Journal of Israeli History

Politics, Society, Culture

ISSN: 1353-1042 (Print) 1744-0548 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjih20

Jewish Republicanism

Nir Kedar

To cite this article: Nir Kedar (2007) Jewish Republicanism, Journal of Israeli History, 26:2,
179-199, DOI: 10.1080/13531040701552124

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13531040701552124

Published online: 20 Sep 2007.

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The Journal of Israeli History
Vol. 26, No. 2, September 2007, pp. 179–199

Jewish Republicanism
Nir Kedar

David Ben-Gurion is usually considered a labor leader or a Zionist national leader and is
less remembered as a civilian head of state. Nevertheless, as premier of a fledgling state, he
played a major role in shaping Israel’s civil institutions and establishing democracy and
the rule of law. This article seeks to show that Ben-Gurion’s policy as a political leader was
derived from a well-defined civic worldview encapsulated in the idea of “mamlakhtiyut.”
Ben-Gurion understood “mamlakhtiyut” as an awareness of society’s need to function as
a civilized, independent polity manifesting civic responsibility and participation,
respecting democracy, and upholding law and order. It is argued that Ben-Gurion’s
civic ideas can best be explained by the political theory known in the last 40 years as
“republicanism.”

David Ben-Gurion is usually considered a labor leader or a Zionist national leader and
is less remembered as a civilian head of state. Although he served as prime minister
for 15 years, the academic research has focused mainly on his political actions and his
conception of security, overlooking to a great extent his social, economic and civic
views. Nevertheless, as premier of a fledgling state, he played a major role in shaping
Israel’s civil institutions and establishing democracy and the rule of law. In this article
I have two aims: the first is to show that Ben-Gurion’s policy as a political leader was
derived from a well-defined civic worldview encapsulated in the idea of mamlakhtiyut.
Ben-Gurion understood mamlakhtiyut as an awareness of society’s need to function as
a civilized, independent polity manifesting civic responsibility and participation,
respecting democracy, and upholding law and order. The second purpose of the
article is to claim that Ben-Gurion’s civic ideas can be best explained by the political
theory known in the last 40 years as “republicanism,” which emphasizes the common
weal (res publica) as a decisive condition for free and meaningful human life and seeks
to nurture the public sphere and protect it from being controlled by private—
factional—interests.

Nir Kedar is a lecturer in the Faculty of Law, Bar-Ilan University. Correspondence to Nir Kedar, Faculty of Law,
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel. Email: kedarn@mail.biu.ac.il

ISSN 1353-1042 (print)/ISSN 1744-0548 (online)/2007/020179-21

q 2007 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13531040701552124
180 N. Kedar
It should of course be borne in mind that political leaders are usually not
philosophers, and it is rare therefore that they present a well-ordered worldview. Ben-
Gurion was no different, in the sense that his ideas were not the product of systematic
study. Indeed, he was an autodidact, and even though he read much of the canon of
Western political thought, his knowledge of the field was rather fragmentary. Although
he often referred to Plato, Spinoza, Rousseau, Hegel and many other thinkers in his
writings, it is unclear how much he borrowed from their works, and it is even difficult
to point to a single political philosopher or a certain theoretical school (such as
republicanism) as his clear source of inspiration. In sum, it seems imprudent to ascribe
to him a well-defined political worldview, and especially to identify him with
republicanism, a political theory that was developed in Anglo-Saxon academe largely
after he retired from his post as prime minister in 1963. For these reasons, it is
common to conceive of political leaders like Ben-Gurion as people whose decisions
and policy are based on political constraints, and on short-term needs and interests.
Nevertheless, Ben-Gurion’s ideas should not be seen as stemming solely from, and
always subordinate to, his political missions. Even though politicians’ ideas and vision
are shaped to a large extent by the political and other conditions of “reality,” it would
be mistaken to ignore the possibility that they hold a set of beliefs and ideologies that
are not merely conducive to action. For example, Ben-Gurion’s penchant for science
and technology, or his socialist, democratic and (as we will see) civic-republican
policies should not be seen as deriving from practical choices alone, or as mere
political maneuvers. Of course, science (and the ideal of progress), socialism,
democracy and republicanism were important instruments in the establishment of a
Jewish state, but can we conclude that Ben-Gurion embraced these ideas only because
they served this ultimate goal? In this article, I argue that although these ideas were
indeed a means to achieve an end (the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state), they
were also ends in themselves, stemming from Ben-Gurion’s basic belief in human
beings’ freedom and ability to control their lives.1 Therefore, it is worthwhile to
investigate Ben-Gurion’s political and civic ideas, even though he was a political leader
and not a philosopher.
The article has three parts: the first sketches the concept of republicanism; the
second explains the meaning of Ben-Gurion’s idea of mamlakhtiyut, and the third
demonstrates the correlation between Ben-Gurion’s mamlakhtiyut and the more
general concept of republicanism.

Republicanism
The main characteristic of republicanism—as the Latin origin of the name suggests—
is the emphasis on the common weal, that is, on the common interest of all citizens.
Republicans, as we will see below, have developed manifold strategies in order to
prevent a faction from gaining control over the government, the public sphere or the
common interest of the public. In particular, they have encouraged active citizenship
(also known as civic participation). But in order to better understand the full
 The Journal of Israeli History 181

significance of the ways in which republicans seek to protect the republic (i.e. the
common weal), it is necessary to briefly review the conceptual and historical roots of
republicanism. I shall therefore begin with a brief historical survey describing the
changing meaning of republicanism from ancient times to modernity. Then, I will
show that modern republicanism and contemporary democracy are intertwined and
deal with two major immanent tensions within democratic republicanism. Finally,
I shall discuss the ways in which republicanism has sought to sustain the republic and
protect it from being seized by a private faction.
Republican political theory is in fact based on the political idea in general: the
understanding, as Aristotle stated in his Politics, that “man by his nature is a political
animal,” who cannot conduct free meaningful human life without a political
community and therefore must—in addition to protecting his own rights and
interests—nurture the public sphere and common weal.2 The acknowledgment of the
need to cultivate a civic-political life and to protect the polity is indeed an old
command known already from ancient times.3 Since no one can have a meaningful
human life outside a political community, the welfare of the polity—or of the public
sphere in general—becomes a “public affair” (res publica) in the sense that every
member of the political community should be engaged in active citizenship.
Modern republicanism, which developed since the Renaissance, placed even greater
emphasis than ancient republicanism on the idea that active citizenship and the
protection of the common weal are necessary conditions for free and meaningful
human life. In the modern era, the major political project was the protection and the
cultivation of man, his liberty and what was later known as his “sovereignty”: the idea
that man is born free and is free to shape his private and public life, and that he is
conscious of his freedom, his rights and his abilities. Consequently, modern
republicans reformulated the ancient republican idea, describing the public sphere as a
necessary condition for the protection and enhancement of individual sovereignty.
Niccolò Machiavelli, Benedict de Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Paine, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and James Madison lived in different periods and developed
political theories that differed in many respects; yet they all believed that the nurturing
of the public domain and the protection of the common weal—through active
citizenship and other means—are vital to the sovereignty of man, or at least to his
freedom,4 and have therefore all been regarded in the last 40 years as “republicans.”5
The idea of individual sovereignty gradually made republicanism more democratic.
Ancient and early-modern (“classical”) republicanism was not democratic but rather
emphasized a mixed government within a static—and politically unequal—society of
estates, in which every person knew his unchangeable political rank. The original
republican idea was that a mixed, balanced government is the main guarantee for the
prevalence of the common weal against the menace of being controlled by a private
interest. However, as the idea of individual sovereignty gained power, republicanism
became increasingly democratic, stressing the principle that the public domain and the
government have a central role in preserving and enhancing individual sovereignty,
and that consequently civic participation must be universal and the regime
182 N. Kedar
democratic. Modern democracy and republicanism are thus bound together—they
both grew from the same ideological source (individual sovereignty) and hence they
both underline the importance of participation and active citizenship.
There are two immanent tensions within modern democratic republicanism:
the tension between the common weal and individual freedom; and the tension
between the formal and procedural facets of the modern democratic republic,
on the one hand, and the substantial ideas on which republicanism rests, on the
other hand.
The tension between the common weal and individual freedom stems from the fact
that the common interest binds the individual and violates his/her freedom. Unlike
communitarianism—which lays a greater emphasis on the community and in which
the borders between the individual and the collective are more blurred6— modern
republicanism is grounded in the idea of individual sovereignty, and therefore values
individual freedom and autonomy. Yet, the emphasis that republicanism places on the
common weal and the common interest may pose a genuine threat to individual
liberty. Both the Jacobin terror and the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes have
demonstrated that total subordination of individual interests to the general interest
(or the general will) is not an imaginary threat. For this reason, republicans must
delineate precise borderlines between the public and the individual domains and
clearly define the complex relationships between the two spheres as well as stress the
reciprocal contribution of the two realms to one another.
The second tension within the democratic-republican tradition is that between the
formal-procedural features of modern republics, and especially the formal elements of
legalism and of democracy as a majoritarian mechanism, on the one hand, and the
substantial ideas of individual sovereignty and active citizenship on the other hand.
The formalism that governs many of the republic’s laws and institutions enhances
formal equality and shields the individual from the possible arbitrary implementation
of the frequently obscure “common interest” or volonté général. Formalism thus serves
as a protector of personal liberty. Nevertheless, the ideal of individual sovereignty,
which is one of the foundations of republicanism, counterbalances the injustices
that may result from a rigid implementation of the formal rules and procedures.
For example, it prevents democracy from turning into mere majoritarianism.
Republicans therefore cherish both the formal-procedural elements of the state and
the substantial ideas of individual sovereignty and civic participation.
Under republicanism there are four conditions that are necessary to sustain a solid
democracy and a mixed balanced government. Two of these four conditions
may indeed not be specifically republican, but they were (and still are) viewed by
republicans as necessary requirements for a sustainable republic.
The first of these four conditions for the “good republic,” which is already found in
the late works of Plato as well as in the writings of Aristotle and Cicero, is the existence
of just and efficient laws and political institutions and procedures, which are regarded
as the foundation of order, justice and political stability.7 In modern times this
penchant for legalism is manifested in the republican support for the ideas of
 The Journal of Israeli History 183

parliamentary democracy, some version of separation of powers, the rule of law, and in
most cases constitutionalism.8
A second condition is basic economic equality, as was succinctly expressed by the
seventeenth-century writer James Harrington in his famous utopia Oceana: “equality
of estates causes equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty, not only of the
commonwealth, but of every man.” And further in the book: “where there is inequality
of estates, there must be inequality of power; and where there is inequality of power,
there can be no commonwealth.”9 This idea, which is also found in the writings of
Rousseau and many others,10 not only links economic inequality to political instability
but also maintains that it violates the very idea of individual sovereignty and hampers
the possibility of individuals participating as active citizens in the public sphere and
governing their own lives. In this sense, modern republicanism is close to left-wing
liberalism and social democracy,11 and it is no wonder that the Zionist Labor
Movement frequently expressed republican ideas along with its social-democrat ones.
The third condition for a sustainable republic, which is typical of republicans and
can even be said to define republicanism, is the demand for the development of civic
virtues and of civic-republican consciousness and responsibility. It should be noted
that, unlike the Christian idealistic virtues, the republican virtues, advocated by
Machiavelli and his contemporaries, were earthly civic virtues that aimed to protect
and strengthen the republic. Modern republicans stressed the real and not the ideal;
they wished to nurture and protect the existing political community and not to imitate
an idealistic “city of god.” The early modern republicans sought first to ensure the
existence of the state and therefore demanded bravery in military affairs and skill in
diplomacy. Since they maintained that the stability of a republic also depends on its
civic strength, they demanded the development of a commitment to law, order and
justice as well.12
As republicanism became increasingly democratic, the idea of civic virtues was
transformed into a general civic consciousness that should be shared by the entire
population of the republic (and not mainly by the educated political elite). The essence
of the modern civic consciousness, however, remained very similar to that of the
republican virtues that preceded it—an awareness of the need to ensure the very
existence of the state and of the importance of a developed public sphere, of
democracy, law and order.
The republican-civic consciousness described above is important not only because it
enables civic life and makes it more pleasant, but also—and more importantly—
because it establishes a kind of civic affinity that binds all the citizens of the republic to
one another and unifies them under the state. This can be called civic affinity because
affiliation and inclusion derive not from a person’s primordial attachment to a certain
ethnic, religious or other group but rather from a civic consciousness and sense of
citizenship. This sense of affinity to one’s fellow citizens and republic is not a substitute
for other types of affiliation (local, religious, national, professional, class) but is
rather a supplement to these affiliations, an additional type of bond that unites all the
citizens of a political community. In fact, civic affinity is never totally detached from
184 N. Kedar
national-ethnic, religious or other cultural ties, and it is probably strengthened when
linked to other types of affiliation. But even though civic affinity cannot replace other
forms of identity and belonging, it is an important type of connection because
it enables the cohabitation of different interests and cultures in one civic-political
community (as suggested by the modern ideas of the social contract and
constitutionalism).13
Civic consciousness also stimulates civic responsibility: citizens who are aware of
the importance of civic life and of law, order and justice, and who are sensitive to the
civic bonds that tie them to their fellow citizens and their republic, are more likely to
develop a sense of responsibility towards their “civic partners” and the public domain
in general. Here again history has demonstrated that the feelings of civic affinity and
responsibility are stronger when attached to other types of bonds. Yet, civic affinity
and responsibility are specific feelings, not to be confused with national, cultural or
religious affinities.
The fourth republican condition for a sustainable republic is of course civic
participation, or active citizenship. It will be recalled that republicans believe that since
no one can have a meaningful human life outside a political community, the welfare of
the polity becomes a “public affair,” in the sense that every member of the political
community should be engaged in active citizenship. Whereas classic republicanism
assigned the exhibition of civic virtues mainly to the political elite, expecting the
leading groups to participate in the defense of their state, in diplomacy and in general
maintenance of the republic, modern democratic republicanism—informed by the
belief in individual sovereignty—expects the entire citizenry to participate in the
democratic political processes and in the public debate, to defend their homeland
and their republic in case of a threat to their liberty, to sustain the republic by paying
their dues, and generally to engage in active citizenship on behalf of their political
community.
Having reviewed the central tenets of republicanism—active citizenship and civic
consciousness, affinity and responsibility—I shall now investigate Ben-Gurion’s idea
of mamlakhtiyut as a republican concept.

Mamlakhtiyut
Despite the centrality of the notion of mamlakhtiyut to Israeli culture and history,
very few systematic studies have addressed it.14 Historians and scholars sometimes
referred to mamlakhtiyut as “statism” or “etatism,”15 but these terms fail to reflecting
the complexity of the concept and to convey the full meaning of such common
Hebrew expressions as a “mamlakhti approach” (gishah mamlakhtit) or “mamlakhti
personality” (demut mamlakhtit). Moreover, they are sorely misleading because they
have a pejorative connotation absent from the Hebrew concept. The concept of
“etatism” not only places the state at the center of the political sphere but also
delegitimizes all other voluntary organizations that are vital for the existence of a
developed democratic-republican civil society. Identifying mamlakhtiyut with etatism
 The Journal of Israeli History 185

therefore imposes an unfair burden of proof upon the Hebrew idea, disregarding its
republican features.
Hebrew– English dictionaries translate the term mamlakhtiyut as “statehood” or
“sovereignty,” with the adjective mamlakhti rendered as “officially of the state.”16
The identification of mamlakhtiyut with statehood and sovereignty stems also from
the Israeli collective memory of the “battles over mamlakhtiyut” waged during Israel’s
first years of independence (these included the dismantling of the pre-state militias
and the establishment of a centralized mamlakhti education system). However, as
I have shown elsewhere, the idea of mamlakhtiyut means more than just political
independence or sovereignty, and the adjective mamlakhti connotes more than
“officially of the state.” Indeed, as early as the beginning of the twentieth century, Ben-
Gurion translated the adjective mamlakhti from the Russian gosudarstvennyi, and like
its Russian source it indicated “state-like.” But the term rapidly acquired a more
complex meaning. During the 1930s, when the likelihood of establishing a sovereign
Jewish state became increasingly realistic, the character of the state and the structure of
its institutions sparked a lively public debate.17 It was in these years that Ben-Gurion
ascribed to the neutral adjective mamlakhti a novel, normative, significance that
referred not only to “the state” but also to what might be called civic consciousness, i.e.
society’s ability to conduct a civilized, independent polity that displays civic
responsibility and respect for democracy, law, and order. Later, Ben-Gurion termed
this civic awareness mamlakhtiyut, a term that henceforth would mean both
sovereignty and civic consciousness.18
According to Ben-Gurion, civic consciousness (i.e. mamlakhtiyut) denotes first of
all a call to recognize and realize the ability of a people to maintain an independent
sovereign polity. Ben-Gurion specifically linked political independence to individual
autonomy; for him, political independence was the expression and the fruit of
individual sovereignty. In an address before a conference of the youth organization of
his Labor Party (Mapai) in Haifa on 9 September 1944, he asserted:

The meaning of the Zionist revolution is in one word—independence:

independence for the Jewish people in its homeland. And in the same way as
dependence is not only political or economic but moral, cultural and intellectual . . .
so independence is not political or economic independence alone, but also spiritual,
moral, intellectual.19

This perception of independence echoes Kant’s famous motto of the Enlightenment:

“Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own reason!”20 Indeed, later in his speech
Ben-Gurion warned his young listeners against “the weakening of confidence in our own
powers as the main and decisive factor in the shaping of tomorrow.”21 Ben-Gurion’s
mamlakhti civic consciousness was, then, first and foremost an expression of his
modernist belief in individual sovereignty and in the ability to revolutionize one’s life
and become independent.
Yet this notion of mamlakhtiyut not only stipulated the recognition of individual
sovereignty and the ability to establish and maintain an independent polity.
186 N. Kedar
As it became clear that the foundation of a Jewish independent state was not far off,
Ben-Gurion stressed the complementary side of his idea of independence:
Our expected independence—which might be close—does not mean only a release
from the yoke of a foreign government. The liberation from foreign rule is nothing
but the negative attribute, not the main [attribute], of independence. Independence
has a positive meaning, and this is the essence [of independence]. And the positive
gist of independence means—responsibility. Great and heavy responsibility, a joint
responsibility of the Jewish public, and the bearing of the burden of immigration
(aliyah), development, equality and peace . . . . In the Jewish state we will be
responsible not to the Jews alone, but to all the inhabitants of the state, and to all the
inhabitants of the state in an equal manner.22
After the establishment of the State, Ben-Gurion developed his idea of mamlakhti
awareness and responsibility into a more comprehensive concept, formulated as a
triple demand: first, the recognition of the state as the sovereign center of authority;
second, a recognition of the values entrenched in the state and the state’s special
modus operandi. He made it clear that the deeper significance of mamlakhtiyut lay not
only in its emphasis on sovereignty but also in the values and purposes embedded in
the idea of the modern state: to guarantee individual sovereignty and safeguard the
general welfare. This second demand involved also respect for the state’s democratic,
legal and bureaucratic modes of action stemming from those values, which are
designed to control and legitimize the state’s sovereign power. And third,
mamlakhtiyut also set forth a republican code of civic responsibility and affinity
that tied all Israeli citizens to one another and united them under the state.

Mamlakhtiyut as Republicanism
Although the expressions “res publica” and “commonwealth” were well known in
classical and early modern political thought, and although the words “republican” and
“republicanism” had already entered the English language in the seventeenth century
to describe the proponents of the Commonwealth (or at least the opponents of
hereditary monarchism), the conception of “republicanism” as a political theory was
developed by English-speaking scholars only in the second half of the 1960s,23 and it is
unlikely that Ben-Gurion was familiar with it. However, I argue here that Ben-Gurion’s
political ideas can in fact be defined as “republican” in their essence and that they were
instrumental in shaping his policies.
Indeed, many aspects of his worldview reflect the central tenets of republicanism,
such as the permanent republican tension in his thought and policies between the
importance attached to individual sovereignty, on the one hand, and to the public
sphere, on the other. Ben-Gurion held the common weal and the public domain in
high esteem. As a labor and Zionist national leader his conception of the public
domain was very far from the liberal perception that treats it as a perilous necessary
evil. Contrary to classical liberalism, Ben-Gurion viewed the public sphere as
an important and necessary condition for free and meaningful human life, indeed
 The Journal of Israeli History 187

a condition and expression of human sovereignty. Importantly, then, his high regard
for the public sphere did not diminish his insistence on individual sovereignty: “The
subject of partnership is man,” he warned the members of the United Kibbutz
Movement in 1951, “and the kibbutz will succeed only if it manages to cultivate not
only the partnership, but the partners as well; and if it always thinks of the individual
in the kibbutz, his manners, his wishes, his distinctive qualities . . . his uniqueness and
individuality.”24 This was also his guiding principle with regard to the state, as he
asserted in an address to the Knesset on 1 November 1950:

Basically, the person is the state. Let us not embrace a totalitarian opinion. The state
was created for the people, and not the people for the state, and the sincere concern
for the individual, the mother, the worker, each and every person is the essence of
every state action.25

Ben-Gurion, then, deeply believed in the idea of individual sovereignty, which lay at
the basis of his Zionist ideology. In his view, the main problem of Jews was neither
anti-Semitism (as Herzl and Pinsker had thought) nor alienation and loss of Jewish
identity (as Ahad Ha’am had warned), but rather the very status of exile that prevented
the Jews from exercising their individual and collective sovereignty.26 The purpose of
Zionism, he stressed, was to enable the Jews to be “one hundred percent Jewish and one
hundred percent free.”27 Consequently, he conceived of Zionism as a total revolution
not only because it aimed to change all aspects of Jewish life, but mainly because for
the first time the Jews were expressing and realizing their sovereignty as individuals
and as a group, deliberately transforming their individual and communal life and
future and liberating themselves politically, economically, culturally and psycholo-
gically. “The meaning of the Zionist revolution is in one word—independence,”
he concluded.28
The idea of Zionism as a revolutionary expression of Jewish sovereignty explains
Ben-Gurion’s ceaseless efforts to establish a sovereign Jewish state, and it explains also
his social-democrat endeavor to turn the Jewish people into a “working people” (am
oved): only a working nation, productive and economically independent, could be
truly sovereign.29 His emphasis on the importance of the realization (hagshamah) of
Zionism and his call for pioneering (halutziyut) also derive from his belief in
individual sovereignty. “Zionism is nothing but its realization,” he insisted.30 It had no
meaning and no hope as an unrealized ideal because only its realization made it a true
expression of human sovereignty. Unrealized, Zionism would remain a modern
version of the age-old Jewish passive (i.e. non-sovereign) expectation for the return of
the Messiah, articulated in the verse from the Jewish liturgy: “may our eyes behold Thy
return to Zion in mercy.”31 Ben-Gurion’s ideas were republican, then, not only in the
sense that they stemmed from his solid belief in the importance of the public sphere to
human sovereignty but also because he anchored his ideas to the concrete political
reality. Ben-Gurion did not wish to formulate an unattainable political ideal, but
rather a desirable yet realistic theory that could be implemented in the real social
world. In that sense, his ideas of hagshamah and halutziyut were a radical Zionist
188 N. Kedar
version of the republican idea of civic participation. Indeed, it is in this light that we
should also evaluate Ben-Gurion’s devotion to democracy and civic participation in
the public domain, which will be discussed below.
The republican features of Ben-Gurion’s political thought are best expressed in his
call for the development of mamlakhti consciousness, i.e. Israel’s need to function as
a civilized, independent polity demonstrating civic responsibility and affinity and
respect for democracy, law and order. As we have seen, Ben-Gurion’s mamlakhti civic
consciousness meant first of all the call to the Israeli people to recognize and realize
their ability to maintain a sovereign polity. But civic consciousness meant also the
individual’s responsibility to his/her fellow citizens, to the public domain and the
common weal. As noted above, this mamlakhti awareness advocated by Ben-Gurion
can be formulated as a triple demand, which I shall now discuss in greater detail, in
particular the second component: the demand to recognize the values and purposes
embedded in the idea of the modern state, and to respect the state’s democratic, legal
and bureaucratic modes of action stemming from them.

The State as Sovereign

The first of these three demands concerns the need to recognize the state as the sovereign
center of authority. In contrast to the pre-state situation, sovereignty was expressed by
the new state’s uncompromising demand to gain a monopoly over the use of force in
Israeli society and become the major arena of political and other basic decisions. It is
this aspiration that explains, for example, Ben-Gurion’s determination to dismantle the
pre-state Jewish militias and establish the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as a mamlakhti
apolitical army.32 The insistence on recognizing the state as the sovereign center of
authority is in effect the fundamental republican demand. A sovereign center of
authority is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable and secure political
community able to fulfill its ultimate goal: the protection of order, security, peace and
justice, and individual life and sovereignty. In the absence of a sovereign center, justice
and individual sovereignty cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, even liberal political
theory, which sanctifies individual liberties, must recognize the authority of the
sovereign state, albeit considering it a necessary evil. This is even more the case for
republican political theory, for which a vigorous and fair public sphere is a necessary
condition for meaningful and free human life. The demand to recognize the state as the
sovereign center of authority is indeed the demand most identified with Ben-Gurion’s
mamlakhti policy, but it is only one of the three requirements.

The State as Embodiment of Republican Values

As mentioned above, republicans do not cherish the republic for its own sake but
regard it as means for improving human life. Consequently, modern republicans insist
that the idea of individual sovereignty be reflected in the fundamental values of their
 The Journal of Israeli History 189

republic. They thus stress the general-universal character of the modern state, that is,
its obligation to manifest and protect the common interest on behalf of the entire
citizenry, as well as to guarantee the life and liberty of its citizens and enable them
to express their sovereignty. From these values also derives the demand to respect
the democratic, juridical and bureaucratic procedures of the modern republic. This
demand is significant not only because these procedures guarantee individual
sovereignty but also because they control the omnipotence of the sovereign state and
thus legitimize the republic’s claim for a monopoly over the use of force. A republic
that respects democracy and the rule of law subordinates the power of its government
to the will of the people and to equal formal rules and procedures that safeguard
individual sovereignty. Consequently, a law-abiding democracy enjoys the legitimacy
of its citizens, who feel that their individual sovereignty, rights and freedoms are
secured.
Ben-Gurion’s appreciation of the values entrenched in the idea of the modern state
is reflected first of all in his endeavor to nationalize the main public services, as
manifested in the famous battles over the dismantling of the pre-state militias and the
formation of a mamlakhti army, the centralization of a mamlakhti education system,
or the disputes over the establishment of mamlakhti employment bureaus and
healthcare systems.33 Many of Ben-Gurion’s political opponents viewed these “battles
over mamlakhtiyut” as another manifestation of his insatiable will to power. Yet, the
demand of the nascent Jewish state to control the areas of defense, welfare or
education—a demand that in fact resembled similar requirements imposed by all
modern republics—derived from the republican idea that the state must utilize its
monopoly over the use of legitimate power in order to manage these areas in a
universal, equal and just manner and thus protect the common interest and human
liberty. Ben-Gurion’s efforts to defend the common weal and regulate the public
services in a just and equal manner also explain his socialist economic policy as prime
minister. During its first 15 years, Israel maintained a socialist-egalitarian policy that
encouraged organized labor, protected an egalitarian wage policy and conducted an
expansive monetary policy.34
Ben-Gurion’s respect for the values entrenched in the modern state can also be seen
in his devotion to democracy and the rule of law. True, Ben-Gurion is not associated
with legalism or the rule of law; he is generally perceived as a strong-willed centralist
leader who opposed a written constitution, minimized the importance of the rule of
law, and despised legal procedures and formalities.35 However, on the contrary, he was
well aware of the importance of law and order and held the idea of the rule of law in
great esteem. It is in this light that we should understand for example his attempts to
have a Sephardic jurist appointed to the Supreme Court (which I will discuss below);
his great contribution to the independence of the attorney general; his efforts to
change the Israeli voting system; and his endeavor to impose law and order on the
newly created IDF and to quickly enact a military criminal code.36 Furthermore, his
notion of the law and the rule of law derived from his belief in individual sovereignty
190 N. Kedar
and in a vigorous public sphere as a necessary condition for a free and meaningful
individual life. In a passage that echoes Rousseau, Ben-Gurion proclaimed:
We should understand the law not as a command but as an expression of the
people’s will, an edict legislated for the common good, [an edict] that does not
restrict individual liberty but protects it, i.e., protects the liberty of each and every
one, and does not impose an obligation on the individual, unless it is for the need of
the common weal, i.e., for the need of each and every individual.37

Ben-Gurion not only praised the law but was also a main force in shaping the Israeli
institutions of law and order. Despite certain lamentable lapsi linguae concerning
advocates and jurists,38 it was thanks to his unswerving support in the first years of the
state that the foundations of democracy, the rule of law, and an autonomous,
professional legal system were laid down, consisting of an independent judiciary and
legal bureaucracy, active bar, and powerful attorney general.39
Ben-Gurion’s respect for the values embedded in the idea of the state was also
expressed in his awareness of the significance of proper political institutions and
procedures. Despite his dissatisfaction with the American model of checks and
balances, he was a keen advocate of the political separation of powers, and especially a
supporter of the British parliamentary model.40 His firm belief in the rule of law and
the separation of powers made him also an important protector of the legal system’s
autonomy. In March 1953 Ben-Gurion wrote a letter to Israeli President Itzhak Ben-
Zvi, indicating that he was shocked to hear from the attorney general that the
president had asked the latter to delay the prosecution of the mayor of Hadera:
I was astonished by this, it is a gross mistake committed by the ruler [the president].
The president of the state cannot do such a thing. The president has the right of
pardon, but no one has the right to intervene in legal processes . . . it is forbidden to
impose one’s personal or formal authority to prevent a process of interrogation or
indictment, especially on the part of the highest authority of the state—that of the
president.41

It should also be recalled that Ben-Gurion’s famous engagement in the Lavon affair in
the early 1960s was ignited by his fierce opposition to the committee of seven cabinet
ministers that had been appointed to investigate allegations that could have
exonerated former defense minister Pinhas Lavon from responsibility for the 1954
espionage fiasco in Egypt. Ben-Gurion thought that the allegations should be
investigated by the judicial authorities and not by members of the cabinet, especially as
Lavon was an influential, high-ranking politician.42
In addition to his commitment to the British model of separation of powers, Ben-
Gurion also strove to change the Israeli voting system from a general proportional
ballot system to a multi-constituency single-winner voting system, similar to that in
the Anglo-American world.43 In this case too his political actions derived from his
“republican” understanding that the present system threatened the common weal and
the sustainability of the Israeli republic by encouraging the disintegration of the Israeli
party system into many factions and promoting sectarian politics. It is clear, then, that
 The Journal of Israeli History 191

Ben-Gurion was aware of the crucial role of proper laws, political institutions and
procedures in the sustainability of the Israeli republic.
Despite Ben-Gurion’s deep admiration for the values rooted in the modern state, his
popular image is of a centralist and determined leader, who embraced the democratic
method only as long as he was sure to have the majority on his side, and who
understood democracy in a narrow formalistic way, i.e. as a process of majority rule,
while disregarding the deep human and political ideals that lay at the basis of the
democratic idea.44 It is in this light that we should understand the accusations by his
opponents on both the left and the right (especially after the establishment of the state)
that he had abandoned the democratic-voluntary and pioneering spirit of Zionism or
the social-democrat ideals and converted to “etatism” and formalism, basing his
political power on dubious political agreements and on state and party hierarchical
systems. The poet Amir Gilbo’a, one of the prominent young intellectuals of the left-
wing Mapam Party, charged Ben-Gurion with being a “slave” to his will to power,
expressing his disappointment in Ben-Gurion’s alleged abandonment of the ideals of
solidarity and camaraderie.45 Yisrael Scheib, a prominent right-wing intellectual (and
the former commander of the right-wing Lekhi underground militia) lamented that:
“we have become formalists. A framework: ‘state’; A framework: ‘government’; A
framework: ‘army’,” and added that Israel’s formalism would lead to its spiritual and
actual demolition.46 On the other hand, many intellectuals blamed Ben-Gurion for
conducting an etatist policy that disregarded the basic civic and political tenets and due
processes of democracy and the rule of law. This was, for example, the main claim of
the famous intellectuals’ petition published at the height of the Lavon affair in 1960.47
Ben-Gurion was indeed an astute and sometimes cunning politician who knew how to
exploit the democratic party and parliamentary systems. It is also true that his party had
a strict hierarchical structure,48 especially after the establishment of the state, and that he
stressed the formalist majoritarian facet of democracy, demanding that political
minorities adhere to majority rule. This was his attitude to the minority within his own
Mapai Party, as well as to the right-wing Etzel and Lekhi pre-state militias, and later to
“rebellious” ministers in his cabinet or the minority in the Knesset. Yet, his conception of
democracy was by no means formalistic. First, throughout his political career—from his
role of general secretary of the Histadrut (Labor Federation) in the 1920s until his
retirement from the premiership in 1963—Ben-Gurion’s authority (and that of Mapai)
was always based on democratic elections.49 Second, as mentioned above, his concept of
democracy stemmed from his basic belief in the idea of individual sovereignty, i.e. the
idea that people are born free and are free to shape their private and public life: “our
affinity for the democratic regime and human liberty is engraved in our very being,” he
declared.50 His resolute demand that the minority adhere to the majority’s rule did not
mean that he was unaware of the minority’s rights in a democracy but rather that the
minority manifest republican responsibility. If the minority accepted the democratic
“rules of the game” and understood that every society must have a center of authority,
then it should act in a responsible manner. Of course, in a democracy the minority is
guaranteed human and political rights and freedoms, such as the right to protest and
192 N. Kedar
express its different views. But the minority cannot endanger the security or the stability
of the political community (like the pre-state right-wing militias, who had rejected the
authority of the organized Jewish community in Palestine), and it cannot impose its
policy on the democratically elected majority, claiming that the majority errs (as the
minority in the Zionist Labor Movement tried to do from the early 1940s). The minority
in a democratic republic must be respected, maintained Ben-Gurion, but it also bears
republican duties and responsibilities.51

The State as an Expression of Civic Affinity

The third mamlakhti demand was the call to develop a sense of civic affinity that would
unite all Israeli citizens under the state. Ben-Gurion insisted:
A state is not only a formal matter, a framework, a regime, an international status,
sovereignty, an army; the state does not exist as long as it is not part of the heart of a
people, of its soul, of its consciousness. A state is a consciousness, a sentiment of
responsibility and a mamlakhti affinity of all the people, of all the citizens.52

I have dubbed this affinity “civic” because the sentiments of affiliation and inclusion it
advances do not derive from a primordial attachment to a certain ethnic, religious or
other group. Although Ben-Gurion’s civic mamlakhti affinity was in fact based on
Jewish national and cultural bonds, and as such tolerated the Arab citizens of Israel
as equal citizens but did not see them as genuine partners in the Israeli res publica,53
the universalistic republican language did nonetheless offer a universal type of
connectedness that I call “civic” affinity, which enables the formal inclusion of all under
the state. These “civic” feelings of belonging developed from a civic consciousness, and
in particular from the understanding of the public sphere’s importance to individual
sovereignty, and from the awareness of the significance of participation in the public
domain. It is precisely these sentiments that Ben-Gurion’s mamlakhtiyut sought to
foster. In an article from 1954 Ben-Gurion wrote:
The citizens of Israel have not yet sufficiently absorbed the consciousness and
mamlakhti responsibility of an independent people. Jews have suffered generally
from the heavy hand of hostile regimes that forced them to deceive and ignore state
laws. The behavior patterns of generations cannot be erased in a matter of years; the
new immigrant, straight off the boat or plane, does not automatically become a
[conscious] member of the state and an educated citizen. A well-run state is not the
result of lofty morality, but of a decent and educated civic life. Naturally, a corrupt
regime will impede proper civic education, but the regime alone does not define the
totality [of civic life], and an oppressed, dependent and galuti people cannot be
changed overnight, by the single stroke of declared sovereignty or a change of
scenery, into a mamlakhti . . . people.
In our country, even good manners are lacking. Much of the population, including
the youth, has not learned how to treat their neighbor with respect, courtesy, tolerance,
or sympathy. The basic sense of fairness between people, that makes public life pleasant
and provides an environment of general amity and understanding, is defective.54
 The Journal of Israeli History 193

Mamlakhtiyut in Practice
Ben-Gurion’s complex ideas of civic affinity and responsibility and his attitude
towards democracy and the rule of law reveal the immanent republican tension
between the basic ideals of individual sovereignty and participation on the one hand,
and the formal characteristics of the rules, procedures and institutions of the state and
its law on the other hand. As we have seen, Ben-Gurion emphasized the importance
of the republican formal-procedural elements: formal democracy, positive law,
autonomous legal and administrative systems and formal bureaucracy. Yet, at the same
time he also tried to resolve or soften the problems of exclusion or injustice that often
resulted from the strict implementation of these formal rules and procedures:
he stressed the halutzi (pioneering) spirit and the realization of the ideals of civic
consciousness, civic affinity, responsibility and partnership.
It is in this light that we should understand, for example, Ben-Gurion’s complex
approach to democracy and the idea of formal equality. Ben-Gurion thought that
formal legal and administrative equality is a vital condition in a mamlakhti republic:
“in a democracy the laws of the state apply equally to all citizens, just as the sun shines
equally on everyone, and everyone outdoors gets equally wet in the rain.”55 However,
realizing that the goal of full equality was unattainable and that strict formal equality
sometimes caused problems of exclusion and injustice, he believed that one must fight
against specific inequality and discrimination, while simultaneously emphasizing the
principles of civic participation, cooperation and responsibility in addition to equality.
Elsewhere I have elaborated on Ben-Gurion’s approach to equality.56 Here I shall give
two examples: that of his long and bitter dispute with the Israeli legal elite with regard
to the appointment of a Sephardic judge to the Israeli Supreme Court,57 and that of his
struggle with the kibbutz movement with regard to the “absorption” of immigrants.
In the first dispute the legal elite adhered to the idea of formal equality: appointments
to the court must be made on a strictly equal basis, according to professional
meritocratic rules. Ben-Gurion did not challenge this principle but insisted that the
matter of the Sephardic judge should be perceived from a different—republican—
angle: that of participation and republican responsibility. Although he was well aware
that one Sephardic judge among eight non-Sephardic judges would not contribute
to equality in Israeli society, he believed that such an appointment would help
the Sephardic Jews (who at that time constituted more than a third of the Jewish
population of the state) to develop a sense of participation in and belonging to the
Israeli community, and he blamed the legal elite—who refused to accept his opinion—
of being irresponsible and non-mamlakhti. He thought that Israelis should not only
respect their fellow citizens but also feel responsible towards them. “We will fail if we
do not see ourselves as a state, which is responsible to all of its citizens,” he reproved his
party members in 1950.58
This approach also explains Ben-Gurion’s struggle with the kibbutz movement
with regard to the proper attitude towards the new Jewish immigrants. Ben-Gurion
demanded that the kibbutzim accept thousands of newcomers and be responsible for
194 N. Kedar
their “absorption” and well-being. When the kibbutz movement did not fulfill his
hopes, he blamed them for being irresponsible and non-halutzi, and said that he was
“deeply ashamed” of the kibbutzim’s behavior.59
As a “republican” leader he cherished responsibility since it denoted a real, “active”
concern for the other’s well-being, accepting and including him or her in the political
community. Ben-Gurion, then, was deeply devoted to equality, democracy and the
rule of law, but, understanding that these ideals stemmed from the more profound
idea of human sovereignty, he interpreted them from a republican perspective, which
demanded also civic affinity, responsibility and participation.

Conclusions
I have argued that the concept of republicanism can best explain Ben-Gurion’s idea of
mamlakhtiyut and his policy as a political leader, both before and after the foundation
of Israel. First, Ben-Gurion’s worldview often echoes the central tenets of
republicanism: as a modernist he believed in individual sovereignty, i.e. in the idea
that human beings are free to shape their life and future; and he believed that a vital
public sphere is an imperative condition for free and meaningful human life, and that
therefore the individual should participate in the public domain, cultivate and protect
it. These basic “republican” tenets were also aligned with his Zionist and socialist
ideology, as well as with his belief in science and progress and his devotion to the ideas
of democracy, the rule of law and halutzi active citizenship.
Second, Ben-Gurion conducted a republican policy de facto. He understood the
importance of just and efficient laws, procedures and institutions for the sustainability
of the republic and played a major role in shaping Israel’s civil institutions and
establishing democracy and the rule of law. He carried out a socialist economic policy
in order to reduce economic inequality and increase social and civic participation.
And lastly, he called for the development of mamlakhti consciousness that would enable
Israel to function as a civilized, independent polity manifesting civic responsibility and
affinity, respecting democracy and upholding law and order. Ben-Gurion was indeed a
centralist and determined political leader and not a systematic philosopher. His political
tenets were constantly examined and redefined according to the complex, dangerous
and ever-changing reality. It is therefore clear that no political theory (including
republicanism) can fully explain all his actions during his nearly 60 years of political
activity. Nevertheless, as I have sought to show, Ben-Gurion did have a well-defined civic
worldview which accords well with the political theory of republicanism.

Notes
[1] Cf. Bareli and Katz, “Ben-Gurion on Plato.”
[2] Aristotle, Politics, book 1, part 2.
[3] Plato, Republic, books 2– 4; Aristotle, Politics, book 1; Cicero, De re publica, de legibus.
 The Journal of Israeli History 195

[4] Modern republicans indeed disagree on how the writings of early modern republicans
(sometimes referred to as “classical republicans”) should be interpreted and how to define
republicanism as a political theory. In the Anglo-American literature this difference of opinions
is sometimes known as the argument between “civic humanists” and “civic republicans.”
Whereas the former believe that active citizenship and the nurture and protection of the
common weal are important as means for free and meaningful human life, the latter believe
that active citizenship is important to protect the individual from arbitrary domination, and
that therefore it is instrumental—and not intrinsic—to the idea of political freedom. On this
historiographical and theoretical dispute, see generally Haakonssen “Republicanism,” 568– 74;
Pettit, Republicanism; Viroli, Republicanism, 61.
[5] See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment; Skinner, The Foundation of Modern Political Thought,
vol. 1; Viroli, Republicanism.
[6] For a discussion of communitarianism and republicanism, see Haakonssen, “Republicanism,”
571– 72.
[7] See n. 3 above.
[8] See Paine, Political Writings; Rousseau, Du Contrat social; Hamilton, Jay and Madison,
The Federalist Papers.
[9] Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, 170, 199.
[10] Rousseau, Discours sur l’économie politique, 2: 284 –85.
[11] For a left-liberal republican idea, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, esp. 205.
[12] Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 31 – 80.
[13] It is important, however, not to confuse civic affinity with multiculturalism. Of course, civic
affinity can be multicultural, as in the case of many Western republics in recent years. However,
civic affinity and multiculturalism are distinct phenomena. Furthermore, despite its neutral
and universalistic language, civic affinity has usually been connected to specific patriotic,
national, religious or cultural feelings.
[14] Among the few systematic works are Medding, Mapai in Israel, chap. 11; idem, The Founding of
Israeli Democracy, chap. 7; Horowitz and Lissak, The Origins of the Israeli Polity, chap. 8; idem,
Trouble in Utopia, chaps. 2 and 5; Liebman and Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel, chap. 4;
Zion and the State, chaps. 11 and 12; Yanai, “Ha-tfisah ha-mamlakhtit shel Ben-Gurion”; Bareli,
“Mamlakhtiyut ve-tnu’at ha-avodah,” 23. For the theoretical and etymological roots of
mamlakhtiyut, see Kedar, “Ben-Gurion’s Mamlakhtiyut.”
[15] See, among many others, Don-Yehiya, “Political Religion in a New State,” 171 (which uses the
term “statism,” despite its subtitle, “Ben-Gurion’s Mamlachtiyut,”); Lahav, “A ‘Jewish State . . .
to Be Known as the State of Israel,’” 387, 388.
[16] See, for example, Alkalay, The Complete Hebrew – English Dictionary, 1362.
[17] See, for example, Ben Gurion “Halikhot ha-medinah ha-yehudit” (Mores of the Jewish State)
(address given on 29 October 1937 and again on 7 June 1938), in idem, Ba-ma’arakhah, 1:278
(part 1), 1:293 (part 2).
[18] See Kedar, “Ben-Gurion’s Mamlakhtiyut,” 117.
[19] David Ben-Gurion, “Tzivuyei ha-mahapekhah ha-yehudit” (The imperatives of the Jewish
revolution), in idem, Ba-ma’arakhah, 3:202.
[20] Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung,” Berliner Monatsschrift,
30 September 1784.
[21] Ben-Gurion, “Tzivu’yei ha-mahapekhah ha-yehudit,” 203 (emphasis in the original).
[22] David Ben-Gurion, “Nikon” (Let’s be ready) (address to the Zionist Conference, 29 October
1947), in idem, Ba-ma’arakhah, 5:241, 247.
[23] See Rodgers, “Republicanism,” 11.
[24] David Ben-Gurion, “Shlikhut ha-mifal ha-tziyoni” (The mission of the Zionist project), in
idem, Hazon ve-derekh, 3:238.
196 N. Kedar
[25] Ben-Gurion, Hazon ve-derekh, 3:330.
[26] Donyets, “Ha-idiologiyah ha-le’umit shel David Ben-Gurion,” 57– 59.
[27] David Ben-Gurion, “Dvar Yisrael be-artzo” (The words of Israel in its land), in idem,
Ba-ma’arakhah, 5:58 (emphasis in the original).
[28] Ben-Gurion, Ba-ma’arakhah, 3:202.
[29] See Ben-Gurion, Mi-ma’amad le-am, especially 242.
[30] David Ben-Gurion, “Ye’udey ha-tziyonut be-sha’ah zo” (The objectives of Zionism at this
hour), in idem, Ba-ma’arakhah, 4:14.
[31] Ben-Gurion’s belief in individual sovereignty explains not only his call for the realization of
Zionism but his faith in scientific progress as well, and he made a clear connection between
science and hagshamah: “science is the governance of man over nature, [and] pioneering is the
governance of man over himself.” See “Keitzad nekabel pnei ha-ba’ot?” (How shall we greet the
future?), in Ben-Gurion, Be-hilakhem Yisrael, 237.
[32] See Shapira, Mi-piturey ha-Rama ad peruk ha-Palmah.
[33] See Yanai, “Ha-tfisah ha-mamlakhtit shel Ben-Gurion.”
[34] See Avi Bareli, “Mamlakhtiyut, Capitalism and Socialism in Israel during the 1950s,” in this
issue, 201– 27 below.
[35] Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem; Goldberg, “‘Kshe-not’im etzim,’” 29, 45.
[36] Kedar, Mamlakhtiyut, chap. 4; and my articles, “Ben-Gurion veha-ma’avak,” and “A Civilian
Commander in Chief ”; Gutman, Ha-yo’etz ha-mishpati, 46 – 68, 124 – 47.
[37] David Ben-Gurion, “Mahapekhat ha-ruah” (The revolution of the spirit) (address before a
meeting of free professions, 15 January 1949), in idem, Hazon ve-derekh, 1:29, 34– 35.
[38] See for example Ben-Gurion’s statements in the Provisional Council debate on the Terror
Ordinance: “Every jurist knows that it is simple to weave juridical cobwebs, to prove anything
and to contradict anything . . . as a law student I know that nobody compares with the jurist in
the ability to warp a text, and to conjure up sophistic theories and confusing interpretations.”
Proceedings of Provision Council of State Meetings, vol. 1, 19th session, 23 September 1948,
p. 17, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem. In a debate in the government devoted to the salary of the
attorney general, Ben-Gurion (who supported paying the attorney general the same salary as a
minister and a supreme court judge) complained: “It’s only the lawyers who receive high
salaries; this is not just, and I loathe this profession, but the fact is that lawyers receive high
salaries; the talented ones, whether by fraud or by virtue of real talent, are the only ones who
succeed in receiving extremely high salaries.” Proceedings of Provisional Government meetings,
12 September 1948, p. 45, Israel State Archives, Jerusalem.
[39] See Kedar, “A Civilian Commander in Chief ”; Mamlakhtiyut, chap. 4; and “Mabat hadash al
hakamat ma’arekhet ha-mishpat ha-yisraelit.”
[40] Aronson, “David Ben-Gurion and the British Constitutional Model.”
[41] Personal Letter from Ben-Gurion to Ben-Zvi, 5 March 1953, Correspondence, Ben-Gurion
Archives, Sde-Boker.
[42] Ben-Gurion, Devarim ke-havayatam.
[43] File 4-gimel-2 (Ben-Gurion – Weinschel), Ben-Gurion Archives, Sde-Boker; Goldberg, “Ben-
Gurion ve-Hazit ha-Am,” 51– 66.
[44] See for example Shapiro, Ha-demokratiyah be-Yisrael; Peleg, “Israel’s Constitutional Order and
Kulturkampf,” 242.
[45] Amir Gilbo’a, “Shir shel yom” (“A day song”), Massa 12 (27 December 1951): 1, cited in Bareli,
Mamlakhtiyut, 33.
[46] Scheib (Eldad), Ma’aser rishon, 343– 44 (emphasis in the original).
[47] Ha’aretz, 30 December 1960. See also Kedar, Mamlakhtiyut, chap. 6.
[48] See in general Bareli, Mapai be-reshit ha-atzma’ut.
[49] See Bareli and Gorny, “Ahdut ve-shituf,” 127, 141– 42.
 The Journal of Israeli History 197

[50] David Ben-Gurion, “Mediniyut ha-hutz” ([Our] foreign policy), in idem, Hazon ve-derekh,
3:285, 288.
[51] See for example, Ben-Gurion, “Hukah o hukim?” (Constitution or statutes?), in ibid., 2:125,
149– 50.
[52] Ben-Gurion, “Ha-medinah veha-am” (The state and the people), in ibid., 3:95, 98.
[53] For a critique of Israeli republicanism from this angle, see Peled, “Zarim ba-utopiyah”; Peled
and Shafir, Being Israeli.
[54] David Ben-Gurion, “Ha-mivhan ha-elyon” (The supreme trial), in idem, Hazon ve-derekh,
5:90 – 91.
[55] David Ben-Gurion, “Hagigim: Le-anshey Deganyah” (Reflections: To the people of Degania),
Davar, 27 January 1961: 2.
[56] Kedar, “Tzrikhah lihiyot hargashah shel am,” 747 –72.
[57] By “Sephardic” I mean those who trace their lineage to Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 or who
come from a Mediterranean or Middle Eastern country. See Kedar, “Ben-Gurion veha-
ma’avak.”
[58] Minutes of Mapai faction in the Knesset, 26 January 1950, Labor Party Archives, Beit-Berl.
[59] For Ben-Gurion’s dispute with the kibbutz movement regarding the absorption of immigrants
in the kibbutzim see his famous “I’m ashamed” address in the Knesset, 16 May 1950, Divrei ha-
Knesset (Knesset Record), 3 (1950): 536. For one of the many responses to Ben-Gurion,
see Aharon Zisling, “Bosh ve-nikhlam: Tshuvah le-rosh ha-memshalah” (Ashamed and
confounded: An answer to the Prime Minister), Al ha-Mishmar, 27 January 1950, 3 –4.

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