Preferred Citation: Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes's Imaginsion: Proportion, Tmages, and the AcUvity of Thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995 1986. hp://arkcalb-org/ark:/13030/RtGs5r99Te/ Descartes's Imagination Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking Dennis L. Sepper Preferred Citation: Sepper, Dennis L. Descartes's Imagination: Proportion, Images, and the Activity of Thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996 1996, hp://arkcalb-org/ark:/13030/RtbsSrO9Td/ To Kathleen PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS {have a quite precise memory of when and where this project began. In the spring of 1983 1 was attempting to reconcile the Rules forthe Direction ‘of the Mind with » rather conventional account of Descartes phlosooy for 9 group of graduate students, Unforunotely Twos faced by passage Biter passage that did not it the convention. The frst few interpretive sources {turned lo provides only # litle help, hardly more than 8 sharp ocus, I veallzed that when opportunity arose, T would Reve to dig more deeply into the orginal text and the secondary IRerature. Sut teaching and other research Kept me occupies unt the summer of 1986, when my wife and I had the chance to pavcipate in Marjorie Grene's Natenal Endowment forthe Humanities (NEM) seminar on Descartes at Cornall University, In Ithaca, New York. 1 still remember the fst time I tied to explain to Marjorie my Inklings about Descartes's Imagination, she exclalmad that that covlen be fight, but we (she and I and another member of the seminar) went immediately to the Latin text of Rule 12 and coniemec that atleast 3 few of the Inklings were well founded. A summer of recognize tht exploring and articulating the backgrouné to Descartes Use of Imagination would demane an investigation of medieval and Renaissance sources with which Iwas Itle familar. That investigation, undertaken In the academic year 1988-1989 with the Suppor of 2 fellowship \with che Institute for Research in the Humanities of the Unversity of Wisconsin, Madison, uncovered for me tha fches of an old philosophical psychology that had defined specific roles for mmagination—in metltation, n the practice of memory, in poate Invention, in mathematics, indeed in cognition Unfortunately Ihave been able incorporate only a faction of those Fiches into this book. Some of my historical excursions are undoubtecly eversimplifie, in patt because af the demands of brevity, In part, 1 feat, because of my Ignorance. There are many places where interested readers wil wish for futher detal that {do not give. Tose who are Mistorealy Interestee may be patent win some of the ahilosophical excursions; and the philosophically inlined may find more history than fs t ther Hiking. Allthe erers, of course, are my own: Lean only offer apologies in advance for not making the book batter than it's. Nevertheless, if I were to make an apelogia fori, 1 would begin by calling atertion tothe words of Wittgenstein quoted above. No philosopher of the madem era has deen, and cantinues to be, more mytholagizee than Oascartes. One reason is tat Descartes himself began the process with his "autobiography" Inthe Discourse an the Method for Conducting One's Reason Well and Finding Truth inthe Sciences. Vitually Everyone since has followed Descartes's example, i only by reading him teleological, that's, with the expectation that everything he wrote he ‘ne must commence the Jourmey; atthe very least tis af obstacle ta understanding Descartes’s witings prior to 1637. What Ihave thersfore ted {ado In this book isto trace a path from Imagination as ts found inthe "canonical" Descartes to what I believe Is the deeper truth, tat his Sciestic and philosophical interests began with the pawers of the Imagination. This angin not enly reveals an originating impulse, It alse largely explains the course of his researches ang gives clues to how we shuld read (and how we often misread) the witings of his maturity The book is articulated as follows. Inthe introduction I ciscuss impressions that someone familar with Descartes is Iikely to have about the role of imagination In ls thought, then offer signs ofa quite radically diferent assessment of imagination from one of his eaflest notebooks. Part 1 Sketches the background of ancient and medieval theories of Imagination as a sensitve power ofthe soul witha determinate role Inthe process of knowing; it then tums to Deseartes's adaptation ofthis tradition in his early theory of an analogical and proportonalizing, cognitive imagination Parl proceeds to examine the Regulae ad directionem ingen, in which a physiologically based psychology of Knowing elaborated and Geepenes the conception of cognitive Imagination but also began to create ifs between the corporeal and intelectual alma, Part it then attends to the ‘ore Imited out nevertheless stil important roles tat imagination played in the writings that followed Descartes's abandonment af the Regulae, fom Le Monde (The Worl, begun around 2630) to the Passions ofthe Soul (published In 1699). For although In these works Descartes sharaly restricted its cognitive Bearing, imagination nevertheless remained essortial for phys= les and mathematics, i took on baste functions In guiding the human passions, and it served analogically as @ model fr thinking and ideas in his mature phlasophy. The study ends with a reflecuon on some implieations of this attempt to reconceive Descartes and his philasapnical Importance {Go not pretend that ths Is the definitive Interpretation of Imagination in Descartes, but I do hope that it helps reorient our conception of the phenomena In pursuit of which Descartes becama a prlosopher My guiding ineention, at any ate, hae been philosophical: to reawaken our conse for a deep and wacaly ranging mental experience that has been largely forgottan without ever being invalidated or contuted‘A word about translation: The available translations of Descartes into English all have thelr virtues, but there Is none that sufficiently marks distinctions of psychological toms, especially those In Latin. Thus 1 have given my own renderings of all the Descartes and of most of the Latn items Ihave quoted. nave tied to be as Itaral and consistent as possible, probably ering overmuch on the sige of choosing cognates to render the original terms, In tansiating the Latin, Rave as much as possible kept to the orginal articulation of phrases, clauses, and sentences, The result is often suit; but beter a sifoess tht causes us to pull up in surprise from time to lime than a Muty that smooths over Important [owe Marjorie Grane 2 deep debt of gratitude; her NEH seminar was the place where this project was given first shape and name, ané even her entlsms and doubts have been a support. Many thenks to Dovid Lindberg, Paul Boyer and al the faculty and fellows of the Insttte for Research in the Humanities ofthe University of Wisconsin, Madisan, with a very spectal thankyou to Lareta Freling, who Keeps things going. The Institute enabled me to spend the academic year 1988-1989 hammering out the frst craft of tis book; the institute's doors were opened to m= gain in tre summer of 1993, which saw the completion of the penultimate craft that found its way 2 few months later to the University of Calforia Press [A heartfelt thanks to Edward Dimencberg of the Press for his promptness, encouragement, and professionalism; may every auther find such an ecitort Thanks as well to Stephanie Emarson, for helaing me navigata the manuscrist through the Voyage of preproduction; to Rebecca Frazier, or guiding itm production; and to Sheila Berg, for her care and sensivity in editing Bamey Rieca once again saved me from having to lear to program In Pastsenpt; I thank him forthe use of his expertise and for his swiftness In procucing tre figures I wanted There are Iterally dozens of libranans whose help has been invaluable to me, in particular at Comell University, the University of Wisconsin (Madison and Milwaukee), the University of Flarida (Galnesvlle) the University of Texas (Austin and Dallas), the Unversity of Oklahoma (Norman), and the University of Dallas. My very special thanks goes to Mrs. Alice Pure, {the Inervaty Loan Ubraran af the University of Dallas, who always has time for a smile and a quick check of OCLC, regardless of how many requests nave flooded her desk T wish to express my gratitude tothe editors of the Jounal ofthe History of Philasophy fr allowing the use of passages from my article ‘Descartes and the Eclipse of Imagination, 1618-1630," which fist appeared in that journal, and to Oxford Unversity Pres forthe use of portions of "Ungenium, Mamory Art and the Unity of Inaginabve Koewing Inthe Early Descares." (Excerpted from Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes, etited by Stephen Voss. Copyright © 1993 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Reprinted By permission.) To the undergraduate majors and graduate students of the University of Dallas who have been the audience, sometimes captive, often enough wiling, for both prepared and spontaneous expositions of Descartes, I want to say: Your interest ané questions helped sustain this werk; now you fan see how the whole argument goes, ‘The endgame of this book, the finishing of It, has as usual Brought a It-te craziness into family life. I wart to thank my chiléren, Elizabeth and Matthew, for putting up with my fitful fenzies. My wife, Kathleen, has seen this all before and knows that its Ihkely to happen again. She, 2 Feal historian indulges my occasional pretensions to Fistorcal acumen, can thank her for that; But for her love, Tam simply, deeply, lovingly sratetut ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS The following abbreviatons are used forte mast often cited work, n= | reguiae 2d atrectionem Ingen, as printed inthe 1701 Latin edition of vartious works by Descarees: R. Des-Cartes Opuscula posthuma, physica & mathematica. Amsterdam and). Blacu, 1701 at = | oeuvres de Descartes cited by Chattes Adam and Paul Tannery. 12 vols. Paris: Crt, 1897-1913. Rev. ed. 11 vals. Pars: Vein, 1964-1978. (The orginal editions twelfth volume is 3 biography of Descartes by Charles Adam.) Text references wil take the form "AT X 387-386," mearing pages 387-380 of volume 10. The pegination of the two felons Is the same, except for matter added atthe end ofthe volumes in the second VIILA, VIB, IA, and 1X8 csm = | me philosophical Watings of Descartes. 3 vols. Tanslated by John Cottingham, Robert ‘Stoathaff, Dugald Murdoch, ane Anthony Kenny. cambridge: Cambridge University ress, 1986-1091, Regulae ad disctionem ingen, inthe Latin MS copy ordered by Leibniz, dlscovered In the 1850s In Hanover in te Konicliche Offeniche Biblthek by Foucher de Carel egulze ad directionem ingen, n the Outch translation of 1684: R. Descartes Brieven, Derde Deel, Neffans eon nette Verhandellng van het Licht. Translated DDutcn By J. H. Glazemaxer. Amsterdam: Jan Rleuwersz, 1668 [have used the English form of nfl forte four major works of Descartes that were published curing hs fete: thus i ls the Discourse on the ‘Method, the Meditations on Arst Philosophy, the Pnncioles of Philosophy, and the Passions of the Soul. The sare holds forte three scientic, essays that accompaniee the Discourse, the Dioptes, the Meteorology, and the Geometry. For other works Tuse the Latino the French, for xample the Regulae and Le Monde [nave avoided using “Cartesian” as an adjectve charactenzing Descartes, his works, or his philosophy. Where it occurs, it signifies Ns followers or the pilesophy that is characterstic of them. Except where noted, all the translations ffom Latin and French are my awn. { have stven for Iteralism rather than smoothness. Square brackets are used In translated passages Inthe following ways! ‘imran conte nh ajc ee rotina cj pacaang cet 8 alate uposomae erase at aaa or 8 dane aviaistn sf eanat arpasetie ate rma te pcng t 'spr w ca e ra con {ern pam) at th nore face pene aera anton st medley Dee rear nsates my irl extn sat redaay peso ote nay we he sarundingt. Introduction Descartes and the Imagination ze ha pone of macy wi ome asa a rs am Bee of understand 9 eu ote esr of mal, a ey min Fer ‘tough mr bs ror eco wl on ees rary sere tng a rw oon tr ser al nw eee 9 ferthing cre rome. ey cent sey ee towne mn fone ae ste i) it wa ack (ee we) eve tat {Bey owt un © cout ane Sa Sra) he mh magne Coa get 2 te ee Ctr feo aurea oi {Berle 'nng we uneartanaressevllinsyre'ny tn very sas ecru eo fe asa ae wn anne Rie masring none ae a ‘gage, Sear pe vs seeing ie ey cova wiht ores Hn a panned ye A. THE QUESTION Readers ofthe Mecitations on First Philosophy know thatthe imagination falls to bring us tothe truth, whether about ourselves as thinking tings oF {bout the world as extendes mater. Imagination by its nature hes os object what I not really “there, end in dreams and hallucinations i takes ‘Sppearances for reality. Yet even as the mediator ees I Tal shor of truth, Imagination Nevertheless Serves as 9 vehlcle able to traverse part of ‘he way to what Is fm and unshakable In the Fist Meditations searen for truth, that i, for an appearance that accurately cortesponds tothe underlying reality, Imagination ‘compounds the uncertainties the meditatar discovers In sensation. Although sensation can sometimes be proved unfeiable, the Imagination, Inthe hallucinations of madmen and the creams of everyman, produces appearances that are virtually queranteed not to have any corresponding realty. Imaginations power of feigning realty tums out to be methodologealy futul, homeve, [1] Tum,'nere and a fe tines farther down, ronders convertat, whic, along wih the noun form conversa, Is the standard term in Scholastic Latin or the turning toward phantasms that was necessary fr thought. See chapter t forthe significance of this. = ‘asthe meditator pursues the thought that she might be dreaming and then considers the consequences. Although Imagining produces possbilties rather than certantes, it leads the meditator to a brillant fictional device: the demon who cevotes al is force and cunning to deceiving the ‘ecitotor always and everyanere, The device brings the mediator tothe threshold of the fst certainty, the “cog, sm" Ts not tre that Imagination perceives this th, but it does prepare the may. In the Sixth Meditation, imagination once again plays a preparatory role, Aer the Fifth Meitation persuades the mediator of the ruth of mathematies, God's existence, and the fellabilty of memory (when recalls what has slready been known clearly and distntly), the medtator retumns to the question of the First Meatation, whether there Is an extended, material weld coresponding o ofelnay sense experience. Imagination comes close to establishing the existence of Bodies, but only as @ possibilty, not as realty. The proof ofthe existance af the corporeal realm requires instead a renewed examination of the testimony of the senses, understood now in the ght of te frst traths of metaphysis. ‘Thus both In the descent into doubt and in te reascent toa knowledge of the extended wortd the imagination plays an intermediate role betwean the senses and the Intellect. Although cognitively waak, fis frutful In generating possiblities, and wen rigorously put to mathocslogical purpose it points the mecitator in the ght draction. From the Meditations the imagination appears to have the character of @ middling power it marks out an experience that resembles sensation but also exhibits a freedom from the senses, yet this Is nok suflcient to establizn that experience az secure enough eo atisy intellect. There ls 2 ‘aking to Imagination, but its not enough fo make a realty; itn lead one closer to the Wurth, but it Is Incapable of knowing the truth TEs Simultaneously frustrating in its neapacities ana tantalizing Inthe prospects and analogies it suggests, For example, when Descartes Begins to "wonder whether his experience is dreamike, Ne reflects thet dreams might be like paintings. Perhaps the true realives are the elements out of \Wolen bath dreams and pictures are composeahumen figures, for example, are composes of arms, legs, and heads, or (concentrating mare “pecifcally on now paintings are made) permaps of colors. "And fara not csimilar reason, although these general things, eyes, head, hands, and the lke, could be Imaginary, itis nevertheless necessary atleast that certain atner things even simpler ane more universal ae to be acknowledged ‘rue; out of such tre colors (as It ware) are fashioned al those Images ef things, ether true or false, that are In our cogitation” (AT VIl 20}. Nevertheless, the impression of imagination that a reader takes avay from the Meditations is more likely o be dominated by the memory of its failures than of its promise. The reflection on the realty ofthe elements or “tue colors” subverts our confidence in the truth value of all composites, and even the hope momenta putin the possible existence of tue ‘lemants fall, at leost forthe time being. Descartar's adversion to color may well adumbrate a source of tis Yalu, for, as we know form Cartesian prysies, colors are not in tinge But only in the mina ‘The imagination of the Meditations is simultaneously promising and perplexing. tn the context of the search for truth Its bound to come up ‘anart, of course, ince by the and of the Second Maditation the mediator nav that imagination does not and cannot know. Ae te examination of fhe piece of wax snows, the knowledge of things Belongs not t9 sensation or imagination Sut to the Inspection of the mon (inspectio ments; AT Yl 30-32) Imagination can produce sppearances, Sut this power is never definitive. Akhough everyone can picture, tat ls, proguce In magination, 5 triangle, tnousand-sided Tigure fs beyond the human Being’ Imaginative powers; forthe understonding, however te cilhagan Ts no Test clearly ‘nd elstnely conceived than the tslongle (AT VIE 72) ost devastating of al to any pretensions for human imagination isthe claim made in the eplaraph to this introduction: imagination must Ie outside my essence os a thinking being, since without fT would stil be the seme thing {am now (AT VIT 73). Although imegining¥s included 98 one Bt the tems falling under te generic name thinking’ (AT VIE 28), itis 9 weak instance of thinking, inessentia to tat most funeamental of human ‘ctivities. It seems implausioe to take Imaginalon as In any seise typical or paradigmatic of whet thought and understanding are. Moreover, We an even begin to wancer whether imaginaton’s methodological use Inthe Medations ean have more than incidental significance, especially when we note the claim in the letter of 13 November 1639 to Manin Mersenne that imagination harms rater than alps in the search forthe most basic truths of al those of metaphysis (AT 1 622), Imagination by its nature is, for cognitive purposes, unreliable and even deceptive. Yeti we are famihar with all of Descartes's writings, we know that imagination dace occasionally nave positive cognitive roles, Consider two remarks drawn from a notebook that Descartes kept in the ‘years 1619 t0 1621, that i, some twenty years before the Medftations. src ate sme hae, ee teen sere ie eh he wn) er, tn, many sonInaghaton: wr es or sac) of serena nitrate Oued By Paps raha a) Hoe Wray eager aL eB te sedans ao wiiave her suas eras etn a ae cpr se: estates pan, APA TST) These notes present a rather diferent, one might say quite unCartesia, picture of imagination and is role in krowing. As we shall seein chapter 2, ths is not an aberration But typical ofthe high estaem in vnich Descartes held cognitive Imagination early In his ahlosephical career ‘The Reguiae ad cractionem Ingen (AT X 359-469; presumably abandoned ca. 1629 and not published In any form unt tity-Tour years after Descartes's death) the best-known work presenting a postive understanding of imagination; imagination is discussed thoughout, and the second Dart expressly develops a cognitive method of employing imagination to salve problems. Moreover, even in works of his philosophical matury, Descartes frequent used images for cognitve purposes. In the opts essay appended tothe Discourse, for example, tennis rackets, grapes in Wine vats, and rigid sticks are used as models for conceiving the mechanic of light, inthe preface to the French edition of Principles of Philosophy, the tee of philosophy represents te relationships ofthe vantous disciplines to one another {4 ‘are such "facts" about imagination In Oascartes isolated, even aberrant, or do they reveal something deeply Ingrined inhi ‘the ukimate status of Imagination In Descartes? ‘The answer depends not a Ile on whe the questioner thinks Descartes is. For philosophers, he Is probably above al the author of the ‘Meditations, around winch al te other works revolve, Foran intellectual or caltual mstorian, he might be intead the author ofthe Discaurse on ‘Method ; fora historian of science, the author ofthe essays on optics, meteorclogy, and geometry to which the Discourse was Justa preface, [According to the Descartes Intended, the answer wil be diferent, or at last ciffeerly Inflected. About imagination In Descartes, however, the ‘Mesttations' account of the inessentiaity and cognitive lrelevance of imagination appears to be the decisive fact that any scholars claims or ought? What Is Nevertheless, Descartes scholarship and philosophical reflecton about his work have not yet settled the question of the role and scope of Imagination in his thought. The top, seemingly of marginal Interest, has produced few studies @nd-no consensus. In the frst part ofthis century [2] For the tee of philosophy, ses AT IXB 14-15, For evicence of che pervasiveness of suggestive images Inthe later writing, see Geneviéve Rodis-Lowis, From Motapnysics to Physics," in Essays on the Phlosophy and Science of René Descartes, ed. Stashen Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 242-256, was some attention tothe place of imagination in Descartes’: mathematical writings, (1 Hore recent stuclas have looked to ome of his early ‘watings, unpublished dung his Ifetime, to underscore the centrality of imagination in fiits human existence.(4) another philosopher, surveying the mre cop of Descartes wing recerlysuggesed that shits nthe teatmnt of imagination might seve as ndators of deeper transformations In is philosophy.(8) a bookclength study of imagination In Descartes, written in the early 1940s by a student of Jean-Paul Sartre, carefully surveys what Descartes had to say about Imagination in Its psychological aid physico-physilogical ramifications. Tis limited, however, by'an insrticient attention tothe sources an the development of Descartes’ theay, or rather theories, of imagination (© Imagination can indeed serve as an index of Descartes’s deeper concerns and of the transformations of his thought—not because there are remote and obscure connections between them, but rather because imagination wos at the heart of his earliest philosophizing, and because his prolonged effor to establish the practeal relevance and cogntive Importance of imagination lec him nko a network of problems tat defeated his Initial Ropes. The later philasophy, the canonical Descarces (as we might call it, 1s 2 lrect outgrowth of shift that was Intended to crcurwent and displace the problematies of Imagination. Neverthelass, the later philosophy bears the mark offs ongins, and its not ‘or any accidental reason ‘that imagination makes ts appearance at crcial tums in the investgations of what human beings are and how itis that they know [5] Pier Boutroux, Cimaginaion et les mathématiques selon Descartes, Faculté des lettres de {Université de Paris, no. 10 (Pais: Felix Alcan, 500); Léon srunschvieg, ‘Mathématique et mStaphysique chaz Descartes n Eee phlosophiques, wol. 1: Humanteme de )Occident: Descartes, ‘Spineza, Kant (Pars: Presses Universitaires de ance, 1951), 11-54; and Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Ongin of Aigebya, trans. Eva Brann (Cambricge: MI” Press, 1968), 107-231 and notes. A recant, profound reevocaton ofthis themes found in Davié Rapport Lichtenman, The Ethies of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hal, 1980), esp. 67-91. In hs stay of the Fegulae, Leslie J. Beck nates the persistence of the methodological Importance of imagination inthe Discourse ; see Beck, The Method of Descartes: A Study of the "Regulse” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), [4] Udder Gabe, Descartes! Selbstkntk: Untersungen zur Philosophie des jungen Descartes (Hamburg: Felx Maines, 1972), ane Josef Simon, Wahmhet als Point: Zur Entwicklung der Wanrelts-frage In der naveren Philosophie (Bevin: de Gruyter, 1978), esp. 121-149. [5] Veronique Fat, "The Cartesian Imagination," Pilescpky and Phenomenological Research 46 (1986): 631-642. [6] Joan, Roy, LTmagination selon Descartes (Pais: Gallimard, 1946), Th chapter 7, T will mention in addition several eutstancing atcles on Imagination in the Meditations ‘Also of note s an unpublished clssertation that uses Rules 7, 12, and 14-16 ofthe Regulae, the passage explaining imaginations role in musical perception from the Compendium musica, and the Meditations’ assertion thatthe thinking human being Is an Image of God to argue that Imagination is the truly active, synthetic agent among the powers of mind (a thess which I give only qualified assent), see Stephen Henry Ford, imagination and Though in Descartes,’ Ph.D, dissertation, York University (Canada), 1977, T believe that Ford gives too unary a reading of imagination in Descartes and overlooks essential diferences between the witings before and alter 1630; in parieuar, he does not recognize the historeal context and development of Descartes’ peychophysialogy of Imagination, the central role of proportional mathematics (er matyetcs) in Its funetoning, and the eiplananty of imaginative tinking. Nevereeless, had it bean published, Ford's study would have helped estaalish the urgent need forreconceiving Descares's pilesophical psychology. ‘This study can be viewed a arguing for thee mafor claims: (1) In Descartes's earliest works, fm 1628 unl around 1630, the cognitive use of Imagination was slways of central concern and often the fundamental one. (2) Le Monde (begun ca. 1630) markec the beginning af @sherper restriction of Imaginations cognitive capaailives to mathematics and physics, but imagination nevertheless remained at the centr of his thought, both ae an exolct theme and 23 providing an analogical kay to understanding the workings even of pure intellect And (2) when the mature Descartes used words Ike copita Je pense ), esprit, idea (ldée } Inspectio ments, medttatic, and te Ika, he was marking postions Ina psychologieal constellation informed by and entwined with a prestodem conception of the human soul and its operations, a formation and Entwinement thot has been eclipsed by the passage of time and by a shifein the central problematcs of Westem piflossphy. Once we have become ware ofthis, however, even the Meditations” apparent rejection of Imagination begins to tll another story than the one to which We are accustomed, and we begin to recognize Descartes’ preoccupation witn imagination as a key episode In his efforts to came to grips with thought as anactvty cf mind ‘The historical tendency of thase three claims might be put in @ kind of slogan that, though oversimplifiad, nas the vinues of being compact and suggestive: the philosophy of Descartes, from beginning fo end, an extended reflection onthe Implications of a dictum fist pronounced In Greek antiquity by Aristotle, "There ts no tought without phantasms’—no thought wthovt the presence of something in imagination in wiew of hier the power of understanding exercises its activity‘The third claim, in particular, that Descartes’s psychology is entwined more with premodem than modern psychology, ‘sas much about plosophy and the history of philosophy as is about Descartes, and It concems not merely his subsequent Influence on philosophy but us as wel ‘Consider frst that ‘epistemology’ a coinage of the seventeenth century, not by accident but because the attention tothe powers, activites, and {acts of consclousness vansformed the phlosophical way of questioning, 2 transformation that received a decisive impulse from Descartes's Works Yet, a6 we shall see, tis transformation is only 2 poral Vansltion of Descartes's own problematic, which was more physieal, physiological, psvehalogeal —_ anthropological, and metaphysical than it was epistemological. If he isthe father of modem philosophy, his offspring bear an imperfect resemblance te him Thus by attending to some of the diferences between the pre-and post-Caresian problematics, we can gait clearer sense of the distinctive character of modern thought. Moreover, there 's an important sense in which the apparent anistorelsm of Descartes's own thinking Is temperea by nis awareness thatthe starting point of thinking that ris one of prejuless Is situated and must averse the ground of @ hertage in ‘order to recover @ clear and distinct sense of the activity of knoving (If here ts some fundamental trut tothe nation that there (sno thinking ‘without phantasme-ane I shall argue that Descarts bellaved that this was for most purpaees tue, even in his mature pilesophical works and it ‘the phantasm in the fullest sense tums out to be someting that Is not just an Image of cerpereal things but also words and intellectual memories that ae Dlographeally and historically constituted, tnen by following out the pro lematies of imagination in Descartes in an even more raical Woy than he did we can recover a relevant understanding of human existence as historical and Imaginative. The phantasm thus would turn out to be not Just a nation of archive Interest But a Heh and evolving prinetpe st the rast af oth thinking and ding B. LOOKING AHEAD ‘The reader with a specialized intrest in Descartes may already find sufficient reason to proceed. But, as the preceding considerations have already suggested, there are larger reasons for pressing ahead withthe question of Imagination. ‘The first has too with Descartes. The Sixtn Meditaton's dismissal of te possibilty that imagination is essential to us as thinking things and its recognition of tre cognitive weakness of imagination do nat establish the ielevance of imagination anc images tothe later Descarves ‘Throughout his career Descartes attbuted a key role to imagination in mathematical and ahysial thinking, Inthe lost wore he published, the ‘Passions of the Soul, he allowed ie a notable function in the mastery ofthe passions. In the Meditations he pik imagination to work in the very at af vanscending it, and he Look ordinary Imagination 25 an analogical made! for conceiving [7] The examination of beliefs that one ought to undertake once in one's ifetime follows on one's acquisition of those beliefs not simply as 2 ‘thinking thing but also as.a human being who has been brought up In the ways and traitions ofa society with some decided canceations about the nature ang existence of knowledge (quite apart from the mores that give rise to the morally one adheres to). One must therefore think rough the Conte of Interpretations one has grown up with by means of the models of sequited and secured truth that heve been previously recoghized and caltivated a the activity 2nd objects of intellecton. One need think only of the use he made of the “malign geniys" atthe end ofthe First Mestation to recognize that radical doubt itself I an imaginative, o” atleast an Imaginaton-tike, function, As for imagination’ role as analogical model forthe ‘workings of the thinking thing, one might read the “Responses” tothe third set of objections to Ue Meditations, where Descartes tlle Thomas Habpes that he chose the term idea because it s used "by philosophers fr signiying the forms of perceptions of he divine mind, although me fcognize no phantasia in God (RT VI 181). Ideas are like the forms of God's imaginings, if Ged had imaginings-which of course ne doesrit! Even IFever tne years Descartes recenceived or downgraded the importance, especialy the cognitve imporance, of Imaginaten, the respanse to Hobbes ‘suggests that for an adequate understanding of so Cartesian a notion as Idea’ we must consider Itim the context of imagination’ functions {A futher motivation for pushing forward in this study is provided by remarking that imagination i jst one of what medieval and early modern thinkers called internal senses and tha, as we shall see, some of Its functions In Descartes are closely relate or even idetical to those that had traditionally been assignec to the cogtativa, the intemal sense In which cogtation proper bagi. In the Regus ad dlrectionem ingen, the term imagination fact appears on one occasion 3s a direct synonym of cogitati, which atthe very least reinforces the suspicion that Descartes's ore {630 understanding of psychology provides a context aut of mhieh the later pilosopay might be more accurately understood. Tt woul, afte alli Said ana done, be hard to argue that Descartes understanding of cogftatlo\s a matter af only minute histoncalinterest—not when the tuth that resists the crrosiveness of hyperbolic doubt and marks the beginning of modern philosophy Is formulated "coglto, erga sum." But we can press beyond Descartes scholarship and history of philsophy conce'ved narrowly to the question af his influence and vale In Wester intellectual culture. The constellation of the intemal senses, from common sense to cogitation, was pat not just of philosophy but also of the medical and scentfic understancing of tre sensitive and cognitive ablities of human beings, n particular ofthe relationship between bocy and mind or soul, The doctrine of ieerral senses constituted an intellectual commonplace well into the seventeenth century, But the wake of Cor. {esianiam ft underwent rapid cisintegration and was aislaced by radically simpifes schemss, Unlike the Cartesons, tat Is, his followers, Descartes began his philosophic ane scientific career slily rted inthis earier tradition. He developed a new conception ofthe min/body relationship precisely by thinking through the paradoxes ofthe ol Ladiion ana discovering that it could not be brought into conformity wth the Imecizine and science of his day. If there was 9 Cartesian tum in Western thought, Descartes himself was the Fist to accomplish it, and perhaps he was the only person ever to accomplish It in a theroughgoing, philosophical way, ‘Seeing how this hoppened may Nelp Us recogrize questions about Deseertes and modemity tot Rove never been adequately explored. Hot least of the advantages we could gain might be @ more concrete and less Gemonized version af Ue classic Descartes, wham fs popular ta stigmatize 38 ‘originator of @ hast of modem evils. ‘The final reason I shall cite for pressing forward has to do with imagination itself and is place inthe economy of human being and hums Ife, taday no aspect af ming has comparable power to ect by the mere mention of Its name & wide and cumtous audience, path inellectua! and popular ‘Imacination’ Isa shioboleth of modern hopefulness. Ie names a power that many people think can save them, if not the world; they belleve {hat "the results of an ever greater trumph ofthe Imagination can only be good. C8) Eva Brann, na work that attempts to bring into focus the vast philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic iterature an Imagination, remarks ‘that western tradition assigns imagination “a pvotal function.” ipl carly etn fis ditty tn le wl. uth ole ne tpn win deve 0 cs io ee antes pet pnt crn stn tive patos he leah at mene, yd sons apn sens se bio eu or oper ssrawis. i soto tk, he song mpsey of ses (One might acd: Its @ missing mystery of Western culture as wel Tks sky to put eat hopes in any ane thing. There is the danger of asking from imagination, by nature a midling power, more than it ean possibly deliver Tt eannat, fr examote, supplant the extremes that fe mediates. In order to understana, we must have recourse to abstacton ane oncepts, but there must also be real objects of understanding situated in a word that Is experienced by sense before Its Imagined. We cannot {ink in images alone, nor ean we lve in them. Yet fe sometimes seems to even the most tough-minded thinkers tat imagination has 2 force able to'deegen understanding and enliven ordinary experience Few have hae such high hopes fer imagination as Descartes, and few who have entertained such hopes have ended by so narowing its ‘application, Yet imagination always retained for him a paredigmatic aspect: he[8) René Girard, Decet, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other In Literary Structure, rans. Wonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Unversity Press, 1968), 85, Girard ascribes tne sentiment, which ne does not share, © 'omantce and necromanties alike [9} Eva TH. Brann, The World of Imagination: Sum and Substance (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Litefield, 1991), 3; emphasis in original recognized that its in imagination that most human beings, including himself, fist encounter (although ne find and the activity of thous Pethaps It isnot tao fanciful, here atthe outset, to wonder whether Its precisely owing to the closeness of imagination to our thinking, acting being that we set sucn great store by Ie and atthe same time are unable to give more than a fragmaneary or oblique account of i. Much of ‘What Descartes has to say about Imagination Is fragmentary and oblique. Is this because his understanding is Inadequate? Oris Because there Is ing about imagination that encourages, even demands, insitecion an parality? Are human beings capable of 2 complete, discursive lnderstanding of imagination? Although this book cannat aspire to answer each ofthese, it will T hope, ave insight into the phenomenon of Imagination=the silent center ofthis investigaion-and the questions surrounding it At te very least, By tying to think imagination along with Descartes, by tracing out the career ofthe Imagining Descartes, we can galn not Just perspective on the evolution of a single thinker but also Insight into the workings of this Geeply rooted power, the souree of much promise and many perplexibes. In purest form) the active power of PARTI The Early Philosophy of Imagination aun ONE ‘The Internal Senses and Descartes's Psychophysiology of Imagination In the inveducion 1 mentloned Descartes’s Indebtedness to 2 traction of philosophical psychology that placed So-called Intamal ar inward senses between the five external senses and the powers of inellect. The purse of this chapter s twofad: (1) to introduce the che! elements of the doctrine ofthe Interal senses and situate the Imagination within (rand (2) to demonstrate the connection of the psychology and physiology of Understanding elaborated in Descartess Reguiae ad directionem ingen to tis tradivon, As we sall presently see, although at frst glance the psychophysi-ology of the Regulge "ead like an anticipation of the later theory of the pineal gland (as the seat of the soul the boGy}, It isin 8 ‘more orginal serge an outgrowth of the doctrine of internal senses. A. IMAGINATION AND THE INTERNAL SENSES BEFORE DESCARTES Imagination Is 2 name traditionally elven to one of the powers af the mind enumerated in so-called facuty psychologies, (1) whicn divide the human oul according fa fundamental capacties, Most meciaval alscussions follow Anatole in taking the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual parts 2© [1] As pointed out by Jery &. Fodor although faculty psychology Is pronounced dead in every century, it invariably recovers; see Fodor, The ‘Modula of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology (Comoridge: MIT Press, 1983), The central issue for 8 psychology of faculties Is not whether ‘mind or soul fs thought to have various functions but the degree of independence of these functions from higher powers. For example, ifthe senses Bre thought to operate In essential independence from intellect, than sensibiity isan independent faculty intellect, in les tum, rught function Independently of sense, for instance Inso‘ar as f does not require the immediate action of the senses. AS soon as one allows even a small degree of Independence to a function, one has in fact taken the frst step Inte a psychology of Faculties. basic; Thomas Aquinas amplifies this to five by adding the appetitive (including wil) and the locomative powers. Each of these parts may in turn be subdivided aecoraing to its various functions and objects. The Intellectual power, for Instance, can be cvided, according to ts mode of operation, Inte intellect, whien is Immeciately apprenensive, and cscu'sve reason, which proceecs by stages) of, emphasizing Instead the object towers which the faculty is directed, one can civige it into the three capacities oF knowing (0) what is changing, (2) what Is unchanging but maternal, and (3) what Is unehanging and wholly immaterial The sensitive powers include not just the five extemal senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste but also the internal senses. there was ne ite clsagreement about the precise numberof the intemal senses, the proper names, thelr orga locations, and the correct delimitation oftheir functions, there was suicient consistency In medieval presentations for us to abstract a core theory. The core theory ulm derives trom Aristotle But has admixtures tom other philosophical tactions one incorporates scent ond medical octrne 9s wel Ina first approximation we should note thatthe sensitive powers, which human beings share with other animals, are intermediate between the vegetatve-nutrtive-reprocuctive powers possessed by all ving things and the intellectual powers possessed (atleast among physical beings) only by humans. In contrast to the vegetative powers, te sensiive powers involve an awareness of things or at least of aspects of things. Awareness aes not make them intellectual, fr te Intellectual powers proper operate atthe level of abstractions, universal concepts, and generalizations, ‘whereas the sensitive pawers deal witn sensory aspects of singular things. Sul, there can be more than a supericial resemblance to understanding Inanimal sensinilty. This is evident not so muth from indivicual sensations—seaing a col, hearing a tone, smelling an aroma~as from the abilty of animals to use mutiple sensations of the same and diferent types, to compare and remember them, In order to survive and prosper. So, for fxamle, most mammals learn froma small number of incigents to avoid situations that produce unpleasant eects, and they can make discriminations in ther environment that pert ther to secure food and shalter and to raise heir Young. ARhough some Might be incline to call these abilties forma of inteligence and to treat them as In essence Intellectual, the tradition fam Gescrbing saw these as closer tothe external, Senses than to Intllect. Nevertneless, they opened the way to the cancepton cf a Geeper Kind of sensibility that is crystallized inthe internal tense tradition, ough [AS { have already noted, the ultimate source ofthe Internal senses doc: [2} Summa theologae, 1,4. 78, ar. 1 tring Is Aristotle's psychological wetings, especially De anima (On the Soul). The second and third books of De anima develop a theary (beyond the Vagetatve) of the sensitive and cognitive powers of soul: the five external senses, the common sence (asthesis kaine } Imagination (ahantasi Fecepive intelect (nous pathetkas ), and agent of productive Intellect (nous poletkes J. Tis cognitive psychology was predicated on the existence Of forms in substances (Fer eur purposes ‘substance’ can be taken to mean physical objects, though for Aristotle there are Immaterial substances, too) an essential form, which consttates the nature ofthe thing and makes I the kind or species of thing itis (e.g, the form of human being), dnd sense form, hich determine the various (many nonessential) sensible qualities of the thing (e.g, the visible form/shape oF 9 particular human body)31 Sensible forms con be communicated to the properly disposed sense organs of anima, ane they are divided into two kindsproper sensibles, those things that are perceived by one and only ane sense (colar in vision, ador in smal, sound In nearing, ee.), and common Sensible, like movement, res, figure, magnitude, number, and Unity, which are communicated to more than one sense (e.g, both the eye and ouch can detect figure). Tt must not be thought that this communication of forms necessarily occurs through local motion or that It akes time, say by means of an “anstotellan proton flying through saace from abject to sense. Arstetle Goes not, for example, concalve of vision ae Deing due to te transmission cof lite abject or impulses. Rather, a proper sensible In the object, for examole Its color, acts on the organ when the medium betwean them, in the ase of color wnat Aristotle cals the diaphanous or transparent, is made actually transparent by ight. In darkness, wansparent materials are only potentially claphanous, and so colors cannot be communicated to the eye; but light activates the medium, thus enabling it fo be the mens tough IWhlen the sensible form communicates itsalt tothe sense organ Tne Fesut Is thatthe Sense Fecalves Int sll the sensible forms of things Inithout the matter “To use the classe formula, the sense in act isthe sensible abject in act; thats, the sense of sight as it actually engaged in seeing is the ‘same be the activity of the sensible form of the abject (whlch s communicated [3] An argument might be made that ths division into essential and sensible forms is artificial, that iis from the essential form that the act of an ‘object is communicated to the sense organs, which receive and cifferentiate the form according &o thelr natures, But the evisence of Aristotle's ext [stties lnating sensible forme in the objece [4] Once again, this not like the ease of light rays bouncing off an object nd traveling tothe eye, because in such a case the light rays, not the ‘iaphanous, would be the medium A futher step away from the Aristotelian conception WoUld be to consider Ue rays not as a medium Dut as, makers or stimulators of color (tne early madem sciatic notion of color ae understoag by Gallee, Sescartas, and Newton), through the mediom without the matter ofthe object and activates the sense organ), Or to use the image thst anticipated Descartes’ use aft (in Rute 22, AT X 422) by nearly two thovsond Years, "every sense is receptive of the forms of sensible objects withouk their matter ond in Sor of way in which wax receives the impressian of a signetring without the iron of 2016, for Une max receives the Impression of the golden or bronze [ning] not qua gota or qua bronze” (42¢a17-21, brackets in source) 2) Between his discussions ofthe five senses and intellect, Aristotle introduces two other powers that, withthe addition of memory, initiated the lntemal senses vadition. The fist s common sense, so named because itis thet part of sense In which the common sensiles like motion ana ‘shape are perceived. The eye recewves not jst colo but also motion, rest, number, shape, and magaltude (418018-20) out itself perceives only ‘hat is proper to i, color Another power ls therefore needed In which the common sensibes can be perceived slongsice the proper sensiblas and in \which the sensible from al the éifferant sense organs ara brought together into a und feld ef percepton.C6] The eye judges of redness, Dut the Unified sense, not the eve, judges that a red thing Is moving, that tis round, that its large, ad So on» Vision by itself recognizes not objects as 430eh but colo; hearing recognizes not things but sounds; ond similaty for the ather extern senses. But to recogni that this white, crystalline ‘SUM, calles sugar, Is sweet, to recognize tha an assemblage of colar isa thing, and to recognize Mat a parUeular object has Sueh-andssuch ‘Characteristics is perceived not by ary individual Sense organ But inthe common sense. ‘The Justification for ths faculty is perhaps clearest fom the need to coordinate and compare the information’) of the ciferent senses. We ‘an not enly see with our eyes but also feel by our touch that a thing is moving, round, of large, and these two "channels" of Information are perceived as refering to 2 single thing. Neither the aye nor te tongue is able to judge thatthe white stu we call sugar is swact (the eve erceives whiteness But not sweetness, the tongue sweetness but not whiteness). The common sense is able to co these things Because Its where {he ltferentsensibles are unifeg ‘The common sense, we might conclude, s the repository of the unified image of sensation, But we also have images when we are nat directly ‘sensing things, and ths Justfies Inveducing anether sensitve pawer preced- [5] Translations trom De anima are taken from Aristotle's "On the Soul” (Be anime), trans. Mippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, Towa: Peripatetic Press, 981). [6] ‘Unifeg fila of perception’ isnot Aristotle's term, but t gives some sense of the problem being addressed [7] tis not entirety legitimate to think of both the modem ene the Aistotelien connetations of this word -we Ing Intellact, phantasia or imagination. There is debate about whether imagination is really 2 faculty for Ansttl,(®) but ne can by and large ignore this, since for the vast marty of Ambic ar Latin commentators tere was no doubt that ie was a Taculty which isnot to say that trey tmovght there were no difculies of interpretation, Difficulties arise not least because Aristotle's discussion of imogination is cialectical and problematical Most of te third chapter of Book 3 of De anima (cited below as De anime ll 3) ls devoted to distinguishing imagination from external sense, commen sense, opinion, belie, knowledge, and intellect, with due regard given to possible connections to these. Put summarily, aristatle argues {that imagination, the power or habit by virtue of which images are formed In Us = 9 power of discrimination, ies nevertheless diferent fom ther siserminating powers, lie the extemal senses and common sense, because It does not require the presence of an object, although it does ‘Sepend on the previous actvity ofthese (ve, If ane has never sensed anything, ane cannot have Images). Because imaginings are nat inherently fru, Imagination must also be afferntiated from the cognitive faculties tat are always tre, like knowledge and inellection. It's nat Identical ‘with ofa varety of opinion, ners Ira mixture of opinion and sensation, because convicuon and feason alvays accompany opinion, whereas neither Is necessary for imagining. He concludes that Imagination has nat so much to do with the proper activities ofthe senses-which ar Infalibte with respect to the proper sensies (when the eye sees rec itis realy seeing red)~as withthe ateibution of proper sensible to objects and the isesiminetion of common sensible, hich are sometimes false. “Aecordinaly, I nothing other ten Imagination has the things stated above, then Imagination would be a motion produced by the activity af sense” (42830-42982). "And because imaginations persist In us and ate similar to the ‘corresponding sensations, animals do many things according to them, some (.e., nonrational animals) decause they passess no intellect, and ‘thers (Le, men) because thelr icllect is sometimes clouded by passion of dlscase or sleep" (4294-8) Lke the extemal senses and the common ‘Sense Imagination is of the sensible; but its objects need not be Immediately presen, and tis responsible fr ar related to the persistence and the repeatability of Images, ‘his account of De anime IL 2 leaves many questions unresolved, it not entirely clea for example, what means for imagination to be a [s} Soe Michael V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Malcolm Schofiel “Aistotle on the Imagination," In Essays on Ansttl's De Anima,” ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 249-277; tnd Dorathee Frede, “The Cognitive Role of Phontasia in Arstatie," als In Esays on stole “De Anima," 279-295, <8 motion produced by the activity of sense. Since images persist in imagination, it would seem to have some significant relatonship to memory, although that isnot pursued in De anima, {91 and it appears to overlap the common sense in that It deals in matters af the unified sense (one would assume with ciferent functions). The obscunties and unresolved questions would by themselves have occasioned atleast some elaboration from commentators, But the deepest reason for the persistence of interest in Aristotle's doctrine of phantesio was @ claim made ih De anima I 7 that puts imagination at the heart of knowing sel Leyes tr wee wn ing, te tr lr re ra sn on a, cy er ows hws by te fu) af esalos bs hay ssechng weet sas tc busca mon Asker ten ey jlgrans ond eles Sot ‘hese esas peut soar mene a Inger cag st ft ma cer se Wes oh were = gure rca obede mage) te Besezse GLE denn ea, Dale cles acne ie vale th esiad Ta ace a)“Thete ls no thinking without images, without phantasms, The word for thinking here Is alanosia, which in Aristotle Imples jucgrant,t discursive thinking that combines of aivides two things; in De memoria et remiscantia the same statement is made of noein, whicn embraces both discursive thinking and the intutve grasp of simple things (Cerms or concepts, te elements that discursive thinking combines in judgments) 0261 ‘istote’s [9] ut rather in De memoria et reminiscentia; see Richard Sora, Aristotle on Memory (Providence: Brown University Press, 1972) [20] Noein, caresponding £0 nous, would refer specially o any simple act of receiving a fundamental concept or principle; mare generally it Comprises both the intuluon of simple concepts and the combination of them In judgments, The passage from De mamona et remniscentia (45081 8) rads: cHR> ‘An account has already been given of imagination Inthe discussion ofthe soul, and it's rot possible to think without @phantasm, For the same fection occurs in thinking as Inthe drawing of sibgrem. In the latter cose, even though we sre not also Using the triangle’ being determinete in quantity, ponetheless we draw It determinetely 26 to auanlly. In ust the same way, Ihe person thinking, even if he is not thinking af quary, laces [a} quantity before nis eyes, but does not think of it qua quantity. Even ifthe nature (of what he is thinking) is among the quantities, but Indeterminate, e places before his a determinate quantty, but thinks of ie qua quantiy only. (Quoted after Lacheerman, The Ethics oF Geomesy, 82) formulations in terms of good/bad, pleasurable/painfl, and future acts might lead one to suspect thatthe dictum applies to practical activity ang not to theoretical. But in the Same passage of De anima he notes that “objects which are outside ofthe sphere of action, too Le, the ue and the false, come under the same gerus, namely, that of good ang evil; they der, awever [by being good or evi] either without qualification or n a gualfed way" (431b10-12; brackels In the source). What the orginal statment means, the, Is that all discursive thinking—all thinking of any Kin, if we take into account the passage from De memoria et reminiscentia —requires Phantasm, and images are imoortant net jst because trey bre fundamental to the activity of comporison that Underies Jucgment but also Because I strom images thatthe form or essence of 8 thing is Srived at, is abstrocted. Moreover, chapter 7 leaves open the question of whether tis even possible forthe intellect to thnk an abject Separate from matter) The image, mith is remaants of corporeal magnitude, is at the core of Astale's ontlogically grounded epistemelogy. Chapter 7 of book 3 corrects an impression thet one can easily get: that the treatment of phantasi in chapter 3 was include for the sake of completeness rather than inns importance, since chapters 4 and'5, which treat the cuclal topics of receptive and agent Intellect, make no feference to images. But those latte we chapters are dedicated chiefly to continuing the cfferentation of soul powers fom one anotner that began Inook 2. Accordingly, ty Identy the factors that difereniate Intellect from other pars ofthe soul and dlsinguish the intellect according to es activity (agent intellect) and poterWallty (receptive Intllet).C#8) Tes only in te following chapters, and there quite briefly, hat AnstoUe discusses the interrelations of the sensitive and cognitive powers In human knowing and doing Understancing the nature ofthe twofold intellect was one ofthe chief and most controverted parts of Aristotle's De anima forthe Middle Ages ‘This was not just because of the importance ofthe question of knowing but also Because it bore on te Immortality of the soul ang its relation to [211 "In genera, then, the intellect wen in actuality isthe objects which it thinks. But whether the intellect, which isnot separate from magnitude, an or cannot think any separate abject Is a matter to be considered later (De anima, 431b17-19). The question Is not treated subsequertly In De ‘may one might consider the ciscussion of thought thinking Itslf Inthe twelfth book of Metaphysics as decisive, out even there the queston might be raised whather human beings can truly think wnat Is separate from matter [12] Intllection isnot simply on automatic process set off by lower parts of the soul. For Aristotle, everything tht is not unchanging needs to be Understood in terms of potentiality and actuality, and since human intact is sometimes understanding snd sometimes not (or sometimes Understanding one thing, sometimes another, there must be 2 cause of ths change from one to the other state, Chapters 4 and Sof book 3 show ‘hatin intellction couse and etfact are ontologialy correlative Sod, inasmuch os Aristotle had stated that olthough all the other faculties pass avay withthe snimal body, the agent intellect is apparently Separate and unchanging. In what follows 1 shall by and large leave untouched the questions of lmmostality and of whether the agent intellect i aft of the human soul or Instead 2 lvine emanation (asin Avicenna) or even God himself. My focus willbe the Interpretation of the process of Eogation Rather then continue ere with an analyss of Astotle Nimsel, we can now tum to Avicenna interpretation of imaginatian Inthe process of knowing, ince ha theory of the former az on of the internal sances became canonical forthe later Latin thinkers, Aviceanal!9) (30-1037) was 3 Persian philosopher and physician whose medical writings were probably the single most important influence on the medicine taught in European Universities through the Renaissance and whese commentaries on and elaborations of Arstatla (along witn those of Ibn-Rushé, or Averroés, 1126- 1138) decsivalyshope the reception ofthe Pariptetic philosophy inte thteenticentry, West Indes tis ely that atthe begioing ofthat Century Avicenna mas better known and more influential in the Gecident than wee Avistate. (24) in his ewn work about the soul als titled be ‘ima, he tried not only to present Avistate’ teachings but also to clanfy ahd develop what the Greek philosopher ang his commentators had let bscureor implict. In 20 doing, Avicenna contributed new dactines ana theories that ware to shape the later medieval and Renalscance Conceptions ofthe soul ang it cognitive powers In his De anima, Avicenna identified five Internal senses. They were translated into Latin under the names (1) fantasia or Sensus communis, (2) mmaginatio, (3) vs aestimation's, (4) vis memanalls or reminiselbils, ana (5) vis imaginatva or cogtans. (381 The phantasy oF common sense is [13] This isthe fomiiar Latin form of his name; the Aric is Tbn Sina"? [24] See Joh Merenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1950): An Introduction (London: Routledge & Kegan Poul, 1987), 50-65, esp. 54-55 [15] See Marenbon, Later Medieval Philosophy, 105-106; see also , Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits (London: Warburg Institute, 1975), 40-4 Avicenna's De anima was tvanslated into Latin in the twelfth certury by Gundlssalinus. The Latin vadition quickly abandonea te terminological icentiieaton of ‘phantasi’ with ‘sensu communis found in the translation of Avicenna, ‘Phartasia’ and imaginato” were rarely used Dy any single thinker as direct Synonyms; Tt was common to finé them (or cognates) used to clstingulsh intemal sense powers, for example the store of avaable Sense images versus the power to combine, eivde, and recombine images. The Latin terminology, at any rate, varied greet from author to author. For ciscussions of the tation of the psychology and anatomy of the intemal senses, see Walther Sudha, “Die Lehre von den Hiawentrkeln in textloner und graphischer Tradition des ARtertums und Mitelaers," Archiv fUr Geschichte der Medlzon 7 (1913): 249-203; Edwin Clark and Kenneth Dewhurst, An llustratea History of Brain Function (Berkeley, os Angeles, and London: Unversity af Calfomia Press, 1972), esp. 5-55, Harvey, The Innard Wits ; Nicholas Hans Steneck, "The Problem of the Intemal Senses in the Fourteanth Century,” PhO. ciss, University of Wisconsin, 1970; ary Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses In Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophie Texts,” Harvard Theological Review 28 (1935): 69-133; Marenbon, later Megieval Philosophy : Katharine Park, "The Organic Sou,” in The Combrige History of Renaissance Philosophy, e@. Chares . Schinitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 464-284, and David Summers, The Judgmeat of Sense: Renaissance ‘Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambildge University ress, 1987), sense of Aristotle: its the place where all te sensible forms are perceived. These forms are stored for future use in the Imagination, a kind of fense-imoge memory, Besides the form tne can be sensed, there ore also instinctive perceptions or judgments of gos and bad, aovantageous Sand hormfut (Ike @ young, inexperienced lambs recognivon of the dange* posed by @ wall); these So-called intentines, or intentions, ate recelves Inthe vis aestimatlnis, of power af estimation. The memorial orreminislble power stores these nonsensibie intentions, just as the Imaginetion ores the senable forme that ave been received by the comman sense, The remaining power is calles vis imaginativa in animals, vie cogitans In the human being, This powar, as one scholar describes it,‘notre tu amar nis coy ors nse nay tobe comarca tate ft a hema avconachosas for Ra pumarainacatey te vis apt Congo Senora aap tae cus Was mvever omon arose eon to mate Sans sg ng, mk # ea ‘The cogitatve power is thus based on our ability (and, in some sense, also the ability of animals) to see one imagined sensible form In relation to another or in relation tothe intentions, which in animals embody’ an nstine® for good an bee) ‘Avicenna's theory of the intemal senses explains the progressive dematerialzation or apstraction that takes place inthe processes of ‘sensation and intllecton. As the form, Image, of phantasm Is passed on from sense organ to commen sense to imagination, and so on, It Undergoes a progressive simination of the paticulartes of the orginal object The theory Is also In Large part physiological; that I, the internal Senses are dependent on end localzable in the body. Physicians In eriquity had alreedy suggested the localization of the sensitve and rational powers, and Avicenna’s extension of this does not seem to be inconsistent with Aristotle's intentions. Inthe Canon of Medicine, translated into Latin Inthe twelfth century by Gerard of Cremona, Avicenna fifst divides the o-callad animal virus ino the comprehensive and tre active virtues; te former includes bath external and internal senses. The Cann points out thatthe internal senses [26) Marenbon, 105-108 -2- re consigered by doctors to be three in number: phantasia inthe anterior bron ventricle, virus cogtativa in the middle, ané virus memorais oF onservatva inthe posterior. Prlesaphers make mare precise lstinctions ane identify five: Ue front ventele has sensus communis to receive ‘Sensations ang phantasia to retain them, the mile vance’ vittus coglatva i referred to as Imaginatva’ when i is under the commane of ‘2xtimadiva animals and ‘cogitatva' when the rabonal powar makes use of It The vrtas extimativa does not properly have 2 verte, although Its functioning depends on the other intemal sense powers. Both human Deings and animals have ths insunctve atinb.tion of good anc bad, safe and eangerous, This power isnot, However, to be confused withthe Migher powers proper "The comprehending power, wich is one of the ‘omprchensing powers of the soul, the humen reason, And becouse doctors do not desl with the estimative power for te reason we have given, {they do not deal wth ths power fr the same reason: it works enly through the otner tee powers (that the doctors iaenty, an no in ether ‘things. C18) The last power vrtus memoralis/conservatva, Is the same for philosopher and dactor In adaltion to tis psychaphyslology of the intemal sense, Avicenna also hele to th traditional Stole medial dactine of animal or ody spit, which mere considered to be “the bearer of the powars ofthe soul in the mos of animals, whch work by thel] means. °(0%) [Avicenna was not unique in making the powers of the internal senses the focal point fora cooperation of bosy and soul that extended, on the ‘one mand; Into the mevements af the Body ane, on the othe, Into the realm of reason, nor was he the fist to do this, aut he was the most Intluentia, espectally n the West, The peychophysiology ofthe internal senses Became 2 commanslace, altmough the exact names ofthe pONer=, the cisermination oftheir functions, ane their degree of Independence fom intellect varied from author to author, A particulary Important examole Is Aquinas, who followed Avicenna quite closely (except forthe names) in te cases of sensus cormunis, Imoginab {lor fantasia), and vis -memorativa. He citcized Avicenna’ conception af maginatva/cogitative (which Aquinas gave the altematve name Yantasia), however This isthe power that combines and alvides Imaginary forms lke the golden mountain. Aquinas did nat deny the existence of the power but rather ascribed It (following Averroes) tothe imagination. Moreover, Aquinas's vis aestimativa Isto be dstnguished from Avicenna's vitus extmatva. In the Canon [1:71 In the Be anima, ne nevertheless positions the estimative power atthe top ofthe midéle ventricle; see Harvey, The Inward Wits, 45, [18] Quoted by Harvey, The Inward Wits, 24; the bracketed interpolation s mine. The clscussion of this paragraph Is largely adapted from Harvey. [19] Quoted by Harvey, The Joward Wits, 24; the bracketed Interpolation s mine, Avicenna hag described it as depending on the other internal powers but as not propery located in any af the brain ventiles inthe Be anim, however the vis extimativa was considered to be in the midale ventricle and closely related in function to imaginaiva, costativa, and memattalls (eepecially tothe former two, ince trey also were seated in the miadle ventricle). For Aquinas, the aestmativa, which In animals (e te most judg manilke of the intemal senses, Is In human eins called cogttativa of ratio particulars. t's the sensitive power that s most eeeply touched By the ratonality of human nature, Its the power by which the hurran Being Knows inclviduals as faling under a universal, although onl intellect can know the universal as such. One modem analysis ofthe cogitatva in Aquinas explains It this way Dec tara he gate,» cee a alae, ko he anon na, at pan oak evel St Thema crt cy os he He ye tate ‘Spates tune he aha orcas eb omg nate um ore Sy speauna rare ew aye sa Yen bargin ler Een em ose sent etn nr Seg ee Wiser oe nas Oe aio Granted that there Is already a kind of thouoht that i a least implicit inthe highest intemal senses: how does intellect use the phantasm propared by them to think in the ful sense? The answers to this question in the Arable and Latin Miedle Ages were manifele, Avicenna had agent Intellect stip the image of its last vestiges of matter ang accidents, but this stripped image was not itself impressed in receptive or passive Intellect (wnat Aristotle had ealled "nous pathetkos') rather, the passive intellect as thereby mace ready forthe intelligible form that came from ‘agent intellect ies, This agent intellect, the last of the emanations of Gag, was separate from all human souls; as te common source of intelighbility, ie explained how aiferent people cauls be sale to Understand the same thing In he same way. This problem ofthe eameness of Understanding in efferent actors ang acs of understancing was of even more crucal Importance to Averroes, who did not accept Avicenna's ‘estimative power as a special faculty He bellaved that the ancionts had attrbted the functions of estimation {receiving nonsersible Intentions) to the imaginative power, and he numbered the "immateral faeuties" that Aristotle had posited as four: common sense, Imagination, cogitaion, and memory But in some [20] ullen Peghaire, “A Forgotten Sense, the Cogltative according to St Thomas Aquinas," Modem Schoolman 20 (1943): 121-140, 210-228; see p. 40, contexts Averrots reduces the number to three, the Imaginative, the cogitative, and the memoratve, one foreach ofthe three venticles of the bratn that ne lente For both Avicenna and Averoés, the imagination is very close tothe highest power that humen beings possess per se. In Avicenna nous poletskos, or agent intellect, Ges not property belong to human beings, although passive Intellect (nous pathetic) does; but there fs atleast @ PRYal Kentiestion in Avicenna of passive intellect with imagination (eg, n the Kita a-Naja, he calls Imagination a second passive intellect). 21) For Averres, imapination, that i, the power of dividing and composing images (which he also sometimes referrea to as cogieaton), was quite ‘simply the highest power of man bot the passive and the agent intellect were from God and coulé be pariipated in by man only inthe presence ‘of a properly disposed phantasm All five (or four, or three) of the intemal senses are involved in the preparation of phantasms, and one of them, the cogtative oF Its ‘equivalent under sore other name, even "tinks” those phantasms according to a particular form, For the future Mstory of the theory of the internal Senses, in particular for Descartes's conception of the function of imaginaign, Avicenna's teaching is crucial, especially in that it wa transmitted ‘nth essential integrty tothe Latin High Midale Ages by Albert the Great. (221 gut Averroés's scheme hod ts proponents 8 wel, one of them 89 Fess influential than Aquinas. Despite the many variations that arase (especially In the use of termunclogy), fs basis, Is "opograpny” af ‘organically located intemal senses that effect the commen ‘leld of sensation, the retention of images and feactions to \mages, the recall of them, ‘and thelr composition and vison, remained canonical ight upto the begining of the early madem peniog in Europe. The Intamal senses were Understood a5 multiple, as corporeal, ane as to some degree already involving, or at leat imitating, thought, and the imaginative functions Were enceived as closely connected with, even Identical to, the cogltation oF parveulars,In the raion of intemal senses, extemal sensations are not immediately taken up by the intellectual powers but rather “processed” at an Intermediate level. although any animate being s able to make very simple discaminations at the level of sensaton—vision, not an intemal sense orintallec, distinguishes Black from white and red from blue—more sophisticated distncions require a higher faculty (common sense frst of all \whien distinguishes color from depth from aroma). These distinctions are [21] See F Rahman, Avicenna’ Psychology (London: Geotfeey Cumberege, fr Oxtord University Press, 1952), 68-69, 115-116. Already in antiquity Commentators Ike Simplicius hae identified Imagination wth passive Inelist [22] See Steneck, "Problem ofthe Internal Senses inthe Fourteenth Century,” esp. chaps. 2-3, {231'the intemal senses a5 a Qroup ae capable nat jst of registering Images delivered by the extemal senses but also of comparing, contesting, decomposing, and recomposing tem and (since itis ofthe essence of performing discnmination and comparison) of seeing ane image In relation (identity and citference) to others, This capacity of relating images to one ancther is wnat allows the intemal senses a thelr peak to exercise the power of particular jucgment. Furthermore, since the intemal senses are sensitive powers, they have organs oF organic location Just as the external Senses de. The medieval thinkers, supported by bath mesical and philosophical traction, assigned them to the interior spaces of te Sra, the entrees enclosed by the two hemispheres. Throughout the medieval and early moder periods ane finds illustrations and diagrams af the positions Bf the intemal senses Inthe head, it was customary, for example, to place the common sense In ane of the font ot anterior vertrles, the Fecombinative pawer of imagination or cogtaton In the icdle venbcle, and the memory In the postenor ventricle. The medieval writers were quite ware, therefore, that anatomical and physiological dferences between incividuals coulg affect tne operations ofthe intemal senses, Moreover, Since a phantasm is required for thinking oroper and the phantasm s prepared by the Interal senses, lesions or diseases coule impair a person's Ability to think ord understand. Ta short the constitaton of the internal senses eould porcularze, even personalize, the powers of experiencing Snd knowing that are common to ll human beings although r have discussed the internal senses as part of Aristotelian tradition, itis important to realize thatthe basics ofthe doctrine were acceptec even by those who were not properly Aristotelian or Scholastic. Quite apert from the fact Ut mecical knowledge eppeared to Support iy the doctrine nad snatogues in other philosophical aditions, especialy the Platonic ana the Stole. Accepting some version of the inemal senses was Cus no mare controversial in late Medieval and early madem Europe than It would be today to held that diferent parts of the raln are Fesponsibl for afferane motor, speech, and cognitive functons (Inéeed, one can tace a ine from the psychophysialogy of the intemal sanses down {fo mocern theories of bain function).C241 The mesial tracition also helpee contnbute to @ synthesis of Aristotelian themes with the Stole conception of [23] This parceling out of awareness is not at all counterntutive, An assembly line worker might be able to sort pats by color while daydreaming nd @ diver might be able to negotiate afc ll the white shes considering & mathematical root. [24] Asis done in Jean-Pierre Ghangeux, Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind, tens. r. Laurence Garey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and in Clarke and Oewturst,ustrated History of Brain Function. imagination and psychophysilogical functions. The Stois believed thatthe nerves were hollow tubes filed with pneume, & very fine, active matter capable of maving snd animating grosser matter These spints, as they came to be calleé, were conceived as the means by which the Impressions of the senses were conveyed to the command center of the bran, the hegemonikon , and it was also by means of tese spins that thinking could fommand the body. The Stolc preuma dactne ultimately became embedced inthe esyenophysiology ofthe Internal senses. In particular, spInts were thought cles of the brain, although by tosay’s standards thera was Insufficient attention tothe cetalls ofthe role they played in, there was ithe doubt that they di [nave mentioned the Stoics not simply because they contributed a theory of animal spirits tothe psychephysiology of intemal sens because, a5 we shal see In what succeeds, Rollow nerves filled with spirits are part of Descares's neurophysiology. The Stoies were also responsible, it oppears, for the articulation af a conceptual structure and terminology thst drematicaly raises the stats of imagination, © stuctore that was conveyed tothe Latin West by way of medieval Islam and Jewsh thinker. In Thomas Aquinas and other high medieval Latin waters, one tinds agi-nati' used in the sense of pure conceptual intutlon, of a purely Intellectual Imagination. This usage ean be traced to a small number of conceptual pairings that came dawn to Arabs and Persians from Stoic writings ou were used to artculate the egsentally Anstoteliandistincton between simple Intellectual apprehension (nous, ntllectus ) and lecursve ratonal thought (dlanoa, ratio ).C291 This might seem at first nly to ada tothe confusion about the proper meaning and status of maginati, wrich even inthe rarrower confines of the Scholastic tration was rendered by an unsteady vocabulary often used In cuite diferent senses by thnkers close to one another in time and place, But the varity an ven the contusion mey testify instead to the nature and Importance af the image. The various sensory end mental capacities for producing, reproducing, and considering Images are relevant tothe entre range af Mental experience, rom conceiving, storing, and recovering ordinary Sense Images, cvcugh recombining them and bringing them Into judgrmentike felatons to one anether, to uncerstancing anytning whatsoever tet appears to the mind, This range of powers and problems crystallized into a network arranged abovt the terms maginato’ ‘phantas', ‘maginativa, 2 network that was not in need of any single philesophieal, scientific, or medieal tradition to be exploited, adapted, culbvated, and, ulatey, fanded down. The prob- [25] See Hany austin Wolfson, “The Terms tasawuul"? and tasalg"? in Arabic Philosophy and Thelr Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents, ‘Moslem Word (1943) : 114-128, i of the intemal senses, in particular of the imagination, thus took on a relatively autonomous cultural existence, although we have very Ite speciic information about how Descartes became aware of the problematic of imagination andthe intemal senses, its pervasiveress makes establishing any specie connection moot. That Descartes was exposed to I at school is anear-certainy. We Shovle recall tet the three-year-ong philosaphy curriculum of the Jest Henry TV College bt La Fléche, whied Descartes sttended from around 1607 to 1615, focused on the works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (241 Moreover, the Jesuit ware the supreme cultural gatherers of their day, collecting art-facts,inormation, ad knowledge in thelr ambition to evangelize and to magnify the glory of God. We know thet the precocious René Descareet was permitted to read more widely han nis fellow students; doubtless he encountered imagination andthe intemal senses in many Books and many different contexts We snall examine several of these contexts in the chapters that follow, ranging from the mathematical tothe spiritual. For now i willbe enough to mention a single wer that likely was available at La Flecne and that reflects the Jesus’ conception of the philosophical and cognitive relevance of imagination. lam refering tothe commentary on Arstate' De anima prepare by Jesuit scholars at the University of Coimbr> (in present-day Portugal), one of the so-calee Coimbran Commentaries, The De anime commentary presents the Greek text and o atin transtation an facing pages; these texts are surroundea by footnoted comment and discussion ranging Irom the philological to the philosophical; and after each mejor secton of text and comment, the formet Is Interrupted by quaestiones that giscuss te fundamental theses and conflicting interpretations ro and conta (Le, that reflect the basle structure of the Scholastic guaesbo ). One of these, the eighth question focusing on the first half af the tra book of De anima, asks whether phantasms (and tus the power oF imagination) are truly require fora ntllectual acovity. After a prolonged discussion [261 On the years of Deseartes's attendance, see Genevidve Rodis-Lewis, ‘Descartes Life and the Development of His Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cotingham (Cambriege: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1992), 21-57, esp. p. 23. On education at L2 Flecne, see Camile de Rechemonte’x, Un Colége de Jesuits aux XVII ot XVII siécles: Le College Hend IV de La Flache, 4 vol. (La Mans: Legulcheux, 1889), esp. vol. 4. The Kato studiorum, which govered ecucation at Jesut schools, does not mention the teaching of Anstotl's De ‘anima, but psychologial topics are included In two books which Were taught, the Metaphysics and tye Niwmachean Ethies, ana the Catholic doctrine of separate substances would be scarcely Intellgible without distinguishing the knowing processes of human beings, who reguire phantasms forknowing, from engelle and divine knowing. The internal senses ore mentioned in 6 collection of theses submitted by a stusent in 162¢; see Rochemonterx, Un Collage de Jésutes, #1352, the editors conclude thot phantasms are necessary for ai ordinary and common” motes, The exceptions are revesling: Christ could understand pant from phantasms because he had a divine ae well as a human nature; in the afterlife, when human souls wil be joined to glorfiee bodies, wl be possib to know Intllectual things directly (altmough In the glofiad state it wil iso be possible to think by way of phantasms); and, in te present life on earth, the vary few who are given a special grace from Gad that raises them to a rapturous, ecstatic contemplation of his essence {think anc know witout phantasms. Sut "erinary” human eestasy, like that experienced by Socrates when he stood in rapt contamplation of the Teas for a whole day and right (told by Alebiaves in tig Symposium ),regures phantasms, 2s do all over activities of thinking and knowing that human beings perform in accordance with their natures.(27) ‘The exceptions are therefore hardly exceptions for ll practical and theoretical purposes, apart from situations in which the human being passes beyond the natural into the supernatural realm, tere can be no trinking and knowing without Use intemal senses and thelr phantasirs Al reosoning, conceiving, understanding, al scence end tuth, must come tos by way of and accompanied by phantasms B, THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY OF THE REGULAE (RULE 12) Having remarked these things, we are ready to commence our exploration of Imagination and the Interal senses in Descartes. [Anyone familiar only with the Descartes of stendard interpretations i likely to find a close reacing of the Regulae ad diretionem ingen surprising, since ther the power of imagination is given 2 cena role n Knowing scienticaly. The full extent of the importance of imagination i the Regulae wil be the focus of Pa I of this work. To galh a provisional sense of ts fle, Its USeful to leak ata passage Fam the tween rule that presents Descartes's early psychophysiologcal theory of human cognition. ‘Although there are controversies about the cates of composition of the Regulae —sume think Descartes worked on i or about a decade, beginning as early 35 1618 (when he was twenty-two years old) and encing around 1628, hereas others chine that the entire Work was produced in a short period ending at te latter date—it ls Believed that by te time he began the Investigations of Le Mande (pernaps inate 1629 or cary 2630) head abandoned the Regutae. Virwally all students ofthe question would agree [271 have usee the third edition; Commentari Coleg Conimbricensis Socetatslesu, in tes -bros De anime, Arstotelis Stagirta, 3d ed. (Lyon Horace Cardon, 1604); see question 8, 452-458. The fst ection appeared in 1586. == that Rule 12, which discusses the psychophysiclogy of knowledge, was written shorly before that abandonment, Thus, if we place Descartes's postgraduate intellectual career in 1618 (thus more or less taking the Discourse on the Method at its word), the Regulae’s paychophysilogy flls roughly may detween this beginning and Descares's frst publication, the Discourse and its accompanying scientific stays (1637) Ely in Rule 12, which is by for the longest ofthe twenty-one extent rtes,(281 Descartes presents a theory of sensation, imagination, and understanding that has obvious connections tothe doctrine of Intemal senses, which It adapts ina novel way to a new lente sensibility. The rule fxplaine that impressions received by the sense organ are passed on ta the sensus communis, ar coman tenee, from where they are further transmitted to tre phantasia, oF Imagination, which ne calls "a true par of the body . of such magnituce that Is different pars can take on many distinet figures one after ancther and usually retain these for a longtime” (AT X 414), from this phantasia the knowing force (v/s Cognoscens ) can then receive an Impression, of recirocaly, the knowing force can impress a new figure Int ‘The external senses, “Insofar as they are parts of the body, although we apply them to abject through action, viz, local moti, nevertheless properly sense tough passion only, in the same way in Which wax receives an Impression from a seal” (AT 412); that ls, they are purely passive fr receptive in sensation proper. Ha emahasizes thatthe comparison to an impression in wax is no mare figure of speech (per analogiam ): we must think of the "extornal fgure of the sanbent body as being really changed by the objec, just as that which is n to surface of the wax 's changed by the seal” (AT X 412), This ols not just for taUeh But also forthe eye ("the fist opaque membrane tha sin the eye receives the figure impresses by an illumination arrayed with various eolars") and all the other senses (the isk memorane impervious to the object “borrows @ new figure rom tte soune, the odor and the flavor"), Descartes notes further that we can conceive this more clearly i wa make the supposition that te varety of Clots, sounds, ocofs, and favors coresponds tothe oreat variety of possible two-dimensional figures. Next, Just as the motion of ane end of 2 pen gets passed on ngily and instantaneously tothe rest of the Instrument as one writes, so Goes the stimulus ofthe sense organ get passed on "> a Exrtain otver par of the body, whichis ealled common sense,” and this common sense “functions lke a seal for forming In phantasia or imagination, as | begining of [28] The individual rules consist of a rubsie oF heading and an exposition or commentary, with the exception of Rules 19 trough 21, which have nly headings. From Descarces’s remarks at the end of Rule 12 and the beginning of Rule 13 tis evident that he Intended to present thiy-six In All vided nto three groups of twelve in wax, the same figures or ideas" that come, pure and without body, fom the external senses" (AT X 414). After briefly explaining how Dhantesla can cause motion in the nerves t bring about the locomation of the bady, he Sscenas to the uimate power, the vis cognescens, “hat force through which we properly keow things, whch is purely spitual. Indsea, (eis the particular functioning ofthis knowing fores that produces the etferentation of the otner faculties, EE er ene Ber te iano] spe ev ese © ere ere: ene et oe a [lrg ote tring ts ere nove ad ate pr tah, enaian, mare sete: R's ppey ale ape, Rover wan Noe Romanos non ease trate eer soles fo ncaa toe aay mane (TST) Several things are immediately strking about thls passage, The frst Is haw closely Imaginaton Is coordinated with a physiological theory. tn one sense, the Imagination Is a physical organ inthe bran, identiad no more specifically than by the term ‘phantasi’. In anathey Imagination Is the result of the knowing force apalying Itself to (or, more literally, bearing down upon) this orpan. A second stiking note ls how central 2 le imagination plays Inthe functioning furan being, The knowing force cam act on its own—in that case Ie is called pure intellct—bat In all other respects ts upon or tough the orgon phantasia (2) Sensation is te knowing foree [291 im the Regulae, and even in many occurrences in the Discourse on the Method, ‘des Is synonymous with ‘orporeal image [30] 4 recent translation of Rule 12 obscures the relationship of the knowing force and phantasia tothe common sense. The Latin clause "vnicamaue esse, quae vel acipt figuras 3 sensu communi simul cum phantasia" (AT X 415 U. 16-18) Is rencered as "it [tne knowing force) 's one single power, whether t receiver figures from the ‘common’ sense atthe same time as does the corporeal imagination’; ee CSM, 1:42. This translation implies thatthe phartasia and the knowing force are simultaneously but separately applying themselves to the commen sense. Sut this Is to reed the phrase "simul cum phantosi,” » prepositional ablative, as though introduces an elliptical subjunctive clause, mith ‘phantasie is the hominetive (compare the last line of p- 215, which has a pacllel ablalve expression in “vis, quse, si applicet se cum imaginatlone ad sensu Communer”). Moreover, simul” probably shoulé not be taken Inthe stictlytemparal sense but as joined with ‘cum to express a sharing of action (Ley together wen); sv. ‘simul, Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. . G. W. Glare (Oxfore: Oxford Unvarsty Press, for the Clarendon Press, 1982) Haldane and Ross rendered ths wth the more defensiole “it isa single agency, whather It ecaives Impressions from the common sense‘simultaneously with the fancy,” which at least leaves the constal open; see The Philosophital Works of Descartes, 2 vos, e4. and tans. Elzabeth 5. Haleane and G. R.T. Ross, corrected ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 1:38. Note also that Justa few lines Gown from the lause in question, Imagination is ivan a role in all acts of the knowing fore, excest when that force arts on its own (AT X 4181. 27-4161. 12). My prefered reading 's "one andthe same Is this Force, which, IF t applies itselF long with imagination to te commen sense. +” —a- ‘applying itself in civerse ways to the common sense “along with Imagination"; reminiscence Is this force applying ise to Imagination alone insofar ‘3 there are figures already Impressed there Imagining (or conceiving, a nat unimportant altematve that we shall explore presently) is the knowing force applying itslf inorder to produce new figures. Even the mation ofthe body depends on Imagination: "its to be conceived that the motive Torce, or the nerves themselves, takes its origin from the brain, In wrich there i the phantasia, fom which these (rerves} are moved in various ways, just as the common sense ['s moved) By external sense, a” just asthe whole pen [is moved] by its lower part” {AT X 414-415). This ‘conception ean even be used, Descartes says, {0 accaunt for “all movements of ather animals, although in these absolutely no cognition of things be aamitted, bt only purely corporeal phantasia;Iiewse as well in te way al those operations happen in ourselves that we accomplish without ‘ny assistance from reason” (ATX 418). Thus imaginatio:phantasia~—the former term implying chiefly the activity of making images, the latter the ‘organ where the Images are formed-is at work In virtually all acbvites of te human baing, wth the apparent exception of pure Intllacon. (29) What should we make ofthis passage? It is tempting to interpret i simply as an early version of the theory af the conavion or pineal sland, whichis infact loeted Inthe ventricles of the Brain 9) In the ealy 1630s, [311 In the Regulae, imaginafo’ sometimes refers tothe organ, but more often It refers tothe power of imagining: ‘shantasia, by contrast, refers ‘slmost extusively to the orgen and activites of Imoginationinsolar as they are Understood as the st af an organ. The degree to which pure Intellect constitutes an exception rom Imaginative invalvement wil be discussed later [32] The pineal body or gland is an outgrowth ofthe raf of the dlencephalon, one ofthe three parts of te forerain. It ison the uppermost part of the brain stem, whieh Is tucked away into the concave bases ofthe brain nemspneres (known as the ventncles; te pineal gland i, speccally,'n the third ventricle, Tis one ofthe few brain parts that do not develop bilateral structures, and itis near the thalamus, where all the nerves from the Senses (except Tor smell) come together Descartes says that he chose the pineal gland as the central argan of the sensory system because he {thought it mas the only place forthe two channels of informalign fram the Wight and lft side sense argans (e.g, the night and let eye) to be unified Into single impression (see LHomme, AT X1 174-177; Dioptrics, AT Vi 128-130; anc Passions, At X1 352-353) Descartes expressly identified this gland as the focal point of bodily activity: external impressions are conveyed to it from the sense organs by means of motions transmitted along the nerves, and, n tur, its the source of lows ofthe so-callec animal spirits tna produce the animal's Body ‘motions. The mind, which is a fadealy different kindof substance from body, somenow takes note of whet Is happening to the pineal gland and Is {ble to produce motions of that gland, Preclsely haw such tings happen between radically cltinct substances, the main problem af mind-body Gualism, has exercised generations of Caresians and cites, of course. At any rate, Descartes conceived tlnking and body to be intimately ‘although mysteriously joined in human beings. Most people are unable to conceive them as distinct because ofthis intimate joining, a fact that sets the main problem for Descartes's principal works, in particular the Medltatians, which appears to teach that we can come to § pure experiance of ourselves by tuming away from reliance on the senses end imagination 331 Incerpreting phantasia meray as the prtopineal gland seems quite natural. Nevertheless, a closer look can help clanfy small but significant ‘iforences between the prentasia of the Requige and the pineal sland of Descartes’ ater work, The pineal gland is the "command center” of the ‘sutonamous mechanical System that Is the bosy ‘Autonomous mechanical system means thatthe Body's funetoning Is explained by the mechanical Tans of the materal universe. Within his system the pineal gland Is affected by matlons of nerves and flows or cuents of the animal spits, ane i uses these motions and lows to divect new flows that produce bedy mations anc other physiological responses. This system, whichis at wor In both animals ang the human being, requires no consciousness to ‘unction accurately and affactvely. A lamb flees from 2 waif because the nerve motions and spint flows elicit this as a mechanical reaction; likewise 2 human being withdraws 2 hand from the scaring heat ofa flame, or might fee atthe sight ofa woll, because of such mechanical operations, Sutin the case of @ human being facing a woll, “mght Mee” i the exactly “Spproprate location, beesuse there are Ue adltionsl factors of mind and will. The presence ofthe wolf can tigger an automatic expose, Buti right also set the mind to wort on the question of whet to do. I's solutan tothe stuatlan appears, the mind, trough its intimate fusion wlth the Pineal gland, can induce gland mations that tigger the approprate bedly mechanisms Implementing what the rund Ras decides. This mind-body Interaction is what Is conventionally understood as a key element of Cartesianism. [22] Later in chapter 6, L shall suggest that although the Meditations does teach us how te tum avay from the corporeal power, it does nat teach {thatthe eazence of human being ts mind apart from body. — 3 In Rule 32, however, Descartes uses @ vocabulary mote psychological than mechanical to describe what happens on the way from sense organ to phantacia. Sensut commun, Imaginate, phantasia, and memoria are of course the Inwaré of intemal senses that played a Important rele Scholastic and Renaissance psychology, n particular in accounts of the progress of a sensibe species from sense organs tothe higher sensitve faculties. The Regulae cescnbas a transmission of impressions, but this way of conceiving things isnot necessarily @ madem ait: Anstotle himself Used the image ofthe signet ring impressing its shape into wax to ilstate the process of sensation. The impression that Descartes deserbes 1s not inthe fist instance an impression of a mechanical mation or force but rather the impression of an image If we atone carefully to Descartes's explanation in Rule 12, we see that itis not Intrnsically mechanistic at al. There are no atoms, no colisions, no tansmssion of motion and nothing but motion. OF course, Deseartes describes a motion that takes place instantaneously, lke the Simultaneous motion of all the pats ofa pen, butts purpose is otto reduce sensation to mation but to ilustate how an impression or figure mace on a sense organ can be transmitted without lapse of time. Moreover, the transmission of the impression sketched in the Regulae takes place ‘Bea whole that is, ae the transmission ofan integral image, whereas In Descarte's Tater physiological accounts the impression ie breken up Into many discrete motions because of the multplicty of individial nerve fibers that are involved inthe tansmussion of sensation. (4 Nor is clear fom the Regulae passage what the medium of transmission i, Its not clearly the nerves, since they are discussed only as the medium for proiccng the locomotion ofthe body (ike raising one's arn or walking), and there Is no mention of the Involvement of armel spins. Unlike the {ase of the purely mechanical pineal system, the emphasis in Rule 12 i on the intemal senses and thelr relations to one anather, that, 09 traditional tops of medieval and Renaissance psychology with thelr organic correlates {A pemaps more pregnant sifference between phantasie and the pineal gland is suggested by a simple synonymy noted in te passage. When the knowing force applies itself tothe Imagination in order to form new figures, [e's Said to Imagine of cancelve” The conjunction of imaginar snd foncpere suggests that imaginations belag taken, not the tesicted sense ofa power that merely forms images, but a more expansive one {hat regards fas 2 truly cognitive powert8) The importance ofthis synonymy le [BAI See Dioptres, AT VI 146 [35] Te Meditations, of course, uses Imaginar' In a more restiicted sense, The synonymy between the two Latin terms is tobe found also in & ‘ery early work from late 1618, she Campenalum musicas ; ee chap. 2, Sec. A reinforced when one considers that the formal definition in Rule 3 of intuit, which is the fundamental way of knowing taught inthe Regule , calls Tea concept (conceptum ) of rind (mens ). Conceptum is, of course, the past participle of coneipere I it possible hat Descartes haa in mind Something like the medieval notion ofan Imaginato that isnot Just an intemal sense but also ah intellectual power capable of exerising te Simplest and most basic act af mind, the act of Intuting a concept?Another question is intimates by Descartes's remark that the knowing force not only notices images present in phantasia but aso applies Itself fo the common sense with Imagination (cum imaginatione ) In the process of sesing, touching, smelling, and so on. That Is, net ony is there an extra organ Involved in sensation, the sensus communis, Dut the ming itself, under the name vis cognoscens, acts on It and seems In this sense {0 be more deeply invelved in the huran bocy thanis the ieellect that acts on the pineal syster. In the pineal system the gland is te unique Tocstion for direct body-mind interaction; the mind can act ciretly there but nowhere else, if Descartes Mae already worked aut his two-substance metaphysics and the correspencing theory of the human being when he compose Rule 12, we would have to conclude that this formation is at best sloventy. But tis not ata clear that he had worged It out. Inceed, Its lkely that he dle not work out the foundations of his mature metaphysics unl after ne had given up the Reguae. (8) ‘These few “facts” about differences between the early and the later Descartes ae Insuficient In themselves to bear the weight of the thesis that the Regulae presents @ conception of imagination, human cognitan, and the relation between Body ana mina that Is radically ifferent fram the fone we ordinanly atnbute to Descartes. Yet they are clues leading us deeper into the proslem of understanding Descartas's thoughts before 1630 and thus also ito the questions of where, why, ane haw he may have changed his mind about tings. Moreever, the psychophysiological hypothesis of Rule 12 doubtless reveals something important about the intentions of the project ofthe Regulae ,forat leat tree Feasons. First, atthe outset f Rule 12 we are told thatthe “mle concludes everything that has Been [36] anotner important difference Is tat in the pineal system one really should not say that the mind produces images in te pineal gland, or even ‘that Images are formed on its surface. This claim may seem eccantc, given later texts that describe an Image being formed onthe glands surface (1g, AT XI 176 and 355-356). As shal gracually become clear, hewever, Descartes’ late, purely mecnarical conceation of the procasses involved in the motions and effects of nerve and animal sprit motions undermines the legitimacy of Feerence to Images in any iteral sense, and therefore Suen references might be interpreted 2s a tmowbsck to the prepieal accounts. See erep. 7n account af the accepted understending of Descartes's physiological psychology ean be ound in Gary Haliela, "Deseartes’ Physiology and Ils Relation to His Payehalogy,” In The Cambridge Companion t9 Descartes, ed. Joho Cottingham, 335-370 (Cambridge: Cambrldge University Press, 1992) said above {in the previous rules}, and it teaches in general what vill bel37) expicated In particular” (AT X 410-411); thus it seems to serve as a Tinenpin to the argument of tne Reguiae , both 9s 0 summing up of te fist part and an introdvction to what follows. Second, although Descartes introduces the psychophysiologial hypothesis as supposition that wil help the reader to conceive what he does not have space to expound st rengt (implying that he could do's), he says that they "diminish nothing of the wuth of things but only Fender everyting clearer by far (AT X 412). Descartes must balleve thar this Imaginative hypothesis Is really ue or a least gets af a basic truth. Third, we should remund ourselves that the passage ciscussing the names corresponcing to the various activites ofthe knowing forge concludes with the definition of a faculty that was not among the standard Senolastc Faculties but that nonethaless 's crucial t the Reguae, ingenium. The importance ofthis definition should be abvious, since after al it was forthe purpose ofthe rection of the ngeniom thatthe Regulae was composed 381 Yet hardly anyone has token notice ofthe significance of this term. Ae we shal seein te course of our cussions, understanding precisely what ingenium ts, of capital Importance Tor understanding what Descarte's early philosophy is about, Ingenium was Descartes's response to prablem tat he hed been thinking about far Years, the role of the intemal senses, specifically of Imagination, In knowing. We must therefore st lok into the proslematles of Imagination and the intemal senses Inthe earllest writings and documentation avaiable. We shall begin by turing back to 1608, a Year that marked a ceclsiveturn—probably the ceclsive turnin Descartes's Ie. [371 AT nas the past tense; A, H, ond N, the [38] Te tite ae Descartes intended its somewhat conjectural, since no original manuscript is extant. In particular, the traditional Regulae ad

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