BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN NUMBER: 737 23-01 DATE: December 21, 2023 This bulletin provides information which may prove useful in airline operations or airline training. The information provided in this bulletin is not critical to flight safely. The information may not apply to all customers; specific effectivity can be determined by contacting The Boeing Company. This information will remain in effect depending on production changes, customer-originated modifications, and Service Bulletin incorporation. Information in this bulletin is supplied by The Boeing Company and may not be approved or endorsed by the FAA at the time of writing. Appropriate formal documentation will be revised, as necessary, to reflect the information contained in this bulletin. For further information, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes through the Service Requests application on the MyBoeingFleet home page. SUBJECT: Global Positioning System (GPS) Signal Interference ATA NO; Multiple APPLIES TO: All 737NG and 737MAX airplanes. This bulletin is not applicable to 737MAX airplanes with Hybrid GPS-Inertial enabled. REASON: —_To describe the fight deck effects associated with a loss of GPS signal or GPS signal interference. This bulletin replaces Flight Operations Technical Bulletin 737 21-04 Global Positioning System (GPS) Signal Interference. BACKGROUND INFORMATION Reports of GPS interference (jamming and spoofing) are increasing. These occurrences are currently concentrated in specific regions; however, they can occur worldwide. Interference with GPS signals can have an effect on multiple systems on the 737. This bulletin aims to identify and provide guidance to operators and flight crew for mitigating these effects. GPS uses signals from satellites to determine an accurate position. GPS data is used in many functions on the 737, including: + Flight Management Computer (FMC) ‘© GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain + ADS-B © Timeiclock Occurrences of GPS interference can result in missing or erroneous information. This interference comes from many sources, including portable devices, GPS jammers, and GPS repeaters. Not light control systems are not affected by GPS interference. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or oftware ie sujec tthe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fer expt -epor, nrousay uae, or access EXCEPT to uty group Fl a 2 eourtiexiersons er Supp 1 Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCNG 9197 Page 1 of 19Intentional Interference Intentional interference includes jamming and spoofing. Occurrences can be due to: ‘+ Geopolitical confict ‘* Protection of sensitive areas or personnel such as military, government sites, or VIP movements + Personal privacy devices Jamming causes a loss of measurement and therefore a degradation of the position/velocityitime (PVT) solution, ‘Spoofing is a fake signal that causes the receiver to output misleading data, such as an incorrect position or time. Unintentional Interference Unintentional interference can result from unregulated radio transmitters that infringe on radio frequency spectra protected for aviation. It can also be caused by rare atmospheric electromagnetic phenomena and potentially malfunctioning radio frequency transmitters, Interference ht Deck Effects (FDEs) and Recommended Crew Mitigations ‘There are several potential FDEs possible with GPS interference. The following list contains examples and is not an exhaustive list. Some effects have aural or visual alerts, others do not. Flight Management Computer ‘+ Jamming causes an increase in ANP which impacts navigation capability. Enabling radio Updating when there are sufficient radio navigation facilities will help maintain a lower ANP. GPS- L INVALID and GPS-R INVALID FMC alerting messages can show. + Effects of spoofing on FMC: Inaccurate GPS position input to the FMC in the air or on the ground. ‘An FMC-generated fight path can be affected, such as LNAV or VNAV. ‘The ANP value changes based on the update sources being used. On the ground, if spoofing is encountered while the FMC is pawering up, the position can be inaccurate and it may not match the gate or stand location. Comparing the FMC position with the actual location of the gate or stand will reveal if the FMC position is corrupted. The two GPS receivers may display a significant position difference due to spoofing. This may result in FMC alerting messages in air, including VERIFY POS: FMC-FMC and VERIFY POS: FMC-GPS, FMC fuel predictions can be inaccurate © GPS Data can be deselected — Refer to the Mitigations for Consideration section of this bulletin + FMC position update can change from GPS to radio if GPS update is not available (GPS update tumed off or GPS data is invalid). + UNABLE REQD NAV PERF-RNP ND message can show if ANP exceeds RNP. This alert must be considered valid, GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain ‘+ Jamming causes a loss of GPS position data, When the GPS signal is no longer available, the GPWS uses IRS data as a backup. When the IRS horizontal position uncertainty exceeds limits, the terrain is removed from the ND and TERR POS message shows. ‘+ Effects of spoofing on GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain: © Erroneous GPS position data to the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain function that can resolve or persist for the remainder of the flight. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tectrology or sofware is subject tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fer expt -exper, nrousty Uae, or access EXCEPT to uty group i a :? countiesipersons per Suppo Pert 70 ofthe EAR ECCN: 979 Page 2 of 19© False GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain alerts including "PULL UP" on the PFD can occur. A complete list of these are in the FCOM Chapter 15 Warning Systems. © Terrain warnings can occur at any altitude. Terrain display on ND and VSD (as installed) can be inaccurate. For a GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning at a cruise altitude that is clearly above the highest known actual terrain in the area, pilot discretion can be used in determining the alert, including persistent alerts, to be false © Further guidance on GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning is available in QRH: Maneuvers: Non-Normal Maneuvers: Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Response. © The basic GPWS is still operational. Basic GPWS Alerts are valid. Refer to the Appendix 1 and FCOM Chapter 15 Waring Systems. © GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain can be disabled. Refer to FCOM Chapter 15 Warning Systems. Note: Selecting GPS UPDATE OFF on the NAV OPTIONS page does not inhibit GPS autonomous data for GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain, ADS-B ‘+ Jamming causes a loss of ADS-B capability, Coordination with ATC is necessary. ‘= Spoofing can cause erroneous position data to ADS-B, + AIITCAS alerts must be considered valid Note: Selecting GPS UPDATE OFF on the NAV OPTIONS page does not inhibit GPS for ADS-B. Time/Clock ‘+ Jamming can result in the loss of GPS time source. ‘+ Spoofing can cause inaccurate time and date information. © FMC ETA and RTA function can be affected © Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) communication functions are impacted by dateltime inaccuracy. Log-on and reporting functions may not be available. © The ATN ground system can disconnect from the aircraft due to the error in which case the ATN connection will be terminated and indicated in the message "ATC COMM TERMINATED”. General Mitigations for Consideration Loss of GPS information is usually temporary. GPS data, communication, and surveillance functions can recover as soon as the airplane leaves the area affected by interference. However, some spoofing events can impact the user system for the remainder of the flight, ‘When responding to alerts, signs, and symptoms of GPS interference, itis important to advise ATC as soon as practical of any degraded navigation capability, advising them of systems that have not recovered due to spoofing, ‘= _ If systems such as LNAV or VNAV experience degraded performance or unsatisfactory performance due to interference, reduce the level of automation (e.9., HDG SEL, LVL CHG, V/S). Once clear of the interference area and the position of the GPS and FMC is verified, the level of ‘automation can be increased. ‘+ _ IF GPS spoofing is suspected, revert fo another update mode such as DME/DME updating or use available ground-based navigation aid such as VOR and NDB, These functions are described in FCOM Supplementary Procedures: Flight Management, Navigation. ‘+ Cross-check terrain altitude using enroute charts if terrain depiction on ND and VSD (as installed) appears unreasonable for the geographic location, EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tectrology or sofware is subject tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 130-778) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commete i egited fer expt -expor, nrourtay Uae, or access EXCEPT to uy group Fo 2 countiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 91.97 Page 3 of 19‘= Familiarize crew with the availability of arrival and approach procedures using conventional navigation aids. GPS updating in the FMC can be temporarily disabled as per the FCOM Supplementary Procedures: Flight Management, Navigation as a preventative measure before entering known areas of GPS interference and in the event of unexpected GPS interference. This practice is at the discretion of the operator after a risk assessment with the following considerations: +The operator must provide the flight crew instructions on when to disable GPS updating as a preventative measure against GPS interference and when to tum GPS updating back on upon ‘exiting known areas of interference ‘+ GPS updating should be turned back on after the position accuracy is verified. This can be accomplished by referring to the NAV OPTIONS page as described in the FCOM Chapter 11 Flight Management, Navigation. Boeing does not recommend preventative disabling of GPS Updating for the entire flight Qperator Responsibilities Operational Risk Assessment Operations into known areas of GPS interference should be carefully risk assessed by the operator. The conditions and effects on airplane systems vary depending on the type, sophistication, and geographical area of the interference. Consider avoidance of known areas of interference as one of the risk reduction measures. Contingency procedures can be developed by the operator using this guidance. Ensure crews are familiar with conventional navigation capabilities and operation. This information is contained in the FCOM Chapter 11 Flight Management, Navigation. However, when doing so: ‘* Caution should be exercised when developing procedural steps if they involve disabling or downgrading of navigation systems and GPWS Look Ahead Terrain. Unintended consequences ‘can occur in integrated systems. ‘= Consideration must be given to the negative effect of desensitizing fight crew to valid alerts due to frequency of occurrence. ‘+ Flight crew workload must be considered in operator-developed procedural mitigations, especially in critical phases of flight. ‘+ Flight crews should only disable GPS updating when instructed to do so as part of an established operator-created risk mitigation or if unexpected FDEs occur in-fight. Repor \g Interference Anom: s Data from interference events is being collected and analyzed, Communications from Boeing will be updated as needed. Pilots are encouraged to submit detailed reports of disruptions or interference events as soon as practical through an internal company reporting system. Operators can submit reports and data to Boeing to assist in targeted situational improvement. Reference ‘See Appendix 1 of this bulletin for an in-depth technical description of the 737 GPS and types of interference. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or sofware is stject tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fr expt -epor, nrourty Uae, or access EXCEPT to _oumy group Fo? courtiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 9197 Page 4 of 19APPENDIX 1 ‘This appendix provides engineering data to help operators further understand the flight deck effects during GPS signal interference and to assess risks and mitigations to a level that is satisfactory to operators and their regulatory authorities. Below is a list of appendix sections: |. GPS Jamming (Basic) . GPS Smart Jamming or Spoofing - Navigation GPS Signal Available (Normal Operation) GPS System Overview — Expanded Information Flight Deck indications — Expanded information GPS Light and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC) Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain — Expanded Information 8, ADS-B During GPS Signal Interference — Expanded Information 9. Electronic Flight Bag 10. Additional Information NO@PeENS 1, GPS Jamming (basic) GPS interference typically causes a loss of measurement data from one or more satellites and a degradation or loss of the receiver's PVT solution and should not result in an output of misleading data from the GPS receiver. The position simply becomes unavailable and the FMC reverts to using another navigation source such as inertial navigation or conventional navigation aids like DME-DME or VOR- DME. When radio updating is available and not inhibited, the FMC will start using radio updates for updating the FMC position. ‘The Ground Proximity Waming System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain, and the Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)/Air Traffic Services (ATS) systems utilize GPS data, and GPS interference can affect these systems. ‘The flight deck indications and detail of impacted systems are covered later in this document, ‘When interfering signals have a structure similar to the desired GPS signals, the effects can be more severe. This is called smart jamming or spoofing, This is a fake signal pretending to be real. Smart Jamming can cause the receiver to output misleading data. Smart jamming is more difficult to produce than basic interference; however, the means to produce such signals are becoming more accessible and affordable due to advances in electronics capabilities such as software defined radios (SDR). Smart jamming can cause position errors of varying magnitude. Large errors can be detected and mitigated by a crosscheck of the GPS position compared to the position from an independent navigation aid. Smaller errors can be dificult to detect. During smart jamming, the flight deck indications of the impacted system can vary depending on the ‘sophistication of smart jamming, 3. Navigation GPS Signal Available (Normal Operation) ‘The FMC uses data from the navigation systems to accurately calculate the position of the airplane. The Map Source Annunciation shows the source of FMC data on the ND. See Figure 1 EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or sofware is stject tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fr expt -epor, nrourty Uae, or access EXCEPT to ‘uy group Fo 2 countiexiersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 91.997 Page 5 of 19Figure 1 — Map Source Annunciation The FMC position is continually updated from the GPS, navigation radios (DME/DME or DME/VOR), and IRS. Updating priority is based on the expected accuracy and availabilty of valid data from the supporting systems, FMC position updates from navigation sensor positions are used in the following priority order: 1.,IRS-GPS-DME 2.IRS-GPS-DME-VOR 3,IRS-OME 4.IRS-DME-VOR 5.IRS-DME-LOC GIRS EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology o sofware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 3 Fr the US. Depastient of Cormac srequited fr export seoxpt, incor Wanser, or acess EXCEPT 19 ofthe FAR, ECCN: 91381 -oumiry ro Fl or? countiestperson per Supp. Pe Page 6 of 19The FMC selects the GPS and DME as the primary update to the FMC position if DME update is turned on and the DME data is available. If all GPS data becomes unavailable, the FMC uses IRS/radio Updating, or IRS updating when radio update is not available. ‘The GPS, IRS, and station identifiers and frequencies of the selected radio navigation aids currently in use by the FMC for position calculation are shown on NAV STATUS page 1/2. See Figure 2. Figure 2— NAV STATUS page [Lines 11 and 1R] display VOR, ILS or GLS identifier and frequency tuned on the corresponding VHF NAV control panel. [Lines 2L - 2R through 4L — 4R] display up to five DME identifiers and frequencies tuned by the corresponding scanning DME receiver. Data is displayed in large font with the identifier highlighted if that facility is being used for navigation. For CDU with color, instead of being highlighted, the station ident turns green Data is displayed in large font with the identifier not highlighted if that facility is being received but not used for navigation, Data is displayed in small font if that facility is being tuned but not received If the navaid has failed, FAIL will be displayed in small font, If there is no corresponding identifier for the displayed frequency, then the identifier field will be blank and only the frequency will be displayed. [Line 5R] Displays the IRS currently selected for use in navigation. *L” or *R” indicates left or right IRS is being used in the FMC position calculation. °2" indicates a dual system with both IRSs used in the FMC position calculation, [Line 5L] Displays the GPS currently selected for use in navigation. “L” or *R” indicates left or right GPS is being used in the FMC position calculation. *2” indicates dual system with both GPSs used in the FMC position calculation, EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tesrology o oftware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 30:74). No authorization fom the US. Depastnent of Carte s equted fr export re-exp,it-coury Wane, or acess EXCEPT 19 _oumiry group Fo 2 countiextpersons per Supp Prt 70 of the EAR, BCCN: 91.97 Page 7 of 19EFIS Control Panel POS Button ‘When the "POS" button on the EFIS control panel is selected, the symbols for the GPS, IRS, and radio. Positions, relative to the FMC position, are shown, See Figure 3. GPS position Figure 3 — GPS and IRS Positions on ND EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology o sofware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 730-778) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commete i egited fer expt -eper, nrousty Uae, or access EXCEPT to uy group Fo? countiexiersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 9197 Page 8 of 19lay UI Control Di (CDU) POS REF Page POS REF Page 2/3 shows FMC, IRS, GPS and radio posttions. shows both GPS and radio positions available. Phra Phra Chr Cea Carers Figure 4— GPS, IRS, and radio Positions on CDU POS REF page [Line 1L] shows the FMC calculated position. [Line 61] shows the radio position. When in range of a navigational radio, this ine shows the radio's position even when radio updating is inhibited. If radio updating is inhibited, the FMC does not use it as. an update source until radio updating is enabled. Control Display Unit (CDU) POS SHIFT Page POS SHIFT Page 3/3 shows position relative to FMC position using current mag/true reference. See Pee aa 373 Fmc-k Ce Loe ett Es TT eer Leet es rrreweere res CEPT eee eer es Presa CL ae ees CTV arr Garr EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tectrology or sofware is subject tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fer expt -epor, nrousty Uae, or access EXCEPT to ‘oumiry group or 2 countiexipersons per Supp Pert 70 of the EAR, BCCNS 9197 Page 9 of 19Figure 5 - POS SHIFT page NAVAID INHIBIT The NAV OPTIONS 2/2 page shows the enabled sensors and the inhibited sensors. To allow a sensor to be used as a navigation source update, it must be selected to “ON". Selecting "ON" allows conventional navigation aids like DME-DME or VOR-DME to be used for updating the FMC position provided they are in range with proper geometry. The Inhibiting VOR/DME Use for Position Updating supplementary procedure in Volume 1 of the 737 Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) provides the steps to inhibit / allow the navigation sources. The operator can choose a default to whether the normal state is to inhibit radio updating or allow radio Updating through the default DME Update Off software option, Figure 6 below shows that all sources are available. SSaD is Figure 6 - CDU NAV OPTIONS page 4. GPS System Overview — Expanded Information The 737 has two independent global positioning system (GPS) receivers. The GPS receivers are part of the two multi-mode receivers (MMR), Each GPS receiver has an independent GPS antenna, The GPS receivers on Boeing airplanes have receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) algorithms to detect, and mitigate erroneous GPS signals. These algorithms offer some protection against errors from interference. For example, RAIM detects smart jamming where the receiver tracks both real and fake satellite signals that cause inconsistent measurement data. The RAIM horizontal integrity limit (HIL) must be valid before the GPS output is used for most other functions. ‘Two independent Inertial Reference Systems (IRS) are installed on the 737. The IRSs provide attitude, true and magnetic heading, acceleration, vertical speed, ground speed, track, present position, and wind data to appropriate airplane systems. IRS outputs are independent of external navigation aids. ‘The 737 is normally installed with two Flight Management Computers (FMC). Each FMC computes a multissensor position solution based on GPS, IRS, DME, and VOR. The IRS data is the basis and other sensors are used to compensate IRS errors. The IRS errors, including position, velocity, and attitude, are estimated through Kalman fiter. Based on the sensors being used and the north and east position EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tesrology o oftware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 30:7). No authorization fom the US. Depastnent of Carneros equted fr export re-expat,it-coury Wane, or acess EXCEPT 19 _oumiry group Fl or? countiextpersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 9197 Page 10 of 19variances from the Kalman filter, the FMC computes the 95% horizontal position accuracy - the actual navigation performance (ANP). Figure 7 shows the path of the GPS data and its use by the airplane systems. rss Sg a petite sis PGE torvess mI ates 5 ata Poon Velodty/Tine 605 Data Bouton ely Tne ‘NAV OPTIONS 2/2 pag ‘enable radio update EGPWs PS date Ose our inhibits the Look head Terrain alerts and Navigation Display of Terrain PFO. ND, Figure 7 - Block diagram of GPS data flowluse 5. Flight Deck Indications - Expanded Information This section covers the flight deck indications for the affected systems during GPS signal interference events. Navigation when GPS Update is Not Available or during GPS Signal Interference When a GPS signal is not available to update the FMC position and radio updating is inhibited, the lateral ANP begins to increase. When the FMC is no longer receiving valid GPS information, the GPS position on the POS SHIFT 3/3 blanks and the GPS-L INVALID and GPS-R INVALID scratchpad messages show after 10 minutes while on the ground or after 30 seconds while in air. See Figure 8 below. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or sofware is sujet tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnent of Commerce i eguived for expert -expor, neourty uae, or access EXCEPT to _umiry group Fl or? countiexspersons per Supp Prt 70 ofthe EAR, BCCN: 91.991 Page 11 of 19Pris) Gwin Figure 8- Loss of GPS Signal ‘The increasing ANP value is shown on the ND. See Figure 9 below. Figure 9 — Increasing ANP For airplanes with navigation performance scales (NPS), the PFD shows the increasing ANP value. See igure 10, EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tesrology o sofware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 30:7). No authorization fom the US. Department of Carte s equted fr export re-expa,itecoury Wane, or acess EXCEPT 19 ‘oumry gop Eo 2 countiextpersons per Supp Prt 70 ofthe EAR, ECCN: 91.997 Page 12 of 19er Beir Figure 10 — NPS Scale with increasing ANP value EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tesrology o sofware ie sjec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 30:74). No authorization fom the US. Depastent of Carte s equted fr export re-exp,itecoury Wane, or acess EXCEPT 19 _oumiry group or? eountiexipersons er Supp Prt 70 of the EAR, ECCN: 9197 Page 13 of 19When ANP exceeds RNP for longer than the time to alert per the phase of fight and the airplane is airborne, the "UNABLE REQD NAV PERF - RNP* message shows as depicted in Figure 11. The UNABLE REQD NAV PERF-RNP message will be displayed on the CDU scratchpad. An additional amber UNABLE REQD NAV PERF-RNP will be displayed on the MAP. The amber FMC lights located on the main panel will also illuminate with the annuncialion of this message. For airplanes with NPS, the NPS scale turns amber. RNP is also shown on the POS SHIFT, RNP PROGRESS 4/5 and the RTE LEGS pages. rs Tre Ose Figure 11 — UNABLE REQD NAV PERF - RNP Message DU POS REF Page When a GPS signal is not available to update the FMC position and radio updating is inhibited, the FMC Uses the IRSs as the only navigation source. During oceanic operations, when a GPS signal is not avallable and the airplane is out of range of any radio navaid, both the GPS and RADIO posilion fields are blank. See Figure 12 EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology o sofware ie sbjec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR, Pans 730-774), No authorization fom the US. Depurtnent of Commerce i egited fer expt -epor, nrourtay Uae, or access EXCEPT to uy group a 2 courtiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, ECCN: 91.97 Page 14 of 19Crea Crea Drea Figure 12 - Oceanic Out of Radio Range When a GPS signal is not available but the airplane is in range of radio navaids, only the GPS position fiold is blank. If radio updating is inhibited, the FMC uses the IRSs as the only navigation source. Seo tg rrr) hres Chr) Figure 13 - Domestic within Radio Range ‘When radio updating is enabled, the FMC uses the radio navaids as the navigation source as shown in [Lines 1L - 18 through 4L — 4R} in below. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or sofware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 730-774) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commerce i egited fer expt e-epor, nrousty Uae, or access EXCEPT to ‘uy group Fo 2 courtiexipersons er Supp Prt 70 of the EAR, ECCN: 9197 Page 15 of 19Figure 14 - FMC Radio Position Update [Lines 1L and 1R] display VOR or ILS identifier and frequency tuned on the corresponding VHF NAV control panel. [Lines 21 - 2R through 4L. - 4R] display up to five DME identifiers and frequencies tuned by the corresponding scanning DME receiver, Data is displayed in large font with the identifier highlighted if that facility is being used for navigation. For CDU with color, instead of being highlighted, the station ident turns green GLS approaches (As install When GPS signal loss occurs during a GLS approach the following are the flight deck indications with autopilot disengaged: Before LOC, Armed ‘After LOCIGS, Above 200ft ‘After LOGIGS, Below 200ft Distance to runway removed Distance to runway removed Distance to runway removed IDENT, course, RWY number stay shown IDENT, course, RWY number stay shown IDENT, course, RWY number stay shown Deviation guidance removed Pitchiroll FID removed after 2 seconds, PitchirollF/D removed after 2 seconds EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetology or sow ie subject the US. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans fr the US. Department of Commacesrequited fr export seoxpt, in-country tanser, or acess EXCEPT 19 ‘uy group Eo 2 countiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the EAR, ECCN: 9197 Page 16 of 19When GPS signal loss occurs during a GLS approach the following are the fight deck indications with autopilot engaged, fail passive option installed: Before LOG, Armed After LOCIGS, Above 60ft | After LOG/GS, Below 6oft Distance to runway removed | Distance torunway removed | Distance to runway removed IDENT, course, RWY number | IDENT, course, RWY number | IDENT, course, RWY number stay shown stay shown stay shown PitchirollFID removed ater 2 Deviation guidance PitchirollF/D removed after | seconds. (Flare: F/D already 2 seconds. removed BOV) Autopilot disconnect Autopiotdisconnects ater | ter 10 seconds, ‘When GPS signal loss occurs during a GLS approach the following are the flight deck indications with autopilot engaged, fail operational option installed: Before Loc, Armed ‘After LOCIGS, Above 200ft | After LOC/GS, Below 200ft Distance to runway removed | Distance to runway removed | Distance to runway removed IDENT, course, RWY number | IDENT, course, RWY number | IDENT, course, RWY number stay shown stay shown stay shown Deviation guidance removed | Autopilotdisconnectatter 10 | Autopilot disconnect after seconds. 4 seconds Pitch/Roll FID removed after | Pitch/Roll FID removed after ‘Autopilot disconnect (F/D | Autopilot disconnect (F/D removed alter 2 seconds in | removed after 2 seconds single-channel approach). | in single-channel approach). 6. (GPS) Light and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC) GPS Receiver Failure Failure of both GPS receivers illuminates the GPS light and the Captain's and First Officer's Master Caution lights. Loss of the GPS signal or a signal interference does not result in the GPS light illuminating because there is no system failure. The navigation update mode drops to the next available sensor. When ANP exceeds RNP, the "UNABLE REQD NAV PERF - RNP" message shows, ‘The steps in the UNABLE REQD NAV PERF - RNP Non-Normal Checklist (NNC) are based on a detected failure of the equipment. The checklist is not intended to cover the loss of the GPS signal or a signal interference. Other Non-Normal Checklists (NNC} EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology o oftware ie sujec tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans 730-778) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnen of Commere i egited fer expt -epor, nrourty Uae, or access EXCEPT to ‘uy group Fo? countiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 9197 Page 17 of 19Itis not possible to develop checklists for all situations. In all situations, the Captain must assess the situations and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action. 7. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain ‘The GPS is the primary source of position data for the Ground Proximity Warning Systern (GPWS), When the GPS signal is no longer available, the GPWS uses inertial data as a back-up. As long as the iner horizontal position uncertainty stays within the required accuracy limits, the terrain continues to be shown on the ND and the look-ahead terrain alerting continues to function. Once the inertial position uncertainty exceeds required accuracy limits, the terrain is removed from the ND, and the "TERR POS" message will show on the ND. Ground proximity alerts that occur are valid. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain during GPS signal interference ‘The GPWS look-ahead terrain function can detect step changes in GPS position and altitude data. In this, case, the GPWS step detection algorithm invalidates GPS position inputs and uses IRS data. If the IRS horizontal position uncertainty exceeds accuracy limits, the terrain is removed from the ND, and TERR POS message shows. Indication returns to normal when the GPS inputs are stable for 60 seconds. ‘The GPWS cannot detect a small and gradual change in the GPS position or altitude. In this case, depending on the landscape in the terrain database for the GPS position, alerts associated with look- ahead terrain function can occur when threat thresholds are met. There have been several in-service cases where false GPWS look-ahead terrain alerts occurred during GPS smart jamming. Ground Proximity Terrain inhibit (TERR INHIBIT) When TERR INHIBIT is selected, it inhibits the GPWS look-ahead terrain and obstacle display. The TERR INHIBIT message shows, GPWS immediate alerts are based on radio altitude, barometric altitude, glideslope deviation, and airplane configuration. These alerts continue to function and if an alert occurs, itis valid, GPWS alerts ‘occur for the following conditions: altitude loss after takeoff or go-around ‘excessive descent rate excessive terrain closure Unsafe terrain clearance when not in the landing configuration ‘excessive deviation below ILS glideslope ‘excessive deviation below IAN glide path (as installed) ‘These functions also remain valid ‘© reactive windshear = altitude call outs ‘+ bank angle callouts (option) GPWS alerts that do occur are valid. Accomplish the maneuver associated with the alert as described in the FCOM. 8. Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) During GPS Signal Interference ADS-B OUT During GPS interference or when the GPS signal is lost, the ADS-B Out does not function: ‘+The transponder fail ight illuminates if ADS-B is inoperative. Selecting the opposite transponder causes the message lo show again since the signal is not available. EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetrology or sofware is sujet tothe U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CER. Pans 730-778) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnent of Commerce i egited for expt -exper, nrourty Uae, or access EXCEPT to uy group Fo 2 countiextpersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCNS 91.97 Page 18 of 19‘+ Loss of ADS-8 position reports by ATC. ATC reports ADS-8 OUT is lost. Selecting the other transponder does not restore ADS-B OUT. Transponder mode C remains operational. ‘+ ADS-B OUT reporting of incorrect airplane position during a GPS smart jamming event is, Possible. In this case, ATC can observe a position difference between ADS-B OUT position and airplane position on primary and secondary radar. 9. Electronic Flight Bag ‘Some EFB applications use autonomous GPS data and GPS interference can affect these applications. 10. Adi A lull listing of FAA-issued flight prohibition and advisory NOTAMSs and fight prohibition SFARS for areas in which the FAA does not provide air navigation services is posted on the FAA website: hitp:/iwww faa.gov/air trafficipublications/us restrictions jonal Information i subject the US. Export Administration Regulations (EAR), (15 CFR. Pans EXPORT CONTROLLED - This tetology o sow tes equited fr export zeexpt,in-coury Wanser, or acess EXCEPT 19 730-778) No authorization fom the US. Depurtnent of uy group or 2 countiexipersons per Supp Prt 70 of the FAR, BCCN: 9197 Page 19 of 19