The Logic of Hegel's Logic

Pinkard, Terry P.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 4, October

1979, pp. 417-435 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0205

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v017/17.4pinkard.html

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 The Logic of Hegel's Logic
TERRY PINKARD

ONE OF THE PROBLEMSinvolved in doing the history of philosophy is reinterpreting

past philosophers in such a way that the relevance o f their work to contemporary
discussion can become clear. In doing so one often finds that certain doctrines to
which a philosopher himself attached great significance may not be central to a parti-
cular line of his argument. Recent efforts at interpreting Kant have attempted, for
example, to disentangle the objectionable part of the Kantian metaphysics from the
"objective" argument contained therein. The whole doctrine of transcendental psy-
chology in Kant's first Critique, for example, may perhaps be shelved without injur-
ing the rational core of the argument. With Hegel, however, the case seems prima
facie more difficult, since Hegel's whole system is seemingly tied down to a very
obscure metaphysics, that of the " W o r l d Spirit." However, just as not all of Kant's
doctrine is necessary to his philosophy, perhaps not all of Hegel's philosophy is
inextricably bound up with commitment to such shadowy entities. In this paper I
would like to try to draw out the central argumentative core of Hegel's Science oj
Logic. To do this, I will first sketch briefly what Hegel takes to be the goal of such a
theory. Second, I will outline the basic logical structure of the work. The result will
be, it is hoped, a presentation of Hegel's philosophy that will make it not the obscure
confidant of World Spirit, but rather one not far from contemporary concerns.

i. Hegel's Idea of Philosophical Theory Hegel begins the Wissenschafl der

Logik with a rejection of the " G i v e n " in experience. The Phenomonology of Mind
is taken to be the argument for this, and thus Hegel says he must presuppose that
work in erecting the kind of theory offered in the Logik. If there is not brute given in
experience irreducible to conceptual treatment, then philosophical theory can go two
ways: either one can construct "hypothetical" philosophies or one can look for tran-
scendental conditions within the conceptual framework itself. Hegel opts for the
latter. Such a theory, so he claims, must be reconstructive: "Consequently, logical
science in dealing with thought d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . . , will also be a reconstruction of
t h e m . ' " Such a reconstruction amounts to (1) "translating" (redescribing) other
modes of experience into conceptual form and (2) linking the concepts logically with
one another.
Insofar as philosophy is to be logical reconstruction, it is also an a priori dis-
cipline. The validity of the concepts in question is to be obtained not by comparing

1 would like to thank Professors Klaus H a r t m a n n and D o n lhde for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I would like to thank also Dr. Gitnther Maluschke for his suggestions about par-
ticular parts of the architectonic.
G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1971), 1:19 (here-
after cited as WL). All translations from this book are m y own.

[417]
418 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

them with things that are their instances (indeed, to see something as an instance of a
concept presupposes a prior knowledge of the concept), nor by giving various
empirical examples of them. Instead, the validity of such concepts is to be obtained
immanently, that is, logically, solely through their relations to one another. Hegel
expresses it in a characteristic manner:

In that philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it gives their content the
essential form of freedom of thought (of the a priori) and the confirmation of necessity instead
of the attestation of that which is "lit upon" [ Vorfindens] and of the experienced fact; the fact
becomes an exhibition and image of the original and completely independent activity of
thought. 2

Philosophical theory reconstructs items so as to exhibit their logical ( " n e c e s s a r y " )

relations. Thought legislates for itself according to logical norms and thus achieves a
" t r u e " necessity.
Transcendental considerations, however, lead Hegel to the conclusion that the
logical relations cannot be taken in, as it were, from the outside. To presuppose
them is to leave them in philosophical limbo; it is to make them surds. If the
reconstruction is to be complete, so Hegel thinks, the logical relations must them-
selves be reconstructed.
Thus amounts to a demand for a transcendental philosophy along Kantian lines.
Hegel rarely characterized his philosophy as transcendental; for the most part, he
characterized it as speculative. However, his understanding of the word "transcen-
d e n t a l " was limited; he took it to refer to a philosophy of subjectivity and took ex-
ception to Kant's idea that transcendental consciousness and not simply purely
conceptual conditions was the ground of knowledge. He says of Kant's philosophy
that " t h e transcendental exists in the exhibition of such determinations in subjective
t h o u g h t , " and "this expression is related only to the sources [Quellen] of such deter-
minations, and this is consciousness."' While Hegel condemned K a n t ' s transcen-
dentalism, he understood the rational core of Kant's theory to be not transcendental
but itself speculative. For our purposes we can use " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " in a broader
sense than Hegel understood it, since in this broader sense it can perfectly well
characterize his system also. If the rules of inference, and so on, are to be counted as
a m o n g the principles of pure reason, then they must be incorporated into a system of
the principles of pure reason. And this Hegel himself characterized in his lectures on
Kant as transcendental.
He takes his jumping-off point from Kant's marginal characterization of the syn-
thetic unity of apperception in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.

The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe
all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith,
transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.'

z EnzJ,kloplldie der philosophischen Wissenschqften(1830; Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969), par.
12 (hereafter cited as E). I shall follow the usual practice of citing only the paragraph numbers and not the
page numbers. All translations from this book are my own.
Werke, r Hermann Glockner, 26 vols. (Stuttgart: Fr. Frommann Verlag, 1959), 19:559.
Trans. N+ K. Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1933), B 134n.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 419

In a more Hegelian light, the synthetic unity of apperception may be called a

concept-principle, that is, a principle for the understanding of conceptuality as such.
If even the "whole of logic" is to be ultimately derivative from the concept-principle,
then presumably the central concepts of the notion of logic itself can be recon-
structed according to this principle. Part of the task of a transcendental logic is then
to give an explanation of the central concepts of logic.
Hegel notes that within our epistemic framework is a whole battery of concepts:
concepts of independent entities, of relations, and of inference. Hegel's problem was
to find a procedure for exhibiting the logical (or better: transcendental-logical)
connections between them. What he proposes thereby is a constructive logic of
concepts. In order to understand what this is, why it may be taken to be Hegelian,
and what kinds of demands such a logic would make, we must first of all clarify what
a logic o f concepts is.
For this purpose, we can use the analogy of language games. A familiar formula-
tion of a relevant notion of a language game may, following Wilfred Sellars, 5 be
made in analogy with chess. A piece in the chess game, for example, the bishop, is
defined by its moves in the game; although it usually appears in a certain form it can
appear in any material form and still be a bishop. Sellars envisages chess on a grand
scale, which he calls "Texas Chess," where the squares are counties and Rolls-
Royces are kings. The point is the kinds of moves a piece can legitimately make
within the game. To put it in Hegelian language, we can say that the determinateness
of the bishop (i.e., the conceptual meaning of " b i s h o p " ) is constituted by its moves,
its logic. One can extend the analogy to language. Terms may be said to take their
meaning (their determinateness) by virtue of the moves they make within the
language (the game). The concept of red, for example, refers to the kinds of moves
the vocable " r e d " (or " r o t " or " r o u g e " ) can legitimately play (allowing for auxili-
ary moves in different games, e.g., the rules of German as opposed to English). The
terms are embodiments of the concepts in question (just as this bishop is an
embodiment of " b i s h o p h o o d " ) , and the concepts are defined by their moves in
abstraction, that is, vis ~ vis other concepts. The moves of concepts constitute their
logic; one can therefore speak of an immanent logic of concepts, meaning simply the
behavior of concepts vis/l vis one another, the kinds of moves a concept makes. One
can draw the analogy further and claim that the conceptual meaning of a term is con-
stituted by what can be inferred from it--that is, what kinds of moves are enjoined,
to where one can m o v e - i n accordance with the rules of inference (the logic) of the
language (epistemic frame) in question. In other words, concepts acquire their
meaning, their determinateness, from their logic, from their behavior vis ~t vis other
concepts. The logic of a concept is therefore not external to its determinateness but
instead internal to it, constitutive of it.
Hegel speaks similarly: " T h e forms of thought are first set out and deposited in
human language. ''6 The point of the analogy with language games is that it makes
sense to speak of concepts as embodied in language; one need not draw the Wittgen-
steinian conclusion and be restricted only to a description of actual usage within a
particular language. Yet one also need not take the Cartesian alternative and speak

See Sellars, "Some Reflection on Language Games," in Science. Perception, and Reality (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 321-58.
WL, 1:9.
420 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

of a subjective immediacy of thoughts as opposed to their expression in language.

The opposition of description of overt language performances versus Cartesian
analysis of inner thoughts is not the only alternative. One can still affirm a priority of
language and nevertheless talk of concepts as distinct from their embodiment in a
particular language (although, of course, the specific embodiment of concepts is
always, at the least, heuristically interesting). That is, one can speak of the concept
of red being embodied in the vocables " r e d , " " r o u g e , " and " r o t " in the same way
in which one can speak of different pieces (e.g., a stick of wood, a matchbox, a tele-
vision tube) embodying the bishop. The particular pieces embody the bishop by
virtue of the kinds of moves they make within the game. Likewise, the particular
vocables embody the concept of red by virtue of the moves they make in the lan-
guage game. The analogy of chess, of course, breaks down when one asks what (or
who) is moving the pieces. The answer is that the pieces, so to speak, are not mov-
ing. Rather, it is " t h o u g h t " itself that is moving from position to position. Thought
is the only " p i e c e " in the game, and its movement from position to position is what
constitutes it as conceptual thought. The movement being spoken of, therefore, is
inferential. Thought moves from one position to another in the sense that it infers
one position from another. Each concept in the Logik is thus a position in the game
in which "speculative thought" moves. Hegel misstates this point by speaking of the
movement of the concepts when actually it is only thought moving from one position
to another. For reasons of brevity, I shall follow Hegel's wording and speak of
movement of concepts. This analogy with language games is, of course, only cur-
sory. The point of it is to propose a model through which one can understand
Hegel's notion of the movement of concepts and of this movement's being constitu-
tive of the determinateness of the concepts. (I am not claiming here, it should be
noted, that Sellars's and Hegel's metaphysics are in any way the same.)
Hegel favors, moreover, a constructive and not merely a descriptive philosophy.
Again, care must be taken in order that Hegel's meaning may not be lost. The oppo-
sition of constructive/descriptive philosophy is not to be identified with the more
familiar Strawsonian opposition of revisionary/descriptive metaphysics. In the
introduction to his book Individuals Strawson makes the distinction: "Descriptive
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the
world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure. ''7
Descriptive metaphysics, moreover, is not merely descriptive but has a certain
"scope and generality ''~ that a purely descriptive program does not have. It seeks to
uncover " a massive central core of human thinking, ''9 namely, the categorial
concepts, "which, in their most fundamental character, change not a t a l l . " Hegel
might at first seem to be saying something similar; he says, for example that "the
history of philosophy exhibits in the various philosophies that come on the scene in
part only One Philosophy, ''l~ and that " t h e same development of thought that is
presented in the history of philosophy is presented in philosophy itself, purely in the
element o f thought, freed of that historical externality.'"' In one sense Hegel's

' (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), p. xiii.

Ibid.
9ibid., p. xiv.
'~ E, 13.
" Ibid., 14.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 421

theory answers to the Strawsonian notion of a descriptive metaphysics, since he

claims only to deal with a conceptual structure that is already there: "Philosophy
can consequently presuppose an acquaintance with its object, indeed, it must pre-
suppose an acquaintance and moreover an interest in s u c h . " " Hegel's theory offers
only a reconstruction of already familiar concepts, that is, those already at least
implicitly in use in language.
But this is not to say that for Hegel philosophy reconstructs only life-world con-
cepts or concepts that can be found only in ordinary language. Other concepts--
scientific, and so o n e - - a l s o fall within the reconstruction (although scientific con-
cepts fall properly within only that part of the reconstructive scheme called the Real-
philosophie). Hegel's theory is not purely descriptive, for it is intended to have
normative import. The familiar concepts are to be reconstructed so as to exhibit
their " r a t i o n a l i t y . " Hegel's theory is not therefore revisionary, in that it does not
propose a new conceptual scheme in competition with the normal one. Rather, it
seeks to reconstruct the logic, the rationality, of the conceptual scheme we already
have. It is a normative reconstruction of the scheme unearthed by descriptive meta-
physics.
To sum up: Hegel's theory is reconstructive in that it attempts to exhibit the con-
ceptual structure that is familiar to us, and it is constructive in that it constructs a
logic to do so and also constructs new concepts where these are shown to be neces-
sary to the conceptual apparatus (the specific status of the new categories will have to
be considered later). Hegel's proposal is: (1) a reconstruction of familiar concepts
gained from experience, science, and the history of philosophy; (2) a construction of
a normative logic of these concepts (as opposed to the acceptance of mere usage) and
of new concepts where these are necessitated; (3) a theory of the determinateness of
concepts, that is, a logic that not only connects the concepts but is constitutive also
of their determinateness, their meaning. Hegel's proposal for a transcendental
theory thus exhibits a peculiar blending of reconstructive (descriptivist) and con-
structive (revisionary or normative) demands along with a theory of determinate-
ness. To see how well such demands can be unitarily treated requires us to look more
closely at the actual structure of the Hegelian theory.

II. Hegel's Logical Procedure

A. The Beginning Hegel proposes therefore to take already granted concepts
and reconstruct them according to a logic that is thereby constitutive of those
concepts' determinateness. Hegel adds another condition: the whole procedure must
be grounded, justified step by step. One cannot simply invent a logic that merely
connects the concepts; the added condition that the logic must be constitutive of the
determinateness of the concepts in question rules out the idea that all one need do is
" c o n n e c t " the concepts with one another. If the connection is to be constitutive of
determinateness, then at each step the requisite logical moves must be shown to be
integral to the meaning of the concepts in question. As Hegel obliquely puts it, the
" f o r m " must emerge from the content: " t h a t the m e t h o d with the content, the form

'~ Ibid., 1.
422 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

with the principle is united. '''3 Both the specific content and the logical steps (the
method) required to establish such a content must be legitimated. How in any save a
metaphorical sense can this be done?
Hegel's answer is quite complex and must be carefully explicated in order to be
intelligible. He puts the problem quite simply: With what must the science, the
theory, begin? The theory is to be a theory of concepts that gain their determinate-
ness through their logical relations to one another. Therefore, the beginning must
be, so it seems, a concept. The question, then, refines itself: Which concept?
Two conditions immediately impose themselves. (1) If the theory is to explain deter-
minateness, then the beginning must somehow undercut determinateness; that is, it
must be the seemingly i m p o s s i b l e - a n indeterminate concept. (2) It must be logically
immediate; it must not be the result of something else. In other words, the beginning
cannot already contain the method, the logic of the development as already stated.
By this is meant no more than that the beginning cannot state the method before-
hand. To state the method beforehand is to presume beforehand what kind of rela-
tions are to be constitutive of the concepts. A third condition supplements these
other two: this concept, so Hegel thinks, must be a concept relating to the object of
knowledge. His reasons are, to speak loosely, that one must develop the "object lan-
g u a g e " before one can develop the " m e t a l a n g u a g e " ; or, still speaking loosely, that
one must have something to talk about before one can talk about one's talking. The
statement of the method, of the logic that connects the concepts, must therefore
come at the end. However, since the logic of the concepts is constitutive of their
determinateness, the statement of the logic is tantamount to a statement of the
ground of the concepts in question; the emergence of the logic itself as thematic
within the theory is the emergence of the " t r u e " ground of what has come before:
" T h a t the forward movement [das Vorwartsgehen] is a regression [Rfickgang] to the
ground, to the primordial [Urspranglichen] and true depends on that with which the
beginning is made and is indeed brought forth from i t . " " The initial concept is to
be, like all the concepts within the theory, implicitly defined by the logic that
emerges fully only at the end: " T h i s last, the ground, is then that out of which the
first emerges, which first appears as immediate. ' ' ' 5 What at the beginning of the
theory can appear only as something merely immediate or stipulated is in fact con-
stituted ( " i n der Tat hervorgebracht wird") by the terminal section of the theory.
But, likewise, the end of the theory is something that emerges from the " n a t u r a l "
development of the concepts and is, from that point of view, also something derived
from the initial concepts.
Hegel thus speaks of a "circle" of justification, although such talk is not entirely
accurate. It is not circular in that the end is identical with the beginning (although
Hegel euphorically says that also), nor is it circular in the sense in which some coher-
ence theories of truth are circular, that is, the same proposition that appears at least
once as a premise appears later on as a conclusion, thereby justifying itself.
The only concept that fulfills all these c o n d i t i o n s - to be a concept of being (since
it is being that we talk about), indeterminate, free of any stated logic, a ground from

"WL, 1:52.
~' Ibid., p. 55.
" Ibid.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 423

which the logic can develop--is the concept of pure being. It is indeterminate
immediacy and equal only to itself ("unbestimmten U n m i t t e l b a r k e i t . . . sich selbst
gleich") '6 This initial concept is something primitive, not susceptible to further
analysis--a "Nichtanalysierbares,"" something that cannot be shown to have any
more primitive predecessors. As the most primitive concept it is the presupposition
of all other concepts. It is a concept free of any logic that can be stated at the outset.
Such a concept is, however, logically equivalent to the concept of pure nothing.
The concept of pure being is indeterminate and cannot therefore be distinguished
from pure nothing, since only by virtue of some determination could it be distin-
guished from anything else. Taken in this form, the beginning exhibits a dilemma:
Two concepts that in their ordinary meaning simply do not mean the same are
equated. Hegel claims that they have passed over into one another (he does not say
that they pass over into one another since he feels that such a statement would
impute a logic to them prematurely.) This immediate passage of one into another is
equivalent to the concept of becoming: the passage of being into nothing and of
nothing into being. " B e c o m i n g " here does not refer to the ordinary notion of such
that would imply that something (a determinate being) passes into nothing (which
would, so Hegel thinks, thereby also be a determinate concept since it would be the
negation of something). It denotes rather the "shiftiness," the "unsteadiness" of the
concepts of pure being and pure nothing: "Passing-over [Obergehen] is the same as
becoming. '''8 But the concept of becoming has the advantage in that it has as its
meaning the unity of being and nothing; that is, within the concept of becoming one
can talk of being and nothing. The logic of the initial concept, pure being, is there-
fore to have passed over into the concept of pure nothing. Yet nothing and being
simply are not equivalent. The concept of becoming thus emerges as a solution to a
primitive contradiction: without it one must hold the seemingly contradictory (and,
depending on one's feeling toward Hegel, perhaps senseless) idea that being and
nothing are the same. The concept of becoming thus emerges as part of the logic of
the concept of pure being and pure nothing. From the opening position, one moves
to a new concept--one infers to it--that is (1) more developed and (2) a solution to a
dilemma, in this case a protocontradiction. Within the concept of becoming, being is
distinguished from nothing; it is thereby determinate being (Dasein). The initial logic
thus emerges with the initial concept: the logic of pure being is to have passed into
pure nothing, this passage leading to a new concept, becoming. Or one can say: in
order to think intelligibly of the concept of being, one must think of it as determinate
being; otherwise one must say being equals nothing. But as long as one remains on
the level of pure being, one cannot say this; the inference or move to the concept of
becoming is thereby partially justified. One may abstract from this the general prin-
ciple that the concept of being acquires determinateness through its incorporation
into itself o f the negative o f itself. The inference to the negative of the concept of
being is necessary for its determinateness.
The opening move of Hegel's theory struck his contemporaries as bizarre and has
struck probably every reader since as at least odd. In the subsequent edition of the

'~ Ibid., p. 66.

" Ibid., p. 60.
~s Ibid., p. 79. This characterization of " b e c o m i n g " was suggested to me by Klaus H a r t m a n n .
424 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Wissenschaft der Logik Hegel added a great many observations and explanations in
an attempt to quiet the feelings of oddness and make this part understood, for he
himself realized that the point of the section was extremely difficult to grasp. It
requires a further reflection in order that its point may not be lost.

B. Logic and Metalogic: The Principles of the Theory What the apparently
bizarre beginning of the Logik in fact does is present the basic logical structure of the
whole work. Hegel characteristically describes this somewhat obliquely: he speaks of
it as the " g r o u n d of the whole science" '~ and says that the progression in the theory
is only a "further determination ''20 of the beginning. He sums it up thus: " S o the
beginning of philosophy is the foundation [Grundlage] that is preserved and is
present in all subsequent developments, remaining immanent throughout its further
determinations."2' The logic of the concepts of being and nothing form the logical
structure of the work. The logic of other more developed, less primitive concepts are
constructed according to the logic of the concept of pure being: each concept takes
its determinateness from its own " n o t h i n g , " that is, its negation. Negation is
thereby made the vehicle for the reconstruction of categorial concepts. The begin-
ning is a proposal for a constructive " l o g i c " of concepts; Hegel proposes that we
attempt to construct all our categorial concepts in terms of the implicit relation
between a concept and its specific negation. This involvement of a concept with its
other (the Hegelian term for the concept that serves as a negation of another
concept) then leads to a new concept that is thereby justified as a product of and a
solution to the dilemmas of the lower level. The higher level concept is one in which
the dilemmas of the lower level concept do not appear. Hegel calls such a movement
an Aufhebung. Within the Hegelian theory, the term means "integration": the
higher level concept integrates the logic of the lower ones. The determinations a
concept gains by its references to its other, that is, by the move from it to its nega-
tion, is integrated within the higher concept.
Hegel distinguishes three basic types of logical moves within his theory. (1) The
moves appropriate to the logic of being, where one concept passes over into another
concept; that is, where a move to another concept is always sanctioned because there
is nothing to stop it, so to speak. (2) The moves appropriate to the logic of essence,
where each concept has a certain independence on its o w n - - o n e moves to the nega-
tion of concept A but then must move back to concept A. This is described by Hegel
as a reflection of one into the other. (3) The moves appropriate to the logic of con-
ceptuality itself, where one moves to a new concept in which the first concept has a
continuity, for example, the way a universal is continuous in its instances. The
moves from each of these three logics to the other may be architectonically described
as a move from noninclusion of the determining other (being), to partial inclusion of
the determining other (essence), to full inclusion of the determining other (concep-
tuality). The Hegelian thesis is that each of these logics is a novel one, and none can
be reduced to the other. Although there are three basic types of logic in the theory,
all three logics are nevertheless "principled" by the opening move; the beginning
move is "metalogical" for the whole theory. The beginning set of moves, then, has a

" Ibid., p. 54.

~~ Ibid., p. 56.
2, Ibid.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 425

double role: (1) they are principles, that is, metalogical, for the logic of being, which
is only a particular logic of the theory; (2) they are principles, that is, metalogical,
for not only the logic of being but the logic of essence and the logic of conceptuality.
However, if the latter is the case, how can the logic of essence and conceptuality be
novel? If the logic of being is metalogical for the other two, does that not mean that
the other two are reducible to the logic of being?
Here one must distinguish between the sense in which the beginning of the theory
presents the basic moves of the theory and the sense in which later stages of the
theory are developments of this initial move. The sense in which the opening of the
logic presents the characteristic moves of the rest of the theory is to be understood
through the concept of negation. The logic of the concepts in the theory, it is to be
remembered, constitute the meaning, the determinateness, of the concepts in ques-
tion. The opening moves present just that logic: determinateness is to be recon-
structed through the means of negation. A concept gains its determinateness through
its negative relation to another concept. The reconstruction of determinateness
through negation offers, then, a precise expression of the more general program ot
the theory, namely, to reconstruct the determinateness of concepts solely through
their logical relations to one another. The question is, then, which relations? Is there
a multiplicity of them? A few? If there are more than one, how do they relate to one
another? Hegel's proposal is to reconstruct all the relations out of negation. One
cannot merely compare concepts with one another; such comparison would be
something external to the contents of the concepts in question and would certainly
not be constitutive of the content. Only negation is immanent enough to the
concepts to do the job the Hegelian theory demands. Hegel rejects other proposals
as being either external or containing presuppositions within themselves, that is,
already containing a "relation within itself," being already " c o m p l e x . "
It would seem, though, as if Hegel's own objections could be raised against him.
To speak of a concept as a negation of another concept would require, so it seems,
that the two concepts be determinate. That is, it might be argued that negation is no
less external than a number of other relations; indeed, a negation is always a nega-
tion of something; and hence negation must assume the prior determinateness of
that of which it is the negation. Therefore, Hegel's use o f negation would be just as
arbitrary as any other.
Hegel himself saw the problem. As an answer to such a possible objection, he
added four " A n m e r k u n g e n " in later editions of the Logik in an attempt to dispel
such criticism. Negation is to be preferred, so Hegel argues, not only because it is
immanent to the content in question but because a preliminary account can be given
of it. Negation, that is, is preceded by the concept of nothing. The opening concept
of nothing is not simply quivalent to negation; it is the negation in abstraction from
that of which it is the negation, namely, being. Nothing is not equivalent to non-
being, "for in nonbeing the relation to being is contained," and the beginning must
contain no stated relations. Instead, the logical relations are to be developed out of
the initial concepts. Hegel claims that "it first of all has nothing to do with the form
of opposition, that is, of relation, but with the abstract immediate negation, with
Nothing [das Nichts] purely for itself, the relationless denial [Verneinung]-if one
pleases, what could also be expressed through the mere: not [Nicht]."'2 Elsewhere,

2~Ibid., p. 58.
426 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Hegel speaks of "this immediate or abstract negation, ''23 of "the complete abstrac-
tion, thus the already abstract negativity, Nothing, ''2' and claims "that passing-over
[Obergehen] is not yet a relation [Verhi~ltnis]. '':s The terms by which one could con-
nect the concepts of being and nothing are at the beginning not yet given. One
cannot say that they are alike, unlike, nor even that they "pass over" into one
another so long as one remains on the level of the two concepts of pure being and
pure nothing. In this sense, the metalogic of the opening concepts needs to be devel-
oped, not by abstracting from the beginning, but be developing via negation the
kinds of moves characteristic of the metalanguage.
Hegel's reason for thinking that his opening concepts make sense is that the mean-
ing of concepts is to be obtained from their place in the system; that is, meaning is
constituted by the kinds of moves the concepts make. Therefore, the meaning of the
concepts of being and nothing is dependent on their place in the whole system of
concepts. Only insofar as the logic is developed can one speak of being and nothing
as having a full meaning. Hegel's well-known doctrine that the truth is the whole
signifies no more than that: the meaning of categorial concepts is not to be recon-
structed in their isolation from each other but it terms of their logical relations to one
another. It does not refer to any kind of metaphysical thesis. The rationale for the
Hegelian way of putting things off and assuring the reader that the solution is yet to
come finds its roots in this doctrine.
To sum up: The logic of being and nothing and the move to a concept that
integrates (aufhebt) the logic of the two, namely, becoming, is normative for the rest
of the theory. In this sense, it is metalogical for the rest; the rest is to be seen as a
development of this initial logic, a gradual incorporation of " n o t h i n g " into
" b e i n g , " that is, an incorporation of that which gives determinateness to a
c o n c e p t - its negative--into the meaning of the concept itself. On the other hand, the
machinery for commenting on this opening is not yet developed; in this sense, the
metalanguage is something yet to come. The incorporation of its negative into a
concept is the language in which we can talk of the determinateness of concepts (i.e.,
the principle of reconstruction), yet we do not have yet the explicit machinery for
doing so. In order to avoid confusion, therefore, we may speak of the opening of the
logic as furnishing the principle of the theory, and the necessary machinery for
formulating this principle the metalogic of the theory. We could also speak of the
opening moves as forming models for the interpretation of the determinateness of
most concrete concepts.
The logic of the concepts of being and nothing, however, does not present the full
structure of the principles of the theory. From the concept of determinate being
Hegel reconstructs the concept of quality, then of reality, negation, and so on. Con-
cepts such as reality and negation are said by Hegel to be moments of the concept of
determinate being. Hegel's use of " m o m e n t " to characterize this relation of inclu-
sion that some concepts have to another is crucial for his theory. He obviously
intends to draw an analogy to the notion of a circle. A circle is constituted by 360

z~Ibid., p. 85.
~' Ibid.
z~Ibid., p. 90.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 427

degrees, and each degree is said to be a moment of the circle. One can consider each
degree, so to speak, by i t s e l f - a n sich, as Hegel would s a y - b u t a degree is one only
as part of the " w h o l e , " the circle. The circle, then, is made up of its degrees, but its
degrees are such only as a part of the circle. Hegel uses the analogy of the circle in
reference to conceptual structures. The relation of concepts such as reality and nega-
tion to more general concepts such as determinate being is not an inclusion of species
within their genus. By the use of the term " m o m e n t " Hegel is proposing another
sense of inclusion than that of genus-species. To say of some concept that it is a
moment of another is to say that the logic of the former "makes u p " the meaning of
the latter. Concepts that are moments of another concept make up the meaning of
that concept, but they cannot be considered outside of the concept in which they are
included. Being and nothing are the moments of becoming; they are not species of
becoming. It is the movement of being and nothing that constitutes becoming: the
concept of becoming "subsists in this m o v e m e n t . " The term " m o m e n t " is a theore-
tical expression of the leading idea of the Hegelian program, that the determinate-
ness of categorial concepts arises only from their logic, from the kinds of moves that
they make. If certain concepts subsist solely through the logic of their moments, then
the explication of the moments is an explication of the concepts in question.
We need not follow the precise details of Hegel's procedure. What is of impor-
tance are the types of logical moves; that is, the interpretive models he introduces in
the doctrine of qualitative being, since it is through the logic of these preliminary
concepts that the other logics are to be constructed. Negation is to be the basic
vehicle for the construction of the logic of the concepts. The section on qualitative
being presents therefore the basic moves of negation itself. First, one is offered an
antecedent of negation, namely, pure nothing. From the relation of being to nothing
one arrives at the concept of negation as a "determinate nothing." Hegel then works
out the logic of negation, that is, the logic of determinateness, thereby developing
the principles of his theory. The procedure is brought to its first closure in the notion
of being-for-self (Fgirsichsein). Being-for-self is a concept in which the determining
other is included as a moment of the concept itself. It is an ideal and not a real unity
of being. Being-for-self, then, is a concept in which (1) the moments are totally con-
stitutive of it--the logic of the concept includes no reference to a recalcitrant
o t h e r - - a n d (2) the moments have an explicitly stated logic (they are "posited").
Being-for-self, then, is a totality structure, a concept in which the logic of the other
concepts can be stated. It emerges as a necessary result of the conceptual progression
of the Logik. If the Hegelian thesis is accepted, namely, that the " m e a n i n g " of con-
cepts is determined by the logic of their moments, then one will need a totality struc-
ture such as being-for-self in order to state the logic of the moments that have come
before. Indeed, being-for-self is the structure of conceptuality as such. Through the
device of being-for-self Hegel avoids what he calls the " b a d infinite"; he need not go
infinitely from one concept to a concept of that concept, ad infinitum. 2~ Instead, he
has developed a metalogical concept that is inherently "reflexive," that is the result
of the movement of the concepts that have preceded it. It is self-determining in that it
is determined only from the logic of the concepts it includes and not from some other

2~ I have treated the Hegelian notion of the infinite and its relation to being-for-self in more detail in
" H e g e l ' s Philosophy of M a t h e m a t i c s , " forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
428 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

concept (i.e., its dialectical other). Without such a reflexive concept, the progression
in the logic would have no end; it would be the infinite progress of which Hegel
speaks. A concept gains its determinateness from its other; therefore, unless some
device is found in which the determination can come from within, an " o t h e r " will
always emerge. Being-for-self is, then, the closure principle for a conceptual progres-
sion, a means for reflecting on what has come before. With the introduction of it the
whole machinery or principles, that is, the complete working out of the steps of
negation, is thereby presented.
The logic of these concepts forms the totality of principles for Hegel's logic of con-
cepts. Qua concepts they are only particular determinations of qualitative being;
their logic, however, forms the network of principles for the theory. This structure of
principles is what gives to some commentators on Hegel the appearance of arbitrari-
ness or of dogmatism. The principles, however, are not indicative of a dogmatic line
of thought running throughout the theory; they are more indicative of such things as
construction rules, procedures with which to construct the logic of further concepts.

C. The Logic of Conceptuality Having done this, Hegel then reconstructs

the other two basic concepts of the doctrine of being--quantity and measure--and
then begins a new logic, that of terms belonging to the family of concepts he sub-
sumes under the general heading of essence. In the logic of being new determinations
progressively follow one another; in the logic of essence it is new relations of deter-
mination that are introduced. The logic of being is an "entity-logic"; entities are
characterized as, for example, qualitatively or quantitatively different. The terms in
essence-logic, however, cannot be so characterized. An essence and that of which it
is an essence are not two entities standing side by side; each is ingredient in and
relevant to the determinateness of the other. The logic of essence is that of concepts
referring to substructure/superstructure relationships. Reasons of space prohibit
me, however, from going any deeper into this logic.
The two sections of Hegel's Logik, the doctrine of being and the doctrine of
essence, comprise what Hegel calls the objective logic, which he partly identifies with
Kant's transcendental logic and classical metaphysics. The objective logic is, then, a
general ontology, a treatment of the a priori determinations of being. It is "meta-
physical" in an obvious sense; it is the study of being "at large." Its transcendental-
ity is not, however, so immediately obvious. The precise nature of its transcendental-
ity must be spelled out later, but this much is obvious: Hegel's ontology is explicitly
a purely conceptualist one. The a priori determination of objects is demonstrated
through a logic of concepts. In this sense Hegel reconstructs the determinations of
things according to the principles of thought; he thereby reconstructs the a priori
conditions for thought about objects. Ontology is prosecuted via a reconstruction of
how we think about the real.
Why, then, does Hegel's Logik not end with the sections on being and essence?
Hegel holds that once an account of "things" has been offered, what is needed is an
account of the account: conceptuality itself has to be understood. If the logic of
concepts of objects has been given, what is now required to complete the explanation
is a logic of the logic, a metalogic. The principles of conceptuality itself must be
worked out. Again, to put the same point differently, if reconstructive, transcen-
dental thought has provided a reconstruction of concepts of objects, then must it not
 HEGEL'S LOGIC 429

a l s o - f o r the sake of the completeness of the e x p l a n a t i o n - - p r o v i d e an account of

how it is that it can establish or grasp the categories it has thus far laid out? The
doctrine of conceptuality is meant to do just that. It is intended to provide an answer
to a transcendental question; What are the logical conditions of the possibility of
thought's having established the categories that it so far has; that is, what are the
conditions of the possibility of thought's comprehending objective categories? Just
as the first two sections, being and essence, provided the conditions of the possibility
for thought of objects, the section on the concept is meant to establish the conditions
of the possibility for thinking about the first two sections.
Hegel's logic of conceptuality is an attempt to explain how what has come before
has indeed " c o m e a b o u t " and thereby to justify what has come before, that is, the
logic of being and essence. Concepts of being and essence have been given; the ex-
planation now demands that we be told what concepts are. The logic of conceptual-
ity is thus a successor to the logic of being and essence; the determinateness of the
concept of conceptuality (the concept of the concept, as Hegel calls it) is then in part
constituted by the logic of being and essence:

Being and Essence are the moments of its becoming [ Werdens]; it, however, is their founda-
tion [Grundlage] and truth as the identity in which they are submerged and contained. They
are contained in it because it is their result, but no longer as Being and as E~ence; they have
these determinations only insofar as they have not yet gone back into this their unity?'

The specific concepts of the doctrine of being and essence are no longer present; the
logic, the network of principles that make up these concepts, is. The logic of con-
ceptuality is their " t r u t h " insofar as it provides the metalogic of the two earlier sec-
tions, that is, insofar as it establishes the basis from which the first two sections were
done.
What, then, is the logic of conceptuality? Briefly put, the logic of this position
consists in a concept's maintaining its identity in the other that gives it determinate-
ness; the paradigm case of such is the identity of a universal in the m a n y particulars.
The other, then, is fully included in the initial concept. Metalogically, we can see
that a concept is an instance of being-for-self. In the doctrine of being, the other was
not included; something was different from its o t h e r - - t w o books sitting on a table
do not include one another. In the doctrine of essence, there was partial inclusion,
but each m o m e n t maintained an integrity, an independence on its own. The essence
is not divorced from that of which it is the essence as two qualitative or quantitative
entities are; the cause refers to its effect but is not identical with it, nor is the thing
totally identical in all its instances. The logic of conceptuality is that certain concepts
are " c e n t e r s " of determination; a universal is a " c e n t e r " for the determination of its
many instances. In the logic of conceptuality the concept and its other are dialec-
tically intertwined: each is a moment of the other; each is the determining " o t h e r to
the o t h e r . " Hegel describes this "concept of the c o n c e p t " in typical Hegelian
fashion:

Each of them is the totality, each contains the determination of the other within itself, and for
that reason these totalities are purely and simply one, as this unity is the diremption of itself

2, WL, 2:213.
430 HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

into the disengaged seeming [Schein] of this doubleness [Zweiheit] . . . in that one is con-
ceived and expressed, the other is immediately conceived and expressed in it. 2~

Ontologically expressed, a concept is that which ideally included its other. This
inclusion is to be understood in terms of Hegel's theory of determinateness: a con-
cept is determinate only by virtue of its other, in this case, that with which it is
continuous.
In terms of the whole Hegelian theory, we can see that conceptuality is deter-
minate only in virtue of its other, which is being and essence, the a priori determina-
tion of objects. In other words, concepts must be o f being, and this " o f " is to be
understood as the " o f " of intentionality. In order to understand what a concept is,
one must think of it in opposition to the categories of objects. Concepts, and there-
fore thought (insofar as thought is conceptual), are in the fundamental sense inten-
tionaUy o f being. The other from which the concept takes it determinateness is being
and essence. The explanation of conceptuality is therefore also an explanation of
intentionality.
Hegel has this point expressly in mind. He speaks approvingly of the Kantian idea
that the synthetic unity of apperception is the principle of conceptuality as such.
Conceptuality is the "principle" of cognitive consciousness. Hegel's disagreement
with Kant lies in what he considers to be Kant's conflation of an abstract principle
with a particular existent, the I. The principle of conceptuality is not to be confused
with that for which it provides the interpretive model: " F r o m that nonmental just as
well as this mental formation [geistigen Gestalt] of the concept, its logical form is
independent. '''9 The principles of conceptuality form the logical framework for the
reconstruction of m i n d as intentional, but this framework for the reconstruction is
not to be confused with what is reconstructed, that is, with mind or ego as such. The
concept of mind or of the ego is not to be reconstructed in the Logik; only the frame-
work for reconstruction is there presented.
The logic of the concept of cognition is for the subject to overcome the brute
otherness of the object, to bring the " g i v e n " into the conceptual sphere, into the
epistemic (conceptual) framework. To this end, one requires logic, axioms, and so
o n - all moments of the notion of a conceptual framework. Insofar as these schemes
are constructed, the world is not, however, merely apprehended in its givenness but
rather brought under certain norms. Theory is thus not a mere description of the
world. Description of a given is actually a bringing of it under certain norms. Thus,
the concept of cognition is intimately bound up with that of action--that is, ulti-
mately bound up with the establishment of rational norms.
Hegel thus gives a diagnosis of the cognitive relation of knower and known. The
subject brings the world into its own orbit by bringing it into rational conceptual
form. The subject is essentially intentional: " T h e I thinks something, itself or some-
thing else. ''3~ Intentionality is explained as the appropriation of an other into the
sphere of the subject; concretely, it is the bringing of the brute, nonconceptual given
into conceptual form. In terms of Hegel's logical categories, intentionality is an

2, Ibid., p. 219.
2, Ibid., p. 24. Likewise, the WL is not a reconstructionof Geist but offers only the "simple scaffold-
ing" (eitorache Geruste) of such a reconstruction.
~o Ibid., p. 433.
 HEGEL'S LOGIC 431

example of being-for-self, an inclusion of the other within itself; it is the inclusion of

the determinateness of the world in the orbit of the subject, in concepts such that
nothing is "left o v e r , " which is not conceptualized. The " o f " of intentionality is
thereby conceived as inclusion within a concept or a conceptual structure. The exact
nature of the derivation of this concept can be shown only by taking into account the
doctrine of method, or what Hegel calls the absolute ldea.

D. The Absolute Idea: Metalogical Considerations The move into what

Hegel calls the absolute Idea is the place within the theory where the method of the
theory can become thematic, can be reflected upon. If the m e t h o d - t h e logic of the
concepts, devised to account for their d e t e r m i n a t e n e s s - i s indeed constitutive of the
determinateness of the categories, then the consideration of conceptuality as such is
a consideration of the logic of conceptuality. This logic is, moreover, identical with
the method of the Logik itself. Thus, the final concept is not so much an "individ-
u a l " concept (as, say, " s u b s t a n c e " is) but is a metaconcept, a concept-principle. It
is the point at which the method becomes explicit, thematic; it is the metalogical
consideration of what has gone before: " W h a t comes here for consideration is not a
content but the universal in its f o r m - - t h a t is, the method.'"' Hegel claims that it is
the identity of subject and object, meaning no more than that the subject of the
m o v e m e n t - t h e logic of c o n c e p t s - - h a s at this point become the object of considera-
tion. Formerly, the object was some particular concept or set of concepts, but now it
is conceptuality itself. The consideration of the absolute idea, then, is a reflection of
the standpoint from which the rest of the Logik is written.
What, then, is the method? Hegel simply claims that " t h a t which constitutes the
method are the determinations of the concept itself and their relations that are now
to be considered in the significance as determinations of the m e t h o d . " " The method
is quite simply the means of relating the concepts with one another. But it is not
something external to the concepts in Question: it is constitutive of them.
It is a reconstructive method that is structured into three aspects: (1) a progressive
aspect, (2) a regressive aspect, and (3) a systemic or architectonical aspect. Together,
the three aspects constitute Hegel's dialectic. The first of these, the progressive
aspect, is the logical movement of establishing new content, the progressive intro-
duction of new concepts. It is the means by which new content is placed ( " t h e
forward moving further determination"). It is not a process of deduction; clearly,
deduction in a strict sense of the term could not provide new content. The progres-
sive aspect, rather, is the placing of new concepts partly as a solution to dilemmas,
specifically, to avoid contradiction. Since the progressive m o v e m e n t cannot create
new content, the content must be granted. That is, one grants a n u m b e r of concepts
to be reconstructed, and then one places them in a progressive order. What consti-
tutes the progression is an arrangement of concepts from abstract to concrete; the
early concepts display an abstract determinateness, and what follows becomes
"always richer and more concrete."33

" Ibid., p. 485.

" Ibid., p. 487.
" ibid., p. 502. Hegel takes both the progressive and regressivemethods from Kant's characterization
of his own method. Kant distinguishes a progressive, synthetic method from an analytic, regressive
method in his work; the Critique of Pure Reason follows, Kant says, a progressive, synthetic method
432 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

The progressive m o m e n t offers, then, only a placement of content according to the

concreteness of the concept in question; it cannot create any new concepts. Hence, a
regressive aspect is required, a " b a c k w a r d s going grounding [Begriindung] of the
b e g i n n i n g . " " The basis of the forward movement found in the progressive aspect is
that each concept is deficient in determinateness in respect to the next one; the
former exhibits a deficiency in terms of the latter, and the movement goes forward in
order to overcome the deficiency.
Ultimately, all concepts are deficient in terms of the final concept, the absolute
Idea, and thus the progressive m o m e n t has a teleological bent to it. The prior con-
cepts are antecedents of later ones; their logic is in part constitutive of the later
concepts. The arrangement of concepts according to the schema " p r i o r - l a t e r " offers
thereby a genealogy of concepts; the prior concepts are more primitive than later
ones; they are " a n c e s t o r s " of the later ones. ~5 The so-called genealogical aspect of
the m o v e m e n t constitutes the regressive feature of the method. Seen regressively,
each concept has a set of " a n c e s t e r s " that may be said to explain it. This is the sense
of transcendental explanation as it occurs in the Hegelian theory. A concept m a y be
said to be explained when (1) its logic is exhibited and (2) when it is shown to be
developed out of other concepts. To put it another way, we could say that a concept
has been explained in the Hegelian sense when it has been systematically redescribed
in the framework of Hegel's theory, that is, when it has been reconstructed as arising
out of moves of negation and double negation (as Hegel understands it).
Both m o v e m e n t s -- the progressive and the regressive-- are necessary to the theory.
If the theory is not to be a mere catalogue or a listing of items on a sheet of paper,
then it must offer some way of establishing its concepts, tt therefore calls for an
arrangement of concepts in terms of foundational logical relations. This is provided
by the progressive-regressive aspects of the method. Since the progressive aspect
cannot be deduction, it must be a process of establishing new content that is already
granted; thus the progressive movement is the reconstruction of what, regressively
seen, is already granted. One has a totality--the categorial apparatus of knowledge
- a n d one attempts to reconstruct this whole in terms of its logical relations.
The vehicle for reconstruction is the concept of determinate negation. This is
articulated through the third aspect of the method, which we may call the architec-
tonic. Hegel himself does not use the term, but there is a structure to his theory that
may be so labeled. The progressive m o m e n t is a constructive " u p - b u i l d i n g "
(Aufbau) of concepts; the regressive m o m e n t is the " u n - b u i l d i n g , " so to w of
the same concepts. Together, these two aspects cannot support a well-ordered move-
ment such as the Hegelian theory requires. The notion of a progressive m o v e m e n t
specifies only that the concepts follow one another; the notion of the regressive
movement specifies only which concepts there are. If the determinateness of concepts
is to be constituted by their logic, and if the logic of ordinary usage is to be rejected,
then the logic, that is, the kind of moves concepts make vis ~ vis one another, must

(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Peter G. Lucas [Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1959], pp. 4, 5n).
~" WL, 2:503.
32A similar notion of the role of the architectonic as providing a genealogy of concepts can be found in
Klaus Hartmann's, "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View," in Alisdair Maclntyre, ed., Hegel: A Collec-
tion o f Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 101-24.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 433

be constructed. This logic is the architectonic of the theory. The architectonic is

constituted by the basic models of interpretation and provides the principles for
ordering the concepts. It is in virtue of the architectonic that concepts are seen to be
deficient; and the architectonic determines the kind of deficiency that is present. We
may distinguish, moreover, between the architectonic on the large scale and the
architectonic on the small scale. On the large scale, there is a movement from (1)
noninclusion of concepts in one another, as is found in the doctrine of being (e.g.,
something and something else, quantitative difference, etc.), to (2) partial inclusion,
as is found in the doctrine of essence, to (3) full inclusion, as is found in the doctrine
of conceptuality. The terminal point is total inclusion, which is the absolute Idea, or
conceptuality giving an account of itself. The large-scale architectonic regulates the
large-scale transitions on the theory, that is, those from Being to Essence and from
Essence to Concept. This is also illustrative of a peculiar strength of a Hegelian style
of transcendental theory: even if a particular transition is not valid, the transition
per se has a rationale to it, since architectonically the former position must yield to a
later one--noninclusion must yiel d to at least partial inclusion. The whole progres-
sive movement is not invalidated by a faulty transition. This obviously puts the
Hegelian style of system at odds with a purely deductive theory in which a faulty
inference can invalidate the whole outcome.
Each particular transition is regulated by the small-scale architectonic. Each
domain of the Logik has its own logic, and within this logic is a small-scale archi-
tectonical ordering. Thus, while the doctrine of being has its place in the large-scale
architectonic as the logic of noninclusion, the logic of being has its own special type
of architectonic. Hegel delineates the small architectonic in the following way:
The abstract form of progression in Being is an other and passing-over in an other, in Essence
an appearing [Scheinen] in opposites [Entgegensetzen], in the concept the differentiatedness of
the individual from universality, which is continuous as such in that which is differentiated
from it and with it as identity. ~

Again, a particular transition may not be valid, but the necessity for such a transi-
tion is prescribed architectonically. The large-scale and small-scale architectonic
thus offers the theorist a schema for placing c o n c e p t s - t h a t is, a schema for the
reconstruction of c o n c e p t s - a n d it is then an open question whether or not a parti-
cular concept validly fills the particular spot in the schema.
If Hegel's proposal for an immanent, logical reconstruction of concepts is to be
valid, however, the architectonic must be not external to the concepts in question
but immanent to them, constitutive of their determinateness. Hence, the architec-
tonic cannot be merely constructed and applied but must itself be developed. This
underlies Hegel's insistence on the importance of the beginning of the theory. The
beginning must develop the architectonic out of itself. In order for the beginning to
develop this, however, it must (1) be deficient and (2) have the architectonic
immanent within it. It must also have the other characteristics noted earlier. The
logic of the method must come from the beginning itself but not as thematic. If one
merely applied the architectonic, then there would be no problem of beginning.
Hence, Hegel says that " t h e immediate of the beginning must by itself [an ihm

~ E , 240.
434 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

selbst] be deficient and infected with the impulse to lead itself further. ''37 For this
reason the beginning must be indeterminate in order to present a genealogy of deter
minateness. The move to determinateness, which is constitutive of the architectonic,
is presented at the beginning. Clearly, however, the procedure is circular. If some-
thing is deficient, it is deficient only in terms of something else. Hence, the deficiency
of the beginning is one only in terms of at least the next stage and ultimately the end.
But Hegel's point is that since the method, the logic of the concepts, is constitutive
of their determinateness, the genealogy of determinateness is the genealogy likewise
of the architectonically structured method. In this sense, the architectonic emerges
from the beginning, since the logic of determinateness emerges there. Circularity
ensues because this initial logic later explains itself in the terminal concept, where
full inclusion is attained. The circularity is not a petitio since the beginning is not a
premise that then appears in the conclusion. Rather, it is a more subtle case of a con-
structivist self-explanation; the dialectical logic is able to give an account of itself in
its own terms. What is to be e x p l a i n e d - t h e explanadum -- is the same as that which
does the e x p l a i n i n g - t h e explanans; in both cases it is conceptuality or " t h o u g h t . "
Within the theory it is not as if one has a stance from which results are derived, either
deductively or constructively; there is not a first premise that on the grounds of cer-
tainty is to be preferred and to which all else is related. Rather, a p r i n c i p l e - t h e
unity of being and nothing--is in virtue of its logic able to give an account of itself.
The principle of conceptuality itself can be grasped and understood. There is thus no
surd in the explanation: the beginning is explained as the primordial case of deter-
minateness by the end, and the end is the development of the beginning. Closure is
achieved in that there remains no countervailing " o t h e r " at the end of the theory.
Conceptuality accounts for itself; the explanans (the bestowal of determinateness via
determinate negation) explains itself. To use Hegelian language, thought categorizes
itself as categorizing its other. The accusation ofpetitio does not enter also because
the scheme is reconstructive, not deductive. A principle that is akin to a construction
rule is developed at the beginning; at the end the "construction rule" grasps itself.
Thought understands that its determinateness comes from the whole logic of its con-
cepts, its moments. The circularity lies in the fact that the principle that is operative
in the beginning can by virtue of its logic become thematic at the end. There is no
leap from the object language, so to speak, to the metalanguage.

It is the pure concept that has itself for object and that, in that it runs as object through the
totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, to a system of science
and with that concludes by grasping this comprehension of itself, thereby integrating [auf-
zuheben] its position as content and object and cognizing [erkennen] the concept of science.3'

In terms of the game analogy, the Logik can be seen in two ways: (1) a static
w a y - t h e collective arrangement of all the " p i e c e s " on the " b o a r d " ; (2) a dynamic
w a y - t h e m o v e m e n t from one position to another.
The rest of the Hegelian p r o g r a m follows virtually automatically from this begin-
ning. The Logik is an attempt, a proposal, to reconstruct the determinateness of the

J' W L , 2:489.
~l Ibid., p. 505.
 H E G E L ' S LOGIC 435

purely categorial concepts of experience in terms of the concepts found within the
Logik. A second type of reconstruction follows. Having set up his general ontology,
Hegel attempts systematically to redescribe more concrete notions in the terms of his
general ontology. Thus, one accordingly can systematically redescribe the concepts
of natural science, reconstructing their logic along the lines of the concepts found in
the Logik. In this way one can investigate the foundations of scientific theories; one
can place the concrete concepts of science and experience in the now intelligible
framework of the Logik. Such a proposal is enacted in Hegel's philosophy of nature.
One can do likewise for concepts in the behavioral and political sciences, a proposal
Hegel enacts in his philosophy of subjective mind and objective mind. The con-
clusion of such more concrete reconstructions would be the reconstruction of the
notion of philosophy itself. Philosophy becomes conceived as the conceptual cri-
tique of the other domains of conceptuality, for example, natural science, behavioral
science, science of politics, and so on. The advantages to such a reconstruction are
then twofold: (1) one can claim to understand, that is, to have provided foundations
for, the basic concepts found in science and experience; (2) one has a method of plac-
ing sciences according to the kind of explaination they offer.
In conclusion, we note how the Hegelian theory on this reading fits into more con-
temporary styles of philosophy. There is, first, in contemporary philosophy the
newly reawakened concern for system in philosophy. Hegelian theory obviously
answers to this concern, but with Hegel's careful attention to constructing the
systemic (architectonical) aspect of his theory out of a small set of basic principles
that are themselves developed in the Logik, he avoids many of the charges
commonly associated with such systematizing, namely, that of " f o r c i n g " material
into places where it does not fit. Hegel's concern for analyzing and reconstructing
the logic of the concepts that constitute the core of our conceptual framework is also
very much in line with other types of contemporary concerns. In its search for first
principles, much of contemporary philosophy stresses a clarification of particular
problems at the expense, perhaps, of system. Hegelian philosophy, with its notion of
an " i m m a n e n t " system of concepts, need not be taken as very far from this type of
concern. Hegel is not simply some nineteenth-century German romantic listening to
his own incantations of the World Spirit but a philosopher concerned with carefully
working out the logical relations between all the different ways in which we experi-
ence things and talk about that experience. Nor is he the champion of those who
would like to reject the principle of noncontradiction, as he is often supposed to be.
To see Hegel in this light, as a kind of transcendental philosopher, is, I would main-
tain, the proper and the most fruitful way to read him.

Georgetown University