Evidence: Original Document Rule

Under the Original Document Rule (previously called the Best Evidence
Rule), when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing,
photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original
document itself.[36] In this case, respondents formally offered the MIASCOR
Storage and Delivery Receipt and the Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt as proof
of their respective contents.[37] As such, the originals should have been
presented at trial.

Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules, however, an original

document may consist of a "duplicate" produced by means of photography,
mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduce the original. A photocopy of an original,
therefore, may consist of a "duplicate" if there is no question that it is an
accurate reproduction of the original. But even though this case was tried
before the effectivity of the 2019 Rules on Evidence, petitioner had already
objected to the admissibility of the MIASCOR Delivery Receipt No. 251294
and Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt No. 124108, arguing that they are
secondary evidence because they are mere photocopies. [38]

Under Section 5 of Rule 130, a party is allowed to submit secondary

evidence to prove the contents of a lost or destroyed document by a copy,
a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or the testimony of
witnesses, provided that the offeror of the secondary evidence proves: (1)
that the original existed and duly executed; (2) it was lost or destroyed; and
(3) its unavailability is not due to bad faith on his or her part. [39]

That said, regardless of whether an exhibit is an original, a "duplicate" of a

document, or secondary evidence, it must still be presented at trial in the
manner provided for by the Rules on Evidence before it can be admitted into
evidence. For such purposes, it is important to distinguish between public or
private documents. Public documents are admissible in evidence without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. [40] On the other hand,
under Section 20 of Rule 132, a private document cannot be admitted into
evidence unless its due execution and authenticity is proven by: (a) anyone
who saw the document executed or written; (b) evidence of the genuineness
of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) other evidence showing its due
execution and authenticity.[41]

Upon a review of the records, We agree with the RTC's finding that the
MIASCOR Delivery Receipt No. 251294 and Japan Cargo Delivery Receipt
No. 124108 were not authenticated as required by Section 20 of Rule 132.
Not one of respondents' three witnesses testified that they saw the receipts -
and importantly, the notations of damage - being executed or written. As
such, the photocopies of said receipts are inadmissible and have no
evidentiary value.

In any case, the evidence does not show whether the MIASCOR receipt
referred to an inspection that was conducted on the goods upon the vehicle's
arrival at NAIA or to one done after the unloading from the vehicle. This is
critical because the extraordinary responsibility of petitioner KAC, as a
common carrier, lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
its possession and received for transportation until they are delivered,
actually or constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right
to receive them,[42] e.g., a warehouse operator at NAIA or a forwarding
service who is responsible for the last leg of transportation to the consignee.
For the same reason, We do not think that the photographs of the cargo that
Barcena took are competent to prove the damage as they were taken when
the cargo had already arrived at the consignee's premises. At that point in
time, the cargo was no longer unconditionally placed in the possession of the
carrier.

Neither can the annotations in the MIASCOR Storage and Delivery Receipt
be considered prima facie evidence of damage to the goods as "entries in the
course of business" under Section 43, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of
Evidence, which provides as follows:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. - Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
The Rules of Evidence has since been revised and "entries in the course of
business" have now been replaced with "records of regularly conducted
business activity" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the 2019 Rules, which
provides as follows:

Section 45. Records of regularly conducted business activity. - A

memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made by writing, typing, electronic, optical or other
similar means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of
information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular
course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic,
optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay
evidence.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals,[43] the Court laid down the requisites for
admission in evidence of entries in the course of business: (1) the person
who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the
entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty. [44]

In this case, the first, second, and third requisites were not proven at trial
because respondents failed to establish who made the annotation in the
MIASCOR receipt that the cargo was damaged. Barcena never met the
person who made the annotation on the MIASCOR receipt but was content
to take a photocopy of it on face value when preparing the Certificate of
Survey. The records do not bear out who made the annotation, when they
made it, whether they were competent to make such an annotation, and why
they could not testify in court on this matter. For these reasons, the
annotation of damage, as they appear on the photocopy of the MIASCOR
delivery receipt, cannot be considered as an entry in the course of business
or as prima facie evidence of damage to the goods under Section 43, Rule
130 of the 1997 Rules of Evidence. A ruling to the contrary would make
carriers susceptible to spurious claims of negligence in the transport of
goods merely on the basis of a photocopy of an annotation, the provenance
of which is uncertain. As will be explained below, this is not the intention of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or the extraordinary diligence expected of
carriers under Article 1735 of the New Civil Code.

The delivery receipts aside, respondents failed to present any other evidence
that the subject cargo was indeed damaged while it was under the control of
KAC. Despite Barcena's own finding that there was no visible sign of
damage to the cargo, it appears that the consignee prevailed upon him to
believe what appeared in a copy of the MIASCOR delivery receipt that he
was provided with. Indeed, testimony that merely repeats the contents of
inadmissible documentary evidence is just as insignificant.(Kuwait Airways
Corporation vs. The Tokio Marine And Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., and Tokio
Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc, G.R. No. 213931, November 17, 2021)