Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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The Renewal of Alsatian Nationalism

Etienne B. Schmitt

To cite this article: Etienne B. Schmitt (2023) The Renewal of Alsatian Nationalism, Nationalism
and Ethnic Politics, 29:1, 39-59, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2022.2153494
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2022.2153494

Published online: 19 Dec 2022.

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NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS
2023, VOL. 29, NO. 1, 39–59
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2022.2153494

The Renewal of Alsatian Nationalism

Etienne B. Schmitt
Concordia University

ABSTRACT
Alsace is usually known in nationalism studies as the historical object of conflict between
France and Germany. This peripheral region is rarely studied as a minority nation struggling
for recognition and claiming autonomy. This article aims to conceptualize Alsatian nationalism
and its renewed practices and representations amidst mobilization against the merger of
Alsace into the Grand-Est. Alsatian nationalism is now at the crossroads of thwarting French
hegemony, between a cosmopolitan autonomism that promotes Alsace as a transnational
entity and a “new” nationalism that perceives Alsace as a nation with self-determination.

Introduction
Despite the extensive work by historians on Alsace,1 the study of nations and national-
ism in political science gives only minor consideration to this peripheral region of
France at the border of Germany and Switzerland. The reasons for this lapse likely stem
from the fact that Alsace’s self-determination claims have been marginalized in recent
decades and that a methodological Jacobinism2 that limits the study of minority nation-
alisms in France.
On the historiography of Alsace, which perceives this region mostly through issues of
French cohesion and integrity or as a territorial conflict between France and Germany,
Alison Carroll writes: “the key for future English-speaking studies of Alsace is to ensure
that Alsatians are at the center of their analysis.”3 Indeed, many studies on Alsatian
nationalism regard it as a result of the great game of nations. While historic events have
contributed to defining it and historians have described those events, this article aims to
define Alsace by centering an analysis of the practices and representations of Alsatian
nationalism itself. This approach enables a fuller understanding of the renewal of
Alsatian nationalism.
A significant moment in this renewal occurred in 2014, during a period of large-scale
mobilization against the merger of Alsace with Lorraine and Champagne-Ardenne into
a bigger region, the Grand-Est (“Great East”), a decision made by the central state.
Countering this merger, Alsatian political actors stood for the territorial integrity of
Alsace and demanded exclusive competences legitimated by Alsatian particularism. In
2021, a new local authority was established, the Collectivit
e europ
eenne d’Alsace
(European Collectivity of Alsace, CEA), which recognizes this particularism with special
competences on promotion bilingualism and transnational cooperation. But hostility
toward the Grand-Est and the demerger’s claim persists. This article therefore analyzes

CONTACT Etienne B. Schmitt etienne.schmitt@concordia.ca Concordia University, Montreal, Canada.

ß 2022 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
40 E. B. SCHMITT

anti-merger mobilization as both a consequence of cultural nationalism and the cause

of its renewal. Alsatian nationalism can be perceived as a heterogenous movement
encompassing irredentism, autonomism, secessionism, and regionalism, which all advo-
cate for Alsatian particularism, perceived as a set of cultural, political, and social charac-
teristics that define Alsace as a unique cultural and political entity.
Because anti-merger mobilization has given legitimacy to particularistic claims, it is
now contentiously divided between a cosmopolitan autonomism that promotes Alsace
as a transnational entity and a “new” nationalism that perceives Alsace as a nation with
self-determination. These new currents question the definition of Alsatian nationalism
itself, breaking its old taboos, reinventing its ideological ambition, and redefining its
scope. Thus, Alsatian nationalism finds itself at a crossroads between antithetical
definitions.
To observe this phenomenon of renewal, this article is divided into three parts. In
the first part, I define Alsatian nationalism, outlining its practices and representations.
In the second part, I analyze the anti-merger mobilization and its cultural and political
outcomes. In the third part, I look at the renewal of Alsatian nationalism, highlighting
the changes that have emerged. The methodology used in this article is inspired by phe-
nomenological sociology with the crucial use of constructivism. By analyzing public dis-
courses,4 this methodology provides a better understanding of the “social practices and
processes of communicative construction, stabilization and transformation of symbolic
orders and their consequences”5 used to evaluate the construction of social practices
and representations of Alsatian nationalism.

Defining Alsatian nationalism

There is no consensus in the academic literature on the Alsatian particularism advocacy
movement. Most authors focus on autonomism rather than nationalism because auton-
omy is the main claim of this heterogenous movement. However, while the autonomism
hypothesis is partially verified, the movement is historically divided between irreden-
tism, autonomism, secessionism, and regionalism. These currents are based on different
“ideational ambitions and scope.”6 In fact, they share a common cultural nationalism
but diverge on practical purposes. Like every nationalism,7 Alsatian nationalism is poly-
morphous (Figure 1).

The autonomism hypothesis

Autonomism can be defined as the achievement of a certain level of territorial or cul-
tural autonomy “independently of other sources of authority in the state, but subject to
the overall legal order of the state.”8 If autonomism is not the same as nationalism, can
autonomy claims be untied from nationalism?
The first autonomy demands in Alsace were initiated by homeland nationalism. After
the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Alsace and part of Lorraine—the department of
Moselle—were annexed to the German Empire with the status of Reichsland Elsaß-
Lothringen (“Imperial land of Alsace-Lorraine”). In the first years after the annexation,
some of the Alsatian elite protested against Germany, pledging loyalty to the French
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 41

Figure 1. Evolution of the Alsatian particularism advocacy movement.

Republic.9 This homeland nationalism expressed autonomy claims, as did German fed-
eralism, which demanded a similar autonomous status to every constituent state of
German Empire, or Alsatian independentism, which used autonomy as a step toward a
free state.10 While the same claim was made by each of these currents, their ambitions
diverged sharply. The historic context of the German annexation may explain this situ-
ation, but the same observation can be reproduced during the interwar period
(1918–39) under French sovereignty. After Alsace and Moselle returned to France in
1918, four parties11 pushed for greater autonomy:

1. The Heimatbund (“Alliance for Homeland”): a minority nationalist party claim-

ing full autonomy for Alsace within France, as a national minority;
2. The Unabh€angige Landespartei f€ ur Elsaß-Lothringen (“Independence Party for
Alsace-Lorraine”): a Pan-Germanist party claiming full autonomy as a step
toward independence;
3. The Kommunistische Partei-Opposition (“Communist Party—Opposition,” or KP-
O): a communist party claiming full autonomy, according to Leninist anti-
imperialism; and
4. The Union Populaire R
epublicaine (“Popular Republican Union,” or UPR) a cen-
ter-right Catholic party claiming partial autonomy for Alsace, with special status.

As Christopher Fischer states, Alsace is a complex case and can be paradoxical.

Indeed, political actors pushed for autonomy to defy majority German and French
nationalism. During this period, “Alsatian regionalism did not simply serve as a con-
venient mode of contesting the region’s fate. Alsatians sought to define their culture,
traditions, and heritage positively.”12 In other words, the affirmation of Alsace’s integ-
rity is based on anti-nationalist feelings. And this is the paradox: most of the autonomy
claims were and are related to nationalistic or identity ambitions—French irredentism,
Pan-Germanism, minority nationalism, and regionalism. Autonomy appears to be a step
toward something else rather than an end in itself.
42 E. B. SCHMITT

After 1945, autonomy claims were marginalized in the political field, and nationalism
was strongly rejected, which explains why minority nationalism political parties after
the Second World War have opted for “autonomism” to describe their ideology. Thus,
during the period between 1945 and 1990, in a postwar France where anti-German sen-
timent was pervasive, regionalism was limited to its functional aspects13 without identity
claims. Moreover, decentralization policies in France only emerged in the 1980s. Except
for a few small far-left or far-right groups that did not stand candidates for election, the
first autonomist party was the Els€assische Volksunion (“Union of Alsatian People,”
EVU), which was founded in 1988. In the 1990s, “new” regionalism14 was developed to
solve territorial issues and neutralize this first attempt to renew nationalism. New
regionalism achieved European integration on a local basis, focusing on bilingualism
and transborder cooperation. This Europeanist activism can be interpreted as a strategy
for securing a certain degree of autonomy from the central state. Technically, new
regionalism is not nationalism because the nation is not its ideational ambition, but its
claims are highly motivated and legitimized by Alsatian particularism. As Eve Hepburn
notes, there is a consensus among scholars to categorize political parties with the same
territorial demands as belonging to the same “family,” but there is no agreement on ter-
minology.15 In the Alsatian context, ethnoregionalism seems to be the appropriate cat-
egory. Ethnoregionalism can be “defined as referring to the efforts of geographically
concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes
even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural
identity.”16 This describes the work of the EVU as well as the particularity advocacy of
the new regionalism.
Because of this ideological proximity, the autonomy claim cannot be separated from
nationalism or, at least, from a cultural nationalism. Therefore, the autonomism hypoth-
esis is partially verified, but—again—autonomy here is a strategy, a means to achieve
another purpose. And the diversity of purposes points to the polymorphic nature of
Alsatian nationalism.

The polymorphic nature of Alsatian nationalism

Over the past 150 years, Alsatian nationalism has evolved within its specific historic, lin-
guistic, and sociologic context. French irredentism and Pan-Germanism disappeared,
and while regionalism and minority nationalism still exist, they have changed.
Nationalism is not merely the political expression of the nation; it is the process of
institutionalizing it. Thus, nationalism produces the nation’s everyday experience, its
socializations, and its representations. For this reason, it can be difficult to define
Alsatian nationalism. As Michel Keating notes of the Swiss cantons, “the language of
nationhood”17 in Alsace seems to be only rarely or slightly expressed in the political
field. Can nationalism exist without a nation?
In the past, Alsatians defined their land using the word Heimat rather than “nation.”
In German, Heimat means something more than the English word “homeland”: it is a
common entity shaped by history, language, culture, values, institutions, and a particu-
lar way of life.18 In other words, a Heimat is a cultural community that—usually—does
not overlap with a political community. However, during the interwar period, the
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 43

Heimat was assimilated into the political community by nationalist parties. Since the
Second World War, Heimat has nearly disappeared from political discourses, though it
persists in common language as a synonym for nation.
This discrepancy between discursive practice in the political field and everyday repre-
sentations is the result of two interconnected factors. First, there is censorship in the
local political field due to the hegemony of French nationhood. This partially explains
why local politicians speak cautiously,19 avoiding references to a minority nation that
would call the monistic conception of the French national narrative into question. Yet
their caution seems odd. Compare it with Corsican nationalism, which struggles with
the same Jacobinism: Corsican political actors identify themselves as nationalist, and the
language of nationhood is used broadly by all Corsicans. The difference in the use of
the language of nationhood in Alsace and Corsica lies in the second reason: in Alsace,
there is a taboo that restrains the political expression of the nation. During the Second
World War, most of the nationalist leaders participated in organizing and managing
Nazi structures20 that tried to assimilate populations21 perceived as too hybridized. In
addition, nearly 100,000 Alsatians had no choice in joining the German army, where
they served as cannon fodder on the Eastern Front. One third of the Malgr
e-nous
(“Despite ourselves”)22 never returned. After the war, Alsatians felt “an inferiority com-
plex before other French people, because their culture was considered to be the same as
the enemy’s culture.”23 Being a Malgr
e-nous was seen as shameful. Alsatian political
actors made to conform to French Jacobinism to show their loyalty, and the Alsatian
population rejected nationalism. Reproducing this rejection, the local political field
banned it and marginalized autonomy claims.
Although the taboo faded from Alsatian society during the 1990s, censorship in the
political field persisted. For example, while the elite continues to endorse the singularity
of the French nation, self-determination is no longer seen as taboo because 58% of the
local population now favor an autonomous status for Alsace.24 Political discourses have
integrated external and internal censorship, adapting the language of the nation within
the hegemon of French nationhood and to address new issues, such as globalization
and Europeanization. For example, new regionalism worked to advocate for the institu-
tionalization and the development of Alsatian particularism, transnationalizing Alsatian
identity and empowering transborder cooperation to construct European autonomy on
the local level. Within the framework of French nationhood, new regionalism acted as a
sort of cultural nationalism. I define cultural nationalism as the ideational basis of eth-
nopolitical entrepreneurs who promote “the cultivation of the nation.”25 Therefore,
Alsatian nationalism varies in practical purposes, but its different currents share a cul-
tural nationalism. It is neither merely an ethnic nationalism nor a civic nationalism but
a counter-state nationalism,26 where the definition of nation is based on its distinctive-
ness against the French nation.

Alsatian particularism as the resilience of nationhood

To qualify the cultural nationalism in Alsace, it is important to delineate Alsatian par-
ticularism. A particularism is more than a culture or an identity; it is an identification
as a community. As Rogers Brubaker writes, “identification calls attention to complex
44 E. B. SCHMITT

(and often ambivalent) processes, while the term ‘identity,’ designating a condition rather
than a process, implies too easy a fit between the individual and the social.”27 Thus,
Alsatian particularism is a process of distinction from Germany in the first period and
from France in the second period.
Alsatian particularism today is based on three main characteristics:

1. Alsatian language: the Alsatian language is a glottonym encompassing the

Alemannic and Franconian dialects spoken in Alsace. Alsatian is not unified but
rather territorially diversified and hybridized between French and German influen-
ces.28 It would be more accurate to speak of “Alsatian dialects,” but sociologically,
most speakers perceive Alsatian as a language distinct from German.29 Since the
Second World War, language activism has reinforced the unification of dialects and
the differentiation of Alsatian from German, imposing in the 1990s the
Schriftsprache (“written language”) for spelling. While the use of the Alsatian lan-
guage is decreasing (see Table 1), 61% of the local population still perceive it as a
part of collective identity, and 50% are in favor of giving it equal official status
with French.30

The defense of Alsatian is historically related to the bilingualism claim.31 This claim
has been continually expressed since 1871, when the French language was banned by
Germany, and subsequently when the German language was banned by France.

2. The Local Law and the Concordat: Under the German Empire (1871–1918),
Alsace–Lorraine obtained political institutions, such as a Landtag (parliament) in
1879. In 1900, Alsace–Lorraine also obtained a local civil code and then in 1911 a
constitution. However, in 1924, after the region’s incorporation into France in 1918
and a transitional period, the central state shut those institutions down. This was
met with large-scale mobilization, prompting the French government to recognize
Alsatian particularism and enact the Droit local d’Alsace-Lorraine (“Local Law of
Alsace–Lorraine”).32 In 2017, Alsatians continued to consider the Local Law part of
their particularism, with 78% in favor of maintaining it.33 Moreover, in 1924
Alsace–Lorraine obtained a derogated status in laicity rules, called the Concordat.
The Concordat officially recognizes and funds four religions:34 Catholicism,
Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Judaism. Moreover, religion is mandatory for pupils
in primary and secondary public schools. While the Concordat was popular in dec-
ades past, only 48% of Alsatian were in favor of it in 2020. However, a large contin-
gent of Alsatian political actors continue to support and want to expand it to
include other religions, such as Islam and Buddhism.35

Table 1. Alsatian language evolution.

Yearsa 1900 1946 1997 2001 2012 2020
Alsatian speakers 95% 91% 63% 61% 43% 25%
(% of the population)
a
From 1900 to 2012, see ED Institut/OLCA. 2012.
Etude sur le dialecte alsacien; for 2020, see IFOP, Enqu^ete sur la ques-
tion r
egionale en Alsace (2020).
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 45

3. Rhenish culture as a European vocation: The idea of Alsatian culture as a hybrid

of German, French, and Rhenish (or Alemannic) cultures emerged before the
annexation in 1871, among artists like Daniel Ehrenfried Stoeber.36 During the
German annexation, the writer Ren
e Schickele and the painter Jean (Hans) Arp cre-
ated St€urmer (“vanguard”), an arts review, which aimed to develop “Alsatianness”
as distinct from German culture.37 This representation of Alsatianness, rooted in
Rhenish culture and hybridized with German and French, has been incorporated
into the symbolic universe38 of the local population. Indeed, the Alsatian population
sees Alsace as part of a Dreyeckland (“triangle land,” in Alemannic language), that
is, a junction region of the larger Dreil€andereck (“tri-border area,” in German) that
encompasses France, Germany, and Switzerland. The myth of Dreyeckland is an
integral part of the local narrative, providing a justification for the “European
vocation” of Alsace.

Alsatian particularism is a social construction that has evolved throughout history.

Nevertheless, each strand of nationalism—be it homeland nationalism, minority nation-
alism, or regionalism—has unanimously participated in constructing and advocating it.

The issues of the merger

Before the 2014 merger, most political actors from the center-left and center-right were
in consensus on the European vocation of Alsace and on particularism advocacy. New
regionalism refreshed the local culture and pushed forward autonomy claims to achieve
European integration on a local basis. The 2014 merger was the first contemporary con-
flict between France and Alsace, upsetting the local equilibrium and highlighting the
traumas and taboos from the past. For this reason, it is important to contextualize the
merger and describe its political and cultural issues.

The construction of a problem

In 2014, the Socialist government of François Hollande decided to merge French
regions, with the goal of rationalizing local expenditures and increasing the political
weight of those regions in the European area.39 These rational and performative argu-
ments found consensus among representatives from most of the affected regions. A first
draft of the plan to merge Alsace and Lorraine was approved by political actors in both
regions, on the recognition of their common history and similar culture. But a second
draft—which now added Champagne-Ardenne to the initial project—faced a strong
contestation, especially from the Alsatian representatives.
Their criticism cannot be reduced to a classic left–right cleavage. Political actors from
both the left and right criticized the incoherence of this future “big” region—now called
Grand-Est—because it is composed by culturally, economically, and socially different
territories. The local left was split. On the one hand, part of the local left supported the
merger because of its political bonds with national parties. Moreover, the merger could
decrease the hegemony of the right in Alsace, diluting its influence in a bigger region.
As left discourses reproduced the government’s rational and performative arguments,
46 E. B. SCHMITT

some pro-merger leaders on the left restated the accusations of disloyalty used by
Jacobinism in targeting particularism during the debates on the merger law. For
instance, Socialist member of the National Assembly (MNA) Philippe Bies blamed anti-
merger local representatives for dividing the nation:
The second consequence, more serious, more dramatic for Alsace, is that your attitude not
only awakened but continues to fuel an identity feeling. Some colleagues have rightly
referred to the demonstration of October 11, but they have forgotten a few details of which
I would like to remind you. The first is that La Marseillaise was whistled. [ … ] there were
no blue-white-red flags. There were only Rot un Wiss flags, the white and red flags of the
Alsatian autonomists from Unser Land, who are your main support today.40
However, new regionalism was popular among the Alsatian left, and some of its lead-
ers, such as the former Strasbourg mayor Roland Ries or the former MNA Armand
Jung, opposed the merger, based on their advocacy for Alsatian particularism. This
struggle, between anti- and pro-merger groups, played out in the right wing as well, but
only a small number of right-wing political actors supported the merger, mostly those
elected to the regional council. The majority of right-wing Alsatian MNAs, senators,
department councilors, and mayors were—and are—anti-merger.
It is interesting to observe the evolution of the arguments used by anti-merger leaders
on the left and the right. During the first months of 2014, most avoided mobilizing
identity arguments. Although a discourse on the merger as a threat to Alsatian particu-
larism appeared, political leaders avoided linking this discourse to identity. For example,
Charles Buttner, former president of the general council of the Haut-Rhin department,
warned Alsatians against the merger, stating:
[The Alsatian population] should know that it is a minefield for the Concordat, the Local
Law, special regimes, taxes … 41
Charles Buttner did not forget that the Alsatian language and culture are key compo-
nents of Alsatian particularism, but the discourse of new regionalism never placed the
Alsatian identity in opposition with the French one. That discourse is instead used by
minority nationalism.
While the new regionalists on the left and the right were against the merger, the
party Unser Land (“Our Land,” UL) and other stakeholders in Alsatian particularism in
the academic, cultural, and economic sectors led the protests. From 2014 to 2018, they
mobilized the Alsatian population with large-scale actions. Ten-thousand people demon-
strated in 2014 against the merger, responding to a call from UL and some cultural
associations, and continued to protest by the thousands in following months. Many
petitions, such as Alsace retrouve ta voix (“Alsace, find your voice”) in 2016, which had
more than 100,000 signatures, were transmitted to the central government. Opinion
leaders from all sectors of society were mobilized, speaking in the media daily against
the merger. Political associations like the Club perspectives alsaciennes (“Alsatian
Perspectives Club”) worked to legitimize self-determination claims, commissioning sur-
veys to assess the protests and anti-merger sentiment among the population. Cyber-
activism was another decisive factor in mobilizing and structuring the movement; it
also contributed to normalizing minority nationalism perspectives to a wider audience.42
With these initiatives and the media coverage, Alsatians were socialized to the minority
nationalism stances.
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 47

In the end, stakeholders in Alsatian particularism contributed to the problem, endow-

ing the merger with a strong identity trait. Local political actors reacted the same way
the population did in becoming socialized to the minority nationalism stances. The
result was a rejection of the merger by a majority of 84% in 2017 (IPSO/ICA),43 inde-
pendent of political ideology and social class, among other attributes.44 The success of
this mobilization can be explained as a direct response to preexisting political and cul-
tural issues.

The political issues

To analyze the political issues, it is important to describe the local political field in
Alsace and its relation to the national political field. According to Pierre Bourdieu’s def-
inition,45 a field combines a force and a struggle fields in which actors hold social posi-
tions. Insiders of the Alsatian political field are the actors from different parties who
lead it. Outsiders, meanwhile, are those who are involved but hold less advantageous
positions or are marginalized because of their stances. To avoid confusion, the Alsatian
political field discussed here is not restricted to a single authority, that is, the Region
Alsace. A political field is not a single institution, and the Alsatian political field
includes roughly every locally involved political actor. Thus, the political field in Alsace
is very similar to other French regions. French centralism has shaped it with the same
local authorities. Local representatives of national political parties compete in it, and,
naturally, most national issues also reverberate in the local field.
Despite these homologies, there are three differences that singularize the Alsatian pol-
itical field. First, there are local issues related to Alsatian particularism. For example,
because they are recognized and publicly funded, religions are more influential in
Alsace than in other regions, and debates related to laicity are less controversial.
Second, ethnoregionalist parties like Alsace d’Abord (“Alsace First,” AA) and Unser
Land run in elections. AA is a far-right ethnic nationalist party, and UL is a center-right
minority nationalist party. These ethnoregionalist parties have never ruled a local
authority such as a major city, departmental council, or regional council. However, in
2015, UL achieved its highest results, with 11% of the vote, becoming the third-stron-
gest political party in Alsace (Figure 2).
Third, Europe plays an important role in the local political field. Before the merger,
Alsace was the only region in France authorized to manage European funds because of

12.00% 11.10%
10.00% 9.42%

8.00%
6.16%
6.00% 4.98%
4.00%
2.00% 1.08%
0.00%
1992 1998 2004 2010 2015
Figure 2. The electoral results of Alsatian ethnoregionalist parties (1992–2015). Based on the results
during the regional elections from parties self-designated as autonomist or regionalist.
48 E. B. SCHMITT

its “regional specificities” recognized by the state.46 In fact, the European vocation of
Alsace is mobilized by political actors for autonomy claims.
These three differences create consensus in the Alsatian political field. According to
Serge Moscovici and Willem Doise, a consensus is more than an agreement: it is “the
confluence of individuals that mutually commits them regarding interests or ideas nour-
ishing their reciprocal trust.”47 This reciprocal trust enables actors to pursue decisions
beyond the disagreements that ordinary conflicts generate. Therefore, this consensus is
a political means to empowering local political actors and providing European legitim-
acy that suits the central state. Indeed, European integration does not contest the integ-
rity of the state and French nationhood hegemony. Hence, the consensus has a double
purpose. Internally, it serves to silence the self-determination claims that disturb the
central state. Externally, political actors are united to reach accommodations. In brief,
the purpose is to dampen the willingness for Alsatian autonomy to appease Paris.
However, reaching an Alsatian consensus requires space for Alsatian decision-making
on Europe, something the Grand-Est has confiscated.
Moreover, the new legitimacy of ethnoregionalist parties due to the mobilization
against the merger jeopardized the intercessor role—between local aspiration and
national injection—that new regionalism played. The proximity of the minority nation-
alism of ethnoregionalist parties to the new regionalism of the insiders has grown and
blended together from the central state’s standpoint. As tensions with the central state
increased and the popularity of minority nationalism grew, new regionalism replicated
nationalistic claims. Among dozens of similar speeches, the example of the Haut-Rhin
General Council’s press release shows the semantic shift:
the organization of a referendum allowing the Alsatian people to democratically give its
opinion on the creation of the Alsace-Lorraine-Champagne-Ardenne mega-region.48
Demanding that a people—and no longer a region—be able make decisions about its
faith is an explicit invocation of self-determination. Hence, from the perspective of new
regionalism, it was urgent to act in order to avoid a complete takeover of the polit-
ical field.

The cultural issues

Since the French Revolution, Jacobinism has created a dichotomy between the French
nation, conceived as modern and universal, and regional cultures, perceived as archaic
and particularistic. Hence, French culture has been constructed as “high culture”
whereas regional cultures have been reduced to folklore. According to Ernest Gellner,49
the national narrative makes this distinction to delegitimize self-determination claims.
In this context, new regionalism contributed to the changing self-representations of
Alsace through two processes: the modernization of local culture and the transnationali-
zation of identity.
The first step in the modernization of Alsatian culture was reconciliation with the
past. To distinguish the whole Alsatian population from Nazi collaborators during the
Second World War, it was important to rehabilitate the Malgr
e-nous. While they
received official status as war veterans in 1973, they were not compensated until 1981.
Recently, however, France has recognized them as victims of Nazism: in 2005, an
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 49

official memorial was erected, and in 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy made an
official statement that the Malgr
e-nous did not betray the nation. The official act recog-
nizing them as victims of Nazism was enacted in 2013.
The second step was to de-folklorize Alsatian culture. According to Pierre Bourdieu
and Luc Boltanski, when a culture is reduced to folklore, it “recognizes its own
decline.”50 To prevent the decline of Alsatian culture, in 1994, local authorities estab-
lished a public agency to promote Alsatian language and culture, the Office de la langue
et des cultures d’Alsace (“Office for the Language and the Cultures of Alsace,” OLCA).
The OLCA funds cultural and language associations and organizes events to stimulate
local culture, emphasizing its pluralistic aspects. The OLCA promotes a narrative of
Alsatian culture’s modernity by using digital tools such as dematerialized resources,
smartphone applications, social media, and websites.
The transnationalization of identity aims to redefine the perimeter of Alsatianness, as
distinct from German identity and beyond the hegemony of French nationhood.
The transnationalization of identity is a process by which social actors consciously de-
territorialize and renegotiate their mutual understanding of collective identity.51 As
John Clammer claims, transnationalization depends on “a huge number of cross-border
cultural transactions,”52 which are facilitated by local representations and institutions
such as the two European regions—the Trinational Metropolitan Region of the Upper
Rhine and the Regio TriRhena—and the four eurodistricts but also everyday practices
such as working in another country (of the 72,000 cross-border workers, representing
12% of Alsatian workers)53 or shopping. The normalization of German culture,54 begun
in the 1970s, the involvement of Germany in European integration, and the special rela-
tionship between France and Germany—forming the “Franco-German couple”—enabled
local political actors to develop a narrative around a hybrid culture and a European
vocation, renewing the myth of Dreyeckland. As Paul Smith notes, the European voca-
tion narrative emerged after the First World War, when the local elite proposed making
Alsace an autonomous territory under the control of the League of Nations to avoid
future conflicts between France and Germany.55 This vocation was and still is related to
an autonomy claim. More recently, in 2008, the former mayor of Strasbourg, Roland
Ries, asked that the Strasbourg-Ortenau Eurodistrict be “a European territory beyond
states.”56 New regionalists adapted past propositions to a new context of the
Europeanization of local government, “an accelerated process and a set of effects that
are redefining forms and identification with territory and people.”57 In Alsace,
Europeanization is highly institutionalized, as the region holds the seats of several
European institutions and institutions of transnational cooperation as well as a network
of academic, cultural, economic, and political associations dedicated to Europe and local
media coverage of European stakes. The former mayor of Strasbourg (1959–83) and for-
mer president of European parliament (1984–87) Pierre Pflimlin said in the Alsatian
language: “Ich bin Europ€aer, weil ich Els€asser bin” (“I am European because I am
Alsatian”), which perfectly illustrates the congruence of Alsatianness and Europeanness.
In disrupting these processes of modernization and transnationalization, the merger
was perceived as a threat to Alsatian culture. Local political actors decried the
“dissolution of Alsatian culture,” noting that Alsace would be minorized in the larger
region. As it was, the merger was conceived by central state to create a coherent region
50 E. B. SCHMITT

with equivalent populations: Alsace (1.9 million as of 2014), Lorraine (2.4 million), and
Champagne-Ardenne (1.4 million). They argued that Lorraine and Champagne-Ardenne
wanted to reduce funding for local particularism and Europe because they do not share
that history, culture, and European vocation.58

Alsatian nationalism at the crossroads

These issues show the magnitude of the merger and explain the reasons behind the
mobilization. From 2014 to 2019, the mobilization was led by multiple actors, using
numerous action repertoires such as mass demonstrations, petitions, and acts of civil
disobedience. It also generated socialization, gathering people from different sectors of
society, different ideologies, and both outsiders and insiders in the Alsatian political
field. Additionally, this socialization through struggle with the central state created an
experience that changed the representations of France and the collective entity. In other
words, the anti-merger movement unified the social base and stimulated ideological and
strategic changes. Two trends emerged: cosmopolitan autonomism and a new national-
ism, putting Alsatian nationalism at the crossroads (Table 2).

The anti-merger mobilization as a milestone: from new regionalism to

cosmopolitan autonomism
The new regionalism reintegrated many claims from autonomism, but the autonomy
claims and the self-representation of Alsace as a Heimat were prohibited. However, the
anti-merger mobilization broke taboos and led to ideological changes. Obviously, this
new regionalism persists in the Alsatian political field, and it would be premature to say
that it is no longer effective. Nonetheless, most insiders in the local political scene have
turned to cosmopolitan autonomism. For example, an initiative for a new Alsatian local
authority with extensive autonomy was supported by Fr
ed
eric Bierry and Brigitte
Klinkert, presidents of the departmental councils of Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, respect-
ively. They are typical Alsatian politicians from a center-right background, who began
their careers as political staffers. Both were newly elected when the anti-merger mobil-
ization began: Bierry in 2015, Klinkert in 2017. Like many local political actors, they
subscribed to the moderated expression of new regionalism from before the merger.

Table 2. Political agenda of minority nationalism and regionalism currents.

Minority nationalism Regionalism
Cosmopolitan
Autonomism New nationalism New regionalism autonomism
Nationalistic Alsace as a Heimat, meaning a nation Alsace as a Heimat, Transnational identity
perspective meaning a
homeland (France
is the nation)
Autonomy claim Partial autonomy Full autonomy and European autonomy Partial autonomy
(special status) right to decide (special status)
Political sphere Outsider actors in Outsider actors in Insider actors from national social-democrat
ethnoregionalist ethnoregionalist parties to national conservative parties
centrist parties centrist
(UL) and far-right parties (UL)
parties (AA)
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 51

However, anti-merger mobilization changed their repertoire of actions and, more sig-
nificantly, their ideological scope.
Before the merger, the defense of Alsatian particularism and the European vocation of
Alsace resulted in discreet negotiations between local authorities and the state, always avoid-
ing open confrontation and the involvement of locals. Risking the state’s disdain, because
the mobilization radicalized them, Bierry and Klinkert broke with the traditional negotiation
style, instead publicizing their claims and involving the population in promoting their views.
A perfect example is the statement called “To a euro-collectivity of Alsace” made in 2018,
whereby 17,000 people expressed their opinions on the future of Alsace and elaborated on
political proposals. This kind of popular pressure was reproduced in 2021, when Bierry
launched an online consultation for the future of Alsace, where 92.4% of the participants
voted “Yes” to the question, “Should Alsace leave the Grand-Est to become a region
again?”59 While the consultation had no legal effect, it lobbied the central state. This change
in repertoires of action is consistent with a strategy of cosmopolitan autonomism that alter-
nates between confrontation and cooperation with the central state.
Concerning the ideological turn, the statement “To a euro-collectivity of Alsace”
reproduced the perspective of the new regionalism of Alsatianness, underlining the
“Rhineland anchoring of Alsace”60 and presenting Alsace as a “multilingual region.”61
Hence, this cosmopolitan autonomism is similar to the cosmopolitan localism theorized
by Luis Moreno.62 In fact, the cosmopolitan autonomism diverges from the new region-
alism on a single issue—self-determination. Promoters of cosmopolitan autonomism
developed the idea of an Alsatian autonomy, but not the same as UL and supporters of
new nationalism. The former conceived an autonomy conceptually related to cosmopol-
itanism. According to David Held, cosmopolitanism sees sovereignty
( … ) as the networked realms of public authority shaped and delimited by an overarching
cosmopolitan legal framework. In this model bounded political communities lose their role
as the sole center of legitimate political power. Democratic politics and decision-making
are thought of as part of a wider framework of political interaction in which legitimate
decision-making is conducted in different loci of power within and outside the
nation-state.63
Cosmopolitan autonomism changes the decision-making process by reinforcing the
principle of subsidiarity. Although subsidiarity is a constitutional principle in France, it
is severely limited by a law that forbids local agreements between local government that
reorganize the sharing or transferring of competences.64 Cosmopolitan autonomism
aims to expand the application of the principle in terms of local autonomy. In the state-
ment “To a euro-collectivity of Alsace,” Bierry and Klinkert proposed sharing compe-
tences with the Grand-Est, turning Alsace into “a partner and leader collectivity, driving
by a willingness to use the principle of subsidiarity.”65 In another example from the
2021 regional election, Klinkert proposed to reorganize the Grand-Est as a regional fed-
eration based on subsidiarity.66 After his election as president of the Collectivit
e euro-
p
eenne d’Alsace (“European Collectivity of Alsace,” CEA), Bierry proposed to rule
Alsace with referenda as is done in Switzerland, arguing that direct democracy repre-
sents the other side of subsidiarity.67
By 2018, the President Emmanuel Macron (center-right) had partially responded to
requests for cosmopolitan autonomism. France recognized Alsatian particularism
52 E. B. SCHMITT

according to the narrative of cosmopolitan autonomism, as the Prime Minister Edouard
Philippe’s discourse reflected:
Alsatians have strongly expressed their willingness to embody their specificity in a new
institution. The signatories [of the common declaration] intend to make substantial this
“desire for Alsace.” The cradle of European integration, Alsace is an open and attractive
territory, a link between France and Germany. The affirmation of its Rhenish roots within
the Grand Est region is a reality that should be understood and fully exploited.68
A new local authority for Alsace was established in 2021: the CEA, which reproduced
the proposition of cosmopolitan autonomism. The CEA merged the departments of
Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin, and the state granted it dedicated competences such as bilin-
gualism, transnational cooperation, tourism, and transport. In France, there is no hier-
archical relationship between local governments, but—and because the CEA and the
Grand-Est Region shared some dedicated competencies—their relations are based on
the subsidiarity principle.
Hence, while past expressions of regionalism contributed to drastically changing
Alsatian culture into a transnational one, cosmopolitan autonomism caused the cultural
community to overlap with the political one. Cosmopolitan autonomism is now hege-
monic in the local political field.

The end of a taboo: New Alsatian nationalism

The CEA, however, is not a success, according to local political actors; Alsace is still
part of the Grand-Est, and Alsatians continue to reject the merger (see Figure 3). In
fact, the anti-merger mobilization was not merely a political conflict but rather a strug-
gle for the recognition of Alsace. As Axel Honneth explains, a struggle for recognition
begins with the feeling of disrespect entailed by a violation of the collective body, denial
of the group’s rights, and denigration of its way of life.69 The loss of Alsace’s integrity
was perceived as a threat to its collective identity. Therefore, as long as Alsace continues
to be integrated in the Grand-Est without genuine autonomy, its demands will not van-
ish. While cosmopolitan autonomism perceives the CEA as a first step toward recogniz-
ing an autonomous status for Alsace, it is not enough for the new nationalism.

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2017 2018 2020 2021 2022
Figure 3. Anti-merger sentiment in Alsace (2017–22).
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 53

“New nationalism” was theorized by Michael Keating based on Catalan, Qu
eb
ecois,

and Scottish nationalism:
These are, of course, old nations and their nationalist movements go back at least to the
nineteenth century. Yet they had re-emerged in strength in the late twentieth century, with
some new features. They tended, with some exceptions, to be inclusive rather than
ethnically exclusive, committed to a civic nationalism based on common values and
culture, and open to newcomers. They had fully embraced free trade and transnational
integration through the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union;
and they were committed to forms of self-determination different from statehood in its
classic sense.70
Compared with cosmopolitan autonomism, which is more a political culture71 shared
by the insiders of the Alsatian political field, new nationalism is an ideology shaped by
different actors in the academic, cultural, and political fields, but monopolized by one
party: Unser Land. UL can be categorized as an ethnocultural party. Like Junts per
Catalunya (JxCat), the Parti Qu
eb
ecois (PQ), and the Scottish National Party (SNP), UL
is a centrist catch-all party, with a strong commitment to diversity and European inte-
gration. In a nutshell, UL is not a radical movement, but it has radically targeted
Alsatian taboos.
New nationalism has renewed the language of nationhood. While cosmopolitan
autonomism conceives Heimat as part of a transnational identity, UL’s new nationalism
defines Alsace explicitly as a civic nation:
Alsace is a nation, that is, a human community aware of being united by a historic,
cultural, and linguistic identity, and expressing the will to live together. On this basis,
an Alsatian is everyone who recognizes himself or herself in the historic, cultural, and
linguistic identity of Alsace, whatever his or her origin.72
In another breach of taboo, UL claims the right to self-determination with the same
meaning as the right to decide73 present in Catalan nationalism. However, UL is not a
secessionist party, claiming only full autonomy:
We claim a genuine local and participatory democracy such as that of our neighbors in
Europe. This democracy will be organized into a parliament of Alsace, with our own
government and administration. Our Local Law will be extended and completed with a
genuine constitution. [ … ] This evolution will occur within the French framework. In the
end, Alsace will have a European status that allows it to play its role in the Rhineland.74
This autonomy would come in the form of home rule with devolved powers, endow-
ing Alsace with a local constitution and its own parliament. Moreover, UL explicitly
demands European status for Alsace. European status means to empower Alsace and to
emancipate it from the central state hegemony. This is not exactly secessionism, which
can be defined as the “demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority
by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status”75 or
a step toward joining a host state, but full autonomy from the central state.
This breach of taboo can be explained by sociological changes and by an evolution of
the feeling of loyalty among the Alsatian population. Memories of the First and Second
World Wars are vanishing with generational change, and the local population is becom-
ing more Europeanized and more ethnoculturally diverse.76 The European legitimacy
acquired by transnational cooperation and Europeanist sentiment have allowed
Alsatians to self-represent as members of a minority nation without opposing their
54 E. B. SCHMITT

loyalty toward France. As Luis Moreno has demonstrated for Scotland and Catalonia,77
Alsatian nationhood is dual, but not duel in this renewed Alsatian nationalism.
Cosmopolitan autonomism and new autonomism compete to define the future of
Alsatian nationalism. Although new nationalism has a civic and dual definition for the
nation and never claims secession from France, it continues to be marginalized on the
local political field. The Alsatian political field is now structured the same way as it was
in the past: new nationalism is the ideology of outsiders, and cosmopolitan autonomism
is the political culture of insiders, as autonomism and new regionalism were before the
merger. Thus, the groups have not changed, but they have new resources and a new
legitimacy due to the anti-merger mobilization, and they have evolved in their represen-
tations and practices due to their conflictual experiences with the central state.
With the negotiations over the creation of the CEA in 2019, cosmopolitan autonom-
ism tried—and failed—to ban new nationalism from the political field in order to keep
its relationship with the central state balanced. Because insiders know that promoters of
new nationalism need conflict with France to spread their ideology and increase their
symbolic resources, they are tempted to cooperate with the central state to reduce its
influence. Anti-merger mobilization, however, has legitimated cosmopolitan autonom-
ism, and the same insiders need to keep pressure on the central state to achieve genuine
autonomy to remain this legitimacy; the next stage would then be Alsace’s splitting
from the Grand-Est. As Rogers Brubaker explains:
A national minority [ … ] is a field of struggle in a double sense. It is [ … ] a struggle to
impose and sustain a certain kind of stance vis-a-vis the state; but at the same time, it is a
struggle to impose and sustain a certain vision of the host state, namely as a nationalizing
or nationally oppressive state. The two struggles are inseparable: one can impose and
sustain a stance as a mobilized national minority, with its demands for recognition and for
rights, only by imposing and sustaining a vision of the host state as a nationalizing or
nationally oppressive state.78
Because of the delicate equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal forces, cosmo-
politan autonomism fights new regionalism with its own claims. While anti-merger feel-
ing decreased after the announcement of the CEA in 2019, it remained high. The
political opportunity of the 2022 presidential election has motivated Fr
ed
eric Bierry to
officially call for the splitting of Alsace from the Grand-Est, increasing anti-merger sen-
timent without upsetting the central state.
Conversely, new nationalism must now break the last taboo: Alsatian independence.
As 18% of the Alsatian population is pro-independence,79 the question has appeared in
many discourses implicitly. Comparing Alsace with Corsica, UL released an official
statement that reflects, in its last sentences, a new radicality:
This situation should make us ask ourselves: should we riot to be heard and have our
rights recognized? [ … ] Alsatians wishing for a change therefore have the choice: to make
Molotov cocktails, or a regionalist bulletin at the ballot box.80
While 18% is high in the Alsatian context, it is low compared to the secessionist feel-
ing in Corsica, where 32% of the population supports independence.81 This figure also
comes out from the first time in contemporary Alsatian history that the question was
asked explicitly. It shows a change in political culture and also explains why UL remains
cautious, avoiding referring to independence as an official claim. Independence is
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 55

currently only used for the purpose of radicalizing the stance, to compete against
cosmopolitan autonomism.
Rather than endorsing independence, UL follows the path taken by autonomist par-
ties in Corsica, which shares a cultural nationalism with secessionist parties but aspires
to a nonviolent solution within France. In other words, new nationalism in Alsace is
becoming another French peripheral nationalism, as in Corsica.82

Conclusion
The anti-merger mobilization is probably the longest political conflict between Alsace
and France since the Second World War. Although the announcement of the CEA in
2019 recognized Alsatian particularism and pacified the situation, the issue remains
unresolved. The renewal of nationalism is the consequence of three complementary phe-
nomena. First, European activism in the political field in Alsace has reinforced the
empowerment of local political actors to find legitimacy beyond the state. European
integration has created a symbolic and material autonomy. Second, old taboos are pro-
gressively vanishing, while the desire to preserve local institutions endures and the
need to adapt Alsatian culture to contemporary issues emerges. Third, the anti-merger
mobilization has socialized the population to political issues. While the anti-merger
mobilization was a turning point, it is also only a stage in the very long process of
nation-building. However, the Alsatian particularism advocacy movement is now split
into two trends: a cosmopolitan autonomism and a new nationalism. These trends can
be seen as the result of power relations in the local political field. In the end, they share
a cultural nationalism, yet they disagree in their definitions of autonomy. This study
makes a relevant case for further comparative studies, especially on the transnationaliza-
tion and Europeanization of local identity, as Scotland and Catalonia have experimented
with in very different contexts.

Notes
1. There are many interesting works on Alsatian history, including the following books: Philip
C. F. Bankwitz, Alsatian Autonomist Leaders: 1919–1947 (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press
of Kansas, 1978); Alison Carrol, The Return of Alsace to France, 1918–1939 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018); Christopher Fischer, Alsace to Alsatians: Visions and Divisions of
Alsatian Regionalism, 1870–1939 (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2011); Karl-Heinz
Rothenberger, Die elsaß-lothringische Heimat und Autonomiebewegung zwischen den beiden
Weltkriegen (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1975); Alfred Wahl and Jean-Claude Richez, L’Alsace
entre France et Allemagne. 1850–1950 (Paris: Hachette, 1994).
2. By methodological Jacobinism, I mean the trend of certain scholars to reproduce Jacobinist
biases on minority nations. This notion is based on the concept of methodological
nationalism, that is, “the naturalization of nation-state by social science”; see Andreas
Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the
Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology,” Transnational Migration:
International Perspectives 37, no. 3 (2003): 576.
3. Alison Carroll, “Les historiens anglophones et l’Alsace : une fascination durable,” Revue
d’Alsace 138 (2012): 281.
4. With a non-restrictive definition of the public discourse; see Norman Fairclough, Analysing
Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: Routledge, 2003), 2–3. My corpus
56 E. B. SCHMITT

is mainly composed of allocations, electoral platforms, transcripts of conversations, debates,

interviews, articles, reports, website pages, social network posts, and so on.
5. Reiner Keller, Doing Discourse Research. An Introduction for Social Scientists (London: Sage
Publications, 2013), 62.
6. Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?,” Political Studies 46, no. 4
(1998): 750.
7. Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 21.
8. Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and Conflict Resolution:
Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in Divided Societies (London: Routledge,
2005), 11.
9. Fischer, Alsace to Alsatians, 21.
10. Paul Smith, “A  la recherche d’une identit
e nationale en Alsace (1870–1918),” Vingtieme
Siecle. Revue d’Histoire 50 (1996): 28.
11. Quoted in Christian Baechler, “L’autonomisme entre l’entre-deux-guerres,” Les saisons
d’Alsace 65 (2015): 79.
12. Fischer, Alsace to Alsatians, 8.
13. Romain Pasquier, Le pouvoir r
egional. Mobilisations, d
ecentralisation et gouvernance en
France (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012), 94.
14. Michael Keating, “Is There a Regional Level of Government in Europe?,” in Regions in
Europe, edited by Patrick Le Gales and Christian Lequesne (New York, NY: Routledge,
1998), 16–18.
15. Eve Hepburn, New Challenges for Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (London:
Routledge, 2016).
16. Ferdinand M€ uller-Rommel, “Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe. Theoretical
Considerations and Framework of Analysis,” in Regionalist Parties in Western Europe,
edited by Lieven De Winter and Huri T€ ursan (London: Routledge, 1998), 19.
17. Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 4.
18. Celia Appelgate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley and Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
19. Daniel-Louis Seiler, “Peripheral Nationalism Between Pluralism and Monism,” International
Political Science Review 10, no. 3 (1989): 191–207.
20. Wahl and Richez, L’Alsace entre France et Allemagne, 254–255.
21. Liliane M. Vassberg, “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Language Choice: The Effect of Nazi
Assimilationist Policies in Alsace, 1940–1945,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 3
(1994): 496–516.
22. Elizabeth Vlossak, “Traitors, Heroes, Martyrs, Victims? Veterans of Nazi ‘Forced
Conscription’ from Alsace and Moselle,” in Rewriting German History, edited by Jan R€ uger
and Nikolaus Wachsmann (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
23. Bernard Vogler, Nouvelle histoire de l’Alsace. Une r
egion au coeur de l’Europe (Toulouse:


Editions Privat, 2003), 267.
24. CSA, Les Alsaciens et leur R
egion (2017), 5.
25. Eric Taylor Woods, “Cultural Nationalism,” in The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Sociology,
edited by David Inglis and Anna-Maria Almia (London: Sage Publications, 2016), 430.
26. Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2004), 145.
27. Emphasis in the original; ibid., 44.
28. Liliane M. Vassberg, Alsatian Acts of Identity. Language Use and Language Attitude in
Alsace (Philadelphia, PA: Multilingual Matters, 1993).
29. Marie-No€elle Denis, “Le dialecte alsacien :
etat des lieux,” Ethnologie française 33, no. 3
(2003), 363–4.
30. CSA, Les Alsaciens et leur R
egion (CSA Research, 2017), 17–18.
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 57

31. Dominique Huck and Erhart Pascale, “Das Elsass,” in Handbuch des Deutschen in West-
und Mitteleuropa: Sprachminderheiten und Mehrsprachigkeitskonstellationen, edited by Rahel
Bayer and Albert Plewnia (T€ ubingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2019), 155–92.
32. H. Patrick Glenn, “The Local Law of Alsace-Lorraine: A Half-Century of Survival,”
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 73 (1974): 769–90.
33. CSA, Les Alsaciens et leur R
egion, 5.
34. Jean-Marie Woehrling, “La diversit
e territoriale des r
egimes français de financement public
des cultes,” Revue du droit des religions 1 (2016): 67–84.
35. François Vignal, “Concordat en Alsace-Moselle : faut-il le supprimer ?,” Public S
enat (2021),
https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/concordat-en-alsace-moselle-faut-il-le-
supprimer-188539 (Accessed 20 September 2022).
36. Eve Cerf, “Identit
e et culture des minorit
es. L’Alsace de 1830 a 1980,” Revue des sciences
sociales 9 (1980): 35–47.
37. Detmar Klein, “Folklore as Weapon: National Identity in German-Annexed Alsace,
1890–1914,” in Folklore and Nationalism in Europe During the Long Nineteenth Century,
edited by Timothy Baycroft and David Hopkin (Boston: Brill, 2012), 178.
38. Symbolic universes “are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of
meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality”; Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of
Knowledge (New York: Penguin Books, 1991[1966]).
39. Etienne Schmitt, “La cr
eation d’une Collectivit
e europ
eenne d’Alsace : Une mesure de
compensation apres la fusion des r
egions,” in Emmanuel Macron et les r
eformes territoriale:
Finances et institutions, edited by Patrick LeLidec (Paris: Berger Levrault, 2021), 176–8.
40. Assembl
ee nationale, “Compte rendu int
egral. Deuxieme s
eance du vendredi 14 novembre
2014” http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cri/2014-2015/20150062.asp (Accessed 20
September 2022).
41. Quoted in Franck Buchy, “Le tocsin et le r
ef
erendum,” Dernieres Nouvelles d’Alsace (2014),
https://www.dna.fr/politique/2014/12/15/le-tocsin-et-le-referendum (Accessed 20
September 2022).
42. Robert A. Saunders, Ethnopolitics in Cyberspace: The Internet, Minority Nationalism, and the
Web of Identity (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2011), 58.
43. IFOP/ICA, Enqu^ete aupres de la population alsacienne (2017).
44. Yolande Baldeweck, “Les Alsaciens rejettent la fusion,” L’Alsace (2015), https://www.lalsace.
fr/actualite/2015/10/24/les-alsaciens-rejettent-la-fusion (Accessed 20 September 2022).
45. To reach a comprehensive definition of field theory, see Pierre Bourdieu, Propos sur le
champ politique (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000).
46. S
enat, “Rapport sur le projet de loi relatif a l’exp
erimentation du transfert de la gestion des
fonds structurels europ
eens,” Rapport 161 (2007): 37.
47. Serge Moscovici and Willem Doise, Dissensions et Consensus (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1992), 19.
48. Quoted in Baptiste Cogitore, “Les conseillers g
en
eraux du Haut-Rhin r
eclament un
r
ef
erendum sur la nouvelle r
egion,” France 3 Alsace (2014), https://france3-regions.
francetvinfo.fr/grand-est/2014/12/18/les-conseillers-generaux-du-haut-rhin-reclament-un-
referendum-sur-la-nouvelle-region-616216.html (Accessed 20 September 2022).
49. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983), 34–38.
50. Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski, “Le f
etichisme de la langue,” Actes de la recherche en
sciences sociales 1, no. 4 (1975): 13.
51. David B. Willis, “Transnational Culture and the Role of Language: An International School
and its Community,” The Journal of General Education 41 (1992): 73–95.
52. John Clammer, Cultural Rights and Justice (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 73.
53. ARP, Note sur le Travail en Alsace. Le travail frontalier en Alsace, https://www.apr-
strasbourg.org/downloaddocument/41822/le-travail-frontalier-selon-les-territoires-alsaciens.
pdf (Accessed 20 September 2022).
58 E. B. SCHMITT

54. Stuart Taberner and Paul Cooke, eds., German Culture, Politics, and Literature into the
Twenty-First Century: Beyond Normalization (Suffolk: Camden House, 2006).
55. Ernest Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity,” October 61
(1992): 83–90; Immanuel Wallerstein, European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (New
York, NY: The New Press, 2006).
56. Quoted in Vincent Lebrou and L
ena Morel, “L’Europe bat la campagne a Strasbourg,” Caf
e
Babel (2008), https://cafebabel.com/fr/article/leurope-bat-la-campagne-a-strasbourg-5ae0051
6f723b35a145dcfb9/ (Accessed 20 September 2022).
57. John Borneman and Nick Fowler, “Europeanization,” Annual Review of Anthropology 26
(1997): 488.
58. Quoted in Jacques Fortier, “L’« Appel des cents » pour une r
egion Alsace,” Les Dernieres
Nouvelles d’Alsace (2017), https://www.dna.fr/politique/2017/09/27/pour-une-region-alsace
(Accessed 20 September 2022).
59. According to official results, the number of voters was 168,456 for 153,844 valid ballots. In
sum, 9% of Alsatian population (or 12% of Alsatian population with voting rights)
participated in this consultation.
60. Fr
ed
eric Bierry and Brigitte Klinkert, Vers une Eurocollectivit
e d’Alsace: Contribution des
ex
ecutifs d
epartementaux du Bas-Rhin et du Haut-Rhin consolid
ee des propositions des
Alsaciens (Strasbourg/Colmar: L’Alsace en commun, 2018), 3.
61. ibid., 5.
62. Luis Moreno, “Local and Global: Mesogovernments and Territorial Identities,” Nationalism
and Ethnic Politics 5, no. 3–4 (1999): 61–75.
63. David Held, Cosmopolitism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 19.
64. Marc Thoumelou, Collectivit
es territoriales:. Quel avenir ? (Paris: La Documentation
Française, 2016), 41–44.
65. Bierry, Fr
ed
eric and, Klinkert, Brigitte. 2018. Vers une Eurocollectivit
e d’Alsace, 8.
66. Brigitte Klinkert, Twitter Post, 30 April 2021, 11:49 AM, https://twitter.com/KlinkertBrigitt/
status/1388158536102912001?s (Accessed 20 September 2022).
67. Vincent Ballester and Flavien Gagnepain, “Alsace : Fr
ed
eric Bierry lance une consultation
citoyenne sur la sortie du Grand Est,” France 3 Grand Est (2021), https://france3-regions.
francetvinfo.fr/grand-est/alsace/alsace-frederic-bierry-lance-une-consultation-citoyenne-sur-
la-sortie-du-grand-est-2386606.html (Accessed 20 September 2022).
68. R
epublique française, D
eclaration commune en faveur de la cr
eation de la collectivit
e
europ
eenne d’Alsace (2018), 1.
69. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: A Moral Grammar for Social Conflicts
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1995), 131–9.
70. Keating, Plurinational Democracy, iv.
71. Lucien Pye, “Political Culture Revisited,” Political Psychology 12, no. 3 (1991): 487–508.
72. Unser Land, “Principes,” Unser Land, https://www.unserland.org/page/761795-principe-
grundsaetze (Accessed 20 September 2022).
73. Kathryn Crameri, “Do Catalans Have ‘the Right to Decide’? Secession, Legitimacy, and
Democracy in Twenty-First Century Europe,” Global Discourse 6, no. 3 (2015): 423–39.
74. Unser Land, “Principes.”
75. John R. Wood, “Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework,” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 14, no. 1 (1981): 110.
76. In 2004, almost 180,000 people were officially registered as immigrants in Alsace.
Immigrants comprise 10% of the Alsatian population, mainly from the EU and Switzerland
(41%), the Maghreb countries (22%), Turkey (16%), and sub-Saharan Africa (6%); INSEE,
“Les immigr
es en Alsace: 10% de la population,” Chiffres pour l’Alsace (2006).
77. Luis Moreno, “Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the ‘Moreno Question’,” Scottish
Affairs 51, no. 1 (2006): 1–21.
78. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 64.
79. CSA, Les Alsaciens et leur R
egion, 5.
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 59

80. Laurent Roth, “Communiqu
e de Presse. Autonomie pour la Corse : L’Alsace aussi,” Unser
Land (2022), https://www.unserland.org/articles/93563-communique-de-presse-autonomie-
pour-la-corse-l-alsace-aussi? (Accessed 20 September 2022).
81. IFOP, Les Français et la situation en Corse apres l’agression d’Yvan Colonna (2022), 11.
82. David S. Siroky, Sean Mueller, Andr
e Fazi, and Michael Hechter, “Containing Nationalism:
Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica,” Comparative Political Studies 54, no. 6
(2021): 1023–57.

Notes on contributor
Etienne B. Schmitt is an assistant professor in political science at Concordia University
(Montreal, Canada). His research focuses mainly on representations and ideologies of national
and ethnocultural minorities.

ORCID
Etienne B. Schmitt http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0269-7676