up a

secret military alliance, and he branded as "idiotic" cur­

rent Hungarian-sponsored rumors that the new Little Entente

treaty called for a joint Czechoslovak-Yugoslav occupation

of Hungary in the event of a Soviet-Rumanian war. To this,

Dr. Bradac, the Czechoslovak Minister of National Defense,

expressed full confidence in the army's power of resistence.

The potential menace of Nazi G-ermany provoked a

Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact which was approved by

Moscow on February 17, 1933, and by Paris on March 16, 1933.

 110
The Friendship between these two countries became so marked

that, late in the year, rumor had it that France had offered

Russia defensive alliance.

On July 4, at London, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia,

Rumania and Yugoslavia signed a non-aggression pact. This

pact clearly defined an act of aggression and an aggressor.

This pact was considered by the Little Entente as an “Eastern

l

Locarno"— a consolidation of Eastern Europe against Germany.

Czechoslovakia was relieved that the U.S.S.R. had apparently

broken definitely with Germany and had come to the side of

■fcke status quo bloc. She decided to follow the example of

the United States and recognize de .jure the U.S.S.R.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE CONFERENCES— 1935:

The three Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente

met in London on June 20-22, 1933 for the purpose of deter­

mining the British viewpoint regarding the practicability

of a Danubian Confederation as a means to draw Austria and

Hungary from the influence of Germany. Despite the support

of Great Britain, France and Italy, the plan failed. In

fact, Nazi Germany preferred, and predicted, a new Central

Europe dominated by a revisionist bloc under the Joint

leadership of Germany and Italy. The Hungarian Premier,

Gombos, considered unsatisfactory the proposed Danubian Con­

 Ill
federation, or any new project which would perpetuate the

status q u o f ajid he held that a drastic revision of the Peace

Treaties alone could restore Central Europe to economic

health. When Ghancellor Dollfuss of Austria visited Musso­

lini on August 20, rumor had it that a new plan for a new

Danubian Confederation was being laid, but including only

Austria, Hungary and Italy. So persistent were the rumors

of a rivalry between Italy and the Little Entente for the

position of dominance in Central Europe, that Benes was

compelled to issue a statement that he would oppose any

Danubian Confederation that would not include Czecho­

slovakia.

After'his Four-Power Pact, Mussolini had another

plan in mind— an economic and political union of the Little

Entente, Austria, Hungary and Italy. The visits of Premier

G-ombos of Hungary to Vienna on July 9, and to Rome on July

25, were interpreted as preliminary steps to the formation

of the new bloc. Because the Little Entente showed more in­

terest in than opposition to the new plan, seemed to indi­

cate that France, although excluded from the new bloc, had

given it her approval. Benes, although he opposed any form

of union between Austria and Hungary as much as anschluss.

favored the new plan as an adequate and practical substi­

tute for the Danubian Confederation which he had so long

 112
been advocating. He even went further by stating that in

.order to safeguard the economic future of Central Europe,

it would be necessary to restore an economic equivalent of

the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Early in June, 1933, the Permanent Council of the

Little Entente met in Prague. The purpose of the Conference

was economic. It was to create an Economic Council of three

sections, one for each country and each with five members
and technical advisers. The main duty of this Council was

to create a preferential tariff system for the three states

and to investigate how a quota system could be employed to

increase the exchange of goods. It would meet four times

annually, alternately in the three capitals, and would con­

cern itself with such questions as general commercial poli­

cies, agriculture, industry, credits, banking and finance

and transportation. Also to be created would be a special

committee to ‘‘normalize*1 all branches of commerce and of

industrial life. This system of “normalization** was to ex­

tend to all branches of military equipment.

The discussions also included politics. It was

agreed that the dangers of revising the frontiers of Hungary,

had been overestimated. Many complaints were voiced that

the official communique failed to mention the status of

relations with Poland, whose relations with both France and

 115
,the Little Entente were cooling as the result of the dis­

regard by the Oreat Powers for Poland’s desire for great

p ower st and ing.

Such progress was made in the Economic Council that,

on October 51, Benes predicted that the next few years

would witness the transformation of the Little Entente into

a compact economic unit. He also added that Czechoslovakia

would have to prepare for new developments by controlling

private capitalism under a nationally planned economy. She

would have to specialize in products her Little Entente

Partners could not supply, and would have to modify her

economy in order to import their cattle and grain. At the

i

same time, Benes desired close and friendly relations with

Austria and Hungary; but admitted that such a desire would

be difficult, especially in view of Hungary’s recently re­

vived revisionist campaign.

Another Little Entente Conference was held at Sinaia

on September 24-2?, 1935. Attending this meeting were not

only the three Foreign Ministers— Benes, Yevtich and Titu-

lescu— but King Alexander of Yugoslavia and King Carol of

Rumania. This was the first Conference ever attended by

the titular heads of more than one state. On the agenda were

the recent visits of Combos and Dollfuss to Rome, the pro­

spects of a Danubian Confederation, the general problem of

 114

increasing still further the solidarity of the Little

Entente and its relations with Prance and Poland.

The result of the Conference was a declaration

against the inclusion of Austria and Hungary in any "bloc

with the Little Entente. Benes was selected to represent

the organization on a diplomatic mission to Home. The

purpose of this mission was a conference with Mussolini

whereby closer and more amicable relations with Italy could

be attained. No immediate agreement resulted.

On October 19, Benes made a trip to Vienna. There

he stated his conviction to Dollfuss that a system of bi­

lateral treaties would be Austria’s best protection, both

economically and politica,lly. He warned Dollfuss against

adopting any radical policy which might endanger relations

•with Czechoslovakia.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE IN THE YEAR 1934:

On January 9, 1934, the Economic Council of the

Little Entente, under the presidency of Benes, met at

Prague. The purpose was to devise ways and means whereby

the three partners might retain at least one-half of their

foreign trade among themselves. The regular Conference,

originally scheduled for January 8, did not convene until

after January 20, because of the assassination of the

 115
Rumanian Prime Minister, Duca.

At Zagreb, the regular Conference convened on Jan­

uary 20-24. There was general agreement as to the future.

United .opposition was expressed against Mussolini, both to

his project to replace the League with a "Concert of Europe,"

and to his suggestion for a Danubian Confederation based

upon an economic alliance of Austria and Hungary. A firm

and determined stand was taken against Hungarian revisionist

propaganda. The three states refused immediate de jure

recognition of the Soviet Union, in spite of French desires.

They first insisted upon further negotiations as to the

terms the U.S.S.R. might offer in return. The only note of

disharmong was Yugoslavia1s desire for a rapprochement with

Hitler. To her, Naziism posed no direct menace, whereas,

in an emergency against Italy, the support of G-ermany could

be of more value than that of France. Also suggested was a

-five-year Balkan non-aggression pact which was to be attemp­

ted immediately after the Conference.

The situation in Europe, at this time, called for a

new orientation on the part of.the Powers.* The Soviet

Union, since the year 1931, had come to realize the possi­

bility of a war on two fronts— Central Europe and the Far

East. She began an about-face in her foreign policy, from

a revisionist to a status quo viewpoint. By March of 1934,

 116
she sent out feelers to .London and Paris regarding the pos­

sibility of her entry into the League of Nations. The

question was further discussed at Geneva by Barthou and

Litvinov on May IB, and, ten days later, the Soviet Union

announced that it had been invited to join the League,

To Benes, these moves indicated the advisability of

the formation of a new bloc consisting of Prance, the

U.S.S.R*, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. He

believed that, according to the agreement which had been

made at the Little Entente Conference of Zagreb on January

22, 1934, the time had arrived to recognize the Soviet

government. On June 9, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, ap­

parently with Yugoslavia*s approval, recognized the Soviet

Union. Yugoslavia’s attitude was that the time was not con­

venient .

The Little Entente followed the recognition of Russia

with the Conference of Bucharest on June 13-20, 1934. At

this meeting it was decid_ed to continue mutual cooperation

towards the economic recovery of Centra.1 Europe, and to con­

tinue opposition to Hungarian revisionism and to any re­

storation of the Hapsburgs.

Hardly had the Conference ended, when Barthou of

France arrived at Bucharest. That evening, on June 20, he

delivered an address in which he stressed the common in-

 117
terests of France and Rumania in opposing revisionism.

After stopping in Belgrade, June 23-26, Barthou departed

for France, via Vienna,

Barthou1s trip was highly significant. France was

concerned over the future solidarity of ,the Little Entente,

particularly over Yugoslavia’s attitude. French uneasiness

had increased because of the failure of the Disarmament

Conference at Geneva, and the threatened Italo-German

rapprochement. a preliminary to which was Hitler’s confer­

ence with Mussolini at Venice on June 14-15. King Alexander

of Yugoslavia felt that an Italo-German reconciliation would'

not be permanent, because of Nazi interference in Austria.

He felt that an Italo-French alliance would be inevitable

if anschluss was to be averted. In such an alliance, his

country.might be abandoned by France. Yugoslavia had nothing

to fear either from Moscow or from anschluss. but did fear

a Hapsburg restoration and an extension of Italian influence

in Central Europe and the Balkans. A recognition of Russia J‘

might antagonize Germany without any corresponding gain for

Yugoslavia. In event of a war with Italy, there might be a

chance of German help. Therefore, King Alexander declined

to take any further action regarding the Soviet Union, and

merely promised to pay a visit to France in the autumn.

The Soviet Union became a member of the League of

 118
Nations on September 18, 1934, and the Little Entente whole­

heartedly supported her entry. Even Poland withdrew its

opposition to a permanent seat for the Soviet Union on the

League Council.

On September 13, the Little Entente announced its

approval of the proposed Wastern Locarno Pact. Litvinov

and Barthou tentatively agreed upon a proposed mutual

assistance pact which would include not only their own

countries, but the Little Entente, Turkey, Italy, Greece

and Spain. But, such an idealistic project had so many

insurmountable problems that if was never realized.

A year and one-half of Nazi interference within

Austria culminated in the assassination of Dollfuss on

July 25, 1934. This event represented a setback for Germany

in that it alienated the only great power in Europe which

might have been friendly— Italy— who was almost compelled,

now, to seek closer ties with France.

In order to prevent anschluss f Mussolini at once

ordered an army to the Austrian frontier. Italy’s quick

action alarmed both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, both of

which took prompt military measures. The extension of

Italian control over Austria would be intolerable. The

situation became critical and complex. Yugoslavia sought to

prevent Austria from falling into the hands of Italy, and

Czechoslovakia wanted to save Austria from both Italy and

G-ermany. Prince Starhemberg, Austria’s acting Chancellor

after the murder of Dollfuss, apparently preferred to co­

operate with the Little Entente and Italy rather than with

Germany. Barthou asserted his opposition to any solution

of the Austrian question which would make Italy predominant

in Central Europe. It appeared that Yugoslavia, of the

small states, held the key to the situation. If she de­

serted France for Germany, she might be followed by Rumania

and even by Hungary. As a result, not only the Little

Entente and the French system of alliances would be threat­

ened with disruption, but Italy would lose her friend,

Hungary. Such an event was not impossible, because neither

Yugoslavia, Rumania nor Hungary was directly threatened by

German ambitions in Central Europe. On the contrary, they

found Germany a better market for their agricultural pro­

ducts than either France or Italy. In this critical situ­

ation, Barthou sought to clarify the situation by inviting

King Alexander to visit France.

Instead of clarifying the situation, Alexander’s

visit made matters much more critical, because he and

Barthou were assassinated in Marseilles by a Croatian

terrorist. Evidently, Barthou's death was an accident, due

to his desire to protect the King, whom certain dissatisfied

 120
subjects sought to slay as part of a plot to disrupt the

unity of Yugoslavia.

The Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente met at

Belgrade on October 14, The purpose of the meeting was to

determine a stand against Balkan terrorists. On the 19th,

they accused Hungary of aiding the assassins. Large de­

tachments of the Yugoslav army were concentrated on the

Hungarian frontier, and it was decided to request the League

to investigate the charges against Hungary.

Yugoslavia, assured of the support of her Little

Entente partners, of Greece, Turkey and France, decided to

take matters into her own hands if no satisfaction was forth­

coming from Geneva. Hungary demanded the withdrawal of

Benes as President of the League Council when the case came

before that body. France requested for a further delay in

order that some agreement might be reached with Italy, but

in spite of this, Yugoslavia submitted her protest to the

League of Nations on November 22. Hungary demanded, two

days later, immediate action regarding the charges, because

she characterized them as a threat to the peace of Europe.

The situation was further aggravated when Yugoslav troops

drove across the frontier into Hungary several thousand

Magyars who had resided in Yugoslavia since the War and who

had not been naturalized.

 121
The League considered the dispute on December 7-10,

1934, and finally produced a satisfactory compromise. Dur­

ing the deliberations, the Little. Entente demonstrated its

solidarity. Benes, speaking for Czechoslovakia, threatened

to resign from the League Council unless that body demon­

strated sufficient courage and efficiency in preventing

armed warfare between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Although,

he added, this action would not mean Czechoslovakia's with­

drawal from the League. Titulescu, speaking for the Little

Entente, after denouncing revisionism, pointed out that

Hungary's national honor was in no way questioned. Even­

tually, both Hungary and Yugoslavia accepted the draft

treaty sponsored by Prance, whereby there was created a

permanent international investigating committee of five

members for the suppression of terrorism. Immediately, all

frontier deportations ceased. Upon his arrival in Prague,

Benes explained his strong stand by stressing that the

bbject of revisionism was to destroy the status quo in

Central Europe, and that revisionism could never accomplish

Its ends in a peaceful manner.

The outcome of the assassination crisis was the fur­

ther isolation of Germany. In France, on November 23, a

sensation was created by Leon Archimbaud, Reporter of the

Budget. During the course of a debate in the French Chamber

 122
of Deputies, he announced that the Soviet Union had offered
40
her army to France in the event of a war with Germany.

This statement was premature, yet, all denials by the Quai

d fOrsay failed to remove the impression that an alliance was

imminent. The trend toward this goal was given further im- ■

petus when, on December 5, France and the U.S.S.R. signed a

protocal which called for joint negotiations regarding the

completion of an Eastern Locarno. Czechoslovakia adhered

to this protocol on December 12. France and Italy were

conducting negotiations, and in January of 1935 effected a

reconciliation.

All in all, the year 1934 was a good year for the

status quo nations. The Little Entente showed increased

solidarity, the U.S.S.R. had joined the League and was

supporting the cause of the status quo bloc, Italy and France

were near a rapprochement and Germany was steadily being .

more isolated.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE:

From a political and economic point view, the Balkan

Entente and the Little Entente must be considered together.

In both cases the political aim was to eliminate the con­

flicts among the states of Central and Southeastern Europe

which, .up to the time of War, kept this area in turmoil, and '
40Ibia.. p. 393.
 123
which, unfortunately, many times involved the major powers

of Europe. On the economic side, both Ententes sought to

replace the policy of nationalistic self-sufficiency with

a policy of cooperation.

The connection between the Little Entente and the

Balkan Entente may be seen at once by the fact that two

members of the Little Entente— Rumania and Yugoslavia—

were also members of the Balkan Entente. Although, it

would not be correct to regard the protocols of the Balkan

Pact, which were finally signed in February and November,

1934, as primarily a result of the policy of the Little

Entente.

There were some misgivings about the effect on the

Balkan Conference of the consolidation of the Little Entente

on February 16, 1933. During the Balkan discussions, the

representatives of Yugoslavia and Rumania were asked to ex­

plain their position. They assured the Conference that the

Little Entente action did not change the political direction

of their countries regarding the Balkan movement. Many be­

lieved that the experience of Yugoslavia and Rumania in the

Little Entente would be helpful in realizing the goal of

41
Balkan cooperation.

41
Robert J. Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard, The
Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1950-1945 (Ber­
keley: University of California Press, 1936), p. 96.
 124
The path to the Pacts of 1934 lay through a number of'

conferences, the results of which were usually unsatisfac­

tory. It was suggested in October, 1929, at the Interna­

tional Peace Conference in Athens that the Balkan Confer­

ences should become regular and permanent, and that all the

Balkan states, Albania and Bulgaria as well as Greece, Yugo­

slavia, Rumania and Turkey, should send delegates to these

permanent conferences. The agenda of these conferences

were at first loosely planned, and consisted principly in

devising ways and means of maintaining peace in the Balkans.

There followed the Balkan Conferences of 1930 in Athens, in

Angora in 1931, Bucharest in 1932, and the Fourth Balkan

Conference of Salonika in 1933.

Despite their unofficial character, the Balkan Con­

ferences showed some achievement even though they were in­

terrupted by the development of the European crisis and the

threat toward authoritarianism in the Balkans. A political

pact was drafted by the Third Conference at Bucharest in

1932, based on the ideals of the outlawry of war, arbitra­

tion and mutual assistance. Within the framework of ex­

isting treaties, a procedure was set up for the settlement

of the difficult problem of minorities. Also adopted was a

draft convention on the right of Balkan citizens to travel,

live and work throughout the Balkans. This was noteworthy

 125
"because it considered those social, economic and cultural

contacts which would give broad basis for political under­

standing. The draft project of 1953 for a partial Balkan

Customs Union was quite significant. Also, there were pro­

posed projects for intellectual cooperation and for broad

collaboration.in the field of social legislation. The Con­

ferences promoted a thorough system of sanitary and veter­

inary treaties, not to mention projects for a Balkan system

of agricultural, cooperatives, a system of agricultural

credit and a Balkan Chamber of Agriculture. Several of

these projects were put into operation. A Balkan Chamber

of Commerce and Industry was set up in Istanbul in 1931, an

Oriental Tobacco Office was created in 1933 by Bulgaria,

Greece and Turkey, and a Balkan Medical Union began to

function in 1933. A Commission of Balkan Jurists began the

difficult ts.sk of legal unification. Also, preparation

•was made for a Balkan Postal Union.4 ^

These preliminaries were of importance insofar as

they enabled the leading statesmen of all these countries to

realize that pacification of Southeastern Europe and elimin­

ation of the common economic distress could only be effected

by the cooperation of the Balkan states themselves and not

4%lobert J. Kerner, editor, Czechoslovakia (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1945), p p . 376-7).
 126
by the pre-war practice of continual appeals to one or

another Great Power, Such cooperation was deemed a neces­

sity, and there remained only the method of achieving such

cooperation. A method was finally found in 1934 in the

Balkan Pact, which was signed in Athens on February 9, 1934.

It was based on the draft of a pact for Balkan Union ac­

cepted by the Third Balkan Conference and the draft of a

^Balkan Economic Union adopted by the Fourth Conference.

First, in order to appreciate this Pact for the

solution of the problems of the Balkan area, a weakness

should be pointed out. The Pact of February 1934, guaran­

tees the existing frontiers of the participating states

between themselves. Thus, there is no direct obligation on

the participating states to protect the frontiers of one of

the participants against revisionist attacks from without.

This limitation made the accession of Bulgaria to the Balkan

^act more difficult. Nevertheless, although Bulgaria and

Albania did not adhere to the Pact, they did not play in

the Balkans a role identical with or even similar to that

which Hungary assumed in the Danubian basin regarding re­

visionist claims. The revisionist problem of Bulgaria was

different from that of Hungary, because the representatives

of revisionist aims were found less in Bulgaria than outside

her frontiers. Eventually, Bulgaria did, in August 1938,

 127
enter into a general pact of non-aggression with the Balkan

Entente. This, only after her military freedom had "been

restored.43

After the conclusion of the Balkan Pact in February,

1934, a start was made with the extension to economic

'matters. This was also the method followed by the Little

Entente. A new conference of the Balkan Entente, which took

place in the Turkish capital from October 30 to November 2,

1934, adopted a Statute of Organization for the Balkan

League. This Statute was drafted by the Rumanian Foreign

Minister M. Titulescu, which together with the Economic

Statute of the Balkan League, adopted in Angora at the same

time, greatly resembles the corresponding agreements of the

Little Entente. Here was1 also found a Permanent Council,

whose President was in turn the Foreign Minister of Greece,

Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. In the Economic Statute

the community of interests of the participating states in

agriculture, industry, trade and sea transport liras noted

and a program of mutual assimilation of laws laid down.

Finally, plans for a Balkan Bank were laid. This Bank was

established in Athens in 1934. Branches of this bank were

established in Angora, Istanbul, Salonika, Bucharest and

43
Joseph Slabey Roucek, Politics of the Balkans (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), p. 156.
 128
Belgrade. Its first task was to finance the exchange of

goods between the countries of the Balkan Entente, and after

that to provide credits for industry and agriculture, to

facilitate the transfer of payments by transferring to this

institution the functions set up by various agreements, and

to finance the raw material requirements of the Balkan sta­

tes. The issue of international loans was contemplated for

a later date. The Balkan Pact of February and the Organi­

zation and Economic Statutes of 1934 were considered just

the framework to be filled out little by little.

Here, as in the Little Entente, there seemed to be

a determination to avoid going too far in the beginning.

The goal of economic cooperation was to be achieved step

by step. An important step was the foundation of the Inter-

Balkan Chamber of Commerce, which originated in a decision

of the Balkan Conference.

It was necessary, of course, to have closer poli­

tical cooperation before economic cooperation could be

achieved. One of the greatest obstacles to this political

goal was the relations between the ti^ro Slav states of the

Balkans, Greece had unsettled difficulties with Bulgaria,

but her understanding with'Turkey showed that she could

resolve political problems in the interest of economic unity.

Close cooperation between the Balkan and Little Ententes

 129
was inevitable because their purpose was the same— political

and economic unity— and, also, Rumania and Yugoslavia were

members of both Ententes.

The Balkan Entente did not produce the desired re­

sults. It came into being far too late, and met with Great

Power opposition. The European crisis was too critical to

allow such an idealistic project to succeed. Hitler1s

political and economic penetration of the Balkans, and the

failure of France to act forcefully in crises proved too

much for the Balkan Entente.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE IN THE YEAR 1955:

After extended negotiations, France and Italy reached

a reconciliation of January 7, 1935. Signed by the new

French Foreign Minister, Laval, and by Mussolini, the new

Rome accord stipulated: first, a pact of consultation

■whereby the two countries agreed to consult with one another

upon all European questions, particularly in the event that

Austrian independence should be jeopardized; second, a pact

of non-intervention, to be signed by the Little Entente,

Austria, Hungary and possibly Germany; third, other powers

might accede to the consultative provisions of the Pact; and

fourth, colonial concessions by France to Italy in Africa.

The negotiators asserted that the Pact was aimed at no

 130
particular state, but the specific guarantee of Austrian

independence left no doubt that it was intended against

■Germany.

Thus was created a new ring of nations around Germany.

Except for Japan, whose distance precluded any effective

influence in Central Europe, and Poland whose military value

and sincerity were open to question, Nazi G-ermany appeared :

deserted by all states with any power whatsoever* Never­

theless, Hitler continued to reiterate his demands for

German equality with other nations in military as well as

colonial matters.

Both the Franco-Soviet and the Fran co-Italian

rapprochements were enthusiastically welcomed by the Little

Entente. At Ljubljana, the three Little Entente Foreign

Ministers— Benes of Czechoslovakia, Yevtich of Yugoslavia

and Titulescu of Humania— -met to discuss the new situation

created by the recent Franco-Italian accord and to formulate

a unified policy regarding it. The Conference decision was !

made public by Titulescu who stated that the Little Entente

would enter negotiations regarding a Danubian Pact only as

a unit. He demanded four specific conditions upon which

the Little Entente would consider accession: first, the

restoration of the Hapsburgs; second, the minorities

question would not be considered as solely internal affairs

 151
of any signatory Power; third, all revisionist propaganda

regarding the territories of signatories would he dropped;

and, fourth, the exceptional privileges enjoyed by some

0

citizens of certain signatory states within the territories

of another state (i.e. the special economic privileges of

Italians in Dalmatia) would end with the signature of the

new pact. The effect of Titulescu1s demands on France and

Italy was not known, but the fact remained that the Little

Entente did not accede to the Rome accord of January 7,

1935.

Nazi success in the Saar plebiscite of January 15,

1935, and H i t l e r s proclamation of compulsory military

service caused great concern in Europe. The Austrian

government also feared Hitler. Chancellor Schuschnigg and

Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg visited Paris on February

21-23 and London, February 24-26, in an effort to obtain

further assistance against German threats. They were re­

ceived cordially and politely, but without enthusiasm in

both western capitals. British and French governments

agreed to help maintain Austrian independence, but denied

Austria any further loans and renewed their stand against

a Hapsburg restoration.

The question of Austria's future became the subject

of discussions between the Little Entente and Italy.

Titulescu, who was spokesman for "both the Balkan and the

Little Ententes, conferred with Yevtich at Belgrade on

March 25, in the course of a tour through the Little Entente

states. An unofficial report from Belgrade indicated that,

a difference of opinion had developed betxfeen Italy and the

Little Entente. Italy was apparently willing to approve

compulsory military service within Austria as essential to

prevent ultimate annexation by G-ermany, but the Little

Entente opposed such a move because it might establish a

precedent for the rearming of both Hungary and Bulgaria.

Austria1s rearming might not represent a threat to the

Little Entente, but the rearming of either Hungary or Bul­

garia would present a potential threat and would be met by

resolute action on the part of the Little Entente, Two days

later Titulescu, while enroute to Paris, met Benes at

Bratislava. Evidently, the two were in complete accord,

for, on departing, Titulescu asserted that no power could

separate Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

At the Stresa Conference of April 11-14, 1934, a

united front was established by Great Britain, France and

Italy. This joint effort represented an attempt to pre­

serve the peace. But, Great Britain refused to accept any

definite commitments on the continent beyond those of

Locarno. The Conference decided that Austrian independence

 133
could best be preserved by a Danubian Pact which would in­

clude all the neighbors of Austria. In order that such a

Pact might be effected, Mussolini invited all interested

Powers to a Conference at Rome, set tentatively for May 20.

With regard to an Eastern Pact, the three Great

Powers concluded merely to continue discussions for the

consolidation of security in Eastern Europe. France had

already decided to enter into such a pact with the Soviet

Union. Even G-ermany agreed to accede to it, at least to

some limited degree. With regard to the question of the

rearming of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria* Italy and France

expressed the opinions of the former enemy states and of

the Little Entente, respectively. Since the Stresa Con­

ference had decided to bring before the League of Nations

the question of G-ermany1s violation of the Treaty of Ver­

sailles by rearming, the Little Entente did not intend to

permit similar violations of the Peace Treaties by the

smaller former enemy states. Because of Laval1s forceful «

i) o
pleading that any rearming of the small former enemy states

would have to await an effective peace and security agree­

ment negotiated under the contemplated Danubian pact.

A treaty of mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia

and the Soviet Union, similar to that between France and

the Soviet Union, was signed in Prague on May 16, by Benes

 134
for Czechoslovakia and Alexandrovsky, the Soviet Minister to

Czechoslovakia. The Pact was to become effective whenever

one of the signatories became the object of an unprovoked

;attack on the part of a European state, in which case the .

other would assist immediately. But, as in the case of the

Franco-Soviet Treaty, aid to Russia would not be forthcoming

against a Japanese attack. The protocol of.Signature

specified also that “both governments understood that the

obligation of mutual assistance becomes effective only when

it shall meet the foreseen conditions of the Pact and when

the victim of aggression shall receive also the aid of

France.0 zech osloykkia, then, would not be obligated to

assist the if France refused to do so. Another

variation from the Franco-Soviet Pact was the so-called

“neutrality clause,0 whereby, in the event of an attack upon

one of the signatories “by one or two states, under circum­

stances that could not be foreseen, the other signatory

must not aid, directly or indirectly,, the aggressor, and

both signatories offer one another assurances that there

exists no secret treaty which would invalidate the ful­

fillment of these understandings.11 At the same time, the

two states negotiated an air convention whereby service

between Moscow and Prague was to start in August. The

direct route was to have been via Warsaw, but when Poland
 135

refused permission to fly across her territory, the route

x*ras changed to Kiev and Uzhorod.

The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty was negotiated with

the approval of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It was followed

by a visit of Benes to Moscow. Enroute, at Warsaw, he

received a cool reception. At Moscow, Benes and Litvinov

exchanged ratifica/fcions of the Mutual Assistance Pact, of

the Air Treaty, of the Patent Agreement and of the Trade

Credit Treaty. They agreed that the only way to preserve

European peace was an extension of the mutual assistance

pact to other states. Their three-day conference ended

with a joint communique stating that Czechsolovakia1s geo­

graphic position had been a dominant factor in the rap­

prochement with the U.S.S.R. The communique was followed

I
almost immediately by a report that the Soviet Union and

Rumania were also negotiating a pace of mutual assistance,

I The several states of Central Europe were looking

forward to the contemplated Danubian Pact. At the Con­

ference of Venice, which ended on May 6, Austria, Hungary

,and Italy were reported to have reached a tacit understand­

ing favorable to Hungarian rearming. Italy was alleged to

have promised Hungary “moral11 support in an effort to rec­

tify Hungary1s frontiers in return for a guarantee of

Austrian independence. An interesting sidelight to the

 136
Conference of Venice was the report that the Italian Foreign

Minister, Suvich, had induced Beck, of Poland, who was

visiting Italy, to participate in the Danubian negotiations

in order to help to counterbalance the influence of France

and the Little Entente.

The Foreign Ministers of the three Little Entente

states and of G-reece met at Bucharest on May 10-11. They

took a realistic view of the situation. The eventual re­

arming of Bulgaria and Hungary was considered as almost

inevitable. The question was what price could be had In

return for rearmament. Also, it was considered advisable

to please the Western Powers and approve the recommenda­

tions of Stresa. Thus, in view of these considerations,

the Little Entente and G-reece agreed that Bulgaria and

Hungary accede to a six-Power pact of non-aggression and of ■

mutual assistance. The Little Entente was willing to

abandon its long opposition to the rearming of the former

enemy states on condition that they guarantee the status

quo and agree to terminate revisionist propaganda. Both

the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente were obssessed

by two fears: first, Hungary and Bulgaria would probably

refuse to perpetuate the present boundaries in return for

a right they assumed already theirs; and second, the whole

conception of a Danubian Pact was jeopardized seriously by

Mussolinifs African policy.
The Conference of Home, which had been scheduled

originally for May 20, 1935, had been postponed several

times. Hitler took advantage of these successive postpone­

ments by sending his lieutenant, General Goring, on a

Balkan tour in order to restore German influence in that

area. Goring was in Sofia on May 27 to return a recent

visit that a Bulgarian delegation had made secretly to

Berlin. The trip also took him to Rumania, .Yugoslavia, and

Hungary. He made a particularly strenuous effort to attract

Yugoslavia within the German.orbit, and thereby create a

German bloc across Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia, and

elsex^here, Goring1s tour was termed a diplomatic failure;

but its aftermath in Yugoslavia was a political crisis. As

a result, Yevtich was succeeded by the allegedly Germano-

phil, Stoyadinovich, as Permier. Because of the internal

difficulties in Yugoslavia, the Little Entente Conference

of Bled was postponed, and Rumania hastened to draw closer

to both Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.

There again arose the question of a Hapsburg restor­

ation in Austria. Czechoslovak newspapers took the lead

in calling attention to the imminence of such a restoration.

Some of its assertions received apparent confirmation when

the Austrian Federal Chamber approved a law restoring to

 13 8

the Hapsburgs their former property within Austria. The

■Little Entente acted swiftly. The Yugoslav Begent, Prince

Paul, sped to Sinaia to confer with King Carol II, Titu­

lescu announced their decision. He asserted that the three

Little Entente states would recall their diplomatic repre­

sentatives, inaugurate an economic blockade, terminate the

transportation of goods and passengers, mobilize their three,

armies and take immediate military measures. The action of

the three states would not be motivated by mere sentiment,

said Titulescu, but by a desire to avert the confusion that

s- change in the Austrian status quo would produce in Central

Europe. Cooperation among the three partners was further

confirmed when Benes stated that his earlier views regard­

ing a restoration remained unchanged. The Czechoslovak

■press objected to the return of Archduke Otto or ex-Empress

( ~
Zita to either Austria or Hungary even as private citizens.

The apparent solidarity of the Little Entente, to-

.gether with its close cooperation with the Balkan Entente,

was again evident at the Little Entente conference at Bled,

August 30-31. This Conference was followed immediately by

a conference of the Balkan Entente. This was the Little

Entente’s fifteenth anniversary and Benes characterized it

as a fruitful alliance which had fully Justified its ex­

istence. He also raised the question of the recognition of

 139
the U.S.S.R. by the Little Entente as a unit, but no action

was taken because of the opposition of Yugoslavia. At the

end of the Conference, a communique was issued which ex­

pressed solidarity on all political questions. The Little

Entente would also strive to help preserve general peace

and remain faithful to the League of Nations. It remained

unalterably opposed to a Hapsburg restoration in either

Austria or Hungary. It agreed that existing difficulties ':

would be greatly lessened by the successful conclusion of

Eastern and Danubian Pacts. In the latter, which would

i

perhaps be negotiated under French and Italian auspices, .

they desired an inclusion of a guarantee of Austrian in­

dependence, mutual pledges of non-aggression and non­

intervention and a general agreement for consultation rather-

than mutual assistance in the event of a threat against

either the political or the territorial status q u o . The

communique ended on a pessimistic note stating that, since

the question of revision of the Peace Treaties was not to

be raised, Hungary alone would probably destroy all hopes

for a general agreement.

No member of the Little Entente was deceived as to

the weakness of the props of peace. Doubtful Franco-Italian

relations, the (German rearmament, Italo-G-erman rapproche­

ment . the political fatuity of British leadership and Nazi

 140
economic and propaganda penetration of Austria, Hungary,

Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia, all constituted menaces

44
to European peace.

The French, Czechoslovak and Soviet maneuvers during

the late summer and early fall of 1935 indicated close

friendship among the three countries. Of significance was

the choice of location for each: the French in the

Ghampagne in July, the Czechoslovak on the German frontier

in August and the Soviet in the Ukraine in September. Mili­

tary missions from each state were present at each of the

maneuvers. Rumanian and Yugoslav military missions also

witnessed the Czechoslovak maneuvers. These maneuvers were

given a sense of reality hy the German minority which cut

wires and committed other acts of petty sabotage. The round

of military maneuvers ended early in October with those of

Rumania. Invited to these were observers from Yugoslavia,

Czechoslovakia, and France.

Late in September, 1935, the Little Entente denied a

report that a Soviet-Rumanian pact permitting passage to

Soviet troops across Rumania to aid Czechoslovakia in the

event of war had been negotiated. Nevertheless, the report

provoked, among Germany, Hungary and Poland, counter-nego­

tiations which alarmed Czechoslovakia. Soviet leaders were

44
Harrison S. Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 332..
convinced that the new bloc was aimed at the isolation and

eventual partition of Czechoslovakia as a prelude to a war

of aggression against the U.S.S.R. The Czechoslovak gov­

ernment countered by planning more elaborate fortifica­

tions, particularly along the German frontier. Benes sum­

marized the situation on November 5 before the Foreign

Affairs Committee of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

He indicated that Czechoslovakia favored peace and inter­

national cooperation; that she threatened no one and would

never become a party to an aggressive war, and that her

system of alliances and friendships promised her the maxi­

mum security then attainable.

Attention was now focused on Mussolini1s attack on

Ethiopia. For the first time in its history, the League of

Nations took a firm stand and declared one of its members an

?
aggressor. - •

The question was raised as to what should be the

attitude of the various members if the application of sanc­

tions against Italy should impel her to declare war on Great

Britain. The small victor states of Central Europe stood

firmly behind the League and Great Britain. They considered

the African crisis a mere_prelud_e to a much greater one in ^

the future involving Germany. If the League could be

strengthened sufficiently to cope efficiently with an ag­

 142
gressive Great Poi^er, a precedent might he established

whereby the small states could find in the League an ef­

fective recourse in the event of future threats to their

security. France hesitated long before supporting Great

Britain, because she needed both Great Britain and Italy for

support against Germany. But certain members in both the

Little and the Balkan Ententes (Yugoslavia, Greece and

Turkey) pledged armed support to Great Britain against Italy

should war come.

After the annual military conference of the Little

Entente at Belgrade, Rumania and Czechoslovakia tentatively

agreed to follow the more aggressive lead of Yugoslavia in

backing Great Britain against Italy. But the final deci­

sion was not made until January 22, 1936. Czechoslovakia

had no direct quarrel with Italy; in fact, the government

permitted shipments of coal, shoes and other products to

Italy until sanctions became operative. However, Czecho­

slovakia did not waver in its support of League principles.

For if it disregarded them and refused to support the League

assistance against German aggression in some future crisis?

Thus, Benes informed the League of Czechoslovakia's willing­

ness to impose upon Italy an oil, coal and steel embargo.

The year 1935 was the peak of Little Entente effec- '

tiveness. The Franco-Italian and Franco-Soviet rapproche­

ments plus the Stresa Front completed the isolation of G-er­

many and preserved the independence of Austria. The Soviet-

Czechoslovak Treaty and the army maneuvers witnessed by

observers from the Little Entente states, france and Russia

added to the military potential of the Little Entente. The

opposition to Italy1s invasion of Ethiopia was unanimous.

The only discordant note was Nazi (Germany’s economic and

political penetration in the Balkans, especially in Yugo­

slavia where a political crisis brought a pro-G-erman govern­

ment to power.

THE DECLINE AND DEATH OF THE LITTLE ENTENTE

THE YEAR 1936:

THE QUESTION OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN CONSOLIDATION:

Late in 1935, President Mazaryk of Czechoslovakia

died, and on December 18, 1935, Dr. Benes was elected Presi-

cent. Dr. Kamil Krofta became Foreign Minister. As a re­

sult, Czechoslovakia1s influence in the Little Entente lost

none of its previous forcefulness.

Early in 1936, negotiations regarding Austria were

directed at the formation of an Eastern European bloc com­

posed of the Little Entente states, which, it i^as hoped,

might replace Italy as official defender of Austrian in­

dependence against the encroachments of Nazi G-ermany.

During these negotiations--which took place in Paris and in

which G-ermany, Italy, Poland and Hungary did not parti­

cipate— Premier Hodza of Czechoslovakia offered to reduce

Austria* s economic dependence on G-ermany and Italy by open­

ing Little Entente markets to Austrian goods. But, this

plan had two great obstacles: the reluctance of the Schus-

chnigg government to renounce all hope of Hapsburg restor- ,

ation, which Rumania and Yugoslavia— unlike Czechoslovakia-

regarded as more dangerous than G-erman absorbtion of Austria;

and the unwillingness of Yugoslavia— which shared Hitler*s

hostility to communism and has distrusted France since King

Alexander’s assassination in 1934— to take any action which

might close the profitable G-erman market to Yugoslav trade,

45
already affected by League sanctions against Italy.

On January 17, 1936, Schuschnigg met with Prime Mini­

ster Hodza in Prague. In a statement, Schuschnigg said

that a rapprochement between the countries of the Little

Entente and those of the Rome Pact (Italy, Austria and Hun­

gary) was likely to be realized. He also saw President '

Benes and assured him that no Hapsburg restoration would be

attempted without first consulting the Little Entente.

The Czechoslovak Prime Minister, on February 6, 1936,

46
Vera Micheles Dean, ’’Origins of the Locarno
Crisis,” Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. 12, Mo. 7 (June 15,
1936), p. 861
 145
:made a statement to the Italian Stefani Meiirs Agency which

was designed to reassure Mussolini. He expressed the opin­

ion that political and economic cooperation in Central

Europe, and especially in the Danubian Basin, would have to

be based on a rapprochement between the Little Entente states

and the states which had signed the Rome Pacts. Czecho­

slovakia was fully aware of Italy1s position in Europe. The,

efforts to consolidate Central Europe should not be inter­

preted as an attempt to injure Italy1s interests or the part

she played in Central Europe.

In spite of these assurances, the exclusion of G-er­

many and Italy from the Danubian negotiations aroused the

apprehensions of both countries. Nazi Germany redoubled its

efforts to encourage Yugoslavia^ pro-German orientation;

while Mussolini further cemented his ties with Austria and

Hungary, both of which had refused to participate in League

sanctions against Italy. In a conference held in Rome on

March 20-23, Italy, Austria and Hungary reaffirmed the

pledges of political, economic and cultural cooperation

given in the Rome Protocols of March 17, 1934. These

countries arranged to organize themselves into a bloc and

to create a permanent organ of mutual consultation modelled

on the periodic Little Entente conferences. They agreed

that, while it was advisable to develop economic relations

 146
■with other Danubian states, this could be achieved only by

means of bi-lateral treaties. This would exclude an under­

standing between Austria and the Little Entente as a unit,

but not an Austro-Czechoslovak provisional trade treaty,

which was concluded on March 10. They-undertook not to open

negotiations with any other country concerning Danubian

questions until they had consulted each other, thus barring

a secret Italo-G-erman or Austro-Little Entente accord.

There took place in Vienna on November 11 and 12 a

conference of the governments of Italy, Austria and Hungary.

Italy was represented by Count Ciano. This conference fol­

lowed a visit by Count Giano to Berlin where he discussed

with Hitler and the German Ministers the situation brought

about by the Austro-German rapprochement of July 11, and its

relation to the so-called policy of the Rome Protocols fol­

lowed by Austria, Hungary and Italy.

The Vienna Conference did not produce any important

decisions, but it was of great interest because it marked

an attempt by the Italian government to harmonize the Rome

Protocols with the July 11 declaration. It was generally

regarded as having been promoted by Italy in order to create

the impression of Joint Italo-Gerraan control over the

countries in the Danubian Basin. If this was Italy's pur­

pose, according to the November 12 communique, she did not

succeed. Although, it did include a statement referring to

the decision reached by the Italian and G-erman governments

to treat Danubian problems tJin a spirit of friendly cooper­

ation, according to the provisions of the supplementary.

Home Protocols of March, 1936.f1

Mussolini’s November 12 Conference in Vienna could be

regarded as an attempt by Italy to show that the Rome Pro­

tocols constituted a major element in Central European

politics, and which had to play a very important, if not

predominant, part in any settlement, in spite of the re­

conciliation between Vienna and Berlin in July of 1936.

G-ermany and Italy both claimed the right to be the

principal engineer of any agreements reached in Central

Europe, political or economic; Benes was convinced that the

Little Entente was the keystone of Central Europe, and Hun­

gary was insistent that she must not be left out of any

arrangement.

YUG-OSLAVIA AND RUMANIA AND G-ERMAN PENETRATION IN

THE BALKANS:

Early in March, 1936, Yugoslavia asserted that the

Little Entente continued to be a pledge of peace, and was

ready to cooperate in the consolidation of conditions in

the Danubian basin. The Balkans, thanks to the Balkan

Entente, were now a region of perfect^ p eace. As to Austria,

it added, the restoration of the Hapsburgs would inevitably

lead to conflict and, as a real friend of peace, Yugoslavia

must a second and a third time say "no" to this. But, in

spite of these reassurances, Yugoslavia signed a trade

agreement on April 1, 1936 with Germany. It provided that

the outstanding claims against Germany (about 470 million

dinars) would be cleared by means increased imports from

Germany.
This agreement caused apprehensions among the

countries of the Little and Balkan Ententes. To allay these

fears, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Stoyadinovich, issued a

statement through the foreign press denying that there was

any political significance whatever in the trade agreement

with Germany. Italy and Germany were Yugoslavia's best

customers and in view of the losses caused by sanctions,

Germany was doubly important because there existed about

450 million dinars of "frozen" debts owed by Germany. As

Germany could not pay in cash she had to pay in goods, but

this by no means implied a political approach to Yugoslavia

by Germany. A strong Yugoslavia was in the best interest

of her allies, but economic weakness meant political weak­

ness. He also added that the Little Entente would always be

loyal to the League of Nations, but that it had proved too

weak, and the members of the Little Entente and of the Balkan
 149
Entente, had been forced to draw closer together and seek

security by other means.

Another ominous event took place on June.11, 1936,

when Dr. Schacht, the "economic wizard" of Nazi Germany,

visited the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, This visit pro­

duced a most rapid and astonishing result. On the next day,

.June 12, 1936, M. Lititza, the Yugoslav Minister of Finance,

signed an order which was to take effect on January 25,

1937, restricting imports from Great Britain and the United

States and certain other non-clearing countries, with the

hope of encouraging trade with Germany.

Hitler's avowed policy of disrupting all existing

alliances in Europe, especially in Central Europe, was on

its way. Adding to his success was the lack of solidarity

manifested by Great Britain and France, particularly in.

their resistance to aggression. The effect of Hitler's

policy on the Balkan and Little Ententes was evident during

a Little Entente conference at Bratislava in September,

1936, when Yugoslavia seemed determined to pursue a separate

46
policy with both Italy and Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, Rumania, was strengthening its ties with

Czechoslovakia. On July 14, 1936, these two countries

signed a credit agreement. It was understood in Bucharest

^Kerner, on. cit. p. 382.

that the amount of the credit would not be transferred ev­

entually to Czechoslovakia, but would be applied to the con­

struction of strategic roads and rails in Rumania, so as to

coordinate the communications of the two countries. Foreign

Minister Titulescu issued a statement in which he said that

a reconciliation with Russia was the best.way of enabling

Rumania’s existing alliances to have their full value. In

this way, he evidently had in mind the augmenting of the

Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaties. But, he

denied that permission had been given for Soviet troops to

cross Rumanian territory.

France’s steady decline caused repercussions in

Rumania, as they had in Yugoslavia. The Francophile, Titu-

lescu, was forced to resign in August, 1936.

47 The new

Foreign Minister, M. Antonescu, stated that Rumania’s

foreign policy was to remain unaltered. The basis of it

was her alliance with France. Another essential element

was the alliance with the Little Entente. With Poland,

Rumania wished to maintain and develop an active and

friendly relationship, and the same applied to the Balkan

Entente. With Great Britain she wished to develop their

economic-and financial relations; a ’’common origin and

memories of the w a r ” bound them to Italy and this *was

47
Roucek, jop. cit., p. 156.
 151
strengthened by economic interests; with Russia they would

continue to maintain and develop their relations of good

neighbors and friendship; and with Germany she would main­

tain the best relations, Mwhich had their origin in the

existence of great economic interests*11 In spite of M.

Antonesculs reassurances, R u m a n i a ^ shift was away from

France, and the assumption of a more independent attitude

regarding the Little Entente*

LITTLE ENTENTE CONFERENCES OF 1956:.

The Italo-Ethiopian war drew formally to a close in

the spring of 1956, and on March 7, Nazi Germany, in viola­

tion of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, moved into the

Rhineland. The remilitarization of the Rhineland was .very

important to the countries of the Little and Balkan Ententes

because here was another open and defiant violation of

solemn treaties. Moreover, remilitarization of the Rhine­

land might prove an effective barrier to any direct French

assistance to Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente in the

event of war. Four days after the remilitarization, on

March 11, a joint meeting of the two Ententes was held in

Geneva. Though no official communique was forthcoming,

there were indications of support for France and the prin­

ciples of collective security.

 152
Just prior to this, on March. 5, 1936, a Little

Entente meeting was held in G-eneva to which the Balkan

Entente was represented "by Rushdi Aras of Turkey. A re­

solution was adopted in which all the powers represented

reaffirmed their fidelity to the Covenant of the League of

Nations.

The next conference of the Little Entente was held

in Belgrade on May 7, 1S36. A communique stated that the

three powers would oppose every attempt to change the ex-'

isting situation. Thby would pursue that policy to the

final consequences. They would never give their assent to

legalizing a change of international engagements unless the

modifications had first been discussed with them, but they

would pursue energetically the attempt at economic cooper­

ation with other Danubian states.

In order to strengthen their military potential, the

Chiefs of Staff of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav armies

arrived in Bucharest on June 14, 1936, to take part in a

five-day conference. The purpose of this conference was

the coordination of the national defense plans of the Little

Entente.

The meeting of the Permanent Council of the Little

Entente took place at Bratislava on September 13-14. Dis­

cussed was the forthcoming Loca.rno Conference, and it was

 153
decided that the Entente would he represented at it, in

order to prevent the possibility of the adoption of a policy

which would divide Europe into a western and eastern sphere,

with the risk that Germany might have a free hand in the

latter sphere. Regarding Russia, Yugoslavia would not join

in any common front against her, hut did not wish for

closer relations. There was agreement in the opposition to ;

the rearmament of Hungary. As to the reform of the League

of Nations, all three states were opposed to any alteration

in the Covenant which would increase the possibilities of

treaty revision at the expense of the smaller states.

The Conference ended on September 14, and a commun­

ique was issued emphasizing the solidarity of the three

states and their fidelity to the League of Nations. In re­

ference to Locarno, it held that a lasting peace could not

be attained if any system of collective security were

limited to the west. The Entente wished to see a complete

organization of European peace; It wished friendly rela­

tions with all states, but unfortunately the relations with

Austria had been disturbed by the one-sided repudiation of

the military terms of the Treaty of St. Germain. They sup­

ported non-intervention in Spain, and declared that they

would not tolerate interference in their own affairs. Re ­

ference was made to Czechoslovak Premier Hodza's plan for

 154
eoonomio cooperation in Central Europe, and it was stated

that it would he discussed at Bucharest in October. All

three countries made it clear that they would not be brought

into any “common front,11 against either Bolshevism or

Fascism.

In Prague, on the occasion of the eighteenth anni­

versary of the Czechoslovak declaration of independence, an

official communique was issued regarding the conversations

held with King Carol and M. Antonescu of Rumania. The

foreign policy and problems of the Little Entente, as well

as the general problems of Europe, were discussed. There

was complete agreement of views, and the future policies of

the three states were also approved. Emphasized was the

fact that the Little Entente wished to cooperate in Central

European questions with the states of the Rome Protocols

and with Germany.

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Krofta, speaking

at the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, said that

Mussolini had changed his ideas on several questions, in­

cluding disarmament, the League and collective security.

His open support of Hungarian revisionism, and the friendly

hand extended to Yugoslavia appeared to be an attempt to

split the Little Entente. It was clear, Krofta continued,

that Hungary, if enlarged by territory now belonging to

Czechoslovakia and Rumania would not stop at the frontiers

of Yugoslavia. The Little Entente as a whole was absolutely

determined to resist any attempt at frontier revision and

was equally resolved to maintain existing pacts and allian­

ces. Mussolini had not mentioned either Czechoslovakia or

Rumania as partners in his plan for reorganization in the

Danube basin. This was held to be inconsistent with Italy1s

previous plan, and, he thought, also to her real intentions

which were directed toward.general cooperation in South­

eastern Europe by all the states concerned.

With further regard to the rearming of Hungary,

Hodza, on November 14, 1936, issued a. communique on behalf

of the Little Entente stating that the three states had

already, in May, 1933, recognized in principle Hungary's

right to equality in armaments, provided this was brought

about by mutual agreement, and that necessary guarantees

for the security of the three states were given.

The last official act of the Little Entente in 1936

was in Bucharest on December 1, 1936. Here a joint session

was held of the Rumanian, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav parli­

amentary delegations who were in Bucharest. Speakers em­

phasized the determination of the Little Entente to oppose

any attempt to revise their frontiers. Such opposition to

include the use of force, if necessary.

THE YEAR 1937:

The rise of Hitler in Germany revived the old Drang

nach Qsten. which could be achieved only by an intensifi­

cation of German activity in Central and Southeastern

Europe. The new drive assumed two distinct aspects: first,

an attempt to bring the internal government of the various

states under German influence, either directly, as in the

case of Austria, or indirectly through the encouragement

of native fascist movements; second, a determined effort to

split up the existing international blocs— the Little and

Balkan Ententes— and attract the members separately into

making bilateral arrangements with the German government,

48
or at least adopting a policy of independent "neutrality.11

The changed situation in Europe caused by the Ethio­

pian War and the Spanish Civil War, which left no doubt in

the minds of the small states that France and Great Britain

were losing their position of leadership in Europe, forced

these small states to adopt.changed policies in order to

preserve their security.

Yugoslavia, especially, was showing separatist

tendencies. In January, 1937, under the pro-German Premier,

Stoyadinovich, she signed a treaty with Bulgaria. The main

feature of this Treaty was that the two countries promised

48
H. Fisher, "Cross-Currents in Danubian Europe,"
Foreign Policy Reports. XVI (July 15, 1937), p. 103.
 157
“never again” to make war upon each other. This nullified

Yugoslavia1s position in the Balkan Entente which had

obligated her to protect Greece, Rumania and Turkey against

an unprovoked Bulgarian attack.

On March 25, 1937, Yugoslavia signed a treaty with

Italy. This Treaty was considered by many as the opening

wedge in the break-up of the Little Entente. This Treaty

included new commercial arrangements, Italy’s promise to

aid the Yugoslav Istrian minority and to restrain the Groat

terrorists. No reference was made to the League of Nations,

but joint consultations between the two signatories were

stipulated. This last provision was contrary to the Franco-

Yugoslav Treaty of 1927 (renewed in 1932 and 1937). But,

this Treaty with Italy was intensely unpopular with the

Yugoslav people. In April, 1937, President Benes of Czecho­

slovakia visited Belgrade and received an enthusiastic

welcome from the populace, who also took advantage of the

opportunity to demonstrate against the newly concluded

Italo-Yugoslav T r e a t y . ^

Bilateral agreements and rapprochements. such as

those described above, are not in conflict with the Pacts of

Organization of the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente or

with the Rome Protocols, provided they are accepted before-

4% b i d .. p. 111.
 158
hand toy the other states concerned.

Nevertheless, these agreements were symtomatic of a

European trend away from collective treaties toward "bi­

lateral pacts. All the collective alliances became aware

■of the tendencies on the part of their partners to seek

outside alliances, and, therefore, worked hard to join them

closer together. There was a great increase in economic

cooperation, partly through the Economic Councils and partly

through nexf bilateral treaties. In the Little Entente,

Czechoslovakia and Rumania became active in exchanges of

courtesies, culminating in Prague’s enthusiastic reception

of King Carol of Rumania at the end of October, 1936, and of

Premier Tatarescu in March, 193?. During these discussions,

Rumania received an important armament loan from its Czech

ally. In a similar series of talks, Yugoslavia and Rumania

arranged for the construction of the first bridge to span

the Danube between the two countries. They a,Iso concluded

an agreement to exchange Yugoslav copper and Rumanian oil

for military purposes.

Rationalizing somewhat for the Little Entente, Dr.

Kamil Krofta, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, on March 2,

1937, commented that because of the changed European situa­

tion, the individual states of the Little Entente had to

Goncern themselves with the new distribution of power.

 159
The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met in

Belgrade on April 1-2, 1937. The Foreign Ministers of all

three states were in attendance. The communique issued at

the end of the meeting stated that the three Ministers had

noted a certain improvement in the international situation,

which encouraged the hope that, in spite of all the still

unsolved difficulties, the worst period had passed. There

was agreement about the general principles of foreign policy

of the three states, and the methods of its application.

Beaffirmed was the insistence that the policy and mutual

relations among the three states continue to develop within

the framework adopted by the Little Entente on February 16,

1933. The Gouncil reiterated its adherence to the League

of Nations, and the principles upon'which it was based.

The statement also said that the bonds between the

Little Entente states and the countries of the Balkan

Entente and France were prepared to expand and intensify

their political and economic relations. The three states

were firmly opposed to any kind of international ideological

conflict and would not Join either of the blocs to which

such conflict might give rise. The domestic governments of

independent states must be mutually respected. The Little

Entente stand toward the Spanish Givil War was based on this

principle. The recent Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-

 160
Italian agreements met with approval, and were seen as

aiding the cause of peace. Finally, it was hoped that the

negotiations for a new Locarno pact would meet with success.

The regular meeting of the Little Entente was held at

Sinaia on August 30-31, 1937. At the end of this two-day

meeting, a communique was issued res-ffirming adhesion to

the League of Nations and to an unmodified Covenant. Re­

garding the Locarno Pact, it asserted that no pact could

effectively contribute to the maintenance of peace unless

it offered a system of security elsehwere at the same time.

Continued support of non-intervention in Spain was announced.

The Conference had given special attention, and discussed,

the political and economic relations with other•Danubian

states.

At this Conference, M. Antonescu, the Rumanian

Foreign Minister, was asked Rumania*s attitude toward the

Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty. He answered that Rumania re­

garded the Pact very favorably.

The final Little Entente meeting of 1937 was held at

G*eneva on September 15, and the result was a communique

which proclaimed full agreement on all questions of foreign

policy.

The year 1937 was not an active year for the Little

Entente as a unit. It was a year of readjustment by the

 161
individual members to the rapidly changing power positions

of the European states. This readjustment was particularly

evident on the part of Yugoslavia, which had effected

rairprodiements with Italy and Bulgaria, and had made import­

ant commercial treaties with Nazi Germany,

1933— THE FATEFUL YEAR:

The year 1938 was Nazi Germany1s year of success in

Central Europe. In January, 1938, Premier Stoyadinovich of

Yugoslavia made a visit to Berlin— the first Yugoslav ges­

ture of this kind. It provided Germany with an entering

wedge toward separating Yugoslavia from France and the Little

Entente.

Nazi penetration of the Balkans had economic as well

-as political motives. She needed oil, wheat, cotton, fats,

coffee and raw materials of every kind for her strained

economy and her enormous military machine. Rumania, Bul­

garia, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey were considered ideal

supply bases. The German long-range policy called for in­

corporation of the Balkans under its supremacy and to ac­

quire direct control of their resources. The first step in

her plan was economic aggression, which was going forward

very well— thanks to Dr. Schacht and the world economic

depression. Her next step was political, and she was be-
ginning to succeed.

March of 1958 witnessed the most brazen act so far

comitted by Nazi Germany. Hitler's legions marched into,

and annexed Austria to the Third Reich. The Little Entente

was powerless to act because the great Western Powers—

France and Great Britain— did not oppose Hitler, and because

only Czechoslovakia of the three Little Entente powers feared

anschinss. Yugoslavia's government, especially, looked with

favor upon the union because of possible increases in her

export trade.

The Permanent Council of the Little Entente met at

Sinaia on May 4-5, 1958. In attendence were King Carol of

Rumania, and the Prime Ministers of Czechoslovakia and

Yugoslavia. The communique issued at the close of dis­

cussions stated that a unanimous conclusion was reached in

that they must continue their efforts to cooperate in any

work of appeasement and collaboration. Fully examined was

the question of relations between the Little Entente and

Hungary, and the unanimous wish was expressed to continue

the negotiations in progress with a view to the establish­

ment of understanding and confidence in. the Danubian basin.

Also reaffirmed was loyalty to the League of Nations. In

the interest of all those who had so far collaborated In the

furtherance of economic exchanges in the Danubian basin, it

 163
was agreed to continue to give their moral, technical and

material collaboration to the search for a solution.

During these troubled months, formal unity, at least,,

existed within the circles of the Little Entente and the

Balkan Entente. When Hitler agitated the Sudetenland situa­

tion and forced the Czechoslovak crisis on Europe, the two

Ententes remained firm.

The Balkan Entente, meeting at Salonica on July 31,

1938, moved toward an understanding with Bulgaria by re­

moving the military restrictions on that country. In re­

turn, Bulgaria reaffirmed her pacific intentions.

As the Czechoslovak crisis deepened, the Little

Entente made another effort at appeasement. The Permanent

Council o f .the Little Entente met at Bled, Yugoslavia on

August 21-23, 1938— this also proved to be the last meeting

of the Little Entente. At this Conference, primary agree­

ments were initialed between the Little Entente states and

Hungary. Mutually agreed was the renunciation of force in

the settlement of disputes and the recognition of Hungary's

equality of rights in the matter of armaments. Preliminary

discussions had also been held on all outstanding questions

between the parties concerned— on the treatment of Hungarian

minorities within the states of the Little Entente— but the

texts of declarations embodying these had not been definitely

 164
agreed upon. The precarious situation in which the League

of Nations found itself was fully appreciated, but the three

Little Entente states were unanimous in their desire to

collaborate with it and give it support within the limits of

existing possibilities.

Subsequent statements made by Hungarian Premier Dr.

Iraredy and Hungarian Foreign Minister M. de Kanya during

their visit to Berlin revealed that the signature and exe­

cution of the agreements, and in particular of the clauses

renouncing resort to force, were contingent on the conclu­

sion of the agreements on minorities. Further, that while

such agreements had been reached with Rumania and Yugo­

slavia, Czechoslovakia, had not yet accepted Hungarian de­

mands, which were farther-reaching in her.case than in that

of the other two states because she was a “nationality

50
state.** This made it very evident that G-ermany was con­

centrating on Czechoslovakia, and wanted no peaceful agree­

ments concluded with her— either by G-ermany or by another

nation in Central Europe. Since 1936, G-ermany tried to

turn Hungarian revisionism away from Rumania and Yugoslavia,

whose collaboration Berlin desired, and to concentrate it on

Czechoslovakia. Efforts to bring about a rapprochement

50
“Hungary and the Little Entente,11 Bulletin of inter­
national News (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs), Vol. XV, p. 762.
 165
■between Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania repeatedly failed,

but G-ermany at times succeeded in rousing Hungarian re­

visionism resentment against Prague to fever pitch. Lead­

ing Hungarian newspapers published venomous anti-Czech

articles in the controlled press. The Hungarian Premier,

Gombos, in particular, seemed to have intended to seize

Slovakia should Germany go to war against Czechoslovakia.

But other political leaders, Dr. Imredy, de Kanya, Count

Bethlen, Rassay, Eckhardt, apparently did not share that

plan. The intention of the present Hungarian government

was to remain alood in case of a German-Czechoslovak war,

because of the fear of a Yugoslav-Rumanian attack on Hun­

gary. Hungarian invasion of Slovakia was the joint casus

belli specifically stated in the Little Entente Pact.

In the face of Hitler’s ultimatum, to Czechoslovakia

in September,,though, both Yugoslavia— thanks to popular

pressure on behalf of Czechoslovakia— and Rumania, as

members of the Little Entente rallied to the support of

Czechoslovakia. They were reported to have made it clear

to Hungary that, according to their obligations, they would

dispatch troops against her if she attacked Czechoslovakia.

Rumania might have allowed Soviet airplanes to fly over its

territory to aid the Czechs, but the passage of Soviet

troops across Rumania was very doubtful, unless Rumania it-

 16 6

self became involved in the war— or unless Soviet forces .

51
forced their way through. The two partners remained true

to their obligations, and were ready to resort to arms as

long as they had any confidence in France and Great Britain.

The Anglo-French plan of September 18 to cede Sude-

tenland to G-ermany caused great dismay in Yugoslavia and

Rumania, especially in the latter country, because she still'

had strong ties with France. After the Munich "Accord0 of

52
September 29— in which Czechoslovakia ceded portions of her

territory to G-ermany— King Carol visited both Paris and

London. He failed in both capitals to secure pledges of.

support against any future G-erman encroachments on Rumania.

In Yugoslavia, the Munich "Accord" seemed to justify the new

policy of rapprochement with G-ermany. A so-called t e c h ­

nical Union" supposed to finance G-erman trade with Yugo­

slavia offered the Nazis another opportunity to support

Yugoslavia’s fascists. Of significance, after Munich, was

the fact that S. Hodjera (not of Serbian, but of Czecho­

slovak descent), leader of the blue-shirted Serbian fascists

known as borbashi (fighters), was appointed a member of

51
"Munich Crisis," Foreign Policy Reports. Vol. XV
(October 15, 1958), p. 180.

^ % e e Appendix "E" for full text of Treaty.

Premier Stoyadinovich1s cabinet.

For all practical purposes, Munich destroyed the

Little Entente, and fatally weakened the Balkan Entente. A

Belgrade newspaper commented on October 1, 1938, that the

Balkans, as a result of Munich, had become more realistic,

and had seen a small Slav country— the only democratic state

left east of the Rhine— abandoned to its fate under the

threat of armed force. Temporary peace or appeasement

should not blind the smaller nations of Europe of the ul­

timate designs of the ”new masters of Europe.”^

,To add further insult to Western European and Czecho­

slovak prestige, representatives of G-ermany and Italy, sit­

ting in Vienna on November 2, 1938, ^arbitrated” the

frontier dispute between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The

Slovak and Ruthenian delegations were not allowed to take

a direct part. Hungary received all she demanded on ethnic

grounds, with the exception of three areas: the city of

Bratislava, the Episcopal Seat of Nitra and the district on

the frontier of Rumania. The territory she received con­

tained about 4,200 square miles with nearly 900,000 inhabi­

tants, of whom some 700,000 were Hungarians, 100,000 Slovaks

RR
and 90,000 Rut he ne s .

53
Roucek, pp. cot., p. 159,
54
Kerner, op. cit.. p. 383.
 168
On December 13, 1938, the Czechoslovak Prime Mini­

ster expressed the thanks of his government, which remem­

bered with the “greatest satisfaction*1 the loyalty of her

Little Entente partners during the recent crisis.

If some still contended that there existed in 1939

a Little Entente, their contentions w e r e ■utterly destroyed

in March of that year. On March 15, Hitler took over

Slovakia, and on the next day he annexed Bohemia and

Moravia. Thus, ended the existence of the Czechoslovak

Republic— the cornerstone of the Little Entente.

Bulletin of International News (London: Royal

Institute of International Affairs), Vol. XV, p. 1062.
 CHAPTER IV

CRITICAL EVALUATION

From the end of the First World War to 1938, only-

one stable and permanent alliance emerged in Central Europe

— the Little Entente, composed of Czechoslovakia, Yugo­

slavia and Rumania. These states banded together in 1921

for a single purpose— to maintain the status quo established

by the Peace Treaties. To this end they concluded bilateral

treaties which provided military guarantees against aggres­

sion by Hungary, and they collaborated in resisting all

threats to the existing order. They were particularly

active in opposing attempts to restore the Hapsburgs in Hun­

gary, and in preventing the economic collapse in Austria,

which might have led to foreign intervention.

The greatest advantage of the Little Entente did not

lie in its original bond. The a.llianee Itself was ob­

viously inadequate to guarantee security in Central Europe.

Each of the three member states had to contend with a power­

ful neighbor— Rumania with Russia, Czechoslovakia with G-er­

many and Yugoslavia with Italy. Its only contribution to

peace came when it worked in conjunction with the Western

Powers and within the framex^ork of the League of Nations.

When abandoned by the Western Powers at Munich, it collap­

sed. Its real contribution consisted in the fact that it

endeavored to promote and evolve a permanent structure of

inter-state cooperation in every field: political as well

as economic and cultural.

The Czechs, Yugoslavs and Rumanians knew that a re­

storation of the Hapsburgs would mean the restoration of

G-erman-Magyar absolutism and tyranny and the destruction

of the freedom won by the political revolution of 1918.

They also knew that mere defensive measures would not be

adequate for the maintenance of the new regime if they were

lacking in creative forces, or failed to attain the highest

possible degree of political and economic solidarity and

mutual trust and cooperation within the whole area of

Central Europe. The ultimate aim of the Little Entente

was to educate Central Europe as to the advantages of peace

and European consolidation.

In its formative period the Little Entente consoli­

dated its position in European politics and became an in­

creasingly important factor. It defeated every attempt to

make any important change in the situation produced in

Central Europe by the Peace Treaties. This growth in im­

portance was manifested in the assurance of a permanent seat

on the Council of the League of Nations. It twice pre­

vented ex-King Charles from usurp_ijng^ the throne of Hungary.

/
A great part of the economic/and financial rehabilitation
 171

of Austria and Hungary can be attributed to the active help

given by the Little Entente, especially by Czechoslovakia.

In its formative period, the Little Entente activity

was principally political; but the world-wide depression

brought the acute economic problems to the fore. Political

negotiations were therefore always held in conjunction with

economic negotiations. The result was a series of commer­

cial treaties, the first between the states of the Little

Entente and then with all the neighboring countries. In

1934, there was organized the Economic Council of the Little

Entente which attempted to lay the foundations for closer

economic collaboration among Czechoslovakia, Rumania and

Yugoslavia. It was acknowledged that progress would only

be made slowly because of the similarity in the agrarian

economy of Rumania and Yugoslavia and of the well-balanced

agricultural and industrial structure of Czechoslovakia. In

spite of such cautious predictions, the results were most

disappointing. This was due to the severity of the depres­

sion, the nationalistic economic policies pursued by the

small Central European states, and later the economic and

political penetration of Central Europe and the Balkans by

Nazi Germany.

Although the Little Entente was not meeting with

success in its economic endeavors during its middle period

 172

of existence, it was eminently successful in the political

field* Under Dr. Benes and Dr. Titulescu, the Little

Entente took a leading part in urging the application of ef­

fective sanctions against Japan in the years 1931 to 1933.

Then, together with Poland, the members of the Little

Entente successfully protested against the Four-Power Pact

of March 1933, signed in July by Italy, Germany, Great

Britain and France. This Pact would have set up a four-

power directory, as suggested by Mussolini, in substitution

for the League of Nations, for the revision of treaties

without consultation with and possibly against the in­

terests of the smaller states of Europe. The members of

the Little Entente were represented at the London Economic

Conferences in June and July of 1933, and on July 4, they

signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The

next year, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, though not Yugo­

slavia, entered into diplomatic negotiations with Moscow.

An extension of the principles of regional security, as pro­

jected by the Little Entente was made in February, 1934,

when Yugoslavia and Rumania joined with Turkey and Greece

to form the Balkan Entente. The increased menace of Nazi

Germany provoked a Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance in May,

1935, following al similar French-Soviet alliance two x*reeks

earlier.
 173
By the year 1935, when it appeared that the Little

Entente was effecting heretofore unattained unity, its de­

cline was already evident. Europe was again in crisis, as

it had been since the beginning of the Japanese aggression

against China in 1931. In October, 1934, King Alexander of

Yugoslavia was assassinated, and with him, Jean Louis

Barthou, France1s Foreign Minister, was also slain. In one

blow, two important adherents to a strong Little Entente

were eliminated. While Yugoslavia did not disintegrate,

as Mussolini had hoped, Prince Paul, the new Regent, was a

weaker character and Premier Milan Stoyadinovi&h, who

dominated the country from 1935 to 1939, pursued a policy

of rapprochement toward Italy, Bulgaria and G-ermany— a

policy which undermined the purpose of both the Little and

Balkan Ententes. In addition, the weakness of France, its

ft
vacillating foreign policy and the difference between France

and G-reat Britain regarding Italy and G-ermany produced

disastrous effects on Little Entente unity.

While there was manifested surprising unity in the

Little Entente during the .Ethiopian crisis of 1935-6 and

the early phases of the Spanish Civil War, there was

distinct evidence of difficulty at the Little Entente Con­

ference in September of 1936 when Yugoslavia seemed deter­

mined to follow its own pattern, and the members virtually

acknowledged the right of member states to pursue an in-

.dependent cour s e .

In reality, all that remained was formal unity. Be­

lated French and Czechoslovak attempts to consolidate the

Little Entente and to generalize the obligations of member

states against all aggressions failed— as similar attempts

had failed in the effort to produce a system of collective

security in Western Europe.

The Little Entente was in its last stages. When

Austria was seized by G-ermany in March, 1938, G-ermany was

brought to the border of Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia was

almost surrounded. In September, 1938, as a result of the

so-called Munich "Accord,11 G-ermany was permitted to annex

the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia. Just prior to this

event, in an effort to conciliate Hungary, the Little

Entente offered Hungary equality of armaments in return of

promise of a peaceful policy. When the test finally came

during the Munich crisis, despite the reluctance of the

Stoyadinovich government in Yugoslavia, both Yugoslavia and

Rumania, in accordance with the terms of their alliance

with Czechoslovakia, warned Hungary not to attack the re­

public. In spite of this unexpected unity, the outcome was

never in doubt because of the attitude of France and Great

Britain. The Munich "Accord," for all intents and purposes,

 175
destroyed the Little Entente because it sacrificed the most

important member— Czechoslovakia.

There seems to be an unritten postulate in the field

of international politics that a small state, or states,

cannot attain security x-rithout the military or diplomatic

support of a powerful ally or allies— the Little Entente

was no exception.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Beard, Charles Austin, The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia. New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1929* 325 pp.

Cornea, Victor, What Next in Central Europe? Oxford: The

Shakespeare Head Press, 1938. 71 pp.

Cra.ne, John Oliver, The Little Entente. New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1931. 222pp.

Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second

World War, 2 Vols. New York: International Publish­
ers , 1948•
Freund, Richard, Watch Czechoslovakia I New York: T. Nelson
& Sons, Ltd., 1938. 112 pp.

Grantebein, James Watson, Documentary Background of World War

I I . New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.
1122 pp.

G-yorgy, Andrew, Governments of Danubian Europe. New York:

Rinehart, 1949. 376 pp.

Kerner, Robert J. , Editor, Czechos1ovakia. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1945. 504 pp.

Kerner, Robert J . , and Harry Nicholas Howard, The Balkan

Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1945.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936.
271 pp.

Langsam, Walter Consuelo, Documents and Readings in the

History of Europe Since 1918. Chicago: J. B. Lip-
pincott Company, 1939. 865 pp.

Machray, Robert, The Little Entente. New York: Pwichard R.

Smith, I nc., 1930. 394 pp.

Masaryk, Thomas, Creation of a State. New York: Frederick

A. Stokes Company, 1927. 518 pp.
 17?
Pasvolsky, Leo, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. 609 pp.

Roucek, Joseph Slabey, Contemporary Roumania and Her Prob­

lems. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1932.
442 pp.

Roucek, Joseph Slabey, Politics of the Balkans. Nettf York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959. 168 pp.

Schacher, G-erhard, Central Europe and the Western World.

London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.., ,1936. 223 pp.

Seton-Watson, Hugh, Eastern Europe Between the Wars. 1918-

1941. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1946. 445 pp.
Sontag, Raymond James, European Diplomatic Historyf 1871-
1952. New York: The Century Company, 1933. 425 pp.

Thomson, Harrison S., Czechoslovakia in European History.

Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1944. 390 p p .

Vondracek, Felix John, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia.

1918-1955. New York: Columbia University Press,
1937. 451 p p . .
Wheeler-Bennett, John, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy. 'New
York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1948. 507 pp.

B. PERIODICAL ARTICLES
Benes, Edward, nThe Little Entente," Foreign Affairs T i:
66-72, September, 1922.

Bulletin of International News. London: Royal Institute of

International Affairs, years 1935-1939, incl.

Dean, Vera Micheles, "Political Realignments in Europe.H

Foreign Policy Reports. 9:45-56, May 10, 1933.

Fisher, H . , Cross-Currents in Danubian Europe,1-

1 Foreign
Policy Reports. 13:102-112, July.15, 1937.

G-alitzi, Christine, "Balkan Federation," The Annals. 168:

178-182, July, 1933.
 178

Jonescu, Take, “How the Little Entente'Began,“ The Living

Age, cccxi:627-632, December 10, 1921.

Jonescu, Take, “The Future of the Little Entente,0 The

Living Age, cccxi:699-703, December 17, 1921.

Pribichevich, Stoyan, “The Nazi Drive to the East— Yugo­

slavia, Rumania and Hungary,11 Foreign Policy Reports.
14:174-185, October 15, 1938.

Rankovitch, J . , "France and the Little Entente,11 The Living

Age, cccxvii:7-13, April 7, 1923.

Seton-Watson, R. W . , “Little and Balkan Ententes,” Slavonic

Review. 15:553-576, April, 1937.

Seton-Watson, R. W . , “The Little Entente,” Contemporary

Review, cxxxii:692-707, December, 1927,

C. ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLES

Benes, Edward and Harry Nicholas Howard, “The Little Entente”

Encyclopaedia Britannica. 14th edition, XIV,
219-220B.
APPENDIX A
 APPENDIX A1

CONVENTION OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, GROATS AND SLOVENS AND
THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, SIGNED AT BELGRADE
ON THE 14TH AUGUST, 1920.

Firmly resolved to maintain the Peace obtained by so

many sacrifices, and provided for by the Covenant of the
League of Nations, as well as the situations created by the
Treaty concluded at Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the
Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Hungary on
the other, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and
His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have
agreed to conclude a defensive Convention.
For this purpose they have nominated as their Pleni­
potentiary Delegates:

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: M.

Edward Benesh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs;

For His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Groats, and

Slovenes: M. Momtchilo Nintchitch, Doctor of Law, Minister
of Commerce and Industry and acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs;

Who, having exchanged their full powers and found

them to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hun­

gary against one of the High Contracting Parties, the other
Party agrees to assist in the defence of the Party attacked,
in the manner laid down by the arrangement provided for in
Article 2 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 2

The competent Technical Authorities of the Czecho­

slovak Republic and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes shall decide, by mutual agreement, upon the pro­
visions necessary for the execution of the present Con­
vention.

^Robert Machray, The Little Entente (New York,

Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930~n
 180
ARTICLE 3
Heither of the High Contracting Parties shall con-
'elude an alliance with a third Power without preliminary
notice to the other.

ARTICLE 4

The present Convention shall be, valid for two years

from the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the
expiration of this period, each of the Contracting Parties
shall have the option of denouncing the present Convention.
It shall, however, remain in force for six months after
the date of denunciation.

ARTICLE 5

The present Convention shall be communicated to the

League of Nations (Covenant of the League of Nations).

ARTICLE 6

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the

ratifications shall be exchanged at Belgrade, as soon as
possible.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries names have

signed and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Belgrade, in duplicate, August 14, 1920.

(Signed) Mon. Nintchitch

(Signed) Dr. Edward Benesh

APPENDIX B
 APPENDIX B1

CONVENTION OP DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE

KINGDOM OF RUMANIA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK RE­
PUBLIC, SIGNED AT BUCHAREST ON THE 23RD
APRIL, 1921.

Firmly resolved to maintain the peace obtained by so

many sacrifices, and provided for by the Covenant of the
League of Nations, as well as the situation created by the
Treaty concluded at Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the
Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Hungary
on the other, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic
and His Majesty the King of Rumania, have agreed to conclude
a defensive Convention.

For this purpose they have nominated as their Pleni­

potentiary Delegates:

For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic: M.

Ferdinand Veverka, Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten­
tiary of the Czechoslovak Republic at B u carest;

For His Majesty the King of Rumania: M. Take

Jonescu, His State Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having exchanged their full powers and found

them to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hun­

gary against one of the High Contracting Parties, the other'
party agrees to assist in the defense of the party attacked,
in the manner laid down by the arrangement provided for in
Article 2 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 2

The competent Technical Authorities of the Czecho­

slovak Republic and Rumania shall decide by mutual agree­
ment and in a Military Convention to be concluded, upon the
provisions necessary for the execution of the present Con­
vention.

■^Robert Machray, The Little Entente (Nex^r York,

Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930*7^
 182
ARTICLE 3
Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall con­
clude an alliance with a third Powder without preliminary
notice to the other.

ARTICLE 4

For the'purpose of coordinating their efforts to

maintain peace, the two Governments undertake to consult
together on questions of foreign policy concerning their
relations with Hungary.

ARTICLE 5

The present Convention shall he valid for two years

from the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the ex­
piration of this period each of the Contracting Parties
shall have the option of denouncing the present Convention.
It shall, however, remain in force for six months after the
date of denunciation.

ARTICLE 6

The present Convention shall he communicated to the

League of Nations (Covenant of the League of Nations).

ARTICLE 7

The present Convention shall he ratified, and the

ratifications shall he exchanged at Bucarest as soon as
possible.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries named have

signed the present Convention and have affixed their seals
thereto.

Done at Bucarest, in duplicate, April 23, 1921.

(Signed) Dr. Ferdinand Veverka

(Signed) Take Jonescu

APPENDIX C
 APPENDIX C1

CQNVENTIQN OF DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE

KINGDOM OF RUMANIA AND THE KINGDOM OF THE
SERBS,;CROATS AND SLOVENES, SIGNED AT BELGRADE,
JUNE 7, 1921.

Firmly resolved to maintain the peace obtained by so

many sacrifices and the situation created by the Treaty
concluded at Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the Allied
and Associated Powers, on the one part, and Hungary, on the
other part, and by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, con­
cluded on November 27, 1919, between the Allied and Associ­
ated' Powers, on the one part, and Bulgaria, on the other
part, His Majesty the King of Rumania and His Majesty the
King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have aggred to con­
clude a Defensive Convention.

For this purpose they have nominated as their Pleni­

potentiaries :

For His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Groats, and

Slovenes: M. Pashitch, President of the Council, Minister
for Foreign Affairs;

For His Majesty the King of Rumania: M. Take

Jonescu, His Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having examined together their full powers and

found them in order, have concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hun­

gary or of Bulgaria or of both these Powers against one of
the High Contracting Parties with the object of subverting
the situation created by the Treaty of Peace concluded at
Trianon, or by that concluded at Neuilly-sur-Seine, the
other Party agrees to assist in the defence of the Party
attacked in the manner laid down by the arrangement pro­
vided for in Article 2 .of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 2

The competent technical authorities of Rumania and

■^Robert Machray, The Little Entente (New York,
Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930T[
 184
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Groats and Slovenes shall by mutual
agreement determine in a military Convention to be con­
cluded as soon as possible, the provisions necessary for the
execution of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 3

Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall con­

clude an alliance with a third Power without first giving
notice to the other.

ARTICLE 4

For the purpose of coordinating their efforts to

maintain peace, the two G-overnments undertake to consult
together on questions of foreign policy concerning their
relations with Hungary and Bulgaria.
ARTICLE 5

The present Convention shall be valid for two years

from the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the ex­
piration of this period each of the Contracting Parties
shall have the right to denounce the present Convention.
It shall, however, remain in force for six months after the
date of denunciation.

ARTICLE 6

The present Convention shall be communicated to the

League of Nations (Covenant of the League of Nations).

ARTICLE 7

The present Convention shall be ratified and the

ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries named have

signed the present Convention and have affixed their seals
thereto.

Done at Belgrade, in duplicate, June 7, 1921.

(Signed) Take Jonescu

(Signed) N. Pashitch
APPENDIX D
 APPENDIX D1

GENERAL ACT OF CONCILIATION, ARBITRATION AND

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN TEE STATES OF THE
LITTLE ENTENTE.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, HIS

MAJESTY THE KING OF RUMANIA, AND HIS MAJESTY THE
KING OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES,

Inspired by the friendly relations existing between

their respective nations and imbued with the spirit of con­
fident cordiality which characterises their reciprocal
intercourse;

Sincerely desirous of ensuring, by pacific means,

the settlement of any disputes which may arise between their
countries;

Noting that respect for the rights established by

treaties or arising out of international law is binding
upon international courts;

Recognizing that the rights of each State cannot be

modified without its consent;

Considering that the faithful observance, under the

auspices of the League of Nations, of methods of pacific
procedure will permit of the settlement of all international
disputes;

Highly appreciating the recommendation made to all

States by the Assembly of the League of Nations, in its
resolution of September 26, 1928, to conclude conventions
for the pacific settlement of international disputes;

Have resolved to give effect to their common inten­

tion in a Convention, and with that object have appointed
as their Plenipotentiaries: 9

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC:

His Excellency Dr. Edvard Benes, Minister for Foreign

Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic;

■^Robert Machray, The Little Entente (New York,

Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1 9 3 0 T
 186
HIS MAJESTY THE KING- OF RUMANIA:

His Excellency Monsieur George Mironescu, Minister

for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Rumania;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING- OF THE SERBS, GROATS AND

SLOVENES:

His excellency Monsieur Kosta Kumanudi, Doctor of

Law and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes;

Who, having deposited their full .powers, found in

good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

CHAPTER I— PACIFIC SETTLEMENT IN GENERAL

Article 1

Disputes of every kind which may arise between the

High Contracting Parties, or between two of them, and which
it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy shall be
submitted, under the conditions laid down in the present
Convention, for settlement by judicial means or arbitration,
preceded, according to circumstances, as a compulsory or
optional measure, by recourse to the procedure of concili­
ation.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out

of events prior to the present Convention and belonging to
the past, or to disputes relating to questions which, ac­
cording to international law, fall within the sole compe­
tence of the States.

Article 2

1. Disputes for the Settlement of which a special

procedure is laid down in other conventions in force be­
tween the High Contracting Parties shall be settled in
conformity with the provisions of those conventions,

2. The present Convention shall not affect any

agreements in force by which conciliation procedure is es­
tablished between the High Contracting Parties or by which
the High Contracting Parties have assumed obligations to
resort to arbitration or judicial settlement for the purpose
of settling the dispute. If, however, these‘agreements
provide only for a procedure of conciliation, the provisions
 187
of the present Convention concerning judicial settlement
or arbitration shall be applied after such procedure has
been followed xtfithout result.

Article 3

1. In the case of a dispute the occasion of which,

according to the municipal law of one of the High Contrac­
ting Parties, falls within the competence of the judicial
authorities, the Party in question may object to the dispute
being submitted for settlement by the various procedures
laid down in the present Convention.

2. A dispute which falls within the competence of

the administrative authorities may not be submitted for
settlement by the various procedures laid down in the
present Convention until a final decision has been pro­
nounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent author­
ity.

In such case, the Party which desires to resort to

the procedures laid down in the present Convention must
notify the other Party of its intention within a period of
one year from the date of the aforementioned decision.

CHAPTER II— JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

Article 4

All disputes with regard to which the Parties are in

conflict as to their respective rights shall be submitted
for decision to the Permanent Court of International
Justice, unless the Parties agree, in the manner herein­
after provided, to have resort to an arbitral tirbunal.

It is understood that the disputes referred to above

include in particular those mentioned in Article 36 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article 5

If the Parties agree to submit the disputes men­

tioned in the preceding article to an arbitral tirbunal,
they shall draw up a special agreement in which they shall
specify the subject of the dispute, the selection of the
arbitrators and the procedure to be followed. In the ab­
sence of sufficient particulars in the special agreement,
the provisions of the Hague Convention of October 18th,
 18 8

1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,

'shall apply so far as is necessary. If nothing is laid
down in the special agreement as to the rules regarding the
substance of the dispute to be followed by the arbitrators,
the tribunal shall apply the substantive rules enumerated
in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of In­
ternational Justice.

Article 6

If the Parties fail to agree concerning the special

agreement referred to in the preceding article, or fail to
appoint arbitrators, either‘Party shall be at liberty, after
giving three months' notice, to bring the dispute by an
application direct before the Permanent Court of Interna­
tional Justice.

Article 7

1. In the case of the dispute mentioned in Article

4, before any procedure before the Permanent Court of In­
ternational Justice or any arbitral tribunal, the Parties
may agree to have recourse to the conciliation procedure
provided for in the present convention.

2. In the event of recourse to and failure of con­

ciliation, neither Party may bring the dispute before the
Permanent Court of International Justice or call for the
constitution of the arbitral tirbunal referred to in Article
5 before the expiration of one month from the termination
of the proceedings of the Conciliation Commission.

CHAPTER III— CONCILIATION

Article 8

All disputes between the parties other than the dis­

putes mentioned in Article 4 shall be submitted obligatorily
to a procedure of conciliation before they can form the sub­
ject of a settlement by arbitration.

Article 9

The disputes referred to in the preceding article

shall be submitted to a permanent or special Conciliation
Commission constituted by the High Contracting Parties.
 189
Article 10
On a request to that effect being made by one of the
Contracting Parties to the other Party, a permanent Con­
ciliation Commission shall be constituted within a period
of six months.

Article 11

Unless the parties agree otherwise, the Conciliation

Commission shall be constituted as follows:

1. The Commission shall be composed of five members.;

The Parties shall each nominate one commissioner, who may
be chosen from among their respective nationals. The three
other commissioners shall be appointed by agreement from
among the nationals of third Powers. These three com­
missioners must be of different nationalities and must not
be habitually resident in the territory nor be in the ser­
vice of the Parties concerned. The High Contracting Parties
shall appoint the President of the Commission from among
their number.

2. The commissioners shall be appointed for three

years. They shall be re-eligible. The commissioners ap­
pointed jointly may be replaced during the course of their
mandate by agreement between'the Parties. Any one of the
High Contracting Parties may, however, at any time replace
the commissioner whom it has appointed. Even if replaced,
the commissioners shall continue to exercise their functions
.until the termination of the work in hand.

3. Tacancies which may occur as a result of death,

resignation or any other cause shall be filled within the
shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nomin­
ations .

Article 12

If, when a dispute arises, no permanent Conciliation

Commission appointed by the Parties is in existence, a
special commission shall be constituted for the examination
of the dispute within a period ofthree months from the date
on which a request to that effect is made by one of the
Parties to the other Party. The necessary appointments shall
be made in the manner laid down in the preceding article,
unless the Parties decide otherwise.
 190
Article 13
1. If the appointment of the commissioners to be
designated jointly is not made within the periods provided
for in Articles 10 and 12, the making of the necessary
appointments shall be entrusted to a third Power, chosen by
agreement between the Parties or, on request of the Parties,
to the Council of the League of Nations.

2. If no agreement is reached on either of these

procedures, each Party shall designate a different Power and
the appointments shall be made jointly by the Powers thus
chosen.

3. If, within a period of three months, these two

Pox^ers have been unable to reach an agreement, each of them
shall submit a number of candidates equal to the number of
members to be appointed. It shall then be decided by lot
xtfhich of the candidates thus designated shall be appointed.

Article 14

1. Disputes shall be brought before the Conciliation

Commission by means of an application addressed to the
President by the two Parties acting in agreement, or, in de­
fault thereof, by one or other of the Parties.

2. The application, after giving a summary account

of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation
to the Commission to take all necessary steps with a view to
arriving at an amicable solution.

3. If the application emanates from only one of the

Parties, 'the other Party shall without delay be notified by
it.

Article 15

1. Within fifteen days from the date on xfhich a

dispute has been brought by one of the Parties before a
permanent Conciliation Commission, any Party may replace its
oxtfn commissioner, for the examination of the particular dis­
pute, by a person possessing special competence in the
matter,

2. The Party making use of this right shall immedi­

ately notify the other Party; the latter shall in such case
be entitled to take similar action within fifteen days from
 191
the date on which it received the notification.

Article 16

In the absence of agreement to the contrary between

the Parties, the Conciliation Commission shall meet at a
place selected by Its President.

Article 1?

The work of the Conciliation Commission shall not be

conducted in public unless a decision to that effect is
taken by the Commission with the consent of the Parties.

Article 18

1. In the absence of agreement to the contrary be­

tween the Parties, the Conciliation Commission shall lay
doT'sm its own procedure, which in any case must provide for
the Parties being heard. In regard to enquiries, the Com- •
mission, unless It decided unanimously to the contrary, s h a H
act In accordance with the provisions of Part III of the
Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes.

2. The parties shall be represented before the Con- .

eiliatlon Commission by agents, whose duty shall be to act
as intermediaries between them and the Commission. They
may, moreover, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed
by them for that purpose and may request that, all persons
whose evidence appears to them desirable shall be heard.

3. The Commission, for its part, shall be entitled

:to request oral explanations from the agents, counsel and
experts of both Parties, as well as from all persons, it
may think desirable to summon with the consent of their
Governments.

Article 19

In the absence of agreement to the contrary betxveen

the Parties, decisions of the Conciliation Commission shall
be taken by a majority vote, and the Commission may only
take decisions of the substance of the dispute if all its
members are present.
 192
Article 20
The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate
the work of the Conciliation Commission, and in particular
to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all re­
levant documents and information, as well as to the use the
means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their
territory, and in accordance with their law, to the summon­
ing and hearing of witnesses or experts and to visit the
localities in question.

Article 21

1. During the proceedings of the Commission, each

of the commissioners shall receive emoluments the amount of
which shall be fixed by agreement between the Parties, each
of which shall contribute an equal share.

2. The general expenses arising out of the working

of the Commission shall be divided in the same manner.

Article 22

1. The task of the Conciliation Commission shall be

to elucidate the questions in dispute, to collect with
that object all necessary information by means of enquiry or
otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the Parties to an agree­
ment. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the
Parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to
It, and lay down the period within which they are to make
their decision.

2. At the close of its proceedings, the Commission

shall draw up a proces-verbal stating, as the case may be,
either that the Parties have come to an agreement, and, if
need arises, the terms of the agreement, or that it has
been impossible to effect a settlement. No mention shall be
made in the proces-verbal as to whether the Commissions
decisions were taken unanimously or by a majority vote.

3. The proceedings of the Commission must, unless

the Parties agree otherwise, be terminated within six months
from the date on which the Commission shall have been given
cognizance of the dispute.

Article 23

The Commission's proces-verbal shall be communicated

 193
without delay to the Parties. The Parties shall decide
whether it shall be published.

CHAPTER IV— SETTLEMENT BY ARBITRATION

Article 24

If the Parties have not reached an agreement within

a month from the termination of the proceedings of the
Conciliation Commission mentioned in the previous articles,
the question shall be brought before an arbitral tribunal
which, unless the Parties agree otherwise, shall be con­
stituted in the manner indicated below.

Should, however, both Parties agree, the question

may, if it is a political one, be submitted to the Council
of the League of Nations, which shall decide in accordance
with Article 15 of the Covenant.

Article 25

The arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members.

The Parties shall each nominate one member, who may be
chosen from among their respective nationals. The other
two arbitrators and the umpire shall be chosen by agreement
from among the nationals of third Powers. They must be of
different nationalities, and must not be habitually resident
in the territory or be in the service of the Parties con­
cerned.

Article 26

1. If the appointment of the members of the arbi­

tral tribunal is not made within a period of three months
from the date on which one of the Parties requested the
other Party to constitute an arbitral tribunal, a third
Power, chosen by agreement between the Parties, shall be
requested to make the necessary appointments.

2. If no agreement is reached on this point, each

Party shall designate a different Power, and the appoint­
ments shall be made jointly by the Powers thus chosen.

3. If within a period of three months the Poxtfers

so chosen have been unable to reach an agreement, the
necessary appointments shall be made by the President of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. If the latter
is prevented from acting or if he is a national of one of
 194
the Parties, the appointments shall he made by the Vice-
President. If the latter is prevented from acting or if he
is a national of one of the Parties, the appointments shall
be made by the oldest member of the Gourt who is not a
national of either Party.

Article 2?

Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, re­

signation or other cause shall be filled within the shortest
possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 28 -

The Parties shall draw up a special agreement deter­

mining the subject of the dispute and the details of the
procedure.

Article 29

In the absence of sufficient particulars in the

special agreement regarding the matters referred to in the
preceding article, the provisions of the Hague Convention
of October 18th, 190? for the Pacific Settlement of Inter­
national Disputes shall apply so far as is necessary.

Article 30

Failing the conclusion of a special agreement within

a period of three months from the date on which the tribunal,
is constituted, the dispute may be brought before the tri­
bunal by an application from one or another Party.

Article 31
i

If nothing is laid down in the special agreement or

no special agreement has been made, the tribunal shall apply
the rules in regard to the substance of the dispute enumer­
ated in Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Gourt of
International Justice. In so far as there exist no such
treaties applicable to the dispute, the tribunal shall
decide jex aequo et bono.

CHAPTER V— DISPUTES BETWEEN THE THREE CONTRACTING PARTIES

Article 32

Should a dispute arise between all the High Contrac-

 195
ting Parties, the following rules shall be observed with
regard to the procedures described in the foregoing pro­
visions ;

As regards conciliation procedure, a special commis­

sion shall always be set up. The composition of the com­
mission shall vary according to whether all the Parties have
separate interests, or two of them act conjointly.

In the former case, the Parties shall each appoint

one commissioner, and shall jointly appoint commissioners,
nationals of third Powers, who shall number one more than
the commissioners appointed separately by the Parties.

In the latter case, the Parties acting conjointly

shall agree to appoint their own commissioner jointly, and
at the same time agree with the other party as regards the
appointment of the commissioners chosen from among the
nationals of third Powers.

In either case the Parties shall, unless they agree

otherwise, apply Articles 12 jet seq. of the present Con­
vention in so far as these are compatible with the provi­
sions of the present article.

As regards judicial procedure, the Statute of the

Permanent Court of International Justice shall apply.

As regards arbitration, if the Parties fail to agree

on the composition of the tribunal, any Party may, in the
case of disputes referred to in Article 4, bring the dispute
by an application direct before the Permanent Court of
International Justice; in the case of disputes referred to
in Article. 8, Articles 25 et seq. shall apply, but each of
the Parties which has separate interests shall appoint one
arbitrator and the arbitrators appointed separately by the
Parties shall always number one less than the other arbi-
trators.

Article 53

1. In all cases where a dispute forms the object of

arbitration or judicial proceedings, and in particular if
the question on which the Parties differ arises out of acts
already committed or on the point of being committed, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accord­
ance with Article 41 of its Statute, or the arbitral tri­
bunal, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the
 196

provisional measures to be adopted. The Parties shall be

bound to comply x?ith such measures.

2. If the dispute is brought before a Conciliation

Commission, the latter may recommend to the Parties the
adoption of such provisional measures as it considers suit­
able .

3. The Parties undertake to abstain from all measures

likely to react prejudicially on the execution of the judi­
cial decision or arbitral award or on the arrangements pro­
posed by the Conciliation Commission, and, in general, to
abstain from any act whatsoever which might aggravate or
extend the dispute.

Article 34

If in the judicial decision or arbitral award it is

declared that a judgment or measure enjoined by a court of
law or any other authority of one of the Parties to the
dispute is wholly or partly contrary to international law,
and if the constitutional law of that Party does not allow
or only imperfectly allows of the consequences of the
judgment or measure in question being annulled, the Parties
agree that the judicial decision or arbitral award shall
grant the Injured Party equitable satisfaction.

Article 35

1. The present Convention shall be applicable as

between the High Contracting Parties, even though a third
Power has an interest in the dispute..

2. In conciliation procedure, the Parties may agree

to invite such third Power to intervene.

3. In judicial procedure or arbitration, if a third

Power should consider that it has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case,
it may submit to the Permanent Court of International
Justice or to the arbitral tirbunal a request to intervene
as a third party.

It will be for the Court or the tribunal to decide

upon this request.

4. Whenever the question is one relating to the

interpretation of a Convention to which States other than
 197
those concerned in the case are Parties, the Registrar of
the Permanent Court of International Justiceor the arbi­
tral tribunal shall notify all such States forthwith.

Every State so notified has the right to intervene

in the proceedings, but if it uses this right, the inter­
pretation given in the decision shall be binding upon it.

Article 36

Disputes relating to the interpretation or the appli­

cation of the present Convention, including those concern­
ing the classification of disputes, shall be submitted to
the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Article 37

The present Convention, which is in conformity with

the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be inter­
preted as restricting the duty of the League to tahe at any
time, itfhatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to
safeguard the peace of the world.

Article 38

1. The present Convention shall be ratified and the

instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Bucharest.

It shall be registered with the Secretariat of the

League of Nations.

2. The present Convention shall remain in force for

a period of five years from the date of the exchange of
ratifications.

3. Unless denounced at least six months before the

expiration of this period, it shall remain in force for
a further period of five years, and similarly thereafter.

4. Notifithstsending denunciation by one of the Con­

tracting Parties, all proceedings pending at the expiration
of the current period of the Convention shall be duly com­
pleted.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-mentioned Plenipotenti­

aries have signed the present Convention.
 198
DONE at Belgrade in triplicate on May 21st, one
thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine.

(L.S.) DR. EDVARD BENES

(L.S.) G. G. MIRQNESCU

(L.S.) DR. K. KUMANUDI

APPENDIX E
 APPENDIX E

MUNICH PACT

Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking

into consideration the agreement, which has been already-
reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the
Sudeten German territory, have agree^dT^On^^ne^ollowing terms
and conditions governing the said cession measure consequent
thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves re­
sponsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

1. The -evacuation will begin on the Jlst October. '

2. The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that 1

the evacuation of the territory shall be com­
pleted by the 10th October, without any existing
‘installations having been destroyed and that the
Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible
for carrying out the evacuation without damage
to the said installations.

3. The conditions governing the evacuation will be

laid down in detail by an international commi­
ssion composed of representatives of Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czecho­
slovakia.

4. The occupation by stages of the predominantly

German territory by German troops will begin on
1st October. The four territories marked on the
attached map will be occupied by German troops
in the following order: the territory marked
No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the terri­
tory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October,
the territory marked No. Ill on the 3rd, 4th and
5th of October, the territory marked No. IV on
the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining ter­
ritory of predominantly German character will be
ascertained by the aforesaid international com­
mission forthwith and be occupied by German
troops by the 10th of October.

5. The international commission referred to in

^Harrison S. Thomson, Czechoslo'vakia in European

History (Princeton University "Press, 1944).
 200

paragraph 3 will determine the territories in

which a plebiscite is to be held. These terri­
tories will be occupied by international bodies
until the plebiscite has been completed. The
same commission will fix the conditions in which
the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis
the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The
Commission will also fix a date, not later than
the end of November, on which the plebiscite will
be held.

6. The final determination of the frontiers will be

carried out by the international commission.
This commission will also be entitled to recommend
to the four Powers, G-ermany, the United Kingdom,
France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases
minor modifications in the strictly ethnogra­
phical determination of the zones which are to
be transferred without plebiscite.

7. There will be a right of option into and out of

the transferred territories, the option to be
exercised within six months from the date of this
agreement. A G-erman-Czechoslovak commission shall
determine the details of the option, consider
ways of facilitating the transfer of population
and settle questions of principle arising out of
the said transfer.

8. The Czechoslovak G-overnment will within a period

of four weeks from the date of this agreement
release from their military and police forces any
Sudeten (Germans who may wish to be released, and
the Czechoslovak G-overnment will within the same
period release Sudeten G-erman prisoners who are '
serving terms of imprisonment for political of­
fenses .

ADOLPH HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLIN
EDOUARD DALADIER
MUNICH BENITO MUSSOLINI
September 29, 1938
 201

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and

the French Government have entered, into the above agreement
on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in
paragraph six of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th
September, relating to an international guarantee of the new
boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked
aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian! minor­

ities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy
for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

ADOLPH HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLIN
EDOUARD DALADIER
MUNICH BENITO MUSSOLINI
September 29, 1938

DECLARATION

The Heads of the Governments of the four Powers de­

clare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minor­
ities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months
by agreement by the respective Governments, shall form the
subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments
of the four Powers here present*

ADOLPH HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLIN
EDOUARD DALADIER
MUNICH BENITO MUSSOLINI
September 29, 1938

SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATION

All questions which may arise out of the transfer

.of the territory shall be considered as coming within the
terms of reference of the Commission.

ADOLPH HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLIN
EDOUARD DALADIER
MUNICH BENITO MUSSOLINI
September 29, 1938 ...... -—
 20 2

COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

The four Heads of G-overnment here present agree that

the international commission provided for in the agreement
signed by them today shall consist of the Secretary of State
in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and
Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a represen­
tative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

ADOLPH HITLER
NEVILLE CHAMBERLIN
EDOUARD DALADIER
MUNICH BENITO MUSSOLINI
September 29, 1938

U fllvo rslty o f S o uthftrn CaJffornia L ib r tiy