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HSM One Year On
HSM One Year On
SHIFTING SANDS
UNPACKING THE
TUMULTUOUS
TIMES OF
PRESIDENT
HASSAN SHEIKH
MOHAMUD'S FIRST
YEAR
HIRAAL BRIEFING
MAY, 2023
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the first year of President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term, examining the complexity of Somalia's
political, security, and regional landscape. Key issues of focus include the
strained relationships between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
and the Federal Member States (FMSs), the handling of the National Security
Architecture (NSArch), and the challenges posed by the Al-Shabaab
insurgency.
The year was marked by significant political instability and challenges in the
security sector. Despite expectations for improved political stability and FGS-
FMS relations, the administration's approach fell short, particularly due to
the exclusionary drafting of the NSArch, which risks alienating key FMSs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The intricate dynamics of Somalia's political and security landscape are vital to
understanding the complexities of the region. This comprehensive review delves into
the myriad factors and actors that shape Somalia's political and security environment,
encompassing everything from past military operations, the role of the Somali National
Army (SNA), the influence of the Al-Shabaab (AS), to the evolving relationships between
the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS).
The analysis begins with a retrospective of the final major operation of former president
Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's administration, Operation Badbaado, and traces the
ensuing political instability that stalled further operations. It also highlights the
involvement of the SNA forces in political maneuverings, leading to factional clashes
within the army.
The report then shifts its focus to President Hassan Sheikh's administration, scrutinizing
the successes and failures of previous offensives against the AS and the expansion of AS
influence in both rural and urban areas. The narrative further explores the impact of
these developments on the FGS's campaign strategies and their implications.
A critical part of the analysis is the examination of the National Security Architecture
(NSArch), its creation process, its envisioned implementation, and the politically charged
reactions it has elicited from the FMSs. The report also provides an in-depth look at the
initial decisions of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's (HSM) administration regarding the NSA,
evaluating its leadership appointments and the ripple effects these have had on the
security sector.
The analysis then probes into the status of offensives, the dynamics of FGS-FMS
relations, and the politics of Somalia's security framework.
2. BACKGROUND
The background section provides an analytical overview of the political and security
dynamics that shaped the initial stage of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's
administration. The last major operation of former president Mohamed Abdullahi
Farmaajo's administration, Operation Badbaado, forms a significant part of this
backdrop, having been a key initiative aimed at liberating regions from Sabiid to
Janaale between April 2019 and March 2020. An analysis of this operation reveals
how it was disrupted due to the political instability triggered by the impending
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elections, highlighting the intertwining nature of security and politics in Somalia.
The presence of Somali National Army (SNA) forces in the city during the transition
phase provides another critical dimension to our analysis. These forces, self-
identifying as Badbaado Qaran (“nation's saviors”), were heavily involved in political
agitation, advocating for elections and thereby exacerbating the political tension. An
intriguing aspect of this development was the active support for the Badbaado
Qaran from then-candidate Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his future cabinet
members. This indicates a strategic alliance between political actors and sections of
the military, which is a crucial factor to consider when analyzing the political
manoeuvrings during this period.
Furthermore, the engagement of the Badbaado Qaran in urban conflict with SNA
Gorgor special forces led to a significant schism within the SNA. The internal conflict
within the military, an institution crucial for maintaining security and stability, had
far-reaching implications for the security situation. This prompted the SNA to initiate
distraction operations against Al-Shabaab (AS) in the Middle Shabelle region, a move
that suggests an attempt to divert focus from internal divisions and maintain unity.
The analysis also notes the high expectations for political stability and improved
FGS-FMS relations at the beginning of Hassan Sheikh's administration. Despite the
corruption scandals surrounding Hassan Sheikh's first presidency, there was a
strong anticipation of inclusive governance. This, however, did not materialize as
hoped, and the strained FGS-FMS relations remained a complex issue that continued
to define the political landscape in Somalia.
3. THE AS SITUATION
The Al-Shabaab (AS) insurgency has transformed significantly since President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud's previous term (2012-17). During that time, two major offensives
were initiated – Operation Indian Ocean and Operation Eagle – approximately 18
months into his presidency.[1] The president came to power understanding the need
for earlier planning and execution in the future to allow sufficient time for liberation
before elections.
3 [1] AMISOM, "Joint Security Update on Operation Indian Ocean by Somali Government and AMISOM," AMISOM, October 1, 2014, accessed May 15, 2023, [4] Goaan ah in Ciidamada Somaliland ka baxaagobolka Sool oo
Laascaanood laga soo saaray." Puntlandes, accessed April 30, 2023,, http://www.puntlandes.com/?p=95746.
Today, AS appears wealthier, more influential, and more entrenched in both rural
and urban areas nominally under government control. AS's enhanced tax system
now competes with the government’s own capabilities, indicating a robust financial
structure that bolsters its operations. Moreover, the penetration of the security
sector allows AS to carry out operations deep within the capital's supposed safe
zones, showcasing their strategic sophistication and resilience.
While the government tried its best, it failed to dent AS’s operational tempo in the 12
months Hassan Sheikh has been president. The group managed to increase its IED
attacks to 204, from 149; assassinations to 219 from 208; however, other attack
types mostly stayed the same. The data suggests that the government's current
strategy is insufficient to curb AS's activities, necessitating a more effective
counterinsurgency approach.
While the government slightly increased operations by the regular forces, this was
dwarfed by operations which were carried out in coordination with the irregular
Macawisley clan militias.
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Figure 2 Allied ops against AS, compared
4. ATMIS WITHDRAWAL
The impending withdrawal of the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) from
the security landscape presents a substantial challenge for the Federal Government
of Somalia (FGS). Originally, a reduction of 2000 ATMIS soldiers was scheduled for
completion by 31 December 2022. However, this deadline has been extended to 30
June 2023. The delay could be attributed to the complexities and potential risks
associated with such a significant transition in the security framework.
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Upon the completion of this withdrawal, the FGS will be required to fill the vacuum
left by the ATMIS. The challenge lies in ensuring that the transition does not provide
opportunities for Al-Shabaab (AS) to exploit any potential security gaps. It raises
questions regarding the FGS's capacity to respond effectively and maintain control
over areas previously managed by the ATMIS.
As a preventive measure, the FGS has proposed the deployment of forces from the
frontline states for one last offensive, termed Black Lion, to liberate the remaining
territory from AS. This campaign could involve up to 30,000 non-ATMIS forces. While
this move indicates a proactive approach, it also underscores the magnitude of the
challenge.
Moreover, the temporary nature of the proposed Black Lion campaign raises critical
questions about the sustainability of any gains achieved. Liberating territories from
AS control is only one aspect of the challenge. Establishing governance systems
acceptable to local communities and ensuring the long-term security of these areas
is equally, if not more, important. The FGS needs to develop a comprehensive
strategy that addresses both these aspects to ensure the effectiveness and
sustainability of their efforts post-ATMIS withdrawal.
The NSArch document itself leans towards aspirational rather than operational,
featuring ambitious elements such as unified training manuals and a homegrown
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military academy. While these goals are commendable, their actualization appears
challenging, especially without substantial political unity. Their inclusion, however,
could be viewed as an attempt to project an image of progressive reform, regardless
of the current practical feasibility.
However, the NSArch notably sidesteps several pressing issues that demand
immediate attention. The absence of clear mechanisms for integrating FMS forces into
the federal system and guiding their operations across FMS boundaries leaves a
significant void in the security framework. This omission could potentially perpetuate
operational inefficiencies and inter-state tensions, undermining the overall
effectiveness of the NSArch.
6. ANALYSIS OF APPOINTMENTS
This section provides an analytical review of the key appointments made during
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's first year in power. These appointments,
particularly those rewarding political loyalty over merit or qualifications, have
significant implications for the functioning of public institutions and the public's
perception of government.
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The appointment of a media influencer, the owner of Mustqabal Radio, as the
Auditor General, further hints at an attempt to control the narrative and information
flow within the country. This could have implications for the transparency and
accountability of government actions.
Similarly, the replacement of the Accountant General and the Revenue Director
General at the Ministry of Finance with individuals closely associated with the
Hassan Sheikh campaign suggests a potential consolidation of power and financial
control. This could affect the financial integrity and efficiency of the government,
especially if these appointees lack the necessary technical skills or experience.
The filling of the National Security Office with non-technical individuals who worked
on the president's campaign is another point of concern. National security is a highly
specialized field that requires a deep understanding of security dynamics, strategic
planning, and crisis management. Placing individuals without the required technical
expertise in these positions could weaken the country's security framework,
potentially making it more vulnerable to both internal and external threats.
7. FGS-FMS RELATIONS
The relationship dynamics between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and
the Federal Member States (FMSs), particularly the southern states, are increasingly
characterized by power centralization. The president's success in gaining the
southern FMSs' support, ostensibly by approving their term extensions, suggests a
calculated exchange rather than a genuine consensus. This centralization of power
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In Mogadishu could reduce the FMSs to mere rubber stamps for FGS decisions,
undermining the federalism principle and potentially breeding discontent among
marginalized states.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud presided over the opening of the National Consultative Council Meeting in Baidoa @TheVillaSomalia
The lack of Puntland's involvement in key processes such as the NSArch, revenue
and financial system, and constitutional review potentially risks the FGS becoming
unrepresentative of the entire federation. This could have broader implications,
turning the FGS into a de facto representative of the southern FMSs and
exacerbating Puntland's grievances. This situation is further aggravated by the FGS's
attempts to influence the local government elections in Puntland, as evidenced by
the call from the President and PM to revert to indirect voting methods.
Such actions not only undermine democratic principles but also instigate potential
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destabilizing forces within Puntland. The increased arms stockpiling by opposition
forces and reported FGS interference in Puntland's internal affairs suggest a brewing
crisis that could disrupt the electoral process.[1] The unfortunate alignment of the
FGS and the Islamic State in Somalia (IS-S) in opposing direct elections in Puntland
should be a wake-up call for the FGS to change its position.
Interestingly, many of the politicians allegedly involved in disrupting the elections are
reported to possess western passports or reside in the west or neighboring countries.
This adds an international dimension to the problem and calls for vigilant monitoring
by interested parties, and possibly legal action against any and all entities attempting
to disrupt democratic processes.
8. CONCLUSION
The first year of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's term in office has
been marked by a series of challenges and contentious decisions, each
carrying significant implications for the future of Somalia. The analysis
presented in this report highlights key areas of concern, from the
centralization of power in Mogadishu and the strained FGS-FMS relations
to the challenges posed by the Al-Shabaab insurgency and the looming
withdrawal of ATMIS.
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CONTACT
Hiraal Institute,
Airport Road, Wadajir
Mogadishu, Somalia
hiraalinstitute.org
@hiraalinstitute
Cover: President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Parliament (Photo: Villa Somalia Twitter Nov 15, 2022)