University of Nueva Caceres

SCHOOL OF LAW
Naga City, Camarines Sur

AGENCY, TRUST AND PARTNERSHIP

BENJAMIN YU v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GR No. 97212,

1993-06-30

FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin Yu was formerly the Assistant General Manager
of the marble quarrying and export business operated by a
registered partnership with the firm name of "Jade Mountain
Products Company Limited" ("Jade Mountain").
The partnership business consisted of exploiting a marble deposit
found on land owned... by the Sps. Ricardo and Guillerma Cruz,
situated in Bulacan Province, under a Memorandum Agreement
Benjamin Yu was hired by virtue of a Partnership Resolution dated
14 March 1985, as Assistant General Manager with a monthly salary
of P4,000.00. According to petitioner Yu, however, he actually
received only half of his stipulated monthly salary, since he had
accepted the... promise of the partners that the balance would be
paid when the firm shall have secured additional operating funds
from abroad.
Sometime in 1988, without the knowledge of Benjamin Yu, the
general partners Lea Bendal and Rhodora Bendal sold and
transferred their interests in the partnership to private
respondent Willy Co and to one Emmanuel Zapanta. Mr. Yu Chang, a
limited partner, also sold and... transferred his interest in the
partnership to Willy Co... he partnership now constituted solely
by Willy Co and Emmanuel Zapanta continued to use the old... firm
name of Jade Mountain, though they moved the firm's main office
from Makati to Mandaluyong, Metropolitan Manila.
All the employees of the partnership continued working in the
business, all, save petitioner Benjamin Yu as it turned out.
Petitioner Benjamin Yu reported to the Mandaluyong office for
work and there met private respondent Willy Co for the first
time. Petitioner was informed by Willy Co... that the latter had
bought the business from the original partners and that it was
for him to decide whether or not he was responsible for the
obligations of the old partnership, including petitioner's unpaid
salaries. Petitioner was in fact not allowed to work anymore in
the
Jade Mountain business enterprise. His unpaid salaries remained
unpaid... enjamin Yu filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
recovery of unpaid salaries
The partnership and Willy Co denied petitioner's charges,
contending in the main that Benjamin Yu was never hired as an
employee by the present or new partnership

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Labor Arbiter Nieves Vivar-De Castro rendered a decision holding
that petitioner had been illegally dismissed.
National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner's
complaint.
ISSUES:
Whether the partnership which had hired petitioner Yu as
Assistant General Manager had been extinguished and replaced by a
new partnership composed of Willy Co and Emmanuel Zapanta.
HELD:
a withdrawing partner remains liable to a third party creditor of
the old... partnership.[9] The liability of the new partnership,
upon the other hand, in the set of circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar, is established in Article 1840 of the Civil Code
which reads as follows:
"Art. 1840. In the following cases creditors of the dissolved
partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership
continuing the business:
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing
partnership, or when any partner retires and assigns (or the
representative of the deceased partner assigns) his rights in
partnership property to two or more of the partners, or to one or
more of the partners and... one or more third persons, if the
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership
affairs;
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the
representative of a deceased partner assigns) their rights in
partnership property to the remaining partner, who continues the
business without liquidation of partnership affairs, either alone
or with... others;
(3) When any Partner retires or dies and the business of the
dissolved partnership is continued as set forth in Nos. 1 and 2
of this article, with the consent of the retired partners or the
representative of the deceased partner, but without any
assignment of... his right in partnership property;
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their
rights in partnership property to one or more third persons who
promise to pay the debts and who continue the business of the
dissolved partnership;
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and
remaining partners continue the business under the provisions of
article 1837, second paragraph, No. 2, either alone or with
others, and without liquidation of the partnership... affairs;
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners
continue the business either alone or with others without
liquidation of the partnership affairs;
When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued
under any conditions set forth in this article the creditors of
the retiring or deceased partner or the representative of the
deceased partner, have a prior right to any claim of the retired
partner or... the representative of the deceased partner against

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the person or partnership continuing the business on account of
the retired or deceased partner's interest in the dissolved
partnership or on account of any consideration promised for such
interest or for his right in... partnership property.
Under Article 1840 above, creditors of the old Jade Mountain are
also creditors of the new Jade Mountain which continued the
business of the old one without liquidation of the partnership
affairs. Indeed, a creditor of the old Jade Mountain, like
petitioner Benjamin Yu in... respect of his claim for unpaid
wages, is entitled to priority vis-a-vis any claim of any retired
or previous partner insofar as such retired partner's interest in
the dissolved partnership is concerned. It is not necessary for
the Court to determine under which one or more of... the above
six (6) paragraphs, the case at bar would fall, if only because
the facts on record are not detailed with sufficient precision to
permit such determination. It is, however, clear to the Court
that under Article 1840 above, Benjamin Yu is entitled to enforce
his claim... for unpaid salaries, as well as other claims
relating to his employment with the previous partnership, against
the new Jade Mountain.

JERRY R. REYMUNDO-LAW BLOCK-C

 LUZVIMINDA J. VILLAREAL v. DONALDO EFREN C. RAMIREZ, GR No.
144214, 2003-07-14

FACTS:
On July 25, 1984, Luzviminda J. Villareal, Carmelito Jose and
Jesus Jose formed a partnership with a capital of P750,000 for
the operation of a restaurant and catering business under the
name "Aquarius Food House and Catering Services."[5] Villareal
was appointed general manager and Carmelito Jose, operations
manager.
Respondent Donaldo Efren C. Ramirez joined as a partner in the
business on September 5, 1984. His capital contribution of
P250,000 was paid by his parents, Respondents Cesar and Carmelita
Ramirez.
After Jesus Jose withdrew from the partnership in January 1987,
his capital contribution of P250,000 was refunded to him in cash
by agreement of the partners.
In the same month, without prior knowledge of respondents,
petitioners closed down the restaurant, allegedly because of
increased rental. The restaurant furniture and equipment were
deposited in the respondents' house for storage
On March 1, 1987, respondent spouses wrote petitioners, saying
that they were no longer interested in continuing their
partnership or in reopening the restaurant, and that they were
accepting the latter's offer to return their capital
contribution.
On October 13, 1987, Carmelita Ramirez wrote another letter
informing petitioners of the deterioration of the restaurant
furniture and equipment stored in their house. She also
reiterated the request for the return of their one-third share in
the equity of the partnership. The... repeated oral and written
requests were, however, left unheeded.
Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 59,
respondents subsequently filed a Complaint[11] dated November 10,
1987, for the collection of a sum of money from petitioners.
In their Answer, petitioners contended that respondents had
expressed a desire to withdraw from the partnership and had
called for its dissolution under Articles 1830 and 1831 of the
Civil Code; that respondents had been paid, upon the turnover to
them of furniture and equipment... worth over P400,000; and that
the latter had no right to demand a return of their equity
because their share, together with the rest of the capital of the
partnership, had been spent as a result of irreversible business
losses.
ISSUES:
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals' decision ordering the
distribution of the capital contribution, instead of the net

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capital after the dissolution and liquidation of a partnership,
thereby treating the capital contribution like a loan, is in
accordance... with law and jurisprudence
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals' decision ordering the
petitioners to jointly and severally pay and reimburse the amount
of [P]253,114.00 is supported by the evidence on record
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in making [n]o
pronouncement as to costs... whether petitioners are liable to
respondents for the latter's share in the partnership... whether
the CA's computation of P253,114 as respondents' share is
correct... whether the CA was likewise correct in not
assessing... costs.
HELD:
The CA held that, although respondents had no right to demand the
return of their capital contribution, the partnership was
nonetheless dissolved when petitioners lost interest in
continuing the restaurant business with them. Because petitioners
never gave a proper accounting of... the partnership accounts for
liquidation purposes, and because no sufficient evidence was
presented to show financial losses,... Both the trial and the
appellate courts found that a partnership had indeed existed, and
that it was dissolved on March 1, 1987. They found that the
dissolution took place when respondents informed petitioners of
the intention to discontinue it because of the former's...
dissatisfaction with, and loss of trust in, the latter's
management of the partnership affairs. These findings were amply
supported by the evidence on record. Respondents consequently
demanded from petitioners the return of their one-third equity in
the partnership.
First, it seems that the appellate court was under the
misapprehension that the total capital contribution was
equivalent to the gross assets to be distributed to the partners
at the time of the dissolution of the partnership. We cannot
sustain the underlying idea that... the capital contribution at
the beginning of the partnership remains intact, unimpaired and
available for distribution or return to the partners. Such idea
is speculative, conjectural and totally without factual or legal
support.
Second, the CA's finding that the partnership had an outstanding
obligation in the amount of P240,658 was not supported by
evidence. We sustain the contrary finding of the RTC, which had
rejected the contention that the obligation belonged to the
partnership
Third, the CA failed to reduce the capitalization by P250,000,
which was the amount paid by the partnership to Jesus Jose when
he withdrew from the partnership.

JERRY R. REYMUNDO-LAW BLOCK-C

 EMILIO EMNACE v. CA, GR No. 126334, 2001-11-23

FACTS:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto
Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma.
Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided
to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of
partition and distribution of the partnership properties among
them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the
partnership.
Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats,
six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño
and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local
branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential
Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after
Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to
submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities
of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the
partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to
turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the
total assets of the partnership, despite formal demand for
payment thereof.
Consequently, Tabanao's heirs, respondents herein, filed against
petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division
of assets and damages.
In their complaint, respondents prayed as follows:
Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the
assets and liabilities of the partnership at bar; and
After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs the
following:
No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties,
dividends, cash, land(s), fishing vessels, trucks, motor
vehicles, and other forms and substance of treasures which belong
and/or should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the
partnership;
No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages;

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Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire
share/amount/award which the Honorable Court may resolve the
plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance in
court.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to
sue. The trial court denied the motion... to dismiss respondents
filed an amended complaint, incorporating the additional prayer
that petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's)
assets and thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the
plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof. In
due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to
dismiss,... petitioner also raised prescription as an additional
ground warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.

LA COMPAÑIA MARITIMA v. MUÑOZ

G.R. No. L-3704; December 12, 1907

FACTS:
On the 31st day of March, 1905, the defendants Francisco Muñoz,
Emilio Muñoz, and Rafael Naval formed on ordinary general
mercantile partnership under the name of Francisco Muñoz & Sons
for the purpose of carrying on the mercantile business in the
Province of Albay which had formerly been carried on by Francisco
Muñoz.
In the articles of partnership, it is expressly stated that they
have agreed to form, and do form, an ordinary, general mercantile
partnership. The object of the partnership, as stated in the
fourth paragraph of the articles, is a purely mercantile one and
all the requirements of the Code of Commerce in reference to such
partnership were complied with. The articles of partnership were
recorded in the mercantile registry in the Province of Albay.
Rafael Naval was entitled by the articles of agreement to a fixed
salary of P2,500 as long as he was in charge of the branch office
established at Ligao
The argument of the appellees seems to be that, because no yearly
or monthly salary was assigned to Emilio Muñoz, he contributed
nothing to the partnership and received nothing from it.
ISSUES:
Whether Muñoz is liable to third person even if he is an
industrial partner
HELD:
Yes, Muñoz is liable to third persons even if he is an industrial
partner.
The Supreme Court held that in limited partnership, the Code of
Commerce recognizes a difference between general and special
partners, but in a general partnership there is no such
distinction — all the members are general partners. The fact that
some may be industrial and some capitalist partners does not make

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the members of either of these classes alone such general
partners.
Our construction of the article is that it relates exclusively to
the settlement of the partnership affairs among the partners
themselves and has nothing to do with the liability of the
partners to third persons; that each one of the industrial
partners is liable to third persons for the debts of the firm;
that if he has paid such debts out of his private property during
the life of the partnership, when its affairs are settled he is
entitled to credit for the amount so paid, and if it results that
there is not enough property in the partnership to pay him, then
the capitalist partners must pay him.
Our conclusion is upon this branch of the case that neither on
principle nor on authority can the industrial partner be relieved
from liability to third persons for the debts of the partnership.

GEORGE LITTON v. HILL, GR No. 45624, 1939-04-25

FACTS:
Petitioner George Litton was the plaintiff and the respondents
Hill & Ceron, Robert Hill, Carlos Ceron and Visayan Surety &
Insurance Corporation were defendants.
Plaintiff sold and delivered to Carlos Ceron, who is one of the
managing partners of Hill & Ceron, a certain number of mining
claims, and by virtue of said transaction, the defendant Carlos
Ceron delivered to the... plaintiff a document reading as
follows:
Received from Mr. George Litton share certificates Nos. 4428,
4429 and 6699 for 5,000, 5,000 and 7,000 shares respectively
total 17,000 shares of Big Wedge Mining Company, which we have
sold at P0.11 (eleven centavos) per share or P1,870.00... less
1/2 per cent brokerage.
Ceron paid to the plaintiff the sum of P1,150 leaving an unpaid
balance of P720, and unable to collect this sum either from Hill
& Ceron or from its surety Visayan Surety & Insurance
Corporation, Litton filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the said defendants for the
recovery of the said balance.
The court, after trial, ordered Carlos Ceron personally to pay
the amount claimed and absolved the partnership... the Court of
Appeals, the latter affirmed the decision of the court on May 29,
1937, having reached the conclusion that Ceron did not intend to
represent and did not act for the firm Hill & Ceron in the
transaction involved in this litigation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ceron individually entered into the transaction
with the plaintiff.
HELD:

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The transaction made by Ceron with the plaintiff should be
understood in law as effected by Hill & Ceron and binding upon
it.
It is an admitted fact by Robert Hill when he testified at the
trial that he and Ceron, during the partnership, had the same
power to buy and sell; that in said partnership Hill as well as
Ceron made the transaction as partners in equal parts; that on
the... date of the transaction, February 14, 1934, the
partnership between Hill and Ceron was in existence.
Hill & Ceron sold shares of the Big Wedge when the transaction
was entered into with Litton, it was neither published in the...
newspapers nor stated in the commercial registry that the
partnership Hill & Ceron had been dissolved.
Hill testified that a few days before February 14th he had a
conversation with the plaintiff in the course of which he advised
the latter not to deliver shares for sale or on commission to
Ceron because the partnership was about to be dissolved; but what
importance can be attached to said advice if the partnership was
not in fact dissolved on February 14th, the date when the
transaction with Ceron took place article 226 of the Code of
Commerce, the dissolution of a commercial association shall not
cause any prejudice to third parties until it has been recorded
in the commercial registry.
Dissolution of a partnership by the will of the partners which is
not registered in the commercial registry, does not prejudice
third persons.
The order of the Bureau of Commerce of December 7, 1933,
prohibits brokers from buying and selling shares on their own
account.
The stock and/or bond broker is, therefore, merely an agent or an
intermediary, and as such, shall not be allowed. * * *
"(c) To buy or to sell shares of stock or bonds on his own
account for purposes of speculation and/or for manipulating the
market, irrespective of whether the purchase or sale is made from
or to a private individual, broker or brokerage firm.
Management of the business affairs of the copartnership shall be
entrusted to both copartners who shall jointly administer the
business affairs, transactions and activities of the
copartnership, shall jointly open a current account or any
other... kind of account in any bank or banks, shall jointly sign
all checks for the withdrawal of funds and shall jointly or
singly sign, in the latter case, with the consent of the other
partner.
A written contract of the firm can only be signed by one of the
partners if the other partner consented. Without the consent of
one partner, the other cannot bind the firm by a written
contract. Now, assuming for the moment that Ceron attempted to
represent the firm in this contract with the plaintiff (the
plaintiff conceded that the firm name was not mentioned at that
time), the latter has failed to prove that Hill had consented to
such contract.
But we dissent from the view of the Court of Appeals that for one
of the partners to bind the partnership the consent of the other

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is necessary. Third persons, like the plaintiff, are not bound in
entering into a contract with any of the two partners, to
ascertain whether or not this partner with whom the transaction
is made has the consent of the other partner. The public need not
make inquiries as to the agreements had between the partners. Its
knowledge is enough that it is contracting with the partnership
which is represented by one of the managing partners.
Several presumption that each individual partner is an authorized
agent for the firm and that he has authority to bind the firm in
carrying on the partnership transactions.
Sufficient to permit third persons to hold the firm liable on
transactions entered into by one of members of the firm acting
apparently in its behalf and within the scope of his authority...
purpose or object for which this copartnership is organized is to
engage in the business of brokerage in general, such as stock and
bond brokers, real brokers, investment security brokers, shipping
brokers, and other activities pertaining to the... business of
brokers in general.

[ GR No. 25007, Mar 02, 1926 ]

PACIFIC COMMERCIAL COMPANY v. ABOITIZ
FACTS:
In April, 1919, Arnaldo F. de Silva, Guillermo Aboitiz, Vidal
Aboitiz and Jose Martinez formed "a regular, collective,
mercantile partnership" with a capital of P40,000 of which each
of the partners Aboitiz and De Silva furnished one-third. The
partner Jose Martinez was an industrial partner and furnished no
capital; it was provided in the partnership article that he was
to receive 30 per cent of the profits and that his
responsibility for losses should not exceed the amount of the
profits received by him.
On April 27, 1922, the partnership, through its duly authorized
representative, Guillermo Aboitiz, executed a promissory note in
favor of the plaintiff, the Pacific Commercial Company, for the
sum of P23,168.71, with interest at 12 per cent per annum until
fully paid and an additional sum of 10 per cent as attorney's
fees and costs of collection in the event it became necessary to
resort to judicial proceedings. As security for the payment
of the note, the partnership executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff on certain personal property therein
described.
ISSUES:
For failure of the partnership to pay the debt, the chattel
mortgage was foreclosed, the mortgaged property sold, and the
proceeds of the sale, P2,000, was paid over to the plaintiff
on December 28, 1923.
HELD:
Upon trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the partnership for the sum of P27,951.68

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and for the payment of interest on the capital of P21,168.71 at
the rate of 10 per cent per annum from the 31st of October,
1924, until paid, together with 10 per cent on the amount due for
fees for collection in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid
note. The judgment further provided that execution should
first issue against the property of the partnership Aboitiz &
Martinez and that in the event of the insolvency of the
partnership, it might issue against the property of the partners
De Silva and Aboitiz, and in the event of their insolvency,
then against the property of the industrial partner Jose
Martinez. From this judgment Martinez appealed to this court
and here maintains that under article 141 of the Code of
Commerce he, as a mere industrial partner, cannot be held
responsible for the partnership's debt.
The case is practically identical with that of the Compañia
Maritima vs. Munoz (9 Phil., 326), in which this court held
the industrial partners secondarily liable for the debts of the
partnership, but on the strength of the vigorous dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Arellano in that case, the appellant
argues that the decision therein was erroneous and should now be
overruled. With all due respect for the legal acumen of the
first Chief Justice of this Court, we are still of the opinion
that the case was correctly decided. Article 127 of the Code of
Commerce, reads as follows:
"All the members of the general copartnership, be they or be
they not managing partners of the same, are liable personally
and in solidum with all their property for the results of the
transactions made in the name and for the account of the
partnership, under the signature of the later, and by a
person authorized to make use thereof."
The language of this article is clear and specific and must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, namely, that all the members
of a general copartnership are liable with all their property for
the results of the duly authorized transactions made in the name
and for the account of the partnership. On the other hand,
article 141, upon which the appellant relies and which provides
that "losses shall be computed in the same proportion among the
capitalist partners without including the industrial partners,
unless by special agreement the latter have been constituted as
participants therein," is susceptible of two different
interpretations of which that given it in the Compañia Maritima
case, supra, i. e., that it relates merely to the distribution of
losses among the partners themselves in the settlement of the
partnership affairs and has no reference to partnership
obligations to third parties, appears to us to be the more
logical.
There is a marked distinction between a liability and a loss, and
the inability of a partnership to pay a debt to a third party
at a particular time does not necessarily mean that the
partnership business, as a whole, has been operated at a loss.
The partnership may have outstanding credits which for the
moment may be unavailable for the payment of debts, but which
eventually may be realized upon and yield profits more than
sufficient to cover all losses. Bearing this in mind it will be
found that there in reality is no conflict between the two
articles quoted; one speaks of liabilities, the other of losses.

JERRY R. REYMUNDO-LAW BLOCK-C

 PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ &CASTILLO.”July 30, 1979

FACTS:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of
Atty.Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that
they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms,
the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that
no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom
or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila
Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
ISSUES:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain
the name of the partners who already passed away in the name of
the firm?
HELD:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking
Corporation, the SC said: The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed

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which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility
of deception.Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can
tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice
of the profession.An able lawyer without connections will have to
make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able
lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old
firm’s reputation established by deceased partners. The court
also made the difference from the law firms
andbusinesscorporations: A partnership for the practice of law is
not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for
a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property.”11 Thus, it has been stated that“the use of a nom de
plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. We find
such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the
elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely
because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean
that Courts can rely on the same for purposes ofadjudication as a
juridical custom.Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

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