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Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy: The Bangladesh

Experience

Article in Public Organization Review · June 2011

DOI: 10.1007/s11115-010-0116-5

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Public Organiz Rev (2011) 11:155–176
DOI 10.1007/s11115-010-0116-5

Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban

Policy: The Bangladesh Experience

Pranab Kumar Panday & Ishtiaq Jamil

Published online: 6 May 2010

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract The paper analyzes factors that impede inter- and intra-organizational
coordination in urban governance in policy implementation. The unit of analysis is
the Rajshahi City Corporation, one of six large municipalities in Bangladesh.
Inadequate institutional rules and regulations, ambiguous system for financial
management and shady practices create a large degree of discontent amongst officials
and impede both inter-organizational and intra-organizational coordination in
implementing urban infrastructure policy. In addition, central-local relations, different
modes of operation and patterns of accountability act as barriers to sound working
relationships between the city corporation and other government departments and
autonomous agencies operating within the jurisdiction of the city corporation.

Keywords Inter- and intra-organizational coordination . Policy implementation .

Rajshahi City corporation . Bangladesh

Introduction

Good urban governance is the sine qua non for the successful implementation of
policies. In fact, successful policy implementation is an important indicator for
measuring good governance. Bangladesh (a South Asian Country) has two types of
institutions for providing good governance to its urban citizens. For the six
divisional cities there are six city corporations (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna,
Rajshahi, Sylhet and Barisal) and for the urban areas (secondary towns), there
are almost 309 pourashavas. The present study focuses on one of the six city
corporations of Bangladesh—the Rajshahi City Corporation (RCC).

P. K. Panday (*)
Department of Public Administration, University of Rajshahi, Rajshahi, Bangladesh
e-mail: pranabpanday@yahoo.com

I. Jamil
Department of Administration and Organization Theory, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
156 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

When discussing ‘policy implementation’ in this study, we refer not only to

courses of action adopted for the sake of expediency between and within the various
departments discussed; we also include in this concept the initiation and completion
(i.e., ‘implementation’) of infrastructure-related projects in the RCC’s area of
jurisdiction. As far as the RCC’s policy implementation is concerned, coordination
amongst its different departments (intra-organizational coordination) and with the
other city corporations and various departments (inter-organizational coordination) is
essential. With regard to intra-organizational coordination, departments within an
organization need to coordinate their activities to achieve organizational objectives.
Thus, successful policy implementation requires clear division of labor about who
will do what, when and how amongst various departments to foster sound working
relationships between these departments. On the other hand, where inter-
organizational relations are concerned, coordination between different government
departments and autonomous entities working under a city corporation’s jurisdiction
is crucial for providing better urban facilities to the city corporation’s residents.1
Therefore, successful policy implementation depends to a large extent on how these
organizations interact with one another.
Coordination is complex and crucial, both at the day-to-day operation level and at
the policy level. Coordination problems may occur when several institutions are
required to act together to achieve certain objectives, and the problems may worsen
if the various institutions’ activities, operations and areas of jurisdiction overlap. For
example, research indicates that at least 42 institutions are involved in carrying out
different aspects of urban development in the Dhaka Metropolitan Area (DMA)
(Mohit 1992:101, cited in Khan 1997:16). Lack of cooperation and coordination
between municipal governments, on the one hand, and special government bodies,
various development authorities and special purpose authorities, on the other hand,
stems from the former being elected bodies, while the latter are government agencies
whose nature of operation and system for reporting decisions are different. This
acute lack of coordination has also to a large extent made it difficult for the
municipal corporations to implement various policies and solve the problems of their
clientele (Khan 1997:16).
Lack of coordination creates numerous problems, one of which is failure in
meeting project deadlines, and the other being overlap and duplication of activities.
This causes many development projects to remain incomplete in the middle stage.
When a deadline is missed, the cost of the project increases, creates chaos,
confusion, discord and fiction among various departments which subsequently leads
to inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the activities of the organizations involved
(Khan 1997:29). Accordingly, it becomes difficult for a city corporation to start new
projects. Such problems deprive citizens of the opportunities good urban governance
could have offered. This is evident from the following example:
In 2003, the World Bank withdrew nearly 50% of USD 220 million allocated
grants for the development of the transport infrastructure in the Dhaka City
(capital of Bangladesh) that was a clear sign of the donor institution being
1
Examples of autonomous entities and government agencies working within the RCC areas are the Power
Development Board (PDB), the Roads and Highways Department (R&HD), the Local Government
Engineering Department (LGED), and Rajshhai Development Authority (RDA).
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 157

disillusioned with the progress made in its implementation. The fund cuts had
led to dropping of two major components of the plan, the first one having to do
with reduction of traffic congestion and the second with pollution control. This
happened because of lack of coordination and understanding between Dhaka
City Corporation (DCC) and Roads and Highways Department (R&HD), the
two principal agencies involved in the projects. Both the organizations were
blaming each other for the World Bank decision to withdraw funds. Obviously,
they were trying to hide behind their failures by passing the buck against each
other (The Daily Star, 12.03.03, quoted verbatim).
The major concern of this paper is to analyze those factors that impede
coordination in the process of urban policy implementation. We analyze both
intra- and inter-organizational coordination, and in this regard particular focus is on
identifying factors that affect both these coordination and their roles in urban policy
implementation. Since it is impossible to shed light on the implementation of all the
RCC’s policies in a single study, we choose to narrow our scope to its implementation
of infrastructure policy. While exploring how different actors’ roles affect coordina-
tion, we seek to identify the various departments within and outside the RCC with
whom the authorities must collaborate in order to successfully build infrastructure.
Emphasis is also placed on discussing the essence of coordination in policy
implementation, and on elucidating the formal coordination mechanism of urban
governance bodies in Bangladesh. The paper is based on empirical data collected in
2004, through open-ended questionnaires. These were administered to officials and
elected representatives of the RCC as well as officials from different government
departments and autonomous agencies working within RCC’s jurisdictional area.

Coordination: a conceptual overview

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘coordination’ as ‘the action of

coordinating; harmonious combination of agents and functions towards the
production of a result’ (cited in Robinson et al. 2000:7). According to Mooney
and Riley (cited in Islam, 1994:2), coordination unites group efforts in a concerted
manner to achieve a common goal. Christensen and Lægreid (2008:2) argue that the
way through which structure and functioning of organizations can be described and
analyzed is coordination. It helps to pool resources, expertise, experiences, and
synchronize activities of different organizations that are dependent on one another
and in a situation when an organization finds it difficult to achieve an objective alone
and depends on others for achieving a common goal. Therefore, coordination is a
result of the existence of dependencies within an organization as well as between
and among organizations. Thus, coordination can be an important mechanism
through which disparate agencies come together with the intention of making their
efforts more compatible (in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency).
Of the many dimensions of coordination, intra- and inter-organizational
coordination are important in the present paper because different departments within
and outside the city corporation are involved in the process of implementing
infrastructure policy. With respect to the policy implementation in urban governance
in Bangladesh, coordination refers to working relationships between the actors.
158 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

Intra-organizational coordination

In the beginning of the 20th century, Taylorism based on scientific management as

expounded by Frederick Taylor, administrative principles proposed by Henry Fayol,
and later Weber’s description of legal-rational bureaucracy were all attempts to
structure organizational activities, foster division of labor, ensure sound coordina-
tion, and achieve organizational objectives (Scott 2003). As such, activities within an
organization were formalized, i.e. divided according to expertise and grouped in
different units to ensure better coordination for the purpose of achieving predetermined
goals. Formalization specified who can and cannot do what, when, and how.
Mintzberg (1979) argues that when organizations change from being simple to
complex, or from being stable to dynamic structures, different modes of intra-
organizational coordination are required, such as a) mutual adjustment, b) direct
supervision, c) standardization of work, d) standardization of outputs, and e)
standardization of skills. The mode of mutual adjustment coordinates work through
the simple process of informal communication. The direct supervision mode
achieves coordination by having one individual take responsibility for the work of
others. Work processes are standardized when the contents of the work are specified
or programmed. Outputs are standardized when the results of the work are specified,
e.g., when workers are informed about the specific level of performance they should
achieve or the target they should hit. Skills (and knowledge) are standardized when
the kind of training required to perform the work is specified.
In the present study, the term ‘intra-organizational coordination’ is used to denote
the existing working relationship between different departments within the RCC. In
this respect, our concern is to what extent the rules are formalized, functions are
standardized, and properly specified and divided among various departments to
ensure coordination, and thereby achieve RCC objectives.

Inter-organizational coordination

When organizations operate as part of a wider environment involving different

actors—governmental institutions, regulatory bodies, trade unions, private organ-
izations, etc.—it is of great significance to study inter-organizational coordination,
organization structure and the functions and behaviour of the actors (Thompson
2003; Scott 2003; Hatch 1997). The emergence of the open-system perspective in
studying organizations has led to numerous studies, particularly in the 1960s and
1970s, of inter-organizational coordination and networks as a precondition for
organizational success and survival (Christensen et al. 2007). In the context of
these studies, ‘task environment’ refers to those actors in the environment with
whom an organization deals regarding decisions, services, and products. The areas
of inter-organizational relationships were termed ‘inter-organizational fields’ (IOF)
by Warren (1967), or ‘inter-organizational communities’ by Hawley in 1950,
in order to ‘focus on a geographically bounded collection of organizations
rendered interdependent because of functional ties or shared locality’ (cited in
Scott 2003).
Evan (1966) may have been the first to point out that ‘organization sets’ parallel
individual ‘role sets’, with two or more organizations interacting in a set of roles to
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 159

achieve or accomplish a particular task or exchange. The concept of ‘organizational

population’ has also been coined to denote ‘aggregates of organizations that are alike
in some respect—for example, higher education institutions, municipalities, news-
papers, etc.’ (Scott 2003). Different ways of describing an environment populated by
organizations serve to illustrate how they interact, collaborate and coordinate
activities. When a policy is implemented by several organizations, inter-
organizational coordination is important for the policy’s successful implementation.
It is assumed that rules and standard operating procedures will describe what one
should do, when to do it and how to do it, for this will ensure a sound working
relationship between the actors. Here, ‘sound working relationship’ means a
relationship based on trust and reciprocity, thereby reducing the cost of transactions
(Putnam 1993; North 1990). According to Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:465–67)
effective policy implementation requires that those responsible for implementation
have a clear understanding of the program’s standards and objectives. Standards and
objectives cannot be carried out unless they are stated with sufficient clarity so that
implementers know what is expected of them. Hence, as intimated, communication
within and between organizations is a complex and difficult process, and given the
importance of inter-organizational coordination in the urban governance of
Bangladesh, the paper focuses on factors that affect coordination.

The essence of coordination in policy implementation

The need for coordinating the implementation of policies by urban local bodies is
beyond question. Siddique (1994) identifies several reasons why coordination/
cooperation within and amongst different urban local bodies is important. First,
it could pave the way for identifying and solving common problems. Second, it
could lead to the pooling and sharing of costly machinery, financial resources,
expertise and experience, all of which could be used in providing certain common
services. Examples of such services include public health, planning of various
kinds, election administration, staff training, public works, tax assessment and
collection, waste disposal, recreational facilities and civil defence. Third, not only
could it help resolve disputes without outside intervention; it could also engender
joint venture projects. Fourth, coordination and cooperation could be used for
standardizing services, work procedures, personnel systems and so forth. Finally, it
is only through getting together that local government bodies can challenge their
existing peripheral status and strike a better deal with the national government
(Siddique 1994:304–305).
Coordination may affect policy implementation in two ways: either successfully
or unsuccessfully. Sound coordination may lead to the successful implementation of
policies, while a lack of coordination may lead to unsuccessful policy implemen-
tation. As Panday (2006:49–50) puts it, ‘Good implementation means timely project
completion, minimization of cost, and satisfactory public service delivery. Bad
implementation means delays in project completion, cost increases, and unsatisfac-
tory public service delivery’. Thus coordination within an organization and between
different organizations is one of the prime requisites for successfully implementing
policies. These issues are outlined in the following figure (Fig. 1).
160 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

Implementation of
Infrastructure Policy of RCC

Sound coordination Lack of coordination

Successful Unsuccessful
* Timely project * Delay in project
completion completion
* Minimization of * Cost increases
cost * Duplication of
* Satisfactory functions and
public service resource wastage
delivery * Unsatisfactory
public service
delivery

Source: Adapted and Modified from Panday (2006:50)

Fig. 1 Impact of coordination on policy implementation

The implementation of RCC’s infrastructure policy: identification of actors

Since the present study concentrates on exploring the challenges of coordination in

RCC’s implementation of its infrastructure policy, it is important to figure out which
actors are involved in implementing the policy. The engineering department is
responsible for developing the RCC’s infrastructure. A number of projects relating to
the development of infrastructure are in fact approved by the RCC every year. Once
approved, the responsibility for implementing these projects is vested in the
engineering department. ‘Infrastructure Policy’ in this study thus refers to those
projects whose initiation and implementation are taken care of by the engineering
department. It is however impossible for the engineering department to implement
projects single-handedly because several other RCC departments are necessarily
involved. For instance, within the RCC, cooperation from the accounts department is
essential for successfully implementing programs related to funding, and cooperation
from the public relations office is essential for matters relating to the circulation of
tenders and bids (Panday 2007:248–249). There is also the inevitable need for
cooperation from at least three other government departments or autonomous
agencies, which share responsibility for improving infrastructure and providing
better public service facilities to citizens. These departments are the Rajshahi
Development Authority (RDA), the Roads and Highways Department (R&HD) and
the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED).2 In such a situation,
ensuring coordination (both intra- and inter-organizational) is a prime requisite for
successfully building infrastructure in the RCC areas. The total scenario of
involvement by different actors is presented in the following diagram (Fig. 2).

2
RDA is an autonomous body administered by government officials whose main objective is to build a
planned town in the divisional headquarters of Rajshahi. The R&HD and the LGED are the government
departments responsible for developing infrastructure (construction and maintenance of the major road and
bridge network) within Rajshahi City.
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 161

Government/Autonomous Implementation of RCC Departments within RCC

Departments Infrastructure Policy

Rajshahi Development
Authority (RDA)
Accounts Office
Local Government
Engineering Department Engineering Department
(LGED) Public Relations Office

Roads & Highways

Department (R&HD)

Source: Adopted and Modified from Panday (2006) and Panday (2007).

Fig. 2 Actors involved in the implementation of RCC’s infrastructure policy

Formal coordination mechanisms in urban government bodies in Bangladesh

At present there are hardly any formal or informal arrangements for ensuring
coordination and cooperation between urban, local government bodies working at
the same level. In fact, it is only during training programmes or conventions
arranged by the national government that local government functionaries are able to
come together and get to know one another’s problems to any extent. Such get-
togethers are, however, few and far between (Siddique 1994:304–305). In the case of
city corporations, the Awami League (AL is one of the two largest political parties
and the party which came back to power in 2009) which came into power in 1996
and established a high-powered coordination committee in each city corporation.
These are chaired by the minister in charge of LGRD&C, with the mayor acting as
the co-chairman. Top officials of various service institutions are also members.3 The
committees were formed in order to ensure better management of services within the
territory of each city corporation and to settle disputes between the city corporation
and various government agencies. Once formed, however, these committees gave
rise to controversy over their effectiveness. For example, the Dhaka City
Corporation (DCC) coordination committee was ineffective in settling disputes. It
met eleven times from 1996 to 1998 with the intention of resolving disagreements.
Although several issues such as water logging and mosquito control, traffic
management and garbage disposal were discussed in the meetings, only one
concrete decision was taken. The only outcome of these deliberations was

3
The inclusion of higher officials from different service-providing institutions in the coordination
committee varies depending on the city corporation. In the case of Dhaka City Corporation, top officials
from Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (RAJUK), Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
(DWASA), Dhaka Electricity Supply Authority (DESA), Department of Public Health Engineering
(DPHE), Power Development Board (PDB), Bangladesh Telephone and Telegraph Board (BTTB), etc.,
are members. In the case of RCC, top officials from Rajshahi Development Authority (RDA), Roads and
Highways Department (R&HD), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), and Bangladesh
Telephone and Telegraph Board (BTTB) are members of the coordination committee.
162 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

some development in dealing with water logging and mosquito control in Dhaka
City (Siddique et al. 2000:171). Further, during this period there was little scope
for taking the initiative in settling matters of dispute. After the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP is the other largest political party) came to power in 2001,
it imposed a ban on the operation of the coordination committees. Now there is
no coordinating body in urban governance that can deal with matters of dispute
(Panday 2008:568).

Problems of coordination in Rajshahi City corporation’s governance

In terms of governance, the major consequence of inadequate inter-organizational

coordination is a lack of awareness that certain problems exist, and even if actors are
aware of a problem, their understanding of its scope is limited. This deprives the
RCC of learning how to cope with the challenges of governance and service
delivery. There is no concerted effort to solve problems. Governance is based on ad
hoc initiatives rather than on a master plan. For example, the Rajshahi Development
Authority and the RCC are supposed to work as partners in the planning and
execution of such activities as solid waste management, sanitation, and waste-water
drainage, but they lack a formal relationship (Ara et al. 2007:14).
With regard to intra-organizational cooperation, the problems arise because ward
commissioners who are responsible for a particular jurisdictional area are fully
dependent on the RCC for financial and logistical support, but they are also
dependent on mayoral consent to carry out development activities. Since there is no
formal mechanism for allocating resources toward commissioners, allocations follow
the line of clientelism: some loyal ward commissioners are more favoured than
others. Allocation, therefore, is a highly politicized field in which the mayor plays
the crucial role and his preferences take precedence over formal and legal rules.
Similarly, in the absence of a proper exercise of regulations, the RCC is allowing
private real-estate companies to commercially develop RCC land. For example, an
entrepreneur who is also a law maker belonging to the party presently in power, has
of late been trying to gain access to RCC land for his own real estate development
projects. In accordance with the law, the RCC cannot legally allocate land to a
private real estate developer. Newspaper reports indicate that the RCC will most
likely abide by the preferences of the law maker belonging to the party in power
(The Daily Star, May 19, 2009). Such acts of favouring some at the cost of others
and, more importantly, of defying formal legal mechanisms, bear witness of the
informal networking and corrupt practices based on political connections.
As mentioned, in the absence of formal coordination mechanisms, some problems
are not even recognized by the authorities. The following news item serves as an
example:

Most of the passenger bus sheds built by the Rajshahi City Corporation about
15 years back have been occupied by small traders, causing sufferings to the
commuters. City residents alleged that the sheds, many of which have become
haven for anti-social elements, remain occupied by vendors and small traders
(New Age, May 22, 2009, quoted verbatim).
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 163

To summarise the implications of inadequate coordination in urban governance,

the following are the major consequences:
a) Inability to identify the seriousness of an existing problem or the existence of a
new problem and to respond adequately.
b) Inability to pool resources, information and skills in order to develop probable
solutions to urban problems.
c) Inability to build consensus and trust amongst the stakeholders handling the
problems.
d) Inability to inculcate joint responsibility and thus reduce resistance from those
who must implement the policies.
e) Decisions are based on ad hoc plans that often reflect narrow political interests
based on patron-clientelism.

The challenge of coordination in policy implementation

in Rajshahi City corporation

The above discussions substantiate that there are hardly any formal mechanism for
ensuring sound coordination within the city corporation departments and with other
entities working in the city corporation areas. In order to investigate the challenges
of coordination and how they affect policy implementation, a study was conducted
by the authors on the implementation of RCC’s infrastructure policy in 2004. As part
of data collection, the mayor, chief executive officer, chief executive engineer, chief
medical officer, budget cum accounts officer and public relations officer from RCC
were interviewed. In addition, the chairman, executive engineer and town planner
from RDA, the executive engineer and deputy divisional engineer from R&HD and
the executive engineer from LGED were also interviewed.
From the findings, we observed that RCC’s policy implementation suffers from
both intra- and inter-organizational coordination problems, and that these hinder the
implementation of infrastructure policy; this failure comes to expression through
delays in project completion, cost increases and unsatisfactory public service
delivery. When total processes are examined, we can see that it is the general public
who suffers because it is deprived of the benefit of urban services. Since our main
aim is to explore the challenges of coordination (in other words, we ask why inter-
and intra-coordinative problems occur), we refrain from delving into details to
measure the impact of coordination on urban policy implementation.4
The study’s findings suggest that a number of factors are responsible for the lack
of intra- and inter-organizational coordination in carrying out infrastructure-related
projects. Among these factors, a lack of institutionalized rules and regulations and a
lack of financial management are responsible for the intra-organizational coordina-
tion problem, while central-local relations and different modes of operation and
accountability patterns are responsible for the inter-organizational problem.

4
For more details about the impact of intra- and inter-organizational coordination problems in urban
policy implementation, please refer to Panday (2006), and Panday (2007).
164 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

Lack of institutionalized rules and regulations

The study’s findings suggest that the lack of institutionalized rules and regulations is
one of the major challenges for ensuring sound intra-organizational coordination in
RCC’s project initiation and completion processes. In fact, successful operation of
any organization depends to a large extent on how rules are institutionalized, since
rules act as guides for an organization’s employees (March and Olsen 1995). This
perspective advocates that rules are the most important means for defining
institutions and for governing behaviour within them (Peters 1999:346). Here, an
individual’s role is defined by rules that provide the context for action. Moreover,
institutional rules provide information on an individual’s probable future behaviour
and are the basis for punishing non-compliance (Knight 1992:17). With respect to
the impact of intra-organizational coordination in urban policy implementation,
institutional rules and regulations are important because different departments are
involved in carrying out infrastructure-related projects. If rules and regulations are
not properly institutionalized, problems of intra-organizational coordination occur.
It was observed that the Rajshahi City Corporation Act of 1987, through which
RCC operates, is nearly two decades old and lacks guidelines regarding how to
maintain relations and coordination between the RCC departments. In fact, rules
stipulating how the RCC officials should coordinate their activities are rare. It is
obvious that no RCC department can perform alone. For example, although the
responsibility for building urban infrastructure is vested in the engineering
department, it needs to be properly coordinated with the accounts department for
funds, and with the public relations department for calling public procurement
tenders and bids. Thus, to successfully implement infrastructure, it is essential that
all departments coordinate their activities based on institutional rules.
Due to a lack of properly institutionalized rules and regulations, there is no
standard way for RCC officials to maintain relationships with one another. It was
observed that RCC respondents were confused while identifying the types of intra-
organizational coordination in their organization. This indicates that they have a
hazy picture of coordinated relationships.5 Of the six respondents from RCC, only
two were of the opinion that the basis of relationships is routine based; the other four
respondents viewed relationships as hierarchic, informal, leadership oriented and
objective oriented. Given the respondents’ differing opinions, it may be argued that the
lack of unified, structured rules for communication between the departments poses a
dilemma for RCC officials when they deal with matters needing intra-organizational
cooperation. As such, intra-organizational coordination is highly affected.

5
Five options for intra-organizational coordination were given to respondents to choose from: hierarchic,
informal, routine based, leadership oriented and objective oriented. ‘Hierarchic’ denotes that the basis of
relationships is top down, i.e., on the basis of the principle of chain of command as observed generally in
bureaucratic organizations. ‘Informal’ denotes ad hoc measures for solving or sorting out a problem, either
over the telephone or through a personal meeting with the aggrieved party. ‘Routine based’ denotes formal
communication through writing formal letters. ‘Leadership oriented’ refers to communication undertaken
at the initiative of department heads in order to solve a pressing problem. Finally, ‘objective oriented’
describes relationships that are maintained in order to coordinate and fulfill different goals of various
departments geared towards local development. This question was asked with a view towards mapping
whether or not the RCC follows any unified or standard rules regarding intra-organizational relationships.
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 165

All six RCC respondents identify the lack of rules and regulation as one of the
prime causes of problems in coordination. They even give some explicit reasons for
the lack of coordination. Three are especially worth mentioning: (1) old6 and
ambiguous rules without proper elucidation; (2) application of rules are based on an
individual’s own explanation, since these are not well clarified, and (3) lack of
guidelines for applying rules. To substantiate the above discussion, we offer an
example given by one official:
Generally the mayor, chief executive officer, chief executive engineer and the
chief health officer are entitled to obtain vehicle facilities [using RCC vehicles
and taking advantage of the fuel subsidy (paid for by the RCC)] from the City
Corporation. This clause is not properly explained in the law. Many officials
are taking advantage of this unclear law and are getting vehicle facilities. This
burdens the City Corporation with additional expenditures. Sometimes it is
observed that many officials use the rule’s vagueness to embezzle goods or
funds. In such situations the mayor is in a quandary: whom to provide with
vehicle facilities and whom to refuse? […] Taking advantage of the ambiguous
law, the mayor gives those officials who are close and loyal to him permission
to use the vehicles (our translation).
The mayor’s bias in issuing permission for using RCC vehicles generates a huge
amount of discontent amongst the ‘deprived’ officials. This discontent sometimes
incites personal resentment, which in turn creates coordination problems in intra-
departmental matters. Another RCC official expressed the following:
If the laws regarding the use of vehicles were clear, that would not leave any
scope for misapprehension and personal resentment amongst officials, and it
would have ensured good working relationship’. […] Successful intra-
organizational coordination depends on the extent to which rules and
regulations are institutionalized. (Our translation)
In the case of the RCC, however, institutionalized rules and regulations are totally
absent. Available data suggests that RCC officials suffer from severe coordination
problems since all the RCC respondents (six out of six) hold the same view. Thus it
can be said that the lack of institutionalized rules and regulations is one of the major
challenges for the RCC in terms of ensuring sound intra-organizational coordination.

Financial management

Inadequate financial resources pose another major challenge for urban bodies in
developing countries, both in terms of capital investment to meet the growing needs
of urbanization, and for maintaining existing services. The state of urban
government bodies in Bangladesh is no different than in other developing countries
where such units lack resources (Chowdhury 1997:27). Although empowered by the

6
‘Old’ in the sense that when the City Corporation Ordinance was passed in 1987, the population size of
Rajshahi City was small and the RCC’s activities were confined to a manageable size. As time passes,
people’s demands are mounting. Consequently, the activities of the RCC are also expanding. This proves
only to augment the problems generated by poorly defined rules and regulations.
166 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

local government regulations to generate revenues from local sources (e.g., through
the assessment and levy of taxes, leasing of Hats (big market) and Bazars (small
daily market), charging for water, etc.), these government bodies’ accumulated
revenues are inadequate to meet growing demands. The RCC suffers from
insufficient funds to meet the seemingly unlimited demands placed upon it. Due to
the lack of adequate internal financing, it depends entirely on government grants for
financing development projects. The following table signifies the extent to which the
RCC depends on government grants (Table 1).
Table 1 indicates the extent to which the RCC depends on grants from the central
government to cover its expenses. The table gives no indication that the local
revenue base is being revitalized in order to increase income and thereby reduce

Table 1 Income and expenditure of RCC (In Millions of USD)

Year Total Income (Internal Income Total % of expenditure

and government grants) Expenditure financed by
government grants.

2001–2002 Internal income: 3675667 20921609 82%

Taxes
Rates
Fees
Miscellaneous
Government grants: 17245942
Development Assistant Grants 366266999
Project grants (ADP) 640896029
Total Income: 20921609
2002–2003 Internal income: 4414551 24843798 82%
Taxes
Rates
Fees
Miscellaneous
Government grants: 20429247
Development Assistant Grants 432654660
Project grants (ADP) 760413350
Total Income: 24843798
2003–2004 Internal income: 4950375 25809354 81%
Taxes
Rates
Fees
Miscellaneous
Government grants: 20858979
Development Assistant Grants 342035608
Project grants (ADP) 876128777
Total Income: 25809354

Calculated by the authors based on RCC information

Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 167

dependency on central government grants. This does not, however, mean that
internal income was stagnant from 2001 to 2004. Internal revenue has steadily
increased, but the ratio between government grants and local revenue generation has
remained the same.
Now, the concern is to explore how financial management or the RCC’s scarce
resources contribute to intra-organizational coordination problems. In fact,
whenever the question of how to distribute inadequate resources between contesting
projects is discussed, the problem of coordination surfaces. During the allocation
process, the different departments compete to receive as much money as possible to
finance their projects. Such competition sometimes makes it difficult to distribute
resources equitably, or to ensure sound coordination between the contesting
demands. Due to the lack of sound intra-organizational coordination, some projects
remain half done.
The findings suggest that the RCC suffers from severe resources constraints since
six out of six respondents express the same view on this issue. One high-ranking
RCC official describes the scenario as follows:
The funds granted by the government are always lower than the estimated
budget, so it becomes problematic for them to distribute the inadequate funds
amongst the various contesting departments. […] Sometimes the allocation of
government resources depends on how strong the mayor’s relationship is with
the central government. However, it may also happen that the mayor fails to
generate adequate grants from the central government. (Our translation)
We further observe that the prime cause of resource constraint is that not enough
local revenue is generated. Due to this problem, the respondents claim, the central
government has expressed its concern about strengthening the local revenue base.
Yet it is difficult for the RCC to increase its internal revenue base since Rajshahi is
not an industrial city with a low rate of urbanization. The only possible sources of
internal revenue are the taxes and tolls within the city corporation areas.
Thus, it can be argued that the allocation of resources between different
departments is influenced by resource constraints. In the total allocation process,
some departments are fortunate to receive more while others are relatively deprived.
The question is this: Does this uneven allocation of resources affect intra-
organizational relationships? We observed that intra-organizational coordination is
seriously affected by uneven and unequal resource allocation since all six RCC
respondents express the same view. One respondent has this to say:
I am not satisfied with the allocated grants for my department since it is
inadequate in terms of meeting demands. Of course, RCC suffers from
resource constraints, however, government grants are not distributed equally,
nor do they follow any clear rule. Departmental heads who have good relations
with the top authority (the mayor) receive more than others. Such an
atmosphere contributes to discontent amongst different department heads,
and this ultimately affects sound working relations. (Our translation)
The above discussion reveals that financial resource management is one of the
prime factors affecting intra-organizational coordination. RCC respondents clearly
state that they neither have adequate internal resources nor do they receive enough
168 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

grants from the central government through which they can meet their demands. In a
situation where resources are acutely limited and funds are distributed in an
inappropriate way, intra-organizational coordination problems arise. As a result,
many projects remain incomplete. We conclude this section by citing an example of
the lack of intra-organizational coordination in RCC policy implementation:
At one point in time, all illegal construction going on in the city was halted by
the RCC. But at the same time the RCC allowed a new company to start
building something on top of the city protection dam in Futkipara (name of a
place in Rajshahi). In fact, the construction was totally illegal and nobody
knew why this building was constructed. We found out that the construction
work was happening on the basis of the mayor’s oral permission. The chairman
of the city development and planning committee (who was an elected ward
commissioner) expressed his dissatisfaction on the issue since he knew nothing
about it.
On 10th December, 2002, a press conference was organized by the RCC
and the mayor ordered all illegal construction within RCC areas to cease by
17th December, 2002. This statement by the mayor was totally contradictory
since he was, on one hand, issuing an order to stop illegal construction, but on
the other hand, giving oral permission for constructing new illegal buildings.
Later on the newspaper reported that the illegal construction work was built
on a dam that protects the city from flood water. Such construction might cause
damage to the dam and the dam might fall apart any time and the whole city
might be inundated (Sonali Sangbad, 2002). (Our translation)

Central-local relations

Central-local relations have always been an issue in Bangladesh. The colonial legacy
and the absence of democratic government at the centre have made such relations
authoritative. The central (national) government, through its field level functionaries,
exercises control over the urban local bodies. Government officials working in the
RCC include the chief executive officer, the secretary, and the heads of various
offices of district administration who are involved with the city corporation’s
activities. Apart from these government officials, different agencies and ministries
further control the urban units through a plethora of intricate and complicated orders
and circulars that very often contradict the original legal framework. Now, the law
empowers the national government to inquire into the affairs of urban local
government institutions, and after such inquiries, if the central government considers
that an urban unit is ‘unable’ to discharge its duties; or has ‘failed’ to meet its
financial obligations, or otherwise has exceeded or abused its power, then the
government may suspend such bodies for a period as may be specified by the law
(Huq et al. 2001:11–12).
Of the different variables affecting the study of central-local relations, the
question of autonomy is an important one. In Bangladesh, urban local government
bodies are in no way independent of the central government in the country’s overall
administrative system, even though they do enjoy limited operational autonomy. In
fact, there are several areas of interaction between urban bodies and the government,
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 169

areas that concern legal, operational and financial matters involving control and
supervision by the government (Panday 2006). In the context of this paper we
ask whether central-local relations are problematic for ensuring sound inter-
organizational coordination between the RCC and the central government.
The findings of the study reveal a positive relationship between the RCC and the
central government, since all the respondents (six out of six) express similar views
on the issue. The mayor’s political affiliation with the ruling party (Bangladesh
Nationalist Party at the time) is identified as the main factor determining the nature
of central-local relations. Apart from the position of mayor, he was a member of
parliament and one of the organizing secretaries of the party. His power and position
in the ruling party enabled his easy access to the policy level of the central
government. We observe, however, that if a mayor belongs to an opposition party, he
or she faces serious problems while working with the central government. The
respondents mention that the situation in the RCC was different during 1996–2001
when the Awami League (AL) ruled the country and the sitting mayor’s party was in
the opposition. During that time the RCC did not receive much cooperation from the
central government, especially in the allocation of resources and in resolving the
related time delays. These things happen because of confrontational politics in
Bangladesh, where the party in power and the opposition are preoccupied with
criticizing each other. Consensus building between political parties on some basic
issues is almost nonexistent in Bangladesh. In such a situation, mayors who belong
to opposition political parties usually receive less cooperation from the central
government than mayors who represent the party in power.
We further observe that problems of fund mobilization and a conflict between
autonomy versus centralization largely affect central-local relations. There are
serious difficulties in mobilizing funds—this is confirmed inasmuch as all six
respondents expressed the same view on the issue. The problems manifest
themselves in two ways: First, since most of the RCC’s development programs are
financed by central government grants, the normal procedure for getting finding is
that the RCC presents a budget proposal for the up-coming financial year to the
central government and the government accordingly decides the amount it will grant.
In most cases there is a huge gap between how much money the city corporation
demands and how much it receives. The mayor’s political image plays the most
significant role in mitigating this gap. In fact, the more the city corporation is
successful in lobbying with the central government, the larger the grant it receives.
In this case, the mayor’s political image and party affiliation are crucial factors.
Second, sometimes the approved funds are not released in a timely manner. This
happens mostly when the mayor belongs to an opposition party. This causes serious
problems in starting and completing various projects. The following report is
particularly relevant in this regard:

Rajshahi city has for long been faced with a crisis of drinking water, especially
in the dry season. The City Corporation authorities said extraction capacity of
its pumps declined by about 25% in summer. With a view to providing city
dwellers with safe drinking water, the Rajshahi City Corporation opened the
first of the three water treatment plants in September 2003. According to the
Department of Public Health Engineering, works on the other two were going
170 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

on in full swing and were scheduled to be completed by December 2003. The

Rajshahi City Corporation water supply department said it would provide city
residents with only 45 million litres of water a day against the demand for
some 103 million litres. Rajshahi City Mayor said that the construction of these
projects would have been completed 5 years back if they would have received
full cooperation from the then AL government. The Mayor mentioned that the
initiative to install water treatment plants to address excessive hardness of
water was taken up in 1994. The ministry concerned approved the project in
early 1995 and the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
approved of a Tk 56-crore (equivalent to US$9,589,041) project on December
19, 1995. The public health engineering department was entrusted with the
project implementation. Work on the first phase of the project started on April
1, 1996, scheduled for a June 1998 completion. But it could not be
implemented as per schedule because of a cold shoulder shown by the then
AL government. The project was left half way for fund constraints. The money
was released after the four-party alliance government led by BNP came to
power and the work resumed and was completed (The Holiday, (Country
News), internet edition, 26 September 2003) (Quoted verbatim).
This example indicates that central-local relations and a lack of coordination
seriously affected the RCC’s important water plant project. Had the central
government released funds on time, the project would have been completed 5 years
earlier, to the considerable benefit of the public.
With respect to autonomy versus centralization, we observe that the 1987
ordinance under which the RCC operates acknowledges the local autonomy of the
RCC, yet also gives the central government enormous power to exercise control over
it. Some of the more important arrangements which directly affect central-local
relations and coordination are as follows (Siddique et al. 2000:156–157):
a. The central government makes laws and rules for all local bodies, including the
RCC; it can also control the RCC through so-called standing orders.
b. The mayor may be removed from office at any time, without giving a reason;
the government may also supersede the entire RCC or suspend a department of
the RCC.
c. The government may assign any function to the RCC. Similarly, it can also
take away any function from the RCC at any time.
d. The RCC budget must be approved by the central government.
e. The government can ask for any records from the RCC.
f. The government can inspect the RCC at any time; the RCC must send the
central government an annual report of its activities.
g. For forming additional standing committees, the RCC must obtain the
permission of the government.
h. The schedule of posts in the RCC must be sanctioned by the government, and
no appointment beyond the schedule is allowed.
i. The RCC cannot directly negotiate with foreign donors or private investors.
j. The chief executive officer is appointed by the government and has considerable
power; he is the custodian of all records; he is allowed to take measures during an
emergency; he is allowed to be present in all corporation/standing committee
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 171

meetings; he can hardly be censured by the RCC, and he is the appointing

authority for all subordinate posts.
With respect to the above arrangements, we learned that when the government
formulates laws that pertain to the RCC, it does not allow the RCC to offer any
input. The RCC is either bypassed or overruled in the law making process.
Moreover, the existing provisions for removal of the mayor, supersession of the
corporation and suspension of particular RCC departments by the central
government clearly show sign of highhandedness and authoritarianism, which go
against the spirit of the constitutional provision on local government. It is important
to note here that these mechanisms are used viciously when the reigning party in the
central government is opposed to a mayor’s political party, irrespective of the
mayor’s performance. Another mechanism the central government uses to control
the city corporation is through its chief executive officer (CEO) who is a central
government official from the Bangladesh Civil Service. Respondents indicate that as
a result of the CEO being a central government official, he perceives himself as
superior to the city corporation officials, an attitude that sometimes creates
frustration amongst these officials. This usually has a negative impact on the
working environment and can directly affect the degree to which the affairs of the
RCC are subordinated to the wishes of the central authorities. One official expresses
his opinion thus:
As the CEO is deputed by the central government, he suffers from a superiority
complex. He does not concern himself over RCC officials. Besides, the mayor
is a very busy person who cannot be in the city hall all the time. The absence
of the mayor has made the CEO very powerful. This type of conflict creates a
problematic working environment that hampers the overall development
process. (Our translation)

This is a typical view. It confirms the extent to which the positions and ties of
particular individuals, especially the CEO and the mayor, can influence, if not
determine, the nature of central-local relations and associated activities.

Different modes of operation and accountability patterns

There is a sharp distinction between the RCC and various government departments
with regard to their modes of operation and patterns of accountability. City
corporations are directly elected political organs and their leaders are elected through
a popular vote. The political leadership is therefore responsible to the general public
for every action it takes. Government departments, on the other hand, are staffed by
civil servants who are accountable to their line ministries in a hierarchical manner.
Wilson (1987) has rightly said that one of the important problems confronting the
modern state is to identify a way to strike a balance between politicians and civil
servants—the two contending elites in the policy process. Although the policy
process is subject to influence and manipulation by a variety of individuals and
institutions, these two sets of actors nevertheless have special roles to play (Ahmed
2002). That is why coordination between these two organizations is indispensable
during policy implementation.
172 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

The pattern of accountability between city corporations and government

agencies is different. As a political body, city corporations are answerable to the
inhabitants of the city, and their job is to meet the demands and needs of ordinary
people. However, in a political system where politics are personalized and
leadership is oligarchic, interpersonal relationships are informal and personalized.
As a result, patrimonialism or patron-client relationships are strong and influence
decision-making in city corporations (Brinkerhoff and Arthur 2002). In contrast,
government agencies are answerable to their line ministries and are organized
according to what may be termed ‘Weber’s rational-legal system’, which is
characterized by a graded hierarchy, written documentation, salaried full-time
staff and political neutrality. The Weberian system is based on the formal rule
of law and people working in this kind of system are supposed to act on the
basis of formal laws and standard operating procedures. There should be a sharp
distinction between official and private lives, and civil servants are required
to act on the basis of professional norms and ethics (Brinkerhoff and Arthur
2002). Based on the above, it can be said that the basic difference between the
city corporation and government agencies lies in their structure and patterns
of accountability.
Our concern now is to explore whether or not contrasting pattern of accountability
affect inter-organizational coordination. From the findings we observe that inter-
organizational coordination is affected by the contrasting patterns of accountability
since more than three-quarters of government officials (86%) expressed their views
in the affirmative (respondents were asked to give ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers). The
respondents identify a number of reasons for coordination problems between the
RCC and different government departments. First, decision-making in a bureaucratic
organization is lengthy (hierarchical), whereas the decision-making process in the
RCC happens much more quickly. In communicating with government offices,
city corporation authorities expect to get prompt responses from field-level
functionaries in line ministries, but field-level bureaucrats seldom respond promptly
to queries and requests from the city corporation, because all decisions need to be
approved by the respective line ministries. This sometimes causes serious co-
ordination problems. In such situations the city corporation authorities, sometimes
out of frustration, implement their plans without waiting for approval from
government offices. In some cases, however, making decisions without going
through the proper government procedure lead to clientelism and the awarding of
undue favours.
Second, civil servants commonly hold the view that politicians in Bangladesh are
not as transparent as they should be; the politicians are preoccupied with seeking
personal gain while ignoring the ordinary people’s welfare. On the other hand,
bureaucrats are not in a position to exercise the same kind of power as politicians.
They (the bureaucrats) argue that sometimes politicians put pressure on them to act
illegally. If they resist they are harassed. This type of manipulation by politicians is a
type of corruption. It may be argued that if corruption is pervasive, it usually starts at
the top of the political and administrative system. When leaders are corrupt, middle-
range civil servants and the police on the street are soon involved in corruption as
well, through being given opportunities to make easy money (www.undp.org/dpa/
publications.corruption/index.html). We conclude this section by citing an example
Challenges of Coordination in Implementing Urban Policy... 173

of the lack of inter-organizational coordination in the implementation of one RCC

infrastructure project:
The Roads and Highways Department (R&HD) in Rajshahi made a Jatri
Saouni (waiting places for the passer-by on the road side) by the side of a road
in the centre of Laxmipur (name of a place in Rajshahi city) in 2001. The
ownership and maintenance of this waiting place [was the responsibility of] the
R&HD. But in 2003, the RCC, violating all rules and regulations, divided that
Jatri Saouni in two and leased it to some individuals who established shops
there. Some informal sources said that some RCC officials were bribed to do
this for 8 million BDT (name of the local currency), which was equivalent to
$15,000 USD. Once informed about the matter, the R&HD started formal
correspondence with the RCC authorities, requesting them to break the divider
and evacuate the shopkeepers. Altogether, R&HD sent four letters to the RCC
authority, but the RCC took no action. The R&HD did not even receive any
letter from the RCC regretting their action.7 (Our translation)
This example strongly suggests that inter-organizational coordination is poor. All
the organizations are performing their activities without considering other organ-
izations’ interest, as in the case of Jatri-Saouni. As a result of non-cooperation from
the RCC authority, the basic purpose for which the waiting area was built remained
unfulfilled. Those who ultimately suffer are the common people.

Conclusion

The above discussions allow us to draw the conclusion that coordination in policy
implementation is essential, as it brings together separate agencies to make their
efforts more compatible in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency. From
this perspective, ensuring sound coordination is of the utmost necessity when
Bangladesh’s urban government bodies seek to carry out projects. This is because
multiple actors are involved in the process of implementing a single project. It is
evident from the analysis that urban government bodies like the RCC suffer from
both intra- as well as inter-organizational problems in coordination while carrying
out infrastructure-related projects.
To sum up these problems: The lack of institutionalized rules and regulations and
erratic financial management create enormous discontent amongst RCC officials,
which negatively affects working relationships. In the absence of updated and
institutionalized rules, employees bend the existing rules to their own advantage, or
merely do what seems right in their own eyes. This creates confusion and resentment
between the officials. In the absence of adequate financial resources, favouritism is
the principle upon which funds are distributed between contesting demands. This
causes intra-departmental coordination to suffer, which negatively affects how
projects are carried out. Examples here are delays in project completion, cost
increases and the delivery of unsatisfactory public service to the citizens.

7
The case was discussed while interviewing a high ranking official from the R&HD, Rajshahi District.
174 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

Central-local relations and different modes of operation and accountability

patterns hamper the RCC’s working relationships with other government depart-
ments and autonomous agencies working in the city corporation areas. Given that the
mayor’s political affiliation is the most important determinant of central-local
relations, if the mayor belongs to the reigning party, he/she gets more central
government grants and other advantages than mayors whose affiliation is with an
opposition party. Although the Rajshahi City Corporation Act of 1987 theoretically
allows the RCC to enjoy limited autonomy, the central government does not, in
practice, allow it to exercise autonomy. Instead the central government controls
RCC’s operations and the RCC must put up with the situation because it depends on
the central government for grants amounting to three-fourths of its expenditures. As
stated, the officials’ divergent modes of operation and accountability patterns make
their working environment complicated. All things considered, ensuring coordina-
tion amongst and between political and bureaucratic organizations is a serious
challenge in an environment where there are no written and established coordination
mechanisms, and where there is no culture of co-ordination whereby even informal
connections may be established.
Finally, urban local government as a political institution that ensures public
participation in development activities has yet to take proper shape in Bangladesh.
Since independence in 1971, successive administrations have attempted to make
structural changes in the urban local government system, but have, in the process,
ignored the functional implications of these changes. This is why almost all local
government bodies suffer from various problems, including problems of coordina-
tion. One may rightly ask: If there is no coordination, how does work get done and
how are services provided? There must be some mechanism behind it, but what
mechanism? The answer is that there are almost no mechanisms for ensuring sound
coordination between the involved actors. Things get done in an ad hoc way, and in
the process of implementing policies, if there is some degree of coordination it is
welcomed by the actors, but it is sorely inadequate. During this process, policy
outcomes rarely reflect policy objectives; rather, they lead to increases in the cost of
projects, delays in project implementation and the delivery of unsatisfactory
services. In the total process, the ultimate sufferers are ordinary citizens living
in the urban areas, for they are deprived of the services good urban governance
can provide.

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Pranab Kumar Panday is Associate Professor and Chair at the Department of Public Administration,
University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh. His main research interests include Public Policy and Governance
(both Urban and Local Governance), Public Sector Reforms, and Gender and Governance in South Asia.
176 P.K. Panday, I. Jamil

His articles have appeared in the Asian Survey, International Political Science Review, Local Government
Studies, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, the Public Organization Review, the Asia-
Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development, the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, and Asia-
Pacific Journal of Public Administration.

Ishtiaq Jamil is Associate Professor at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory,
University of Bergen, Norway. His research interests include administrative culture, public policy,
governance, and trust in public and political institutions. He is currently leading two projects on public
policy and governance in South Asia. Journals that have accepted his work for publication include:
International Political Science Review, Asian Survey, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, International Review of Sociology, Journal of Contemporary South Asia, and Journal of Middle
Eastern and South Asian Studies.

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