Geopolitics

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Making or Breaking Regions: China’s Belt Road

Initiative and the Meaning for Regional Dynamics

David Mitchell

To cite this article: David Mitchell (2021) Making or Breaking Regions: China’s Belt Road
Initiative and the Meaning for Regional Dynamics, Geopolitics, 26:5, 1400-1420, DOI:
10.1080/14650045.2020.1716738

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1716738

Published online: 23 Jan 2020.

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GEOPOLITICS
2021, VOL. 26, NO. 5, 1400–1420
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1716738

Making or Breaking Regions: China’s Belt Road Initiative

and the Meaning for Regional Dynamics
David Mitchell
Department of International Relations, Department of Political Science, Bucknell University, Lewisburg,
PA, USA

ABSTRACT
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has gained worldwide
attention, as the government of Xi Jinping has committed itself
to globe the spanning connectivity project. Global in scope,
the role of regions and regional organisations has been identi-
fied as being important elements in bringing the BRI to frui-
tion, even though its execution has been based on bilateral
agreements. This is true in those regions, notably South Asia,
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean that are central to the
BRI’s immediate development and early recipients of substan-
tial investment. This raises the question of what type of influ-
ence the BRI will have on these regional groupings. Drawing
on the concept of ‘regionness’ developed by Hettne and
Söderbaum, this study assesses how the aforementioned
regions are affected by their respective states’ participation in
the BRI. Each case will assess changes in institutions, transna-
tional linkages and development of shared identity of each
region. Regional change in these areas is highly contingent, it
is found that an alternation of the ‘regionnness’ is most likely
in the case of South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Introduction
First announced in 2013 and formally presented in 2015, the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) has garnered significant international because of its scope
and the large financial resources devoted to it. Interestingly, although global
in scope, geographic regions figure prominently into the BRI’s development
in two ways. First, regions are the beneficiaries of greater connectivity
and, second, regions are the mechanism by which to extend the BRI
(NDRC 2015). Given the magnitude of what China is attempting to accom-
plish, one question that can be raised is what will the BRI do to the regions
where it takes root and develops? In simple terms, might the BRI strengthen
existing regional groupings or, alternatively, might the BRI have the effect of
‘breaking’regions, resulting in some new association or configuration of
states. This study will begin the process of answering this question by

CONTACT David Mitchell dmmitche@bucknell.edu Department of International Relations, Department of

Political Science, Bucknell University, One Dent Drive, Lewisburg, PA 17837
© 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 GEOPOLITICS 1401

examining what effect the BRI will have on Southeast Asia, South Asia and
the Indian Ocean regions. Acknowledging that the BRI crosses many regions,
these three regions are the focus of this analysis because the BRI has made
significant advances in these regions and they figure prominently in the
initiative. This is evidenced by China’s expenditure of resources and the
place of these regions in the broader BRI project. Forty-six percent of
China’s BRI contracts and investment has been directed to Southeast Asia,
with Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore the biggest recipients (Kong
et al. 2019). In the case of South Asia, between 2013 and 2018, Pakistan has
attracted 6.5% of the total BRI spending, which has gone to the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor, the largest BRI project (Kong et al. 2019). Thus,
if we are interested in studying the effects of the BRI on regions, there are
grounds to focus on the regions where the BRI has gone the furthest in its
development. The Indian Ocean Region becomes of interest because it
comprises the majority of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and spans South
Asia and Southeast Asia.
At a more general level, these three regions are fundamentally important
to China, if the BRI project is going to succeed. A vital element of the BRI is
greater connectivity of China’s western and southern provinces to the global
economy, which places a salience on South and Southeast Asia. Acting as
a doorway between regions is the critically important Malacca Straits through
which 80% of China’s energy needs flow. As a means to lessen dependence
on this choke point, the creation of ports tied to overland transportation
throughout the three regions highlights their centrality and the need to
understand how the BRI will or will not alter regional dynamics. A caveat
is warranted, however, as it must be acknowledged that the BRI is a complex
series of projects most of which have not yet been developed. This means that
any judgements on the future of the regions discussed here are in part based
on inferences from the available evidence and theoretical literature.
Moreover, as Blanchard and Flint (2017) note, much of the literature on
the BRI has been very descriptive and prescriptive, as opposed to drawing on
concepts from the scholarly literature. This study is a contribution in broad-
ening the scope of the conversation on the BRI, by drawing on the regiona-
lisation literature to assess whether the BRI is/will alter these three regions. In
the next section, the scope of the BRI is briefly discussed. This is followed by
an overview of the literature on regionalisation, as it pertains to our under-
standing of what a region is and the relevant factors that influence the
development of ‘regionness’. Central to this presentation is the typology of
regions developed by Hettne and Sӧderbaum (2000), which will be used as
a starting point to evaluate the way in which the three regions are evolving.
The conclusion will evaluate the overall implications for these regions, China
and the international community.
1402 D. MITCHELL

Belt and Road Initiative: Overview

At its core, the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road
initiatives are a series of economic infrastructure projects designed to expand
economic ties between China and 120–150 states, depending on how one
counts. Most of these states have signed memorandums of understanding
with China on various types of projects with a smaller number having begun
or completed projects. Five priorities are the basis of the BRI: policy coordi-
nation, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and
people-to-people bonds (National Development 2015). Facilities connectivity,
the main thrust of the BRI, refers to a range of infrastructure projects that
can advance economic development, including roads, railways, ports, com-
munications infrastructure (i.e. fibre optic cables) and energy infrastructure
(gas and oil pipelines). Similar to the original Silk Road, which is the
imaginary used promote this enterprise, the SREB is not a single road but
a series of different routes and connections that will extend from China
across Central Asia to Europe. Similarly, the MSR is not a single marine
path, but a series of ports with improved connection to road and rail
infrastructure and special economic zones. In the past two years, the BRI
has expanded to Latin America with fifteen countries signing cooperative
memorandums of understanding. To advance all of the BRI’s priorities, the
Chinese government formally identifies a role for regional and sub-regional
organisations that can be the forum for development and implementation of
projects. However, the overall approach to the BRI has been largely bilateral.
For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the economic incentives in the BRI have
a broader goal of developing a ‘community of common destiny’ or more
recently referred to as a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’
a concept that has animated Chinese diplomacy since 2011 (Denghua 2018;
Zeng 2016). The idea does not have an official definition, but it connotes
a vision of an inclusive global community of common interests where states
should partner to share the rights and responsibilities of global development,
as opposed to zero-sum relations. The ‘community’, although, conceived as
global is most often articulated in relations to China’s engagement with the
developing world (Mardell 2017). The idea of a shared community gives the
BRI an underlying ideological objective that can not only be seen as goal, but
a basis for building authority and legitimacy for the BRI, thus building
greater support and commitment by participating states.
For countries participating in the BRI, the benefits could be considerable,
as they have opportunity to create projects that can boost economic growth
and development. Initially, $40 billion was devoted to the creation of the Silk
Road Fund ($14.5 billion more was added in 2019), which is in addition to
funds provided through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the
$1.25 trillion in investment that China plans to make over the next decade.
 GEOPOLITICS 1403

Using a general equilibrium model to predict the benefits of the BRI, Fan
(2017), assuming full implementation, argues that the BRI countries experi-
ence an annual welfare gain of $1.5 trillion. Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam
will experience real income gains 7.5% of GDP. Exports and imports would
jump for participants by 11% by 2030. These resources on offer are impor-
tant as estimates indicate that between 2010 and 2020 the infrastructure
investment needs in Asia amount to eight trillion dollars (Xin 2017). At
the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017, Xi Jinping
announced that $50 billion had been dispersed since 2013 and at the 2019
Belt Road Forum, he announced another $64 billion in contracts. Yet, the
benefits of these contracts may not be all positive, as Blanchard and Flint
(2017) assert, negative economic effects will be experienced among all parties
from the firm to the regional level. As of the 2019 Belt and Road Forum,
China has attempted to mitigate these challenges with new promised efforts
to develop debt sustainability programmes, greater environmental sustain-
ability and more transparency. Despite the identifiable costs and benefits for
all involved, a great deal of ambiguity still remains around the BRI as there is
no clear timetable, prioritisation of projects or even hard and fast commit-
ments from many of the states that have declared an interest in participating.

Theorising Regions and BRI

The various elements of the SREB and MSR span globally, but regions figure
prominently in the development of the BRI. The Chinese government iden-
tifies that the BRI will accelerate regional cooperation, link different regions
to China and rely on multilateral regional institutions as mechanisms to
build cooperation. The BRI is multi-scalar and geopolitical, but its main goal
is regional economic integration, but one where its flexibility and open-
ended character accommodates different forms of regionalisation (Mayer
and Balász 2018; Zeng 2016). A theoretical challenge in addressing the
impact of the BRI on regions is the difficulty associated with defining what
we refer to as a region. Since the 1970s, when the interest in studying regions
became more prominent, scholars have acknowledged that regions have
various definitions with differing characteristics (Cantori and Spiegel 1970;
Thompson 1973). Volgy et al. (2017) assert that research has typically relied
on previous scholarship or on an understanding of what a region is based on
convenience. Nonetheless, one can identify common types of definitions. For
some, regions are essentially functional arrangements designed to address
a common security problem or they are economic institutions (Buzan and
Waever 2003; Powers and Goertz 2011). Fawn (2009), however, responds
that definitions based on institutions can be misleading because underlying
historical interactions precede the formal institutions and those interactions
essential define the region. The latter point is important because it points to
1404 D. MITCHELL

the way the regional literature has placed an increasingly greater focus on the
social constructions of regions.
The value of approaches grounded in social construction is that they
accept that regions do not have fixed qualities, but are the products of
historical context and the changing nature of the identities and interests of
actors inside and outside of the region. The one element of regions com-
monly recognised as a necessary component is territory; however, delimiting
the space that is the region is the result of social constructed interests
(Katzenstein 2005; Passi 2009). The implication is that regions are defined
by certain characteristics that are contextual and constantly subject to
change. This leads to an understanding of regions where the region needs
to be thought of as being in the process of becoming and, while it may
consolidate, it is never permanently fixed (Lombaerde et al. 2010; Vayrynen
2003). Further, regions have always been porous, which means that defini-
tions have to account for the change brought on by the penetration of various
forms of flows that are operative at various scales of activity simultaneously
(Acharya 2011). For example, regionalisation could be the product of local
actors seeking to protect or resist against global processes (Acharya 2018).
Alternatively, transnational capital or global economic powers can use
regions as the means to propagate the rules of liberalisation and enhance
competitiveness of firms (Vayrynen 2003). Thus, an effort to analyse how the
BRI will effect regions requires an approach that accounts for the dynamic
nature of regions, has an account of their characteristics that includes factors
at multiple scales and accepts that social interaction is seminal in the devel-
opment of the region. Hettne and Söderbaum’s concept of ‘regionness’ does
this as it rejects a static view of regions and identifies different phases of
regional evolution in relation to level of institutionalisation, transnational
development and shared identity formation.

Variations in ‘Regionness’
Hettne and Sӧderbaum (hereafter H&S) (2000) identify five phases in the
process of ‘becoming’ for regions (regionness) with each phase treated as an
ideal type, although regions may feature characteristics that fall between the
articulated phases. While H&S identify five phases, only three are of interest
in the assessment of China’s BRI. The first phase – regional space – does not
apply to any of the regions under examination here as all have transcended
this phase. This is a ‘pre-regional’ order defined primarily by being
a geographic space where pre-modern kinship relationships are the basis
for economic exchange. In the fifth phase, the ‘regional state’, states volunta-
rily accept pooled sovereignty, power and authority are multi-layered in
a democratic order, but the regional level is the most important. They
claim that the EU is most closely related to the region-state and given that
 GEOPOLITICS 1405

no other region comes close to obtaining this level of regionness, the region-
state is not considered here. The other three phases are the regional complex,
regional society and regional community.
The regional complex is characterised by widening trans-local relations
on a basis of shared historical, social or cultural identity. Nation-states as
the primary actors are protective of sovereignty, limiting cooperation. One
could identify relations in this environment as ‘anarchic’, described as
competitive with the pursuit of relative gains and no sense of shared
economic fortune. The regional society in contrast undergoes a two-part
process of change with the creation of formal regional organisation(s) and
deepening interdependence of transnational actors who contribute to
regional economy and civil society. The states play an important role in
facilitating regional economic development, although formal organisations
and social institutions play a crucial role in identity building. In the
regional community phase, the region turns into an active subject with
a distinct identity, meaning that there is a convergence and compatibility
of ideas, organisations and processes. In security terms, the region is
subject to common external threats with minimal internal conflict among
states in the region. Economically, the states create mechanisms to manage
the market in a manner designed to promote regional prosperity. The
regional community experiences the emergence of mutually reinforcing
relationship between formal organisations and civil society producing
greater welfare and norms. The sense of regionness has developed to the
point that the idea and reality of the region is an organizing basis intra-
and extra-regionally.
Two additional issues need to be addressed – change and power – before
using the typology to analyse the effect of the BRI. If the assumption of
‘regionness’ is that regions are not fixed, but are constantly in the process of
becoming, there must be an explanation of how they change. H&S point out
that change in regions is historically contingent, but they do not specify
specific factors driving change. Katzenstein (2005) argues regions are dis-
rupted from without and within by the social forces that create them, which
is consistent with a social construction approach. Similarly, others (Destradi
2010; Nolte 2011) argue that regions are “contested” either by states, political
elites or non-state actors that are challenging norms, identity, governance
structures or institutions. A second missing element of regionness is a role
for powerful states and their ability to ‘contest’ elements of the region.
Powerful states can provide public goods or social order, which can lead
weaker states, in exchange, to recognise its authority and legitimacy (Nolte
2011). Regional powers have the ability to influence the creation, durability
and effectiveness of cooperation, on both economic and security issues.
Regional powers can be a powerful mechanism by which transnational elites
can exercise hegemony. Furthermore, they can also be the cause of the
1406 D. MITCHELL

emergence of a counter-hegemony, as states or non-state actors in the region

mobilise in response to a power perceived as undermining cohesion.
Power and power contestation provide an explanation for how change
takes place in the region and, by extension, influences degree of regionness.
Thus, China’s power exercised through bilateral agreements act as the basis
to alter the shared, identity, institutions and transnational linkages, but actors
within regions are not passive and have the ability to contest the exercise of
power within the region. What type of change is produced by the BRI is
contingent on the factors unique to the region. Determining outcome is
further complicated by the complexity of the BRI and China’s use of very
different mechanism to build connectivity. We can observe that the projects
and the nature of those projects vary from country to country. A 2019 World
Bank study of the BRI identified the status of all transportation and related
investment projects proposed, underdevelopment, or completed among 77
states (including the states of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the east coast of
Africa). Surveying these projects reveals that China does not prefer
a particular type of project for a region and the extent that there is an overall
logic, it is to connect rail and road links between China and ports throughout
all three regions. Thus, the evolution of the BRI has been ad hoc with the
bilateral agreements varying between and within regions, which means causal
explanations become more difficult.
Bilateralism is further important because it is a main mechanism for
fostering the ideological shift towards the ‘community with a shared future
for mankind’. Mardell (2017) cites Wang Yiwei who claims that the ‘com-
munity’ gives rise to a new global economic order, built on economic
interdependence fostering a ‘community of shared interests’. With origins
in China’s peripheral development policy, the ‘community’, is advancing
a worldview where China is playing a leading role in coordinating a more
equitable world order, promoting shared interests as an alternative to the
zero-sum thinking of the west. Xi Jingping believes the ‘community’ func-
tions to change material conditions among collaborating states fostering
a basis for deeper ideological change (Denghua 2018). The benefit to China
of the ideological change is that it can serve as the basis to redefine regional
identities. In what follows, the discussed phases are applied with an evalua-
tion of the extent to which the BRI is or will change the shared identity,
institutions and transnational linkages of South Asia, Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean. For the sake of argument, the association of a particular phase
of regionness with a region is taken as a given. The identified phases are ideal
types and, because regions are constantly in the process of becoming, it is
assumed that the match between region and phase may not be perfect. As
a starting point, South Asia is assumed to fall between a regional complex
and the regional society phase; Southeast Asia is at the regional community
phase and the Indian Ocean is at the regional complex phase.
 GEOPOLITICS 1407

South Asia: BRI Developing Regional Society?

South Asia sits somewhere between a regional complex and regional society.
Like a regional complex, states are the primary actors and trans-local rela-
tions are based on shared history and identity. However, more like the
regional society, there has been the emergence of formal regional organisa-
tions and states facilitate regional economic development. However, the
extent of transnational actors developing a transnational regional economy
and civil society can be questioned. South Asia contains one of the world’s
emerging economies, but it remains woefully under integrated economically
or, as Yang (2018) describes South Asia, it is ‘India-centric’ and regionally
fragmented. Intra-regional trade is less than 5% of the total and investment is
less than 1% (Economist 2018). The exceptions to this are the high levels of
bilateral trade between India, Nepal and Bhutan, but India is only among the
top twenty trading partners for Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh (Batra
2007). Pakistan has negligible levels of trade with India. Thus, this has
created the conditions for China to create new points of economic access
and activity as an alternative to India. China has a further advantage in that it
lacks the ‘acrimonious’ relations India has had with some its neighbours;
thus, the benefits of the BRI can be presented as an act of goodwill (Jain
2018). India suffers from its own connectivity limitations and it is only more
recently under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘neighbourhood first policy’
that it has sought to expand investment in South Asia. Despite these efforts,
states on or near India’s borders that have been dependent on trade with
India, now have other means to break this dependence.
The focal point of Chinese investment in South Asia is the China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) that includes the development of the Gwadar
port, thirteen rail and road projects, energy projects, mass transit investment,
fibre optic cables and provincial development. Sri Lanka has received
eight billion dollars in financing that includes Colombo and Hambantota
Ports, Mattala Rajapaksa Airport and energy projects. Nepal has nine pro-
posed transport and energy projects. Bangladesh has BRI investments total-
ling $10 billion that includes investment in rail and road, the Praya port, and
the Chittagong industrial park. The Maldives owe China $3.2 billion in loans
for road and bridge infrastructure, in addition to port and housing develop-
ment. India and Bhutan are not currently BRI participants. Even though
several governments have reconsidered the scope of their engagement with
the BRI or specific projects, the need for infrastructure investment has not
spoilt interest in continuing to collaborate with China. Importantly, the
bilateral efforts have not affected regional institutions, but nor do these
institutions pose a challenge to the BRI’s potential in the region. South
Asia has been able to develop economic institutions, such as the South
Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and South Asian Free
1408 D. MITCHELL

Trade Area, and the SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement, which were
created to spur intra-regional trade through the elimination of tariffs and
preferential trade. To the detriment of regionalism in South Asia, the pro-
gress and development of SAARC and other regional arrangements are
continually hampered by regional political problems, particularly the con-
flicts that exist between India and Pakistan. This, then, creates a space in
which the BRI could develop new regional institutions to redefine the region;
however, China’s emphasis on bilateralism, as of yet, has not positioned it to
build regional institutions. Moreover, the fact that India remains outside of
the BRI means that its presence in the existing regional institutions will
complicate any leverage China seeks to exercise.
The BRI is further hampered by two other factors that mean the current
configuration of South Asian regionness is likely to remain unchanged,
India’s resistance and the hedging behaviour of BRI participants. India has
been opposed to the BRI because of perceived economic and security threat.
India perceives the MSR element of the BRI as an effort by the Chinese to
develop a string of port facilities for its navy that would encircle India
(Baruah and Mohan 2018). Moreover, CPEC, which was announced shortly
before a visit to China by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is perceived as an
affront to India and attempt to strengthen China’s position in the region. As
a part of India’s response to perceived Chinese pressure, Modi has sought
extra-regional ties as a way to counter-balance China by way of the Quad
(including Japan, the United States and Australia), the “Act East Policy”, and
deepening ties with ASEAN. In fact, India’s emphasis on the ‘Indo-Pacific’
presents an alternative regional configuration reorienting towards Southeast
Asia, potentially exploiting fractures in ASEAN (Nieuwenhuis 2016). While
the idea of the Indo-Pacific has also been advanced by the United States and
Australia, it is not clear which states are formerly a part of the region and the
idea has not yet been broadly accepted, particularly not to the point that it
undermines ASEAN (Chacko 2016).
The BRI’s influence on South Asia is also limited by the hedging beha-
viour of states that have partnered with China. Given, the economic needs
of South Asian states, the lure of Chinese capital is irresistible, but this
exists alongside concerns about problems with the BRI, such as delays,
mounting debt and extensive use of Chinese labour. States within South
Asia, such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, are seeking to strike
a balance between economic engagement with China and India. For exam-
ple, Nepal has signed a series of bilateral agreements with China on con-
nectivity, trade, tourism and investment, yet it has asserted that it will
maintain an independent foreign policy and continue relations with any
states that serve its interests (Nepal Foreign Ministry 2018; Oli 2017).
Nepali Foreign Minister Gywali has claimed that China’s initiative and
the Indo-Pacific strategy are both in Nepal’s interests (Koirala 2019). In
 GEOPOLITICS 1409

the case of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina stated a need to strike
a balance between economic ties with India and China (Chakma 2019).
Even Pakistan, which has gone further than other states in its participation
in the BRI, under President Imran Khan, chose to minimize long-term costs
by reviewing CPEC in the belief that the agreements signed by previous
governments have not been beneficial to Pakistan (Anderlini, Sender, and
Bokari 2018). However, in China’s favour, the economic relationship with
India and regional states, in addition to its development model has meant
an absence of free trade agreements and a lack of investment interest from
the Indian business community (Pattanaik 2019). The hedging behaviour
speaks to a region where the development of a regional economy falls victim
to the competitiveness between states and bilateralism with outside actors.
While China may play a greater role in the region, it will not be exclusive
and it does not appear this contributes to a regional move towards
a consolidated regional society or some other configuration dominated by
China. The nature of the regional society in South Asia with its fractured
politics, lack of integration and weak institutions has not lent itself to
a regional response to Chinese influence by creating rules to preserve
their collective autonomy. This ‘norm subsidiarity’ strategy is developed
by weaker states that result in their creation of their own norms or rules, as
a form of resistance, or they adopt more global norms that are consistent
with local interests that preserve autonomy (Acharya 2011). South Asian
states collectively have not done the former and do not seem inclined to do
the latter. Thus, China’s bilateralism at best contributes to maintaining
a fractured region.
Regional societies are based on a combination of formal regionalisation from
above and informal regionalisation from below with transnational actors playing
a role in both. China’s investment in the region does not appear to be altering
this dynamic. The BRI has begun the process of introducing more Chinese
nationals into South Asia, particularly by way of labour, Chinese privately
owned businesses and state-run corporations. However, the BRI is still at an
early stage and the effectiveness of Chinese non-state actors do not seem to have
the ability to compete with existing relations. For example, deeper relations exist
at the non-state and state levels between Sri Lanka and southern India or the elite
ties between Nepal and India. Labour migration in the region and remittances by
South Asians living in India amounted to $7.5 billion in 2014, while Chinese
remittances from India amounted to $107 million (Anderson and Ayres 2015).
To the extent that China can expand non-state ties, it will heavily depend on the
success of the BRI projects. For example, BRI projects meant to develop people-
to-people relations have developed bilaterally, but they do not appear to encou-
rage a shared regional identity or commitment to deepening ties throughout the
region. In the case of the CPEC, Pakistan and China have agreed to exchanges
that promote understanding of each other’s heritage, develop a Pakistan
1410 D. MITCHELL

Academy of Social Sciences and create a consortium of Chinese and Pakistani

business schools. In this case, transnational ties are exclusively with China and
not with other neighbours in the region. China further confronts the reality that
it has not developed a cultural affinity among South Asian populations, com-
pared to the regional power, India (Jain 2018). Cultivating more of these
transnational ties is limited by the fact that energy, transportation, real estate
and metals account for over 80% of the BRI spending, while resources for social
development are a fraction of the remaining 20% (Kong et al. 2019).
Developing a shared identity could occur by way of the idea of
a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’, but this will have to be
a product of the success of the BRI. China’s idea of a ‘community’ has been
echoed by leaders that have signed projects with China, but there is no
evidence that beyond representing common economic interests that this
concept has become a common cultural/social organizing principle. What
might in part account for this is a fundamental problem that the concept
remains vague concerning its meaning and objectives (Denghua 2018). In
addition, states do not know what kind of impact the BRI will have on their
interests. As the hedging behaviour indicates, states have not fully accepted
the logic of the “win-win” relationship and, given ongoing relations with
India as a counter-balance and other extra-regional powers, a new shared
identity that redefines the region does not appear in the offing. The Chinese
approach to economic development has caught the attention of many leaders
in the region and those that seek to distance themselves from Indian political
influence, have found the emphasis by China on non-interference and
sovereignty attractive (Pattanaik 2019). Yet, fears of Indian pressure and
the desire for greater engagement with China does not mean an acceptance
of a Chinese ideological perspective (Chaudhary 2016).
Other factors also serve to weaken the BRI’s ability to change identity.
According to Herrero and Xu (2019) study, their survey of media reveals that
South Asia possesses the most negative views of the BRI. At the same time,
alternative regional identities exist or are being cultivated, such as the Indian
Ocean or Southeast Asia (Karunanayake 2017; Oli 2017). India, aside from
endorsing the idea of an Indo-Pacific, has created Project Mausam, which is
an effort to ‘re-connect and re-establish’ cultural ties in the India Ocean. Sri
Lanka, for its part, perceives itself as being a critical actor in the Indian
Ocean Region and Southeast Asia (Karunanayake 2017). While it is certainly
the case that states see a benefit to participating in the BRI, the ongoing
reservations about specific projects and the concern about undue Chinese
influence that drives hedging behaviour demonstrates that the idea of
a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ has not taken root. At the
same time, it does not appear that alternative forms of ideation or identity
appear to be coalescing.
 GEOPOLITICS 1411

What can be said about the overall impact of the BRI on South Asia as
a region? If it borders between being a regional complex and regional society,
at best the BRI contributes to the continued stunting of South Asia’s progress
in the direction of a more defined regional society. At worst, South Asia
could devolve back towards a regional complex. The impediment to the
development of the regional society is a product of the BRI’s pull on states
as they seek to rebalance economic relations away from the region towards
China. If China’s bilateral agreements can be more successful in integrating
with the smaller states in South Asia, the region’s focus will increasingly be
outside of South Asia. This fits with Yang (2018) who has argued that the
dynamics in South Asia create the possibility of the opening of a Sino-centric
regional security community. However, South Asian regionalism, in the form
of institutional development, is not advanced by the BRI. China’s bilateral
approach does not encourage it and the BRI does not help in overcoming the
differences that plague the existing institutions. The BRI has not yet devel-
oped transnational linkages that would dramatically transform the existing
regional configuration or develop a new kind of shared identity. If the BRI
can come to full fruition, South Asia’s regional society will remain stunted
and possibly subject to a resorting. As the regional society is weakened by the
BRI, India as the other major power in the region will find it increasingly
difficult to exercise influence in the region, unless it can present itself as
a viable alternative, but this would involve greater Indian economic penetra-
tion of the region and, perhaps, the ability to develop a specific form of
Indian ideological hegemony that would be attractive to regional partners.

Southeast Asia: Deepening Regional Community?

H&S suggest that the original states that comprised ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) are a regional community. While the states
of Southeast Asia may not perfectly approximate a regional community, it is best
characterised as such. The regional community possesses a ‘community of states’
with formal organisations and institutions reinforced by regional civil society that
emerges from below but are dependent on regimes that promote welfare, norms
and identity. Southeast Asia has established deep economic ties with China prior
to the proposal of the BRI. China is the largest trading partner for the countries in
the region, while ASEAN is China’s third largest trading partner and the region
figures prominently in China’s production networks (Yu 2017). Between 2013 and
2018, BRI spending towards ASEAN countries amounted to $54 billion, the
primary recipients being Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos and
Thailand (CIMB ASEAN Research Institute 2018). These projects included
ports, rail, road and energy projects. The totals for current and future projects
present a dramatic increase in ties through the BRI, with a total of $739 billion
towards ASEAN Countries (CIMB ASEAN Research Institute 2018). ASEAN and
1412 D. MITCHELL

China have developed rules for economic cooperation dating to the 2002
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (Lu 2016).
In 2010, ASEAN created the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 that
China supported with funding in 2011. Further, China and ASEAN negotiated
a free trade agreement in 2003, which came into effect in 2010. Because of this
history, China identifies ASEAN as a key multi-lateral forum for advancing
various initiatives (National Development 2015). Given the level of engagement,
Southeast Asia should expect to be impacted by the BRI.
The engagement by way of ASEAN speaks to the legitimacy of ASEAN as
a key institution that represents the commonweal of its member states. For
the states of ASEAN, the organisation plays a vital role in relationship to
a much more powerful state. Goh (2007) describes the ‘omni-enmeshment’
strategy that Southeast Asian states practice by developing multilateral ties
with the effect of conditioning and regulating the behaviour of more power-
ful states. This is echoed by Breslin (2010) who argues that the centrality of
ASEAN in China’s plans allows member states to socialise China’s behaviour.
However, when one examines the nature of the projects that have been
associated with the BRI, they are bilateral in nature or multi-lateral outside
of the context of ASEAN. For some, this potentially signals the weakening of
ASEAN, since the overall effect of a series of bilateral agreements will be to
undermine collective interests (Jetin 2018; Le Thu 2018). Compounding the
effect of the bilateral economic agreements is the problem of the South China
Sea disputes, which has divided states. As trade with China has increased,
Vietnam has protested China’s activities in the South China Sea and has
unsuccessfully tried to mobilize a common approach to challenging China’s
activities within ASEAN (Hung 2018). Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayuth,
although not focused on the territorial issue, has openly advocated China
work within multilateral frameworks like ASEAN concerning the BRI (Green
2019). These positions contrast the Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte
who has sought to sideline the territorial disputes, in order to engage China.
The ASEAN principle of non-interference means that collective action will be
very difficult to accomplish as individual countries make separate calcula-
tions of their interests.
China’s exercise of power through the BRI is having a meaningful effect on
a key element of regionalisation; however, the process is challenged by countries
re-evaluating the nature of their engagement with the BRI and/or engaging in
hedging. States throughout the region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam) remain apprehensive of the MSR and the economic ties with China
(Chan 2016; Lim and Cibulka 2019). Some of these countries, such as Thailand
and Laos have experienced debt trouble and fear that MSR will further this (Chan
2016; Vineles 2019). Beyond the issue of debt, the MSR in Southeast Asia has
raised the concern of Chinese goods flooding local markets (i.e. in Thailand,
Vietnam and Brunei), trade imbalances, Chinese labour and the poor quality of
 GEOPOLITICS 1413

Chinese construction (Lu 2016). Concerns about the absence of transparency

around projects led Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to renegotiate
the cross-peninsula railway. In Myanmar, the government has scaled back a deep-
water port underdevelopment at Kyaukpyu, although the government has stated
the change is from a concern about demand and not debt (The ASEAN Post
2019). None of these governments are avoiding participation in the BRI, but they
are taking measures to avoid undue costs and this involves seeking alternative
sources of finance and advancing strategic relationships beyond China. Laos is
attracting significant investment from Vietnam, Thailand, as well as South Korea
and Japan (Tappe 2018). Indonesia is seeking to avoid the debt problems experi-
enced by Sri Lanka and is hedging by seeking infrastructure investment from
Japan (Coca 2019). Sensing the raising concerns and possible resistance, China
declared at the 2019 ASEAN foreign ministers meeting that it wanted more
ASEAN centred mechanisms and wanted to develop greater coordination
between the BRI and the ASEAN plan on connectivity. Despite apprehensions,
the existing institutional framework that is at work in Southeast Asia is under
pressure from the opportunities that China is creating by way of the BRI. It is not
clear if the BRI has affected the identity and norms unifying Southeast Asia’s
regional community. To the extent that ASEAN acts as a mechanism that
mediates relations with China, one could make the argument that the identity of
Southeast Asia has been affected; it has been strengthened. Acharya (2013) has
argued that ASEAN as an intergovernmental organisation acts as the unifying
element that has been the basis for developing a Southeast Asian identity.
A central element in this development has been the concept of the ‘ASEAN
Way’, which refers to the preferred principles of consensus-building and the
norm of non-interference among Southeast Asian states (Acharya 2018).
Although the continued relevance and meaning of the ASEAN Way are ques-
tioned, the fact that there is a debate speaks to the depth of meaning of the idea for
states in the region. ASEAN has sought to cultivate a socio-cultural community in
Southeast Asia, but this has been difficult in part because of principles of non-
interference and the ethnic-religious differences that persist. Acharya, however,
still finds that there has been efforts by non-governmental organisations to
advance transnational efforts to protect and promote human rights norms across
the region, even if their effect has been limited. So, Southeast Asia has developed
a regional identity as well as a transnational civil society, but both have limits. At
an ‘informal’ level, this creates an opportunity for China to influence the creation
of an alternative set of norms or identity by way of a shared community’. Liu
(2018) has suggested that the idea of a Chinese model of economic development
or the ‘Beijing Consensus’ has had attraction for states because it presents an
example of a state that has achieved success in a short period of time or has
achieved economic success without the need to fully democratise. The economic
benefits of the BRI are real and will grow for Southeast Asia, yet the wariness of
economic engagement and a persistent identity built around ASEAN (although
1414 D. MITCHELL

under pressure) has not translated into a fundamental shift that would indicate the
coalescing of a new shared identity.
Moreover, the BRI has not been powerful enough to overcome fears held
by the public and governments in many states in the region. A survey carried
out across ASEAN by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found that 73% of
respondents agreed that governments should be cautious when negotiating
BRI agreements. Fewer than one in ten perceive China as a benign power and
almost half believe China seeks to extend a sphere of influence over Southeast
Asia (Kim and Simon 2019). Vietnam has experienced protests by the public
regarding the development of a special economic zone, fuelled by a longer
history of opposition to Chinese influence (Noseworthy 2019). Added to
these controversies are the existing tensions that exist in some countries in
relation to ethnic Chinese communities. For example, Indonesia and
Malaysia have raised concerns due to China’s support for ethnic Chinese
communities and the influx of Chinese workers. (Damuri et al. 2019;
Suryadinata 2017). At this stage, BRI does not appear to have the ability to
alter the identity of Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia has achieved the level of regional community and the
member states’ participation in the BRI does not appear at this stage to
alter the level of regionness. Among the possibilities, it is most plausible that
the regional community consolidates, as China becomes more deeply
embedded in the region and as states turn to ASEAN and other regional
arrangements, thus enhancing a common identity vis-à-vis China. China’s
affirmation of a role for ASEAN may indicate that China recognizes this as
a possibility. Alternatively, China’s use of bilateral agreements, as the means
to advance the BRI, has the potential to weaken the regional solidarity. This
is already evident as states balance the economic benefits of the BRI with the
issue of the South China Sea. Yet, this may at best weaken the bonds and
neutralize ASEAN as an effective organisation, because apprehension in the
near-term will likely temper divisions that may emerge. This is evidenced by
the development of a regional fund involving Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos and Myanmar with the express purpose of funding infrastructure
projects to lessen dependence on China (Ono 2018). These intra-regional
efforts, although modest, co-exist with various projects or initiatives under-
taken with extra-regional partners, including Japan, Australia, India, South
Korea, and the European Union. Southeast Asia is not passive as it engages
with the BRI and there is a clear sense among these states that they need to
be active in the development of the region.

Developing the Regionness of the Indian Ocean?

The India Ocean Region (IOR) poses a particular challenge because the idea
of an Indian Ocean Region and its scope are debated; it is not uncommon for
 GEOPOLITICS 1415

the India Ocean to be discussed in terms of the sub-groupings within the

region (Muni 2005). While membership in overlapping regions is not unique,
the overlap here makes it difficult to understand the effects of the BRI on
IOR as opposed to the pull of sub-regional dynamics. Muni (2005) identifies
eleven different regional and sub-regional Indian Ocean organisations; how-
ever, many of these organisations are comprised of states from South and
Southeast Asia with one populated by states from Africa and one of the Arab
states. This means that there is some formal institutionalisation, but it is the
eastern end of the Indian Ocean where this is most advanced. For these
reasons and those below, the IOR is best understood as a regional complex.
Prior to 2013 announcement of the BRI, the Indian Ocean had become of
strategic interest to China because of the vast amount of trade that traverses
this space. With an absence of land routes to ports on the Indian Ocean and
this strategic vulnerability in the Malacca Straits, China has sought to
enhance its access to port facilities for its navy and for the purposes of
supporting ship-bourne trade. The historic strategic importance of the
Indian Ocean has meant that it has been a region where great powers have
competed to control navigation. So, the BRI is perceived as a threat by India
and extra-regional powers, such as the United States, which only fuels the
‘anarchic’ security environment within the region. Given this competition
and varying relations among regional states with great powers, it is reason-
able to expect that this will undermine the regionalisation of IOR by way of
the BRI.
The Indian Ocean region, perhaps, exposes how the bilateralism of the BRI
does not serve to encourage regional development. In regional complexes,
economic relations are competitive with little sense of common economic
fortune and relatively greater engagement with the broader international system.
This seems to describe the current state of the IOR, which is exacerbated by the
development of sub-regions. The conditions in South and Southeast Asia,
already discussed, create opportunities and challenges for Chinese influence.
Africa presents a different context as the BRI builds on prior Chinese investment
in Africa. Thirty-seven African states have signed memorandum of understand-
ing with China, which is in addition to agreements struck in the China-Africa
Cooperation Forum and the South African Development Community linking
the BRI to its industrialisation strategy. Much of the BRI investment is focused
on Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti, Mozambique and Ethiopia that are likely to draw
economic activity from other landlocked states, as they will be able to connect to
the MSR (Demissie 2018).
Sino-African ties further contribute to the development of sub-regions that
will prevent IOR from evolving away from a regional complex. However, Hu
Zhang (2018) on the shipping industry, and G. Zhang and Long (2018), on
international maritime law, identify the ways in which MSR will compel
participating states to coordinate. These connections, with transnational
1416 D. MITCHELL

business, form the basis for developing greater ties across the region, but
there is no strong evidence that this will cultivate a common identity in the
IOR beyond what already exists. In thinking about the development of the
IOR, the problems that limit Chinese influence in the other regions come to
overall weaken the BRI’s development of this region. Even if the idea of
a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ took hold in relation to
Africa, it might only serve to separate it from the other sub-regions. Since
MSR has not developed very far in Africa compared to other parts of the IOR
and because the sub-regions or the regions that crosscut the IOR have
developed further in their regionalisation, it is not possible to see MSR
altering the regional complex.

Conclusion
Regions do not have a fixed quality and the phases of regionness address the
evolution of institutions, development of shared identity and transnational
linkages. A grand project like China’s Belt and Road Initiative that links
participating countries should be expected to have an important influence on
these dimensions, and it does with varied effects. In the case of South Asia,
the BRI undermines the development of South Asia as a regional society. One
possibility is that the BRI enhances Chinese influence causing states in the
region to deepen ties with China, leading to a South Asia that devolves from
a regional society to more of a regional complex. This is different from
Southeast Asia, where the regional community’s degree of institutionalisation
could constrain or limit Chinese influence. Chinese recognition of ASEAN as
a central mechanism for building cooperation could have the paradoxical
effect of reinforcing the sense of community. The Indian Ocean Region exists
at a more rudimentary phase of regionness, even though sub-regions in the
IOR are more developed. The BRI holds some potential to develop the region
because of the need of states to cooperate and across the scope of the MSR.
However, this drive is unlikely to overcome the pull of sub-regionalisation.
Assuming China can avoid self-inflicted injury from delays, an absence of
transparency, poor financing, and political insensitivity, the BRI holds out
the most opportunity for regional alteration in South Asia and IOR. India
does not currently support the BRI, but the incentive of Chinese capital is
proving persuasive among other states in the region and India will be hard
pressed to compete. The power of Chinese bilateral agreements can fracture
regions, which means that in ‘weak’ or ‘weakening’ regions norm-subsidiarity
or omni-enmeshment are less likely to prove a challenge to China.
A restructuring South Asia will have long-term benefits for China’s western
regions as they seek to develop. In the case of IOR, China can certainly effect
the sub-regions, but the BRI could potentially advance regionalisation as the
various nodes in the MSR network share interests and need to coordinate. It
 GEOPOLITICS 1417

is possible that the scope of the IOR is simply too large and diverse to
develop beyond a regional complex. Southeast Asia could prove to be the
most complicated region for China to deal with. For China, the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea will continue to hamper the relationship
with individual states. These disputes will exacerbate disagreements over the
BRI and cause states to continue to find ways to hedge against undue Chinese
influence. However, the scale of regionalisation could be to the advantage of
China as the region and its institutions are leveraged to make the BRI more
effective, assuming regional cooperation. When considering China’s role in
the development of regions, the BRI case demonstrates that powerful states
do matter; however, the exercise of power requires legitimacy on the part of
a regional power, both materially and ideological. Actors, within the region
and without, are not left powerless and can react in ways limiting powerful
states. The conclusion is that powerful states like China need to be attuned to
the conditions of regionness and tailor their policies accordingly, if they
intend to shape the direction of regions.

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