Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11

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Space Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepol

‘All u need is space’: Popularizing EU space policy

Iraklis Oikonomou
Independent Researcher, 6 Amphitritis Str., P. Faliro, 17561, Athens, Greece

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The development of EU space policy and its two main programmes, Galileo and Copernicus, has
Received 3 October 2016 necessitated a parallel process of legitimization of this policy. Popularization, defined as the simplifi-
Received in revised form cation of a policy in order to be made accessible to the masses and accepted by them, has been a core
1 February 2017
legitimising tool in the hands of the European Commission, with regular help from experts/industrialists,
Accepted 23 February 2017
or ‘organic intellectuals’. After establishing popularization conceptually, the analysis illustrates instances
Available online 6 March 2017
of both expert-based and non-expert-based popularization at the Brussels level. It concludes that the
process of popularization conceals the most controversial aspects of both Galileo and Copernicus while
Keywords:
EU space policy
also producing a ‘general interest’ that glues together a disparate set of social forces, in favour of EU space
Galileo programmes and their manufacturers - the European space industry.
Copernicus © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Popularization
European Commission

1. Introduction perspective. Then, it moves to the concrete analysis of specific

It has become a commonplace to suggest that the European
Union (EU) is a key actor in space, having developed its own space
policy, resources and programmes. The emergence of this policy,
however, has been a very complex and contradictory process, made
possible through the massive mobilisation of resources and a par-
allel creation of a specific ideational projection of EU space policy as
something beneficial for the Union, its security and its economy,
but also for the world as a whole. To put it simply, the production of
satellites for Galileo and Copernicus has, in the background, been
accompanied by the production of ideology - of a particular
depiction of space as an indispensable field where the EU ought to
activate in order to survive and prosper. Such a depiction is,
essentially, a form of popularization of space - or, as we shall argue,
popularization of EU space policy via space.
How and why has EU space policy been popularized by its
masterminds? What is, in other words, the function of populari-
zation in this specific context? What tools and narratives have been
utilized in order to achieve it? And what is the role of expert
opinion in promoting the popularization and legitimization of this
policy? The paper attempts to tackle these questions, first, by
delineating the theoretical background of the analysis, with special
emphasis on the notion of organic intellectuals and an under-
standing of public discourse inspired by Cox's critical-theoretical
E-mail address: iraklis.oikonomou@gmail.com.
discursive moments in the evolution of EU space policy, focusing on
expert reports and locating the scope and patterns of populariza-
tion involved there. At the same time, there are instances of
popularization that are not directly mediated by the invocation of
expert authority, such as EU-sponsored comics, competitions for
young people, etc. Such ‘moments’ are also illustrated in the pre-
sent paper, as the ‘menu’ of EU space policy popularization is broad
enough to fit both expert- and non-expert - based tools, addressing
a variety of audiences and purposes. Thus, the next section dis-
cusses three major illustrations of non-expert forms of populari-
zation, before turning to the analysis of the rationale of
popularization of EU space policy. Finally, a conclusion sums up the
findings of the analysis.
Empirically, the article focuses on the Galileo and Copernicus
programmes for a number of reasons. To begin with, they are the
two flagship projects of EU space policy; without them, EU
involvement in space would be merely a set of declaratory state-
ments without any substance. So, if one wishes to examine whether
popularization has been indeed an element of that policy, she has to
confront these two programmes unavoidably. Also, these two
projects have been ambitious, both technologically and financially,
and are characterised by an element of politico-military sensitivity
due to the non-civilian applications that both projects involve.
Therefore, if indeed popularization is ‘biased’ towards legitimiza-
tion, then its recurrence should be evident here. If not, then the
entire argument can be safely discarded.
Methodologically, the article is a case study of legitimization of

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2017.02.002
0265-9646/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
6 I. Oikonomou / Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11
an EU policy - EU space policy - via popularization, by utilising a
number of illustrations and by analyzing their discursive content
and purpose. It adopts a two-fold method: on the one hand, it
identifies a popularization potentiality (legitimacy) and then seeks
relevant empirical confirmation; on the other hand, it utilises the
empirical findings in order to add to the theoretical starting point
by expanding on the functions and role of popularization. Apart
from theory-related secondary bibliography, the analysis draws
upon a range of reports and other material intended for public use.
2. Theoretical considerations
The theoretical starting point of this essay is Robert Cox's [1]
conception of theory:
Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories
have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time
and space, specifically social and political time and space. (…)
There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself, divorced
from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so rep-
resents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology,
and to lay bare its concealed perspective.
Even though popularization is not theory, it involves the pro-
duction of simplified, ideational images of social reality. Indeed, in
the above excerpt one could replace the word ‘theory’ with the
word ‘popularization’, and have a delineation of the present anal-
ysis' main thesis: that the popularization of EU space policy is
something bigger than a set of seemingly neutral information
campaigns; it is a tool serving a purpose that is informed by the
interests of the ‘authors’ of popularization.
Popularization of a policy that concerns a field of science and
technology, such as space, is conceptually preceded by the popu-
larization of science. The latter has been given two interlinked
definitions, as ‘the spread of knowledge in science and technology
to the masses’ and as ‘the acquisition of new science and technol-
ogy for improving one's social and economic life’ [2], p. 30. Un-
doubtedly, the introduction and incorporation of science and
technology into the daily lives of the people is a task of tremendous
significance, as it can improve the quality of life, intellectual ca-
pacity, professional prospects and set of skills of the population. As
Albert Einstein said, ‘it is of great importance to give the great
public the opportunity to experience, consciously and intelligently,
the efforts and results of scientific research’ quoted in Ref. [3].
However, science and technology do not fall from the sky; they are
embedded in social relations of production and their development
is planned, organised and funded by industrial actors whose pri-
mary motive is the maximisation of profitability, in conjunction
with public, national and supranational agencies. So, the popular-
ization of, say, satellite navigation or earth observation cannot be
artificially isolated from the producers and the subsidizers of the
satellite systems that make these space-based applications happen.
It ceases, in other words, to be merely popularization of science or
technology; it becomes popularization of scientific or technological
policy. And this is why the mainstream definition of popularization
needs to be expanded in order to take into account the institu-
tionalised policies in charge of supporting the development of
science and technology.
Consequently, in the context of EU space policy, popularization
is the process through which a policy outcome is simplified and
made accessible so that it attracts public visibility and acceptance;
in other words, it is a process of transformation of a complex set of
social relations and interests into a coherent, easily understandable
and approachable message favouring these interests. Legitimiza-
tion, in parallel is the process through which a policy outcome is
considered right and necessary, thereby creating a sense of urgency,
and silencing any potential critique. The two terms are interrelated,
yet they must be conceptually separated: popularization produces
legitimization, while legitimization is not a prerequisite of popu-
larization. Put simply, popularization is a means and legitimization
is an end. The two processes are profoundly politicized, not only in
the sense that they produce ethical-political outcomes - notions of
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ over an EU policy and the EU as such - but also in
the sense that they are themselves produced by political actors
aimed at securing political outcomes. What is at stake here is ide-
ology and the formation of the collective consciousness of the Eu-
ropean citizens, an ideational outcome of mechanisms that are very
material in nature. Or as Kostas Gavroglu [4], p. 226 contends,
‘scientific popularization and the various forms of knowledge in
circulation are involved in the processes of continuous rear-
ticulations of the dominant or hegemonic ideology’.
The popularization and legitimization of EU space policy has
been marked by the role of experts, as has indeed been the case
with European public policy-making per se [5]. This is due, pri-
marily, to the very active engagement of the European Commission
with scientific, industrial, military and other communities, in an
effort to set and promote the agenda - to pave the way for the
introduction and maintenance of its programmes by placing then
under a veil of technocratic urgency and scientific approval. Con-
trary to the idea of experts as socially neutral, scientifically driven
actors, it is hereby claimed that the experts active in the specific
context of the public-private bodies - term borrowed from Euro-
pean Commission [6], - that are organised by the European Com-
mission, act as organic intellectuals of the European military-
industrial capital and its sub-section, the European space in-
dustry. According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci,
organic intellectuals give a social class ‘homogeneity and an
awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in
the social and political fields’ [7], p. 5. In the Brussels policy context,
organic intellectuals often appear grouped together, as collective
organic intellectuals, in the form of think-tanks, panels of experts,
and other institutionalised mechanisms. Their task is the produc-
tion of a hegemonic set of ideas - in this case, the idea of the
development of EU space assets as an urgent task with immense
positive potential for the Union and its citizens - that sustains and
legitimises the Commission's initiatives.
The industrialist can also potentially be an organic intellectual,
and this is indeed a pattern foreseen by Gramsci himself: ‘If not all
entrepreneurs, at least an elite amongst them must have the ca-
pacity to be an organizer of society in general, including all its
complex organism of services, right up to the state organism,
because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the
expansion of their own class’ [7], p. 6. Industrialists themselves -
senior executives of arms/space companies - are regularly called
upon to put on the hat of the expert, presenting and assessing the
benefits of their products, with the output of their intellectual work
then utilized by the Commission as a proof of the value of its space
programmes. Conceptually, the industry does hold de facto an
expert status, as the producer of technological applications, satel-
lites etc. However, there is an evident conflict of interest when the
industry is invited to assess the utility of the very platform it pro-
duces or the policy objectives that underpin the production of this
platform. To that, one should ass the unbalanced composition of the
expert groups in favour of the industry and the relatively secret
modus operandi of these groups.
3. Panels, experts, reports
Expert groups have become a critical component of European
decision-making and legislation, at least at the consultative level,
 I. Oikonomou / Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11
with the European Commission turning increasingly to them in
search for outside expertise see Ref. [8] for a general overview;
Ref. [9] for a specific case. The composition of these panels has been
non-transparent, with industrial representation having a consis-
tently privileged status in them [5], p. 6. The field of space, in the
broader context of aerospace, is no exception to that rule, as dis-
played by the Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st century
(STAR 21), published in 2002. The report presented the findings of
the deliberations among the members of the European Advisory
Group on Aerospace, a panel tasked by the European Commission
to assess the European policy framework for aerospace and propose
improvements. The industrialists - seven in total, drawn from EADS,
BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, THALES, SNECMA and Rolls Royce -
were the largest group of the panel, followed by five Commis-
sioners (including the chair of the panel, Erkki Liikanen), two Par-
liamentarians, and Javier Solana [10], p. 4.
The STAR 21 report is the textbook case of a panel of experts'
output that served as a tool for popularization, with introductory
formulations such as ‘Galileo is a European satellite radio-
navigation programme based upon a constellation of 30 satellites
across the globe’ and ‘GMES1 is a European initiative launched in
1998 which will benefit from existing and planned satellite
research facilities to create an operational system for space-based
information’ [10], p. 34. An experts' report is supposed to go
beyond commonplace definitions; their inclusion is a demonstra-
tion of the simplification that goes hand-in-hand with populari-
zation. The rhetoric reiterates the ever-present logic of strategic
autonomy: GMES ‘should be developed rapidly to ensure that
Europe has an independent, autonomous and operational global
monitoring capability for policy needs relating to environment and
to security’ [10], p. 36.
The authors of the report seem to be fully aware of their own
role and the significance of the public's stance vis-a
-vis space
policy. Among the recommendations of the panel, one reads:
‘Adapt public support for maintaining a European independent and
competitive access to space’ and ‘Adapt public support to space
science and the development of its applications’ [10], p. 37. This is
the moment when the veil of ‘expertise’ is fully lifted, only to be
replaced by the reality of the expert as an actor of reproducing
consensus - as an element of a mechanism geared towards the
shaping of a specific public attitude and collective consciousness. It
is, in other words, a point of transition of the expert into a marketer.
The Report of the Panel of Experts on Space and Security (Spasec
Report) was issued in 2005, upon invitation of the European
Commission and, specifically, the then Enterprise Commissioner
Günter Verheugen. There, emphasis is laid on user communities or
‘communities of interest’, according to the terminology of the
report. Even though the text is addressed to these communities and
thus tackles the full complexity of their potential needs, elements
of popularization can be observed. One of the core recommenda-
tions of the report is ‘the need for raise [sic] awareness on capa-
bilities’, as ‘space, in some cases, could offer an interesting solutions
[sic] to many user groups’ [11], p. 42. A significant economic
dimension of popularization appears here - the race to generate
awareness on space-related assets is not limited to the general
public, to the citizens, etc. Its scope extends to the user commu-
nities because, often, while some organisations ‘have clearly
defined interests and understand well what role satellite services
can play in helping them to achieve their objectives’ [11], p. 18,
others are unable to see the linkage between their problems and
the solutions that pass through EU space engagement.
1
Prior to December 2012, Copernicus was known as GMES - Global Monitoring
for Environment and Security.
7
Thus, the authors of the report choose to specify in an overly
basic manner what Galileo is supposed to do in terms of security:
‘The Galileo signals will meet security needs during natural di-
sasters or crisis situations (…) It can also be used for a range of
operations whose boundaries are often difficult to determine ( …)’
[11], p. 34. And the same goes for the then GMES, which is praised
for having ‘a strong security element’ and for offering several
security-related services [11], p. 32. The military uses of Galileo and
Copernicus are, however, controversial, and the popularization that
is addressed to user communities such as policing authorities, se-
curity apparatuses and military forces cannot be assumed to have
the same orientation with the main body of popularization
addressed to the general public. There is an inherent tension be-
tween the two; while Spasec Report clearly included military forces
among the user communities of EU space programmes and
advertised the utility of these programmes for fulfilling military
needs, the general popularizing rhetoric over Copernicus and Gal-
ileo can be expected to conceal this military dimension and present
the two as purely civilian projects.
Security research has become a context for the promotion of the
need to develop space assets at the EU level. The European Security
Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was set up in 2007 on the
initiative of the European Commission, following the completion of
the work of the two previous public-private bodies in the field, the
Group of Personalities and the European Security Research Advi-
sory Board. In December 2009, ESRIF published its final report,
where a separate section is dedicated to the positions of the Fo-
rum's working group on space and situation awareness.
The report summarizes and reproduces the permanent mantra
of EU space policy: ‘Space assets and offered services are today
indispensable enablers for a wide spectrum of applications to
answer societal challenges in fields such as climate change and
environment, transport, development and competitiveness in
Europe and beyond’ [12], p. 166. To reach that conclusion, the
analysis follows the usual path: natural and man-made threats
necessitate surveillance and intelligence, rendering space assets
indispensable. Notably, the report recognises the controversial
nature of these activities, and thus emphasises the need to engage
the public in the direction of popularizing the security and space-
related policies and the respective assets; ‘the public needs to be
properly informed promoting debate on the policies and systems
through specific education and training actions and other forms of
long-term trust-building interactions for the citizen’ [12], p. 163).
This logic highlights one of the core purposes of popularization of
EU space policy: to prevent any societal reaction to the more
controversial aspects of this policy. However, there is more to that:
as Karl Marx said in his 3rd Thesis on Feuerbach, it is essential to
educate the educator himself. So, the report calls for the ‘devel-
opment of specific education and training programmes (…) for
decision makers, regulators and media’ [12], 163]. This is key -
popularization does not concern only the … clueless citizen but
also the individuals who are involved in policy-making. We will
return to this observation later; suffice it to say at this point that,
next to the marketing exercise where the producer/policy-maker
advertises the product to the consumer/citizen, another function
is discernible: the homogenisation of frames and perspectives
among policy-makers, especially in the user communities.
Another ambitious exercise in popularization is the report by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) on the socio-economic benefits of
Copernicus (GMES at the time), as tasked by ESA with the Com-
mission in a consultative role. The conclusion was that the eco-
nomic benefits of the programme ‘can be as high as V28 billion per
annum’ [13], p. 24; emphasis added. The sum is indeed impressive
but, unfortunately, the veil of technocratic objectivity is quickly
removed when we reach the methodological part of the exercise. To
8 I. Oikonomou / Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11
begin with, the entire analysis identified ‘economic benefits that
expert stakeholders have suggested could be realised’ [13], p. 24;
emphasis added. Note the ambiguity: the benefits may or may not
be realised, and their realization depends on factors as vague and
unpredictable as ‘international agreement’ and ‘changes in behav-
iour’ [13], p. 24. Also, the term ‘expert stakeholders’ is perhaps
controversial, as it merges into a single entity the policy-maker (the
Commission), the immediate beneficiary (space industry) and the
actor who is supposed to assess the policy critically and with a
healthy sense of distance from its subject of analysis (expert). In this
case, the masterminds and direct financial beneficiaries of the
policy were the ones assessing the benefits of that policy, as the
entire analysis was based primarily on interviews with industrial
representatives and Commission officials [13], p. 8.
What makes this report unique is the involvement of a private
corporation, PWC, in the very drafting of the report as its sole
author. PWC is one of the well-known ‘big four’ providers of pro-
fessional services; the companies, the products of which it evalu-
ated via the report, are its existing clients outside the report, and
the sources of this report, i.e. the industrialists themselves, are the
ones who stood to benefit from the outcome of PWC's reporting.
PWC's position as author of an evaluation of the benefits of an EU
initiative and the interviews/sources it utilized highlight the
elevation of the private firm to the position of the provider of expert
knowledge - and in fact, a supposedly impartial and objective one,
capable of representing the interests of society as a whole. This is
the moment when the element of mediation (institutional, politi-
cal, ideological, etc.) is removed and capital can now perform a
range of roles that were previously assigned to ‘external’ in-
stitutions such as the intellectual, the university, or the state.
Capital can now inform the society about the benefits of the pro-
jects in which it participates, as producer and contractor. It assesses,
on behalf of the state or supranational institutions such as the
Commission, the value of its own products and applications, and
whatever it defines as its own need must be transformed into the
need of society as a whole. Popularization, in this context, is critical
for capital to project its interests at the level of collective con-
sciousness. And quantification, in the form of benefits measured in
euros, is indeed a powerful tool of popularization. Citizen can rest
assured that whatever the space industry talks about translates into
a tangible, monetized benefit.
A final form of popularization of EU space policy that falls into
this section is the European Space Expo - an open, free-entrance
public exhibition that tours European cities displaying informa-
tion on, primarily, Galileo and Copernicus. The Commission defines
the aim of the Expo as ‘to show citizens how European space policy
and space-based technologies benefit our everyday lives on earth
and also of course, their importance for the European economy and
job creation’ [14]. Once again, this is not about popularizing space
per se; it is about popularizing the space policy of the EU, its main
programmes, and above all the perceived benefits that stem from
them.
Why should this initiative be viewed as an expert-based form of
popularization? In the framework of the Expo, a programme of
lectures by experts runs parallel to the main exhibition, with
speakers drawn from the domestic policy and industrial environ-
ment. The author had the opportunity to attend the Expo that was
organised in Athens from March 28 to April 5, 2015. The pro-
gramme comprised 31 lectures followed by a Q&A session, and a
quick look at it confirms the overwhelming participation of in-
dustrial stakeholders, both as organizers and as speakers [15]. Apart
from the usual European programme authorities (GNSS Agency,
EGNOS, Galileo, Copernicus) and the ESA, the list of organizers
included Si-Cluster and the Hellenic Association of Space Industry.
The former is the main space technologies and applications
innovation cluster in Greece, with 50 corporate members, while the
latter is the organisation that represents the entire spectrum of the
Greek space industry. With regard to the speakers, 16 out of the 31
came from the industry, 11 from national research institutions, 3
from the Commission and the ESA, and one from the Greek public
research authority. As for the topics, the motto of the Expo is
telling: ‘Discover the benefits of space applications in your daily
life’. Almost all of the lectures concerned these benefits, with the
informative leaflet [15] featuring lecture titles such as ‘Role of space
for a European and Greek space policy that benefits the citizens’,
‘The Copernicus programme and the benefits for the citizen’, and
‘Galileo and EGNOS in our daily life’.
4. Non-expert-based forms of popularization
Expert knowledge is not the only channel of popularization - in
fact, it is not always necessary for the popularizing act to be realised
successfully, even though it is an inherent element of EU space
policy popularization in general. Other forms of popularization that
are not founded on expert discourse co-exist with expert-based
ones, targeting specific groups such as students or children where
the invocation of authority is less effective. From a rich menu,
which also includes the ESA website or the space policy section of
the European Commission's website, three cases can be singled out
for the clarity and straightforwardness of their popularization
purpose and effect: the Galileo drawing competition, the GMES
naming competition, and the ‘All u need is space’ comic.
The first one was a drawing competition that ran until
November 2011 and offered the winner the opportunity to have a
Galileo satellite named after him/her. To participate, all entrants
(aged 9e11 years at the time) had to draw a picture and upload it
online, and then a national jury panel would pick the winner. The
announcement read: ‘To enter the competition you will create a
picture that represents “Space and Aeronautics”. This includes
things like stars, rockets, planets and satellites. What else can you
think of that is in Space?’ [16]. This automatic association of Galileo
with space-related objects that are very close to a child's imagi-
nation is definitely an element of popularization, via an artistic/
entertainment channel.
However, there was more to it; the website of the competition
included a text that introduced kids to the Galileo programme itself.
First, the text notified the reader of the usual argument put forward
to the critics of the programme who say that Galileo duplicates
GPS: ‘This programme (…) will also mean that satellite navigation
signals will be available no matter what happens to the other
system [sic] such as the American GPS system’ [17]. Then, children
learnt about the multiple uses of the programme, before the joyful
conclusion: ‘In fact, so many things today are made possible or
more effective by satellite navigation signals!’ [17]. The competition
attracted, of course, media attention in the respective member
states, thereby establishing a chain of popularization, with BBC, for
example, publishing a story of the UK winner. Little Patrick's view
superbly sums up the simplification aspect of popularization of a
programme like Galileo - the association with the unknown, space
exploration etc.: ‘I've always been interested by space. It's fasci-
nating because no one really knows what's out there’ [18].
Turning to our second case of non-expert popularization, in June
2006 the European Commission - in collaboration with the Com-
mittee of Regions - set up a competition for school girls and boys
who were tasked to come up with a new name for GMES. Partici-
pants, who had to be attending the last two years of secondary
education, would compete for ‘an unforgettable hot air-balloon trip
over their home region’ [19] while participating classes would get a
special kit that contained a teacher's leaflet, a poster and a film on
the programme. The rationale of the competition was, in the words
 I. Oikonomou / Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11
of Günter Verheugen quoted in Ref. [20], the following:
We need to find something more attractive, a name that will
encapsulate what the services are and also what they stand for e
in marketing terms, their brand values. We need to establish the
same level of public recognition that is already becoming
apparent for GALILEO, the EU's other space-related flagship
programme.
Interestingly, by picking a new name, students were invited to
popularize an EU space programme, while at the same time
participating at a popularizing process that involved them
receiving promotional material and being allowed to re-name an
EU space programme. Naming is de facto an act that creates a bond
between the two sides, the godparent and the recipient of the
name; it is a bond of familiarity and proximity. And this familiarity
could well extend beyond the students, to their parents, other
relatives, friends and acquaintances with whom students would
share the news of the participation of their class at the competition.
GMES was indeed renamed, but this only happened six years
after the competition, in 2012. Obviously, the urgency was not
about the renaming itself, but about getting the programme known
to as many people as possible. The change of name, however, was
indeed an important popularizing move, with or without student
participation, especially as it connected GMES with the historical
figure of Copernicus.2 The then Enterprise Commissioner
explained:
By changing the name from GMES to Copernicus we are paying
homage to a great European scientist and observer: Nicolaus
Copernicus. As he was the catalyst in the 16th century to better
understand our world, so the European Earth Observation Pro-
gramme gives us a thorough understanding of our changing
planet, enabling concrete actions to improve the quality of life of
the citizens. Copernicus has now reached maturity as a pro-
gramme and all its services will enter soon into the operational
phase. Thanks to greater data availability user take-up will in-
crease, thus contributing to that growth that we so dearly need
today [Antonio Tajani, quoted in Ref. [22]].
The popularizing narrative is all there: understanding the world,
improving the lives of citizens, achieving growth; taking, essen-
tially, the programme from the world of technical specifications,
surveillance and budgets, and inserting it into the reality of the
citizens.
A final noteworthy attempt to popularize EU space policy can be
found in a comic funded and published by the European Commis-
sion, titled ‘All u need is space’ [23], which presents in a simplified
and approachable manner some of the applications of EU space
activities. The majority of the stories concern Galileo and Coper-
nicus, with the main character coming across a range of relevant
themes, from ship detection to environmental monitoring and from
intelligent transport systems to rescue operations assistance. As the
introduction of the comic book reads, Elena, our hero, discovers
throughout the book ‘that so many of the little things she does are
made possible or easier thanks to space technology and science’
[23], p. 5. Each one-page story is accompanied by a little informa-
tion box, detailing the actions of the EU in each respective field/
theme.
2
Popularization is not without its contradictions. Anecdotally, Copernicus was
presented by former Commissioner Verheugen with a ‘K’ - Kopernikus - which is
the German spelling of the word. Polish MEPs became furious and demanded a
change to the Latin spelling, Copernicus, as it indeed happened [21].
9
Notably, the story is replete with references to sci-fi films that
are related to space. The reader is invited to spot these references,
with films ranging from ‘Apollo 13’ to ‘2001: Space Odyssey’ and
‘Star Trek’. What we have here is the incorporation of one form of
popularization of space into another - sci-fi movies into a comic.
And in fact, the purpose of this inclusion is not merely to direct the
child to watch a movie, but rather to set in motion an entire debate
that will involve parents and others. The guidelines are instructive:
‘There were lots of references to films and TV series in the comic.
Some were easy to spot and some were a lot harder. You might need
to ask your parents or teachers because a few of the references
related to ’70s and ’80s sci-fi classics' attachment to Ref. [23].
5. What purpose? The three functions of popularization
After establishing and illustrating the patterns of popularization
of EU space policy, it is necessary to present the purpose of this
process - its rationale, its inner logic. It is hereby argued that the
popularization of EU space policy has the following three key
functions: 1) legitimising the two leading EU space programmes,
Galileo and Copernicus, among European citizens by concealing the
controversial nature of the projects while at the same time adver-
tising their perceived utility; 2) facilitating the concerted action of
political institutions, industrial actors, and user communities
through the articulation of a common unifying narrative; and 3)
securing the future flow of space technology professionals by
making space and space policies attractive to the young generation.
The first point is pretty straightforward: popularization is
necessary in order to reach legitimization and thus secure accep-
tance of EU space programmes by the European citizens. Such
acceptance is always welcome by power, but in the case of inher-
ently controversial projects such as Galileo and Copernicus, this
acceptance is not only welcome; it is absolutely indispensable.
There are at least two controversial elements surrounding these
two projects: the first one is funding, as exemplified by the collapse
of the Galileo public-private partnership see Ref. [24] and the sec-
ond one is militarisation see Refs. [25, 26]. Emmanuel Sigalas [27],
p. 67 has brilliantly summarized this point: ‘Space-related en-
deavours are politically sensitive. They are expensive, high risk and
potentially useful to the military. Hence the gradual involvement of
the EU in space affairs was and remains controversial’.
As far as funding as a source of controversy is concerned, the
present analysis stands in full agreement with the contention by
Lucia Marta and Paul Stephenson [28], p. 111 that ‘by focusing on
the tangible benefits that space programmes bring to all citizens
across the continent, [the Commission] sought to legitimate EU
action to tax payers’. Funding issues and the need to commit re-
sources may recede easily from popular memory once a project is
up and running, but the truth is that the need for funding is not
limited to the stage of development or deployment, and persists
throughout the life-cycle of a space programme. And as for the
latter dimension of militarisation, Frank Slijper [25], p. 72 has
argued convincingly that both Galileo and Copernicus contain
‘tailor-made military functions’ and are ‘connected to military use’.
While it is useful to remind military and security users of the po-
tential civil-military synergies of the two programmes, the Com-
mission must conceal the surveillance, intelligence gathering, and
military functions when addressing broader audiences. Populari-
zation is not only about what is said, but also about what is selec-
tively concealed, bypassed, or silenced.
The second function of popularization is slightly more complex;
popularization is the channel through which a simple narrative is
produced, providing the ideational aegis for the gluing together of
actors and interests that may not have been socialised together
otherwise. One has to keep in mind that EU space policy is
10 I. Oikonomou / Space Policy 41 (2017) 5e11
something more than a simple interaction between the space in-
dustry and the Commission: a complex triangle linking different
fractions of space-industrial capital (big contractors, SMEs) with
two different institutional settings (Commission, ESA) and, of
course, a diverse set of end users without which no policy can exist,
as programmes like Galileo and Copernicus are supposed to not
merely be there but to provide services to users. These user com-
munities belong both to the public and the private sector, and have
established national legacies and varying needs and requirements.
They do not turn to EU programmes automatically; their attraction
to them is itself a political project, through which users must be
informed about available opportunities and be convinced over the
utility of their adoption. Also, space manufacturers are not the sole
producers in the European economy and the battle for securing
public, EU resources is fought among a variety of sectors.
Popularization, in this context, is part of a path for the trans-
formation of the multiplicity of partial (national, sectoral) interests
into a single general interest, which ultimately expresses itself as
the EU space policy. Needless to say that the different historical
legacies, bureaucratic preferences, industrial interests, policy es-
tablishments and technical barriers cannot be materially altered via
the realm if ideas - the opposite would constitute a philosophically
idealist understanding of reality that is alien to the present paper.
The role of popularization is facilitative; it is a necessary but defi-
nitely not sufficient precondition of the production of general
interest.
As for the third function, we need to turn to the European Space
Agency in order to find a succinct description of the problem:
‘Nowadays, a decreasing number of young people decide to take up
STEM-related (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics)
studies and careers’ [29]. The ESA has set up a dedicated depart-
ment for educational purposes, the European Space Education
Resource Office, the mission of which is to attract young people to
science subjects and advertise the career prospects that open up in
the realm of space. Through the Office's activities, ‘Space, in
particular, becomes not just a place of inspiration and future
dreams, but also an everyday fact of modern life’ [29]; indeed, this
is textbook popularization. The direct beneficiary of this social-
isation of students into learning via the context of space is the
European space industry, as such initiatives secure in the long term
the highly skilled human resources that are necessary for the
maintenance of the industry's competitive edge and technological
leadership.
This ‘educational’ role of popularization is not, however, isolated
from the broader goal of reproducing pro-EU consensus among the
people of the Union. This function, besides, is inscribed in the
mission of the Office: ‘The ESERO project also help [sic] stimulate
young people's awareness of Europe's space programme and of its
importance for modern society and economy’ [29]. This initiative as
well as the aforementioned Commission initiatives aimed at the
younger population segments highlight the unity of the various
functions of popularization. The latter's conceptual division into
ideal types for the purpose of studying them does not mean that
the functions are practically separate; by attracting students to
careers in the space sector, the EU also legitimises its programmes
and practices, and by doing so it provides a narrative that can
ideationally unite different class fractions and institutional actors
under the same policy aegis.
6. Conclusion
The following argument was put forward in the present paper:
the emergence of an EU space policy, no matter how ‘natural’ it may
seem, is a politicized process that also expresses itself ideationally,
through the quest for legitimization. The latter is facilitated by
popularization - not of science or space in general, but rather of the
involvement of the EU in space. In other words, in the case of EU
space policy, far from being the spontaneous result of literary
imagination or artistic vision, popularization is a deliberate move
by the respective policy actors - primarily the Commission, with
welcome assistance from the industry and its organic intellectuals,
the experts/industrialists - to build a consensus in favour of that
policy.
To conclude, popularization of space in the EU context is not
politically neutral, supposedly serving the bridging of the gap be-
tween space, science and technology, on the one hand, and the
citizens and society on the other. On the contrary, it ultimately
serves a marketing purpose - ‘selling’ the costly and controversial
projects of Galileo and Copernicus to a European political body that
needs to be convinced over the benefits of EU involvement in space,
so as not to place obstacles to the continuous commitment of re-
sources for EU space policy as well as to the militarizing tendencies
of that policy. At the same time, it cements the co-existence of a
multitude of interests under the protective umbrella of a perceived
general interest, while at the same time attracting the next gen-
erations of space technologists who will assist with the mainte-
nance of the competitiveness of the European space industry. All in
all, the motto ‘All u need is space’ is the facade of a much more
profound, underlying popularization project: ‘All u need is EU space
policy’. And it is much more than the title of a cool comic.
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