Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz

G.R. No. 192571. July 23, 2013.
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ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST, MARIA
OLIVIA T. YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G. ALMAZAR, petitioners,
vs. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Certification Against Forum Shopping;
The prohibition against forum shopping is different from a violation of the certification
requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.—At the outset, it is
noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is different from a
violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In
Sps. Ong v. CA, 384 SCRA 139
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Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz
(2002), the Court explained that: x x x The distinction between the prohibition against
forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to
be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum
shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not
only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The
former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of
the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits
involving the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.—Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the
same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who
files a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending
case if the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed.—Section 5(b), Rule 7
of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a case should provide a complete
statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves the same issues
as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the
same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending.
Labor Law; Probationary Employees; A probationary employee, like a regular employee,

enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an

additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary
employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of the engagement.—A probationary employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment,
aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional ground is provided
under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be
terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the
engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on
probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an
authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
Same; Same; If the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable
standards upon which the regularization would be based on at the time of the
engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee.—Section
6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides that if the
employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable standards upon
which the regularization would be based on at the time of the engagement, then the
said employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.: (d) In all cases of probationary
employment, the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under
which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no
standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular
employee. In other words, the employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements
when dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must
make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If
the employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a
probationary employee.
Same; Same; An employer is deemed to have made known the standards that would
qualify a probationary employee to be a regular
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employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is
expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of probation.—An employer is
deemed to have made known the standards that would qualify a probationary
employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise
the employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of
probation. This goes without saying that the employee is sufficiently made aware of his
probationary status as well as the length of time of the probation. The exception to the
foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids,
cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also, in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, 456 SCRA 32
(2005), it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of the
standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a
manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no
need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same light, an employee’s failure
to perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him
constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s nonregularization.
Same; Same; Basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate
performance of one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a
probationary employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need
not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case.—Verily,
basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance of one’s
duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee
to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not be literally spel led
out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed
that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the nature of a management
prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did in this case — should be
respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like Alcaraz who was tasked
with the vital responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters of her
department.
Same; Same; If the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet
the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient
that a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective
date
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of termination.—A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary

employee; the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that “[i]f the termination is brought about
by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of
probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the
employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.”
Same; Company Policy; A company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract
between the employer and employee.— A company policy partakes of the nature of an
implied contract between the employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v.
Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005), it has been held that: [E]mployer statements of
policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in employees without evidence that the
parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights in the
employee, and, hence, although the statement of policy is signed by neither party, can
be unilaterally amended by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains
no reference to a specific employee, his job description or compensation, and although
no reference was made to the policy statement in pre-employment interviews and the
employee does not learn of its existence until after his hiring. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at
892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an employer establishes an express
personnel policy and the employee continues to work while the policy remains in effect,
the policy is deemed an implied contract for so long as it remains in effect. If the
employer unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the implied contract are also
thereby changed.
Same; Termination of Employment; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an
employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so t hrough invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.—Case law has settled that an
employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon),
442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that where the dismissal is for a just cause,
the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
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employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was
ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Same; Same; If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code
(now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process
was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on
an authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative.—It was
explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor
Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement,
the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal
process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is
based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the
dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause
of retrenchment — as contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was
dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty — the Court ordered the employer to pay
the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of P50,000.00.
Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Directors; Requisites to Hold Corporate Directors,

Trustees or Officers Personally Liable for Corporate Acts.—It is hornbook principle that
personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith
or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting
in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to the
issuance of watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold
themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by
specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action.
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Civil Law; Bad Faith; It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it.—A judicious perusal of the records
show that other than her unfounded assertions on the matter, there is no evidence to
support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in their capacity as Abbott’s
officers and employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in terminating
Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign and not allowed to enter the
workplace does not necessarily indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient
ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with her termination. On the alleged
loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of any showing that the same could
be attributed to Abbott or any of its officers. It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot
be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since
Alcaraz failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or any of its officers, the
Court finds the award of moral or exemplary damages unwarranted.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Labor Law; Appeals; View that a labor case finds its way into the judicial system from the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) whose decision is final and executory;
When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already final and
unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through a limited
review on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.—A labor case finds its way into the
judicial system from the NLRC whose decision is final and executory. Finality simply
means that the NLRC ruling is no longer appealable; the legal intent is to confine
adjudication of labor cases to labor tribunals with the expertise in these cases and
thereby bring the resolution of the case to a close at the soonest possible time. When an
administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already final and unappealable,
the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through a limited review on
jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. This has been the mode of review followed since
the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were directly brought to this
Court but only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.
Same; Same; View that under Section 65 of the Rules of Court, the sole ground or issue
allowed is jurisdictional — the presence or
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absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in ruling on the case; whereas, a Rule 45 review the Supreme Court
simply determines whether the legal correctness of the Court of Appeal’s finding that
the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.—Under the Rule 65
review by the CA, Montoya reiterates that the sole ground or issue allowed is
jurisdictional – the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling on the case. To state the obvious, this kind of review would have made it
easier for the CA to handle the case; in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, it can
dismiss labor cases for lack of grave abuse of discretion as we do in this Court. From the
CA, further recourse is through a Rule 45 review by this Court on questions of law in
accordance with prevailing rulings. The office of a petition for review on certiorari is not
to examine and settle factual questions already ruled upon below. In this review, the
Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA’s finding that the NLRC
ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.
Same; Probationary Employees; View that while the respondent might have been hired
as a probationary employee, the petitioner’s evidence did not establish the employers’
compliance with the probationary employment requirements under Article 281 of the
Labor Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I
of the Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent should be considered a regular
employee and the case should be reviewed on this basis.—While the respondent might
have been hired as a probationary employee, the petitioners’ evidence did not establish
the employers’ compliance with the probationary employment requirements under
Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules
of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent should be
considered a regular employee and the case should be reviewed on this basis. Article
281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: ART. 281. Probationary employment.—
Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee
started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary
basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known
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by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
[italics supplied; emphasis ours] Further, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book
VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended, states: Sec. 6. Probationary employment.—
There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his engagement, is made
to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for
regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of
engagement. [emphasis supplied]
Same; Same; View that a valid probationary employment requires the concurrence of
two requirements; Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a
probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular employee.—A valid
probationary employment requires the concurrence of two requirements. First, the
employer shall make known the reasonable standard (performance standard) whose
compliance will render the employee qualified to be a regular employee. Second, the
employer shall inform the employee of the applicable performance standard at the time
of his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a
probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular employee. The
ponencia apparently fully agrees with the above statement of the applicable law as it
substantially recites the same requirements, including the consequence that upon
failure to comply with these same requirements, “the employee is deemed as a regular
and not a probationary employee.” It continues, however, with a twist that effectively
negates what it has stated and admitted about the need to communicate the
regularization standards to the employee.
Same; Termination of Employment; View that to justify the dismissal of an employee, the
employer carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause and with
the observance of due process prior to dismissal.—To justify the dismissal of an
employee, the employer carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just
cause and with the observance of due process prior to dismissal. The employer has to
discharge this burden by clear, accurate, consistent and convincing evidence; in case of
doubt, the presumption in the employee’s favor under Article 4 of the Labor Code
should apply.
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Same; Same; View that a probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a
regular employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of
an employment.—An important legal point that should not be lost in considering this
case is that a probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular
employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an
employment. While the strict application of Article 282 of the Labor Code may be
relaxed because the employee is still under probation (so that analogous probationary
status rules may apply), the same essential just cause for dismissal must be present and
must be proven. In other words, probationary employment does not mean that the
employee is under an “employment at will” situation as that phrase is understood in
American jurisprudence. To reiterate, the fact that the respondent was still in her
probationary period of employment did not lessen the burden of proof that the law
imposed on the petitioners to prove the just cause for her dismissal. Probationary
employees are protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution and they
cannot be removed from their position except only for cause.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Laguesma, Magsalin, Consulta & Gastardo for petitioner.
Jimenez, Baroque and Salazar for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 10,
2009 and Resolution3 dated June 9, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No.
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1 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 14-58.

2 Id., at pp. 1040-1054. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate
Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 1139-1140.
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101045 which pronounced that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) did
not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz
(Alcaraz) was illegally dismissed from her employment.
The Facts
On June 27, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the
publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical and Regulatory
Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager) who would: (a) be responsible for drug
safety surveillance operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the development and
implementation of standard operating procedures/policies for drug safety surveillance
and vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface with internal and external customers
regarding safety operations and queries.4 Alcaraz — who was then a Regulatory Affairs
and Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another
pharmaceutical company like Abbott) — showed interest and submitted her application
on October 4, 2004.5
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned position

which was an item under the company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU)
department.6 In Abbott’s offer sheet,7 it was stated that Alcaraz
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4 Id., at p. 74.
5 Id., at pp. 75-76.
6 Id., at pp. 51-52. Based on Abbott’s organizational structure, the Regulatory Affairs
Manager was under the umbrella of Hospira ALSU, a sub-department in Abbott’s
Hospital Care Division. ALSU serves as a transition body of Hospira, Inc., a corporation
based in the United States of America, while it is in the process of organization in the
Philippines. Abbott intended to cede the qualified employees under ALSU to Hospira
once the latter obtained its own legal personality to engage in business in the
Philippines.
7 Id., at pp. 165-168. Abbott sent Alcaraz an initial offer sheet on December 1, 2004. The
compensation contained therein was re-
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was to be employed on a probationary basis.8 Later that day, she accepted the said
offer and received an electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbott’s Recruitment Officer,
petitioner Teresita C. Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached to Bernardo’s
e-mail were Abbott’s organizational chart and a job description of Alcaraz’s work.9
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated, inter alia,
that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning
February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005. The said contract was also signed by Abbott’s
General Manager, petitioner Edwin Feist (Feist):10
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
Dear Pearl,
After having successfully passed the pre-employment requirements, you are hereby
appointed as follows:
Position Title : Regulatory Affairs

Manager
Department : Hospira
The terms of your employment are:
Nature of Employment : Probationary
Effectivity : February 15, 2005 to

August 14, 2005
Basic Salary : P110,000.00/ month
It is understood that you agree to abide by all existing policies, rules and regulations of
the company, as well as those, which may be hereinafter promulgated.
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negotiated and thus, the increased offer as per the offer sheet dated December 7, 2004.
8 Id., at pp. 167-168.
9 Id., at pp. 127, 169-172.
10 Id., at p. 174.
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Unless renewed, probationary appointment expires on the date indicated subject to

earlier termination by the Company for any justifiable reason.
If you agree to the terms and conditions of your employment, please signify your
conformity below and return a copy to HRD.
Welcome to Abbott!
Very truly yours,

Sgd.
EDWIN D. FEIST
General Manager
CONFORME:
Sgd.
PEARLIE ANN FERRER-
ALCARAZ
During Alcaraz’s pre-employment orientation, petitioner Allan G. Almazar (Almazar),

Hospira’s Country Transition Manager, briefed her on her duties and responsibilities as
Regulatory Affairs Manager, stating that: (a) she will handle the staff of Hospira ALSU
and will directly report to Almazar on matters regarding Hopira’s local operations,
operational budget, and performance evaluation of the Hospira ALSU Staff who are on
probationary status; (b) she must implement Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate Conduct
(Code of Conduct), office policies on human resources and finance, and ensure that
Abbott will hire people who are fit in the organizational discipline; (c) petitioner Kelly
Walsh (Walsh), Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug Safety of Hospira, will
be her immediate supervisor; (d) she should always coordinate with Abbott’s human
resource officers in the management and discipline of the staff; (e) Hospira ALSU will
spin off from Abbott in early 2006 and will be officially incorporated and known as
Hospira, Philippines. In the interim, Hospira ALSU operations will still be under Abbott’s
management, excluding the technical aspects of the operations which is under the
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control and supervision of Walsh; and (f) the processing of information and/or raw
material data subject of Hospira ALSU operations will be strictly confined and controlled
under the computer system and network being maintained and operated from the
United States. For this purpose, all those involved in Hospira ALSU are required to use
two identification cards: one, to identify them as Abbott’s employees and another, to
identify them as Hospira employees.11
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa), Abbott’s Human

Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of the
procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees and further
indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz
was also given copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance
Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation Modules
(Performance Modules) which she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the
Hospira ALSU staff.12
Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a probationary

employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice:
first on the third month and second on the fifth month from the date of employment.
The necessary Performance Improvement Plan should also be made during the third-
month review in case of a gap between the employee’s performance and the standards
set. These performance standards should be discussed in detail with the employee
within the first two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally required that a signed copy of
the PPSE form must be submitted to Abbott’s Human Resources Department (HRD) and
shall serve as documentation of the employee’s performance during his/her
probationary period.
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11 Id., at pp. 127-128.
12 Id., at pp. 1042-1043.
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This shall form the basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment.13
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had
disciplinary problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for their unprofessional
behavior such as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of
Abbott officers. However, Alcaraz’s method of management was considered by Walsh
to be “too strict.”14 Alcaraz approached Misa to discuss these concerns and was told to
“lie low” and let Walsh handle the matter. Misa even assured her that Abbott’s HRD
would support her in all her management decisions.15
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting immediate action on
the staff’s performance evaluation as their probationary periods were about to end. This
Alcaraz eventually submitted.16
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible (Terrible),
Abbott’s former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding staff performance
standards. In the course thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail
sent by Walsh to some staff members which essentially contained queries regarding the
former’s job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the normal process of
evaluation. Terrible said that it was not.17
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible where she
was informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of
Regulatory Affairs Manager.18 Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested Alcaraz to
tender her resignation, else they be forced
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13 Id.
14 Id., at p. 1044.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id., at pp. 1044-1045.
18 Id., at p. 1045.
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to terminate her services. She was also told that, regardless of her choice, she should no
longer report for work and was asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to no avail.19
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative assistant, Claude Gonzales (Gonzales),
that she would be on leave for that day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh and
Terrible already announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz already
resigned due to health reasons.20
On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally handed to Alcaraz a letter
stating that her services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005.21 The letter
detailed the reasons for Alcaraz’s termination — particularly, that Alcaraz: (a) did not
manage her time effectively; (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an
effective rapport with them; (c) failed to train her staff effectively; and (d) was not able to
obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and
article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties.22 On
May 27, 2005, Alcaraz received another copy of the said termination letter via registered
mail.23
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa,
Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist.24 She claimed that she should have
already been considered as a regular and not a probationary employee given Abbott’s
failure to
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19 Id.
20 Id., at p. 1046.
21 Id., at p. 1047.
22 Id., at pp. 19-21, 78, and 80-81.
23 Id., at p. 1047.
24 Id., at p. 255. See Labor Arbiter (LA) Decision dated March 30, 2006.
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698
inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her engagement as
required under Article 29525 of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that
while her employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary
status, the same did not indicate the standards on which her regularization would be
based.26 She further averred that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to
illegally dismiss her when: (a) they threatened her with termination; (b) she was ordered
not to enter company premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) they
publicly announced that she already resigned in order to humiliate her.27
On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her
regularization which were made known to her at the time of her engagement.28
The LA Ruling
In a Decision dated March 30, 2006,29 the LA dismissed Alcaraz’s complaint for lack of
merit.
The LA rejected Alcaraz’s argument that she was not informed of the reasonable
standards to qualify as a regular employee considering her admissions that she was
briefed by Almazar on her work during her preemployment orientation meeting30 and
that she received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules which
were used for
_______________
25 Formerly, Article 281 of the Labor Code; renumbered pursuant to Republic Act No.
10151.
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 267.
27 Id., at pp. 261-262.
28 Id., at pp. 263-267.
29 Id., at pp. 255-274. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.
30 Id., at p. 269.
699
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
699
evaluating all types of Abbott employees.31 As Alcaraz was unable to meet the
standards set by Abbott as per her performance evaluation, the LA ruled that the
termination of her probationary employment was justified.32 Lastly, the LA found that
there was no evidence to conclude that Abbott’s officers and employees acted in bad
faith in terminating Alcaraz’s employment.33
Displeased with the LA’s ruling, Alcaraz filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC Ruling

On September 15, 2006, the NLRC rendered a Decision,34 annulling and setting aside
the LA’s ruling, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 March 2006 [sic] is hereby
reversed, annulled and set aside and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding respondents Abbot [sic] and individual respondents to have committed

illegal dismissal;
2. Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate complainant to her former

position without loss of seniority rights immediately upon receipt hereof;
3. To jointly and severally pay complainant backwages computed from 16 May 2005
until finality of this decision. As of the date hereof the backwages is computed at
a. Backwages for 15 months - PhP 1,650,000.00
_______________
31 Id., at p. 270.
32 Id., at pp. 271-272.
33 Id., at p. 273.
34 Id., at pp. 356-378. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Commissioners

Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. (on leave) and Perlita B. Velasco, concurring.
700
700
b. 13th month pay - 110,000.00
TOTAL PhP 1,760,000.00
4. Respondents are ordered to pay complainant moral damages of P50,000.00 and

exemplary damages of P50,000.00.
5. Respondents are also ordered to pay attorney’s fees of 10% of the total award.
6. All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.35
The NLRC reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that there was no evidence
showing that Alcaraz had been apprised of her probationary status and the
requirements which she should have complied with in order to be a regular
employee.36 It held that Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and Abbott’s Code of
Conduct and Performance Modules was not equivalent to her being actually informed
of the performance standards upon which she should have been evaluated on.37 It
further observed that Abbott did not comply with its own standard operating procedure
in evaluating probationary employees.38 The NLRC was also not convinced that Alcaraz
was terminated for a valid cause given that petitioners’ allegation of Alcaraz’s “poor
performance” remained unsubstantiated.39
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated July 31, 2007.40
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 377-378.
36 Id., at p. 367.
37 Id., at p. 368.
38 Id., at p. 369.
39 Id., at pp. 370-373.
40 Id., at pp. 413-416. Penned by Commissioner Romeo L. Go, with Presiding

Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco, concurring.
701
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
701
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 101045 (First CA Petition), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
NLRC when it ruled that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed.41
Pending resolution of the First CA Petition, Alcaraz moved for the execution of the
NLRC’s Decision before the LA, which petitioners strongly opposed. The LA denied the
said motion in an Order dated July 8, 2008 which was, however, eventually reversed on
appeal by the NLRC.42 Due to the foregoing, petitioners filed another Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 111318 (Second CA Petition),
assailing the propriety of the execution of the NLRC decision.43
The CA Ruling
With regard to the First CA Petition, the CA, in a Decision44 dated December 10, 2009,
affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and held that the latter did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in finding that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed.
It observed that Alcaraz was not apprised at the start of her employment of the
reasonable standards under which she could qualify as a regular employee.45 This was
based on its examination of the employment contract which showed that the same did
not contain any standard of performance or any stipulation that Alcaraz shall undergo a
performance evaluation before she could qualify as a regular employee.46 It also
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 417-450.
42 Id., at p. 1403.
43 Id.
44 Id., at pp. 1040-1054.
45 Id., at p. 1052.
46 Id.
702
702
found that Abbott was unable to prove that there was any reasonable ground to
terminate Alcaraz’s employment.47 Abbott moved for the reconsideration of the
aforementioned ruling which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution48 dated
June 9, 2010.
The CA likewise denied the Second CA Petition in a Resolution dated May 18, 2010 (May
18, 2010 Resolution) and ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the execution of
the NLRC Decision.49 Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
While the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA’s May 18, 2010 Resolution
was pending, Alcaraz again moved for the issuance of a writ of execution before the LA.
On June 7, 2010, petitioners received the LA’s order granting Alcaraz’s motion for
execution which they in turn appealed to the NLRC — through a Memorandum of
Appeal dated June 16, 2010 (June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal) — on the ground
that the implementation of the LA’s order would render its motion for reconsideration
moot and academic.50
Meanwhile, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the CA’s May 18, 2010 Resolution
in the Second CA Petition was denied via a Resolution dated October 4, 2010.51 This
attained finality on January 10, 2011 for petitioners’ failure to timely appeal the same.52
Hence, as it stands, only the issues in the First CA petition are left to be resolved.
Incidentally, in her Comment dated November 15, 2010, Alcaraz also alleges that
petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when they filed the Second CA Petition
pending the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the CA’s De-
_______________
47 Id., at p. 1053.
48 Id., at pp. 1139-1140.
49 Id., at p. 1218.
50 Id.
51 Id., at p. 1219.
52 Rollo (G.R. No. 193976), p. 30.
703
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
703
cember 10, 2009 Decision i.e., the decision in the First CA Petition.53 She also contends
that petitioners have not complied with the certification requirement under Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court when they failed to disclose in the instant petition the filing
of the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC.54
The Issues Before the Court
The following issues have been raised for the Court’s resolution: (a) whether or not
petitioners are guilty of forum shopping and have violated the certification requirement
under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether or not Alcaraz was sufficiently
informed of the reasonable standards to qualify her as a regular employee; (c) whether
or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment; and (d) whether or not the
individual petitioners herein are liable.
The Court’s Ruling
A. Forum Shopping and Violation

of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is
different from a violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong v. CA,55 the Court explained that:
x x x The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the
certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To
reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum
_______________
53 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 1223-1228.
54 Id., at p. 1224.
55 433 Phil. 490, 501-502; 384 SCRA 139, 148 (2002).

704
704
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum
shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not
only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The
former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of
the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x.56
As to the first, forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving
the same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.57
In this case, records show that, except for the element of identity of parties, the elements
of forum shopping do not exist. Evidently, the First CA Petition was instituted to
question the ruling of the NLRC that Alcaraz was illegally dismissed. On the other hand,
the Second CA Petition pertains to the propriety of the enforcement of the judgment
award pending the resolution of the First CA Petition and the finality of the decision in
the labor dispute between Alcaraz and
_______________
56 Id., at pp. 501-502; p. 148. (Citations omitted)

57 Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56, 173401, 173563-64,
178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 428, citing NBI-Microsoft Corporation v.
Hwang, 499 Phil. 423, 435-436; 460 SCRA 428, 440-441 (2005).
705
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
705
the petitioners. Based on the foregoing, a judgment in the Second CA Petition will not
constitute res judicata insofar as the First CA Petition is concerned. Thus, considering
that the two petitions clearly cover different subject matters and causes of action, there
exists no forum shopping.
As to the second, Alcaraz further imputes that the petitioners violated the certification
requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court58 by not disclosing the fact
that it filed the June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC in the instant
petition.
In this regard, Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files
a case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if
the latter involves the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar
pending case, Section 5(a) of the same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to
declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending.
Records show that the issues raised in the instant petition and those in the June 16,
2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC likewise cover different subject
matters and causes of action. In this case, the validity of Alcaraz’s dis-
_______________
58 Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or principal party shall

certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a)
that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
xxxx
706
706
missal is at issue whereas in the said Memorandum of Appeal, the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of execution was in question. Thus, given the dissimilar issues,
petitioners did not have to disclose in the present petition the filing of their June 16,
2010 Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. In any event, considering that the issue
on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution had been resolved in the Second
CA Petition — which in fact had already attained finality — the matter of disclosing the
June 16, 2010 Memorandum of Appeal is now moot and academic.
Having settled the foregoing procedural matter, the Court now proceeds to resolve the
substantive issues.
B. Probationary employment;
grounds for termination.
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However,

in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of
termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e.,
the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer
to the employee at the time of the engagement.59 Thus, the services of an employee
who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the
following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the
employer.60
Corollary thereto, Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code provides that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the rea-
_______________
59 Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket Corporation v. Ranchez, G.R. No. 177937,

January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 135, 142.
60 Id.
707
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
707

sonable standards upon which the regularization would be based on at the time of the
engagement, then the said employee shall be deemed a regular employee, viz.:
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the
employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time
of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time,
he shall be deemed a regular employee.
In other words, the employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when
dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the
regularization standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must
make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If
the employer fails to comply with either, the employee is deemed as a regular and not a
Keeping with these rules, an employer is deemed to have made known the standards
that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has
exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is expected to do or
accomplish during the trial period of probation. This goes without saying that the
employee is sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the length of
time of the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance,
in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers.61 Also, in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v.
Agustin,62 it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of the
standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a
manner contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to
_______________
61 Id., at p. 145.
62 495 Phil. 706, 716-717; 456 SCRA 32, 43 (2005).
708
708
which there is no need to spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same light, an
employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly
made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s
nonregularization.
In this case, petitioners contend that Alcaraz was terminated because she failed to
qualify as a regular employee according to Abbott’s standards which were made known
to her at the time of her engagement. Contrarily, Alcaraz claims that Abbott never
apprised her of these standards and thus, maintains that she is a regular and not a mere
The Court finds petitioners’ assertions to be well-taken.
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with
the above-stated requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that
Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her
employment. On this score, the Court finds it apt to detail not only the incidents which
point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also those circumstances which would
show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employer’s expectations that would, in turn,
determine her regularization:
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job
description for as well as the duties and responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid
position; this prompted Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be
employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which specifically
stated, inter alia, that she was to
709
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
709
be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to
August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies
of Abbott’s organizational structure and her job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where Almazar

informed her that she had to implement Abbott’s Code of Conduct and office policies
on human resources and finance and that she would be reporting directly to Walsh;
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as part of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance Modules
from Misa who explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance of
probationary employees; she was further notified that Abbott had only one evaluation
system for all of its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another pharmaceutical company
and had admitted to have an “extensive training and background” to acquire the
necessary skills for her job.63
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be

doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her
ability and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position as Regulatory Affairs
Manager and that her failure to perform such would give Abbott a valid cause to
terminate her probationary employment.
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance of
one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary
employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need
_______________
63 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1201.
710
710
not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this
regard, it must be observed that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the
nature of a management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did
in this case — should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like
Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital responsibility of handling the personnel and
important matters of her department.
In fine, the Court rules that Alcaraz’s status as a probationary employee and her
consequent dismissal must stand. Consequently, in holding that Alcaraz was illegally
dismissed due to her status as a regular and not a probationary employee, the Court
finds that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
To elucidate, records show that the NLRC based its decision on the premise that
Alcaraz’s receipt of her job description and Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Performance
Modules was not equivalent to being actually informed of the performance standards
upon which she should have been evaluated on.64 It, however, overlooked the legal
implication of the other attendant circumstances as detailed herein which should have
warranted a contrary finding that Alcaraz was indeed a probationary and not a regular
employee — more particularly the fact that she was well-aware of her duties and
responsibilities and that her failure to adequately perform the same would lead to her
non-regularization and eventually, her termination.
Accordingly, by affirming the NLRC’s pronouncement which is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, the CA committed a reversible error which, perforce, necessitates the
reversal of its decision.
_______________
64 Id., at pp. 367-368, 370.
711
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
711

C. Probationary employment;
termination procedure.
A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual

two-notice rule does not govern.65
_______________
65 Refers to the procedure stated in Article 291(b) of the Labor Code, as renumbered
pursuant to Republic Act No. 10151, viz.:
Article 291. Miscellaneous Provisions.—
xxxx
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to
be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative
if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promu lgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
xxxx
This procedure is also found in Section 2(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which state:
xxxx
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process
shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 [now,
Article 296] of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the
712
712
Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that “[i]f
the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the
standards of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that
a written notice is served the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date
of termination.”
As the records show, Alcaraz’s dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19,
2005 which she received on May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein
were the reasons for her termination, i.e., that after proper evaluation, Abbott
determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization
considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which
are necessary in the performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager.66
Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above, thereby
legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s dismissal as a probationary employee
under the parameters set by the Labor Code.67
D. Employer’s violation of company

policy and procedure.
Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcaraz’s

employment and Abbott’s compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is
readily apparent that Abbott breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it
failed to abide by its own procedure in evaluating the performance of a probationary
employee.
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between the
employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger,68 it has been held that:
_______________
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
66 Rollo, pp. 78-81.
67 Id., at p. 1047.
68 170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005).
713
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
713
[E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in employees

without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would
create contractual rights in the employee, and, hence, although the statement of policy
is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally amended by the employer without notice
to the employee, and contains no reference to a specific employee, his job description or
compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy statement in pre-
employment interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until after his
hiring. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an
employer establishes an express personnel policy and the employee continues to work
while the policy remains in effect, the policy is deemed an implied contract for so long as
it remains in effect. If the employer unilaterally changes the policy, the terms of the
implied contract are also thereby changed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Hence, given such nature, company personnel policies create an obligation on the part
of both the employee and the employer to abide by the same.
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job
performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed
with the employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth month
from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance
Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap between the
employee’s performance and the standards set, if any.69 In addition, a signed copy of
the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as basis
for recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.70
_______________
69 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), p. 1052.
70 Id., at p. 1043.
714
714
In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in
evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of
Alcaraz’s PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form
was completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance
evaluation discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor
did Abbott come up with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly
gauge Alcaraz’s performance with the set company standards.
While it is Abbott’s management prerogative to promulgate its own company rules and
even subsequently amend them, this right equally demands that when it does create its
own policies and thereafter notify its employee of the same, it accords upon itself the
obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would entail a
disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be mired by
the uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latter’s labor rights and duties would, to
some extent, depend.
In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcaraz’s probationary employment
for her failure to meet the standards required for her regularization, and while it must be
further pointed out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve a written notice
of termination, the fact that it violated its own company procedure renders the
termination of Alcaraz’s employment procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of
nominal damages. A further exposition is apropos.
Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause
but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.
In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon),71 the Court pronounced that where the dismissal is for a
just cause, the lack of statutory
_______________
71 G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573.
715
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
715
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However,
the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.72
Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in
the amount of P30,000.00.73
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka)74 where it created a distinction between
procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and those due to an
authorized cause, on the other.
It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the
Labor Code (now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the
dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now Article 297) but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative.75 Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an
authorized cause of retrenchment76 — as contradistinguished from the employee in
Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty77 — the Court ordered
the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of
P50,000.00.
Evidently, the sanctions imposed in both Agabon and Jaka proceed from the necessity
to deter employers from future
_______________
72 Id., at p. 616.
73 Id., at p. 620.
74 494 Phil. 114, 119-121; 454 SCRA 119, 125 (2005).
75 Id., at p. 121; p. 126.
76 Id., at p. 122; p. 127.
77 Supra note 71, at p. 605.
716
716

violations of the statutory due process rights of employees.78 In similar regard, the
Court deems it proper to apply the same principle to the case at bar for the reason that
an employer’s contractual breach of its own company procedure — albeit not statutory
in source — has the parallel effect of violating the laborer’s rights. Suffice it to state, the
contract is the law between the parties and thus, breaches of the same impel
recompense to vindicate a right that has been violated. Consequently, while the Court is
wont to uphold the dismissal of Alcaraz because a valid cause exists, the payment of
nominal damages on account of Abbott’s contractual breach is warranted in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code.79
Anent the proper amount of damages to be awarded, the Court observes that Alcaraz’s
dismissal proceeded from her failure to comply with the standards required for her
regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated
by an act imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to just causes under Article
296 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court deems it appropriate to fix the amount of
nominal damages at the amount of P30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in both
Agabon and Jaka.
E. Liability of individual peti-

tioners as corporate officers.
It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers

attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or
when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when
there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or
other persons;
_______________
78 Id., at p. 617.
79 Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
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(b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of
such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection;
(c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or
(d) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate
action.80
In this case, Alcaraz alleges that the individual petitioners acted in bad faith with regard
to the supposed crude manner by which her probationary employme nt was terminated
and thus, should be held liable together with Abbott. In the same vein, she further
attributes the loss of some of her remaining belongings to them.81
Alcaraz’s contention fails to persuade.
A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her unfounded assertions on
the matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the individual petitioners herein,
in their capacity as Abbott’s officers and employees, acted in bad faith or were
motivated by ill will in terminating Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to
resign and not allowed to enter the workplace does not necessarily indicate bad faith
on Abbott’s part since a sufficient ground existed for the latter to actually proceed with
her termination. On the alleged loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of
any showing that the same could be attributed to Abbott or any of its officers. It is a
well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has
the onus of proving it. All told, since Alcaraz failed to prove any malicious act on the part
of Abbott or any of its officers, the Court finds the award of moral or exemplary
damages unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 10, 2009 and
Resolution dated June 9, 2010
_______________
80 Carag v. NLRC, 548 Phil. 581, 605; 520 SCRA 28, 53 (2007), citing McLeod v. NLRC,
541 Phil. 214, 242; 512 SCRA 222, 249 (2007).
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 192571), pp. 262, 1046.
718
718
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101045 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2006 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines be ORDERED
to pay respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00 on account of its breach of its own company procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., See Dissent.
Mendoza, J., But concurs with J. Brion in his views on the procedural aspect.
Leonen, J., I join J. Brion in his dissent.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The Case
The case in caption was a Second Division illegal dismissal case that the Court en banc
accepted for decision pursuant to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court.
A. The Issues Posed
The case posed two issues to the Court for resolution. The first is the manner of review
that the Court should undertake. This is an issue that underlies all the Court’s decision
making in light of the various modes of review and essentials that the Rules of Court
require. The second and core issue relates to the merits of the legality or illegality of the
dismissal: whether the Labor Code requirements governing the
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719
dismissal of a probationary employee had been complied with, considered from the
prism of the mode of review and the nature of the decision under review.
B. The Factual Highlights
To briefly summarize the highlights of the case, Abbott Laboratories, Phils. (petitioner),
Cecille A. Terrible, Edwin D. Feist, Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Teresita C. Bernardo, and
Allan G. Almazar (individual petitioners) are the employer and its senior officials who
dismissed respondent Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz from employment within three (3) months
from her engagement. The respondent complained against the petitioners on the
ground that she had been illegally dismissed: (1) she was not informed of the standards
that would govern her as a probationary employee, as required by the law (the Labor
Code) and its implementing rules; (2) the petitioners even violated the company’s own
internal rules on the manner of dismissing probationary employees; (3) substantively,
her dismissal was without the required just cause as required by the law and the rules;
and (4) her dismissal was done oppressively and in bad faith.
C. The Rulings Below
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal had been valid but the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the Labor Arbiter; found the dismissal illegal; and
damages and attorney’s fees because of the manner the dismissal was effected. The
Court of Appeals (CA) found no grave abuse of discretion and accordingly denied the
Rule 65 petition that the petitioner Abbott brought.
D. The Current Court Rulings
The Ponencia. In the present Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari before this Court,
the ponencia undertook a weighing of the evidence in light of her own view of how
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720
the evidence should be interpreted, and came out with her own ruling for the grant of
the petition.
This Dissent. I vote to dismiss the petition before us as I agree with the decision of the
CA that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in concluding that
respondent had been illegally dismissed from employment.
Discussion of the Issues
I. The Procedural Issue
A. The Preliminary Issue: Manner of Review
A labor case finds its way into the judicial system from the NLRC whose decision is final
and executory. Finality simply means that the NLRC ruling is no longer appealable; the
legal intent is to confine adjudication of labor cases to labor tribunals with the expertise
in these cases and thereby bring the resolution of the case to a close at the soonest
possible time.
When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that matter) is already final and
unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through a limited
review on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. This has been the mode of review
followed since the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were directly
brought to this Court but only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.1
_______________
1 The following explanation was made in my Rejoinder to Reply (On the manner of
reviewing a Court of Appeals Labor Ruling) that was submitted to the Court En Banc in
the course of the exchanges on this aspect of the case. The explanation distinguished
between appealable cases and those that, while not appealable, can still be reviewed
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
“For a full understanding of these distinctions, it must be kept in mind that several levels
of review may exist for rulings emanating from the lowest levels of adjudication before
they reach the Supreme
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721
In 1998, the Court — in lieu of directly acting on labor cases under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court — opted to change the
_______________
Court. The ruling of an inferior court or tribunal (for example, the Regional Trial Court
[RTC]) is first reviewed by an appellate court (the CA) on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law; the CA decision may then in turn be reviewed by the
Supreme Court under Rule 45.
Generally, two types of decisions or rulings may be brought to the appellate courts for
review and decision; the appellate courts’ decisions are in turn subject to review by the
Supreme Court.
The first type relates to cases that come to the appellate court by way of appeal (e.g., the
ruling of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction that is appealed to the CA on
issues of facts and law under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). The second type involves
the review by the CA of decisions of inferior courts or tribunals whose rulings, by law,
are final and executory (e.g., the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
[NLRC] that under the Labor Code is final and executory). This is the review of rulings
that, by law, is not appealable and thus can only be made on limited jurisdictional
grounds.
A CA ruling under the first type can be challenged by the aggrieved party before the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Under Rule 45, the review is only on questions of law unless a review of
questions of fact is allowed under the terms established by jurisprudence. This is the
case in the example given above — an RTC ruling that is appealed to the CA on both
factual and legal grounds and which CA decision on appeal is now before the Supreme
Court for further review. This may be the model of a Supreme Court review that the
ponente might have had in mind in asserting that the Supreme Court should be able to
undertake a review of the full range of legal issues before it.
In the second type as exemplified above, a ruling by the NLRC, although final and
executory, may be brought to the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, i.e., on a
petition for certiorari, limited to jurisdictional grounds, usually for grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The final and executory nature of
the NLRC decision under review can best be appreci-
722
722

procedure of review through its ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission,2 taking into account the judicial hierarchy of courts and
the growing number of labor cases elevated to the Supreme Court under Rule 65. The
Court resolved that the proper recourse from the NLRC’s final and executory ruling is to
assail the ruling before the CA under Rule 65. Thus, the unappealable character of the
NLRC ruling (as declared by substantive law) did not change; only the process of review
changed in terms of the court (from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals) to
which the labor case can initially be brought.
From the CA ruling, a dissatisfied party has the option to file an appeal with the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This mode of appeal limits the review to questions of law.
B. Standard of Review of a Labor Case under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Montoya v. Transmed3the CourtMontoya
_______________
ated when it is considered that the decision can immediately be implemented unless a
temporary restraining order or injunction is issued by the CA; the Rule 65 mode of
review is rendered necessary because the decision or ruling under review, by law, is
already final. Finality1 means that the decision is no longer appealable1 and may be
reviewed only when the ruling is void because of jurisdictional defects.”
2 356 Phil. 811; 295 SCRA 494 (1998).
3 G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 334.
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723
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast

with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore,
Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA
decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on
the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other
words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a
review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that
should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the
question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?4 [emphases and italics supplied; citations
omitted]
Thus, under the Rule 65 review by the CA, Montoya reiterates that the sole ground or
issue allowed is jurisdictional — the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC in ruling on the case. To state the obvious, this kind of review
would have made it easier for the CA to handle the case; in the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion, it can dismiss labor cases for lack of grave abuse of discretion as we
do in this Court.
From the CA, further recourse is through a Rule 45 review by this Court on questions of
law in accordance with prevailing rulings. The office of a petition for review on certiorari
is not to examine and settle factual questions already ruled upon below. In this review,
the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA’s finding that the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 342-343.

724
724
NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.
This manner of review is effectively a supervisory review by the courts that bears two
significant characteristics: first, it respects the mandate of the law that the decision
below is final and is not for the courts to review on appeal for its legal and factual
merits; and second, review by the courts (particularly by the Supreme Court) in the
exercise of their supervisory certiorari jurisdiction is mandated no less than by the
Constitution and is intended to ensure that the deciding entity stayed within the due
bounds of its authority or jurisdiction.5
Specifically, in reviewing a CA labor ruling under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Court’s review is limited to:
(1) Ascertaining the correctness of the CA’s decision in finding the presence or
absence of a grave abuse of discretion. This is done by examining, on the basis of the
parties’ presentations, whether the CA correctly determined that at the NLRC level, all
the adduced pieces of evidence were considered; no evidence which should not have
been considered was considered; and the evidence presented supports the NLRC
findings; and
(2) Deciding any other jurisdictional error that attended the CA’s interpretation or
application of the law.
In this kind of limited review, the Court avoids reviewing a labor case by re-weighing the
evidence or re-evaluating its sufficiency; the task of weighing or evaluation, as a rule, lies
within the NLRC’s jurisdiction as an administrative appellate body.
If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence,
then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly,
dismiss the petition. If grave abuse of discretion exists, then the CA
_______________
5 Rejoinder to Reply, supra, at Note 1.
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725
must grant the petition and nullify the NLRC ruling, entering at the same time the ruling
that is justified under the evidence and the governing law, rules and jurisprudence. In
our Rule 45 review, this Court must deny the petition if it finds that the CA correctly
acted.
In the context of the present case, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the NLRC; hence, the CA dismissed the Rule 65 petition before it. In our own ruling
on the Rule 45 petition before us, we should evaluate the petition in this light, not in the
manner that the ponencia did in concluding for the grant of the petition and ruling in
favor of the petitioners.
By so doing, the ponencia undertook a factual appellate review that laid the whole case
open for the detailed examination of every piece of evidence adduced in the case and
for the evaluation of the correctness of the application of the law to the evidence found.
This is a review that a Rule 45 petition does not allow.
II. The Substantive Issues
A. The Respondent’s Status of Employment
II.A.1. Standards to determine probationary

employment
While the respondent might have been hired as a probationary employee, the
petitioners’ evidence did not establish the employers’ compliance with the probationary
employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and
Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as
amended). Thus, the respondent should be considered a regular employee and the case
should be reviewed on this basis.
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726
Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 281. Probationary employment.—Proba-tionary employment shall not exceed six

(6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who
has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when
he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]
Further, Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as
amended, states:
Sec. 6. Probationary employment.—There is probationary employment where the

employee, upon his engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the
employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable
standards made known to him at the time of engagement. [emphasis supplied]
Probationary employment shall be governed by the following rules:
xxxx
(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make known to the
employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time
of his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time,
he shall be deemed a regular employee. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
To sum up these provisions, a valid probationary employment requires the concurrence

of two requirements. First, the
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
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employer shall make known the reasonable standard (performance standard) whose
compliance will render the employee qualified to be a regular employee. Second, the
employer shall inform the employee of the applicable performance standard at the time
of his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a
probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular employee.
The ponencia apparently fully agrees with the above statement of the applicable law as
it substantially recites the same requirements, including the consequence that upon
failure to comply with these same requirements, “the employee is deemed as a regular
and not a probationary employee.”6 It continues, however, with a twist that effectively
negates what it has stated and admitted about the need to communicate the
regularization standards to the employee, thus:
Keeping with these rules, an employees is deemed to have made known the standards
that would qualify a probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has
exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the employee of what he is expected to do to
accomplish during the trial of probation. This goes without saying that the employee is
sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the length of time of the
probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance,
in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also in Aberdeen Court, Inc. v.
Agustin, it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of the
standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee in a manner
contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no need to
spell out a policy or standard to be met. In the same light, an employee’s failure to
perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly made known to him
consti-
6 Decision, at page 12.
728
728
tutes a justifiable basis for a probationary employee’s non-regularization. [footnotes

from the original, omitted]
Based on these premises, the ponencia then deftly argues that because the duties and
responsibilities of the position have been explained to the respondent, an experienced
human resource specialist, she should have known what was expected for her to attain
regular status.
The ponencia’s reasoning, however, is badly flawed.
1st. The law and the rules require that there performance standards communicated at
the time of engagement to the probationary employee. The performance standards to
be met are the employer’s specific expectations of how the probationary employee
should perform.
The ponencia impliedly admits that no performance standards were expressly given but
argues that because the respondent had been informed of her duties and
responsibilities (a fact that was and is not disputed), she should be deemed to know
what was expected of her for purposes of regularization.
This is a major flaw that the ponencia satisfies only via an assumption. The ponencia
apparently forgets that knowledge of duties and responsibilities is different from the
measure of how these duties and responsibilities should be delivered. They are separate
elements and the latter element is missing in the present case.
2nd. The ponencia glosses over the communication aspect. Not only must there be
express performance standards (except in specific instances defined in the implementing
rules, discussed below); there must be effective communication. If no standards were
provided, what would be communicated?
3rd. The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that actual communication of
specific standards might not be necessary “when the job is self-descriptive in nature, for
instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers.” The re-
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729
spondent, in the first place, was never a maid, cook, driver or a messenger and cannot
be placed under this classification; she was hired and employed as a human resources
manager, in short, a managerial employee. Plain and common sense reasoning by one
who ever had been in an employment situation dictates that the job of a managerial
employee cannot be self-explanatory, in the way the ponencia implied; the complexity
of a managerial job must necessarily require that the level of performance to be
delivered must be specified and cannot simply be assumed based on the
communication of the manager’s duties and responsibilities.
4th. The ponencia also forgets that what these “performance standards” or measures
cannot simply be assumed because they are critically important in this case, or for that
matter, in any case involving jobs whose duties and responsibilities are not simple or
self-descriptive. If the respondent had been evaluated or assessed in the manner that
the company’s internal rules require, these standards would have been the basis for her
performance or lack of it. Last but not the least, the respondent’s services were
terminated on the basis of the performance standards that, by law, the employer set or
prescribed at the time of the employee’s engagement. If none had been prescribed in
the first place, under what basis could the employee then be assessed for purposes of
termination or regularization?
From these preliminary take-off points in the ponencia’s premises, it can already be
discerned that something is badly amiss and skewed in its appreciation and review of
the rulings of the NLRC and the CA. It is an appreciation that goes beyond what a
determination of grave abuse of discretion requires. It is an evaluation of the adduced
evidence based on externalities beyond the face value of the presented evidence.
In this case, the ponencia simply disregarded the plain import of the evidence or the lack
of it, and ventured into the realm of assumptions to justify its de-
730
730
sired conclusions. In the mathematical realm of problem solving, it appears to have

started from the conclusion and solved the problem backwards so that the conclusion
would fit into its stretched reading of the evidence.
II.A.2. The respondent should be deemed a

regular employee
In the context of this case, an initial determination of how the respondent’s employment
started and of her legal status at that point is the best starting point in determining the
validity of her dismissal.
The respondent was indisputably initially hired as a probationary employee. This is not a
contested point. The established facts and the applicable law, however, dictate
otherwise from the perspective of law as the petitioners failed to show compliance with
the two requirements of Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and of Section 6(d)
of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended).
This was what the NLRC found, leading the CA to conclude that no grave abuse of
discretion intervened in the NLRC’s ruling because its findings were supported by the
evidence on record and by the correctly-chosen applicable law. In stark contrast, the
ponencia’s reading, although based on the same legal premises, was based on shaky
assumptions, not on the hard evidence that the tribunals below appreciated.
II.A.2(a). No specific employment standard on

record.
As the NLRC found (and as confirmed by the CA), no term or provision exists in the
respondent’s Employment Contract7
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 174.
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relating to the performance standard that the respondent was expected to observe. The
Employment Contract, duly presented as evidence, only proved the terms and
conditions of the respondent’s employment as therein indicated, i.e., the position title,
the assigned department, the status of employment, and the period of employment.
Beyond these, the Employment Contract did not say anything more. To be sure, nothing
more can be extracted from this piece of evidence except the facts stated and the
inferences by implication from the expressly disclosed information. Significantly, none of
these can be characterized or inferred by implication as performance standards.
The best evidence of what the ponencia did when it saw matters otherwise, is its own
statement: its basis is not what the submitted evidence state but on what she was
“largely impelled” to recognize. To quote the ponencia’s own words:
A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with
the above requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott
clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager
prior to, during the time of her engagement, and the incipient states of her
employment. On this score, the Court finds it apt to detail not only of the incidents
which point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also those circumstances which
would show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her employer’s expectations that would,
in turn determine her regularization:” [emphasis supplied]
The petitioner’s other pieces of evidence that the ponencia cited and used to support its
conclusion do not and cannot, however, satisfy the requirement for performance
standards that must be communicated at the time of engagement.
Specifically, these were the Offer Sheet dated December 7, 2004, and the pre-
employment orientation on the respondent’s duty to implement the petitioner’s Code of
Conduct, office policies and training program.
732
732
The Offer Sheet was designed to inform the respondent of the compensation and
benefits package offered to her by the petitioner and can in no way be read as a
statement of the applicable probationary employment standard.8 It was communicated
even prior to engagement when the parties were negotiating, not at the point of
engagement as the law requires.
The pre-employment orientation on the respondent’s duty to implement the petitioner’s

Code of Conduct, office policies and training program likewise cannot be characterized
as performance standards; they simply related to activities aimed at acquainting and
training the respondent on her duties and not for the purpose of informing her of the
performance standards applicable to her. What stands out is that they do not pertain
specifically to the respondent and the required performance standard applicable for her
qualification for regular employment; they related to the staff the respondent managed
and supervised. Additionally, these were all relayed prior to or after the respondent was
engaged by the petitioner.
An important distinction to remember at this point is that the respondent’s knowledge

of the duties that her work entailed, and her knowledge of the employer’s performance
standard, are two distinct matters separately requiring the presentation of independent
proof.
The requirement of independent proof is found under Article 281 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and its implementing rule that deem an employee to be regular if he/she was
not informed of the performance standard for regularization. Independent proof is
likewise necessary as the law provides an additional ground for terminating a
probationary employment, i.e., when the employee “fails to qualify as a
_______________
8Id. at p. 77.
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regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the
employer[.]”9
The performance standard contemplated in law may be proven by evidence of how the
employee’s performance was intended to be or was, in fact, measured by the employer.
The performance standard may be in the form of a clear set of the employer’s
expectations, or by a system of feedbacks (e.g., comment cards) and document
evaluation or performance evaluation and appraisals conducted by the employer.
These were the pieces of evidence that the NLRC, as confirmed by the CA, did not see in
the evidence or in the petitioners’ presented case. The ponencia, unfortunately, glossed
over these gaps and omissions in the petitioners’ case and chose to believe, even
without evidentiary basis that—
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be

doubted that Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her
ability and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position as Regulatory Affairs
Manager and that her failure to perform such would give Abbott a valid cause to
terminate her probationary employment. [emphasis supplied]
From this strained and stretched reading that magically saw the required prescribed
performance standards that — by the factual findings of the NLRC and the CA — never
existed, the ponencia went on to conclude:
Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance of
one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary
employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not be literally
spelled out or mapped into technical indicators in every case. In this
_______________
9 See Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended.

734
734
regard, it must be observed that the assessment of adequate duty performance is in the
nature of a management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as Abbott did
in this case — should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like
Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital responsibility of handling personnel and
important matters of her department.
This conclusion, of course, simply extends the magic by using “basic knowledge and
common sense” to dictate the existence of “inherent and implied standards” of a
probationary employee, and even offers a view of “management prerogative” that is
unusual in the given facts of this case. This approach eloquently exemplifies what I
mentioned above as the “solving backwards” approach that the ponencia used.
II.A.2(b). No specific performance standard

communicated to the respondent.
Complementing the requirement for the existence of performance standards is the

required communication of the performance standard to the respondent. Again,
nothing in the records shows that the petitioner ever communicated any performance
standard to the respondent.
The ponencia, in building up a case contrary to what the NLRC and the CA found, cites
the evidence the petitioners point to — the respondent’s receipt of copies of the
petitioner’s Code of Conduct, Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation, and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules. The NLRC and the CA, looking at the
same pieces of evidence, saw these in a different light as they did not only examine the
documents themselves but went to the extent of examining and appreciating the
circumstances surrounding the respondent’s receipt of these documents.
The evidence on record suggests, as the respondent directly testified to, that the cited
documents were not given to her for the purpose of complying with the petitioner’s
obligation to
736
736
inform her of the performance standards applicable to her. The documents were, in fact,
given by the petitioner to assist her in monitoring the employees assigned to her
department, i.e., as the documents she must rely on in conducting the performance
evaluations of the staff assigned to her department. In short, the respondent received
the documents because they were necessary in the discharge of her functions.
From the point of law, compliance with the first requirement is not also satisfied by the
petitioner’s assertion that the respondent knew that only one performance standard
applied to all employees. Notably, the law requires proof that the employer specifically
made known to her the performance standards applicable to her to enable her to
qualify for regular employment. The required communication must be an effective one if
the law were to be given meaningful substance, not a mere perfunctory transmission of
information.
Faced with these opposing claims, the CA apparently weighed matters in the
respondent’s (and effectively in the NLRC’s) favor. In this situation of possible equipoise,
the CA did not rule incorrectly from the point of law when it acted as it did.
Two factors tilt the balance in favor of the legal correctness of the CA’s ruling. The first is
that the respondent’s position (found by the NLRC to be meritorious) was not without
any basis in fact and in law. The second is from the latter perspective; Article 4 of the
Labor Code and established jurisprudence hold that any doubt in a labor situation must
be resolved in the employee’s favor.
Thus, again, the ponencia’s case and its conclusion must fail.
II.A.2(c). Performance standards and the

internal procedures for their
evaluation were not applied to the
respondent.
736
736
I can only agree with one aspect of the ponencia — its admission that Abbott’s internal
procedures were not applied to the respondent. I cannot dispute and I fully agree with
the following passages of the ponencia:
Records show that Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job
performance of a probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed
with the employee at least twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth month
from the date of employment. Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance
Improvement Plan during the third month review to bridge the gap between the
employee’s performance and the standards set, if any. In addition, a signed copy of the
PPSE form should be submitted to Abbott’s HRD as the same would serve as basis for
recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.
In this case, as it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in
evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz
PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form was
completed to formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation
discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott
come up with the necessary Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz
performance with the set company standards.
While it is Abbott’s management prerogative to promulgate its own company rules and
even subsequently amend them, this right equally demands that when it does create its
own policies and thereafter notify its employees of the same, it accords upon itself the
obligation to faithfully implement them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would entail a
disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer should never be mired by
the uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latter’s
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
737
labor rights and duties would, to some extent, depend.10 [footnotes in the original
omitted]
Internal processes, however, cannot be dissociated from the substance that the
processes seek to achieve. This is the essence of due process. There is the requirement
for the observance of proper procedures, hand in hand with the substance of what the
law seeks – to level the playing field between the all-powerful employer and the
vulnerable employee who lies at the mercy of the employer if he or she can be
dismissed on the basis of the latter’s whim. This attempt at leveling is the reason for the
requirements for duly disclosed performance standards and their communication to the
probationary employee at the very beginning of the relationship. Reason, experience
and common sense dictate that the substance of the law carry more weight than the
process component so that any violation of the substantive portion is a transgression
that mere obeisance to the process or the recognition of the failure of process, cannot
cure. From this perspective, the laudable quotation above loses its luster.
Lusterless or otherwise, the ponencia’s admission of Abbott’s procedural inadequacies is

not without significance in terms of the present case as a whole. Notably, the above
quotation expressly and impliedly admits that no effort at all was ever made for the
conduct of an assessment or evaluation of the respondent’s performance; in fact, no
performance evaluation forms appear to have been submitted by the company. The
dearth of evidence on this point (described by the ponencia as a “hiatus of evidence”) is
completely consistent with what the ponencia explicitly and impliedly admits from the
very beginning: there was no evidence of any performance standard furnished the
respondent so that the ponencia could only deduce the existence of performance
standards from its assumptions and stretched rationalizations; much less was there any
communica-
_______________
10 Decision, at pp. 16-17.
738
738
tion of performance standards qua performance standards, as this is a matter that was
also assumed.
I draw attention, too, to another unusual feature of this case indicating, not only the
omissions that the ponencia already cited, but the implication as well that the
respondent had been singled out for special treatment by the petitioner officers. At the
very least, this incident indicates that the petitioner did not apply the same standards
and processes to the respondent’s work. The petitioner’s prescribed procedure was
narrated in an earlier version of the ponencia in this wise:
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible (Terrible),
Abbott’s former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding staff performance
standards. In the course x x x thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-
mail sent by Walsh to some staff members which essentially contained queries
regarding the former’s job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the normal
process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was not.11 (emphasis ours)
This allegation by the respondent in this regard in her pleadings was impliedly admitted
by the petitioner when it failed to offer any refutation. Interestingly, the above
allegation was included in the narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, the CA
and an earlier version of the ponencia, although they arrived at two (2) different
conclusions.
The respondent’s unrefuted allegation was not considered at all in the conclusions of
the Labor Arbiter and of the ponencia.12 On the other hand, the NLRC and the CA
concluded that a different performance standard and evaluation process
_______________
11 Pages 4-5 of the ponencia.
12 Ibid.; Rollo, pp. 260 and 271.
739
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013

739
was applied to the respondent in light of the circumstances of the case, gleaned from
the evidence submitted.13
In my view, the NLRC and the CA were not without basis in making their conclusion as
the incident, taken together with the facts supported by the available evidence, is vital in
appreciating the nature of the respondent’s employment.
Since the respondent, as the incident suggests, was bound by a different set of
standards and procedures, and since no evidence of record existed showing what these
standards were or that the required procedures were observed, the petitioners’ theory
that the respondent was informed of, and was evaluated pursuant to, the performance
standards applicable to her position, is effectively negated. This leads to the conclusion
that the respondent, from the beginning, had been a regular employee as a result of the
failure of Abbott’s HR processes. A much simpler view, related this time to the manner of
her termination, is that the respondent was simply differently treated.
B. “Just Cause” for Dismissal Must Exist
To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer carries the burden of proving that
the dismissal was for a just cause and with the observance of due process prior to
dismissal.14 The employer has to discharge this burden by clear, accurate, consistent
and convincing evidence;15 in case of doubt, the presumption in the employee’s favor
under Article 4 of the Labor Code should apply.
II.B.1. The petitioner had no valid cause to

dismiss the respondent’s employment
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 1044-1045.
14 Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 205.
15 Ibid.
740
740
The respondent was dismissed as she “failed to qualify as regular employee in

accordance with the prescribed standards set by the Company.”16 Even granting for
the sake of argument that the petitioner had apprised the respondent of an applicable
performance standard, the evidence failed to show that the respondent did not meet
this standard in a manner and to the extent equivalent to the “just cause” that the law
requires.
II.B.1(a). Just cause requirement for

employees, whether
probationary or regular.
An important legal point that should not be lost in considering this case is that a
probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular employee under the
Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an employment. While the
strict application of Article 282 of the Labor Code may be relaxed because the employee
is still under probation (so that analogous probationary status rules may apply), the
same essential just cause for dismissal must be present and must be proven. In other
words, probationary employment does not mean that the employee is under an
“employment at will” situation as that phrase is understood in American jurisprudence.
To reiterate, the fact that the respondent was still in her probationary period of
employment did not lessen the burden of proof that the law imposed on the petitioners
to prove the just cause for her dismissal.17 Probationary employees are protected by the
security of tenure provision of the Constitution and they cannot be removed from their
position except only for cause.18
_______________
16 Rollo, p. 78.
17 Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., 495 Phil. 706, 712; 456 SCRA 32, 38 (2005).
18 Ibid.
741
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
741
II.B.1(b). The evidentiary status of the

just cause for dismissal
In the present case, the evidence did not show the just cause that Article 282 of the
Labor Code requires. No evidence on record showed the commission by the respondent
of any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;
and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
On the contrary, the records disclose that the respondent performed her duties under
the guidance of the petitioner’s management and worked in line with the tasks
assigned to her.19 The petitioner’s allegation of the respondent’s “poor performance”
could not have been substantiated considering the lack of any clear performance
standard in evaluating the respondent’s work.
II.B.2. The petitioner violated its own

procedural requirements in the
performance evaluation
A first instance when the discussion related to “process” was with respect to the
communication of performance
_______________
19 See page 4 of the ponencia.
742
742
standards. This topic also relates to process, but this time on the matter of the procedure
to be taken in performance evaluation: the petitioner failed to observe its own
procedural requirements in evaluating the respondent’s probationary employment.
The petitioner’s prescribed procedure gives probationary employees two (2)

opportunities to meet and qualify for regularization. As mentioned before, the reviews
were aimed at informing the employees of their work performance based on the
petitioner’s standard and on how they can improve it to qualify for regularization. For
reasons not disclosed in the records, the prescribed procedure was not followed by the
petitioner in the respondent’s case. She was immediately terminated from employment
without having been evaluated and without undergoing the evaluation process under
the petitioner’s prescribed procedure.
While the petitioner’s failure to observe its own procedures is not disputed in the
ponencia, the implication of Abbott’s failure cannot simply be glossed over. Abbott’s
non-compliance should be viewed from the point of fairness or lack of it, that attended
the respondent’s dismissal. This circumstance should be considered together with the
other circumstances of the case, if only because the petitioner’s basic unfairness
rendered doubtful the real cause in the termination of her employment.
In other words, any deviation from the prescribed procedures must be sufficiently
explained to remove doubts on the genuineness of the cause of dismissal. In this case,
not only did the petitioner fail to observe its own prescribed procedure; more
importantly, it also failed to provide an explanation on why the prescribed procedure
was not followed in the respondent’s case.
Significantly, the NLRC appreciated all these in this case and this appreciation was duly
noted and evaluated by the CA. As there was in fact basis in fact and in law in the
NLRC’s findings on this aspect of the case,
743
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
743
again the CA correctly found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s actions.
II.B.3. Violation of the Labor Code’s

procedural requirements
Additionally, the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural due process of the
Labor Code when it terminated the respondent’s employment. The two-written notice
requirement under Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended, was never observed. To quote this provision:
Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.—In all cases of

termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be
substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstance[s], grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee’s last
known address. [emphasis supplied]
744
744
The first notice is complied with when the employee is properly apprised of the charges
brought against him/her so that he/she can properly prepare for his/her defense.20 The
second notice is complied with when the employee is informed of the employer’s
intention to terminate the employment.21 A formal “trial-type” hearing, although
preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be heard. In Perez
v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company,22 the Court laid down the following
guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
a) “ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or

written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence
in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and
reasonable way.
b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the
employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or
practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
c) the “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails over the
“hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules and regulations.
From the records, the respondent received only one notice and was not given ample
opportunity to be heard before her employment was terminated. The respondent was
not served a first written notice indicating: (1) the grounds for terminating her
employment; and (2) a directive giving her the opportunity to submit a written
explanation within a
_______________
20 Dolores T. Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 173012, June 13,
2012, 672 SCRA 177.
21 Ibid.
22 G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 127.
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
745
reasonable period. Neither was the respondent given the ample opportunity to be
heard as required by law. There was only compliance with the second notice
requirement through the petitioner’s letter dated May 19, 2005 which was already a
written notice of termination of employment.23
In defense of Abbott’s failure to observe the two-notice requirement, the ponencia

argues that a different procedure applies when terminating a probationary employee;
the usual two-notice requirement does not govern, citing for this purpose Section 2,
Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code.
The ponencia, however, forgets that the single notice rule applies only if the employee is
validly on probationary basis; it does not apply where the employee is deemed a regular
employee for the company’s failure to provide and to communicate a prescribed
performance standard applicable to the probationary employee. The ponencia itself
admits that in such a case, the employee would then be a regular employee. Since the
petitioner utterly failed to support by evidence its compliance with the legal
requirements on performance standards, the two-notice requirement for regular
employees must perforce fully apply.
C. The Consequences of the Respondent’s

Illegal Dismissal
The above analysis shows that the respondent had been illegally dismissed from her
employment. The petitioner failed to show that her dismissal was for a valid cause. The
petitioner also failed to respect the respondent’s procedural due process rights under
the law.
As a consequence, the NLRC and the CA, thereafter, correctly ordered the respondent’s
reinstatement and the payment of the monetary awards of backwages, moral damages,
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 78.
746
746
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The CA and the NLRC also correctly held that
the individual petitioners (i.e., the corporate officers of the petitioner) should be
solidarily liable with the petitioner for the respondent’s monetary awards.
II.C.1. The recoverable reliefs
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the following awards to an illegally
dismissed employee:
Art. 279. Security of tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement.
“By jurisprudence derived from [the above] provision, separation pay may be awarded
to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of reinstatement.”24 Under Section 4(b), Rule I
of the Rules Implementing Book VI of the Labor Code, separation pay is awarded, in lieu
of reinstatement, to an illegally dismissed employee when reinstatement is no longer
possible, i.e., when the dismissed employee’s position is no longer available, or the
continued relationship between the employer and the employee would no longer be
viable due to the strained relations between them, or when the dismissed employee
opts not to be reinstated, or when the payment of sepa-
_______________
24 Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R.
No. 172149, February 8, 2010, 612 SCRA 10, 25, citing Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena,
G.R. No. 173076, October 10, 2007, 535 SCRA 518, 541.
747
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
747
ration benefits would be for the best interest of the parties involved.
“Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and

reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee
and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages.”25
II.C.2. Other awards as a consequence of the

damages suffered
In addition to these basic awards, an illegally dismissed employee may also be awarded
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Jurisprudence holds that moral and
exemplary damages are awarded when the illegal dismissal is attended by bad faith.26
The Court has also ruled that corporate officers are solidarily liable with the employer
company for the employees’ termination of employment done with malice or bad
faith.27
A review of the facts of the case shows ample evidence supporting the petitioner’s bad
faith, as shown by the manner in which the respondent’s employment was terminated.
The NLRC, in its decision, exhaustively discussed the petitioner’s bad faith, as
demonstrated by the actions of the individual petitioners:
_______________
25 Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524, January 30,
2009, 577 SCRA 500, 507.
26 Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, G.R. No. 177795, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 110,
141-142. See also Civil Code, Articles 2208, 2217, 2219 and 2232.
27 MAM Realty Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114787, June 2, 1995, 244
SCRA 797, 803.
748
748
The records show that complainant-appellant’s dismissal was effected by individual

respondents-appellees in a capricious and high-handed manner, anti-social and
oppressive, fraudulent and in bad faith, and contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy. Bad faith and fraud are shown in the acts committed by respondents-
appellees before, during and after complainant-appellant’s dismissal in addition to the
manner by which she was dismissed. First, complainant-appellant was pressured to
resign: (1) she was threatened with termination, which will surely damage her
reputation in the pharmaceutical industry; (2) she was asked to evacuate her
Commission and ordered not to enter the Company’s premises even if she was still an
Abbott employee; and (3) individual respondents Ms. Terrible and Ms. Walsh made a
public announcement to the staff that complainant-appellant already resigned even if in
reality she did not. All of which caused complainant-appellant much humiliation, serious
anxiety and besmirched reputation.28
The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive manner in which the
respondent’s employment was dismissed by the petitioner:
On May 23, 2005, the private respondent still reported for work since petitioner Abbott
had not yet handed the termination notice to her. However, the security guard did not
allow her to enter the Hospira ALSU office pursuant to Ms. Walsh[‘s] instruction. She
requested Ms. Walsh that she be allowed to enter the company premises to retrieve her
last remaining things in her office which are mostly her personal belongings. She was
allowed to enter. However, she was surprised to see her drawers already unlocked and,
when she opened the same, she discovered that her small brown envelope x x x, white
pouch containing the duplicate keys, and the staff’s final evaluation sheets were
missing. The private respondent informed Ms. Bernardo about the incident. The latter re-
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 375-376.
749
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
749
sponded by saying she was no longer an employee of the company since May 19, 2005.
The private respondent reported the matter to the Pasig Police Station and asked for
help regarding the theft of her properties. The Pasig Police incident report stated as
follows:
xxxx
When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one SOCO officer and staff, named
Christian Perez. Kelly Walsh allegedly admitted that she was the one who opened the
drawer and got the green folders containing the staff evaluations. The Reportee, was
told by Kelly Walsh that her Rolex wristwatch will be returned to her provided that she
will immediately vacate her office.
On the same date, the private respondent’s termination letter dated May 19, 2005 was
handed to her by Ms. Walsh, Mr. Almazar and Ms. Bernardo. On May 27, 2005, the
private respondent received another copy of the said termination notice via registered
mail.29
These explanations for the actions taken show that the NLRC’s recognition of the bad
faith was not without basis and was in fact supplemented by the CA in the appellate
court’s own confirmatory explanation.
D. Application of the Rule 45 Standard of Review
Under the evidentiary situation that prevailed in this case as described above in some
detail, an expression of wonder cannot be helped, particularly on how the ponencia
could conclude that the CA committed a reversible error when it found no grave abuse
of discretion in the NLRC’s actions on the case. In contrast with the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, the findings and conclusions of the NLRC, as affirmed on a Rule 65 review by
the CA, were based on the law and juris-
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 1046-1047.

750
750
prudence as properly applied to the established set of facts and evidence.
First, while the respondent, from the petitioner’s standpoint, was hired as a probationary
employee, she was deemed a regular employee pursuant to the clear provisions of
Article 281 of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 6(d) of the Implementing Rules
of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended. The evidence adduced failed to show
that the petitioner ever apprised the respondent at the time of her engagement of the
standards she must meet to qualify for regular employment.
Second, the respondent’s termination from employment had no basis in fact and in law.
Since the records failed to support the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent’s
alleged poor performance and tardiness were proven by evidence and, in fact, fell
within the enumeration in Article 281 and Article 282 of the Labor Code, reason dictates
that the present petition be denied.
At the risk of repetition, the adduced evidence, in the first place, did not prove that the
respondent’s work failed to comply with the petitioner’s performance standard as no
proof of the performance standard applied to the respondent’s work was actually
presented. The respondent’s employment was also terminated without undergoing any
performance evaluation.
The evidence adduced did not also prove any act of omission under Article 282 of the
Labor Code committed by the respondent. No evidence was presented on the
respondent’s actual work so as to determine whether her acts/omissions constituted a
just cause for termination, such as serious misconduct or gross or habitual neglect of
duty or any other analogous cause to the just causes mentioned in the law.
As the records show, neither was there compliance with the respondent’s own internal
procedures nor with the law’s procedural due process. The respondent was not served
the two-
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VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
751
notice required by law before her employment was terminated by the petitioner.
Third, the NLRC’s monetary awards, as affirmed by the CA, were appropriate
consequences of the respondent’s illegal dismissal from employment. The payment of
the respondent’s backwages and the order of reinstatement were consistent with the
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code. Jurisprudence also provides the award of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, when bad faith is proven in
the termination of employment.
In this case, the bad faith exhibited by the individual petitioners was clearly established
in the records. The individual petitioners’ bad faith was demonstrated by the evidence of
how they unfairly effected the termination of the respondent’s employment.
The narration of facts of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA shows, among others,
that: (1) the individual petitioners did not follow the petitioner’s prescribed procedure
performance evaluation as, in fact, the respondent’s work was not evaluated; (2) the
individual petitioners, through their concerted actions, ganged up on the respondent in
forcing her to resign from employment; (3) the individual petitioners pressured the
respondent to resign by announcing her resignation to the office staff, thereby
subjecting her to unwarranted humiliation; and (4) they blackmailed the respondent by
withholding her personal possessions until she resigned from employment.
Bad faith can also be inferred from the lack of fairness and underhandedness employed
by the individual petitioners on how they informed the respondent of the termination of
her employment. The records disclose that the respondent was lured into a meeting on
the pretext that her work performance was to be evaluated; she was caught off-guard
when she was informed that her employment had been terminated. Aside from the
abrupt notification, bad faith can also be deduced from the fact that the termination
was made immedi-
752
752
ately effective; the respondent was immediately banned from the petitioner’s premises
after she was informed that her employment had been terminated.
To my mind, the NLRC correctly ruled that the individual petitioners were solidarily
liable, together with the petitioner, to pay the monetary awards. The cited
circumstances constitute sufficient evidence of their bad faith in terminating the
respondent’s employment. Verily, corporate officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation to pay monetary awards in illegal dismissal cases when their bad faith is
established in the termination of the employment.
III. Conclusion
I close this Dissent with the note that the constitutional protection of security of tenure
is a right enjoyed by every employee. Employment, regardless of the employment status,
may only be terminated for cause and within the procedure prescribed by law and
jurisprudence. A review of the records shows that no reversible error was committed by
the CA in finding the NLRC free from any taint of grave abuse of discretion in ruling on
the respondent’s illegal dismissal. This conclusion is what the Court should reflect in its
Decision if it is to discharge in good faith its duty to adjudicate.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A person whose right to remain in peaceful possession of his property is violated
by another person’s fraudulent registration of such property in her name is entitled to
nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code. (Reyes vs. Montemayor, 598
SCRA 61 [2009])
The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory so much so that non-

compliance could only be tolerated by special circumstances and compelling reasons;
This Court has held that when there are several petitioners, all of them
753
VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013
753
must execute and sign the certification against forum shopping; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. (Pigcaulan vs. Security and Credit
Investigation, Inc., 663 SCRA 1 [2012])
——o0o—— Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz, 701 SCRA 682, G.R. No. 192571
July 23, 2013

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G.R. No. 192571. July 23, 2013.

VOL. 701, JULY 23, 2013