‘This new edition does not simply update a classic resource for teachers and students.

In exploring universal
questions of comparative political science from the dual perspective of democratic backsliding on the part of elites,
and declining trust on the part of the people, it compels us to consider those questions anew.’
– Ben Stanley, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poland

‘Comparative Government and Politics stands out in a market saturated with introductory textbooks. The tone and
style of the text are very accessible and lend themselves well to both those majoring in the field, and those not
familiar with it at all.’
– Johannes van Gorp, American University of Sharjah, UAE

‘This book continues to be the leading introductory text in the field, and for good reason. Comprehensive,
well-structured, and incorporating analysis of the latest trends and developments, it provides a highly accessible
resource for both students and teachers the world over. Its thematic approach and extensive range of country
case studies ensure that it is truly international in scope and relevance.’
– Monique Emser, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

‘I have used this book for the last ten years, and this is the best version I have seen so far. To put it simply, this edition
will allow me to teach my introductory course on comparative politics in the way I want to teach it.’
– Mariely Lopez-Santana, George Mason University, USA

‘In my experience, Comparative Government and Politics is by far the best stand-alone text in this area. It is thorough,
and unlike the many other texts in the field it focuses in an interesting and engaging way on the dynamics of a broad
range of comparative political phenomena as they apply to real-world politics. Coupled with McCormick’s
forthcoming country case studies volume, this will constitute the most comprehensive, and yet interesting and very
readable approach to the teaching of this key subject at the undergraduate level.’
– Daniel Zirker, University of Waikato, New Zealand

‘The addition of John McCormick in this classic title for comparative politics has made a significant impact in this
edition. Full of new features, captivating graphs and images, this has become an important resource for students of
comparative politics as well as an excellent reference point for those teaching the subject. Users of the book will
particularly enjoy the spotlights on specific countries and cases, as well as the abundance of interesting data that
inspire further research.’
– Theofanis Exadaktylos, University of Surrey, UK

‘This enriched version of a classic textbook remains the first choice of textbook for my introductory comparative
politics courses.’
– Bec Strating, La Trobe University, Australia

‘This edition is a substantive enhancement of the previous editions, with more comprehensive coverage of politics
in authoritarian regimes, which is of tremendous added value. This is a text on which students and teachers of
comparative politics can count.’
– James Wong, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong

‘An excellent and comprehensive introduction to comparative government and politics which helps students to
understand basic concepts, theoretical and methodological approaches, and key institutions and developments in
the field across democratic and autocratic states.’
– Rosalind Shorrocks, University of Manchester, UK

‘The 11th edition of Comparative Government and Politics continues to provide a comprehensive introduction to the
field of comparative politics, equipping students with the basic knowledge and methods to compare various forms
of political organization across geographical and cultural boundaries.’
– Karsten Schulz, University of Groningen, the Netherlands
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS SERIES

Published
Maura Adshead and Jonathan Tonge
Politics in Ireland
Rudy Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin
Governance and Politics of the Netherlands (4th edition)
Tim Bale
European Politics: A Comparative Introduction (4th edition)
Nigel Bowles and Robert K. McMahon
Government and Politics of the United States (3rd edition)
Paul Brooker
Non-Democratic Regimes (3rd edition)
Kris Deschouwer
The Politics of Belgium: Governing a Divided Society (2nd edition)
Robert Elgie
Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies
Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and John McCormick
Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction (11th edition)
Paul Heywood
The Government and Politics of Spain
Xiaoming Huang and Jason Young
Politics in Pacific Asia (2nd edition)
Robert Leonardi
Government and Politics of Italy
John McCormick
Cases in Comparative Government and Politics
B. Guy Peters
Comparative Politics: Theories and Methods
[Rights: World excluding North America]
Tony Saich
Governance and Politics of China (4th edition)
Eric Shiraev
Russian Government and Politics (2nd edition)
Anne Stevens
Government and Politics of France (3rd edition)
Ramesh Thakur
The Government and Politics of India
 COMPARATIVE
GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS
an introduction
11th edition

ROD MARTIN JOHN

HAGUE HARROP McCORMICK
© John McCormick, under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2019
© John McCormick 2016
© Martin Harrop 2013
© Rod Hague and Martin Harrop 1982, 1987, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010
© Rod Hague, Martin Harrop, and Shaun Breslin 1992, 1998

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted

save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this
work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Eleventh edition 2019 by

RED GLOBE PRESS

Previous ten editions published by

PALGRAVE

Red Globe Press in the UK is an imprint of Springer Nature Limited,

registered in England, company number 785998, of 4 Crinan Street,
London, N1 9XW.

Red Globe Press® is a registered trademark in the United States,

the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978–1–352–00504–2 hardback

ISBN 978–1–352–00505–9 paperback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
brief contents
1 Key concepts 1
2 Theoretical approaches 18
3 Comparative methods 35
4 The state 52
5 Democratic rule 70
6 Authoritarian rule 89
7 Constitutions and courts 106
8 Executives 124
9 Legislatures 141
10 Bureaucracies 160
11 Sub-national governments 179
12 Political culture 199
13 Political participation 216
14 Political communication 234
15 Elections 252
16 Political parties 270
17 Voters 287
18 Interest groups 306
19 Public policy 324
20 Political economy 342
detailed contents
Illustrations and features ix Nations and nationalism 62
Preface xii The future of the state 63
Guide to the eleventh edition xv
Guide to learning features xviii
Guide to the website xx 5 Democratic rule 70
Publisher’s acknowledgements xxi Democratic rule: an overview 71
Direct democracy 72
1 Key concepts 1 Representative democracy 73
Key concepts: an overview 2 Liberal democracy 76
Government and governance 2 Modernization and democracy 77
Politics and power 4 Huntington’s waves of democracy 79
The state, authority, and legitimacy 8 Democratization 83
Ideology 9 The future of democracy 85
Comparative politics 11
Classifying political systems 12 6 Authoritarian rule 89
Authoritarian rule: an overview 90
2 Theoretical approaches 18 Hybrid regimes 90
Theoretical approaches: an overview 19 Authoritarian regimes 91
The changing face of comparative politics 19 Forms of authoritarian rule 94
The institutional approach 23 The political impact of corruption 102
The rational choice approach 26
The structural approach 29
The cultural approach 30 7 Constitutions and courts 106
The interpretive approach 31 Constitutions and courts:
an overview 107
The character of constitutions 107
3 Comparative methods 35
The durability of constitutions 109
Comparative methods: an overview 36
The role of courts 110
The case study method 36
The role of the judiciary 113
The qualitative method 39
Systems of law 116
The quantitative method 41
Constitutions and courts in
The historical method 43
authoritarian states 119
The challenges of comparison 46

4 The state 52 8 Executives 124

The state: an overview 53 Executives: an overview 125
What is a state? 53 Heads of state and government 125
Origins and evolution 55 Presidential executives 127
The diversity of states 59 Parliamentary executives 129
 detailed contents vii

Semi-presidential executives 134 14 Political communication 234

Executives in authoritarian states 136 Political communication: an overview 235
The evolution of mass media 235
9 Legislatures 141 Into the digital age 238
Legislatures: an overview 142 Media influence 240
The role of legislatures 142 Recent trends in political
One chamber or two? 148 communication 242
Representatives and their work 153 Political communication in authoritarian
Legislatures in authoritarian states 155 states 246

10 Bureaucracies 160 15 Elections 252

Bureaucracies: an overview 161 Elections: an overview 253
Origins and evolution 161 Legislative elections 253
E-government 165 Executive elections 258
How bureaucracies are organized 166 Referendums, initiatives, and recalls 261
How bureaucrats are recruited 172 Elections in authoritarian states 266
Bureaucracies in authoritarian states 173
16 Political parties 270
Political parties: an overview 271
11 Sub-national governments 179 Origins and roles 271
Sub-national governments: an overview 180
Party systems 272
Multi-level governance 180
Party organization 279
Unitary systems 181
Political parties in authoritarian states 282
Federal systems 184
Local government 190 17 Voters 287
Sub-national government in Voters: an overview 288
authoritarian states 193
Party identification 288
How voters choose 290
12 Political culture 199 Voter turnout 296
Political culture: an overview 200 Voters in authoritarian states 298
Understanding political culture 200
From The Civic Culture to 18 Interest groups 306
post-materialism 202 Interest groups: an overview 307
Political trust 207 Origins and types of groups 307
A clash of civilizations? 208 Channels of influence 310
Political culture in authoritarian states 211 Ingredients of influence 312
The dynamics of interest groups 314
13 Political participation 216 Interest groups in authoritarian states 318
Political participation: an overview 217
Who participates, and why? 217 19 Public policy 324
Public opinion 220 Public policy: an overview 325
The dynamics of public opinion 222 Models of the policy process 325
Women in government and politics 223 The policy cycle 328
Political participation in authoritarian Policy diffusion and convergence 332
states 227 Public policy in authoritarian states 337
viii detailed contents

20 Political economy 342 Development and global divisions 351

Political economy: an overview 343 Political economy in authoritarian states 352
Understanding political economy 343
Comparative political economy 345 Bibliography 359
The welfare state 348 Index 374
illustrations and features
spotlights
Nigeria6 Germany204
European Union 64 Russia230
India  80 Venezuela244
China  100 United States 262
South Africa 114 Mexico276
Brazil  130 Iran  300
United Kingdom 146 Egypt  320
Japan  168 Sweden334
France186 Turkey354

focus
1.1 Hobbes’s case for government 3 10.2 Keeping bureaucrats accountable 174
1.2 Two options for classifying political systems 14 11.1 The motives behind creating federations 189
2.1 Empirical and normative perspectives  26 11.2 The government of cities 194
2.2 Culture and politics: Edward Said and 12.1 Identity politics and globalization 202
Orientalism  31 12.2 Revolutions and political culture 212
3.1 Hypotheses and variables  40 13.1 The consumer as a political participant 221
3.2 The Greek financial crisis: why it happened 45 13.2 The uninformed citizen 223
4.1 How many states are there? 54 14.1 The problem of fake news 239
4.2 Globalization and the state 67 14.2 Online activism and the Arab Spring 249
5.1 How many democracies are there? 75 15.1 Who should be allowed to vote? 256
5.2 Full and flawed democracies 78 15.2 Electoral messages and mandates  259
6.1 Hybrid and authoritarian regimes 92 16.1 The rise of niche parties  278
6.2 Totalitarianism 103 16.2 Money, parties, and politics 281
7.1 Amending constitutions 111 17.1 Are voters rational? 293
7.2 Judicial independence 117 17.2 Compulsory voting: pros and cons 299
8.1 The separation of powers 128 18.1 Lobbying 312
8.2 Executives and party numbers 133 18.2 Social movements 316
9.1 Legislatures: does size matter?  150 19.1 Sticks, carrots, and sermons 329
9.2 Term limits: pros and cons 156 19.2 Public policy and political survival 339
10.1 Outsourcing government work: 20.1 Comparing levels of economic freedom 348
pros and cons 163 20.2 The resource curse 356

figures
1.1 Major ideologies: five examples 10 2.2 The institutions of government 23
1.2 Sub-fields of political science 11 2.3 The features of political institutions 25
1.3 Aristotle’s classification of governments  13 3.1 Political science research methods 37
2.1 Five theoretical approaches to comparative 3.2 Five types of case study 38
politics22 3.3 Population and the size of legislatures 42
x illustrations and features

3.4 The KOF Globalization Index 49 12.1 Is life better or worse than
4.1 The features of a state 55 50 years ago? 206
4.2 The formation of states 58 12.2 Comparing trust in government  207
4.3 The size of states 60 12.3 Trust in government in the United States 208
5.1 Forms of democracy 73 12.4 The Inglehart–Welzel cultural map
5.2 Degrees of democracy 74 of the world 210
5.3 The changing number of democracies 75 13.1 Political participation in democracies 218
5.4 Huntington’s waves of democratization 79 13.2 Voter turnout by gender in United
5.5 The expansion of the British electorate 82 States presidential elections 225
5.6 Stages of democratization 83 13.3 Comparing women in legislatures  225
5.7 Global trends in democracy 86 13.4 Political participation in hybrid and
6.1 Leaders overthrown in the Arab authoritarian states 228
Spring, 2011 93 13.5 A patronage network linking centre
7.1 The features of constitutions 108 and periphery 229
7.2 Why new constitutions are written 109 14.1 The evolution of mass media 236
7.3 Ten facts about constitutions 110 14.2 Comparing internet access 240
7.4 Comparing constitutional amendments 112 14.3 The transmission model of political
7.5 Comparing judicial appointments 118 communication241
7.6 The four functions of authoritarian 14.4 Mechanisms of media impact 241
constitutions119 14.5 Comparing media freedom 247
7.7 Human Freedom Index: the lowest- 15.1 The Canadian federal election, 2015 255
ranked countries 120 15.2 Electoral systems 257
8.1 Types of parliamentary government 132 15.3 The use of referendums 264
9.1 The functions of democratic legislatures 143 15.4 Seven roles of elections in
9.2 Stages in the making of a law in the British authoritarian states 266
Parliament144 16.1 Six roles of political parties 272
9.3 A selection of lower chambers 149 16.2 Comparing party systems 273
9.4 Comparing levels of legislative 16.3 Who selects candidates for legislative
representation150 elections?280
9.5 Selecting the upper chamber 152 16.4 Five roles of political parties in
9.6 Models of representation 153 authoritarian states 282
9.7 Comparing levels of trust in national 16.5 Trends in Russian presidential elections 285
legislatures154 17.1 Partisan dealignment in Germany 290
10.1 Weber’s model of bureaucracy 162 17.2 Partisan dealignment in Sweden 290
10.2 Comparing the size of bureaucracies 164 17.3 Causes of partisan dealignment 292
10.3 Comparing the size of central 17.4 Key factors explaining voter choice 292
government164 17.5 Comparing voter turnout 296
10.4 Government departments in selected 17.6 Comparing trends in voter turnout 297
countries167 17.7 Voter turnout trends in Egypt 302
10.5 The structure of a government 17.8 Comparing levels of electoral volatility 303
department167 18.1 Types of interest group 308
10.6 Women in the bureaucracy and the 18.2 Channels of interest group influence 310
labour force 173 18.3 Comparing trade union membership 313
10.7 Comparing perceptions of bureaucratic 18.4 Iron triangles: the case of the
inefficiency175 United States 318
11.1 Multi-level governance in the 19.1 Stages in the policy process 330
European Union 181 19.2 The diffusion of innovation 333
11.2 Four tiers of government 182 20.1 The Index of Economic Freedom 348
11.3 Dispersing power in unitary systems 183 20.2 Comparing welfare spending 349
 illustrations and features xi

tables
1.1 Lukes’s three dimensions of power 8 11.4 Comparing the United States and the
1.2 Contrasting themes of left and right 10 European Union 191
1.3 Comparative political ratings 15 11.5 The structures of local government 193
1.4 Comparing economic size  16 12.1 Huntington’s states and civilizations 209
2.1 Some theories used in political science 20 13.1 Forms of political participation 220
3.1 Comparing qualitative and quantitative 13.2 Women executives (selected) 227
approaches42 14.1 Forms of social media 238
3.2 The challenges of comparison 46 14.2 The internet and the Arab Spring 249
4.1 States by income 61 15.1 Comparing legislative electoral systems 254
4.2 Ten criticisms of the state 66 15.2 The German federal election, 2017 258
4.3 The Fragile States Index 68 15.3 The French presidential election, 2002 260
5.1 Features of democratic rule 71 15.4 Comparing presidential elections 261
6.1 Features of authoritarian rule 90 16.1 Europe’s major party families 275
6.2 Forms of authoritarian rule 94 17.1 The economy and voter choice 294
6.3 The five remaining communist party states 97 17.2 A recipe for higher voter turnout 298
7.1 Comparing supreme courts and 17.3 Countries where voting is compulsory 298
constitutional courts 113 18.1 Comparing protective and promotional
8.1 Selecting the head of state in interest groups 309
parliamentary systems 126 18.2 Examples of social movements 317
8.2 The limited presidential executive 127 18.3 Comparing parties, interest groups,
8.3 The parliamentary executive 132 and social movements 317
8.4 The semi-presidential executive 135 18.4 Social organizations in China 319
8.5 Comparing executives 136 19.1 Three models of policy-making 326
8.6 The unlimited presidential executive 137 19.2 Policy instruments: the example of
9.1 Comparing upper chambers 152 tobacco329
10.1 The world’s top ten countries for 19.3 Manipulating policy outcomes 332
e-government165 19.4 Mechanisms of policy convergence 336
10.2 Divisions within the US Department of 19.5 The Doing Business Index 336
Health and Human Services 170 19.6 Comparing policy in democracies and
11.1 Regional government in unitary states 184 authoritarian states 338
11.2 The world’s federations 185 20.1 Five perspectives on political economy 345
11.3 The strengths and weaknesses of 20.2 Forms of welfare 349
federalism189

maps
1.1 The Human Development Index 14 8.1 Executive types 134
4.1 A world divided: states of the world 54 11.1 The world’s federations 185
4.2 The Soviet successor states 59 11.2 The regions of Belgium  188
4.3 The contested borders of Somalia 61 11.3 The provinces of South Africa 191
4.4 The stateless Kurds 63 11.4 The cities of Australia  194
5.1 The Arab Spring 85 18.1 The global state of civil society  319
6.1 The Corruption Perceptions Index 104
preface
In North Korea, the ruling regime carries out a nuclear test. In Zimbabwe, the military removes the leader from
power. In India, the one-time dominant ruling party records its worst ever election defeat. In Britain, the
government struggles to negotiate its country’s exit from the European Union. In Russia, Vladimir Putin is
re-elected for a new term as president. Across the northern hemisphere, millions of people experience record heat.
In the United States, the president opens a trade war with his country’s major trading partners, while baulking at
an investigation into Russian interference with the presidential election.
Why is all this happening, and what does it mean? To provide an answer, we must first locate specific developments
within a broader framework. Why do different political systems operate on different rules, how do the powers of
different governments explain their actions, and how do their citizens feel about the changes they see? Why are
some countries ruled by presidents and others by prime ministers? Why do some countries have a single dominant
political party while others have dozens? And what is the difference between a supreme court and a constitutional
court?
These are the kinds of questions addressed by comparative politics. As well as helping us identify the rules of
government and politics, comparative analysis also helps us make sense of political news from around the world.
Keeping up with that news is one thing, but being able to understand it and place it in context is quite another. And
as advances in technology, trade, and science bring us all closer together, so developments in one part of the world
can have effects on many others, making it more important that we understand the changes we see. By studying
different governments and political systems, we can better understand not just the country in which we live, but
also other countries, their governments, their political decisions, and their people.
This is a book designed to introduce you to the study of comparative government and politics. The goal of the
chapters that follow is to provide a wide-ranging and accessible guide for courses and modules in this fascinating
and essential sub-field of political science. We will look at the methods and theories of comparison, at the differences
between democracies and authoritarian systems, at the many different forms in which the institutions of government
exist, and at the ways in which ordinary people take part – or are prevented from taking part – in government and
in shaping the decisions that affect their lives.
As with the last edition, the book takes a thematic approach to comparison, with chapters divided into three
groups.

◆◆ The first group (Chapters 1–6) provides the foundations, with a review of the key concepts in comparative
politics, followed by chapters on the theories and methods of comparison, on the meaning and the reach of the
state, and on the features of democracies and authoritarian systems.
◆◆ The second group (Chapters 7–12) focuses on institutions, which constitute the core subject matter of political
science. It opens with a chapter on constitutions that assesses the power maps that help us make sense of how
institutions work and relate to one another. This is followed by chapters on executives, legislatures, bureaucracies,
and government at the sub-national and local level, before closing with a chapter on political culture that helps
us understand the broader context within which government and politics works.
◆◆ The third group (Chapters 13–20) looks at political processes, beginning with a survey of political participation,
then looking at political communication, parties, elections, voters, and interest groups. The book ends with
chapters on public policy and political economy.

The book is designed to meet the needs of students in different countries, approaching the study of government
and politics from different perspectives. You may be using it as part of the first (and perhaps only) course or module
you are taking on government and politics, as part of a course you are required to take outside your major subject,
as part of a course you are taking simply because you are interested in politics, or as part of a course you are taking
in your major course of study. Whatever your background and motivation, the chapters that follow are designed to
help you find your way through the many different forms in which politics and government exists around the
world.
 preface xiii

two key themes: democratic reversal, declining trust

Politics is always full of drama, and rarely stands still. There is a ceaseless jockeying for power and influence, a
constantly changing set of needs and demands, and a cast of heroes and villains whose efforts to govern can
sometimes inspire and at other times infuriate. At few times in recent history have the changes been as intense and
as rapidly moving as they are today, producing numerous possibilities as new pressures and opportunities take
countries in different directions.
Among all the changes we are witnessing, two in particular stand out:

◆◆ The reversal of democracy. Not long ago, democrats were encouraged by the end of the Soviet Union and its control
over Eastern Europe, by the end of military governments in Latin America and then in sub-Saharan Africa, and
by the democracy movements in North Africa and the Middle East that gave rise to the Arab Spring. One
scholar (see Chapter 5) was even inspired to declare the triumph of liberal democracy and the ‘end of history’.
More recently, though, democracy appears to have been struggling, with challenges to political rights and civil
liberties even in countries with strong democratic credentials, including the United States, Britain, France, and
Japan. Meanwhile, in many countries that were once democratizing, such as China, Russia, and Turkey, there
has been a reversal in trends as authoritarian leaders and political parties have become more powerful.
◆◆ Declining trust in government. The citizens of countries in many parts of the world have expressed new levels of
discontent with the performance of their governments, and have shown less trust in their leaders while feeling
more politically and economically marginalized. Many worry about what they see as threats to the political,
economic, and social values they once thought they could take for granted. Those threats may be real, or they
may be imagined, but the result in many cases has been a rising tide of populism as new political leaders point
fingers of blame at the political and economic elite. Political and economic divisions have come to the fore,
there have been demands for a return of power to ‘the people’, and new appeals have been made to nationalism
as opposition to immigration and globalization grows, along with support for the creation of walls and barriers,
whether in a physical or legal sense.

These two themes run through the chapters that follow. We will examine not just the structure of political
systems and the ways that citizens relate to them, but we will look also at the ebb and flow of democracy and
authoritarianism, and of populism, nationalism, and globalization. In so doing, we will gain more insights into
some of the broader and more universal questions of comparative politics: who has power, who does not, how do
power relationships evolve, and how do political systems work.

acknowledgements
Writing and producing a book is a team project, dependent on the encouragement of the publisher (writing can be
a solitary undertaking) and the professionalism of the production team. In both regards, Red Globe Press is
perfection to work with. The authors would like to thank Lloyd Langman for his always thorough, focused, and
reassuring leadership on this project, Peter Atkinson for his detailed and creative work on helping bring the project
to completion, Anne Halliday for her excellent input as copy-editor, and Amy Brownbridge for her sterling work
on the production of the book.
The authors would also like to thank the 15 anonymous reviewers – four from the UK, three from the United
States, two from the Netherlands, and one each from Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, and
the United Arab Emirates – who made many useful suggestions that added strongly to the new edition. They would
also like to thank the many other scholars who provided more informal feedback to Red Globe Press, much of
which found its way into the new edition.
Finally, John McCormick sends his love to Leanne, Ian, and Stuart for everything they bring to his life.

about the authors

Rod Hague and Martin Harrop were senior lecturers in politics at the University of Newcastle, UK. John
McCormick is professor of political science at the Indianapolis campus of Indiana University in the United States.
Among his publications are Cases in Comparative Government and Politics (2019), Understanding the European Union (7th
edition, 2017), and Environmental Politics and Policy (2017).
xiv preface

guide to spotlight features

These focus on the 18 country cases from which examples are most often quoted in the body of the text. They in-
clude a brief profile of each country (or regional organization, in the case of the European Union), brief descriptions
of their political features, some key demographic and economic data, and a short case study of each country in the
context of the topic of the chapter in which the Spotlight appears.

Form of government A general description of the form of a government, including dates on state
formation and the adoption of the most recent constitution.
Executive Form and structure of the executive.
Legislature Form and structure of the legislature.
Judiciary Form and structure of the judicial system.
Electoral system Form and structure of the electoral system.
Parties Outline of the party system and the major parties at work in the country.
Population Data for 2017 from World Bank (2018).
Gross Domestic Product Total value of goods and services produced by a country, in US dollars. Data
for 2017 from World Bank (2018).
Per capita Gross Domestic Total value of goods and services produced per head by a country, in US
Product dollars. Data for 2017 from World Bank (2018).
Democracy Index rating From the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017), which divides states into full
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.
Freedom House rating From Freedom House (2018), which divides states into groups rated Free,
Partly Free, or Not Free.
Human Development Index From the United Nations Development Programme (2017), which divides
rating states into groups rated Very High, High, Medium and Low.
guide to the eleventh
­edition
It has only been three years since the last edition of Comparative Government and Politics was published, and yet much
has changed in the world during that time. This new edition is an opportunity to reflect on those changes, but it
also remains true to the core purpose and personality of earlier editions: to provide an introductory survey of
comparative politics, while integrating some fresh perspectives to the study of the topic.

Structure and features. There are five key structural changes to the new edition:

◆◆ The two chapters on theories and methods have been moved up so that they are more closely connected to the
opening chapter on concepts.
◆◆ The chapter on executives has been moved ahead of the chapter on legislatures so that the parliamentary system
can be explained in more depth ahead of the discussion on legislatures.
◆◆ The chapter on political economy has been rewritten and restored in response to requests from several
instructors.
◆◆ The coverage of authoritarian states has been greatly expanded, with more examples inserted throughout the
text and the chapter sections on authoritarian rule expanded by two-thirds or more.
◆◆ For the first time, Comparative Government and Politics appears in full colour, allowing improvements to the
reproduction of figures and tables, with supporting photographs added to illustrate key political phenomena.

All the new features introduced in the last edition have been kept and developed, including the Focus features,
the Previews to each chapter, and the closing sets of Key Arguments. Also, the Spotlight features have been
redesigned, along with new maps and new sets of further reading.

Length. The phenomenon of textbooks that expand with each edition is well known, but Comparative Government
and Politics remains one of the notable exceptions. Even with the addition of a new chapter on political economy,
the eleventh edition remains only slightly longer than the tenth edition.

Classification of political systems. The last edition saw the introduction of the Democracy Index and the
Freedom House ranking Freedom in the World. This dual system of classification has been expanded in this edition,
with more examples used in the body of the text to illustrate the features of both systems.

Country cases. As with the last edition, this one focuses on a selection of case study countries, enhanced in the
new edition so as to provide political, economic, social, and geographical variety, with Turkey added as an example
of a hybrid political system. The cases are as follows:

Full democracies Flawed democracies Hybrid regimes Authoritarian regimes

Germany Brazil Nigeria China
Sweden France Turkey Egypt
UK India Iran
Japan Russia
Mexico Venezuela
South Africa
USA

Note: This classification is drawn from the Democracy Index. The European Union is not classified separately in
the index, but all its member states are either full or flawed democracies.
xvi guide to the eleventh ­edition

Sources. As always, great care has been taken to use the most recent scholarship and the strongest possible range
of sources. The vast majority of the research in political science is published in English by publishers based in
Europe and the United States, which has the effect of producing a somewhat lop-sided view of the world. As well
as working to include a wide variety of case examples, additional efforts have been made with this edition to seek
out scholarship (published in English) from as great a variety of scholars and countries as possible.

major changes to this ­edition

Throughout the book, arguments have been developed, definitions have been tightened, links have been made to
different theories, a wider range of country examples has been added, and the results of new research have been
integrated.

Theme Key changes

Chapter 1 Key concepts More country examples injected, new terms defined, and
the sections on politics and power have been combined.

Chapter 2 Theoretical approaches Moved up from its previous position, new details added on
the range of political theories, and a new section added on
cultural approaches.

Chapter 3 Comparative methods Moved up from its previous position, details expanded on
different methodologies, and expanded sections on
nationalism and globalization.

Chapter 4 The state Expanded section on political authority, new maps added,
more discussion of the effects of nationalism on the state.

Chapter 5 Democratic rule Expanded discussion on democracy and modernization, and

rewritten section on the prospects for democracy.

Chapter 6 Authoritarian rule Expanded explanation of the features and effects of

authoritarianism, with new sections on despotism and
coercion, and a wider range of country examples.

Chapter 7 Constitutions and courts New coverage of codified and uncodified constitutions, and
considerably expanded section on authoritarian states.

Chapter 8 Executives Moved up from its previous position, expanded section on

heads of state and government, and a new category of
unlimited presidential executive.

Chapter 9 Legislatures Moved back from its previous position, new coverage of
models of representation, new discussion of levels of trust,
and expanded section on authoritarian states.

Chapter 10 Bureaucracies Coverage clarified, more detail on new public management

and e-government, and considerably expanded section on
authoritarian states.
 guide to the eleventh ­edition xvii

Theme Key changes

Chapter 11 Sub-national governments Expanded coverage of local government, new maps, a

greater variety of country examples, and additional depth
on authoritarian states.

Chapter 12 Political culture New clarity to the discussion of political culture, new
sections on multiculturalism and identity politics, more
depth on political trust.

Chapter 13 Political participation Expanded discussion of who participates and why, and new
coverage of women in government and politics.

Chapter 14 Political communication Updated to take account of developments with social media
and to account for the problem of fake news, and
considerably expanded section on authoritarian states.

Chapter 15 Elections Many new country examples integrated into the chapter,
with a considerably expanded section on authoritarian
states and the dynamics of their party systems.

Chapter 16 Political parties New details on legislative elections, updated election

results, and considerably expanded coverage of the
dynamics and purposes of elections in authoritarian states.

Chapter 17 Voters Reduced detail on discussion of how voters choose, more

detail added on voter turnout, and new detail added on
voters in authoritarian states.

Chapter 18 Interest groups Expanded section on lobbying, new examples of the work
of interest groups, more country examples, and new detail
on the work of groups in authoritarian states.

Chapter 19 Public policy More comparison injected into the discussion, new
emphasis on issues designed to illustrate the dynamics of
policy, and authoritarian section largely rewritten.

Chapter 20 Political economy New chapter restored from earlier editions, but almost
entirely rewritten, with coverage of all major approaches
and a new section on authoritarian states.
guide to learning features
Key arguments
Each chapter begins with six
key arguments, chosen to
underline some of the more
important points made in the
chapter.

Overview
Each chapter includes an overview
of the subject of the chapter,
placing it within its broader
context and introducing some of
the key themes.

Preview
Each chapter begins with a
250-word outline of the contents
Concepts of the chapter, designed as a
The first time a key preview of what to expect in the
term is used it appears pages that follow.
in boldface and is
separately defined. The
definitions are kept as
brief and clear as
possible, and each term
is listed at the end of
the chapter in which it
is defined.

Figures
A wide range of figures is used throughout
the book to provide visual support to
topics covered in the body of the text.
 guide to learning features xix

Tables Spotlights
These display statistics or key Each chapter includes a
features of a topic in the nearby spotlight case study that
text, or summarize lists of subjects covers a nation’s background
covered in the text. and other statistical data.

Focus
Each chapter includes two Focus features
that provide in-depth treatment of a topic
related to the subject of the chapter.

Discussion questions
Each chapter closes with a set of six
open-ended discussion questions,
designed to consolidate knowledge by
highlighting major issues and to spark
classroom discussions and research
projects.

Key concepts
Designed to help reflect upon and
memorise key concepts, a complete list
of the main terms defined in boxes
across the preceding pages is included
at the end of each chapter.

Further reading
An annotated list of six suggested
readings is included at the end of each
chapter, representing some of the most
recent, important and helpful surveys of
the topics covered in that chapter.
guide to the website
This book is accompanied by a website which provides an array of resources for students and instructors. See:
www.macmillanihe.com/companion/HHM-CGP-11
Spotlight Map
An interactive map providing key
information and statistics about the
countries appearing in the Spotlight
features in this book, as well as a
number of additional countries.
Testbank
The testbank comprises a total of 500
pre-prepared multiple-choice and true
or false questions relating to the
coverage of each of the book’s
chapters.
for students
Flashcard Glossary
These flashcards help students to test
their knowledge of the key terms
highlighted and defined in each chapter.
Guide to Comparative Politics
on the Internet
This guide helps students navigate their
way through the multitude of resources
available on the internet related to the
comparative study of politics.
for instructors
PowerPoint Slides
A corresponding set of PowerPoint slides
has been prepared for each individual
chapter, ready for instructors to adapt
and customize to suit their weekly
lectures.
publisher’s
­acknowledgements
The publisher would like to thank the following for permission to re-use or adapt data, figures or tables from their
publications:

◆◆ SAGE Publications for Tables 1.2 and 17.1.

◆◆ The Inter-Parliamentary Union for Figures 3.3, 9.4, 9.5, 13.3, and 15.2, and Table 9.1.
◆◆ The Swiss Economic Institute for Figure 3.4.
◆◆ The Center for Systemic Peace for Figure 5.3.
◆◆ The World Values Survey for Figures 9.7 and 12.4 (The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map, WVS-6 (2015). Source:
www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
◆◆ The World Economic Forum for Figure 10.7.
◆◆ The International Telecommunication Union for Figure 14.2 and Table 14.2.
◆◆ The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for Figures 18.3 and 20.2.
◆◆ The World Bank for Table 19.5 (World Bank Group. 2016. Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All.
Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25191
License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.).
◆◆ The Fraser Institute for Figure 20.1 ( James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Joshua Hall (2017), ‘Exhibit 1.2a:
Summary Economic Freedom Ratings for 2015’, Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report, Fraser
Institute, pp. 7-8. www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/economic-freedom).
◆◆ The Fund for Peace for Table 4.3.
◆◆ The Comparative Constitutions Project for Figure 7.3.
◆◆ The International Labour Organization for Figures 10.2, 10.3, and 10.6.
◆◆ Taylor & Francis for Figure 17.1.
◆◆ Oxford University Press for Figures 4.2 and 16.3.
key concepts 1

Source: iStock/araelf
contents
◆ Key concepts: an
overview
◆ Government and
governance
PREVIEW ◆ Politics and power
The best place to begin the study of any topic is with an exploration ◆ The state, authority, and
of key concepts. Most of the political terms which interest us are legitimacy
embedded in ordinary language; government, politics, power, and authority
are all familiar terms. But – as we will see – this does not mean that
◆ Ideology
they are easily defi ned, or that political scientists are agreed on how ◆ Comparative politics
best to understand or apply them. ◆ Classifying political
This opening chapter begins with a discussion about the meaning
systems
of government and governance, which are related terms but quite different
in the ideas they convey: the first focuses on institutions while the sec-
ond focuses on processes. We then go on to look at politics, whose core
features are relatively easy to identify, but whose boundaries are not so clear: does it imply a search for a decision, or a
competitive struggle for power? This is followed by a review of the meaning of power, authority, legitimacy, and ideology,
all of which lie at the heart of our understanding of how government and politics work.
The chapter then looks at some of the core purposes of comparative politics, whose value – above all – lies in help-
ing us broaden and deepen our understanding of politics and government, taking us beyond the limitations inherent
in studying a single political system. The chapter ends with a review of the challenges involved in classifying political
systems, and looks at some of the typologies available to help us make better sense of a complex, diverse, and changing
political world.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Like all fields of study, political science uses concepts whose defi nitions – while often disputed – are
important to understand.
◆◆ While government describes the institutions and offices through which societies are governed, governance
describes the process of collective decision-making.
◆◆ An exact defi nition of politics is difficult, because the term has multiple nuances. But it is clearly a
collective activity, occurring between or among people.
◆◆ Power is the capacity to bring about intended effects, and is central to understanding both government
and politics. Authority and legitimacy are key related concepts.
◆◆ Ideology may have lost its original meaning as the science of ideas, but it remains useful as a way of
packaging different views about the role of government and the goals of public policy.
◆◆ Typologies help us compare, imposing order on the variety of the world’s political systems, and helping
us develop explanations and rules.
2 chapter 1

key concepts: an overview

Concept Every field of study is built on a specialized vocabulary made up of terms or concepts that
An idea, term, or need to be understood and defi ned in order to provide us with our points of reference.
category. Political science is no exception. In trying to understand the features which a political
system (see later in this chapter) must possess in order to qualify as a democracy, for example,
Political we can agree that some measure of popular control over the rulers is essential; if there were no
science ways of holding the government to account, there could be no democracy. A good defi nition
The study of the
theory and of a democracy as a concept, then, is a political system in which government is based on a fair
practice of and open mandate from all qualified citizens of a state. As we will see in Chapter 5, though,
government and there are many facets to the discussion of what should – at fi rst glance – be an idea that we can
politics, focusing all understand without too much trouble.
on the structure This opening chapter reviews several of the most important concepts involved in comparative
and dynamics of
institutions, government and politics, providing the foundations for understanding the chapters that follow.
political processes, We will start with government and politics, two concepts that are routinely used interchangeably,
and political but not necessarily applied correctly. We will then look at power, a concept that comes in several
behaviour. different forms. We also begin looking at the meaning of the state (covered in much more depth
in Chapter 4), and how it relates to authority, legitimacy, and ideology.
Social science These concepts are all central to an understanding of the manner in which governments are
The study of
human society and organized and the way in which politics unfolds.We will find, though, that their precise meanings
of the structured are routinely contested. This is a problem found not just in political science, but throughout the
interactions social sciences; there is even some dispute about the meaning of the term social science. It is
among people used here in the context of studying and better understanding the organized relations and inter-
within society. action of people within society. Social scientists study the institutions we build, the rules we agree,
the processes we use, our underlying motives, and the outcomes of our interactions.
Ultimately, we need to understand these concepts in order to constructively make comparisons. In turn, we need
to make those comparisons in order to better understand human behaviour. Comparison is one of the most basic of
all human activities, lying at the heart of almost every choice we make in our lives. No surprise, then, that it should
be central to research in the social sciences as a whole, and political science in particular. We can study government
and political processes in isolation, but without comparing different cases, examples, and situations, we can never really
hope to fully comprehend them, to draw general conclusions about what drives people to act the way they do, or to
be sure that we have considered all the explanatory options. Only by looking at government and politics across place
and time can we build the context to be able to gain a broader and more complete understanding of how they work.

government and governance

Since this is a book about comparative government and politics, the logical place to begin is with a review of the
term government. Small groups of people can reach collective decisions without any special procedures; a family
or sports team can reach an understanding by informal discussion, and these agreements can be self-executing in
the sense that those who make the decision carry it out themselves. However, such simple mechanisms are
impractical for larger units such as towns, cities, or states, which must develop procedures and
Government institutions for making and enforcing collective decisions. By doing so, they give themselves
The institutions
and structures
a government.
through which The term government is usually used to describe the highest level of political offices in a soci-
societies are ety: presidents, prime ministers, legislatures, governors, mayors, and others at the apex of power.
governed. But government actually consists of all organizations charged with reaching and executing deci-
sions for a community. By this definition, the police, the military, bureaucrats, and judges are all
Institution part of government, even if they do not come to office through the methods usually associated
A formal
organization or
with government, such as elections. In this broader conception, government is the entire com-
practice with a munity of institutions endowed with public authority. The term government can also apply to the
political purpose group of people who govern (as in the Japanese government), a specific administration (the Putin
or effect, marked government), the form of the system of rule (centralized government), and the character of the
by durability and administration of a community (good government).
internal
complexity.
The classic case for the institution of government was made in the seventeenth century by
the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (see Focus 1.1). He argued that government provides
 key concepts 3

Focus 1.1
Hobbes’s case for government
The case for government was well made by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) in
his famous treatise Leviathan, published in 1651. His starting point was the
fundamental equality in our ability to inflict harm on others:

For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others.

So arises a clash of ambition and fear of attack:

From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends.
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they
cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is
principally their own conservation, and sometimes their own delectation, Thomas Hobbes.
endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. Source: Getty Images/De Agostini
Picture Library
Without a ruler to keep us in check, the situation becomes grim:

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.

People therefore agree (by means unclear) to set up an absolute government to avoid a life that would
otherwise be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’:

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of
foreigners, and the injuries of one another … is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or
one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will … This done, the
multitude so united is called a COMMONWEALTH.
Source: Hobbes (1651).

us with protection from the harm that we would otherwise inflict on each other in our quest for gain and glory. By
granting a monopoly of the sword to a government, we transform anarchy into order, securing peace and the oppor-
tunity for mutually beneficial cooperation.
In a democracy, government supposedly provides security and predictability to those who live under its jurisdiction
(see Chapter 5). Citizens and businesses can plan for the long term, knowing that laws are developed in a standardized
fashion, take into account competing opinions, and are consistently applied. Of course, nothing is ever that simple,
because governments create their own dangers. The risk of Hobbes’s commonwealth is that it will abuse its own
authority, creating more problems than it solves. As John Locke – one of Hobbes’s critics –
Political
pointed out, there is no profit in avoiding the dangers of foxes if the outcome is simply to be system
devoured by lions (Locke, 1690). A key aim in studying government, then, is to discover how to The interactions
secure its benefits while also limiting its inherent dangers. and organizations
In democracies, government is influenced by wider forces, such as interest groups, political through which a
parties, the media, corporations, and public opinion. In authoritarian systems, meanwhile, the society reaches
and successfully
government may lack much autonomy, and effectively becomes the property of a dominant indi- enforces collective
vidual or clan. In both cases, the forces and influences surrounding government come together to decisions. See also
form a political system. This concept takes us beyond mere institutions and helps us pin down discussion in
all the factors involved in the political life of a given state or community. It has a hard edge, as Chapter 4 about
reflected in the adverb authoritatively in the famous definition of a political system offered by the regimes.
political scientist David Easton (1965):

A political system can be designated as the interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a
society; that is what distinguishes a political system from other systems lying in its environment.
4 chapter 1

Governance The ‘Swedish political system’ means more than ‘Swedish government’; it is the space in
The process by which most of the activity of Swedish politics – positive and negative, in the public or private
which decisions, interest – takes place. It has many similarities with the political systems of Finland, Denmark,
laws, and policies and Norway, but many differences with those in Mexico, South Africa, or India, even if all
are made, with or
without the input
these countries have governing institutions that have approximately the same purpose. (See
of formal Chapter 3 for details on how comparative politics goes about assessing the similarities and the
institutions. differences.)
Another related concept is governance. Where the concept of government suggests a rather
static account based on organizations, the concept of governance highlights the process and quality of collective
decision-making. The emphasis is on the activity of governing, so that we can – for example – speak of global gov-
ernance: there is no such thing as a global government, but there is a large community of international organizations
(such as the United Nations), thousands of treaties that form the basis of international law, and a constant interaction
involving governments, corporations, and interest groups, all of which amount to a process of governance. Governance
directs our attention away from government’s command-and-control function towards the broader task of public reg-
ulation, a role which ruling politicians in democracies share with other bodies. We need the concept of governance as
a supplement, rather than a replacement, for the notion of government.
The notion of governance has been prominent in discussions about the European Union. This regional integration
association has several institutions that look much like an EU government – they include an elected European Par-
liament and a Court of Justice – but which are better regarded as a system of governance (McCormick, 2015). Their
job is to develop policies and laws, and to oversee the implementation of those policies and laws, but they can only do
as much as the foundational treaties of the EU, and the governments of its member states, allow them to do. They are
better seen as servants of the process of European integration than as the government of the EU.
Because governance refers to the activity of ruling, it has also become the preferred term when examining the qual-
ity and effectiveness of rule. In this context, governance refers to what the institutions of government do and to how
well or badly they do it. Good governance should, at a minimum, be accountable, transparent, efficient, responsive, and
inclusive, but these are all ideals; even those countries that rank at the top of political rating systems (see later in this
chapter) have flaws. The kind of bad governance that we so often find in authoritarian systems is much more clearly
evident; see Spotlight Nigeria as an example.

politics and power

While government is tangible in the sense that we can see most of the people in government, and the buildings that
institutions inhabit, politics and power are much less easy to identify and to measure. In the debate over the
meaning of politics, for example, we can easily list and agree examples of political activity.
Politics When the President and Congress in the United States engage in their annual tussle over the
The process by budget, for example, they are clearly engaged in politics. When the Spanish region of Catalonia
which people held non-binding independence referendums in 2014 and again in 2017, politics was again on
negotiate and
compete in the view. When thousands of Iranians took to the streets during 2017–18 to protest rising food
process of making prices (and also to express their opposition to the government), they too were taking part in
and executing politics. The political heartland, as represented by such examples, is clear enough.
shared or collective However, the boundaries of politics are less precise. When one country invades another, is it
decisions. engaged in politics or merely in war? When a dictatorship suppresses a demonstration by vio-
lence, is it playing or preventing politics? When a court issues a ruling about privacy, should its
judgment be read as political or judicial? Is politics restricted to governments, or can it also be found in businesses,
families, and even university classrooms?
A crisp definition of politics – one which fits just those things we instinctively call ‘political’ – is difficult, because
the term is used in so many different ways. But three aspects of politics are clear:

◆◆ It is a collective activity, occurring between and among people. A lone castaway on a desert island could not
engage in politics, but if there were two castaways on the same island, they would have a political relationship.
◆◆ It involves making decisions regarding a course of action to take, or a disagreement to be resolved.
◆◆ Once reached, political decisions become authoritative policy for the group, binding and committing its
members (even if some of them continue to resist, which is – in itself – a political activity).
 key concepts 5

Politics is unavoidable because of the social nature of humans. We live in groups that must reach collective
decisions about using resources, relating to others, and planning for the future. A country deliberating on whether
to go to war, a family discussing where to go on holiday, a company deciding where to locate a new factory, a
university deciding whether its priority lies with teaching or research: these are all examples of groups forming
judgements affecting their members. Politics involves assessing different opinions, and ideally brings them together
into a compromise course of action.
Once reached, decisions must be implemented. Means must be found to ensure the acquiescence and preferably
the consent of the group’s members. Once set, taxes must be raised; once adopted, regulations must be imposed; once
planned and funded, highways must be built. Public authority – and even force if needed – is used to implement collec-
tive policy, and citizens who fail to contribute to the common task may be fined or even imprisoned by the authorities.
As a concept, then, politics can be defined idealistically as the process of making and executing collective deci-
sions based on the pursuit of a group’s common interest, or at least on seeking peaceful reconciliation of the different
interests within a group. This interpretation of politics as a community-serving activity can be traced to the ancient
Greeks.The philosopher Aristotle (384–322 bce) argued that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (1962 edn), by which
he meant not only that politics is unavoidable, but also that it is the highest human activity, the feature which most
clearly separates us from other species. His view was that people can only express their nature as reasoning, virtuous
beings by participating in a political community which seeks to identify the common interest through discussion, and
tries to pursue it through actions to which all contribute. In Aristotle’s model constitution, ‘the ideal citizens rule in
the interests of all, not because they are forced to by checks and balances, but because they see it as right to do so’
(Nicholson, 2004).
This idea of politics as a peaceful process of open discussion leading to collective decisions acceptable to all stake-
holders in society is all well and good, but the reality rarely measures up to the ideal. Perhaps more realistically, politics
can also be seen as a competitive struggle for power and resources between people and groups seeking their own ad-
vantage. From this second perspective, politics can involve narrow concerns taking precedence over collective benefits
when those in authority place their own goals above those of the wider community, using methods that can spill over
into manipulation, corruption, and perhaps even violence and bloodshed.
In this view, politics is a competition for acquiring and keeping power, a process that yields winners and losers. This
is reflected in the famous definition by the political scientist Harold Lasswell (1936) of politics as ‘who gets what, when,
how’. In short, it is anything but the disinterested pursuit of the public interest. Taking the cynical (or perhaps realistic)
extreme, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz once said that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’,
a view backed up by Chinese leader Mao Zedong when he said that ‘war is politics with bloodshed’. But we could as
easily turn these ideas around and argue that politics is the continuation of war by other means, or that politics is war
without bloodshed.
Politics, then, has many different facets. It involves shared and competing interests; cooperation and conflict; reason
and force. Each concept is necessary, but only together are they sufficient. The essence of politics lies in the interaction
between conceptions, and we should not narrow our vision by reducing politics to either one. As Laver (1983) puts it:
‘Pure conflict is war. Pure cooperation is true love. Politics is a mixture of both.’
Meanwhile, at the heart of politics is the distribution and manipulation of power. The word comes from the
Latin potere, meaning ‘to be able’, which is why the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1938) saw power as ‘the production of
intended effects’.The greater our ability to determine our own fate, the more power we possess. In this sense, describing
Germany as a powerful country means that it has a high level of ability to achieve its objectives,
whatever those may be. Conversely, to lack power – as do many poor or unstable countries – is to Power
The capacity to
fall victim to circumstance. Arguably, though, every state has power, even if it is the kind of nega- bring about
tive power involved in obliging a reaction from bigger and wealthier states; Somali pirates, Syrian intended effects.
refugees, and illegal migrants from Mexico may seem powerless, but all three groups spark policy The term is often
responses from the governments of those countries they most immediately affect. used as a synonym
Notice that the emphasis here is on power to rather than power over – on the ability to achieve for influence, but
is also used more
goals, rather than the more specific exercise of control over other people or countries. But most narrowly to refer
analyses of power focus on relationships: on power over others. Here, the three dimensions of to more forceful
power distinguished by Steven Lukes (2005) (see Table 1.1) are useful, because they help us modes of influence
answer the question of how we can measure a group’s power, or at least establish whether one notably, getting
group is more powerful than another. As we move through these dimensions, so the conception one’s way by
threats.
of power becomes more subtle – but also, perhaps, somewhat stretched beyond its normal use.
 SPOTLIGHT NIGERIA
Brief profile
Although Nigeria has been independent since 1960, it was not until 2015 that it experienced a presidential
election in which the incumbent was defeated by an opposition opponent. This makes an important point about
the challenges faced by Africa’s largest country by population, and one of the continent’s major regional powers,
in developing a stable political form. Nigeria is currently enjoying its longest spell of civilian government since
independence, but the military continues to play an important role, the economy is dominated by oil, corruption
is rife at every level of society, security concerns and poor infrastructure discourage foreign investment, and a
combination of ethnic and religious divisions pose worrying threats to stability. Incursions and attacks since 2002
by the Islamist group Boko Haram, have added to the country’s problems, but it has still – nonetheless – been
recently upgraded from authoritarian to a hybrid on the Democracy Index.

Form of government Federal presidential republic consisting of 36 states and a Federal Capital
Territory. State formed 1960, and most recent constitution adopted 1999.
Executive Presidential. A president elected for a maximum of two four-year terms,
supported by a vice-president and cabinet of ministers, with one from each of
Nigeria’s states.
Legislature Bicameral National Assembly: lower House of Representatives (360 members)
and upper Senate (109 members), both elected for fixed and renewable four-year
terms.
Judiciary Federal Supreme Court, with 14 members nominated by the president, and
either confirmed by the Senate or approved by a judicial commission.
Electoral system President elected in national contest, and must win a majority of all votes cast
and at least 25 per cent of the vote in at least two-thirds of Nigeria’s states.
Possibility of two runoffs. National Assembly elected using single-member
plurality.
Parties Multi-party, led by the centrist People’s Democratic Party and the conservative
All Nigeria People’s Party.

186m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$375bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$1,969 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Government and politics in
Nigeria
Many of the facets of the debate about
government, politics, power, and authority
are on show in Nigeria, a country that is still
struggling to develop a workable political
form and national identity in the face of
multiple internal divisions.
Understanding Nigeria is complicated
by the lack of durable governmental
patterns. Since independence in 1960,
Nigerians have lived through three periods
of civilian government, fi ve successful and
several attempted military coups, a civil
President Muhammadu Buhari addresses members of the Nigerian war, and nearly 30 years of military rule.
National Assembly in Abuja after submitting his annual federal budget. The first civilian government (1960–66)
Source: Getty Images/Sunday Aghaeze/Stringer. was based on the parliamentary model,
but the second and third (1979–83, and
1999–present) were based on the presidential form. Since 2007, Nigeria has twice made the transition from
one civilian government to another, and the long-term political prognosis has improved. Still, considerable
uncertainties remain.
Political doubts reflect economic drift, and vice versa. The country’s growing population is expected to double
in the next 25 years, straining an infrastructure that is already woefully inadequate to support a modern economy.
Nigeria’s core economic problem is its heavy reliance on oil, which leaves the size and health of the economy –
as well as government revenues –
dependent on the fluctuating price of
NIGER
oil. To make matters worse, much of CHAD
the oil wealth has been squandered and
stolen, feeding into the corruption that
is rife in Nigeria, and there have been
bitter political arguments over how BENIN NIGERIA
best to spend the balance. ABUJA
Nigeria’s problems are more than just TOGO
economic. In social terms, Nigeria is
divided by ethnicity, handicapping efforts Lagos
to build a sense of national identity. It is
also separated by religion, with a mainly CAMEROON
Muslim north, a non-Muslim south, and Gulf of Guinea
controversial pressures from the north
to expand the reach of sharia, or Islamic
law. Regional disparities are fundamental,
with a north that is dry and poor and a Further reading
south that is better endowed in
Bourne, Richard (2015) Nigeria: A New History of a Turbulent Century
resources and basic services. Regional
(Zed Books).
tensions have been made worse by oil, Campbell, John (2013) Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Rowman &
most of which lies either in the south- Littlefield).
east or off the coast, but with much of Campbell, John, and Matthew T. Page (2018) Nigeria: What Everyone
the profit distributed to political elites in Needs to Know (Oxford University Press).
other parts of the country.
8 chapter 1

Table 1.1 Lukes’s three dimensions of power

Dimension Core question Core quality

First Who prevails when preferences
conflict?
Second Who controls whether
preferences are expressed?
Third Who shapes preferences?
Source: Lukes (2005).
Decisions are made on issues over which there is an
observable conflict of interests.
Decisions are prevented from being taken on potential issues
over which there is an observable conflict of interests.
Potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through
social forces, institutional practices, or the decisions of
individuals.

The first dimension is straightforward: power should be judged by identifying whose views prevail when the actors
involved possess conflicting views on what should be done. The greater the correspondence between a person’s views
and decisions reached, the greater is that person’s influence: more wins indicate more power. This decision-making
approach, as it is called, was pioneered by the political scientist Robert Dahl (1961a) in his classic study of democracy
and power in the city of New Haven, Connecticut. In the United States, for example, and in spite of repeated mass
shootings, the successful lobbying of the gun lobby has meant that most leaders of the two major political parties have
refused to impose meaningful limits on gun ownership, forming what amounts to an elite conspiracy to make sure
that guns remain widely available. So far, at least, the gun lobby has prevailed; it has the power (see Chapter 18). The
approach is relatively clear and concrete, based on identifying preferences and observing decisions, and connecting
directly with the concept of politics as the resolution of conflict within groups.
The second dimension focuses on the capacity to keep issues off the political agenda by preventing the emergence
of topics which would threaten the values or interests of decision-makers. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) once put it,
‘to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public air-
ing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power’. In China, for example, fear of government reprisals currently
discourages many people from expressing their support for a transition to democracy. By narrowing the public agenda
in this way, the ruling communist party renders democracy a non-issue. In order to address the problem of control over
the agenda, we need to both study the groups that gain the most from political decisions or the status quo, and those
whose views are not heard.
The third dimension broadens our conception of power by extending it to cover the formation, rather than
­merely the expression, of preferences. Where the first and second dimensions assume conflicting preferences, the third
­dimension addresses the idea of a manipulated consensus. In war time, for example, governments often seek to sustain
public morale by preventing news of military defeats or high casualties from seeping into the public domain. In this
and similar cases, agenda control is achieved by manipulating the flow of information so as to prevent any conflict
from arising in the first place. So this third dimension of power focuses on manipulating preferences rather than just
preventing their expression.
The implication of these examples is that the most efficient form of power is one that allows us to shape people’s
information and preferences, thus preventing the first and second dimensions from coming into play. Denying people
access to information is one way of achieving this, as in the example of the selective briefings initially provided by the
power company responsible for operating the Japanese nuclear power station which leaked radiation after the 2011
earthquake. Power, then, is not just about whose preferences win out; we must also consider whose opinions are kept
out of the debate and also the wider context in which those preferences are formed.

the state, authority, and legitimacy

We will look at the state in more detail in Chapter 4, but a brief preview is needed here so that we can grasp two
other concepts that lie at the heart of our understanding of government and politics: authority and legitimacy. The
world is divided into nearly 200 states (the exact number, as we will see, is debatable – see Focus 4.1), each containing
a population living within a defined territory, and each recognized by its residents and by other states as having the
right to rule that territory. States provide the legal mandate for the work of governments, allowing them to use the
 key concepts 9

authority inherent in the state. We can compare government and politics at multiple levels, from the national to
the local, but it is the state that provides us with our most important point of reference as we work through the
complexities of comparison, and states need both authority and legitimacy in order to function effectively.
Authority is a concept that is broader than power and, in some ways, more fundamental to comparative politics.
Where power is the capacity to act, authority is the acknowledged right to do so. It exists when subordinates accept
the capacity of superiors to give legitimate orders, so that while Russia may exercise some power
over Russians living in neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Kazakh- Authority
stan, its formal authority stops at the Russian border. The German sociologist Max Weber (1922) The right to rule.
Authority creates
suggested that, in a relationship of authority, the ruled implement the command as if they had its own power, so
adopted it spontaneously, for its own sake. For this reason, authority is a more efficient form of long as people
control than brute power.Yet, authority is more than voluntary compliance. To acknowledge the accept that the
authority of your state does not mean you always agree with its decisions; it means only that you person in
accept its right to make them and your own duty to obey. In this way, authority provides the authority has the
right to make
foundation for the state. decisions.
Just as there are different sources of power, so too can authority be built on a range of foun-
dations. Weber distinguished three ways of validating political power:

◆◆ By tradition, or the accepted way of doing things.

◆◆ By charisma, or intense commitment to a leader and his or her message.
◆◆ By appeal to legal–rational norms, based on the rule-governed powers of an office, rather than a person.

This classification remains useful today, even in democracies where we might think that Legitimacy
legal–rational authority is the dominant form. We can also add to Weber’s ideas: much of what The condition of
a leader can or cannot achieve, for example, comes down to competence – or at least, to the being legitimate. A
perception that a leader actually knows what they are doing – and to the extent to which legitimate system
of government is
leaders are able to represent the moral values and ideological goals of their followers. one based on
Legitimacy builds on, but is broader than, authority. When a state is widely accepted by its authority, and
citizens, and by other states with which it deals, we describe it as legitimate. Thus, we speak of the those subject to
authority of an official but the legitimacy of a state. Although the word legitimacy comes from the Latin its rule recognize
legitimare, meaning ‘to declare lawful’, legitimacy is much more than mere legality: where legality its right to make
decisions.
is a technical matter, referring to whether a rule is made correctly by following regular procedures,
legitimacy is a more political concept, referring to whether people accept the authority of a state, Ideology
without which its very existence is in question. A system of
Legality is a topic for lawyers; political scientists are more interested in issues of legitimacy: how connected beliefs,
a political system wins, keeps, and sometimes loses public faith in its right to function. A flourish- a shared view of
ing economy, international success, and a popular governing party will boost the legitimacy of a the world, or a
blueprint for how
political system, even though legitimacy is more than any of these things. In fact, we can think of politics,
legitimacy as the credit a political system has built up from its past successes, a reserve that can be economics, and
drawn down in bad times. In any event, public opinion – not a law court – is the test of legitimacy. society should be
And it is legitimacy, rather than force alone, which provides the most stable foundation for rule. structured.

ideology
The concepts reviewed so far have mainly been about politics, but ideas also play a role in politics: political action is
motivated by the ideas people hold about it. One way to understand this is via the notion of ideology. This is a
term that was coined by the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy during the 1790s, in the aftermath of the
French Revolution, to describe the science of ideas. Its meaning has long since changed, and it now denotes
packages of ideas related to different views about the role of government and the goals of public policy. An ideology
is today understood as any system of thought expressing a view on human nature, the proper relationship between
state and society, and the individual’s position within this order.
Which specific political outlooks should be regarded as ideologies is a matter of judgement, but Figure 1.1 offers
a selection. In any case, the era of explicit ideology beginning with the French Revolution ended in the twentieth
century with the defeat of fascism in 1945 and the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s. Ideology seemed
10 chapter 1

Ideology Typical features

All forms of governmental authority are unnecessary, and society is best structured around
Anarchism
voluntary cooperation and free association.

Elimination of the state system and private property will lead to the creation of a classless,
Marxism
non-exploitive, and self-governing society.

Individuals are the best judges of their own interests. Advocates a tolerant society which maximizes
Liberalism
personal freedom, and favours a government which is limited but freely elected.

Traditional institutions and practices work best, the free market is the most efficient at meeting
Conservatism
societal needs, and government should be as decentralized as possible.

Supports the achievement of national unity through an authoritarian state, strong leadership, mass
Fascism
mobilization, and an emphasis on nationalism and militarism.

Figure 1.1 Major ideologies: five examples

to have been destroyed by the mass graves it had itself generated. Of course, intellectual currents – such as environ-
mentalism, feminism, and Islamism – continue to circulate, but it is doubtful whether contemporary ideas, values, and
priorities constitute ideologies in the classical sense. To describe any perspective, position, or priority as an ideology
is to extend the term in a manner that bears little relation to its original interpretation as a coherent system of ideas.
Even though the age of ideology may have passed, we still tend to talk about ideologies, placing them – and the p­ olitical
parties with which they are associated – on a spectrum between right and left. For the origins of this habit we turn again
to revolutionary France, where – in the legislative assemblies of the era – royalists sat to the right of the presiding o ­ fficer,
in the traditional p­ osition of honour, while radicals and commoners sat to the left.To be on the right implied support for
aristocratic, royal, and clerical interests, while being on the left implied support for a secular republic and civil liberties.
The words ‘left’ and ‘right’ are still commonly encountered in classifying political parties; see Chapter 16. Hence the
left is associated with equality, human rights, and reform, while the right favours tradition, established authority, and
pursuit of the national interest. The left supports policies to reduce inequality; the right is more accepting of natural
inequalities. The left sympathizes with cultural and ethnic diversity; the right is more comfortable with national unity.
(See Table 1.2 for more details.) Surveys suggest that most voters in democracies can situate themselves as being on the
left or right, even if many simply equate these labels with a particular party or class (Mair, 2009).
Although the terms left and right have travelled well throughout the democratic world, enabling us to compare
­political parties and programmes across countries and time, the specific issues over which these tendencies compete
have varied, and the terms are better understood as labels for containers of ideas, rather than as well-defined ideas in
themselves. The blurring of the distinctions can be seen in Europe, where the left (socialists and communists) once
favoured nationalization of industries and services, and the right (conservatives) supported a free market, but the wide-
spread acceptance of the market economy has meant that the concepts of left and right have lost some bite.

Table 1.2 Contrasting themes of left and right

Left Right
Peace Armed forces
Global outlook National priorities
Democracy Authority, morality, and the constitution
Planning and public ownership Free market
Trade protection Free trade
Social security Social harmony
Education Law and order
Collectivist Individualist
Source: Adapted from Budge (2006).
Note: Based on an analysis of the programmes of left- and right-wing political parties in 50 democracies, 1945–98.
 key concepts 11

comparative politics
Recent years have seen the rise of political leaders and parties who have based their appeal on a combination of nationalism
(discussed in more depth in Chapter 4) and populism (Chapter 5). In the United States, Britain, France, Hungary,
Poland, India, and the Philippines, to name just a few, we have seen new support for the idea that countries should put
national interests first and build literal and metaphorical barriers with their neighbours and trading partners. What has
been going on here? Why have such similar policies been pursued by such a diverse group of
countries? What impact have these changes had on the health of democracy in those countries? Comparative
We could study each of these countries in isolation, but it would only be through comparing their politics
The systematic
records that we could gain real insight into the motives and thinking behind these trends.
study of
Comparative politics is just one of the major sub-fields of political science (see Figure 1.2), government and
but it is also arguably the most important and the most fundamental. Its core goal is to understand politics in different
how government and politics works by examining its varieties across a range of cases. Compar- countries,
ison has much to offer, including improvements in the simple description of political systems designed to better
understand them
and institutions, helping us understand the broader context within which they work, helping us
by drawing out
develop theories and rules of politics, and showing us how similar problems are approached by their contrasts
different societies. But two particular purposes are worth elaboration: broadening our under- and similarities.
standing of the political world, and predicting political outcomes.

Broadening understanding
The first strength of a comparative approach is straightforward: it improves our understanding of government and
politics. Through comparison we can pin down the key features of political institutions, processes, and actions, and
better appreciate the dynamics and character of political systems. We can study a specific government, legislature,
party system, social movement, or national election in isolation, but to do so would be to deny us the broader context
made possible by comparison. How could we otherwise know if the object of our study was unusual or usual, efficient
or inefficient, the best option available or significantly lacking in some way?
When we talk of understanding, it is not only the need to comprehend other political systems, but also to under-
stand our own.We can follow domestic politics closely and think we have a good grasp on how it works, but we cannot
fully understand it without comparing it with other systems; this will tell us a great deal about the nature of our home
system. Consider the argument made by Dogan and Pelassy (1990):

Because the comprehension of a single case is linked to the understanding of many cases, because we perceive the
particular better in the light of generalities, international comparison increases tenfold the possibility of explaining
political phenomena. The observer who studies just one country could interpret as normal what in fact appears to the
comparativist as abnormal.

Sub-field Subject matter

Comparative
The comparative study of politics and government in different settings.
politics

International The study of relations between and among states, including diplomacy, foreign policy, international
relations organizations, war and peace.

The study of politics and government in the setting of individual states, including institutions and
National politics
political processes.

Political
The study of political philosophy, addressing issues such as authority, ethics, and freedom.
philosophy

Political theory The study of abstract or generalized approaches to understanding political phenomena.

Public policy The study of the positions taken or avoided by governments in response to public needs.

Figure 1.2 Sub-fields of political science

Note: Political science is subdivided differently in different countries and by different academic traditions. Other sub-fields include law, methodology,
political economy, and public administration.
12 chapter 1

Comparison also has the practical benefit of allowing us to learn about places with which we are unfamiliar. This
ability to interpret events outside our borders grows in importance as globalization continues to deepen and broaden
the political, economic, and social links among us, as events from other parts of the world have a more direct impact on
our lives, and as we find that we can no longer afford to ignore the ‘foreign’. Understanding government and politics
in other systems not only helps us interpret the news, but also helps with practical political relationships. Diplomats, for
example, know the importance of understanding the political, economic, and social realities of the governments with
which they interact and negotiate.

Predicting political outcomes

Comparison helps us make generalizations that can, in theory at least, help us predict the outcome of political events.
Hence a careful study of, say, campaigning and public opinion will help us better understand the possible outcome
of elections. For example, we know from a study of those European countries where proportional representation is
used that its use is closely tied to the presence of more political parties winning seats and the creation of coalition
governments. Similarly, if we know that subcontracting the provision of public services to private agencies increases
their cost-effectiveness in one country, governments elsewhere will see that this is an idea at least worth considering.
If the explanation of a phenomenon is sound, and all the relevant factors have been reviewed and considered, then
it follows that our explanations should allow us to predict with at least a high degree of accuracy, if not with absolute
certainty. But while the study of the physical and natural sciences has generated vast numbers of laws that allow us to
predict physical and natural phenomena, the social sciences have not fared so well. They do not generate laws so much
as theories, tendencies, likelihoods, adages, or aphorisms. A famous example of the latter is Lord Acton’s, that ‘Power
tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely’ (see Chapter 6). While the idea contains much truth,
it is not a rule or a law, and thus cannot be used either to explain or to predict with absolute certainty.
While there is a lot to be said for strengthening predictions by drawing lessons from different countries, and asking
‘what would happen if … ?’ questions, there are many who argue that political science should not – or cannot – be in
the business of predicting to begin with. Karl Popper (1959) long ago asserted that long-term predictions could only
be developed in regard to systems that were ‘well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent’, and human society was not one
of them. More recently, an opinion piece in the New York Times (Stevens, 2012) raised hackles when it argued that in
terms of offering accurate predictions, political science had ‘failed spectacularly and wasted colossal amounts of time
and money’. It went on to assert that no political scientist foresaw the break-up of the Soviet Union, the rise of Al
Qaeda, or the Arab Spring. It quoted an award-winning study of political experts (Tetlock, 2005) which concluded that
‘chimps randomly throwing darts at the possible outcomes would have done almost as well as the experts’.
As we will see in Chapter 2, though, the problem lies less in comparison as such (which, after all, lies at the heart
of the scientific method) than in the way we compare. The results of our research will depend on the number and
the combination of the cases we use, the depth of information we have about each case, the reliability of our data, the
research methods we use, and the extent to which we allow biases and assumptions to shape our research. Despite the
pioneering role of the ancient Greeks, government and politics have been studied in a structured manner for barely
a century, there is still a great deal that we do not fully understand, and there are still many vigorous debates about
meaning and interpretation. Comparison has opened up new horizons and exciting new possibilities as we learn more
about the sheer variety of forms in which government and politics can be found.

classifying political systems

Although the political systems of states have many core elements in common – an executive, a legislature, courts,
a constitution, parties, and interest groups, for example – the manner in which these elements work and relate to
Typology one another is often different. The results are also different: some states are clearly democratic,
A system of some are clearly authoritarian, and others sit somewhere along a spectrum between these two
classification by core points of reference. To complicate matters, political systems are moving targets: they
which states, evolve and change, and often at a rapid pace. In order to make sense of this confusing picture,
institutions,
it is helpful to have a guide through the maze.
processes, political
cultures, and so A typology is a system of classification that divides states into groups or clusters with common
on are divided into features. With this in hand, we can make broad assumptions about the states in each group, using
groups or types case studies to provide more detailed focus, and thus work more easily to develop explanations
with common sets and rules, and to test theories of political phenomena (Yin, 2018). The ideal typology is one that
of attributes.
is simple, neat, consistent, logical, and as real and useful to the casual observer as it is to journalists,
 key concepts 13

political leaders, or political scientists. Unfortunately, such an ideal has proved hard to achieve; scholars of comparative
politics disagree about the value of typologies, and even those who use them cannot agree on the criteria that should
be taken into account, or the groups into which states should be divided, or the labels to use, or even which states to
place in each group.
The first attempt at developing such a system – and one of the earliest examples of comparative politics at work –
was Aristotle’s classification of the 158 city-states of Ancient Greece. Between approximately 500 and 338 bce, these
communities were small settlements showing much variety in their forms of rule, providing him with an ideal labora-
tory in which to consider which type of political system provided what he looked for in a government: stability and
effectiveness.
Aristotle based his scheme on two dimensions.The first was the number of people involved in the task of governing:
one, few, or many. This dimension captured the breadth of participation in a political system. His second dimension,
more difficult to apply but no less important, was whether rulers governed in the common interest (‘the genuine form’)
or in their own interest (‘the perverted form’). For Aristotle, the significance of this second aspect was that a political
system would be more stable and effective when its rulers governed in the long-term interests of the community.
Cross-classifying the number of rulers with the nature of rule yielded the six types of government shown in Figure 1.3.
Another example of an attempt to build a typology was The Spirit of the Laws, a treatise on political theory written
by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, and first published in 1748. He identified three types: republican sys-
tems in which the people or some of the people had supreme power, monarchical systems in which one person ruled
on the basis of fixed and established laws, and despotic systems in which a single person ruled on
the basis of their own priorities and perspectives. Three Worlds
Both typologies remain interesting as historical examples, but the political realities out of which system
they were formed have long since changed. A more recent example that was current throughout A political
much of the Cold War (late 1940s to late 1980s) was the Three Worlds system. Less a formal typology that
divided the world
classificatory template developed by political scientists than a response to geopolitical realities, it along ideological
divided the world into three groups of countries based on ideological goals and political alliances: lines, with states
labelled according
◆◆ First World: wealthy, democratic industrialized states, most of which were partners in the to the side they
Western alliance against communism. took in the Cold
War.
◆◆ Second World: communist systems, including most of those states ranged against the
Western alliance.
◆◆ Third World: poorer, less democratic, and less developed states, some of which took sides in the Cold War, but
some of which did not.

The system was simple and evocative, providing neat labels that could be slipped with ease into media headlines
and everyday conversation: even today the term Third World conjures up powerful images of poverty,
underdevelopment, corruption, and political instability. But it was always more descriptive than analytical in the
Aristotelean spirit, and was also dangerously simplistic. The First and Second Worlds had the most internal logic
and consistency, but to consider almost all the states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a single Third World was
asking too much: some were democratic while others were authoritarian; some were wealthy while others were
poor; and some were industrialized while others were agrarian.
The end of the Cold War meant the end of this particular typology, but nothing has replaced it in the sense of having
won general support. There have been many candidates, though, of which two in particular – the Democracy Index
maintained by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Freedom in the World index maintained by Freedom House –
are among the most often quoted (see Focus 1.2).They are not perfect: questions can be asked about the methodologies

Rule by

One Few Many

Form Genuine Kingship Aristocracy Polity
Perverted Tyranny Oligarchy Democracy

Figure 1.3 Aristotle’s classification of governments

Source: Aristotle (1962 edn: Book 3, Chapter 5).
14 chapter 1

Focus 1.2
Two options for classifying political systems
With political scientists unable to develop and agree a means of classifying political systems, it has been left
to the non-academic world to step into the breach. The two most compelling typologies (used in this book)
are the following:

◆◆ The UK-based Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, related to The Economist, a British weekly news magazine)
maintains a Democracy Index based on 60 different measures. These include such factors as the
protection of basic political freedoms, the fairness of elections, the security of voters, election turnout
rates, the freedom of political parties to operate, the independence of the judiciary and the media, and
arrangements for the transfer of power. It then gives states a score out of ten, and divides them into four
groups: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. In the 2017
index, Norway ranked highest with a score of 9.87 and North Korea lowest with a score of 1.08.
◆◆ The Freedom in the World index has been published annually since 1972 by Freedom House, a US-based
research institute. It looks at the records of states in the areas of political rights (the ability of people to
participate in the political process) and civil liberties (including freedom of expression, the independence
of the judiciary, personal autonomy, and economic rights), and gives each state a score out of 100, rating
them as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. Several countries – including Syria and North Korea – have
sometimes been ranked in the index as the ‘Worst of the Worst’.

Table 1.3 combines the results of these two typologies, focusing on the 18 cases used in this book, while also
including examples of countries with the highest and lowest scores on each index. In both indices there have
been worrying declines in recent years, the authors of both reports commenting on the kind of reversals of
democracy we will examine in other parts of this book. Among the more notable changes of recent years were
the downgrading by the EIU of the United States, Japan, and France from full democracies to flawed democracies.

Very high Medium Data unavailable

High Low

Map 1.1 The Human Development Index

Source: United Nations Development Programme (2017).
 key concepts 15

Table 1.3 Comparative political ratings

Democracy Index Freedom in the World

Score Category Score Freedom rating
Norway 9.87 Full democracy 100 Free
Sweden* 9.39 Full democracy 100 Free
Canada 9.15 Full democracy 99 Free
New Zealand 9.26 Full democracy 98 Free
Germany* 8.61 Full democracy 94 Free
UK* 8.53 Full democracy 94 Free
USA* 7.98 Flawed democracy 86 Free
Japan* 7.88 Flawed democracy 96 Free
France* 7.80 Flawed democracy 90 Free
South Africa* 7.24 Flawed democracy 78 Free
India * 7.23 Flawed democracy 77 Free
Brazil* 6.86 Flawed democracy 78 Free
Mexico* 6.41 Flawed democracy 62 Partly Free
Nigeria* 4.44 Hybrid 50 Partly Free
Bangladesh 5.43 Hybrid 45 Partly Free
Kenya 5.11 Hybrid 48 Partly Free
Turkey* 4.88 Hybrid 32 Not Free
Thailand 4.63 Hybrid 31 Not Free
Venezuela* 3.87 Authoritarian 26 Not Free
Egypt* 3.36 Authoritarian 26 Not Free
Russia* 3.17 Authoritarian 20 Not Free
China* 3.10 Authoritarian 14 Not Free
Iran* 2.45 Authoritarian 18 Not Free
Saudi Arabia 1.93 Authoritarian 7 Not Free
North Korea 1.08 Authoritarian 3 Not Free
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) and Freedom House (2018).
Note: * Cases used in this book. European Union is not rated.

upon which they are based, we should take into consideration the agendas and values of the EIU and Freedom House,
and we should beware the danger of taking classifications and rankings too literally; government and politics are too
complex to be reduced to a single table. Nonetheless, these rankings give us a useful point of reference and a guide
through an otherwise confusing world, and we will use them in the chapters that follow.
We will go further and also use some economic and social data to help us find our way through the maze. The
­relationship between politics and economics in particular is so intimate that – as we will see in Chapter 20 – there is an
entire field of study devoted to its examination, called political economy.This involves looking not just at the structure
and wealth of economies, but also at the influences on economic performance: good governance is more likely to
produce a successful economy, and bad governance less so.
16 chapter 1

Gross The core measure of economic activity is output. There are various ways of measuring this,
domestic the most popular today being gross domestic product (GDP) (see Table 1.4). This is the sum
product of the value of the domestic and foreign economic output of the residents of a country in a
The core measure given year, and is usually converted to US dollars to allow comparison. Although the accuracy
of the size of of the data itself varies by country, and the conversion to dollars raises additional questions
economies,
calculated by
about the appropriate exchange rate, such measures are routinely used by governments and
giving a monetary international organizations in measuring economic size. While GDP provides a measure of the
value to all goods absolute size of national economies, however, it does not take into account population size. For
and services a more revealing comparison, we use per capita GDP, which gives us a better idea of the relative
produced within a economic development of different states.
country in a given
year, regardless of
Finally, we must not forget the importance of gauging political systems by looking at their
who owns the relative performances in terms of providing their citizens with basic needs. There are different
different means of ways of understanding ‘basic needs’, but at a minimum they would include adequate nutrition,
production. education, and health care, and in this regard the most often-used comparative measure of social
conditions is the Human Development Index main-
Table 1.4 Comparing economic size tained by the UN Development Programme. Using a
combination of life expectancy, adult literacy, educa-
Country GDP Per capita tional enrolment, and per capita GDP, it rates human
(billion US $) GDP (US $) development for most of the states in the world as either
United States 19,390 59,531 very high, high, medium, or low. On the 2017 index,
European Union 17,278 33,715
most democracies were in the top 30, while the poorest
states ranked at the bottom of the table, with Niger in
China 12,238 8,827 last place at 187 (see Map 1.1).
Japan 4,872 38,428
Germany 3,677 44,470
UK 2,622 39,720
India 2,597 1,940
France 2,582 38,477
Brazil 2,055 9,821
Canada 1,653 45,032
Russia 1,577 10,743
Australia 1,323 53,800
Mexico 1,150 8,902
Turkey 851 10,540
Sweden 538 53,442
Iran 439 5,415
Nigeria 375 1,969
South Africa 349 6,160
Egypt 235 2,412
New Zealand 205 42,940
Burundi 3 320
WORLD 80,684 10,714
Source: World Bank (2018).
Note: Data are for 2017. Data for Venezuela not available.
 key concepts 17

discussion questions
◆◆ What is government?
◆◆ What is politics? Where does it begin and end?
◆◆ Who has power, who does not, and how do we know?
◆◆ Does it necessarily follow that to be a democracy is to be legitimate, and to be legitimate
is to be a democracy?
◆◆ Are the ideological distinctions in modern political systems as important and as clear as
they once were?
◆◆ What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Democracy Index and Freedom in the World
as means of classifying political systems?

key concepts
◆◆ Authority ◆◆ Legitimacy
◆◆ Comparative politics ◆◆ Political science
◆◆ Concept ◆◆ Political system
◆◆ Governance ◆◆ Politics
◆◆ Government ◆◆ Power
◆◆ Gross domestic product ◆◆ Social science
◆◆ Ideology ◆◆ Three Worlds system
◆◆ Institution ◆◆ Typology

further reading
Boix, Carles, and Susan C. Stokes (eds) (2007) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
(Oxford University Press). At more than 1,000 pages in length, this is a rich survey of the
many different dimensions of comparative politics.
Dogan, Mattei, and Dominique Pelassy (1990) How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative
Politics, 2nd edn (Chatham House). Although published many years ago, the arguments
made by this short and readable book are still relevant.
Goodin, Robert E. (2009) The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (Oxford University Press).
Another in the Oxford handbook series, offering a survey of the different facets of the
study of political science.
Heywood, Andrew (2017) Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 6th edn (Red Globe Press). An
informative and wide-ranging textbook that successfully introduces influential political
creeds and doctrines.
Peter, Fabienne (2011) Democratic Legitimacy (Routledge). An exploration of the components of
legitimacy in democracies, and the ways in which the concept has been understood and
interpreted.
Woodward, Kath (2014) Social Sciences: The Big Issues, 3rd edn (Routledge). A useful general
survey of the social sciences and the kinds of issues they include.
theoretical
2

Source: iStock/KenHoward
approaches
contents
◆ Theoretical approaches:
an overview
◆ The changing face of
comparative politics
PREVIEW ◆ The institutional
In the opening chapter, we looked at comparative government and approach
politics in broad terms, and it is probably already clear that it is a field ◆ The rational choice
of study that is both deep and complex. This is true enough at the level approach
of the individual state, and the complexities grow when we add
multiple political systems to the equation. ◆ The structural approach
Theory comes to the rescue by pulling together a cluster of ◆ The cultural approach
otherwise unstructured observations and facts into a framework that
◆ The interpretive
we can use to guide ourselves as we seek to answer political questions
such as why some countries are democratic and others are not, or why approach
democracy seems to be backsliding in some countries. Theory is a
simplifying device or a conceptual fi lter that can help us sift through
a body of facts, decide which are primary and which are secondary, enable us to organize and interpret the
information, and develop complete arguments and explanations about the objects of our study.
This chapter offers some insights into the theoretical approaches used by comparative political scientists. There
are so many that it is impossible in a brief chapter to be comprehensive; instead, we focus here on five of the most
important: the institutional, rational, structural, cultural, and interpretive approaches. The chapter begins with a
brief explanation of what theory is as well as a review of the changing face of comparative politics, then goes
through each of the five key approaches in turn, explaining their origins, principles, and goals, and offering some
illustrative examples.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Theoretical approaches are ways of studying politics, and help in identifying the right questions to ask
and how to go about answering them.
◆◆ The institutional perspective has done most to shape the development of politics as a discipline and
remains an important tradition in comparative politics.
◆◆ The rational choice approach seeks to explain political outcomes by looking at the motives of the
individuals involved.
◆◆ The structural approach focuses on networks, and looks at the past to help understand the present. In
this way, it helps bridge politics and history.
◆◆ The cultural approach focuses on the ways in which cultural norms and practices support or undermine
political preferences and forms.
◆◆ The interpretive approach, viewing politics as the ideas people construct about it in the course of their
interaction, offers a contrast to more mainstream approaches.
 theoretical approaches 19

theoretical approaches: an overview

Theory is a key part of the exercise of achieving understanding in any field of knowledge, Theory
opening our minds to different ways of seeing. For comparative politics, it means developing An abstract or
and employing principles and concepts that can be used to explain everything from the generalized
approach to
formation of states to the character of institutions, the process of democratization, the methods
explaining or
of dictators, and the dynamics of political instability, political participation, and public policy. understanding a
Several challenges face the political theorist. First, the field of comparative politics is so phenomenon or a
broad that it includes numerous theoretical approaches, ranging from the general to the set of phenomena,
specific. For some, there are so many choices that the diversity can sometimes seem too much, supported by a
significant body of
prompting charges that comparative politics lacks direction. Others see the variety as a strength,
hard evidence.
offering comparativists a multitude of approaches that can be shaped to meet different needs.
Second, political theory has been criticized for focusing too much on ideas emerging from
the Western tradition, a consequence of the relatively large numbers of political scientists working in Western states.
As comparison takes a more global approach – pressed by the influence of globalization – there have been calls for
it to be more inclusive. This trend will further expand the already substantial range of theoretical approaches, but it
will remain hard to develop universal theories so long as many parts of the world remain relatively under-studied.
Third, the value of political theory is often compromised by the way in which it is the victim of fad, fashion, and
individual preference. For every theoretical approach that is proposed or applied, there often seems to be a long line
of critics waiting to shoot it down and propose alternatives. It can sometimes seem as though the debate about the pros
and cons of competing theoretical approaches is more vibrant than that about their practical, real-world applications.
Finally, the place of theory in the social sciences more generally is based on shaky foundations. The natural
sciences have a strong record of developing theories that are well supported by the evidence, are broadly accepted,
and can be used to develop laws, guide experiments, and make predictions. The social sciences suffer greater
uncertainties (if only because they focus more on trying to understand human behaviour), with the result that they
generate theories that are subject to stronger doubts, with a weaker record in generating laws and predicting outcomes.
In this chapter, we focus on five major theoretical approaches to the comparative study of politics. By ‘approaches’
we mean ways of understanding, or ‘sets of attitudes, understandings and practices that defi ne a certain way of
doing political science’ (Lowndes et al., 2017). They are alternatives that influence how we go about political
research, that structure the questions we ask, that offer guidance on where we might seek an answer, and that help
us defi ne what counts as a good answer. The chapter reviews the five approaches in an order that reflects the
historical evolution of politics as an academic discipline, but by no means suggests that the list is complete. For the
sake of clarity, we avoid the many subdivisions, crossovers, and reinventions within each perspective.

the changing face of comparative politics

Although comparison lies at the heart of all research, the sub-field of comparative politics is relatively young, as is
its theoretical base. As a systematic endeavour, it can be dated back to the formal origins of political science in the
late nineteenth century, but it long lagged behind the study of domestic politics, and still lacks either a well-
developed identity, or a single (or even dominant) theoretical approach. This makes it little different from political
science more generally; political theory, argue Dryzek et al. (2006) ‘is an unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline,
with no dominant methodology or approach’.
Comparativists can draw from many different approaches, prompting Verba (1991) to describe the diversity of
approaches as bordering on the anarchic. (There is no fi nal and authoritative list of the options, but a representative
selection of the theories most often used in political science is included in Table 2.1.) At the same time, he argued
that there was strength in diversity because it ‘left the field open to new and often unorthodox ideas and to a variety
of approaches’, a view supported by Przeworski (1995), who saw the variety as giving comparativists a wide array
of options, allowing them to be ‘opportunists’ who can use whatever approach best works. Finnemore and Sikkink
(2001) note that scholars of comparative politics, unlike their colleagues in international relations
do not feel as compelled to maintain a consistent theoretical identity or to ensure that their work furthers a particular
‘ism’ in the paradigm trench wars, and it is not at all unusual for a comparative scholar to work on different problems
using different theoretical approaches.

We saw in Chapter 1 how Aristotle is credited with the fi rst attempt to classify political systems, but his work
was mainly descriptive and did not establish principles that had much staying power. And while both comparative
20 chapter 2

Table 2.1 Some theories used in political science politics and political theory owe much to some of the
biggest names in political science and philosophy –
Behaviouralism Marxism
from Machiavelli to Montesquieu and Marx – none of
Class theory Modernization them took a systematically comparative approach to
Corporatism New institutionalism understanding government and politics as we would
define the task today.
Cultural theory Political psychology The slowness of comparative politics to emerge as a
Dependency Post-structuralism sub-field of political science was partly a result of the
small number of cases available until the twentieth
Elite theory Rational choice century, and partly a result of scholars in most countries
Feminism Structural-functionalism being more interested in studying their home political
systems than in taking a broader view. For European
Imperialism/Neo-imperialism Structuralism scholars, the differences among European states were
Institutionalism Systems theory not seen to be particularly profound or interesting, so
it is perhaps unsurprising that the birth of modern
Interpretivism
comparative politics took place in the United States
(or constructivism)
(see Munck, 2007), where scholars began to study
‘foreign’ political systems as distinct from their own.
There remained a view, however, that Americans had little to learn from other systems, thanks to a deeply held
belief that the US system was superior (Wiarda, 1991). The few scholars who studied other systems focused mainly
on Western Europe, with the Soviet Union and Japan added later, and their comparisons were more often descriptive
than analytical.
Attitudes changed after World War II, when the foreign policy interests of the United States broadened, and the
Cold War made American scholars and policy-makers more interested in understanding both their allies and their
enemies. Eventually, this perspective extended to potential allies and enemies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa

The United Nations headquarters in New York. The possibilities of comparative politics have increased dramatically in
recent decades with the increase in the number of sovereign states.
Source: iStock/mizoula.
 theoretical approaches 21

(Lim, 2010). The end of the colonial era also saw a near-doubling in the number of sovereign states, from just over
70 in 1945 to more than 130 in 1970 (see Figure 2.2). As well as a new interest in emerging states, there was also a
change in the approach taken by comparative political scientists, whose past work had been often criticized for
being too parochial, too descriptive, too lacking in theory, and not even particularly comparative (Macridis, 1955).
As part of what became known as the behavioural revolution, comparativists became interested in studying the
actions as well as institutions of government, in explaining as well as describing, and in taking a more scientific
approach to the development of theory and methods.
The shift towards behaviouralism – which Dahl (1961b) was later to describe as a ‘protest Behaviouralism
movement’ within political science – can be traced back to the work of the political scientist An approach to
Charles Merriam at the University of Chicago in the 1920s. He argued the importance of the study of
politics that
moving beyond the study of formal rules and looking at the actions of individuals, but it was emphasizes people
not until the post-war era of decolonization that his ideas became more widely adopted; in over institutions,
newly independent states, government institutions proved to be transitory as presidents, and focusing on the
then ruling generals, quickly dispensed with the elaborate constitutions written at systematic study of
independence. A fresher and wider approach – one rooted in social, economic, and political the behaviour of
individuals.
realities, rather than constitutional fictions – was needed to understand politics in the
developing world.
Coincidentally, the post-war generation of political scientists in the United States was keen to apply innovative
social science techniques developed during World War II – notably, interview-based sample surveys of ordinary
people. In this way, the study of politics could be presented as a social science and become eligible for research funds
made possible by that designation. The study of legislatures, for example, moved away from formal aspects (e.g. the
procedures by which a bill becomes law) towards legislative behaviour (e.g. how members defi ne their job).
Researchers delved into the social backgrounds of representatives, their individual voting records, their career
progression, and their willingness to rebel against the party line. Similarly, scholars who studied judiciaries began
to take judges, rather than courts, as their unit of analysis, using statistical techniques to assess how the social
background and political attitudes of judges shaped their decisions and their interpretations of the constitution.
While most of the famous names of comparative politics until this time had been American men – including
Charles Merriam, Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Lucien Pye, and Samuel Huntington – new influence
was asserted by scholars with European backgrounds and interests, including Giovanni Sartori, Stein Rokkan,
Philippe Schmitter, Maurice Duverger, and Arend Lijphart. There was also more transfer of ideas between the
study of domestic and comparative politics, and new interests were added with the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Cold War in 1989–91, the emergence of the European Union, and the growing importance of
states such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa.
Just as quickly, there was a reaction against the focus by behaviouralists on the scientific
method and their attempts to develop a grand theory of comparative politics. A difference of Grand theory
A broad and
opinion also developed between scholars favouring a qualitative approach (studying a few cases abstract form of
within their natural setting, and emphasizing depth over breadth) and those favouring a theorizing that
quantitative approach (based on data analysis and emphasizing breadth over depth) (see Chapter incorporates many
3 for more details). More differences emerged as rational choice approaches became popular, other theories and
further promoting the use of statistical modelling. The divisions reached a point in the late tries to explain
broad areas of a
1990s and early 2000s where there was something of a rebellion among American political discipline rather
scientists against what they described as the ‘mathematicization of political science’, and the than more focused
particular marginalization of comparative politics. An informal ‘Perestroika movement’ matters.
emerged that pressed for multiple methods and approaches, and for new efforts to broaden
political science in search of greater relevance (Monroe, 2005).
Although recent decades have seen both a dramatic increase in interest in comparative politics and new efforts
to make it more systematic, most theories of comparative politics have borrowed from other sub-fields of political
science, or even other subjects entirely. The importance of institutions has been a consistent theme throughout, but
rational choice approaches came out of economics, structuralism is influenced by history, cultural approaches by
anthropology, and interpretive approaches by sociology. And in spite of decades of hard work, it is hard to fi nd
theories that have both won general support and produced lasting results.
Consider, for example, the critical question of what causes democratization. Finding an answer might be
considered the holy grail of political research; armed with such knowledge, we might be able to reproduce the
conditions needed and move the world more rapidly and sustainably towards a democratic future. In her review of
22 chapter 2

research on the question, though, Geddes (2007) is only able to point to some tendencies and to rule out others:
richer countries are more likely to be democratic (but development does not cause democratization, although
modernization might), as are countries that were once British colonies, but reliance on oil reduces the chances, as
does having a large Muslim population. ‘Given the quality and amount of effort expended on understanding
democratization,’ Geddes concludes, ‘it is frustrating to understand so little.’ To complicate matters, we are now –
as we will see in Chapter 5 – seeing something of a turn away from democracy in several parts of the world.
One critical problem with theories of comparative politics (and of politics and government in general) is their
long history of association with Western ideas. This was a phenomenon noted by Parel (1992) when he argued that
the scholarship of political theory was so focused on Western political thought that there was a prevailing assumption
that modern Western texts were ‘products of universal reason itself ’. He also noted that Western claims of
universality were being questioned by other cultures, and argued that comparative political philosophy meant
taking an approach that paid more attention to cultural and philosophical pluralism. This point was later taken up
by Dallmayr (1999):
Only rarely are practitioners of political thought willing (and professionally encouraged) to transgress the [Western]
canon and thereby the cultural boundaries of North America and Europe in the direction of genuine comparative
investigation.

Much has changed in recent decades. There has been more research published on a wider variety of states, and
the sub-field of comparative politics has become broader and more eclectic, with new concepts and ideas regularly
shaking up old assumptions. Studies of democracies still greatly outnumber those of authoritarian states, and studies
of bigger and/or older states – with larger communities of political scientists – still greatly outnumber those of smaller
and/or newer states. Even so, comparison has had to catch up with the evolving realities of government and politics
around the world, including the changing role of the state, the rise of new economic powers, the impact of new
technology and globalization, the new political role of Islam, the impact of failed and failing states, and the resurgence
of nationalism and populism. The changes within the sub-field have been positive and productive, and it employs a
greater diversity of approaches than before (see summary in Figure 2.1), but much work remains to be done.

Approach Focus Source Core idea

Institutionalism Institutions Politics Institutions provide the
framework within which
decisions are made.

Rational choice Individuals Economics Individuals make political

choices on the basis of
seeking to maximize
self-interest.

Structuralism Groups History Relationships among the

parts of a political system
form a structure whose role
is more important than that
of the individual parts.

Cultural Societies Anthropology Politics and government are

influenced by cultural
norms and expectations.

Interpretivism Ideas Sociology Politics is defined by the

ideas that participants
have about it.

Figure 2.1 Five theoretical approaches to comparative politics

 theoretical approaches 23

the institutional approach

The study of governing institutions has long been a central purpose of political science in
Institutionalism
general, and of comparative politics in particular. In fact, throughout its formative decades, An approach to
political science was dominated by institutionalism, with scholars mainly interested in the study of
understanding the rules and structures of governing institutions, using approaches that were politics and
often descriptive and qualitative, and being less interested in developing theory. Institutions government that
focuses on the
were regarded as the core subject matter of political science.
structure and
Institutionalism briefly fell out of favour in the 1960s as the behavioural movement dynamics of
emerged, but was revisited in the 1980s when new research on social and political structures governing
combined with the reform of governing institutions in developing countries to give birth to institutions.
what became known as new institutionalism (or neo-institutionalism) (March and Olsen,
1984). This reformulation looked not just at the formal rules of government but also at how New
institutions shaped political decisions, at the interaction of institutions and society, and at the institutionalism
A revival of
informal patterns of behaviour within formal institutions; as Zijderveld wrote (2000: 70), institutionalism
‘institutions are coercive structures that mould our acting, thinking and feeling’. that goes beyond
This approach lent itself well to comparative politics as researchers undertook cross-national formal rules and
studies, many of them interested in better understanding the process of democratization. looks at how
What, then, is an institution? In politics, the term is usually applied to the major bodies of institutions shape
decisions and
national government, particularly those outlined in constitutions, such as executives, define interests.
legislatures, judiciaries, and, sometimes, political parties (see Figure 2.2). Since they often
possess legal identity, acquiring privileges and duties under law, institutions are treated as
formal ‘actors’ in the political process. However, the concept of an institution is also used more informally to
include the rules, interactions and practices that distinguish such entities as the family, marriage, religion, money,
law, and even language. For March and Olsen (2011), an institution is defi ned as follows:

a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources
that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences
and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances.

Institution Role and purpose Examples

Executive Governing, making policy, Presidents, prime ministers,
providing leadership and ministers, cabinets.
direction.

Legislature Representing the interests of Parliaments, congresses,

citizens; making law; forming national assemblies, diets.
governments.

Judiciary and Upholding and interpreting Supreme courts,

courts the constitution. constitutional courts.

Bureaucracy Implementing policy. Departments, ministries,

divisions, agencies.

Political parties Offering policy alternatives, Conservatives, liberals,

fielding candidates, socialists, greens,
forming governments and nationalists.
oppositions.

Figure 2.2 The institutions of government

24 chapter 2

The Hungarian Parliament. Its dramatic architecture and visible presence on the shores of the Danube in Budapest is
emblematic of the importance of institutions in government.
Source: iStock/Andrey Danilovich.

Institutional theory assumes that positions within organizations matter more than the people who occupy them.
This axiom enables us to discuss roles rather than people: presidencies rather than presidents, legislatures rather than
legislators, and the judiciary rather than judges. The study of institutions can also be interpreted to mean the study
of political stability. As Orren and Skowronek (1995) put it:

Institutions are seen as the pillars of order in politics, as the structures that lend the polity its integrity, facilitate its
routine operation and produce continuity in the face of potentially destabilizing forces. Institutional politics is politics
as usual, normal politics, or a politics in equilibrium.

Stability, though, should not be conflated with efficiency, and one of the benefits of the institutional approach is
that it can tell us not only how institutions work, but also where their strengths and weaknesses lie, and what might
be done to make them more efficient. Consider the example of the World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the
leading international organizations. Its job is to promote free trade and to help countries resolve trade disputes, but
its failure to successfully conclude a new round of trade negotiations that began in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, prompted
concerns about its efficacy. Employing an institutional approach, Jones (2015) concluded that the WTO’s problems
lay in a structure inherited from its predecessor (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Institution- or GATT), which had been designed to oversee trade negotiations among a relatively small
alization number of wealthier, industrialized countries. Reforms were clearly in need, he argued, that
The process by were more suited to the greater number and diversity of members and the variety of their
which organizations positions on international trade.
build history, As well as being clear about the tensions between stability and efficiency in institutions, we
memory, stability,
and permanence.
also need to be aware they are rarely static for very long. In fact, they are constantly changing in
response to new circumstances, and are frequently subject to a process of institutionalization.
 theoretical approaches 25

This begins following their creation, as they develop rules and procedures, build internal complexity, entrench their
position, are clearly distinguished from their environment, and come to be accepted by external actors as part of the
governing apparatus. It continues, though, as they evolve in response to pressures for change, as well as new needs and
opportunities.
Consider, for example, the process of institutionalization in South Africa, which adopted a new constitution in
1997 in the wake of the end of the old system of apartheid (institutionalized racial division). Although the new
system was built on the foundations of the old, it also involved several key changes, including an upper chamber of
Parliament designed to represent the country’s nine provinces, a president elected by Parliament from among its
members, and an expansion of human rights. South Africa has since had five rounds of parliamentary elections and
five presidents, but the initial optimism for the institutionalization of South Africa’s new democracy was tarnished
by the dominance of one party (the African National Congress) and by a habit of widespread political corruption,
which has also become institutionalized in the sense that the abuse of public office for private gain became an
accepted routine of political life in its own right.
We should also remember that institutions do not tell us the whole story about a political system, because they
rarely act independently of social forces. In many authoritarian states, for example, the president is the presidency,
and the entire superstructure of government is a facade behind which personal networks and exchanges continue
to drive politics. Even in liberal democracies, it is always worth asking whose interests benefit from a particular
institutional arrangement. Just as an institution can be created for specific purposes, so too can it survive by serving
the interests of those in charge. Even so, the institutions of government remain central to government, and we can
never overlook their origins, features and qualities (see Figure 2.3).
In spite of its age, there are still considerable unmet possibilities for the institutional approach to understanding
government and politics. Take, for example, the single area of environmental policy. It has been the subject of a
burgeoning literature since environmental problems first moved to the top of the political agenda in industrialized
countries in the 1960s, and of developing countries in the 1980s. Despite this, remarkably few studies of the formal
institutions involved in environmental governance have been undertaken, whether at the domestic or the
international level. Scholars of political science have been interested in the work of environmental interest groups
and the rise of green political parties, but they have rarely looked at the dynamics of executive, legislative, or
judicial politics in regard to the environment, nor at the dynamics of bureaucracies and regulatory agencies. (For
more details, see McCormick, 2017b: Chapter 4.)

Feature Qualities

Formal organizations with a political purpose, typically possessing

Definition
legal identity, and acquiring privileges and duties under law.

May be deliberately created for a specific purpose, or may emerge and

Origins
evolve over time in response to changing needs.

To provide the framework within which decisions are made, issues are
Political purpose shaped, and problems are resolved, but may come to serve narrow
interests, such as those of the wealthy and powerful.

Generate norms which shape behaviour and expectations, promote

Effects
stability and predictability, and enable long-term commitments.

May be formal, with rules and hierarchies and employees, or may be

Character
informal reflections of the need for social order (e.g. religion or marriage).

Figure 2.3 The features of political institutions

26 chapter 2

Focus 2.1
Empirical and normative perspectives

Empirical One of the more important debates in political research concerns the differences
Conclusions or between empirical and normative perspectives; one uses facts to ask what happened
inferences based and why (descriptive), while the other uses judgements or prescriptions to ask what
on facts, should have happened or what ought to happen (evaluative) (see Gerring and Yesnowitz,
experience, or
observation
2006). Take electoral systems, for example: the statement that ‘proportional
rather than logicrepresentation encourages multi-party systems’ is empirical, while the statement that
or theory. ‘proportional representation should be used to encourage multiple parties’ is
normative.
Normative Most political research tries to be empirical in the sense that it asks why things are
Reaching the way they are in a manner that tries to be value-neutral, as when a researcher looks
judgements and
prescriptions
into the causes of war in a purely objective and scientific fashion. But other research
about what ought takes a more normative approach by asking what should be done in order to achieve a
to be done. desired outcome, such that the researcher – for example – questions the phenomenon
of war in a more value-driven and philosophical manner, asking whether and in what
circumstances it is ever justified.
Empirical and normative approaches are not mutually exclusive, and there has been renewed demand for
the idea of making political science more relevant by combining the two. Consider the argument made by
Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006):

Empirical study in the social sciences is meaningless if it has no normative import … It matters, or may
matter, but we do not know how. Likewise, a normative argument without empirical support may be
rhetorically persuasive or logically persuasive, but it will not have demonstrated anything about the
world out there. It has no empirical ballast. Good social science must integrate both elements; it must
be empirically grounded, and it must be relevant to human concerns.

Many of the towering figures in the history of political thought trod lightly between the two perspectives,
as illustrated by the cases of Machiavelli and Marx:

◆◆ Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was a writer and historian whose masterpiece The Prince examined the
qualities of power and the means used by rulers to win, keep, and manipulate it. On the one hand, his
book can be seen as an empirical (and even cynical) analysis of the nature and exercise of power in the
real world. On the other hand, it can also be understood as normatively endorsing the sometimes brutal
tactics rulers need to, or indeed should, follow to sustain their position.
◆◆ Karl Marx (1818–83) wrote a vast body of empirical work presenting history as a class struggle between
the owners of the means of production and the labourers, arguing that states were run in the interests
of the owners. He concluded that capitalism created internal tensions which ensured that it was sowing
the seeds of its own inevitable destruction – see Chapter 20. Underlying this empirical analysis, though,
was a normative concern to accelerate capitalism’s overthrow so as to create the possibility of a new
classless society. In Marx’s work, empirical research was motivated by normative goals.

Rational choice
An approach to the
study of politics
the rational choice approach
and government While institutionalism is an approach that focuses on the structure and dynamics of governing
based on the idea
that individuals
institutions, the rational choice approach focuses on individuals and on the assumption that
work to maximize we are all driven by a desire to maximize our own interests. As Geddes (2003) puts it, people
their benefits and ‘are rational in the sense that, given goals and alternative strategies from which to choose,
minimize their they will select the alternatives that maximize their chances of achieving their goals’. We will
costs. each instinctively make decisions that we regard as logical and prudent, and even where
 theoretical approaches 27

actions might not appear to be selfi sh – as when people help other people, or countries provide assistance to other
countries – it can still be argued that the act of providing assistance results in its own benefits, which may be
something as simple as satisfaction.
The potential value of the rational choice approach – which derives from economics – lies in its ability to model
the essentials of political action and make predictions, even without all-encompassing knowledge of the actors
involved. We simply need to identify the goals of the actors and how their objectives can best be advanced in a given
situation; with this knowledge, we can predict what they will do. All else, including the accounts actors give of
their own behaviour, is detail. As Hindmoor and Taylor (2017) put it, ‘if people are rational and self-interested it
becomes possible to explain and even predict their actions in ways that would allow rational choice theorists to
claim a mantle of scientific credibility’.
The rational pursuit of goals depends on accurate information. We have all made decisions that we thought at
the time were in our best interests, only to fi nd out later – usually when the outcome was not what he had hoped
for, or when we learned more about the implications behind our choices and those of the alternatives – that we were
actually harming our interests. This is less true of the numerous small decisions we make in our daily lives, and
about which we do not have to think too much, but it is often true of the kinds of bigger and more complex
decisions we need to make when participating in the political process.
As we will see in Chapter 17, for example, the rational choice approach has been applied in efforts to better
understand voters in democracies, fi nding that even if it is rational for them to vote, it is not necessarily rational to
invest the time and effort needed to become informed voters. Unfortunately, one of the effects of political ignorance
is that wealthy and powerful people and institutions come to exert a disproportionate influence over the electoral
process. A solution proposed by Somin (2016) – for the United States, at least – involves decentralizing and limiting
government, on the basis that people make better decisions when they have stronger incentives to acquire relevant
information and to use it wisely.
People are not the only actors to which we can apply rational choice approaches; if all individuals can be
motivated by self-interest, then so can the collective units to which people belong, such as societies, interest groups,
political parties, institutions, corporations, and even countries or groups of countries. Identifying the goals and
interests of complex organizations is rarely straightforward but it is often fruitful to imagine that, like individuals,
they target specific objectives. In his analysis of political parties, for example, Downs (1957) treated parties as if they
were unitary actors, committed only to the pursuit of office. In the same way, students of international politics often
regard states as engaged in nothing more (and nothing less) than the rational pursuit of national self-interest. In both
cases, the aim of such a treatment is an accurate prediction of how organizations behave, not a detailed reconstruction
of how they actually reach decisions.
One contribution of the rational choice approach lies in highlighting the phenomenon of
a collective action problem. Collective action occurs when a number of people or actors Collective
work together to achieve a common objective (see Chapter 18 for examples). The problem action
problem
arises when individual costs discourage some of these people or actors from voluntarily Arises when
participating in efforts to achieve that objective, and perhaps even undermining those efforts. rational behaviour
Climate change, for example, is clearly a problem, even if some people (in the face of by individuals
overwhelming scientific evidence) deny its link with human activities. Collectively, all produces a
countries share an interest in containing climate change but, because most individual countries negative overall
outcome.
make only a small contribution to total emissions, each has an interest in ignoring any
agreement to control pollution. That way, the cheating country can benefit from the collective
effort while avoiding the inevitable costs, political as well as economic, from greening its domestic policies. In
short, such states can free-ride on the efforts of other nations. When other countries free-ride, the result is that
individual rationality leads to a poor collective outcome. Overcoming this particular collective action problem is a
major issue for the world’s future.
Similarly, during the lead-up to the 2007 global fi nancial crisis (see Chapter 20), many investment bankers made
high-risk investments in order to increase their bonuses; their employers, too, were happy enough as long as their
corporate profits continued to grow. When these investments eventually turned bad, the effect was a problem not
only for the original investors, but also – and more importantly – a threat to the stability of the Western fi nancial
system. Clearly, some form of coordination is needed if private actions are to be made compatible with desirable
collective outcomes – in this case, stricter regulation of banks by governments. More than any other framework,
the rational choice approach encourages us to recognize that individual preferences and collective outcomes are two
different things; a government is needed to bridge the gap.
28 chapter 2

The melting of the polar ice caps is one of the more dramatic effects of climate change, a phenomenon whose definition
and solution is a classic collective action problem.
Source: iStock/Bernhard Staehli.

Paradoxically, the value of the rational choice approach lies not merely in the accuracy of its predictions, but also
in explaining the reasoning behind what might, at first, appear to be irrational behaviour. If people behave in a
surprising way, we have a puzzle in need of a solution. In 2016, for example, many British voters supported Brexit
and many American voters supported Donald Trump, even though numerous political experts warned that they
would often be acting against their best interests. The two events led to an avalanche of political analysis that tied
the two results to shared concerns about immigration, globalization, loss of national sovereignty, distaste for political
elites, and nostalgia for the (largely imagined) ‘good old days’. Even if the choices of Brexit and Trump surprised
many of the pundits, subsequent research found that both choices were a form of protest against the current situation.
Yet the rational choice approach, as any other, takes too much for granted. It fails to explain the origins of the
goals that individuals hold; it is here, in understanding the shaping of preferences, that society re-enters the equation
(as in the cases of the Brexit and Trump decisions, for example). Our aspirations, our fears, our status, and even our
goals emerge from our interactions with others, rather than being formed beforehand.
Also, the rational choice approach is based on a universal model of human behaviour that leaves it with limited
relevance in understanding variation across countries. Just as individual goals are taken for granted, so too are the
different national settings which determine the choices available to individuals and within which they pursue their
strategies. What may seem rational for one person, or community, or society, or country, may not seem rational for
another. For voters in democracies, for example, it may seem irrational for Russian voters to keep on returning
Vladimir Putin to office (helped, of course, by electoral irregularities – see Chapter 15). However, many Russian
voters (particularly younger ones) define his administration – in spite of its authoritarianism – as being in their best
interests, for reasons neatly encapsulated in a report in the Washington Post (Troianovski, 2018):

Rather than dwell on Putin’s crackdown on his opponents, young Russians draw a sense of personal liberty from
those freedoms they do enjoy – a mostly open Internet, an open job market and open borders. Many of them reject
 theoretical approaches 29

state TV as propaganda but nevertheless repeat its central tenet – that Russia needs Putin to stand up to U.S.
aggression. And perhaps most important, these Russians seem shaped by a collective history they never knew – by
fear of a return of the crisis-stricken 1990s or the stifl ing Soviet era.

In short, an action that might seem irrational for European or American voters familiar with the central tenets
of liberal democracy is rational for Russian voters worried about the uncertainties of their country’s past.

the structural approach

In contrast to theoretical approaches based on institutions or individuals, structuralism Structuralism
focuses on relationships: structuralists argue that we must go beyond the rationality of An approach to
individual actors and, in the words of Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997), examine the ‘networks, the study of
linkages, interdependencies, and interactions among the parts of some system’. A structure is politics and
government that
defi ned by the relationships between its parts, with the parts themselves – including their emphasizes the
internal organization and the individuals within them – being of little interest. For example, relationships
the relationship between labour and capital within a country is more important to structuralists among groups and
than the internal organization or the leadership of trade unions and business organizations. networks within
The assumption is that capital and labour will follow their own real interests, regardless of larger systems.
who happens to lead the organizations formally representing their concerns.
The central tenet of structuralism is that ‘groups matter’, as in the examples of powerful groups in society, such
as the bureaucracy, political parties, social classes, churches, and the military. These groups possess and pursue their
own interests, creating a set of relationships which forms the structure underpinning or destabilizing the institutional
politics of parties and government. Each group within the structure works to sustain its political influence in a
society which is always developing in response to economic change, ideological innovations, international politics,
and the effects of group confl ict itself. It is this framework which undergirds, and ultimately determines, actual
politics, because human actions are shaped by this bigger structural environment.
A good example of structuralism at work is found in the way that candidates running for public office in
democracies will routinely campaign on a platform promising change, the injection of new ideas into government,
and the avoidance of ‘politics as usual’. Donald Trump’s oft-repeated promise to ‘drain the swamp’ in Washington
DC is just one particularly colourful example. Once in office, though, they fi nd that change is more difficult to
achieve than they thought, because they are only one small part of a complex structure involving a variety of
organizations, ideologies, and interests. As the American politician Mario Cuomo said, ‘You campaign in poetry.
You govern in prose.’ Meanwhile, voters continue to be seduced by promises of change, and continue voting for
the ‘candidates of change’ instead of realizing that the barriers to change are often inherent in the structure of a
political system, of which they are themselves a part. Structural constraints are central to governance, even though
they rarely appear in campaigns.
Another example is offered by the persistence of poverty in many wealthy countries. Institutionalists might
blame the problem on a failure of institutions to work efficiently or to coordinate with one another, but a structuralist
would argue that poverty arises out of the contrasting interests and power positions of property owners and the
working class. For the structuralist, the important factor is the framework of inequality, not the failure of institutions
to be designed in such a way as to address the way in which particular families are confi ned to the bottom of the
hierarchy of opportunity. ‘At the core of structuralism’, argues Mahoney (2003), ‘is the concern with objective
relationships between groups and societies. Structuralism holds that configurations of social relations shape,
constrain and empower actors in predictable ways.’
Perhaps not surprisingly, the structural approach is strongly historical, often looking at how relationships change
over time, seeking to understand how competition between powerful groups over time leads to specific outcomes
such as a revolution, democracy, or a multi-party system. The authors of such studies argue that politics is about
struggle rather than equilibrium, and they favour comparative history, giving us another contrast with the sometimes
static descriptions of the institutionalists.
One of the leading figures in the field – who not only exemplifies the structural approach but helped to defi ne
it – was the American sociologist Barrington Moore. His 1966 book Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World did more than any other to shape this format of historical analysis of
structural forces. In trying to understand why liberal democracy developed earlier and more easily in France,
Britain, and the United States than in Germany and Japan, he suggested that the strategy of the rising commercial
class was the key.
30 chapter 2

In countries such as Britain, where the bourgeoisie avoided entanglement with the landowners in their battles
with the peasants, the democratic transition was relatively peaceful. But where landlords engaged the commercial
classes in a joint campaign against the peasantry, as in Germany, the result was an authoritarian regime which
delayed the onset of democracy. Although later research qualified many of Moore’s judgements, his work showed
the value of studying structural relationships between groups and classes as they evolve over long periods (Mahoney,
2003). He asked important comparative questions and answered them with an account of how and when class
relationships develop and evolve.
The structural approach asks big questions and, by selecting answers from the past, it interrogates history
without limiting itself to chronology. Many authors working in this tradition make large claims about the positions
adopted by particular classes and groups; specifically, interests are often treated as if they were actors, leading to
ambitious generalizations which need verification through detailed research. Even so, the structural approach, in
the form of comparative history, has made a distinctive contribution to comparative politics.

the cultural approach

The relationship between culture and politics has long been a point of interest for political thinkers and analysts,
with questions asked about how cultural norms and practices support or undermine different political preferences
and forms. The challenge, though, has always been (and remains) just how to defi ne culture,
Cultural a term that is typically used in an anthropological or sociological context to describe a
approach community of people with a shared history and common values, beliefs and customs. As we
An approach to will see in Chapter 12, political culture describes the political personality of a society,
the study of
politics and
reflected in the political norms and values that the community as a whole considers to be
government based desirable and normal. More broadly, culture describes a set of assumptions associated with
on understanding an institution or a society: a model of how it works, of what is considered normal or abnormal,
the influence of and of the goals that are worth pursuing. Ross (2009) makes a distinction between culture
culture and as ‘a system of meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds’ and culture as ‘the basis
cultural norms.
of social and political identity that affects how people line up and how they act on a wide
Culture range of matters’.
The values, beliefs, The earliest use of cultural theory focused on an assessment of how cultural practices either
habits, attitudes, sustained or undermined different political forms. More recently, and particularly in Europe,
and/or norms to there has been a vigorous debate about multiculturalism and its impact on states whose
which a society populations have become increasingly diverse in the wake of immigration since World War II.
subscribes and
responds, often
With this diversity has come new political and social tension, leading to a backlash that has
unconsciously and fed in to the rise of nationalist movements and support for political parties that oppose
even in the face of immigration, notably in France, Britain, and Germany.
individual The troubled European record can be compared and contrasted with that of Canada,
differences. which has made a concerted political effort dating back decades to defi ne, recognize, and
build on its multicultural identity. The 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act acknowledges
Multicultur-
that ‘multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and
alism
A belief in a acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share
society made up of their cultural heritage’. In the United States, meanwhile, which makes much of its immigrant
multiple cultures history, racial differences are discussed more forthrightly than cultural differences, and there
and ethnicities, has been a backlash in some quarters against immigrants that parallels the European experience.
and in the
Culture is also a factor in contrasting global perspectives on politics and government; see
recognition of
minority groups Focus 2.2. We saw earlier the concerns raised about the close association between political
within the wider theory (on the one hand) and Western ideas (on the other), which has been partly a consequence
culture. of the much bigger body of scholarship and analysis produced by Western political scientists.
This is reflected in the research for this book, which is based in part on drawing examples
from the 18 states listed in the Preface. Among those cases (chosen for their political and geographical variety), it
has been easiest to fi nd research sources on politics and government in the United States, the European Union,
Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and China. Decades after the era of decolonization, however, it remains more
difficult to fi nd sources on what we once knew as the Third World, represented in this book by cases such as
Mexico, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Nigeria.
 theoretical approaches 31

Focus 2.2
Culture and politics: Edward Said and Orientalism

The troubled efforts of comparative politics to bridge cultural differences are illustrated by the long-term
results of the publication in 1978 of a book titled Orientalism. Written by the Palestinian-American scholar
Edward Said (1935–2003), it argued that the forces of political and economic domination
had long produced negative Western images and ideas regarding the East (or the Orientalism
Orient). The resulting orientalism, argued Said, embodied ‘dogmas’ regarding studies The habit by many
in the West of
of the Arabs and Islam. These included a characterization of the West as ‘rational, defining the
developed, humane, [and] superior’, and of the Orient as ‘aberrant, undeveloped, [and] Orient (the East)
inferior’, and a view that the Orient was ‘at bottom something either to be feared … in terms of
or to be controlled’. stereotypical and
Said’s book was widely quoted and cited, opening up new possibilities in the debate often patronizing
views about its
about Western perceptions of the East, and also in comparative political study. It was peoples, cultures,
also deeply controversial, however, creating something of a schism in studies of the and political
Middle East and Islam, and Landes (2017) suggests that not much has actually changed systems.
in the wake of Said’s thesis:

[When] one surveys the past two decades alone, Said’s academic progeny have been spectacularly off
the mark in their analyses of and prescriptions for action in the Middle East; and nowhere has this been
more apparent than in the misreading of the disastrous Israeli-Palestinian Oslo ‘peace process’ and
the ‘Arab spring’, with its rapid deterioration into a welter of tribal and sectarian wars.

The problem, Landes continued, was that in their excitement about the prospects for peace and
democracy in the Middle East, scholars and journalists had failed to understand a critical feature of Arab and
Muslim culture: the tension between honour and shame by which ‘the acquisition, maintenance, and
restoration of public honour trumps all other concerns’, including the right of people to voice public criticism
of those in power. ‘In a radical misreading of the popular and social-media empowered protests that drove
some Arab dictators from their perches,’ Landes asserts, ‘scholars interpreted the uprisings in light of
European democratic revolutions.’ In short, cultural misunderstandings continue to interfere with the way
Western scholars interpreted political events in the Middle East.

the interpretive approach

So far, we have looked at theories where the focus is on institutions, individuals, groups, and societies. With the
interpretive approach, the focus is on ideas, summarized by Bevir and Rhodes (2004) when they argue that in order
‘to understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences
of the people involved’. In other words, as Parsons (2018) puts it, people do some things and avoid others because
of the presence of social constructs – ideas, beliefs, norms, assumptions, codes, identities,
meanings, narratives, and values – that fi lter the way they see the world (hence the approach Interpretive
is also sometimes known as constructivism). The starting point is that we cannot take the approach
actor’s goals and defi nition of the situation for granted, as the rational actor approach does; An approach to
the study of
instead, we must look to these kinds of constructs.
politics and
In its strongest version, the interpretive approach argues that politics consists of the ideas government based
participants hold about it. There is no political reality separate from our mental constructions, on the argument
and no reality which can be examined to reveal the impact of ideas upon it. Rather, politics is that politics is
formed by ideas themselves. In short, ‘ideas matter’ and there is nothing but ideas. formed by the
ideas we have
In a more restrained version, the argument is not that ideas comprise our political world
about it.
but, rather, that they are an independent influence upon it, shaping how we defi ne our
32 chapter 2

interests, our goals, our allies, and our enemies. We act as we do because of how we view the world; if our
perspective differed, so would our actions. Where rational choice focuses on how people go about achieving their
individual objectives, the interpretivist examines the framing of objectives themselves and regards such interpretations
as a property of the group, rather than the individual (hence interpretivists take a social rather than a psychological
approach).
Because ideas are socially constructed, many interpretivists imagine that we can restructure our view of the
world and, so, the world itself. For example, there is no intrinsic reason why individuals and states must act (as
rational choice theorists imagine) in pursuit of their own narrow self-interests. To make such an assumption is to
project concepts onto a world that we falsely imagine to be independent of our thoughts. Finnemore (1996) suggests
that interests ‘are not just “out there” waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction’.
Also, ideas come before material factors because the value placed on material things is itself an idea (although
Marxists and others would disagree).
For these reasons, interpretivists – like structuralists – often focus on historical narratives, examining how
understandings of earlier events influence later ones. Take the study of revolutions as an example. Where
behaviouralists see a set of cases (French, Russian, Iranian, and so on) and seek common causes of events treated as
independent, interpretivists see a single sequence and ask how later examples (such as the Iranian revolution) were
influenced by the ideas then held about earlier revolutions (such as the French). Alternatively, take the study of
elections. The meaning of an election is not given by the results themselves but by the narrative that the political
class later establishes about it: for example, ‘the results showed that voters will not tolerate high unemployment’ (see
Chapter 17 for more about this).
Consider what this means for our understanding of states. They are often presented as entities existing
independently of our thoughts, and by acting in a world of states – where we apply for passports, support national
sports teams, or just use the word citizen – we routinely reinforce the concept of the state. But the state is not a
physical entity such as a building or a mountain; it is an idea built over a long period by political thinkers, as well
as by practical politicians. Borders between blocs of land were placed there not by nature but by people. There are
no states when the world is viewed from outer space, as astronauts frequently tell us. It is this point that Steinberger
(2004) has in mind when he says that his idea of the state is that the state is an idea. True, the consequences of
states, such as taxes and wars, are real enough, but these are the effects of the world we have made, and can remake.
Just as the idea of the state is socially reinforced or, as is often said, ‘socially constructed’, it can also be socially
contested (‘Why should I need a visa each time I visit this country?’), leading to gradual changes in the ideas
themselves.
The interpretive/constructivist approach was used in two studies by Wedeen into Yemen (2008) and Syria
(2015). In the first, she argued that the government continued to endure in spite of its inability to control
violence or provide goods and services for its people. This happened because instead of attachments to institutions,
Yemenis had formed strong attachments to one another, and regularly gathered to engage in wide-ranging
discussions about even the most divisive political issues. In the second (the research for which was undertaken
well before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war), she argued that although President Hafez al-Assad was
omnipresent during his term in office (1971–2000), few people believed the claims of the official rhetoric of his
administration. However, its inundation of public and political life with the symbols of his rule had a subtle effect
on encouraging obedience, isolating Syrians from one another, and establishing guidelines for public speech and
behaviour.
There is a clear and useful lesson in the interpretive approach for students of politics, and of comparative politics
especially. When we confront a political system for the first time, our initial task is to engage in political
anthropology: to make sense of the activities that comprise the system. What are the moves? What do they mean?
What is the context that provides this meaning? And what identities and values underpin political action? Behaviour
which has one meaning in our home country may possess a different significance, and constitute a different action,
elsewhere. For example, offering a bribe may be accepted as normal in one place, but be regarded as a serious
offence in another. Casting a vote may be an act of choice in a democracy, but of subservience in a dictatorship.
Criticizing the president may be routine in one country, but sedition in another. Because the consequences of these
acts vary, so does their meaning.
So far, so good. Yet, in studying politics we want to identify patterns that abstract from detail; we seek general
statements about presidential, electoral, or party systems which go beyond the facts of a particular case. We want
to examine relationships between such categories so as to discover overall associations. We want to know, for
 theoretical approaches 33

example, whether a plurality electoral system always leads to a two-party system – see Chapter 15. Through such
investigations we can try to acquire knowledge which goes beyond the understandings held by the participants in
a particular case.
We must recognize, also, that events have unintended consequences: the Holocaust was certainly a product of
Hitler’s ideas, but its effects ran far beyond his own intentions. With its emphasis on meaning, an interpretive
approach misses the commonplace observation that much social and political analysis studies the unintended
consequences of human activity. In short, unpacking the meaning of political action is best regarded as the start,
but not the end, of political analysis. It provides a practical piece of advice: we must grasp the meaning of political
behaviour, thus enabling us to compare like with like.
Compared with the other approaches reviewed in this chapter, the interpretive approach remains more aspiration
than achievement. Some studies conducted within the programme focus on interesting but far-away cases when
meanings really were different: when states did not rule the world; when lending money was considered a sin; or
when the political game consisted of acquiring dependent followers, rather than independent wealth. Yet, such
studies do little to confirm the easy assumption that the world we have made can be easily dissolved. As the
institutionalists with whom we began this chapter are quick to remind us, most social constructs are social
constraints, for institutions are powerfully persistent. Our ability to imagine other worlds should not bias how we
go about understanding the world as it is.
34 chapter 2

discussion questions
◆◆ Why is there so much disagreement among political scientists (or comparativists) about the
best theoretical approach, and why are grand theories so elusive?
◆◆ Which of the different theoretical approaches outlined in this chapter do you fi nd the most
compelling or convincing, and which the least?
◆◆ How far can we understand politics and government by focusing on institutions?
◆◆ Which matter more to an understanding of government and politics: people, cultures, or
ideas?
◆◆ What does ‘rational’ mean, and do people behave rationally?
◆◆ What influences have been most important in shaping how you view the political world?

key concepts
◆◆ Behaviouralism ◆◆ Interpretive approach
◆◆ Collective action problem ◆◆ Multiculturalism
◆◆ Cultural approach ◆◆ New institutionalism
◆◆ Culture ◆◆ Normative
◆◆ Empirical ◆◆ Orientalism
◆◆ Grand theory ◆◆ Rational choice
◆◆ Institutionalism ◆◆ Structuralism
◆◆ Institutionalization ◆◆ Theory

further reading
Dallmayr, Fred (ed.) (2010) Comparative Political Theory: An Introduction (Red Globe Press). An
edited collection that tries to take the discussion of political theory away from its Western
base, and focuses instead on Islamic, Indian, and East Asian ideas.
Dryzek, John S., Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (eds) (2006) The Oxford Handbook of Political
Theory (Oxford University Press). A detailed collection of essays on the many different
options in the field of political theory.
Eriksson, Lina (2011) Rational Choice Theory: Potential and Limits (Red Globe Press). A broad-
ranging review of the meaning, strengths, and weaknesses of rational choice theory.
Lichbach, Mark Irving, and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds) (2009) Comparative Politics: Rationality,
Culture and Structure, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press). Detailed essays on the
rational, cultural and structural approaches to comparative politics.
Lowndes, Vivien, David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker (eds) (2018) Theory and Methods in Political
Science, 4th edn (Red Globe Press). Includes chapters on most of the theoretical approaches
introduced in this chapter.
Peters, B. Guy (2019) Institutional Theory in Political Science, 4th edn (Edward Elgar). A survey
of the different facets of institutional theory, and its potential as a paradigm for political
science.
comparative
3

Source: iStock/ramihalim
methods
contents
◆ Comparative methods:
an overview
◆ The case study method
◆ The qualitative method
PREVIEW ◆ The quantitative
So far we have looked at the conceptual and theoretical aspects of method
comparative politics. These provide us with critical context and ◆ The historical method
guidance, helping provide direction to the practice of comparison: the
kinds of questions that need to be asked, the methods that can be used ◆ The challenges of
to carry out research, the options for designing a comparative research comparison
project, and the pitfalls to be avoided. This chapter is partly a survey
of methods and partly a practical How To guide to the comparative
process, giving more insight into the dynamics of that process. The goal is not to cover the details of specific
techniques such as interviewing or statistical analysis so much as to provide an outline of strategies that will help
students working on comparative projects of their own.
The chapter begins with a discussion about the number and the use of cases chosen in comparison; these range
from one to many, the research methods used being different for single-case studies, those involving a small numbers
of cases (small-N studies), and those involving a large numbers of cases (large-N studies). The chapter then reviews the
features of qualitative, quantitative, and historical research methods, arguing that the latter can be useful in offsetting
some of the limitations inherent in the case study method. It ends with a discussion of some of the challenges faced by
comparison, including the troubling problem of having too few cases and too many variables.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ There are many options for conducting comparative political research, each of which has advantages and
disadvantages.
◆◆ Comparative researchers must make choices that include the unit of analysis, the level of analysis, and
the variables to be studied.
◆◆ Research methods include the case study, the qualitative method (a small selection of cases), the
quantitative method (large numbers of cases), and the historical method.
◆◆ Comparative research has different approaches and results according to whether it is empirical or
normative, or quantitative or qualitative.
◆◆ In making comparisons between two or more factors, it is worth considering the relative strengths of
the most similar and most different system designs.
◆◆ Comparative research can benefit from taking the historical approach: comparing current cases with
past examples, or developments over time across countries.
36 chapter 3

comparative methods: an overview

Comparative Comparison is not only one of the oldest tools of political science (found, for example, in the
method work of Aristotle), but also one of the most important. Some have even argued that the scientific
The process by study of politics is unavoidably comparative (Almond, 1966, and Lasswell 1968), and that
which different
‘comparison is the methodological core of the scientific study of politics’ (Powell et al., 2014). In
cases are
compared in order short, the comparative method lies at the heart of political research. Having said that, we saw
to better in Chapter 2 that there are different theoretical approaches to comparison, and now – in looking
understand their at methodology – we will see that there are also different research methods, and differing
qualities, and to opinions about the best way of realizing the potential of comparison (Munck and Snyder, 2007).
develop
Once we have thought about the best theoretical approach to take, we then need to decide
hypotheses,
theories, and our unit of analysis, which could be the state, a political office, an institution, a process, a
concepts. principle, a movement, a theme, or an area of policy. We then need to think about the level of
analysis, which could be anything from the relations among and between states down through
Methodology groups or social classes to politics at the level of the individual. We are then faced with several
The systematic additional choices: the case or cases we wish to study, the combination of such cases, the variable
analysis of the
that interests us, and the question of whether to use quantitative, qualitative, or historical research
methods used in a
given field of methods. Even if we opt for the most popular approach – the case study method – we are faced
enquiry. Also used with several subsidiary questions regarding the number of cases we use, and whether or not the
to describe the cases we use are representative.
body of methods Once we have made these choices, we have no shortage of methods from which to choose,
used, or the
depending on a combination of the research question we want to ask, the time and resources
means used to
reach a particular we have available, the method with which we are most comfortable, and our research prefer-
set of conclusions. ences; that is, how we believe that understanding is best acquired (see Landman and Carvalho,
2017). In this chapter we will focus on four key methods: case studies, the qualitative method,
Unit of the quantitative method, and the historical method, summarized in Figure 3.1. (These are broad
analysis groupings that contain many more specific methods, and treating them separately is not meant
The object of to suggest that they are distinct from one another, and in fact they often overlap and can be used
study in
comparative
in different combinations.)
politics.

Level of
the case study method
analysis The case study method is one of the most widely used strategies in research, lying at the
The level of study heart of political science and being widely used also throughout the social and natural sciences,
in comparative
and the humanities. The method, says Gerring (2007), involves ‘the intensive study of a single
politics, ranging
from the macro case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases (a population)’. The focus of that
(political system) study might be an event, a policy, or a political institution or process. Although it might at fi rst
level to the micro seem odd to suggest that we can compare using a single case, a case is necessarily comparative
(individual) level. because it needs to be an example of a larger population, against which it can then be
juxtaposed. (For example, Iran as a case of an Islamic republic, or Sweden as an example of a
Case study monarchy.) Single cases have the advantage of depth, and other researchers can use two or
method
A research
more single-country studies to explore broader similarities and differences, and single cases
method involving can be also compared with an ideal type or typology. The greatest advantage of a single case
detailed study of a is that it offers an in-depth, real-world understanding of a phenomenon, a clearly defi ned
particular object example that helps to illustrate a wider principle.
and the context Yin (2018) points out that case studies must be understood in terms of both their scope and
within which it
exists.
their features. In terms of scope, they look in depth at a phenomenon within its actual context;
case studies are different from experiments, for example, because the latter separate the phenom-
ena to be studied from their context. In terms of features, case studies help address the problem
of too many variables and not enough cases (discussed later in this chapter), and are broad-ranging in that they rely on
multiple sources of evidence.
One key to a successful case study is to be clear what the case represents, and how a case differs from a study. By its
nature, a case is an example of a more general category, such that to examine a case is to undertake an investigation with
significance beyond its own boundaries. An account of the Japanese general election of 2017 which does not venture
 comparative methods 37

Method Number of cases Focus Strategy

Case study One Case Intensive study of a single instance with wider
significance.

Qualitative Multiple Case Holistic comparison of two or more cases within

their natural settings.

Quantitative Multiple Variable Statistical assessments of the relationships between

variables involving large numbers of cases.

Historical Multiple Process Tracing of the process leading to a known outcome.

Figure 3.1 Political science research methods

beyond the topic itself is a study, not a case study. However, an analysis which delves into the significance of the election
being the first in Japan since 1953 in which an incumbent prime minister (Shinzō Abe) had a third consecutive victory
makes it a case study, offering a detailed illustration of themes of wider interest. It raises many interesting questions
about the evolution of political parties, about changes in the place of political factionalism, and about the dynamics of
states with dominant political parties. The outcome of the election also had international ramification in that it gave
Abe the support he needed to address constitutional limits on Japanese defence policy.

Prime minister Shinzoˉ Abe stands to take a bow before the Diet after being re-elected to office for a second time, an event
offering a case study with many potentially interesting insights into the changing nature of Japanese politics.
Source: Getty Images/Kyodo News.
38 chapter 3

By their nature, case studies use a wide range of techniques, including the following:

◆◆ Reading the academic literature.

◆◆ Examining primary and secondary sources.
◆◆ Interviews with participants and other observers in the unit.
◆◆ Direct observation, either as a ‘fly on the wall’ or as a participant.

As King et al. (1994) put it, scholars of cases engage in ‘soaking and poking, marinating themselves in minutiae’,
aiming to provide what Geertz (1973) once called ‘thick description’, meaning that it is both rounded and detailed.
This multi-method approach contrasts with a more specific and explicit approach using a single lens, such as
statistical analysis, or an experiment. Unlike statistical analysis, which seeks to identify relationships between
variables measured across a series of observations, case analysis aims to identify how a range of factors interact in
the context of the example being studied.
There are many ways of thinking about cases, some of the modifying adjectives include illustrative, descriptive,
­exploratory, cumulative, and critical, but four particular types stand out in comparative politics – see Figure 3.2. Of these,
the representative case is the most common. This is the workhorse of case studies, as useful as it is undramatic, and often
focused on the home country of a researcher. For example, researchers may be interested in the formation of coalition
governments in general, but they opt to study in detail how governments form in their homeland, hoping that the
resulting research can contribute to broader understandings. A collection of representative case studies can go on to
provide the raw material for comparative generalization by other scholars taking a wider approach.
By contrast, a prototypical case is chosen not because it is representative but because it is expected to become so.
The point here is that studying a pioneer can help us understand a phenomenon which might become more widely
significant. One example is the use of social media in elections in the United States, for which the Obama campaign
in 2008 was a trendsetter. His campaign may not have been the first to do this, but it was clearly one of the most
thorough and effective, setting new standards and exploiting new methods that were quickly adopted elsewhere.
Campaigning via social media has quickly become the norm in many democracies, even moving into darker terri-
tory with allegations of Russian manipulation of elections in several countries. The use of social media to campaign
was predictable, as was the earlier use of mass circulation newspapers, radio, and television, but one of the dangers
of a prototypical case is that it is based on a bet on the future, and may come to nothing if it is not adopted more
widely. (At which point, presumably, the focus of research can switch to an analysis of why it never took off.)
Where the study of prototypical cases looks to the future, exemplary cases look to the past in the sense that they
are the archetypes that are considered to have generated the category of which they are taken as representative. For
­example, the parliamentary system was born in Britain, and thus a study of the features of the British Parliament is like-
ly to provide insights into the manner in which legislatures and executives work in all those countries using this system.
In similar fashion, the French presidency does far more than illustrate the semi-presidential system of government: it is
the model upon which other semi-presidential systems – such as those in Russia, Ukraine, and several former French

Type Quality Example

Representative Typical of the category Coalition government in Finland

Prototypical Expected to become typical Advanced use of social media in US election

campaigns

Exemplary Created the category The British Parliament

Deviant Exception to the rule China as a large country that is not a

federation

Critical If it works here, it will work anywhere Promoting democracy in Afghanistan

Figure 3.2 Five types of case study

 comparative methods 39

colonies in Africa – were based.While an exemplar is often defined as a case to be emulated, in research design the term
refers more neutrally to an influential example which illustrates the essential features of a phenomenon. An exemplary
case is often, but need not be, prototypical.
The purpose of studying a deviant case is to seek out the exceptional and the atypical, rather than the usual: the few
countries which remain communist, for example, or poor countries that have managed to be democratic, or those
where the military still plays an important political role. Deviant cases are often used to tidy up our understanding of
exceptions and anomalies. Why does India contradict the thesis that democracy presupposes prosperity? Why did tiny
Switzerland adopt a federal administrative system when most federations are found in large countries? (Conversely,
why is China – the largest country in the world by population – not a federation?) Why has voter turnout stayed high
in Sweden and Denmark (more than 80 per cent in recent elections) while it has been more modest in neighbouring
Estonia and Finland? Deviant cases always attract interest and, by providing a contrast with the norm, enhance our
understanding of representative examples. Since the exceptional tends to the exotic, however, the danger is over-study:
comparative politics should be more than a collection of curios.
Finally, a critical case (also known as a ‘crucial case’) enables a proposition to be tested in the circumstances least fa-
vourable to its validity. The logic is simple: if it is true here, then it is true everywhere. For instance, if we were to find
that most Germans opposed further European integration, we could anticipate that the same would hold true in other
EU countries. In this way, critical case studies can be highly efficient, providing exceptional returns on the research
investment; by studying just one country, we can generalize to others. However, the pay-off comes with risk: a critical
case design builds a potential for generalization into a single investigation but involves a bet that the relevant proposi-
tion will, in fact, be confirmed in the conditions least favourable to its validity.
Case studies are the building blocks from which we construct our understanding of the political world. In a similar
way to judges in common law systems, political scientists (and politicians more so) usually proceed by comparing cases,
rather than by making deductions from first principles. As a result, much comparative political analysis takes the form
of drawing analogies between cases. For example, what are the similarities and differences between the causes of the
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian revolutions? Why does the plurality electoral system produce a two-party system in the
United States but a multi-party system in India? Why have several Eastern European countries (notably Hungary and
Poland), after setting out on the road to democracy, started slipping back towards authoritarianism? As we will see in
the next section, a comparison of cases can create space for a broader understanding.

the qualitative method Qualitative

Implementing a comparative design involves making either qualitative or quantitative method
A research
comparisons, or a blend of the two. The qualitative method is what we usually associate with method based on
the comparative method, and although it can involve comparing many cases (otherwise known studying a few
as large-N, for the number of cases), it most often concentrates on the intensive examination of cases within their
two cases (a paired or binary comparison), three cases (a triangular comparison), or a few cases. natural setting,
Cases are usually chosen so as to introduce variation into the dependent variable, thus overcoming with an emphasis
on values,
an inherent limit of the single case study. opinions,
The qualitative approach has the following features: behaviour, and
context.
◆◆ A limited number of cases are studied in depth.
◆◆ It tends to be descriptive rather than predictive.
◆◆ An effort is made to understand the interaction of multiple variables.
◆◆ Meaning is allowed to emerge from the objects of study.
◆◆ Observation is the main means of data collection.
◆◆ Phenomena are studied within their natural setting.

An example of the qualitative approach is offered by recent research into nationalism, which (as we will see in
Chapter 4) has been on the rise in multiple countries in different parts of the world. Much of it has come as a
reaction to immigration, globalization, and multiculturalism, but the spark varies from place to place (lending itself
to studies involving a few cases), and because nationalism can be highly emotional, it is hard to fit into the large-N
statistical approaches that come with quantitative analysis.
In a book published in 1995, the author Michael Billig developed the idea of ‘banal nationalism’ to describe the
‘banal’ channels through which people in established nations experienced nationalism; these included routine symbols
and habits, such as flags, anthems, sporting events, and use of terms that imply togetherness, such as ‘the president’ or us
40 chapter 3

Focus 3.1
Hypotheses and variables

Hypothesis At the heart of research in almost every field of study is the formulation and testing of
A proposed a hypothesis. Although distinct from a theory, which – as we saw in Chapter 2 – is
explanation for a an explanatory framework, hypotheses might flow from theories, and can in turn be
phenomenon that tested in order to support or refute theories. Examples of hypotheses include the
can be supported
(confirmed) or
following:
refuted (falsified)
through ◆◆ The wealthier a country, the more likely it is to sustain a stable democracy.
observation or ◆◆ The violent end to a dictatorial regime is more likely to bring chaos than democracy.
experimentation. ◆◆ Colonialism is the root cause of the problems of the world’s poorest states.
Variable
A changeable
In much comparative research, the focus of interest lies with variables, the object
feature, factor, usually being to explore the extent to which they co-vary with one another, such that
quantity, or knowing a country’s score on one variable (such as literacy) allows us to predict its
element. score on another (such as electoral turnout). In such analyses, one variable is
dependent, in the sense that it is the one we want to better understand, while the
Dependent others are independent, in the sense that we believe that they may explain or impact
variable the dependent variable. For example:
The factor or
element we wish
to explain. ◆◆ Higher participation in politics may be driven by factors such as greater wealth and
higher education.
Independent ◆◆ The incidence of military coups may be tied to poverty, social division, and the past
variable incidence of coups.
The factor or ◆◆ An assertive foreign policy may be driven by a high sense of mission, the power of
element believed
to influence the
the defence industry, fear of the foreign, or (as in the case of Putin’s Russia) a desire
dependent to reassert lost influence.
variable. There
are often many
such variables.

or we. (These are known as deixis, or ‘pointing’ words that cannot be understood without understanding the context
in which they are used.)
In a book published in 2017, editors Michael Skey and Marco Antonsich brought together a group of nearly 20
scholars who used Billig’s book as the basis for case studies on nationalism from different parts of the world, including
Azerbaijan, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Serbia, and Russia.They used a variety of techniques to undertake their
research, including interviews, focus groups, survey data, ethnography (the study of people and cultures) and the analysis
of Twitter campaigns. Skey and Antonsich comment on the manner in which national commemorative events build con-
nections ‘between bodies, symbols and places that may generate feelings of awe, respect, sadness or
Most similar joy’, and that they are ‘crucial in making the nation seem resonant and meaningful for substantial
system numbers’. They also argue that any understanding of the nation must pay attention to matters that
A research design are ‘emotional or felt’, otherwise there is a danger of failing to understand how ‘passions, feelings
based on using and emotions drive people’s involvement in political campaigns and public celebrations tied to the
cases that are as nation’. Clearly, then, studies of nationalism invite the use of qualitative approaches based on values,
similar as possible,
in effect opinions, behaviour, and context.
controlling for the The selection of cases is important to qualitative research, and there are two core strategies
similarities and involved (see Anckar, 2008). The most common – known as the most similar system (MSS)
isolating the design – involves selecting those cases which are as similar as possible except in regard to the
causes of object of study (the dependent variable). The underlying logic, argues Lipset (1990) is that ‘the
differences.
more similar the units being compared, the more possible it should be to isolate the factors re-
 comparative methods 41

sponsible for differences between them’. If the units being studied are similar in, say, their history, Most different
culture, and government institutions, it should be possible to rule out such common factors as system
explanations for the particular difference being studied. A research design
An example of the MSS method at work might be a study of attitudes towards membership based on using
cases that are as
of the European Union among its six founding states, or a selection of Western European mem-
different as
bers, or a selection of Eastern Europeans members. Attitudes towards integration differ among possible, in effect
countries within each group, even though they have much else in common, so the goal would controlling for the
be to tease out the differences that accounted for the variation in levels of support for the EU differences and
within an otherwise similar group. isolating the
causes of
The most different system (MDS) design follows the opposite track. Here, the goal is to test a
similarities.
relationship between two factors by discovering whether it can be observed in a range of countries
with contrasting political systems, histories, or cultures, for example. If so, our confidence that the
relationship is real, and not due to the dependence of both factors on an unmeasured third variable, will increase (Landman
and Carvalho, 2017). A well-known example of this approach is the historical analysis by Theda Skocpol (1979) of revolu-
tions in France, Russia, and China. These three cases had quite different political, economic, and social systems, so she set
out to ask what they had in common that would produce a similar political outcome. She concluded that regimes which
were internationally weak and domestically ineffective became vulnerable to insurrection when well-organized agitators
succeeded in exploiting peasant frustration with an old order to which the landed aristocracy offered only limited support.

the quantitative method

Where the qualitative method takes a wide-angle approach to understanding political phenomena, often using
small-N cases in their natural setting, the quantitative method usually takes a narrower approach based on
larger-N cases, more variables, and statistical analysis; see summary in Table 3.1. It usually tries to quantify data and
to generalize the results to a larger population, generates information through experiments and survey research,
and demands a familiarity with the technical language of statistics. It calls for different skills
than the qualitative approach, and is more likely to suffer from the variable quality and Quantitative
availability of data from multiple cases, but the results often provide more breadth. method
The most basic form of quantitative research is counting numbers. For example: how many A research
method using
federations are there; how many states are democratic; or how many of the countries that were
more cases, more
classified by the Democracy Index as full democracies in 2010 are flawed democracies today? variables, and
Just as straightforward case studies can contribute more to comparative politics than elaborate attempting to
attempts at theory testing, so descriptive counts can sometimes provide more useful results than explain political
sophisticated statistical analyses. Once we go beyond the basics, though, we enter the more ana- phenomena using
statistical analysis.
lytical world of dependent and independent variables.
To illustrate the statistical approach, consider the example in Figure 3.3, which is a scatter
Correlation
plot showing the relationship between the number of members in a national legislature (the A relationship
dependent variable) and a country’s population (the independent variable). The simple question between two or
being asked is whether population size impacts the size of the legislature, and the graph reveals a more variables or
modest positive correlation: the larger the population, the larger the assembly. The findings are attributes.
summarized in the graph by calculating a regression line: the line giving the best fit to the data,
and which is determined by a formula linking the two variables. Regression
line
In this case, the equation reveals that, on average, the size of a legislature increases by a factor The line of best fit
of one for each increment of a million in a country’s population. Given such an equation, which in a scatter plot,
also gives a base estimate for assembly size given a notional population of zero, we can use the summarizing the
population of any particular country to predict its assembly size. (If there had been a negative relationship
correlation, the regression line would have sloped down rather than up: in that unlikely case, a between two
variables.
larger population would be associated with a smaller legislature.)
One important virtue of a regression line is that it allows us to identify outliers. The larger Outliers
the difference between the predicted and the actual assembly size, the greater the need for addi- The observations
tional explanation, thus providing a link to deviant case analysis. In our example in Figure 3.3, furthest away
Nigeria has a legislature that is smaller per head of population than most: it has 360 members in a from the value
country with nearly 180 million people, or one representative for 494,000 people.This undersize predicted by the
regression line.
is a reflection in part of its federal structure; federations tend to have smaller national legislatures
42 chapter 3

Table 3.1 Comparing qualitative and quantitative approaches

Qualitative Quantitative
Goal To understand underlying reasons and To quantify data and generalize results from
motivations in the setting of a phenomenon. a sample to the population of interest.
Method Exploratory or ‘bottom-up’; hypotheses and Confirmatory or ‘top-down’; hypotheses
theory generated from data. and theory tested with data.
View of human Contextual, personal, and unpredictable. Regular and predictable.
thought and behaviour
Focus Wide-angle lens. Narrow-angle lens.
Context Natural setting. Controlled conditions.
Sample size Smaller. Larger.
Core principles Interpretive, exploratory. Scientific, conclusive.
Types of information Open-ended, narrative, non-numerical, words, Statistical, numerical.
images, themes.
Information Interviews, focus groups, case studies, Experiments, audits, survey research,
collection observation. rating scales.
Results Particularistic, respondent-framed. Generalizable, researcher-framed.
Advantages Best where ideas cannot be reduced to numbers. Allows for large-scale studies.
Disadvantages Can be difficult to analyse, generating Ideas and political phenomena cannot
conflicting conclusions. always be expressed in numbers.
Adapted from Johnson and Christensen (2017), Chapter 2.
Note: These contrasts should be regarded as tendencies rather than absolutes. There is much overlap between the two methods.

because their people are also represented in state/provincial legislatures. Conversely, Cuba’s National Assembly of Peo-
ple’s Power is large per head of population; it has 612 members in a country with just over 11 million people, or one
representative for 18,000 people, giving Cubans a higher level of representation than almost any other country in the
world. This could be because communist states created large legislatures as a way of reducing any threat they might
pose to the party’s power, giving us a plausible hypothesis for further investigation.
The value of quantitative comparison is that it can provide precise summaries of large amounts of data using
­standard techniques whose application can be checked by other researchers. But, as always, interpretation is the difficult

700

600 Cuba
Membership of legislatures

500

400
Nigeria
300

200

100

0
0 50 100 150 200
Population (millions)

Figure 3.3 Population and the size of legislatures

Sources: Membership of legislatures from Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018); population size from World Bank (2018). Membership of legislatures
refers to lower chamber only.
 comparative methods 43

part, posing two main dangers. First, a strong correlation between two variables may arise simply because both depend
on a third, unmeasured factor. In such cases, there is no relationship of cause and effect. For example, a correlation
between proportional representation (PR) and multi-party systems might arise because both factors emerge in divided
societies, not because PR itself increases the number of parties.This problem of a spurious correlation can be addressed
by including all relevant variables in an analysis, but we may not know how many are relevant, and may not have data
on all those we think might be relevant.
The second problem in interpreting statistical results is that, even if a relationship is genuine, the direction of
causation remains to be established. Suppose we find that liberal democracies have higher rates of economic growth
than authoritarian regimes; does the correlation arise because democracy encourages economic growth, or because
economic growth encourages democracy? A case can be made either way, or both. A statistical correlation by itself will
not provide the answer, and a correlation in itself does not show the direction of causation.
For Brady and Collier (2010), there are several potential dangers posed by quantitative approaches. ‘Constructing a
statistical model requires assumptions,’ they warn, ‘which often are not only untested, but largely untestable.’ Those as-
sumptions come into play when decisions are made about the parameters to include in a study, and the degree to which
chance affects the results. They also warn that ‘regression analysis depends on the model, and if the model is wrong, so
is the analysis’. In short, the results of quantitative research vary with the quality and the quantity of the data used and
the design of the models used. As often as not, scholars in political science will end up arguing about the construction
of those models rather than about the results they produce.

the historical method

Most studies in politics – and in comparative politics, especially – focus on the present and leave history to the
historians. But this division of labour is both arbitrary and artificial, because today’s present is tomorrow’s past, and
it is often hard to truly understand a political system without looking at its historical roots. Political science can,
and perhaps should, make more use of the past as a treasure trove of additional cases, whether of rare events such as

The Cuban National Assembly in session. Given its unusually large number of representatives per voter, it stands as an
outlier in studies of the size and membership of legislatures.
Source: Getty Images/Adalberto Roque.
44 chapter 3

Historical genocide and revolution or of particular episodes that exemplify, challenge, or refi ne existing
method theories. The historical method has much to add to both qualitative and quantitative
A research approaches to research, helping to examine the robustness of fi ndings across distinct time
method based on periods.
studying cases
The European Union offers a good example. One of the hardest challenges in EU studies
from the past,
often with a focus is to provide an answer to the question ‘What is the European Union?’ There is nothing quite
on their like it anywhere else in the world, and it is both more than a standard international organization
development while also being less than a United States of Europe. One possible answer to the question is that
through time. it is a confederation (a union of independent states – see Chapter 11 for more on this), but there
are no true confederations in existence today with which it could be compared. This means that
Process we have to go back in history and look at examples such as the Old Swiss Confederacy (prior
tracing
The study of the
to 1798) and the German confederation (1815–66) in order to better assess the question of the
sequence of degree to which today’s EU can be regarded as confederal.
events linking a We can connect political science with history by using process tracing to identify and
cause to an effect. describe the historical sequence linking a cause to an effect. For example, what were the steps
leading from Hitler’s anti-Semitism to the Holocaust? Through what mechanisms does defeat in
Path war lead to a change of regime? Taking a more particular case: why does Iran have such a troubled
dependence relationship with the West? At first glance, it can appear that Iranians are over-concerned with
The idea that the
outcome of a criticizing the West, and the instinctive reaction of Western political leaders is to reward Iran’s
political process petulance with criticism, mistrust, and an unwillingness to engage. Although Iran was never a
depends on earlier colony, its perspective is still coloured by the long history of Western interference in its politics
decisions that lead and economics, and narratives on both sides have been altered, recycled, and manipulated to fit
down a particular
different agendas (Whiskin, 2018). It is only through an historical analysis of this kind that the
path.
present can be understood in terms of the past.
Critical Pierson (2004) brings together some concepts for thinking about politics in the context of
juncture time, helping tease out our often-submerged thoughts about political change. First among these
A turning point is path dependence, an idea borrowed from physics by economists trying to explain how
which establishes changes in technology impacted the evolution of business practices, and which has since spread
interests, throughout the social sciences. It might be used, for example, to argue that the return of authori-
structures, or
institutions
tarianism in Putin’s Russia can be traced back to decisions made or steps taken during the reform
persisting through era following the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
time. Path dependence implies an emphasis on history generally and branching points specifically.
By contrast, path independence means that the same destination will be reached, regardless of
the route; all roads lead to Rome. It implies an emphasis on underlying structures and resources rather than historical
sequences. For example, the outcome of a war is path dependent if a particular battle proves decisive, and path inde-
pendent if the stronger side is sure to win eventually, whatever the result of a specific confrontation.
Path dependence can be initiated by critical junctures, or key moments that clear a new path that continues to
be followed long after the juncture itself has passed; see Focus 3.2 for an example. During the critical phase (often a
crisis of some kind), all options are on the table and history is written. Revolutions are one example, constitutional
conventions another. Once the new order has consolidated, however, politics settles down and the choices realistically
available to decision-makers shrink.The revolutionary generation gives way to pragmatic operators of the new regime.
As ideas are displaced by institutions, so the constitution as choice is supplanted by the constitution as constraint.
By dividing history into critical and normal eras, we arrive at a plausible perspective on the old debate about wheth-
er people make their own history. The answer is perhaps that they do, but only occasionally. In other words, critical
junctures are rare choice points in which human agency really can be decisive for the long term.
Ideas, in particular, rise to prominence during critical junctures. In normal times, much of the political discussion
defends established procedures and interests. But the existing stock of ideas sometimes becomes incapable of re-
sponding to a shift in circumstances, creating pressures for established procedures to be revised
Sequencing
or completely rethought. A country may experience economic decline; a party may lose voter
The idea that the
order of events, support; a trade union may experience a collapse in membership. Suddenly, ideas that had previ-
not merely their ously received little consideration find themselves at the centre of the table. When disintegration
occurrence, threatens, new thoughts are urgently needed.
affects the Sequencing, the order in which events unfold, can help to account for path dependence. For
outcome.
example, communist regimes which introduced economic reform before political liberalization
 comparative methods 45

Focus 3.2
The Greek financial crisis: why it happened
The financial crisis that emerged in Greece in 2009 is an example both of path dependence at work, and of
critical junctures at which decisions were taken leading to new paths.
The immediate beginnings of the crisis date to 2002, when Greece became one of 12 European Union
states to adopt the new EU single currency, the euro. Even then, there were doubts about its readiness to
take this step, because it had not met all the criteria needed to join the euro, including limits on its budget
deficit. It was allowed to join regardless. One of the effects of membership of the euro was that poorer
states such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain had access to lower interest rates on their loans; as a result,
Greece went on a spending spree fuelled by cheaper borrowing, built a budget deficit that – at nearly 13
per cent – was far above the 3 per cent limit set for eurozone membership, manipulated its official statistics
to exaggerate its levels of economic growth, and accumulated a national debt that was ultimately bigger than
its national economy.
Greece might have struggled on indefinitely in this weakened condition but for the onset in 2007 of a
financial crisis in the United States that quickly spread to Europe. European states felt the effects of the
crisis, but those in a weaker condition suffered the most. In 2009, the Greek government finally admitted
the size of its budget deficit, sparking a broader crisis within the eurozone. Greece was offered a financial
bailout, but only on condition that it cut public spending and increased its tax revenues. The terms of the
deal sparked riots in the streets of Athens and encouraged little improvement in investor confidence.
The European Union revised its policies on the management of the euro, making sure that a closer watch
would be kept in future on the size of national budget deficits, but the crisis in Greece rumbled on. Questions
were asked not only about how long it could remain within the eurozone, but also about the future of the
euro and of Greece’s membership of the European Union itself.
The entire history of the crisis is path dependent in that each effort to resolve the issue failed, leading
only to further plans for reform. And what about the critical juncture: the decisive moment when Greece
finally addressed its core economic problems and the euro zone carved out a more secure future for itself,
with or without Greece? That moment has yet to arrive and may or may not ever do so. Talking up their
story, journalists identify too many historical turning points; political scientists are right to be more cautious.

(such as China) were more likely to survive than those beginning the reform process with political change (such as the
USSR). In European countries where trade unions developed before socialism became a full-blooded ideology (such
as Britain), the labour movement took on a moderate reformist character. But where Marxist thought was already es-
tablished, as in France, communist unions developed a more radical political agenda. So, whether trade unions emerged
before or after the onset of Marxism helps to explain whether particular European countries developed a reformist
or radical labour movement. The outcome was not predetermined but, rather, depended on the sequence of events.
One form of ‘sequence’ is a conjuncture in which separate events occur at the same time, enlarging their political
impact. The collision of World War I with the emergence of working-class socialism, or of the Vietnam War with the
student movement, generated political effects which were greater than would have been the case had these events
unfolded separately. These confluences are typically made by history, and are another contributor to path dependence.
Slow-moving causes, finally, are processes that unfold over a long period. Examples include modernization and
technological advance, the spread of education, globalization, and the growth of the mass media. Such processes often
need to reach a threshold or a tipping point beyond which a variable begins to exert a visible, dramatic effect. For
example, there has been a resurgence of right-wing anti-immigrant political parties in Europe that dates back at least to
the early 1990s, reflecting long-term concerns about immigration, law and order, unemployment
Slow-moving
and, more recently, the ‘Islamization’ of Europe. At least in some countries, such as Austria and cause
France, a threshold seems to have been passed; the Freedom Party of Austria, whose first leader An influence
was a former member of the Austrian Nazi Party and of the paramilitary SS, has even been part which changes
of Austrian coalition governments, in 2000–5 and again in 2017. When thresholds are involved, slowly but, over a
long-term but otherwise slow-moving causes need to be understood historically. Contemporary long period,
dramatically.
explosions have long fuses and political scientists need to search into the past to uncover them.
46 chapter 3

the challenges of comparison

As we saw in Chapter 1, comparison broadens our understanding of the political world, leads to improved
classifications, and gives potential for explanation and even prediction. And as we have just seen, there are different
approaches to using cases and variables in comparative study. Despite the variety of advantages and options, the very
breadth of comparison brings its own challenges, of which four in particular stand out (summarized in Table 3.2).

Too few cases, too many variables

This is a problem for those who think of comparative politics as a version of the experimenter’s laboratory, in which
researchers patiently seek to isolate the impact of a single variable. As outlined by Lijphart (1971), it arises when a
researcher wants to control for many variables at the same time and quickly runs out of cases. In other words, the
number of variables exceeds the number of cases. Even with nearly 200 sovereign states, we do not have enough
cases to allow political comparisons to be as precise as laboratory experiments. To make the same point from
another angle, we will never be able to test all possible explanations of a political difference between states.
Why, for example, have green political parties done so much better in some countries and so much worse in oth-
ers? The differences have often been clear even in neighbouring countries with almost identical economic structures
and bodies of environmental law, as in the case of members of the European Union. However,
green parties have done much better in Austria, Belgium, and Germany than in Britain, France,
Counterfactual
A thought or Italy for example. The Greens have also done well in Latvia; Prime Minister Indulis Emsis in
experiment 2004 became the first Green head of government in the world, and President Raimonds Vējonis
speculating on in 2015 became the first Green head of state in the world.There are many possible explanations
possible outcomes for these contrasts between countries, including post-material values (see Chapter 12), levels
if a particular factor
of education, national cultural traditions, electoral systems, the extent of pollution, the political
had been absent
from a process, or skill with which green parties have pursued their agendas, and the diffusion of environmental
an absent factor ideas across national boundaries. With so many potential explanations, and only a limited set of
had been present. country cases, decisive conclusions are difficult.
There are several potential solutions to the problem. We could increase the number of cases
Selection bias in a study by turning to history and comparing cases over an extended period of time.We could
Arises when
also use most similar system designs to achieve a more focused study of a few cases, or a most
selected cases and
variables are different system design to reduce the number of variables. Finally, we could resort to asking
unrepresentative of hypothetical ‘What if … ?’ questions by using counterfactuals.Would green parties have devel-
the wider class oped in Europe even without the expansion of mass higher education? What would our world
from which they be like if Britain had won the US War of Independence, if Hitler had died in a car crash in 1932,
are drawn.
or if the attacks of 9/11 had never happened? Tetlock and Belkin (1996) have developed useful
guidelines for judging the plausibility of counterfactuals, but the outcome of such thought ex-
Generalizable
Able to be periments can – by definition – never be tested against reality.
accurately applied
or extended to Selection bias
situations or A second handicap to comparison is selection bias, which can happen whenever the units
circumstances of analysis (such as states, cities, interest groups, or electoral systems) are chosen intentionally
other than those
originally studied.
rather than randomly. In these circumstances, the danger is that these units are unrepresentative
of the wider population and, in consequence, results may not be generalizable to the broader

Table 3.2 The challenges of comparison

Too few cases, too The problem of having more explanatory factors for a given outcome than there are cases
many variables available to study.
Selection bias The cases selected for study are often an unrepresentative sample, limiting the significance of the
findings. The selection may be influenced in particular by survivorship, value, or confirmation bias.
Understanding The ‘same’ phenomenon can mean different things in different countries, creating difficulties in
meaning comparing like with like.
Globalization States cannot be regarded as entirely independent of each other, thus reducing the effective
number of cases available for testing theories.
 comparative methods 47

category from which the cases are drawn. For example, studies of English-speaking democracies are unrepresentative
of all democracies, and studies of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa are untypical of those in Europe or Latin
America. Given the rarity of random sampling in qualitative comparisons, the point is not so much to eliminate
such bias as to be aware of its presence.
This danger often emerges as an unintended result of haphazard selection. For example, we might choose to study
those countries which speak our language, or which we feel are safe to visit. As a result, large and powerful states might
be studied more intensively than small and less powerful ones, even though large states are untypical. By contrast,
countries in which it is difficult to conduct research receive less attention. For example, Goode (2010) suggests that
authoritarian regimes such as Russia are under-studied because of the political sensitivity of conducting research in
such domains. The result of such selection biases is that published work is unrepresentative of all states.
One virtue of large-N statistical designs is that they reduce the risk of selection bias. If a study was to cover every
existing state, selection bias should disappear altogether, but the problem may just resurface in another form, through an
unrepresentative selection of variables, rather than countries. For example, much statistical research in comparative pol-
itics relies on data collected by governments, think-tanks, and international bodies whose priorities are often economic
rather than political (this book, for example, draws on data gathered by the World Bank). The result is that financial
and economic variables receive more attention, and politics runs the risk of being treated as a branch of economics.
A particularly troubling form of selection bias comes from examining only positive cases, thus eliminating all vari-
ation in the phenomenon we seek to explain. King et al. (1994) explain the problem as follows:
The literature is full of work that makes the mistake of failing to let the dependent variable vary; for example,
research that tries to explain the outbreak of wars with studies only of wars, the onset of revolutions with studies only
of revolutions, or patterns of voter turnout with interviews only of non-voters.

When only positive cases are studied, several potential conclusions about the causes and consequences of a phenom-
enon are ruled out. Contrast is needed to give variation, so that we can then consider what factors distinguish times of
war from times of peace, periods of revolution from periods of stability, and abstainers from voters.
Even without variation in the dependent variable, we can still identify common characteristics of the cases. For
example, we may find that revolutions are always preceded by war, or that all non-voters are cyn-
ical about politics. However, we have no contrast to explore and explain. We do not know how Survivorship
often the conditions associated with revolution have existed without triggering a revolution, or bias
whether the political cynicism we find among abstainers is equally prevalent among those who A form of
selection bias that
turn out on Election Day (Geddes, 2003). Put differently, war may be a necessary condition of
crops up when we
revolution (no revolution in the absence of war) without being a sufficient condition (whenever study only
there is a war, revolution follows). surviving examples
Three particular forms of selection bias raise their own unique problems. First, survivorship of political types,
bias arises when non-survivors of a temporal process are excluded, leading to biased results. Studying overlooking past
examples.
the few surviving communist states or military governments as representative of the entire class of
such regimes (past and present) is a mistake because the few that have survived may be very different
Value bias
from those that have disappeared. Similarly, if we want to study federations, we should appreciate Allowing
that some have failed and should ask not only whether current federations are successful, but also assessments, the
what proportion of all federations, past and present, have survived and prospered. And just because choice of facts,
every example from history of a confederation has failed or morphed into a federation, does that and conclusions to
be impacted by
mean that future examples are also doomed to fail? In designing our research, we need to look
the values of the
through both ends of the telescope – at starters as well as finishers, at casualties as well as survivors. researcher.
Second, value bias arises when researchers allow themselves to be guided by values or ide-
ology. As we read reports, journal articles, and books (even this one), we have to allow that the Confirmation
authors will have political preferences. In the case of sponsored research we have to consider bias
who paid for the research, whether conditions were imposed on the researchers by the sponsors, The tendency to
or whether there is an underlying political agenda at work.Value bias is a particular problem in seek out or
interpret
comparative studies, because other than the country or countries in which researchers have spent information that
most or all of their lives, they will know little directly about the objects of their study, and they confirms
face the danger of seeing other countries through the lenses of their own experiences, values, and pre-existing beliefs
learning. Without even trying, they will be biased by politics, culture, race, gender, religion, age, and attitudes, and
economic situation, and a host of other factors. to ignore
information that
Finally, confirmation bias arises when researchers have a view in mind before they undertake does not.
their research, and pay attention only to the facts and analyses that support that view, ignoring
48 chapter 3

or downplaying any contrary evidence. Those who sponsor research are likely to seek out and support researchers
who seek out data that support their interests. In regard to climate change, for example, both advocates and deniers
sometimes seize on any study which supports their beliefs, while ignoring or rejecting findings which run against their
entrenched positions. Whether it is conscious or unconscious, confirmation bias has the effect of producing skewed
results and conclusions.

Understanding meaning
Because the meaning of a political action depends on the conventions of the state concerned, comparing like with
like is not always as straightforward as it seems. The cultural approach discussed in the last chapter, and again in
Chapter 12, plays an important role here. Before we begin any cross-national comparison we should ensure that we
understand the relevant cultural codes of the states we are studying. Failure here results in cultural imperialism, in
which the meaning of an action in our home state is incorrectly projected onto other societies.
Take, for example, the question of styles of political representation, which vary across states. Where Nigerian poli-
ticians might seek to impress their supporters by acts of flamboyant extravagance, Swedish politicians are more likely
to set out to affirm their very ordinariness. The same goal of impressing constituents is achieved by culturally specific
means, such that what works in Lagos would be disastrous in Stockholm, and what succeeds in Stockholm would be
met with apathy in Abuja.
Similarly, when members of a legislature vote against their party’s line, the consequences can range by state from
complete indifference to expulsion from the party. What appears to be the same act carries varying significance, and
thus meaning depends on context. Meaning and context also come into play in comparing the incidence of violence in
national legislatures.Why is it, for example, that brawls have occasionally broken out among legislators in Italy, Mexico,
South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, and Venezuela, but that they are rare – if unknown in recent history – in most other
parts of the world. What, if anything, do the countries in this list have in common?

A scuffle breaks out among members of the Taiwanese legislature. What kind of meaning should comparativists attach to
the number of such scuffles in some legislatures and their absence in others?
Source: Getty Images/Sam Yeh.
 comparative methods 49

Switzerland 1
Netherlands 2
Belgium 3
Ireland 4
Sweden 6
Germany 8
UK 9
France 12
Australia 24
USA 32
Japan 44
Russia 45
South Africa 46
Mexico 63
China 72
Brazil 82
India 86
Egypt 87
Nigeria 130
Venezuela 135
Iran 164
Eritrea 191

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Figure 3.4 The KOF Globalization Index

Source: Swiss Economic Institute (2018).
Note: Numbers indicate scores out of 100, with 100 representing the most globalized and 0 indicating the least globalized. Numbers are rounded
out to nearest whole figure. Figures at the end of bars indicate ranking out of 191.

Globalization
The fi nal handicap to comparison (if we take the state as the unit of analysis) comes from Globalization
globalization (Teune, 2010). Although 193 ‘independent’ states belong to the United Nations The process by
in reality these states are interdependent, or even dependent. Countries learn from, copy, which the links
compete, and trade with, influence and even invade each other in a constant process of between people,
corporations, and
interaction. The result can be homogenization, where politics and government in different governments in
countries becomes increasingly similar (though specialization, where each country focuses on different states
its distinctive strengths in the global order, is another possible outcome). (See also the discussion become integrated
about policy diff usion and convergence in Chapter 19.) through trade,
The KOF Globalization Index maintained by the Swiss Economic Institute offers some in- investment, and
technology.
sight into this phenomenon by ranking the countries of the world in terms of the extent to
which they are globally connected in economic, political, and social terms. Among other things,
Figure 3.4 reveals that it tends to be the smaller democracies with advanced economies – such as Switzerland and the
Netherlands – that have achieved the highest levels of global connectivity. Large economies naturally rely more on
their domestic market so in spite of their large economies and expansive trade networks, the United States and Japan
remain less globalized, while large emerging powers such as China and India rank even lower. The poorest African
states, perhaps unsurprisingly, sit at the lower reaches of the ranking.
Looking at these numbers, it might be reasonable to conclude that the most globalized states will have the fewest
political differences, but opinion is divided on the implications of globalization. Does it mean the end of the state,
are global and national processes interacting and adapting to one another, is globalization much older than we think,
and does it even exist? (See debate in Holton, 2011.) It does exist, argues the sociologist George Ritzer (2018), who
writes of the McDonaldization of society, suggesting that culture has come to be dominated by the goals of efficiency,
calculability, predictability, and control; related arguments could be made about politics and political expectations. How
50 chapter 3

then, do we explain the political backlash as nationalists in countries such as Britain, France, the United States, India,
and the Philippines work to reassert the sovereignty of states in the face of globalization?
The major transitions of world history – industrialization, colonialism, decolonization, democratization, and glo-
balization – unfolded on a world stage. In that sense we inhabit one global system, rather than a world of independent
states. Green (2002) puts the point well when he says the world is arranged ‘as if national polities are in fact cells of a
larger entity with a life all its own’.The implication is that we should study this larger organism, rather than comparing
its component parts as if they were unconnected.
Specific institutional forms also reflect diffusion.The presidential systems of Latin America were imported from the
United States; prime ministers and parliaments grew out of the specific circumstances of British political history; and
the ombudsman (see Chapter 10) was a device copied from Sweden. The development of international organizations,
from the United Nations to the European Union, also creates another layer of governance to which all member states
must react.
These links do not invalidate comparative analysis; indeed, they allow studies comparing the impact of an interna-
tional factor on different states, thus bridging the study of international and comparative politics. But interdependence
creates technical difficulties for statistical analysis. Treating states as independent entities artificially inflates the effective
sample size in statistical research, resulting in exaggerated confidence in the significance of the results obtained (Tilly,
1997). To put the point more intuitively, treating states as separate can lead to false inferences if in reality they are all
subject to a common external influence, such as globalization.
 comparative methods 51

discussion questions
◆◆ What does it take for the study of politics to be scientific, and where is it most likely to fail?
◆◆ In what way (or ways) could your country serve as a representative or deviant case study?
◆◆ What are the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative approaches to
comparative political research?
◆◆ How does the study of politics differ from the study of history?
◆◆ How can comparative political research best be protected from value bias?
◆◆ What challenges does globalization pose for comparative politics?

key concepts
◆◆ Case study method ◆◆ Most similar system
◆◆ Comparative method ◆◆ Outliers
◆◆ Confi rmation bias ◆◆ Path dependence
◆◆ Correlation ◆◆ Process tracing
◆◆ Counterfactual ◆◆ Qualitative method
◆◆ Critical juncture ◆◆ Quantitative method
◆◆ Dependent variable ◆◆ Regression line
◆◆ Generalizable ◆◆ Selection bias
◆◆ Globalization ◆◆ Sequencing
◆◆ Historical method ◆◆ Slow-moving cause
◆◆ Hypothesis ◆◆ Survivorship bias
◆◆ Independent variable ◆◆ Unit of analysis
◆◆ Level of analysis ◆◆ Value bias
◆◆ Methodology ◆◆ Variable
◆◆ Most different system

further reading
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (2008) The Oxford Handbook
of Political Methodology (Oxford University Press). An edited collection of chapters on the
many different approaches to political research.
Gray, David E. (2018) Doing Research in the Real World, 4th edn (Sage). A general guide to
undertaking research, offering detail on many of the topics covered in this chapter.
Halperin, Sandra, and Oliver Heath (2017) Political Research: Methods and Practical Skills, 2nd
edn (Oxford University Press). An introduction to the methods, goals, and approaches
used in political research.
Landman, Todd, and Edzia Carvalho (2017) Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, 4th edn
(Routledge). A concise survey of comparative methods and approaches, including chapters
on particular themes in comparative politics.
Lange, Matthew (2013) Comparative-Historical Methods (Sage). A survey of the strategies and
benefits to comparison of the historical method.
Yin, Robert K. (2018) Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods, 6th edn (Sage).
A standard source on conducting case studies, using examples from a range of disciplines.
 4

Source: iStock/123ArtistImages
the state
contents
◆ The state: an overview
◆ What is a state?
◆ Origins and evolution
◆ The diversity of states
PREVIEW ◆ Nations and nationalism
The most popular unit of analysis in comparative politics is the state. ◆ The future of the state
It is far from the only such option, because comparison can be made
at any level from the local to the multinational, and can involve any
political institution, process, problem, or phenomenon. Even so, the
use of states in comparison means that we need to understand what they are, how they work, how they evolved,
the varieties in which they are found, and the current dynamic of the state system.
This chapter begins with a review of the features of states, with a particular focus on sovereignty. It then briefly
examines the history of states, focusing on how and where they emerged, and at how political relationships changed
both vertically (among rulers and the ruled) and horizontally (among different political communities). It then looks at
the diversity that exists among states, before discussing the related concepts of nation and nationalism, ending with an
analysis of today’s debates over the condition and the future prospects of the state.
The state is a younger concept than most people think, and fewer than 50 were in existence at the beginning of the
twentieth century. But even as the number has grown to its current total of about 190, so the questions about the long-
term future of states have grown. Some argue that states are as strong as ever, others argue that they are undergoing
fundamental change in the face of globalization, while yet others argue that they are in decline.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ The state lies at the heart of government and politics, which is why it is so important to understand its
features and evolution.
◆◆ All states have five defi ning qualities: government, population, legitimacy, territory, and sovereignty.
◆◆ The modern state was born in Europe, and its form was exported to the rest of the world by imperial
powers such as Britain, France, and Spain.
◆◆ States differ from one another in terms of their population, the reach of their political authority, and
their income.
◆◆ A nation is quite different from a state, even if the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and
nations and states often overlap.
◆◆ The condition of the modern state is debatable. Some argue that states remain strong, some that they are
declining, and some that they are simply evolving.
 the state 53

the state: an overview

Although we take for granted the division of the world into states, we should assume neither State
that the state always was the dominant principle of political organization, nor that it always The legal and
will be. There was a world before states and, as advocates of globalization like to point out, political authority
there may be a world after them, too. of a territory
containing a
Before the modern state, government and politics was mainly associated with kingdoms, population and
empires, and cities. These were often governed in a personal and highly decentralized fashion, marked by
lacking many of the structured and formal features of states, most notably the sovereign authority borders.
to rule the population of a specific territory. And while those earlier formations had many po-
litical and economic links among them, they functioned within limited horizons, being influenced only by their near
neighbours, and rarely being exposed to ideas about government from further afield.
The modern idea of the state emerged in Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the use of the
word state as a political term coming into common use towards the end of this period. (It stems from the Latin status,
meaning ‘condition’ or ‘manner of standing’. It is also quite different, as we will see, from the idea of a nation, with
which it is often confused.) The number of states grew slowly: there were only 19 in existence in 1800 (most of them
in Europe and Asia), and barely 30 more had been established by 1900 (mostly in Europe and the Americas).
At a global level, the most active period of state formation began after World War II as decolonization saw the end
of European empires: nearly 70 mainly African and Asian states achieved independence in the 1960s and 1970s, more
new states emerged with the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the balance of global power changed with
the rise of emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil in the 1990s. Along the way, debates about sovereignty,
authority, and self-determination broadened and deepened, and political systems – even if they had many core features
in common – took on a greater variety.
The world today has about 190 states (Focus 4.1 explains why we need to use the preposition about when discuss-
ing the number of states), and they have a quite different and more complex relationship with one another than they
did even two generations ago. Their interactions influence domestic political and economic calculations, questions are
frequently raised about their true independence, and in the wake of globalization we have seen an intensified debate
under way about their future: are states becoming weaker, are they as strong as they ever were, or are they simply chang-
ing in the wake of new demands and pressures?
Whatever the answer, the state remains the basis for understanding government and politics all over the world.There
are sub-national units of government, to be sure (as we will see in Chapter 11), and signs of governance at the global
level, but almost everyone is a citizen of one state or another, and when we think of government we also think of states.
The institutions and processes that will be covered in the rest of this book are mainly associated with states, and even
if we study what happens below the level of the state, we will still find ourselves referring back to the governments of
states; they drive and determine what can be done not just within their borders, but also in the relations between and
among states, both regionally and globally.

what is a state?
Few concepts are more central to understanding government and politics than the state, and yet few concepts are
also so contested. It is nearly impossible to meaningfully study government and politics without at least a working
understanding of what the state looks like, because it is the world’s dominant form of political organization, and
states collectively form the building blocks of the international system. We experience the state when we pay taxes,
are subject to state law, must carry a state passport in order to travel across borders, and take part in choosing
governments. The further we move away from these practical signs of the state, though, the harder it is to pin
down.
The usual benchmark for understanding the state is the classic definition offered by the German sociologist Max
Weber, who described it as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of phys-
ical force within a given territory’ (quoted in Gerth and Mills, 1948). There is more to the state than physical force,
though, and it needs to be understood more particularly in its modern context, where it is best defined as a legal and
political entity with five main features: a government, population, legitimacy, territory, and sovereignty (see Figure 4.1).
If all was neat and tidy, then every square metre of land in the world would be part of one state or another. But there
are numerous parcels of territory around the world that lack one or more of these qualities, and cannot be considered
states: examples include Hong Kong, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, and Western Sahara. Furthermore, there are still
54 chapter 4

Focus 4.1
How many states are there?

This is not an easy question to answer. A benchmark point of reference is the membership roster of the
United Nations, which stood at 193 in mid-2018. But this number includes four small European enclave
states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino), which meet the legal definition of a state but are
for all practical purposes parts of the larger states that surround them. Meanwhile, the roster excludes
several territories that function much like states but lack either independence and/or legitimacy. Prime
among those is Taiwan, which would be a member of the UN had it not been expelled in 1971 when China
made it clear that it would not have diplomatic ties with any country that recognized Taiwan. Taiwan has a
population, territory, and sovereignty, but it lacks legitimacy because it is not recognized by most other
states. Meanwhile, Kosovo – part of the former Yugoslavia – has been recognized diplomatically by more
than 100 other states, including most of the member states of the European Union, and is a member of
several key international bodies (including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), but many
UN member states do not consider it a political and diplomatic equal. It is unclear, though, exactly what it
would need to do to achieve UN recognition.
So while the question ‘How many states are there?’ is likely to elicit the response ‘It depends what you mean
by a state’, this book opts for the number 189: the current membership of the United Nations, less the four
European enclave states. (The fifth European enclave state, Vatican City, is not a UN member.) At the same
time, we should not overlook the discussion of microstates, quasi-states, and de facto states later in this chapter.

a few remaining colonies or overseas territories, such as Bermuda, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, and Guam, which lack
the sovereignty required for states.
Every state has a government, but how do states differ from governments? In essence, the state defines the political
community of which government is the managing agent. By enjoying a monopoly of authority, the state creates a man-
date for rule which the government then puts into effect. This distinction between state and government is reflected
in the characteristic separation in many countries of the roles of head of state (e.g. the monarch or non-executive
president) and head of government (e.g. the prime minister) (see Chapter 9).

Map 4.1 A world divided: states of the world

 the state 55

Feature Qualities
States have governments with the recognized authority to administer and
Government
to represent the state in dealings with other governments.

States contain populations, without whom the territory concerned

Population
would be little more than a block of real estate.

States are normally recognized both by their residents and by other

Legitimacy
states as having jurisdiction and authority within their territory.

States operate within a fixed territory marked by borders, and control

Territory
the movement of people, money, and goods across those borders.

States have sovereignty over that territory, its people and resources,
Sovereignty
meaning that they have the sole authority to impose laws and taxes.

Figure 4.1 The features of a state

One of the key features of a state is sovereignty, which the sixteenth-century French philos- Sovereignty
opher Jean Bodin (1530–96) described as the unfettered and undivided power to make laws. The The ultimate
word sovereign originally meant ‘one seated above’, so the sovereign body is the one institution source of authority
unlimited by higher authority: the highest of the high. By definition, that body is the state. As in a society. The
sovereign is the
Bodin wrote, the sovereign can ‘give laws unto all and every one of the subjects and receive none highest and final
from them’ (Bodin, 1980). Sovereignty originally developed in Europe to justify the attempt by decision-maker
monarchs to consolidate control over kingdoms in which authority had previously been shared within a
with the feudal aristocracy and the Catholic Church. This is why monarchs (and currencies) are community.
still known as ‘sovereigns’.
However, as democracy gained ground, so too did the belief that elected assemblies acting Citizen
A full member of a
on behalf of the people are the true holders of sovereignty. The means of acquiring sovereignty state, entitled to
evolved, especially in centralized European countries such as Britain and France. In federations the rights and
such as Brazil, Germany, India, and the United States, by contrast, the notion of sovereignty is subject to the
weaker, because authority is shared between the central and regional governments (see Chapter duties associated
11). In these circumstances, the idea of sovereignty is diluted, and so too is the concept of the state with that status.
Citizenship is
itself. (Americans more often use the word state to denote the 50 states of the Union, rather than typically confirmed
the entire United States. Limited as it is by checks and balances, the US federal government lacks in a document such
absolute authority.) as a passport or
Also inherent in the notion of the state is the idea of the citizen. As the development of identity card.
the state began to override the power of the aristocracy and the Church in Europe, so the
concept of the citizen emerged to imply full and equal membership of the political community defined by the state.
As Heater (1999) notes, ‘the title of citizen was adopted by the French revolutionaries [of 1789] to pronounce the
symbolic reality of equality; the titles of aristocratic distinction were expunged’.To be a citizen is to possess both rights
(such as legal protection) and duties (such as military or community service).
Note, however, that our mental image of a state as a container for its citizens alone is a poor guide to reality. Not only
is dual citizenship now accepted by many states, but international migration has lowered the barriers provided by state
borders. Migration is nothing new, but movement across borders has developed new significance as states have tried to en-
force restrictions and controls on that movement. In their country of destination, legal migrants may be granted the right
of permanent residence without seeking or being granted citizenship, a limitation which denies them the vote in national
elections. To equate a country’s population with its citizens is to overlook this significant inequality (Hammerstad, 2010).

origins and evolution

The modern state is a mainly Western concept that emerged from the embers of medieval Europe (c.1000–1500).
Political entities that looked much like states existed in other parts of the world as well, notably China (see
56 chapter 4

Fukuyama, 2011), but the state as we understand it today is a Western construct based on Western ideas about
sovereignty and autonomy. It is crucial to remember this as we think about modern China, which remains something
of an outlier in the way we think about the political organization of societies.
If there was any single force that was responsible for the emergence of the modern state, it was war. As Tilly (1975)
wrote, ‘war made the state, and the state made war’. The introduction of gunpowder in the fourteenth century trans-
formed military scale and tactics, as organized infantry and artillery replaced the knight on horseback. The result was
an aggressive, competitive, and expensive arms race in Europe, which obliged rulers to employ administrators to re-
cruit, train, equip, and pay for standing armies, laying the foundation of modern bureaucracies. Political units became
larger, and the growth of bureaucracy meant that local patterns of administration and justice became more uniform.
Commerce grew more freely, and rulers began to establish formal diplomatic relations with their foreign counterparts.
Just as war-making weakened the feudal pillar of the medieval framework, so the Reformation destroyed its reli-
gious foundations. From around 1520, Protestant reformers led by Martin Luther condemned what they saw as the
corruption and privileges of the organized Church. This reform movement brought profound political consequences,
shattering the Christian commonwealth as antagonism developed between Protestant and Catholic rulers.
If a single event can be credited as marking the beginning of the modern state system, it was
the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. This brought an end to both the Thirty Years’ War in the Holy
Westphalian
system Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the Dutch Republic. It so doing,
The modern state it made several adjustments to European state borders, gave new definition to the idea of sov-
system that many ereignty, and helped make national secular authority superior to religious edicts from Rome,
believe emerged giving rise to what is often still known as the Westphalian system. Several states pre-dated the
out of the 1648 Peace, including England, Ireland, France, Spain, and Portugal, but it gave clearer definition to
Peace of
Westphalia, based the powers of states.
on the sovereignty As central authority developed in Europe, so did the need for its theoretical justification.
of states and Bodin argued that, within society, a single sovereign authority should be responsible for five
political self- major functions: legislation, war and peace, public appointments, judicial appeals, and the cur-
determination. rency. But the sovereign still needed to be subject to limits and controls, and here the English phi-
losopher John Locke (1632–1704) played a vital role. Locke argued that citizens possess natural
Natural rights
Those rights (such rights to life, liberty, and property, and that these rights should be protected by rulers governing
as to life, liberty, through law. Citizens, he continued, agreed to obey the laws of the land, even if only by tacit
and property) means such as accepting the protection which law provided. But should rulers violate the natural
supposedly given rights of citizens, the people ‘are thereupon absolved from any further Obedience, and are left
to humans by God to the common Refuge, which God hath provided for all Men against force and violence’ – the
or by nature, their
existence taken to right to resist (Locke, 1690).
be independent of These ideas of sovereignty and consent were reflected, in contrasting ways, in the two most
government. momentous affirmations of modernity: the American and French revolutions. In America, the
colonists established their independence from Britain and went on to fashion a new republic,
giving substance to Locke’s liberal interpretation of the state. The Declaration of Independence
(1776) declared that governments derive ‘their just authority from the consent of the governed’, while the US consti-
tution (drafted 1787) famously opened with the words ‘We, the People of the United States’.
But it was the French Revolution of 1789 that made the most daring attempt to reinterpret sovereignty in dem-
ocratic (rather than liberal) terms. Described by Finer (1997) as ‘the most important single event in the entire history
of government’, the French Revolution mapped out the contours of modern democracy. Where the American federal
government was limited in its authority, the French revolutionaries regarded a centralized, unitary state as the sovereign
expression of a national community of citizens with equal rights.
During the nineteenth century, the outlines of the state became more precise, especially in Europe. Borders slowly
turned into barriers as maps marked out defined frontiers. Lawyers established that a country’s territory should extend
into the sea as far as the reach of a cannonball and, later, above its land to the flying height of a hot-air balloon. Re-
flecting this new concern with boundaries, passports were introduced in Europe during World War I. To travel across
frontiers became a rite of passage, involving official permission expressed in an official stamp.
Economically, too, the second half of the nineteenth century saw the end of an era of relatively liberal trade. Stimu-
lated by economic depressions, many European states introduced protectionist trade policies. National markets gained
ground against both local and international exchange, meaning that economies became more susceptible to regulation
by central government. Internally, the functions performed by the state expanded to include education, factory regu-
lation, policing, and gathering statistics (literally, ‘state facts’).
 the state 57

For most of the twentieth century, states bore deeper into their societies, a change that was Total war
often fuelled by war. The first and second world wars were examples of total war, fought War requiring the
between entire countries, rather than just between specialized armed forces. To equip massive mobilization of the
forces with the necessary tanks, planes, ships, and bombs demanded unparalleled mobilization of population to
support a conflict
citizens, economies, and societies. The ability to tax effectively and systematically – described by fought with
Bräutigam et al. (2008) as ‘the central pillar of state capacity’ – grew further. Because total wars advanced
were expensive, tax revenues as a proportion of national product almost doubled in Western states weaponry on a
between 1930 and 1945 (Steinmo, 2003). The twentieth century was an era of the state because large geographical
it was also an age of war. scale, requiring
state leadership,
Peace in 1945 did not initially lead to a corresponding reduction in the role of the state. intervention, and
Instead, Western governments sought to apply their enhanced administrative skills to domestic funding.
needs. Throughout Western Europe, the warfare state gave way to the welfare state, with rulers
accepting direct responsibility for protecting their citizens from the scourges of illness, unem- Welfare state
ployment, and old age. In this way, the European state led a post-war settlement – termed the An arrangement in
‘Keynesian welfare state’ (after the British economist John Maynard Keynes) – which integrated which the
government is
full employment and public welfare with an economy in which the private sector continued to primarily
play a substantial part (see Chapter 20). responsible for
Meanwhile, important developments were taking place further afield. Although the state was the social and
born in Europe, its outline was exported to the rest of the world by imperial powers such as economic security
Britain, France, and Spain. As they competed with one another, they marked out the boundaries of its citizens
through public
of their conquests, and those boundaries eventually became the frontiers of independent states. programmes such
As Armitage (2005) points out, ‘the great political fact of global history in the last 500 years is as incomes for the
the emergence of a world of states from a world of empires. That fact fundamentally defines the unemployed,
political universe we all inhabit.’ The few states without a long history as a possession of another pensions for the
state (apart from the ex-colonial powers themselves) include China, Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, and elderly, and
medical care for
Saudi Arabia. the sick.
Although the term postcolonial is usually confined to countries achieving independence in
the aftermath of World War II, settler societies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States provide early examples of states formed from colonies. Here, the new arrivals ruthlessly supplanted indig-
enous communities, recreating segments of the European tradition they had brought with them; as a result, the political
organization of these countries remains strong and recognizably Western. As for non-settler colonies, they emerged into
statehood in four waves spread over two centuries, the results being different from the strong European states generated
in earlier centuries by military and political competition.
The first wave occurred early in the nineteenth century, in the Spanish and Portuguese territories of Latin America.
Here, the early wars of independence lacked the liberal, egalitarian basis of their US predecessor. New constitutions
were produced but they were neither democratic nor fully implemented. Economic exploitation of native populations,
the poor, and descendants of slaves continued into the postcolonial era. The resulting inequalities created conflicts
within Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico which remain important even today.
The second wave emerged in central Europe and the Middle East around the end of World War I, with the final
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires. The first of these dissolved into five separate states:
Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. With the exception of Turkey, founded on the ruins of the
Ottoman Empire, strong and stable states again failed to develop during this wave. Instead, international politics in the
shape of fascism and communism continued to intrude, preventing those countries on the European periphery from
experiencing the continuous state development found in the continent’s core.
The third and largest wave of state creation took place after 1945, with the end of European empires. Independence
was declared in 1945 to Indonesia, and came in 1946 to the Philippines, in 1947 to India and Pakistan, and in 1948 to
Burma and Ceylon. Many other colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East followed suit: between 1945
and 1989, nearly 90 independent states, almost half the world’s current total, were created (see Figure 4.2). But most
lacked much experience as a coherent entity, and unlike European states that had established their borders through war
and diplomacy, many newly independent states were colonial creations that brought together different ethnic, regional,
and religious groups that now had to struggle to cooperate with one another. Many states continue to feel the desta-
bilizing effects of these divisions even today, including Nigeria, Iraq, and India.
The fourth and final wave of state formation came in the final decade of the twentieth century, triggered by the
collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union – in effect, a Russian empire – into 15 successor states
58 chapter 4

Malaysians wave national flags during annual independence celebrations. The emergence of large parts of the world from
colonialism changed the character of the international state system.
Source: Getty Images/Mohd Samsul Mohd Said.

(see Map 4.2). Their experiences have been mixed: while the Baltic States gained economic and political stability from
their proximity to, and now their membership of, the European Union, central Asian republics such as Uzbekistan suf-
fered from ethnic division, a pre-industrial economy, and autocratic rule. Such problems were reinforced by the absence
in these states of pre-colonial experience as independent states.

70
End of World War II
60
Total number of states

50

40

30

20

10

0
00

50

00
00

50
18

18

20
19

19

Asia/Pacific Africa Europe Americas

Figure 4.2 The formation of states

Source: Based on (and extrapolated from) appendix in Crawford (2007).
 the state 59

EN
SW
ED
FINLAND RUSSIA
AY
RW
O
N

DENMARK

POLAND BELARUS
GERMANY
UKRAINE
KAZAKHSTAN
ROMANIA
MONGOLIA
ITALY
UZ
BULGARIA GEO BEK
ISTA
MONTENEGRO

RGIA KYRGYZSTAN

TURK
N NORTH KOREA

TURKEY MEN
ISTAN TAJIKISTAN SOUTH KOREA

CHINA JAPAN
SYRIA AN
MALTA
CYPRUS
LEBANON IST
JERUSALEM
ISRAEL
IRAQ IRAN H
AN TA
N
G IS
AF PA
K

Map 4.2 The Soviet successor states

Overall, postcolonial states rarely possess the strength and autonomy which most of their European predecessors
acquired during their own development. Sovereignty remains important as a title, securing international recognition
and access to aid. But the label’s significance is sometimes symbolic, with little to prevent the movement of people, sol-
diers, goods, and terrorists across boundaries. Many have experienced civil war as a result of a failure to move past their
mutual suspicions and build workable states; examples include Angola, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In extreme but still exceptional cases, the outcome is a fragile – or even
failed – state which is unable to execute its core task of keeping order (see later in this chapter).

the diversity of states

All states may be equally sovereign, but they are very different in terms of their size, wealth, and power. True,
sovereignty can be trampled when one country invades another, as did Russia when it illegally annexed the
Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014. And philosophical concerns about sovereignty and democracy take a
back seat for small coastal and island states such as the Bahamas, the Maldives, and the Solomon Islands when they
are at risk of disappearing as a result of rising sea levels brought on by climate change. But otherwise sovereignty is
equally exercised by all states, meaning that their diversity is reflected in other ways, such as population, political
authority, and income.

Population
Although many studies in comparative politics examine large states, they are exceptional when viewed through a
global lens. At one end of the scale, China’s population of 1.38 billion is greater than that of the 160 smallest
countries in the world combined. At the other end, the population of most countries in the world is less than 10
million, with one in five falling below 1 million (Figure 4.3). In median position sits Switzerland (8.4 million) – a
country usually described as ‘small’ but which only appears as such when viewed from the
perspective of larger states. Microstates
States that are
The smallest states – microstates – are mainly islands in the Caribbean, the Pacific, or off small in both
the African coast, along with five European states, including the Vatican City. They have limited population and
capacity to shape their own destiny, but we should not assume that they are dysfunctional; sev- territory.
eral European microstates have combined political stability with economic success. Many of the Examples include
smallest states, however, are both people- and resource-poor; Pacific island states such as Tuvalu, Andorra,
Barbados, Palau,
Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Kiribati have few people, little in the way of natural resources and the Maldives.
or economic opportunities, and poor trade and transport connections to the rest of the world.

Political authority
Even if all states are equally sovereign, they do not necessarily have the same levels of internal cohesion and
stability. Many states that were created by European colonialists still struggle to stay together, in some cases – as
60 chapter 4

45

40

35

Number of states 30

25

20

15

10

0
1

10

25

50

0
10

10
w

to

to

to

to
lo

to

e
1

ov
Be

10

25

50

Ab
Population in millions

Figure 4.3 The size of states

Source: Calculated from data in World Bank (2018). Retrieved June 2018. Figures are for 2016.
Note: The final column (Above 100) includes China (1.38 billion) and India (1.32 billion).

with Sudan – fighting bitter civil wars that result in partition: the southern region of Sudan became independent
in 2012 as South Sudan, the world’s newest state. Even in Europe, where it might be reasonable to think that
internal tensions had been resolved decades ago by war, there are still many active secessionist movements.
Czechoslovakia split peacefully in 1993 into the separate states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while separatists
in Scotland have agitated for independence from Britain, and those in Catalonia have agitated
Quasi-states
States that exist for independence from Spain; see the discussion later in this chapter on nationalism.
and are recognized In some cases, political authority is compromised by the failure of states to achieve interna-
under tional recognition under the law, or to exert complete control over their territory. Some of these
international law are what Jackson (1990) calls quasi-states, which he defines as states that won independence
but whose
from a former colonial power but have since lost control over much of their territory. They are
governments
control little of recognized by the international community as having all the rights and responsibilities of a state,
the territory but they barely exist as a functioning entity. Somalia is a prime example: the outbreak of a civil
under their war in 1991 led to the collapse of centralized government and the emergence of several auton-
jurisdiction. omous regions within the country. Although Somalia has been formally a federal republic since
2012, much of the northern part of the country has long functioned as either Somaliland or as
De facto the Puntland State of Somalia – see Map 4.3.
states
States that are not
Others are what Pegg (1998) calls de facto states, meaning that they control territory and
recognized under provide governance, but are mainly unrecognized by the international community (and thus
international law have no legal or de jure existence). So while quasi-states are legitimate no matter how ineffective
even though they they are, de facto states are illegitimate no matter how effective they are. Key examples include
control territory Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Somaliland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern
and provide
governance. They
Cyprus. Somaliland provides a strong contrast with Somalia; the latter has a seat in the United
exist in fact (de Nations and is recognized internationally even though it is ineffective, while the former remains
facto) rather than unrecognized despite the fact that it has been governing the northern one-third of Somalia in
under law (de jure). relative peace since 1991; see Map 4.3.

Income
The era in which states could be classified as ‘rich’ or ‘poor’, ‘developed’ or ‘developing’, has passed. Although
economic inequalities between countries remain large, a more nuanced picture is now required, especially to
capture the growth of emerging economies. The World Bank offers a useful classification, dividing states (strictly,
economies) into four income groups (see Table 4.1). Introduced in 1988, this scheme sought to provide an economic
indicator linked to measures of well-being such as poverty and infant mortality.
 the state 61

PUNTLAND
SOMALILAND

ETHIOPIA
Indian
Ocean

SOMALIA

MOGADISHU

Disputed area

Map 4.3 The contested borders of Somalia

The high-income category is still led by the developed economies of Europe, North America, Australasia, and
parts of Asia. It is these which form the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
rich country’s club which – according to its website – seeks to ‘help governments foster prosperity and fight poverty
through economic growth and financial stability’ (OECD, 2018a).While the cultural, economic, political, and scientific
resources of OECD states remain enormous, their strength was diminished by the global financial crisis of 2008–10,
the resulting increase in public debt, and the subsequent difficulties experienced by the eurozone currency area. Fur-
thermore, the weight of population lies elsewhere: the United States and Mexico are the only two OECD members
in the world’s ten most populous countries. The high-income category also includes small, oil-rich, non-democratic
states such as Kuwait and Qatar, confirming, again, that scale is unnecessary for wealth.
In the upper-middle-income category we find most of the fast-growing new economies; the economic dynamism
and large population of some of these states has already sparked some rebalancing of world power away from the devel-
oped West. The category includes two of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China), a designation invented in
2001 by an economist at the investment firm Goldman Sachs (O’Neill, 2001). The story has not been quite so happy
for Russia and Brazil of late; the former has been suffering from inflation, the effects of sanctions imposed following its
2014 annexation of the Ukrainian province of Crimea, and rising wealth inequality, while the latter has seen a combi-
nation of drought, a sluggish economy, corruption, and rising energy costs.

Table 4.1 States by income

Category Gross national Number Examples

income per capita of states
High income $12,200 or above 78 France, Germany, Poland, Japan, Sweden,
UK, US
Upper middle income $4,000–12,200 56 Brazil, China, Iran, Mexico, Russia, South
Africa, Venezuela
Lower middle income $1,000–4,000 53 Egypt, India, Nigeria, Philippines, Vietnam
Low income $1,000 or below 31 Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti, North
Korea, Somalia
Source: World Bank (2018).
Note: Amounts of GNI per capita rounded out.
Data are for 2018 fiscal year. High-income group includes political communities not recognized as states, such as the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar,
Greenland, and Hong Kong.
62 chapter 4

Lower-middle-income countries are found mainly in Africa and Asia. Although their economies are changing and
growing, their levels of affluence and their global political weight has not always matched that of upper-middle-income
states. India has long been something of a puzzle: its economy is one of the world’s largest, but it suffered for many
years from unmet potential, and the benefits of its economic development have not reached down to the poorest of its
citizens. Root problems included the large role played by the state in the economy, and the challenge of dealing with
India’s rapid population growth. Recent governments have modernized the economy and attracted foreign investment,
which have helped encourage economic growth and reduced poverty rates, but many problems remain.
With the exceptions of Afghanistan, Haiti, North Korea, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Yemen, the low-income countries
are all from Africa. With per capita incomes of less than $1,000 per year (often substantially less), life for the majority
of people in these countries remains challenging; resources and infrastructure are limited, economies are based mainly
on agriculture, and several – such as those on the margins of the Sahara Desert – suffer handicaps inflicted by nature.
Among many other effects, these factors create a dependence of the poor and powerless on the rich and powerful. As
we will see in Chapter 5, such inequalities can create a powerful barrier to a functioning democracy.

nations and nationalism

No discussion of states can be complete without a review of the related, overlapping, and more elusive idea of the
nation. Where states exist under law, nations are considered by Anderson (2013) to be ‘imagined communities’
and are often viewed as any group that upholds a claim to be regarded as such. In two ways, though, we can be
more precise. First, nations are peoples with homelands. As Eley and Suny (1996) put it, a
Nation nation – like a state – implies ‘a claim on a particular piece of real estate’. Here, the origin of
A cultural and
historical concept
the word nation, deriving from a Latin term meaning ‘place of birth’, is relevant. The link
describing a group between nation and place is one factor distinguishing a nation from a tribe or ethnic group.
of people who Tribes can move home, but a nation remains tethered to its motherland, changing shape
identify with one mainly through expansion and contraction.
another on the Second, when a group claims to be a nation, it usually professes a right to self-determination
basis of a shared
history, culture,
within its homeland. It seeks sovereignty over its land, exploiting or inventing a shared culture
language, or to justify its claim. This assertion of self-rule (not to be confused with democratic rule) gives the
myths. nation its political character. A social group becomes a nation by achieving or seeking control
over its own destiny, whether through independence or devolution.To describe French-speaking
Self- Canadians as a separate nation, as opposed to a linguistic community, indicates a claim for au-
determination tonomy, if not independence, for this culturally distinct and geographically concentrated group.
The ability to act
Similarly, the campaign for a Palestinian state since 1948 has strengthened what was previously a
without external
compulsion. The more amorphous Palestinian national identity.
right of national To view nations as modern is to suggest that they are made, rather than found. Nations assert
self-determination statehood and, since states themselves are products of modernity, so too are nations. Specifical-
is the right of a ly, a national identity unites people who do not know each other but who, nonetheless, find
people to possess
themselves living together under common rulers and markets. A shared nationality provides an
its own
government, emotional bond for an increasingly rational world. In particular, it allows the losers from the
democratic or emergence of a large market economy to take comfort in the progress of their country as a
otherwise. whole. In a similar way, national identity provides a rationalization for participation in war, en-
couraging people ‘to die for the sake of strangers’ (Langman, 2006).
Nationalism Even more than nations themselves, nationalism is a doctrine of modernity. Like many
The belief that a
‘isms’, nationalism emerged in the nineteenth century and flourished in the twentieth. But,
group of people
with a common unlike these other ‘isms’, the principle of nationalism is reassuringly straightforward. It is simply
national identity the doctrine that nations have a right to determine their own destiny, summarized in the 1966
(usually marked by United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as follows: ‘All peoples have the right to
a shared culture self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and pursue
and history) has
their economic, social and cultural rights.’ In this way, nationalism is a universal idea, even though
the right to form
an independent each individual nation is rooted in a particular place.
state and to Nations, unlike states, do not necessarily have tidy geographical boundaries. Some national
govern itself free groups are spread among several states.The Kurds, for example, are found in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and
of external Turkey, and thus form a stateless nation (see Map 4.4). Iraqi Kurds have been autonomous since
intervention.
1970, and control large oil reserves, while Kurds fighting in the Syrian civil war have been able
 the state 63

GEORGIA RUSSIA
Black Sea Caspian
Sea

AZERBAIJAN
ARMENIA

TURKEY

IRAN
SYRIA

LEBANON IRAQ

Kurdish area
0 100 km

Map 4.4 The stateless Kurds

to establish control since 2012 over Kurdish regions of Syria. However, the estimated 38 million Kurds have so far been
unable to establish an independent Kurdistan.
An archetypal nation-state contains only the people belonging to its nation (see Wimmer, 2013). The French
Revolution of 1789 established the idea that the state should articulate the interests and rights of citizens bound
together by a single national identity. In the nineteenth century, the English political philosopher John Stuart Mill
(1861) argued that ‘where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force there is a prima facie case for uniting all
the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart’. This has rarely
happened in practice, however, and we have to look hard to find states that are nationally homogenous. One of the
few examples is Iceland, where most of its 335,000 residents are Icelandic. They share such a
Nation-state
well-documented descent from within a compact island that the state’s birth records provide a
A sovereign
perfect laboratory for genetic research. Japan is another example; while its government does not political
keep precise figures, it is estimated that 98.5 per cent of the population is Japanese. association whose
In a multinational state, by contrast, multiple national groups must live under a shared gov- citizens share a
ernment, a goal that is not always easy to achieve because of concerns by each group that it will common national
identity.
be dominated by one of the others, or lose out on a fair share of national resources. International
migration is moving many, perhaps most, states in this direction as they become more diverse, but
Multinational
multinationalism is far from new. Britain, for example, has long been divided between English, state
Welsh, Scottish, and Irish nationals; Canada between English- and French-speakers; and Belgium A state consisting
between Dutch- and French-speakers. Multinationalism is a feature of most European states, all of multiple
of which have national minorities, and most of which have – at the same time – been engaged different national
in the building of the European Union (see Spotlight), which is partly an effort to encourage groups under a
single government.
Europeans to build a shared identity, in addition to their national and state identities.

the future of the state

States are far from static, their borders often changing, and their authority challenged by the difficulties many have
faced in achieving internal unity and stability. As a result, questions are often asked about the current condition and
future prospects of the Westphalian system. One school of thought argues that states are as strong as ever. They still
have a monopoly over the control and use of militaries, they are still the key actors in the economic production and
international trade, their citizens still identify mainly with their home states and are subject to the authority and
rules of the state, and the ability of states to respond to new challenges has grown thanks to technological innovation.
 SPOTLIGHT EUROPEAN UNION
Brief profile
In a world of states, the European Union is an anomaly. It began in the 1950s as an effort to build a single market
among its six founding members in the interests of promoting peace and economic reconstruction after the war.
It has since expanded both its membership and its reach, but opinion on its political personality is much debated.
It has common policies in several areas, and it encourages cooperation among its more than two dozen member
states on a wide variety of issues; most of its members have also adopted a single currency, the euro. It has
treaties but no constitution, and administrative institutions that fall short of being a government of the EU. It is
not a federal United States of Europe and, while some support moves in that direction, there is also resistance to
deeper European integration, particularly among nationalists and those opposed to immigration.

Form of government Debatable. More than an intergovernmental organization, but less than a federal
European superstate.
Executive Shared between a European Council that is the meeting place of the heads of
government of the member states, a Council of the European Union that is the
meeting place for government ministers, and a powerful European Commission
that is a cross between an executive and a bureaucracy.
Legislature A single-chamber European Parliament whose members are elected directly
by all eligible voters of the EU member states. Its standing has increased
substantially since the 1970s, though its scope still does not cover all areas of EU
responsibility.
Judiciary The European Court of Justice, composed of one judge from each member state,
has developed the EU’s strong legal foundations, supporting the drive for
European integration.
Electoral system Members of the European Parliament are elected for renewable five-year terms
using proportional representation, with member states treated as a single
constituency, or divided into a number of separate constituencies.
Parties Few political parties contest European Parliament elections as European parties;
instead, the elections are contested by national parties running in what are –
effectively – separate national elections.

511m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$17.3tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$33,715 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
Note: For ratings of individual EU member states, see each index.
 The European Union and its
meaning for the states of Europe
One of the many challenges to the modern state has
been the phenomenon of regional integration,
whereby two or more states build ties of cooperation
that go beyond those found in standard international
organizations: they seek to reduce trade barriers,
create joint administrative institutions, and develop
common rules on shared interests while remaining
politically sovereign. The oldest and most advanced
such example is the European
Union, which has existed in one Regional
National leaders gather for a meeting of the European form or another since 1952 and integration
Council, the governing body of the European Union, whose now includes more than two The process by
which states build
critics often charge it with being an elitist organization. dozen countries (see McCormick, economic and
Source: Getty Images/John Thys. 2017a, for more details). Other political ties that
examples – less ambitious in their result in some
goals – include the African Union (54 members), the Union of South American Nations (12 pooling of
members), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, ten members). authority over
areas of policy
The EU’s main institutions look in some ways like a European government, but are actually where they believe
no more than a system of shared governance. They oversee the making of common policies that cooperation
and laws in areas where the EU members have agreed to work together, including trade, is better than
competition, agriculture, and the environment. The result has been a reduction in the competition.
independent powers of the member
states, and the development of a
European identity that rests alongside
the national identities of the member ICELAND

states. This is not a federal United

DEN
WAY

FINLAND
SWE

States of Europe, and there is no

NOR

European citizenship that replaces that DENMARK RUSSIA

of the member states, but its powers REPUBLIC UNITED

NETHERLANDS
LUXEMBOURG
BELARUS

and reach have gone beyond those of

OF KINGDOM
IRELAND GERMANY POLAND

any other regional body. UKRAINE

KAZAKHSTAN

The expanding capacity of the EU FRANCE

ROMANIA
ITALY
has not been universally welcomed, and MO
NT
EN
SERBIA

resistance to European integration has

EG
RO
SPAIN

grown since the early 1990s as the ties ALBANIA TURKEY

among EU states have intensified. This MALTA SYRIA

IRAN

has led to charges that the EU is an

LEBANON
MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA IRAQ
ISRAEL
AN

elitist construct that threatens the

RD

SAUDI
ARABIA
JO

rights of its member states. Such EU member states Negotiating exit Candidates
thinking contributed to the Brexit
decision: the 2016 vote in which a
majority of British voters opted to Further reading
leave the EU. In spite of the emerging
Dinan, Desmond, Neill Nugent, and William E. Patterson (eds) (2017)
difficulties with the European model, The European Union in Crisis (Red Globe Press).
the idea of regional integration McCormick, John (2017) Understanding the European Union, 7th edn
resonates in most other parts of the (Red Globe Press).
world, but with a greater focus on Nugent, Neill (2017) The Government and Politics of the European Union,
economic rather than political 8th edn (Red Globe Press).
objectives.
66 chapter 4

Security state Another school of thought argues that states are actually becoming stronger, and making
A state that makes themselves felt in the lives of their citizens in ways that are not always obvious. For example, in
efforts to follow their efforts to address international terrorism, many states have accumulated broader powers to
the activities of its impinge upon personal privacy and to limit the movement and the choices of those who live
citizens through
such means as
and travel within their borders. Monitoring by closed-circuit television, and of telephones and
closed-circuit internet use, has offered new tools for the state to track its population, including ordinary citi-
television and the zens, terrorists, and terrorist suspects. This emergence of what is sometimes called the security
monitoring of state has sparked a reaction as citizens have expressed concerns about surveillance, threats to civil
phone calls and liberties, and the limited accountability of intelligence services.
internet use.
The reassertion of states is also seen in the recent rise of parties and movements in multiple
countries campaigning in support of the nationalist idea of the right of states to be free of exter-
nal intervention, or – at least – to place their interests above those of other states. This is seen, for example, in several
European states where resistance to European integration has grown in step with a reaction against immigration. It has
been behind the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant parties such as the National Front in France, the Freedom Party
in Austria, and the Finns Party in Finland. Nationalist anti-immigrant sentiment was also behind the shock decision
by British voters in a 2016 referendum to support their country leaving the European Union, and nationalism was
at the heart of the electoral victories of Narendra Modi in India in 2014, and – in 2016 – of Rodrigo Duterte in the
Philippines and Donald Trump in the United States.
A third school of thought argues that the credibility and power of the state has fallen so far that the state system may
actually be in terminal decline (see, for example, Ohmae, 2005). In addition to a host of complaints directed at states
by their critics (see Table 4.2), there are two broader developments under way over which states
Intergovern- have only limited control. The most important of these is globalization: increased economic in-
mental terdependence, changes in technology and communications, the growth of international markets,
organization the spread of a global culture, and the harmonization of public policies in the face of shared or
Cooperative
bodies whose common problems (see Focus 4.2). At the same time, people have become more mobile: complex
members are new patterns of emigration have been driven by a combination of economic need and personal
states that are choice, and mass tourism has broken down many of the psychological barriers among states.
established by The second development has been the expansion of interstate cooperation on a wide range
treaty, possess a of issues, which has diluted their independent existence. States have signed thousands of bilateral
permanent
secretariat and and multilateral cooperative treaties, have come together in numerous free trade blocs, and are
legal identity, and linked by a network of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) responsible for encouraging
operate according and monitoring cooperation on a wide range of matters. There are several hundred IGOs in
to stated rules and existence, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Some date back to
with some the nineteenth century (the International Telecommunication Union was founded in 1865),
autonomy.
but most were created in the twentieth century, not least in the aftermath of the world wars.

Table 4.2 Ten criticisms of the state

1. Imposing unnecessary divisions on human society.

2. Having a history of going to war with each other.
3. Limiting the free movement of people and capital.
4. Imposing limits on trade that handicap innovation and efficiency.
5. Pursuing state interests at the expense of human interests.
6. Allowing exclusion to dominate over inclusion.
7. Promoting narrow identities at the expense of broader identities.
8. Having a poor record of working with other states to address shared problems such as terrorism, transboundary
pollution, illegal immigration, and the spread of disease.
9. Being often unable to meet the demands of their residents for security, justice, prosperity, and human rights.
10. Failing to manage their economies and national resources to the benefit of all their residents.
 the state 67

Focus 4.2
Globalization and the state

One of the most active debates in modern international politics and economics revolves around globalization,
which – as we saw in Chapter 3 – is the process by which politics, economics, culture, technology, and the
provision of basic services have been integrated across state borders. The effect has been to ensure that
states are impacted more than ever before by events and developments in other states, and have lost some
of their powers to effect change. States have never been truly independent, because they have always been
impacted to some degree by events elsewhere in the world. In this sense, globalization is not as new as many
people seem to think it is (Cohen, 2007). What is different is that at no time in human history has the degree
and the geographical reach of integration been as great as it is today, nor have the daily lives of all of us been
so significantly impacted by decisions taken in other countries and on other continents.
Globalization has both its critics and supporters (see Held and McGrew, 2007, and Bhagwati, 2007), who
debate its impact on issues as varied as trade, democracy, national sovereignty, jobs, the state of the
environment, culture, and working conditions. Supporters argue that it has helped promote democracy and
free markets by exerting pressure on authoritarian governments, that it has reduced poverty and helped
promote economic and social equality, and that it has contributed to increases in life expectancy and has
helped promote technological innovation. Critics charge that poorer countries have suffered even further
from economic competition and exploitation, that corporate interests in rich countries have profited, that
income inequality has grown, that jobs have been lost in rich countries, and that the environment has
suffered.
Whatever the pros and cons, emerging economies have been at the core of the changes brought by
globalization. They have seen new investment, job growth, and new opportunities offered by expanded
trade, even if their working and environmental conditions have not improved. For the supporters of
globalization, its disadvantages have not been unexpected, nor are they expected to be long-lasting, and
parallels are drawn between the effects of rapid economic growth in today’s emerging economies and those
seen in the United States, Europe, and Japan when they went through their industrial revolutions.

IGOs include single purpose entities, regional organizations, and universal bodies, the most Failing state
important enjoying the membership of a majority of established states. A state with weak
If globalization and new levels of interstate cooperation are broad signs that states are becom- governing
ing weaker, the most extreme challenge to the future of individual states lies in the phenomenon institutions, often
deep internal
of the failed, fragile, or failing state (there is no agreement on the best term). These are states divisions, and
that have so many internal problems that they have stopped functioning effectively, and have the where the basic
kinds of features that Robert Rotberg (2004) ascribes to what he terms a weak state: needs of people
are no longer met.
◆◆ Authorities have difficulty keeping control and usually face insurgencies or armed revolts, Examples include
Eritrea, Haiti,
which often impact large swathes of national territory, and in the worst cases become full- Somalia, Syria, and
blown civil wars. Driven by ethnic or other inter-communal hostility, ‘regimes prey on Yemen.
their own constituents’, with rulers oppressing, extorting, and harassing their people.
◆◆ Criminal violence worsens as state authority weakens. Gangs take over the streets, arms and drug trafficking
spread, the police forces lose control, and people turn to warlords and other strong figures for protection. The
warlords then become the suppliers of political goods in place of the official authorities.
◆◆ Political institutions are ineffective, with all but the executive losing control or ceasing to function altogether,
the court system weakening, the bureaucracy losing its sense of professional responsibility, democratic debate all
but disappearing, and the military remaining as the only institution with any integrity.

Estimates of the number of failing or failed states in the world vary – depending on how they are defined – from
about 20 to about 60. One useful point of reference is the Fragile States Index produced annually by the Fund for
Peace, a Washington DC-based research body which uses a series of political, economic and social measures to rate
68 chapter 4

Table 4.3 The Fragile States Index

Country Score Country Score Country Score
Finland 17.9 Poland 41.5 Turkey 82.2
Sweden 20.8 Brazil 68.7 Iran 84.3
Germany 25.8 Mexico 71.5 Venezuela 86.2
France 32.2 China 72.4 Egypt 88.7
UK 34.3 South Africa 72.9 North Korea 93.2
Japan 34.5 India 76.3 Nigeria 99.9
USA 37.7 Russia 77.2 South Sudan 113.4
Source: Fund for Peace (2018).
Note: The index ranks countries from 0 (Sustainable) to 120 (Alert).

almost every country in the world. In its 2018 index (see Table 4.3) it described most democracies as being either sus-
tainable or stable (Finland had the best score on the index), it gave a ‘warning’ status to China, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
and Russia, and an ‘alert’ status to several dozen mainly African and Middle Eastern states, including Afghanistan, Iraq,
Myanmar, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (see also discussion in Collier, 2007).
As to the question of why states fail, opinion differs. Diamond (2011), for example, looks at historical examples to
conclude that success is often a matter of geography and good luck, and the blame for failure often lies with environ-
mental change. Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) lay the blame at the door of institutions. It is not a matter
of geography, climate, or culture, they argue, but because leaders follow the wrong kinds of policies. States collapse,
they suggest

because they are ruled by what we call ‘extractive’ economic institutions, which destroy incentives, discourage
innovation, and sap the talent of their citizens by creating a tilted playing field and robbing them of opportunities.
These institutions are … there for the benefit of elites who gain much from the extraction – whether in the form of
valuable minerals, forced labour, or protected monopolies – at the expense of society.

Wherever the truth lies, states are constantly changing, and constantly face worries about new challenges.They will
continue to be needed to provide government, to manage economies, to provide security, to prepare their citizens with
the education and skills needed to address global change, and to provide the driving force needed to respond to shared
global problems such as disease and environmental degradation. Rather than declining, states may instead be undergo-
ing a process of change as developments in trade, international law, and modernization have changed the nature of their
power, the relationships among them, and the relationship between states and citizens. (For a survey of the debate, see
Sørensen, 2004, and Hay et al., 2006.)
 the state 69

discussion questions
◆◆ How does the state make itself felt in our lives?
◆◆ How are states different from governments?
◆◆ What does it mean to be a citizen of a state?
◆◆ How does national identity make itself felt in our lives?
◆◆ How do the interests of the state differ from those of a nation?
◆◆ Is the reach of the state expanding, contracting, staying about the same, or merely being
reformed?

key concepts
◆◆ Citizen ◆◆ Quasi-states
◆◆ De facto states ◆◆ Regional integration
◆◆ Failing state ◆◆ Security state
◆◆ Intergovernmental organization ◆◆ Self-determination
◆◆ Microstates ◆◆ Sovereignty
◆◆ Multinational state ◆◆ State
◆◆ Nation ◆◆ Total war
◆◆ Nationalism ◆◆ Welfare state
◆◆ Nation-state ◆◆ Westphalian system
◆◆ Natural rights

further reading
Crawford, James (2007) The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press).
A legal perspective on the defi nition, origins, powers, and problems of states.
Heater, Derek (2008) What is Citizenship? (Polity Press). An assessment of the meaning of
citizenship and its relationship to states and nations.
Jackson, Robert (2007) Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea (Polity Press). An accessible and
concise introduction to the history and meaning of sovereignty.
Jessop, Bob (2015) The State: Past, Present, Future (Polity Press). A survey of the origins,
qualities, and future prospects of the state.
Smith, Anthony D. (2010) Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, 2nd edn (Polity Press).
Provides a succinct and scholarly overview of nationalism, examining conceptions,
theories, histories, and prospects.
Sparke, Matthew (2013) Introducing Globalization: Ties, Tensions, and Uneven Integration ( John
Wiley). A survey text on globalization, defi ning the concept and explaining how it has
impacted – and been impacted by – economics, law, and government.
 5

Source: iStock/Oinegue
democratic rule
contents
◆ Democratic rule: an
overview
◆ Direct democracy
◆ Representative
PREVIEW democracy
Democracy is both one of the easiest and one of the most difficult of ◆ Liberal democracy
concepts to understand. It is easy because democracies are abundant ◆ Modernization and
and familiar, and most of the readers of this book will probably live in
one, while others will live in countries that aspire to become
democracy
democracies. Democracy is also one of the most closely studied of all ◆ Huntington’s waves of
political concepts, the ease of that study made stronger by the openness democracy
of democracies and the availability of information regarding how they
◆ Democratization
work. But our understanding of democracy is made more difficult by
the extent to which the concept is misunderstood and misused, by the ◆ The future of
numerous and highly nuanced interpretations of what democracy democracy
means in practice, and by the many claims that are made for democracy
that do not stand up to closer examination.
This chapter begins with a review of the key features of democracy,
beginning with the Athenian idea of direct democracy (an important historical concept which has regained
significance with the recent rise of e-democracy and social media), before assessing and comparing the features of
representative and liberal democracy. It then looks at the links between democracy and modernization, and reviews
the emergence of democracy in the three waves described by Samuel Huntington. The chapter ends with an
assessment of the present state and future prospects for democracy. After several decades in which the number of
democracies grew and the number of authoritarian countries shrank, there has been a reversal in trends.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ About half the people in the world today live under democratic rule, although there is still no universally
agreed defi nition of democracy.
◆◆ Athenian direct democracy offers a standard of self-rule against which today’s representative (indirect)
democracies are often judged.
◆◆ Representative democracy limits the people to electing a government, while liberal democracy goes a
stage further by placing limits on government and protecting the rights of citizens.
◆◆ There is a close association between democracy, modernization, and economic growth.
◆◆ The spread of democracy occurred in three distinct waves, but questions are now being asked about its
prospect of continuing expansion.
◆◆ Democracy is threatened by a combination of internal shortcomings and the pressures from more
confident authoritarian systems such as China and Russia.
 democratic rule 71

democratic rule: an overview

About half the people in the world today live under democratic rule (see Focus 5.1). At fi rst glance, this may seem
impressive, particularly since the number of democracies has more than doubled in the last generation, and
democratic ideas have expanded beyond their Western core to embrace Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and more of Asia and Africa. But is the glass half full or half empty? Why have so many countries failed
to achieve democracy? And why do many now argue that the spread of democracy may have come to a halt, and
that it may actually be in retreat in several parts of the world?
Democracy
Much depends on how we defi ne democracy, which – in spite of being probably the most A political system
studied concept in the history of government and politics – is still not fully understood. At a in which
minimum, it requires open and responsive government, free elections, freedom of speech, the government is
protection of individual rights, respect for the rule of law, and government by ‘the people’ (see based on a fair and
Table 5.1). But the precise meaning of these phenomena remains open to debate, and many open mandate
from all qualified
democracies continue to be plagued by elitism, limits on representation, rule by a political citizens of a state.
class, barriers to equality, and the impingement of the rights of individuals and groups upon
one another. Democratiza-
It is hard to fi nd a government that does not claim to be democratic, because to do otherwise tion
would be to admit that it was restricting the rights of its citizens. But some states have stronger The process by
claims to being democratic than others; these are what the Democracy Index describes either which states build
as full or flawed democracies. Most of the former are found in Europe, while the latter include the institutions
and processes
countries from many parts of the world. Until recently we could say with some confidence needed to become
that many states were undergoing a process of democratization, where political institutions stable
and processes are developing greater stability, where individual rights are built on fi rmer democracies.
foundations, and where the voice of the people is heard more clearly. But there are signs in
several parts of the world of a backsliding away from democracy, and growing confidence on the part of the world’s
most prominent authoritarian political systems, notably China and Russia. (See Chapter 6 for discussion of
authoritarian rule.)
The core principle of democracy is self-rule; the word itself comes from the Greek demokratia, meaning power
(kratos) by the people (demos). From this perspective, democracy refers not to the election of rulers by the ruled but
to the denial of any separation between the two. The model democracy is a form of self-government in which all
qualified citizens participate in shaping collective decisions in an atmosphere of equality and deliberation, and in
which state and society become one. But this is no more than an ideal, rarely found in practice except at the local
level in decentralized systems of government.
Indeed, in trying to understand democracy, we should avoid the assumption that it is self-evidently the best
system of rule. It certainly has many advantages over dictatorship, and it can bring stability to historically divided
societies provided the groups involved agree to share power through elections. But it has many imperfections, as
British political leader Winston Churchill once famously acknowledged when he argued that democracy was the
worst form of government, except for all the others.

Table 5.1 Features of democratic rule

◆◆ Representative systems of government based on regular, fair, secret, and competitive elections.
◆◆ Well-defined, stable, and predictable political institutions and processes, based on a distribution of powers and a
system of political checks and balances.
◆◆ A variety of institutionalized forms of political participation and representation, including multiple political parties with
different platforms.
◆◆ Limits on the powers of government, and protection of individual rights and freedoms under the law, sustained by an
independent judiciary.
◆◆ An active, effective, and protected opposition.
◆◆ A diverse and independent media establishment, subject to few political controls and free to share a wide variety of
opinions.
72 chapter 5

direct democracy
Direct The purest form of democracy is the type of direct democracy that was exemplified in the
democracy government of Athens between 461 and 322 bce. During this time, Greece consisted of several
A system of hundred small, independent city-communities known as poleis (singular: polis), each typically
government in containing an urban core and a rural hinterland. The leader among these was Athens, where
which all members all male citizens could attend meetings of the Ekklesia (People’s Assembly) at which they could
of the community
address their peers; meetings were of citizens, not their representatives. In Aristotle’s phrase,
take part in
making the the assembly was ‘supreme over all causes’ (Aristotle, 1962 edn); it was the sovereign body,
decisions that unconstrained by a formal constitution or even, in the early decades, by written laws. The
affect that Athenians believed that direct popular involvement and open deliberation were educational in
community. character, encouraging informed and committed citizens who were sensitive both to the
public good and to the range of interests and opinions found even in small communities.
Administrative functions were the responsibility of an executive council consisting of 500 citizens aged over 30,
chosen by lot for a one-year period, with no repeat terms. Meanwhile, juries of several hundred people – again,
selected randomly from a panel of volunteers – decided the lawsuits which citizens frequently brought against those
considered to have acted against the interests of the polis. The courts functioned as an arena through which top
figures (including generals) were brought to account. Above all, politics was an amateur activity, to be undertaken
by all citizens not just in the interest of the community at large, but also to enhance their own development. To
engage in democracy was to become informed about the polis, and an educated citizenry meant a stronger whole.
However, there were flaws in the system:

◆◆ Because citizenship was restricted to men whose parents were citizens, most adults – including women, slaves,
and foreign residents – were excluded.
◆◆ Turnout was a problem, with most citizens being absent from most assembly meetings even after the introduction
of an attendance payment.
◆◆ The system was time-consuming, expensive, and over-complex, especially for such a small society.
◆◆ The principle of self-government did not always lead to coherent policy, and the lack of a permanent bureaucracy
eventually contributed to a period of ineffective governance, leading to the fall of the Athenian republic after
defeat in war.

The Athenian democratic experiment proved that – in the right circumstances – direct democracy was an
achievable goal, and yet it is hard to fi nd in modern political systems. It exists most obviously in the form either of
referendums and initiatives (see Chapter 15), or of decision-making at the community level, for example in a village
or a school. To go any further, some would argue, would be to risk the dangers inherent in the lack of interest and
knowledge that many people display in relation to politics, and this would undermine their
E-democracy ability to govern themselves effectively. But create a more participatory social environment,
A form of
respond its supporters, and people will be up to – and up for – the task of self-government.
democratic
expression Society will have schooled them in, and trained them for, democratic politics, given that
through which all ‘individuals learn to participate by participating’ (Pateman, 2012).
those with an There has been some recent talk of the possibilities of electronic direct democracy, or
interest in a e-democracy via the internet. This includes being able to vote online, launching or signing
problem or an
online petitions, and organizing demonstrations via social media. This is an option that might
issue can express
themselves via the be a useful response to charges that representative government has become elitist, but the
internet or social impact of internet in general on politics – and social media in particular – has been mixed. On
media, thereby the one hand, the internet provides for the instant availability of more political information,
participating in the allows political leaders to communicate more often and more directly with voters (helping
shaping of
change the way that electoral campaigns are run), and can help people engage more directly
government
decisions. in political discussions.
But there are several problems with e-democracy:

◆◆ The opinions expressed online are not methodically collected and assessed as they would be in a true direct
democracy; the voices that are heard tend to be those of people who post most often, and there is often a
bandwagon effect reflected – for example – in the phenomenon of trending hashtags on Twitter.
 democratic rule 73

Form Qualities

The citizens themselves debate and reach decisions on matters of

Direct
common interest.

Citizens elect a legislature and, in presidential systems, a chief

Representative
executive. Representatives are held to account at elections.

A form of indirect democracy in which the scope of democracy is limited

by constitutional protection of individual rights, including freedom of
Liberal
assembly, property, religion, and speech. Free, fair, and regular elections
are based on a near universal right to vote.

Figure 5.1 Forms of democracy

◆◆ Many of those who express themselves via social media are either partisan or deliberately provocative, as
reflected in the often inflammatory postings of anonymous internet ‘trolls’. The result is to skew the direction
taken by debates, and we can never be sure exactly who is behind the opinions posted.
◆◆ The use of social media has led to heightened concerns about privacy, perhaps feeding in to the kind of mistrust
of government that has led to reduced support for conventional forms of participation (see Chapter 13).
◆◆ E-democracy relies upon having access to the internet, which is a problem in poor countries, and even,
sometimes, in poorer regions of wealthy countries.

There are also particular problems with the internet as a medium of political communication, discussed in more
detail in Chapter 14.

representative democracy
In its modern state form, the democratic principle has transmuted from self-government to elected government,
resulting in the phenomenon of representative democracy, an indirect form of government. To the ancient
Greeks, the idea of representation would have seemed preposterous: how can the people be said to govern themselves
if a separate class of rulers exists? As late as the eighteenth century, the French philosopher
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) warned that ‘the moment a people gives itself representatives, it Representa-
is no longer free. It ceases to exist.’ tive
Yet, as large states emerged, so too did the need for a new way in which the people could democracy
A system of
shape collective decisions. One of the fi rst authors to graft representation on to democracy was government in
Thomas Paine, a British-born political activist who experienced both the French and the which members of
American revolutions. In his Rights of Man (1791/2), Paine wrote: a community elect
people to
The original simple democracy … is incapable of extension, not from its principle, but from the represent their
inconvenience of its form. Simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of interests and to
make decisions
secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, we arrive at a system of government
affecting the
capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and community.
population.

In ancient Athens, the upper limit for a republic was reckoned to be the number of people who could gather
together to hear a speaker. However, modern representative government allows enormous populations (such as 1.3
billion Indians and 320 million Americans) to exert some popular control over their rulers. But there have been
many critics of representative democracy, prime among them the Austrian-born political economist Joseph
Schumpeter (1883–1950), who doubted the ability of ordinary voters to make informed political choices:

The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He
argues and analyzes in a way that he would recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes
a primitive again. (Schumpeter, 1943)
74 chapter 5

As for elections, Schumpeter saw them not as a means by which voters could elect representatives to carry out
their will, but simply as a device to produce a government. From this perspective, the voter becomes a political
accessory, restricted to choosing among broad packages of policies and leaders prepared by the parties. The deciding
of issues by the electorate, Schumpeter argued, was made secondary to the election of the people who are to do the
deciding.
Representation, it could be argued, offers a valuable division of labour, allowing those who want to participate
to do so, and everyone else to limit their participation to monitoring government and voting at elections (Schudson,
1998). After all, how serious would our commitment to a free society be if we tried to force people to participate
who would rather be doing something else? But there are many questions regarding how representation works in
practice:

◆◆ The standard means for choosing representatives is through elections, but – as we will see in Chapter 15 – there
are problems with the ways in which elections are structured, and therefore with the ways voices are counted
and citizens are represented (see Figure 5.2).
◆◆ Political parties and candidates are never given the same amount of attention by the media, and money and
special interests often skew the attention paid to competing sets of policy choices.
◆◆ Questions are raised about varying and often declining rates of voter turnout; rates vary by age, gender,
education, race, income, and other factors.
◆◆ Elections can be manipulated in many ways, including complex or inconvenient registration procedures, the
intimidation of voters, the poor organization of polling stations, and the miscounting of ballots. New challenges
have been created by charges that Russia has interfered in US and European elections by manipulating social
media and hacking computerized electoral systems.
◆◆ There are questions – as we will see in Chapter 8 – about the manner in which elected officials actually represent
the needs and opinions of voters. Specifically, how should they guard against being influenced excessively by
interest groups, big business, social movements, or the voices of those with the means to make themselves heard
most loudly?

Form Qualities
Unanimity Everyone agrees, or at least acquiesces.

Consensus No one disagrees.

More than one majority required: for example, most voters and
Concurrent majority
most regions of a country.

Absolute majority More than half of those entitled to vote.

Simple majority More than half of those voting.

Qualified majority More than a simple majority: typically, two-thirds.

Blocking minority A minority is able to prevent a proposal from passing.

A majority after adjusting votes for differences in voting power:

Weighted majority
for example, shareholders may have one vote per share.

Plurality The largest number of votes but not necessarily a majority.

Figure 5.2 Degrees of democracy

 democratic rule 75

Focus 5.1
How many democracies are there?
We saw in Chapter 4 that there are questions about the number of states in the world. There are related
questions about the number of those states that can be considered to be democracies. It is generally agreed
that their number has more than doubled since the 1980s, thanks mainly to two developments. First, the
end of the Cold War freed several Eastern European states from the centralized political and economic
control of the Soviet Union. Second, an expansion of the membership of the European Union (EU) helped
build on and strengthen the democratic and capitalist credentials of those Eastern European states that are
now EU members, or would like to be members.
Even so, there is no agreement on just how many democracies that gives us, out of the world’s approximately
190 independent states. The Democracy Index in 2017 listed 19 full democracies and 57 flawed democracies,
for a total of 76, while Freedom in the World in 2017 classified 87 countries as Free. Another source for a
possible answer is the Center for Systemic Peace, a US-based research body that undertakes research on
political behaviour. Its Polity IV project has gathered data on political systems dating back to 1800, the results
suggesting that there has been much volatility since 1945 as more countries have become independent, and
that the number of democracies has grown since the end of the Cold War (reaching 95 in 2016) while the
number of autocracies has fallen in tandem: see Figure 5.3. How the retrenchment of democracy in several
countries in recent years will affect these numbers remains to be seen.

100

90

80

70
Number of countries

60

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40

30

20

10

0
00

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18

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19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

Democracies Anocracies Autocracies

Figure 5.3 The changing number of democracies

Source: Simplified version of data from Center for Systemic Peace (2016).
Notes: Indicates only those countries with a population exceeding 500,000. An autocracy is a political system in which power is
concentrated in the hands of one person. An anocracy is a system that combines features of democracy and autocracy.

The result of such doubts is to raise the question of just how much true representation we fi nd in representative
democracy. All animals are equal, wrote George Orwell in his novel Animal Farm, but some animals are more equal
than others.
76 chapter 5

Liberal liberal democracy

democracy
A form of indirect In practice, modern democracies are liberal democracies, meaning that they are both
democracy in representative and also liberal in the sense of adopting limited government. Reflecting
which the scope of Locke’s notion of natural rights (see Chapter 4), liberalism seeks to ensure that even a
democracy is
representative government bows to the will of the people, who should be defended against its
limited by
constitutional rulers. In particular, minorities can be protected from another of democracy’s inherent
protection of dangers: tyranny by the majority. Another way of describing liberal democracy is majority
individual rights. rule with minority rights.
So, in place of the all-encompassing scope of the Athenian polis, liberal democracies
Limited offer governance by law, rather than by people. Under the principle of the rule of law (see
government Chapter 7), elected rulers and citizens alike are subject to constitutions that usually include a
A belief that
guarantees must statement of individual rights. Should the government become overbearing, citizens can use
be made for domestic and international courts to uphold their rights. Of course, all democracies must
citizens by placing allow space for political opinion to form and to be expressed through political parties. As
limits on the Beetham (2004) rightly states, ‘without liberty, there can be no democracy’. But, in liberal
powers and reach democracy, freedom is more than a device to secure democracy; it is valued above, or certainly
of government.
alongside, democracy itself. The argument is that people can best develop and express their
Liberalism individuality (and contribute most effectively to the common good) by taking responsibility
A belief in the for their own lives.
supreme value of The protection of civil liberties is a key part of the meaning of liberal democracy. This is
the individual, who based on the understanding that there are certain rights and freedoms that citizens must have
is seen to have relative to government and that cannot be infringed by the actions of government. These
natural rights that
exist independently include the right to liberty, security, privacy, life, equal treatment, and a fair trial, as well as
of government, freedom of speech and expression, of assembly and association, and of the press and religion.
and who must This is all well and good, but it is not always easy to defi ne what each of these means and
therefore be where the limitations fall in defi ning them. Even the most democratic societies have had
protected from
too much
government.

Civil liberties
The rights that
citizens have
relative to
government, and
that should not be
restricted by
government.

American football players take a knee before the start of a game. They were protesting racial
injustice, but many critics charged them with showing disrespect to the US flag and the national
anthem, raising troubling questions about the meaning of free speech.
Source: Getty Images/Michael Zagaris.
 democratic rule 77

difficulty deciding where the rights of one group of citizens ends and those of another begin, and where the actions
of government (particularly in regard to national security) restrict those of citizens.
Take the question of freedom of speech as an example; democratic societies consider it an essential part of what
makes them democratic, and yet there are many ways in which it is limited in practice. There are laws against slander
(spoken defamation), libel (defamation through other media), obscenity (an offence against prevalent morality),
sedition (proposing insurrection against the established order), and hate speech (attacking a person or group on the
basis of their attributes). But defining what can be considered legitimate free speech, and where such speech begins
to impinge upon the rights and sensibilities of others, is not easy. Should Western society – for example – respect the
fact that showing the prophet Muhammad in the form of images is offensive to Muslims, or
should Muslims acknowledge that many in the West consider such a limitation an infringement Structural
on their freedom of speech? violence
The concept of a flawed democracy contained within the Democracy Index (see Focus 5.2) A term used to
describe the social
is particularly interesting in what it suggests about the limits on rights and liberties. For example, and economic
India is often described as the world’s biggest democracy, and yet it is classified in the index as oppression built
flawed. At least part of the problem stems from the generalized phenomenon of structural into a system of
violence. This is a term used to describe intangible forms of oppression, or the ‘violence’ government.
concealed within a social and political system. Hence the oppression of women is a form of
structural violence perpetrated by male-dominated political systems, and extreme poverty is a Checks and
balances
form of violence perpetrated by one part of society on another. In India, structural violence can
An arrangement in
be found in the effects of poverty and caste oppression. These deep-rooted inequalities carry which government
over to the political sphere by impacting the way in which Indians relate to their political system. institutions are
Some democracies emphasize the liberal in liberal democracy more than others, and here we given powers that
can compare the United States and the United Kingdom. In the US, the liberal component is counter-balance
one another,
entrenched by design. The Founding Fathers wanted, above all, to forestall a dictatorship of
obliging them to
any kind, including tyranny by the majority. To prevent any government – and, especially, work together in
elected ones – from acquiring excessive power, the constitution set up an intricate system of order to govern
checks and balances. Authority is distributed not only among federal institutions themselves and make
(the presidency, Congress, and the courts), but also between the federal government and the 50 decisions.
states. This, at least, is the theory; in practice, charge critics of the US system, deliberate efforts
have been made to limit the political participation of minorities, too much power has accumulated to political parties
and a class of professional politicians (see Chapter 8), parties can manipulate electoral boundaries to suit themselves
(see Chapter 16), and money plays too great a role in determining the outcome of elections and policy debates.
Where US democracy diff uses power across institutions, British democracy emphasizes the sovereignty of
parliament. The government is formed by the party or coalition that has the most seats in the House of Commons,
and its control over its members helps (usually) to ensure the passage of its bills into law. Except for the government’s
sense of self-restraint, the institutions that limit executive power in the United States – including a codified
constitution, a separation of powers, and federalism – are absent in Britain. But there are signs that Britain is moving
in a more liberal direction: its judiciary has become more active and independent, privatization has reduced the
state’s direct control over the economy, the electoral system is now less likely to deliver a substantial majority for a
single party, and there has been a popular reaction against professional politicians. British governments have more
control than their American counterparts, although the situation in both countries is fluid.
Modern
modernization and democracy A term used to
characterize a
Why are some countries democratic and others not? What, in other words, are the economic state with an
and social requisites of sustainable democracy? A frequent answer is that liberal democracy industrial or
flourishes in modern conditions: in high-income industrial or post-industrial states with an post-industrial
economy,
educated population. By contrast, middle-income states are more likely to be flawed
affluence,
democracies, and low-income countries will tend to be authoritarian. specialized
Linking modernity and democracy carries important policy implications. It suggests that occupations, social
advocates of democracy should give priority to economic development in authoritarian states mobility, and an
such as China, allowing political reform to emerge naturally at a later date. First get rich, then urban and
educated
get a democracy, runs the logic. Russia tried it the other way around, and found that democracy
population.
did not take root as hoped, and that wealth drifted into the hands of the few rather than the many.
78 chapter 5

Focus 5.2
Full and flawed democracies
The Democracy Index makes a distinction between what it calls full democracies and flawed democracies.
The former group (consisting of 19 countries in the 2017 index, containing less than 5 per cent of the world’s
population) is characterized by the efficient functioning of government with an effective system of checks
and balances, respect for basic political freedoms and liberties, a political culture that is conducive to the
flourishing of democracy, a variety of independent media, and an independent judiciary whose decisions are
enforced. For their part, flawed democracies (of which there were 57 in the 2017 index, containing just
under half of the world’s population) enjoy most of these features but experience weaknesses such as
problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture, and low levels of political participation.
Examples of the two types include the following:

Full democracies Flawed democracies

Australia Brazil
Canada France
Germany Ghana
Mauritius Greece
Netherlands India
New Zealand Indonesia
Norway Italy
Spain Japan
Sweden Mexico
United Kingdom South Africa
Uruguay United States

Two countries which notably fell from a ranking of full to flawed democracy in 2017 were the United
States and Japan, the first because of a decline in public faith in political institutions and a growing partisan
divide, and the latter because of weaknesses in political participation.

Moderniza- The political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) provided the classic statement of
tion the impact of modernization, suggesting that ‘the more well-to-do a [country], the greater
The process of the chances that it will sustain democracy’. Using data from the late 1950s, Lipset found
acquiring the strong correlations between affluence, industrialization, urbanization, and education, on
attributes of a
the one hand, and democracy, on the other. Later, Diamond (1992) commented that the
modern society,
or one reflecting relationship between affluence and democracy remained ‘one of the most powerful and
contemporary stable … in the study of national development’. In an analysis of all democracies existing
ideas, institutions, between 1789 and 2001, Svolik (2008) concluded that ‘democracies with low levels of
and norms. economic development … are less likely to consolidate’. Boix (2011) agrees, with the
qualification that the effect of affluence on democracy declines once societies have achieved
developed status.
Not everyone agrees that there is a link between modernization and democracy, however – see Przeworski and
Limongi (1997) – and there continue to be exceptions to the argument, both apparent and real. The record of the
oil-rich kingdoms of the Middle East suggests that affluence, and even mass affluence, is no guarantee of democracy.
But these seeming counter-examples show only that modernity consists of more than income per head;
authoritarian monarchs in the Middle East rule societies that may be wealthy, but are also highly traditional. A
more important exception is India, a lower-middle-income country with a consolidated, if distinctive, democracy
(see Spotlight India).
 democratic rule 79

So, why does liberal democracy seem to be the natural way of governing modern societies? Lipset (1959) offered
several possible answers:

◆◆ Wealth softens class differences, producing a more equal distribution of income and turning the working class away
from ‘leftist extremism’, while the presence of a large middle class tempers class conflict between rich and poor.
◆◆ Economic security raises the quality of governance by reducing incentives for corruption.
◆◆ High-income countries have more interest groups to reinforce liberal democracy.
◆◆ Education and urbanization also make a difference. Education inculcates democratic and tolerant values, while
towns have always been the wellspring of democracy.

Although Lipset’s argument has been contested by some, particularly those who argue that global capitalism has
been a major cause of political and economic underdevelopment, his conclusions have held up well with later
research. Diamond and Marks (1992), for example, concluded that the level of economic development continued to
be ‘the single most powerful predictor of the likelihood of democracy’. Research by Boix (2003) led him to
conclude that ‘democracy prevails when either economic equality or capital mobility are high in a given country’,
while authoritarianism prevailed in countries where levels of equality were low. More recently, Luce (2017) has
argued that liberal democracy’s ‘strongest glue’ is economic growth:

When groups fight over the fruits of growth, the rules of the political game are relatively easy to uphold. When those
fruits disappear, or are monopolized by a fortunate few, things turn nasty.

As we will see in the following section, much of the story of democracy has been about its steady expansion. In
recent years, though, there has been some backsliding, with growing inequality being among the leading causes.

huntington’s waves of democracy Waves of

democrati-
When and why did modern democracies emerge? As with the phases of decolonization zation
discussed in Chapter 4, so today’s democracies emerged – argues political scientist Samuel A group of
Huntington (1991) – in a series of distinct waves of democratization (see Figure 5.4). Just transitions from
as each period of decolonization deposited a particular type of state on the political shore, so non-democratic
too did each democratic wave differ in the character of the resulting democracies. to democratic
political systems
First wave that occurs within
a specified period
This took place between 1828 and 1926, when the earliest representative democracies emerged. of time and that
During this first period, nearly 30 countries established at least minimally democratic national significantly
institutions, including Argentina, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, outnumbers
New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States. However, some backsliding transitions in the
opposite direction
occurred as fledgling democracies were overthrown by fascist, communist, or military during that period.
dictatorships during what Huntington describes as the ‘first reverse wave’ from 1922 to 1942.

Wave Period Examples

First wave 1828–1926 Britain, France, US

Second wave 1943–62 India, Israel, Japan,

West Germany

Third wave 1974–91 Southern and Eastern

Europe, Latin America,
parts of Africa

Figure 5.4 Huntington’s waves of democratization

Source: Huntington (1991).
Note: The first wave partly reversed between 1922 and 1942 (e.g. in Germany and Italy) and the second wave between 1958 and 1975 (e.g. in much
of Latin America and postcolonial Africa). Many such reversals were later themselves reversed.
 SPOTLIGHT INDIA
Brief profile
Often described as the world’s largest democracy, India is also one of the most culturally and demographically
varied countries in the world, and has the second biggest population after that of China (with which it is rapidly
catching up). After centuries of British imperial control (some direct, some indirect), India became independent
in 1947. While it has many political parties, it spent many decades dominated by a single party (Congress), which
has recently lost much ground to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. India has a large military and is a
nuclear power, but its economy long remained notably staid, with many analysts arguing that its enormous
potential was being held back by excessive state intervention and endemic corruption; changes in policy have
recently helped address these problems, but India still suffers from religious and cultural divisions that have
produced communal strife, and has had difficulties addressing its widespread poverty.

Form of government Federal parliamentary republic consisting of 29 states and seven union
territories. State formed 1947, and most recent constitution adopted 1950.
Executive Parliamentary. The prime minister selects and leads the Council of Ministers
(cabinet). The president, indirectly elected for a renewable five-year term, is
head of state, formally asks a party leader to form the government, and can
take emergency powers.
Legislature Bicameral Parliament: lower Lok Sabha (House of the People, 545 members)
elected for renewable five-year terms, and upper Rajya Sabha (Council of
States, 245 members) with most members elected for fixed and single six-
year terms by state legislatures.
Judiciary Independent Supreme Court consisting of 31 judges appointed by the
president following consultation. Judges must retire at age 65.
Electoral system Elections to the Lok Sabha are by single-member plurality. The Election
Commission of India, established by the constitution, oversees national and
state elections.
Parties Multi-party, with a recent tradition of coalitions. The two major parties are
the Bharatiya Janata Party and the once dominant Congress Party. Regional
parties are also important.

1,324m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$2.6tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$1,940 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Democracy in India
India is the great exception to the thesis
that stable democracy is restricted to
affluent states. In spite of enormous
poverty and massive inequality, democracy
is well entrenched in India, which is often
described as the world’s largest
democracy. This story begs the question
of how it has been able to consolidate
democracy against the background of
major economic and social challenges.
Part of the answer lies in India’s
experience under British control: Britain
often used indirect rule in India, allowing
local elites to occupy positions of
A candidate gives an address during an election campaign in India. Although authority, where they experienced a style
often described as the world’s largest democracy, India’s limitations mean of governance which accepted some
that it is ranked as a flawed democracy. dispersal of power and often allowed the
Source: Getty Images/Hindustan Times.
expression of specific grievances. The
transition to independence was also
gradual and considered, led by the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885), which built an extensive, patronage-
based network that helped it govern a disparate country after independence. Congress also gained experience of
elections as participation widened even under colonial rule. Even before independence in 1947, about 40 million
people were entitled to vote in elections, contests which functioned as training grounds for democracy.
Perhaps the critical factor in India’s democratic success, however, was the pro-democratic values of the
Congress elite. Put simply, democracy survived in India because that is what its leaders wanted. Practices
associated with British democracy –
such as parliamentary government, an Indian controlled Kashmir
independent judiciary, and the rule of Pakistani
controlled
law – were seen as worthy of emulation. Kashmir
In India, then, the consolidation of CHINA
DELHI
democracy was fundamentally an elite
project.
The quality of India’s democracy has PAKISTAN INDIA Kolkata
since inevitably been constrained by Mumbai
economic, religious, ethnic, and class
inequalities in Indian society: it is Indian
because of such limitations that India is Bangalore
Ocean
ranked in the Democracy Index as a
flawed democracy. On the positive side SRI LANKA
of the ledger, Corbridge et al. (2013)
note the increasing self-confidence of
India, at least among its urban middle
classes: there is a growing sense, they Further reading
argue, that India is taking its place ‘at
the heart of the Asian growth machine’. Corbridge, Stuart, John Harris, and Craig Jeffrey (2013) India Today:
At the same time, though, there is Economy, Politics and Society (Polity Press).
Datta, Rekha (2018) Contemporary India (Routledge).
concern about the resurgence of
Mitra, Subrata K. (2017) Politics in India: Structure, Process and Policy,
Hindu nationalism and about what it
2nd edn (Routledge).
means not just for India but for South
Asia.
82 chapter 5

A distinctive feature of many first wave transitions was their slow and sequential character. Political competition,
traditionally operating within a privileged elite, gradually broadened as the right to vote extended to the wider
population. Unhurried transitions lowered the political temperature; in the first wave, democracy was as much
outcome as intention. In Britain, for example, the expansion of the vote occurred only gradually (see Figure 5.5),
with each step easing the fears of the propertied classes about the dangers of further reform. The biggest increases
occurred with women’s suffrage; women over the age of 30 were given the right to vote in 1918, and women over
the age of 21 in 1928.
In the United States, the idea that citizens could only be represented fairly by those of their own sort gained
ground against the founders’ view that the republic should be led by a leisured, landed gentry. Within 50 years of
independence, nearly all white men had the vote (Wood, 1993), but women were not given the vote on the same
terms as men until 1919, and the franchise for black Americans was not fully realized until the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. In that sense, America’s democratic transition was also a prolonged affair.

Second wave
Huntington’s second wave of democratization began during World War II and continued until the early 1960s.
As with the first wave, some of the new democracies created at this time did not consolidate; for example, elected
rulers in several Latin American states were quickly overthrown by military coups. But established democracies
did emerge after 1945 from the ashes of defeated dictatorships, not just in Germany, but also in Austria, Japan,
and Italy. These post-war democracies were introduced by the victorious allies, supported by local partners. The
second-wave democracies established firm roots, helped by an economic recovery which was nourished by US
aid. During this second wave, democracy also consolidated in the new state of Israel and newly independent
India.
Political parties played a key role in the transition. First-generation democracies had emerged when parties were
seen as a source of faction, rather than progress. By the time of the second wave, parties had emerged as the leading
instrument of democracy in a mass electorate. As in many more recent constitutions, Germany’s Basic Law (1949)
went so far as to codify their role: ‘political parties shall take part in forming the democratic will of the people’.
In several cases, though, effective competition was reduced by the emergence of a single party which dominated
government for a generation or more: Congress in India, the Christian Democrats in Italy, the Liberal Democrats
in Japan, and Labour in Israel. Many second-wave democracies took a generation to mature into fully competitive
party systems.

100

90
Electorate as percentage of population aged 20+

80

70

60

50

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Figure 5.5 The expansion of the British electorate

Note: The last major change was made in 1969, when the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18.
 democratic rule 83

Third wave
This was a product of the fi nal quarter of the twentieth century, and included the following elements:

◆◆ The ending of right-wing dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the 1970s.
◆◆ The retreat of the military in much of Latin America in the 1980s.
◆◆ The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s.

The third wave transformed the global political landscape, providing an inhospitable environment for those
non-democratic political systems that survived. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, presidents subjected themselves to re-
election (though rarely to defeat). With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of any realistic alternative to
democracy, the European Union and the United States also became more encouraging of democratic transitions
while still, of course, keeping a close eye on their own shorter-term interests.

democratization
Huntington was writing at a time of great change, and – as we will see later in this chapter – there was reason then
to be optimistic about the future of democracy. Before looking at what has happened since the end of his third
wave, though, it is worth looking in more detail at how democratization occurs, and at the conditions needed for
countries to democratize. The stages of democratization outlined by O’Donnell et al. (1986) (see Figure 5.6) offer
one perspective.
The fi rst step in the process comes with the liberalization of an authoritarian political Political
regime. Much as we would like to believe in the power of public opinion, transitions are regime
rarely initiated by mass demonstrations against a united dictatorship. Rather, democracy is Although, strictly
typically the outcome – intended or unintended – of recognition within part of the ruling speaking, this has
the same meaning
group that change is inevitable, or even desirable. As O’Donnell et al. (1986) assert: as the term
political system, it is
There is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important typically used
divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between pejoratively to
hardliners and softliners … In Brazil and Spain, for example, the decision to liberalize was made refer to
by high-echelon, dominant personnel in the incumbent regime in the face of weak and disorganized authoritarian
opposition. political systems.

In the more liberal environment that emerges, opportunities increase to express public opposition, inducing a
dynamic of reform, moving the process to the second stage of a fraught and often lengthy transition to democracy.
During this time, arrangements are made for the new system of government, with efforts to overcome threats to
the transition from hardliners (who may consider a military coup) and radical reformers (who may seek a full-scale
revolution, rather than just a change of regime). Constitutions must be written, institutions designed, and elections
scheduled. Negotiations frequently take the form of round-table talks between rulers and opposition, often leading
to an elite settlement.

Stage Qualities
Initiation of the reform sequence, usually as a result of recognition
Liberalization
by authoritarian rulers that change is inevitable.

Transition Arrangements are made for the new system of government.

Widespread acceptance of the new system, supported by evidence

Consolidation
that it works.

Deepening Democracy evolves from the superficial to the substantial.

Figure 5.6 Stages of democratization

84 chapter 5

During the transition, the existing rulers will look for political opportunities in the new democratic order. For
example, military rulers may seek to repackage themselves as the only party capable of guaranteeing order and
security. In any event, the current elite will seek to protect its future by negotiating privileges, such as exemption
from prosecution. The transition is substantially complete with the installation of the new arrangements, most
visibly through a high-turnout election which is seen as the peak moment of democratic optimism (Morlino, 2012).
The third stage in the process – consolidation – only occurs when new institutions provide an accepted framework
for political competition, or – as Przeworski (1991) puts it – ‘when a particular system of institutions becomes the
only game in town and when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions’. It takes time, for
example, for the armed forces to accept their more limited role as a professional, rather than a political, body.
While consolidation is a matter of attitudes, its achievement is measured through action and, in particular, by
the peaceful transfer of power through elections. The first time a defeated government relinquishes office,
democracy’s mechanism for elite circulation is shown to be effective, contributing further to political stability. So,
consolidation is the process through which democratic practices become habitual – and the habit of democracy, as
any other, takes time to form (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Transition establishes a new political system but consolidation
secures its continuation.
Finally, in the fourth stage, there is a deepening of democracy as the new system moves towards full liberal
democracy. The term deepening emerged as academic awareness grew that many third-wave transitions had stalled
midway between authoritarianism and democracy, with accompanying popular disenchantment. As we saw in
Chapter 1, democracy in emerging democracies is ‘superficial rather than deep and the new order consolidates at a
low level of ‘democratic quality’ (Morlino, 2012: Part III). So, the point of the term ‘deepening’ is not so much to
describe a universal stage in transitions as to acknowledge that the outcome of a transition, especially in less modern
countries, may be a democracy which is both consolidated and superficial.
The political changes witnessed by Mexico since the 1990s offer an example of this model at work. It had been
governed without a break since 1929 by the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which was able to
maintain control in part because of its ability to incorporate key sectors of Mexican society, offering them rewards
in return for their support. But as Mexicans became better educated, and with PRI unable to blame anyone else for
the country’s growing economic problems in the 1990s, the pressures for democratic change began to grow.
Presidents had long been chosen as a result of a secretive process through which the incumbent effectively named
his own successor, who was sure to win because of PRI’s grip on the electoral process. An attempt was made in 1988
to make the nomination process more democratic, a dissident group within PRI demanding greater openness in
selecting presidents. When it failed, one of its leaders – Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas – broke away and ran against Carlos
Salinas, the anointed PRI candidate. Heading a coalition of parties on the left, Cárdenas officially won 31 per cent of
the vote, although most independent estimates suggest that he probably won. Salinas was declared the winner, but
with the slimmest margin of any PRI candidate for president (50.7 per cent) and only after a lengthy delay in announcing
the results, blamed on a ‘breakdown’ in the computers counting the votes (Preston and Dillon, 2004: Chapter 6).
Salinas’s successor in 1994 was Ernesto Zedillo, who ordered a review of the presidential selection process, which
resulted in the use of open party primaries. Meanwhile, more opposition political parties were on the rise, changes had
been made to the electoral system, more seats were created in Congress, and elections were subject to closer scrutiny by
foreign observers. In 1997, PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and in 2000 lost its majority in the Senate
and – most remarkable of all – lost the presidency of Mexico to the opposition National Action Party (PAN). PAN won
the presidency again in 2006, and PRI won it back in 2012, but the changes of the 1990s – sparked by the realization
among PRI’s leaders that change was inevitable – have created a more competitive democratic system, albeit against a
still-troubled background of widespread poverty, a bloody drug war that has been under way since 2006, and ongoing
corruption. Mexico is today listed as a flawed democracy in the Democracy Index, and as partly free by Freedom House.
A different story is told by one of the most dramatic waves of political upheaval of recent decades: the Arab
Spring. It certainly signalled a desire for democracy on the part of many in the affected countries, but it was to
prove a long-term disappointment because few of the rulers in the affected countries were ready to change. The
uprisings began with a single event on 10 December 2010 when a municipal inspector confiscated wares from
Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed Tunisian who was trying to make a living by selling fruit at a roadside stand.
Bouazizi – whose name deserves to be remembered – protested by dousing himself with fuel and setting himself
alight. His death just over two weeks later seemed to tap in to a widespread yearning for change in Tunisia and
further afield, with the result that democracy movements were formed, protests were organized, and demands for
change resulted in the removal from power of rulers in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, the eruption of a civil
war in Syria, and mass protests or uprisings in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and other countries.
 democratic rule 85

Syria

Tunisia
Lebanon
co Palestine Iraq
oc
or Kuwait
M
Jordan Bahrain
Algeria Libya Egypt
Saudi Arabia

an
Mauritania

m
O
Sudan
Yemen
Djibouti
South
Sudan

Government overthrown Civil war

Major protests Minor protests

Protests and reform

Map 5.1 The Arab Spring

Clearly the death of a single person does not explain what happened, which has been tied to a number of much
wider factors, including resentment at high unemployment rates among the young, disaffection with the long
history of authoritarianism in the region, and dismay at the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity, and
the problem of often persistent corruption. It was widely hoped that the wave of protests would bring lasting
democratic change to the region, where many of the world’s surviving authoritarian states were concentrated.
However, the momentum of change had largely faded by mid-2012, with the actions of many governments creating
new uncertainties.
A critical point confirmed by the experience of the Arab Spring was that a transition from an authoritarian regime
did not entail an immediate or even medium-term transition to liberal democracy: alternative outcomes included
the replacement of one authoritarian order with another, or the emergence of a failed state. The Arab Spring peaked
between 2010 and 2012, it brought significant change only to Tunisia (listed as a flawed democracy in 2017), Libya
is today in a more desperate situation than it had been before the Arab Spring, while the Syrian civil war has resulted
in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and a massive refugee crisis with implications far beyond Syria’s borders.

the future of democracy

Just before Huntington’s book on waves of democratization was published, the political economist Francis Fukuyama
was inspired by the end of the Cold War and the speed of the democratic transition in Eastern Europe to borrow
from Hegel, Marx, and others in declaring the end of history, or the fi nal triumph of democracy:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period End of history
The idea that a
of post-war history, but the end of history … That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological
political,
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the fi nal form of human economic, or
government. (Fukuyama, 1989) social system has
developed to such
At least at fi rst, all looked well as Russia seemed to be moving towards democracy in the an extent that it
1990s, and as Eastern Europe tied itself more closely to the West and to Western ideas about represents the
democracy and free markets. Democracy seemed to be surging. But not everyone was happy culmination of the
evolutionary
about the end of the Soviet Union, which Vladimir Putin was later to describe as ‘the greatest process.
geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century’. It was also soon clear that Fukuyama had
86 chapter 5

50

45

40

35
Percentage of countries

30

25

20

15

10

0
1987 1997 2007 2017

Free Partly Free Not Free

Figure 5.7 Global trends in democracy

Source: Based on data in Freedom House (2018).

spoken too soon, and that the end of the Cold War – rather than bringing new opportunities – had brought new
uncertainties, as well as revealing many of the internal weaknesses of democracy in practice.
By 2008, the political commentator Robert Kagan was writing of the ‘return of history’, arguing that the world
had become ‘normal again’ in the sense that struggles for status and influence were back, along with the old
competition between liberalism and autocracy, to which was added the new uncertainties arising from the struggle
between radical Islam and modern secular powers. More recently, Diamond (2015) has hailed the ‘historic
transformation’ and the ‘remarkable global run’ of democracy between 1974 and 2007, but worries about the
‘democratic recession’ brought by a halt to the expansion of freedom and democracy. The numbers are reflected in
the data generated by Freedom House, whose report for 2018 noted the twelfth consecutive year of net decline in
political rights and civil liberties – see Figure 5.7.
We can see this recession, Diamond continues, as either a period of equilibrium that reflects ‘the remarkable and
unexpected durability of the democratic wave’, or as a reflection of the decline of democracy, particularly in ‘grey
zone’ countries that defy easy democratic classification. Continuing with the economic analogy, Francis Fukuyama
(quoted in Luce, 2017) has argued that it remains an open question as to whether the backsliding of democracy is a
market correction or a global depression. Wherever we go from here, many of today’s political conversations are
not about the health or the spread of democracy but about the challenges it faces even within those states we once
thought to be firmly liberal democratic.
Among those challenges are the following: social disintegration, voter alienation, the tensions between individual
rights and democracy, and the manner in which competitive politics and economics can undermine the sense of
community. For Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), democracy can either end suddenly as the result of a military coup, or
slowly and deceptively with the abuse of power and the suppression of opposition. In some cases, such as Brazil,
France, India, and South Africa, the problems are sufficiently deep that the Democracy Index classifies them as
flawed democracies. As we saw in Focus 3.2, developments in the United States and Japan have led to their recently
being downgraded from full democracies to flawed democracies, and there are concerns about a drift back to
authoritarianism in several Eastern European countries, notably Hungary and Poland. The more specific challenges
faced by democracies include the following:

◆◆ Women have less political power and opportunity than men, do not earn as much as men for equal work, and
are still prevented from rising to positions of political and corporate power as easily as men.
 democratic rule 87

◆◆ Racial and religious intolerance remain critical challenges, with minorities often continuing to be pushed to the
margins of society, and a backlash to migration posing a challenge to the progressive credentials of even the
most open of societies.
◆◆ There is a persistent income gap between the rich and the poor, and levels of unemployment and poverty often
remain disturbingly high. With both comes reduced political influence, and sometimes political radicalization.

The most serious challenge faced by democracy, though, is that faith and trust in government
has been falling, reflecting less a concern with the concept of democracy than with the manner Populism
in which it is practised. Many see government as being dominated by elites, have less trust in A political
programme or
their leaders, and feel that government is doing a poor job of dealing with pressing economic movement based
and social problems. As a result, they are either voting in smaller numbers, or moving away on championing
from established political parties and mainstream political engagement, or switching their the rights and
support to candidates running on a platform of populism. Recent examples of populist interests of the
leaders associated with populist ideas include Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Silvio Berlusconi in people in the face
of the ruling elite.
Italy, Donald Trump in the United States, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Narendra
Modi in India.
In two recent edited collections, a series of connected and contrasting arguments are made about the current
state of democracy. On the one hand, in a book titled Democracy in Decline?, Diamond and Plattner (2015) point to
a fall in the number of democracies as reflected in the kind of objective measures used by Freedom House, but they
also point to the more subjective question of the standing of democracy, and how it is viewed in terms of legitimacy
and attractiveness. On the other hand, in a book titled Authoritarianism Goes Global, Diamond et al. (2016) argue that
‘illiberal powers’ such as China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia have built new confidence and influence in the world,
creating an ‘authoritarian surge’ based on the development of new tools to contain the spread of democracy and to
challenge the liberal international political order. They have not only learned and used new means for repressing
dissent and manipulating the media at home, but they have also learned how to better project their influence
internationally. For their part, the advanced democracies have failed to respond.
Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of democracy? It is true that no country with a sustained
history of liberal democracy has ever freely or deliberately opted for an alternative form of government. It is also
true that liberal democracies never go to war with one another, and have developed a solid record of interstate
cooperation. The broad goals of the liberal democratic model – including freedom, choice, security, and wealth –
are widely shared. But all is not well: democracies face significant internal inequalities, many of them are deeply
divided within themselves, and they face new challenges and threats from abroad. They clearly need to do much
better in terms of meeting the core principles of democracy and making sure that the message of the benefits of
democracy is sustained at a global level.
88 chapter 5

discussion questions
◆◆ Is democracy – in practice – truly government by the people, or have other voices come to
be heard more loudly?
◆◆ Does the internet allow the recreation of Athenian-style direct democracy in today’s states?
◆◆ What are the appropriate limits on government in a democracy?
◆◆ What conditions are needed in order for democracy to flourish?
◆◆ How can democracies respond to the international threats posed by authoritarian regimes?
◆◆ Should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of democracy?

key concepts
◆◆ Checks and balances ◆◆ Limited government
◆◆ Civil liberties ◆◆ Modern
◆◆ Democracy ◆◆ Modernization
◆◆ Democratization ◆◆ Political regime
◆◆ Direct democracy ◆◆ Populism
◆◆ E-democracy ◆◆ Representative democracy
◆◆ End of history ◆◆ Structural violence
◆◆ Liberal democracy ◆◆ Waves of democratization
◆◆ Liberalism

further reading
Altman, David (2012) Direct Democracy Worldwide (Cambridge University Press). A study of the
meaning, effects, and use of direct democracy in different parts of the world.
Dahl, Robert A. (2015) On Democracy, 2nd edn (Yale University Press). An accessible primer
on democracy by one of its most influential proponents.
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner (eds) (2015) Democracy in Decline? ( Johns Hopkins
University Press). An edited collection looking at recent trends in democratic rule, asking
if democracies are in decline.
Grugel, Jean, and Matthew Louis Bishop (2014) Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Red
Globe Press). A textbook assessment of democratization in theory and in practice,
including chapters dealing with five regions of the world.
Levitsky, Steven, and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) How Democracies Die (Crown). A critical assessment
of the possible dangers faced by democracy, using examples from history to speculate on
modern regime breakdown.
Morlino, Leonardo (2012) Changes for Democracy: Actors, Structures, Processes (Oxford University
Press). An extensive review of the academic literature on democratization, including
hybrid regimes.
authoritarian
6

Source: Getty Images/Alexander

rule

Demianchuk
contents
◆ Authoritarian rule: an
overview
◆ Hybrid regimes
◆ Authoritarian regimes
PREVIEW ◆ Forms of authoritarian
While democracy has spread to many parts of the world since 1945, rule
and many people now live in democracies, about as many still live ◆ The political impact of
under authoritarian rule. This means centralized government, power
for the elite, and limits on the rights and freedoms of citizens. These
corruption
conditions are not only widespread today, but have been the norm for
most of human history. The last century will be remembered at least
as much for the dictatorships it spawned – including Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia, and Mao’s China – as for the
democratic transitions at its close. And in spite of the spread of democracy, the most prominent authoritarian states
remain globally significant, whether judged by their economic reach (China), as incubators of terrorism
(Afghanistan), by their natural resources (Russia), or by their actual or seemingly intended possession of nuclear
weapons (Pakistan and Iran).
This chapter follows the lead of the Democracy Index by dividing non-democracies into hybrid and authoritarian
systems. It begins with a survey of hybrid regimes that give some of the appearances of being democratic, but where
institutions are manipulated to keep rulers in power. Examples include Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, and Turkey. It goes on to
look at authoritarian regimes, breaking them down into five different types: absolute monarchy, personal rule, ruling
parties, military government, and theocracy. Many Middle Eastern and African states fall into one of these categories.
The chapter ends with a review of the particular problem of corruption, which is so much a part of the political land-
scape in authoritarian systems.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Authoritarianism is just as complex and nuanced as democracy, with the added problem that it operates
within unspoken limits.
◆◆ The concept of hybrid regimes offers a transitional stage between democracy and authoritarianism.
◆◆ At the heart of authoritarianism is rule by an individual or a clique, whose belligerence is often a cover
for vulnerability.
◆◆ Coercion and patronage lie at the heart of authoritarianism, the means used ranging from the subtle to
the brutally obvious.
◆◆ Authoritarian systems take five main forms: absolute monarchies, personal rule, ruling parties, military
government, and theocracy.
◆◆ Corruption exists wherever people are willing to abuse the offices they hold for private gain, but it plays
a particularly telling role in authoritarian regimes.
90 chapter 6

authoritarian rule: an overview

We saw in the previous chapter that the meaning of democracy is contested, and that democracies come in different
types. In much the same fashion, the meaning of authoritarianism is also contested, and there is no single model of
an authoritarian regime. In studying them, we should avoid falling into the trap of associating them too readily
with despotism and rule through fear and surveillance; the nuances of authoritarian rule are often difficult to
capture and identify. Furthermore, the two types of political system – democracy and authoritarianism – are not
clearly distinct from one another, because the former contain elements of the latter, and vice versa.
Authoritarian rulers operate within unspoken limits. Just as democratic leaders need to retain the support of voters,
so authoritarian rulers need to retain the support of their allies. Authoritarian rule is often associated with a single
dominant leader, but also often revolves around an elite group within which there is considerable internal jockeying
for power. Rulers seek to maintain their control (and increase their wealth) by limiting mass participation, rather than
by mobilizing the population. Ordinary people are unlikely to experience a knock on the door at midnight as long as
they keep their distance from politics. In such a situation, governance is an uneasy combination of unlimited authority
and political vulnerability.
Since non-democratic leaders so clearly stand above the law, the constitutional architecture (if any) is a poor
guide; see Chapter 7. Laws are vague and contradictory, creating a pretext for bringing any chosen troublemaker
to court. Special courts, such as military tribunals, are often used for sensitive cases. The legislature and the judi-
ciary are under-resourced, unprofessional, and ineffective. Civil liberties are poorly respected and the state often
demands that private organizations be licensed. The absence of constitutional constraint leads to callous treatment
of the powerless, including women, minority groups, non-nationals, and prisoners. With no enforceable legal
framework to protect private property rights, authoritarian rule is often associated with economic stagnation.
The price of the rulers securing a large slice of the pie is that the pie itself fails to grow, generating more political
vulnerability.
In the wake of the dramatic collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s and the Arab Spring of 2011, it is
tempting to view any remaining non-democratic regimes as historical anomalies which will soon be vanquished
by the Facebook generation. But we saw in Chapter 5 that such optimism is both sweeping and premature. His-
tory did not end in the 1990s, and the collapse of communism did not bring democracy to Belarus or Kazakhstan,
nor even to Russia. Similarly, the changes brought by the Arab Spring failed to gain much traction, leaving Egypt,
Libya, Syria, and Yemen with a poor long-term prognosis. Just as there are many questions about what it takes for
democracy to take root and grow, so there are many questions about why authoritarian rule often has so much
staying power.
The different shades of authoritarianism are reflected
Table 6.1 Features of authoritarian rule in the distinction made in the Democracy Index
◆◆ A poor record on representative government, with between hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. The
elections – where they are held – often accompanied by first of these have a blend of democracy and authoritar-
fraud, manipulation, and violence. ianism, with some of the indicators of democracy, but
substantial weaknesses in the way it is conducted and
◆◆ Weak, immature, or poorly defined political institutions expressed. Authoritarian regimes, meanwhile, contain all
and processes, with a centralization of power in the the features that we normally associate with the least
hands of leaders and elites. democratic systems, such as strong leaders, centralized
◆◆ A limited selection of forms of political participation political control, and limits on popular participation.
and representation, and no guarantees that the voices Within each of these categories, there are often different
of citizens will be heard effectively. explanations for how authoritarian rulers gain and keep
power.
◆◆ Relatively few limits on the powers of government, and
a mixed record on the protection of individual rights
and freedoms, with no independent judiciary. hybrid regimes
◆◆ An opposition that is constrained, and subject to For decades, Turkey’s straddling of Europe and the
coercion and even violence. Middle East has translated into contradictory political
forces, pulling the country both towards and away
◆◆ A limited and controlled media establishment, subject
from democracy. It has long aspired to join the
to political controls and free to share only officially
European Union, but has failed to meet the kind of
sanctioned opinions.
democratic consistency that other EU leaders look for
 authoritarian rule 91

in new members of the club. Matters seemed to come to a head in August 2014, when Recep Hybrid
Tayyip Erdoǧan – who had been prime minister for 11 years – became Turkey’s fi rst directly regimes
elected president. While this was mainly a ceremonial position, he used it to crack down on Political systems
dissent and opposition. In 2016, an attempted coup in Turkey left nearly 300 people dead, that have some of
the appearances
giving Erdoǧan an opening to arrest thousands of Turks accused of supporting the coup. In
of being
April 2017 he won a national referendum supporting a switch to a presidential system of democratic, but
government, greatly increasing Erdoǧan’s hold on power (see Cagaptay, 2017). In the institutions,
Democracy Index, Turkey’s rating as a hybrid regime was not only confi rmed, but its ranking processes, laws,
slipped several places. and policies are
manipulated to
Hybrid regimes, as the label suggests, combine elements of democracy and authoritari-
keep rulers or
anism, making them neither wholly one nor the other. They have weaknesses both in political elite groups in
culture and in the functioning of government and political participation. Elections are held, power.
but are undermined by irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair, and
government pressure on opposition parties and candidates can be common. Corruption tends
to be widespread, civil society and the rule of law is weak, the judiciary lacks independence, and journalists are typi-
cally harassed. In Turkey, for example, it is a crime to ‘insult’ either the country or the president, and Erdoǧan has used
his new powers to limit media freedom, although – for now, at least – Turkey still has a lively and competitive media
establishment.
The leaders and ruling parties of hybrid regimes are elected, but they use state resources and their influence over
the media to determine the outcome of elections long before campaigns begin. Once elected, governments show
only a limited sense of constitutional restraint, and such concepts as fair play, a loyal opposition, and individual rights
barely register. Leaders change because they are required to by constitutional limits on their terms, but the character
of government and the direction of policy does not much change from one leader to another. This is because hybrid
regimes are normally founded on a powerful leader or political party, rather than on strong institutions. In return for
taking care of the needs of the people, leaders claim their respect, deference, and support.The law is used selectively, as a
tool of power, so that while political opponents are subject to detailed legal scrutiny, supporters find that the law rarely
intrudes on their activities: ‘for my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law,’ said Getúlio Vargas, one-time President
of Brazil. In contrast to pure authoritarian regimes, the leader often provides effective governance, thus earning – as
well as manipulating – popular support.
Because hybrid regimes are so personal in character, they might be expected to be unstable in the long run. Levitsky
and Way (2010) note that such regimes are marked by an ‘inherent tension’ in which oppositions can develop a serious
challenge to the existing power structure. These threats force rulers either to submit (and democratize), or to repress
(and revert to cruder authoritarian rule). But this does not mean that they can be regarded as transitional. Some
(especially those far from Western zones of influence) have provided a stable method of governing poor and unequal
societies. Once set, a hybrid regime can be a strong amalgam, not least in Islamic settings where liberal democracy can
be equated with Western permissiveness. Even when authoritarian regimes fall, argue Albertus and Menaldo (2018),
the democratic institutions that replace them are frequently designed to shield elites from the rule of law and to give
them ongoing advantages.
Haiti provides a particularly disturbing case of a hybrid state. Although independent since 1804, it has never been
able to settle on a durable and stable political model. In theory it is a unitary presidential republic with three branches
of government, but in reality it is whatever its incumbent administration is able to fashion from
the wreckage of instability, civil unrest and corruption. It does not help that the country has Authoritarian
suffered numerous natural disasters, ranging from hurricanes to earthquakes, but a failure to build regimes
Regimes based on
adequate infrastructure has made it less able to withstand such problems. A January 2010 earth-
submission to
quake killed an estimated 230,000 Haitians and left government, the economy, infrastructure, authority,
and the social fabric in ruins. It was rated partly free on the 2018 Freedom House index, but the characterized by
quality of life for most Haitians remains dire, and their country ranked 163rd out of 167 on the ruling elites,
2016 Human Development Index. limited political
pluralism,
centralized
authoritarian regimes political control,
intolerance of
In this section, we look at states with the features we most readily associate with authoritarianism: opposition, and
strong leaders, centralized political control, and weak records in popular participation, civil human rights
abuses.
liberties, and civil rights. As we will see, authoritarian regimes come in different forms, but
92 chapter 6

Focus 6.1
Hybrid and authoritarian regimes
The Democracy Index makes a distinction between hybrid and authoritarian regimes. The first of these
groups (consisting of 39 countries in the 2017 index, containing about 17 per cent of the world’s population)
has the following features: substantial electoral irregularities that often prevent them from being free and
fair, government pressure on opposition parties and candidates, harassment of journalists, a tendency to
widespread corruption, the absence of an independent judiciary, and weaknesses in political culture, the
functioning of government, political participation, the rule of law, and civil society.
For their part, authoritarian regimes (of which there were 52 in the 2017 index, containing just over a
third of the world’s population) suffer from an absence of – or heavy limits upon – political pluralism. Many
of these countries are outright dictatorships, any formal institutions of democracy having little substance.
Where elections are held they are not free and fair, there is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil
liberties, the media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime, and
there is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. Examples of the two types
include the following:

Hybrid regimes Authoritarian regimes

Albania Afghanistan
Bangladesh Angola
Bolivia China
Haiti Cuba
Iraq Egypt
Kenya Iran
Nigeria Libya
Pakistan North Korea
Thailand Russia
Turkey Saudi Arabia
Ukraine Venezuela

Among notable changes in recent years, Egypt, Libya, and Venezuela have been downgraded from
hybrid to authoritarian, reflecting recent reversals and the state of democracy in all three countries, while
Nigeria – undergoing its longest ever experience with civilian government (since 1999) – has been upgraded
from authoritarian to hybrid.

at their heart is a ruling leader or clique which refuses to put itself to the test of open and competitive elections,
tolerates no substantial opposition, and works to hold on to power as long as possible. Although many authoritarian
leaders may appear to be aggressive and belligerent, their actions are often driven by fear and vulnerability.
Svolik (2012) argues that dictators face two sets of conflicts: one with the masses they rule, and one with those with
whom they share power. They lack an independent authority with the power to enforce agreements among key polit-
ical actors, and violence is ever-present as a potential arbiter of conflicts. His study of more than 300 dictators who lost
office between 1946 and 2008 through non-constitutional means found that barely 20 per cent left office as a result
of a popular uprising or public pressure to democratize, while more than two-thirds were removed by regime insiders.
‘Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown’ wrote Shakespeare, an idea expanded by Winston Churchill when he noted
that ‘Dictators ride to and fro on tigers from which they dare not dismount’.
Absolute monarchies apart, the absence of a clear succession procedure is a central weakness of authoritarian
regimes, providing much of their political dynamic. Because there are no competitive elections to refresh the leadership,
 authoritarian rule 93

Muammar Gaddafi (Libya)

Hosni Mubarak (Egypt)

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Tunisia)

Ali Abdullah Saleh (Yemen)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age

Years before coming to power Years in power

Figure 6.1 Leaders overthrown in the Arab Spring, 2011

Note: Before becoming President of Yemen in 1990, Saleh was President of North Yemen for 12 years.

authoritarian leaders may continue in post until well past their sell-by dates, as with the ageing Despotism
autocrats finally overthrown in the Arab revolts of 2011 (see Figure 6.1). As those uprisings show, The exercise of
changing the leader in an authoritarian regime is generally a more difficult process than in a absolute power,
democracy. often characterized
by the abuse of
Among the countries that experienced the effects of the Arab Spring, few collapsed so quickly the powers of
into chaos as Libya. Ruled since 1969 by the autocratic and often eccentric Muammar Gaddafi, office, arbitrary
Libya became a textbook example of despotism. Gaddafi came to power in a military coup and choices, and the
never put his leadership to the test of an election. Libya broke down in civil war in February use of violent
2011, and Gaddafi moved location in order to evade capture, but in late October he was found intimidation. The
term is inter-
hiding in drainage pipes on a construction site, where he was beaten and killed. No arrangements changeable with
had been made for his succession, and only in 2015 did a UN-brokered agreement result in the dictatorship,
creation of a new government, but it failed to win general approval. The Libyan case shows that tyranny, and
government in an authoritarian regime is often so closely tied to a single leader that the system autocracy.
falls apart after he is gone.
While in power, authoritarian leaders normally exploit four key control devices: the military, Coercion
The use of
coercion, patronage, and the media. A strong military and security presence, and a willingness threats, sanctions,
by authoritarian leaders to use this resource, is essential. High spending on the armed forces, or force against
often made possible by revenues from natural resources, is an investment that helps rulers buy groups or
off potential opposition, and provides the means for suppressing domestic dissent. Even when individuals as a
the military does not itself rule, it still provides a key support base for the political executive. means of
compelling them
Lavish treatment of the armed forces is therefore inevitable, producing a drag on economic either to
performance. Authoritarian regimes lack the separation of military and political spheres which undertake or
characterizes liberal democracy. desist from a
The second device is coercion, described by Art (2012) as the ‘core feature’ of authoritarian particular course
regimes. Unlike persuasion, which aims to encourage a voluntary change in behaviour (such as of action.
supporting a particular policy or voting for a particular party), coercion obliges people to act
against their will. Procedurally, it ranges in quality from the subtle – where it becomes clear to the target, without words
needing to be exchanged, that a failure to cooperate will count against them – to the brutally obvious, as reflected in
the use of the military, a secret police, militias, or even just armed thugs to implement policy. While coercion might be
tempting to a despot, it can also be dangerous. As Art points out, dictators ‘must craft coercive institutions that can deal
with threats without undermining support for the regime’ or allowing those institutions to become alternative power
centres; research, after all, shows that most dictators are removed from power not as a result of popular uprisings, but as
a result of being replaced by competing elites, notably the military. Also, while dictators may get their own way in the
short term, they also create resentment that can build up and backfire against them.
94 chapter 6

Patronage The third device is an unofficial patronage network in which other holders of power are
Support, incorporated by providing them with resources (such as control over jobs, natural resources, and
encouragement, access to money-making opportunities) which they distribute, in turn, to their own supporters.
access, and (In states rich in a profitable natural resource, such as oil, this ties in to the resource curse dis-
privileges
bestowed by one
cussed in Chapter 20.) In this way, direct allegiance to one’s patron, and indirectly to the regime,
individual or becomes the key to a successful career. These patron–client pyramids are found in democracies
organization on as well, but they are more central to understanding authoritarian regimes, where webs of alle-
another. In the giances often override the public–private divide. Institutions are weak, while pragmatic alliances
case of are strong, holding the regime together. But there is a high price to pay: corruption corrodes
authoritarian
regimes, the term
whatever public support the regime may possess, increasing potential instability.
describes the use The final device is control of the media to ensure favourable coverage for their achievements,
of state resources and criticism – or even neglect – of their opponents. Censorship is implemented by catch-all
by leaders to offences such as threatening the dignity and effectiveness of the state. In Iran, there is a mixture
reward those of public and private ownership of the media, and a wide variety of options from which to
providing support
to the regime.
choose, but the Islamic Revolutionary Court monitors reports and actions that might be deemed
as threats to the state. These are sufficiently vaguely defined as to allow a wide range of charges,
which might lead to closure, suspension, or imprisonment of the publication in question. Many Iranians circumvent
official censorship by relying on social media, satellite television, and mobile phones.

forms of authoritarian rule

Authoritarian rule is usually associated with dictatorship, and dictators are commonly portrayed as unpredictable,
brutally repressive, and eccentric. Though there is some truth to stereotypes of this kind, argue Ezrow and Frantz
(2011), authoritarianism is not always openly on display, and often takes more subtle forms. It is more difficult to
study than democracy, because it is often shrouded in secrecy. It also involves a large degree of opportunism, with
strong leaders and/or ruling groups exploiting opportunities that come their way, or perhaps coming to power by
accident, or simply falling into bad habits. It also exists in different circumstances to different degrees, as reflected
in Brooker’s reference (2014) to ‘democratically disguised dictatorships’ which might – for example – hold elections
but structure and organize them so that opposition parties win seats, but never enough to become the government.
For all these reasons, authoritarianism has few of the standard templates that we fi nd when we study democracy.
Having said that, there are five different types that we can fi nd to varying degrees in the world of authoritarian
rule – see Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Forms of authoritarian rule

Type Features Examples

Absolute monarchy A ruling sovereign exerts control, with
other members of the royal family in key
political and military posts.
Personal rule The presidency dominates government and
the media, with opponents kept off-guard
and the opposition marginalized.
Ruling parties Rule by a single party, often combined with
a strong president.
Military government Government by the military, often ruling
through a junta comprising the leaders of
each branch of the armed forces.
Theocracy A rare form of rule in which religious
leaders govern directly.
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates
Several former Soviet republics (including
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan), and sub-Saharan African states
(including Angola, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Zimbabwe)
Many African states and remaining
communist states
Many African, Asian, and Latin American
countries in the decades following World
War II. Less common today
Iran
 authoritarian rule 95

Royal guards stand on duty in front of portraits of the Saudi king, the crown prince, and the second deputy prime minister
during an event in the capital, Riyadh.
Source: Getty Images/Fayez Nureldine.

Absolute monarchy Absolute

In contrast to the constitutional monarchies of Europe, where kings and queens survive only monarchy
A form of
as figureheads with few significant powers (see Chapter 8), absolute monarchs still wield
government in
unlimited power. While undemocratic, an absolute monarchy can provide a stable which a monarch
framework for the exercise of traditional authority, in which rulers show paternalistic concern wields absolute
for their subjects. They are particularly important in the Middle East, where several have power over a
shown remarkable staying power; for example, the Al Said dynasty has ruled Oman since state, and in which
all other
1749, longer than the United States has existed as an independent country. Their major oil and
institutions of
natural gas reserves give several of them – such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi government are
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – considerable global influence. marginal. Should
However, we need to be careful in our use of the term monarchy (literally, ‘rule by one’) to not be confused
describe the traditional political systems found in the Persian Gulf, for three main reasons: with the limited
powers of a
constitutional
◆◆ The titles taken by Arab ‘monarchs’ reflect tribal or Islamic tradition, as in emir (leader or monarchy.
commander), sheikh (revered leader of the tribe), or sultan (a leader who possesses authority).
◆◆ The leading members of the ruling dynasty, rather than a single monarch, often exercise
authority. These countries are run by family businesses, rather than sole traders.
◆◆ While the king typically designates a crown prince as his preferred successor, custom requires that a clan
council meets after the monarch’s death to confi rm or change this appointment. In most European monarchies,
by contrast, succession is based on inheritance by the fi rst-born.

Authority in these male-dominated Arab dynasties is owed to the ruler, rather than to a more abstract entity
such as a state or party; the ruler is constrained neither by law nor by competitive election. Because the ruler is
expected to take responsibility for his people, ordinary people have the right to petition on individual matters.
96 chapter 6

However, the petitioner requests benevolent treatment, not the implementation of constitutional rights. The
abstract idea of a state linking rulers and citizens is weak, as are such concepts as constitutions, rights, interest
groups, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. Politics is based on intrigue at the palace, with little distinction
between public and private sectors. Several kingdoms, notably Kuwait, have now established consultative assemblies,
but this reform is unlikely to presage a transition to a constitutional monarchy (Herb, 2005).
Saudi Arabia offers an example of an absolute monarchy. The core of government is formed by a sprawling royal
family, led by an influential group of several hundred princes. The family, itself divided into factions, populates and
controls the leading institutions of state, providing a form of dispersed collective leadership and a barrier to radical
change: family members occupy the key positions on the Council of Ministers, serving as a bridge between the
government, the military, and the active security forces. Although political parties are banned, some mechanisms of
representation have emerged, adding an institutional veneer to a traditional regime. The Consultative Council, for
example, with a non-princely and technocratic membership, is expected to advise the king, although it remains, at
most, a proto-legislature. Rulers also keep an eye on, and sometimes act upon, the issues raised on social media.
In Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere in the Middle East, ruling monarchies have proved resilient. They survived the Arab
Spring, though not without protests in some kingdoms – notably, Bahrain. In contrast to regime-toppling rebel-
lions elsewhere, few demonstrators in the Gulf explicitly sought political transformation. Many sought economic
change (more jobs, less corruption) and political reform (widening the suffrage where representative institutions
already existed), rather than abolition of the monarchy. A combination of some repression and tactical reforms, such
as more hand-outs to the people, contained the protests. Even if times have become less certain, traditions of personal,
paternalistic, and princely rule remain entrenched.

Personal rule
Although many authoritarian leaders derive their power from a source external to the executive office, such as
family or ethnic connections, the office of president (or, less often, prime minister) can itself occasionally be the
power base. A president in an authoritarian system occupies a unique position, sometimes
Personal rule accumulating so much power that the executive evolves into a system of personal rule or
A form of rule in
which authority is
personalism ( Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Kendall-Taylor et al., 2016). In this arrangement,
based less on the politics takes precedence over government, and personalities matter more than institutions.
office held than on Personal rule can be stable but remains potentially unstable because of its dependence upon
personal and often people rather than institutions. The result is often an insufficient emphasis on policy, decisions
corrupt links taken at the whim of the leader, poor governance, and – should the leader appear vulnerable
between rulers
and their patrons,
or have been removed from office – a struggle over succession.
associates, clients, While several former Soviet republics became democracies (the prime examples being
and supporters. the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), many did not, and one element these non-
democratic successor regimes have shared since becoming independent in 1991 is a ruling
president. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all come to mind, as well – of
course – as Russia.
In the case of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko (born in 1954) has maintained a grip on power since winning office
in 1994. While most of his western neighbours (barring some backsliding in Hungary and Poland) have been building
free-market democracy, Lukashenko maintains Soviet-era policies, including state ownership of key industries. He has
been the target of US and EU sanctions for human rights violations, maintains close relations with Putin’s Russia, and
has been described as Europe’s last dictator. He began his fifth term in 2015 after allegedly winning nearly 85 per cent
of the vote on 87 per cent turnout, figures that are too high to be credible under any circumstances.
Further east, the politics of Uzbekistan reveals a similar pattern. Here, Islam Karimov ruled between 1991 and his
death in 2016, transforming his country from a party-based regime to a presidency-based regime. To forestall opposi-
tion, he regularly dismissed ministers and replaced regional leaders, kept tight control of the media, and relied on the
National Security Service for surveillance. His death sparked an immediate election to replace him, Shavkat Mirziyoyev
winning with an (again) incredible 89 per cent share of the vote on the basis of an alleged 87 per cent turnout. Little
was expected to change as a result of the change of leader.
Elsewhere, many sub-Saharan African states have experienced long periods of rule by powerful leaders around
whom political systems revolve. A prime example is Zimbabwe, ruled by Robert Mugabe between 1980 and 2017. He
proved adept at wrong-footing his opponents (using land confiscated from white farmers as a tool for rewarding his
supporters), marginalized and divided the political opposition, stoked the fires of tribalism, and along the way drove
the economy into the ground (see Compagnon, 2011). Inflation was running at more than 230 million per cent in
 authoritarian rule 97

2008 when it was decided to abandon the Zimbabwe dollar and use the US dollar instead. As Cult of
advancing age began to impact Mugabe’s health, rumours began to circulate that his wife Grace personality
was wielding growing power behind the scenes. The 93-year-old Mugabe was finally removed An arrangement in
from power in a military coup in November 2017 (although the military denied that it was a which authoritarian
leaders use the
coup), and was replaced by First Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was not expected
media, propaganda,
to bring much change to Zimbabwe. and political
One of the common features of a ruling presidency is a cult of personality, through which institutions to
the leader comes to dominate the consciousness of the people. He (no dictator in the modern era make sure that
has been a woman) routinely dominates news headlines, his picture or image is omnipresent, he they dominate how
the wider
provides whatever energy the regime possesses, and the stability of the political system depends
population relates
heavily on his control. Rarely does the president’s reach extend as far as it did in the totalitarian to a political
regimes of the twentieth century – such as Nazi Germany or the USSR under Stalin – or as system.
it exists even today in North Korea, but a cult of personality remains an important part of the
manner in which many ruling presidents maintain their control.

Ruling parties
The twentieth century saw the birth, growth, and death of multiple party-based dictatorships (communist, fascist,
and nationalist) which monopolized public authority in the name of economic modernization, social transformation,
and national revival. Their numbers have since declined, but the ruling party model can still be found in the last
remaining communist states and a few African states where a single dominating party continues to win the vast
majority of seats at elections.

Communist parties
At the time of the collapse of the communist order in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 23 regimes claiming Marxist
inspiration ruled more than 1.5 billion people: about one in three of the world’s population (Holmes, 1997). Today
there are just five ‘communist’ states remaining (see Table 6.3), but most are undergoing cautious political change
along with faster free-market economic change.
Although vastly different in size, China,Vietnam, and Laos comprise a coherent regional group; they are tradition-
ally poor, agricultural societies in which ruling communist parties have loosened their direct control over the economy,
while keeping a firm grip on political power. This strategy has delivered substantial if uneven growth, most significant
in China and Vietnam. By unleashing entrepreneurial initiative, ruling parties have averted the inertia which led to the
fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and their position remains intact and largely unchallenged.
From the beginning, Chinese communism had distinct national characteristics, so that while power is exerted
through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party itself has been controlled by elite factions, currently domi-
nated by President Xi Jinping. China has not so much a market economy as a highly politicized economy in which not

Table 6.3 The five remaining communist party states

Country Communist rule established Key features

North Korea 1948 A brutal totalitarian regime led by the Kim family for three
generations. Strong military influence. The official ideology
stresses national independence and self-reliance.
China 1949 The Communist Party retains tight political control while
leading substantial and successful economic reform.
Cuba 1961 Long dominated by Fidel Castro and then by his younger
brother Raúl. A new opening to the United States since 2015
promises to bring change.
Laos 1975 Laos’s partly liberalized economy has grown significantly, albeit
from a low base.
Vietnam 1976 As in China, the Communist Party has initiated economic
(North Vietnam 1954) reform while retaining a political monopoly.
98 chapter 6

only party members, but also local bureaucrats and army officers, can advance themselves alongside more conventional
entrepreneurs. Business people must focus not only on market opportunities, but also on creating strong ties to local
officials that will provide access to those prospects.
China faces numerous problems, including inequality between regions and between individuals, the inefficient
allocation of capital, an ageing population, poor social services, massive population movements into the cities, and
severe environmental degradation. But the party elite has shown exceptional skill in managing these challenges. A
combination of growth, propaganda, reform, and repression has forestalled mass public demands for democracy, and
the nationalist narrative of ‘China rising’ continues to resonate. China’s success in entering the world economy has
established the world’s dependence on its goods, reducing international pressures for democratization. Even though its
Marxist legacy has faded, China continues to offer a model of development without democratization (see Saich, 2015,
and Kroeber, 2016). (See Spotlight China.)

Other ruling parties

Single ruling parties can still be found outside former or current communist regimes, but they are increasingly rare.
Most African states (including Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia) were once run on this basis, but
almost all have now switched either to more competitive multi-party systems, or – as in the cases of Angola, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, and Sudan – to dominant party systems. Often, the party is the
vehicle rather than the driver, with real authority resting with a dominant president, military ruler, or political
elite. The supposed ruling party is an arena within which particular elite groups express and perpetuate their
control. When the elite goes, so does the party.
The case of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt is illustrative. Until the Arab Spring, the party
formed part of an established structure of power based on a strong presidency and an extended bureaucracy.
Within this framework, however, the NDP was the junior partner: it was less a policy-making force than an arena
for furthering political and business careers. The party was outlawed after the 2011 Egyptian revolution, and even
though there are now dozens of parties active in Egypt, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi labels himself an independent,
as did about 60 per cent of the representatives who were elected or appointed to the Egyptian legislature after the
2015 elections.

Military government
In the same vein as ruling parties, military governments are no longer as common as they once were. During the
second half of the twentieth century they could be found in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia.
Today, we are more likely to speak of leaders who came to power in a military coup and then transformed
themselves into civilian leaders, or of regimes in which the military influences civilian governments from behind
the scenes. Since a bloodless coup in Thailand in 2006, for example, the country has experienced phases of both
military and civilian rule, with the latter often using the military to contain anti-government protests. But while
they may be rare, military governments remain a variety of authoritarian rule that is still worth studying.
Usually ushered in by a coup d’état, or an illegal seizure of power, military rule typically
Coup d’état
An illegal seizure involves the suspension of all other key political institutions except the bureaucracy, the courts
of political power and the police, and is based on the military principles of hierarchy and the absence of negoti-
by the military. ation. Coups have been generally easier to stage in smaller countries where the state remains
underdeveloped, and government institutions and media outlets are focused in the capital city.
An ambitious general may just have needed a few tanks, commanded by a handful of discontented officers, to seize
the presidential palace and to begin broadcasting from radio and TV stations. Once in power, military governments
have been typically headed by a ruling council made up of the leader of each branch of the armed forces, with one
emerging as the dominant figure.
In many sub-Saharan African cases, military leaders typically justified coups by arguing that the civilians were doing
a poor job of governing, and claiming that power would be returned to the civilians once a new and more effective sys-
tem of government was established. Then the military leaders often decided to stay on indefinitely, or tried to reinvent
themselves as civilian politicians. Nigeria is a representative case, having spent nearly 30 years under military govern-
ment since independence in 1960.The last successful coup was in 1983, when the military took over amid charges that
political parties were becoming too ethnically based and, ironically, that the government was becoming more author-
itarian. The new military leader oversaw the design of a new civilian system of government, but refused to hand over
power after elections in 1993, claiming that they had been fraudulent. A new leader – Brigadier Sani Abacha – took
control, and vigorously looted Nigeria’s oil revenues while working to be elected as a civilian president. He died of
 authoritarian rule 99

an apparent heart attack in 1998 (an event popularly described as the ‘coup from heaven’), and a new military leader
completed the return to civilian government in 1999.
Not all coups succeed, and attempted coups are hard to count precisely, for several reasons: many fail or are badly
organized, many are only alleged to have happened, and in many cases it is uncertain who is implicated (some apparent
coups are in fact assassinations of leaders rather than efforts to change a government). An exhaustive study by Powell
and Thyne (2011) found that between 1950 and 2010 just over 450 coups were attempted in a total of 94 states, of
which just under half were successful. About one-third occurred in Africa, another third took place in Latin America,
with the balance divided between Asia and the Middle East. The number of coups has tailed off from an average of
about ten annually in the 1960s to about 3–5 annually between 2000 and 2010. In recent times, military coups have
been rare and sometimes short-lived affairs in smaller countries.
What role does the military now play in authoritarian regimes? In most cases, it remains an important element in
the civilian ruler’s support base. For example, the stance of the military was decisive in determining the success of the
Arab uprisings of 2011. Where the army remained loyal to the regime, as in Syria, the government could fight the
disparate opposition. But where the military declined to repress protestors, as in Egypt, the regime fell. So the relative
rarity of military rule does not signal the end of political influence by the armed forces. When new civilian rulers are
unable to limit the generals to a professional military role, the armed forces will continue to dominate, supervise, or
constrain the government, compromising its democratic credentials.

Theocracy
As with military rule, government by religious leaders is rare, but that does not mean that religion has ceased to be
a factor in authoritarian rule (or even, in some countries, in democratic rule). A religious society may be quite
different from a clerical government, and even Muslim countries typically separate religious and civil leadership
within the context of an overall commitment to Islam. Indeed, in much of the Middle East the mosque has become
a source of opposition to authoritarian rulers, a divide which would not be possible if religious and civil leadership
belonged in the same hands.
At least since the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in 2001, the Islamic Republic of Iran Islamic
stands almost alone (alongside the Vatican City) as an example of a constitutional theocracy. Republic
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mauritania also consider themselves to be Islamic Republics, but their A state based on
religious leaders are less prominent. Even in Iran, rule by religious leaders (ayatollahs and mullahs) an Islamic
constitution and
possesses limited legitimacy, especially among the young and educated. Public demonstrations full application of
in Iran disputing the result of the 2009 presidential election confirmed not only popular disaf- Islamic law (sharia),
fection with the political system, but also divisions between reformers and hardliners within the although the
ruling elite itself. Further protests during the Arab Spring in 2011 were contained by a vigorous precise role of the
security response, but this did not stop the victory in the 2013 presidential election of the rela- latter is sometimes
ambiguous.
tively reformist Hassan Rouhani. His economic policies failed to address demands for more jobs
and improved living standards, however, leading to an outbreak of protests in early 2018 that left Theocracy
many dead and injured, and resulted in several thousand arrests. Government by
Iran’s theocracy was a child of the 1979 revolution, the last great insurrection of the twen- religious leaders.
tieth century, in which Ayatollah Khomeini, a 76-year-old cleric committed to Islamic funda-
mentalism, overthrew the pro-Western Shah of Iran. The revolutionaries advocated a traditional
Islamic republic free from foreign domination; ‘neither East nor West’ was the slogan. In power, the ayatollahs created a
unique political system in which they mainly govern indirectly through secular rulers; there may be a directly elected
president and legislature, but Iran remains authoritarian, real power lying with the clerics. The most senior of these is
the Supreme Leader, who has a lifetime appointment as head of state, must be an expert in Islamic law, and has many
executive powers, including control of foreign and economic policy. Meanwhile, a 12-member Council of Guardians
certifies that all legislation and candidates for office conform to Islamic law. Government is based on strictly enforced
traditional, male-dominated Islamic codes, the Interior Ministry still makes extensive use of informants, and the state
employs arbitrary arrests as a form of control through fear.
As with many authoritarian regimes, Iran’s rulers offer no clear direction on such practical matters as economic
development, monetary policy, and overseas trade. Their nuclear programme and sponsorship of international ter-
rorism attracts international sanctions, thereby limiting economic growth, oil revenues notwithstanding. Instead, the
clerics have grown wealthy by establishing bonyads – tax-exempt ‘charitable’ trusts – for their personal benefit. These
foundations – and the public sector, generally – dominate an inefficient economy. The result is that Iran’s theocratic
100
SPOTLIGHT CHINA
chapter 6

Brief profile
China is the world’s largest state by population, the second biggest by economic output, and has been undergoing
a process of political and economic change which is changing the global order. It has one of the world’s oldest
cultures, but is normally reviewed only in terms of the changes it has seen since the institution of communist rule
in 1949. Until 1976 it was under the idiosyncratic and hard-line control of Mao Zedong, since when several
generations of leaders have overseen pro-market changes that have helped China become the world’s fastest-
growing economy. Political reform has not moved as quickly, however, and China remains under the watchful
control of the Chinese Communist Party. Dissent and opposition are controlled and limited, corruption is a
persistent problem, China’s human rights record is poor, and in spite of the changes it has undergone, it ranks low
on most comparative political and economic rankings.

Form of government Unitary communist republic. State formed 1949, and most recent constitution
adopted 1982.
Executive The once mainly ceremonial role of president has been transformed recently
into a powerful executive position, the previous limit of two five-year terms
removed in 2018 and replaced with a lifetime tenure. The position of general
secretary of the CCP is also powerful, while the State Council, headed by the
premier, supervises the work of government ministries.
Legislature Unicameral National People’s Congress of nearly 3,000 members, chosen
indirectly through local and provincial congresses, serving five-year terms. Meets
only for brief periods, its work carried out when in recess by a 150-member
Standing Committee.
Judiciary No independent constitutional court. Rule through law has strengthened but the
judicial system remains underdeveloped.
Electoral system Elections have been introduced to many of China’s villages and to some townships.
However, elected officials still operate under the party’s supervision. Indirect
election is usual at higher levels.
Parties Single party. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains the dominant political
force, its leadership being a parallel government within which most real power is
focused.

1,380m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
Hybrid Regime Not Free
$12.24tn Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$8,827 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 authoritarian rule 101

Authoritarian rule in China

China is an authoritarian system within
which the degree of central government
control has waxed and waned according
mainly to the preferences and political skills
of its leaders. During the era of Mao Zedong
it veered between totalitarianism and
chaos, but his successors began a process
that saw China moving towards new
openness both in its politics and its
economic policy. Much has recently changed
thanks to the efforts of Xi Jinping, president
since 2013.
Government continues to be dominated
by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
A portrait of Chairman Mao dominates Tiananmen Square in Beijing, but Xi was able to convince the party in
offering a reminder of the dominant role in Chinese politics and 2018 to convert the position of president
government of the Chinese Communist Party. into a job for life, and he has used a campaign
Source: iStock/Nikada. against corruption to tighten his control.
He has even been able to integrate ‘Xi
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ into the Chinese constitution. This
philosophy has been summarized by Buckley (2018) as follows: a ‘great rejuvenation’ for China in the world
(through its economic and military power), revitalized control of the CCP over every corner of society, and a
central role for Xi in Chinese leadership.
The degree of political control witnessed in China can be ascribed mainly to the skills of the CCP in both
maintaining its monopoly position while also becoming less intrusive and more supervisory. In local communities,
informal networks of power-holders now determine ‘who gets rich first’ – a political market, rather than a
free market. These alliances are
composed not only of well-placed RUSSIA
party members, but also of officials in
the bureaucracy, local government, MONGOLIA
and the army. Local officials provide
favoured businesses (including their BEIJING NORTH
own) with contracts, land, sympathetic KOREA
regulations, information, supplies, CHINA
transport, and other subsidies. Shanghai
Minzner (2018) concludes that
China’s era of reform is ending. Its Hong Kong
leaders have rejected fundamental INDIA
changes to the one-party system, so
that while the country creates an
impression of political stability and
remarkable economic growth, the
reality is less positive: economic Further reading
cleavages have widened, the entrenched
interests of the CCP have deepened, Economy, Elizabeth C. (2018) The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the
New Chinese State (Oxford University Press).
and the collective governance of the
Heilman, Sebastian (ed.) (2016) China’s Political System (Rowman &
past is trending towards one-man rule.
Littlefield).
Uncertainty hangs in the air, raising Li, Cheng (2016) Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing
many troubling questions about the Collective Leadership (Brookings Institution).
new directions being taken by the
world’s biggest country.
102 chapter 6

establishment consists of competing factions of middle-aged to elderly men exploiting the revolutionary heritage in a
successful effort to build and retain power and wealth. Neither a strong party nor a royal family exist to impose overall
direction.
Unsurprisingly in a country where the median age was just 27 years in 2011, rule by this theocratic elite has inten-
sified generational divisions. Well-educated young people, including many female graduates, chafe at the restrictions
imposed by the religious establishment. This desire for freedom is not necessarily rooted in a secular outlook; rather, it
reflects opposition to the cultural repression imposed by a religious leadership lacking a positive vision of the country’s
future (Gheissari, 2009).

the political impact of corruption

Corruption is far from unique to authoritarian systems, and can be found at every level of government and
administration in every society where people are willing to abuse public office for private gain, even in full and
flawed democracies. However, corruption plays a particularly telling role in hybrid and
Corruption authoritarian regimes, being both a cause and effect of the kind of power that authoritarian
The abuse of
office for private leaders wield. In the famously cynical observation of the nineteenth-century British politician
gain. Lord Acton:

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even
when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you super add the tendency or the certainty of
corruption by authority. (Acton, quoted in Figgis and Laurence, 1907)

Corruption occurs when an official – who could be a member of a government, a judge, a bureaucrat, a customs
official, or someone else in a position of authority – seeks or provides a benefit in exchange for an incentive, rather
than on the basis of entitlement. The incentive may persuade officials to do what they should have done anyway, or to
do it promptly, but it typically involves breaking the law. Most worryingly, corruption can undermine the quality of
governance and the efficiency of an economy. It replaces efforts to promote the public good with efforts to promote
the private good, diverts limited resources away from those who most need them, discourages foreign investment, cor-
rodes public trust in government, and places the interests of those willing and able to break the law above the interests
of the population as a whole.
Political corruption comes in many different forms, including the following:

◆◆ Electoral fraud involves manipulating the outcome of elections, whether by redrawing electoral districts, making
it difficult for voters to cast their ballots, intimidating opposition candidates and their supporters, or artificially
expanding the electoral roll by double-counting voters or adding fake or dead voters.
◆◆ The giving of a bribe to a government official or a police officer.
◆◆ Influence peddling, where someone sells their influence in government to benefit a third party, as when officials
use their office to ensure that a particular company is awarded a public contract.
◆◆ Patronage was discussed earlier, and in many forms is legitimate, but becomes corrupt when it involves leaders
selecting less qualified over more qualified candidates for office in return for their political support.
◆◆ Nepotism or cronyism, the former involving favouring relatives, while the latter involves favouring personal
friends, for example in being selected as candidates in elections, in being appointed to important government
office, or in being awarded government contracts.
◆◆ Embezzlement involves the theft of public funds, as in the case of the nearly $175 million spent on property,
luxury cars, and artwork bought by Teodorin Obiang, son of President Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea,
an oil-rich state in west Africa. The younger Obiang was found guilty of embezzlement in absentia by a French
court in October 2017.
◆◆ Kickbacks occur when government officials use their position to offer a contract for public work to a company
in return for a share of the payment made to the company.

Measuring and quantifying corruption is not easy, mainly because it is – by defi nition – an illegal and covert
activity. In terms of making comparisons, the best guide we have comes in the form of the reports published by
Transparency International, an organization headquartered in Berlin that works to limit corruption and promote
 authoritarian rule 103

Focus 6.2
Totalitarianism
There is a sixth and final form of authoritarian rule (totalitarianism, in which rigid Totalitarianism
support is demanded for a supreme leader), but it was rare even in the twentieth The most absolute
century, and there is only one example left today: North Korea. In spite of its rarity, form of authoritarian
rule, based either on
totalitarianism cannot be ignored as a political type, and it is worth reviewing if only
a guiding ideology or
as the benchmark for the most extreme form of political control we have seen in the the goal of major
modern era. Its features include a dominating leader portrayed as working in the social change, with
benevolent interests of the people, and a single guiding ideology based on a pessimistic total control
view of human nature and claims of the need to strive towards building an ideal exercised by a
leader, state, or
society (see Goodwin, 2014).
party over all aspects
The archetypal totalitarian regime was that dominated by Joseph Stalin in the of public and private
Soviet Union between the late 1920s, when he came to power, and his death in 1953 life.
(see McCauley, 2013). Under his iron fist, the USSR moved away from Marxist ideals
towards an absolutist and unyielding dictatorship that demanded unquestioning
support for the state, the party, and its leaders. Stalin used systematic and calculated oppression to enforce
his reforms, in the process of which perhaps as many as 20 million people died from famine, execution, or
war, and many millions more were purged, or exiled to concentration camps. Stalinism also meant the
elimination of human rights, the encouragement of a cult of personality, and the use of secret police to
identify and remove rivals. It also meant the establishment of a command economy (see Chapter 20) in
which all economic decisions were made by state planners, as a result of which the Soviet bureaucracy
became both massive and massively inefficient.
Today, North Korea has many of the same qualities (see French, 2014), prime among which is rule by a
leader (Kim Jong-Un since 2011) who sits at the apex of a system controlled by a ruling dynasty; his
grandfather Kim Il-Sung was Supreme Leader from 1948 until 1994, and his father Kim Jong-Il held the
position from 1994 until 2011. The current Kim is the uncontested holder of numerous key positions,
including chair of the ruling Workers’ Party, chair of the Central Military Commission, and Supreme
Commander of the military, in which he holds the rank of Marshal.
Kim maintains a cult of personality, his administration routinely abusing the human rights of North
Korean citizens and maintaining a network of prison camps for the most incorrigible opponents of the
regime. There is an elected Supreme People’s Assembly, but it meets only twice annually for a few days at
a time, and while elections are held every five years, only one candidate is fielded for each district. But
even Kim’s power is far from unlimited; he depends on patronage by China and the continued support of
his own military. Meanwhile, an inflexible economic system has led not just to stagnation but also to mass
starvation.

transparency. It publishes an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which uses a variety of governmental and
non-governmental sources to rank perceptions of corruption around the world. The key word here is perception; the
index reflects how countries are regarded by those who know them, rather than providing a direct and objective
measure of corruption itself. The index is based on a compilation of information from banks, foundations, and
interest groups. The overlap with forms of political rule is close, the least corrupt countries corresponding with full
democracies, and the most corrupt overlapping with authoritarian regimes (see Map 6.1).
That even the most advanced democracies experience corruption is reflected in the cases of Denmark and New
Zealand, which usually sit at the top of the Transparency International rankings (although this does not mean that
they are the least corrupt countries so much as those where corruption is less evident). Recent CPI reports note that
Denmark lacks transparency in political and campaign financing, has outdated laws on freedom of information, and
provides insufficient protection to whistle-blowers, while New Zealand is criticized for its failure to ratify the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption.
104 chapter 6

0 –19 20 – 39 40 – 59 60 – 79 80 –100 No data

Map 6.1 The Corruption Perceptions Index

Source: Transparency International (2018).
Note: Ranked on a scale between 100 (Very Clean) and 0 (Highly Corrupt).

These are minor concerns when compared with the situation in North Korea and Somalia, which routinely rank
at the bottom of the Corruption Perceptions Index. In the case of North Korea, information is gleaned mainly from
defectors, whose reports suggest that a culture of corruption has infiltrated the entire society. Bribery, notes Lankov
(2013), has become a matter of basic survival, given the country’s food shortages, lack of basic resources, and harsh
penalties for any actions that might be defined as threatening the governing regime. Somalia experiences comparable
problems, with the addition of even more high-level corruption involving patronage and the misappropriation of
public funds.
 authoritarian rule 105

discussion questions
◆◆ What are the key differences between hybrid and authoritarian regimes?
◆◆ How does patronage differ in its democratic and authoritarian forms?
◆◆ Even if personal rule is unique to authoritarian regimes, could it also be a useful tool for
helping us understand and describe government in democracies?
◆◆ What is the line between ruling parties in authoritarian regimes and dominant parties in
democracies?
◆◆ Why are military governments so much more unusual today than they once were?
◆◆ Why are so many authoritarian regimes corrupt?

key concepts
◆◆ Absolute monarchy ◆◆ Hybrid regimes
◆◆ Authoritarian regimes ◆◆ Islamic Republic
◆◆ Coercion ◆◆ Patronage
◆◆ Corruption ◆◆ Personal rule
◆◆ Coup d’état ◆◆ Theocracy
◆◆ Cult of personality ◆◆ Totalitarianism
◆◆ Despotism

further reading
Brooker, Paul (2014) Non-Democratic Regimes, 3rd edn (Red Globe Press). An assessment of the
different types of non-democratic regime, how they emerge, the means they use, and how
they survive.
Ezrow, Natasha, and Erica Frantz (2011) Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian
Regimes and Their Leaders (Continuum). A comparative survey of the different forms taken
by dictatorships, focusing on the importance of leader-elite relations.
Heywood, Paul M. (ed.) (2015) Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption (Routledge). A review
of the meaning and causes of corruption, with chapters offering cases from different parts
of the world.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After
the Cold War (Cambridge University Press). A detailed account of the rise and diverging
fate of competitive authoritarian regimes since 1990.
Marquez, Xavier (2016) Non-Democratic Politics: Authoritarianism, Dictatorship and Democratization
(Red Globe Press). A comprehensive analysis of the main types of authoritarian regime
and the means by which authoritarian governments wield and retain power.
Svolik, Milan W. (2012) The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press).
Another comparative survey of the causes, methods, and strategies of dictatorship,
explaining why its takes different forms in different situations.
constitutions
and courts 7

Source: iStock/torque
contents
◆ Constitutions and
courts: an overview
◆ The character of
constitutions
PREVIEW ◆ The durability of
So far we have looked mainly at broad concepts and ideas in comparative constitutions
politics, including theoretical approaches and research methods. We ◆ The role of courts
now focus on political institutions, opening in this chapter with a
review of constitutions and the courts that lie at their foundation.
◆ The role of the judiciary
Constitutions outline the rules of political systems, and tell us much ◆ Systems of law
about the structure and aspirations of government, as well as the rights ◆ Constitutions and courts
of citizens. For their part, courts strive to make sure that the rules are
in authoritarian states
respected and equally applied. Just as humans are imperfect, however,
so are the political institutions they create and manage; there are
significant gaps between constitutional ideals and practice.
This chapter begins with an assessment of constitutions: what they are, what they do, their character and durability,
how their performance can be measured, and how they are changed. There is no fixed template for constitutions, they
vary widely in terms of their length and efficacy, and the gap between aspiration and achievement differs from one
constitution to another.
The chapter goes on to look at the role of courts and their relationship with constitutions, examining the differenc-
es between supreme courts and constitutional courts, and the incidence of judicial activism. It then focuses on judges:
how they are recruited, the terms of their tenure, and how such differences impact judicial independence. It then
briefly reviews the three major legal systems found in the world – common law, civil law, and religious law – before
assessing the place of constitutions and courts in authoritarian regimes.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Constitutions are critical to achieving an understanding of government, offering a power map through
key political principles and rules.
◆◆ Understanding governments requires an appreciation not just of the content of constitutions, but also of
their durability and how they are amended.
◆◆ Awareness of the structure and role of courts is also critical, as is the distinction between supreme courts
and constitutional courts.
◆◆ Judges have become more willing to enter the political arena, making it more important to understand
the rules on judicial recruitment.
◆◆ In comparing constitutions and courts, the distinction between common and civil law has long been
important, and more attention needs to be paid to the political significance of religious law.
◆◆ In authoritarian regimes, constitutions and courts are weak, with governments either using them as a
facade or entirely bypassing them.
 constitutions and courts 107

constitutions and courts: an overview

A constitution is a power map containing a set of rules and principles outlining the structure Constitution
and powers of a system of government, describing its institutions and the manner in which A document or a
they work and relate to one another, and typically describing both the limits on governmental set of documents
power and the rights of citizens. A system of government without a constitution is not a that outlines the
powers,
system at all, but rather an unorganized collection of habits that can be changed at the whim institutions, and
of the leaders or the people. In the case of democracies, the authority provided by a constitution structure of
helps provide predictability and security. In the case of authoritarian regimes, the constitution government, as
is more often a fig leaf behind which elites hide, the terms of the constitution being interpreted well as expressing
to suit their needs, or ignored altogether. As well as providing the rules of government, the rights of
citizens and the
constitutions also offer benchmarks against which the performance of government can be limits on
measured. government.
Recent decades have seen a growth of interest in the study of constitutions, for four main
reasons:

◆◆ There has been an explosion of constitution-making, with 105 countries adopting new constitutions between
1990 and 2014 (Comparative Constitutions Project, 2018).
◆◆ Judges and courts in many democracies have become more willing to step into the political arena, in a process
known as judicial or constitutional review. (See later in the chapter for more details.)
◆◆ The growing interest in human rights lends itself to judicial engagement.
◆◆ The expanding body of international law increasingly impacts domestic politics, with judges called on to
arbitrate the confl icting claims of national and supranational law.

A key link between constitutions, law, and government is found in the idea of the rule of Rule of law
law. In the words of the nineteenth-century English jurist, A. V. Dicey (1885), this means that The principle that
no one can be punished except for a breach of the law, that no one is above the law, that societies are best
governed using
everyone is equally subject to the law, and that we substitute ‘a government of laws’ for a
clear, stable, and
‘government of men’. Under the rule of law, political leaders cannot exercise arbitrary power just laws to which
and the powerful are (in theory, at least) subject to the same laws as everyone else (see Bingham, all residents are
2011). equally subject
The implementation of the rule of law and due process (respect for an individual’s legal rights) regardless of their
status or
is perhaps the most important distinction between democracies and authoritarian regimes. In the
background.
case of the latter, the adoption and application of laws is more arbitrary, and based less on tried
and tested principles than on the political goals and objectives of leaders and elites. No country provides completely
equal application of the law, but democracies fare much better than authoritarian regimes, many of whose political
weaknesses stem back to constitutional weaknesses.

the character of constitutions

Most constitutions are structured similarly in the sense that they include four elements (see
Figure 7.1). They often start out with a set of broad aspirations, declaring in vague but often
inspiring terms the ideals of the state, most often including support for democracy and equality. Codified
The core of the document then goes into detail on the institutional structure of government: constitution
how the different offices are elected or appointed, and what they are allowed and not allowed One that is set
out in a single,
to do. There will usually be a bill of rights or its equivalent, outlining the rights of citizens self-contained
relative to government. Finally, there will be a description of the rules on amending the document.
constitution.
While most countries have constitutions that are codified and can be found in a single doc- Uncodified
ument, a few (such as Britain, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia) have uncodified constitution
constitutions based on different sources. In the case of Britain, we must look for its constitution One that is spread
in a large body of statute and common law, European Union law, commentaries written by among several
documents.
constitutional experts, and customs and traditions. This is because, unlike most countries, Brit-
108 chapter 7

Feature Purpose

Seeks popular support for the document with a stirring declaration

Preamble
of principles and, sometimes, a definition of the state’s purposes.

Organizational
Sets out the powers and structure of government institutions.
section

Covers individual and, often, group rights, including access to legal

Bill of rights
redress.

Procedures for
Outlines the procedure for revising the constitution.
amendment

Figure 7.1 The features of constitutions

ain never achieved independence from another country, and never went through the kind of sharp or revolutionary
change that created the need for a new constitution. But the distinction between codified and uncodified is not always
neat and tidy: Sweden falls somewhere between the two, because its constitution comprises four separate Acts passed
between 1810 and 1991: the Instrument of Government describing the structure or government, the Act of Succes-
sion dealing with the powers of the monarchy, the Freedom of the Press Act, and the Fundamental Law on Freedom
of Expression.
Generally, we can look at constitutions in two ways. First, they have an historic role as a regulator of a state’s
power over its citizens. For the Austrian philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992), a constitution was nothing but
a device for limiting the power of government, whether unelected or elected (Hayek, 1960). In a similar vein, the
­German-American political theorist Carl Friedrich (1901–84) defined a constitution as ‘a system of effective, regular-
ized restraints upon government action’ (Friedrich, 1937). From this perspective, the key feature of a constitution is its
statement of individual rights and its expression of the rule of law. In this sense, constitutions express the overarching
principles within which non-constitutional law – and the legal system, generally – operates.
A bill of rights now forms part of nearly all codified constitutions. Although the US Bill of Rights (1791) confines
itself to such traditional liberties as freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, recent constitutions are more ambitious,
often imposing duties on rulers such as fulfilling the social rights of citizens to employment and medical care. Several
post-communist constitutions have extended rights even further; the Polish constitution, for example, has a lengthy
outline of individual rights and responsibilities, including the right of parents ‘to rear their children in accordance with
their own convictions’ and the freedom of workers to choose their occupation and their place of work. As a result, the
documents are expanding: the average length of a constitution (including amendments) is now 29,000 words (Lutz,
2007).
The second, more political and more fundamental role of constitutions is to outline a power map, defining the
structure of government, identifying the pathways of power, and specifying the procedures for law-making. As Sartori
(1994) observes, the key feature of a constitution lies in this provision of a frame of government. A constitution with-
out a declaration of rights is still a constitution, whereas a document without a power map is no constitution at all.
A constitution is therefore a form of political engineering – to be judged, like any other construction, by how well it
works and survives the test of time.
In the main, constitutions are a deliberate creation, designed and built by politicians and typically forming part of a
fresh start after a period of disruption – see Figure 7.2. They are normally written by conventions of politicians, usu-
ally working in closed session, with the voice of ‘the people’ heard directly only if a state holds a referendum to ratify
the new constitution. Many countries, including the United States, have never held such a vote. Interestingly, Iceland
recently tried an exceptionally open process in constitution-crafting. It engaged a group of citizens to list priorities for
a new constitution, and appointed a different set of citizens to undertake the drafting. Social media were then used to
elicit comments on a draft, which was approved in a non-binding 2012 referendum but failed to win legislative support
in 2013. Iceland continues to function under its 1944 constitution.
 constitutions and courts 109

Cause Examples

Break-up in the 1990s of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia,

Regime change
and of Sudan in 2011.

Wholesale political
Bolivia (2009), Kenya (2010), Zimbabwe (2013), and Tunisia (2014).
change

Post-war
Japan after 1945, Iraq after 2005.
reconstruction

Much of Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, or the 15 republics created by the
Independence
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Figure 7.2 Why new constitutions are written

Constitutions often experience a difficult birth, particularly when they are compromises between political actors
who have substituted distrust for conflict. In the terms used by Horowitz (2002), constitutions are built from the
bottom up, rather than designed from the top down. For example, South Africa’s post-apartheid settlement of 1996
achieved a practical accommodation between leaders of the white and black communities against a backdrop of near
slavery and continuing racial hostility – see Spotlight South Africa later in this chapter.
As vehicles of compromise, most constitutions are vague, contradictory, and ambiguous. As a rule, drafters are more
concerned with a short-term political fix than with establishing a resilient structure for the long run. In principle,
everyone agrees with the American statesman Alexander Hamilton (1788a), that constitutions should ‘seek merely to
regulate the general political interests of the nation’; in practice, they are often lengthy documents reflecting an incom-
plete settlement between suspicious partners.
The main danger of a new constitution is that it fails to endow rulers with sufficient authority. Too often, political
distrust means that the new government is hemmed in with restrictions, limiting its effectiveness. The Italian consti-
tution of 1948 illustrates this problem with its hallmark of garantismo, meaning that all political forces are guaranteed
a stake in the political system. It established a strong bicameral legislature and provided for regional autonomy, while
trying to prevent a recurrence of fascist dictatorship and to accommodate the radical aspirations of the political left.
The result was weak centralized control and ineffective governance.

the durability of constitutions

In assessing the practical value of constitutions, it is tempting to look at their age. The most impressive such
documents, it might seem, are those that have lasted the longest. Conversely, a state that keeps changing its
constitution is clearly experiencing difficulty in securing a stable framework of governance; see Focus 7.1. In this
sense, the United States – which adopted its constitution in 1789 – stands in contrast to Haiti, which drew up its
first constitution shortly after independence in 1804, and adopted its 23rd and latest constitution in 1987. More
important than age, however, is the question of quality. All constitutions contain a degree of idealism, and make
claims that either cannot objectively be measured, or else are not reflected in reality. But how can we measure the
quality of a constitution? At least in part, the answer lies in determining the size of the gap between what it says
and what happens in practice.
The Mexican constitution, for example, was both radical and progressive from the time it was adopted in 1917: it
contains principles that prohibit discrimination of any kind, provide for free education, establish the equality of men
and women, limit the working day to eight hours, and prohibit vigilante justice. But many Mexicans argue that too
many of its goals have not been met in practice, and thus they consider the constitution to be still a work in progress.
One analysis (Castagnola and Noriega, 2017) argues that matters have not been helped by the Mexican Supreme Court,
which has missed many opportunities to help Mexico with its recent transition to democracy.The constitution of India
offers another example of the gap between goals and practice; its 448 articles guide the world’s largest democracy, and
110 chapter 7

Feature Examples

Britain (1215), United States (1789), Norway (1814), Netherlands (1815),

Oldest still in use
Belgium (1831).

Newest Thailand (2017), Côte d’Ivoire (2016), Nepal (2015).

Average age in 2015 17 years.

Shortest Iceland, Laos, Latvia, Japan (each 4,000–5,000 words).

Longest India (146,000 words), Nigeria (66,000 words).

Least amended United States (27 in nearly 230 years).

Most amended Mexico (nearly 230 changes in a century), India (101 in just over 70 years).

States with the fewest Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, India, Netherlands, Norway,
constitutions to date United States (one each), among others.

States with the most

Dominican Republic (32), Venezuela (26), Haiti (23), Ecuador (20).
constitutions to date

States with uncodified

Canada, Britain, Israel, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia.
constitutions

Figure 7.3 Ten facts about constitutions

Source: Based partly on information in Comparative Constitutions Project (2018).

Judiciary yet India suffers massive poverty, widespread corruption, human rights abuses (particularly in
A collective term regard to women), unequal access to education, and an extraordinarily slow-moving legal process.
for the judges
within the system Recent developments in the United States offer additional insights into the problem. The US
of courts that constitution did not change after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, but the detention of
interpret and alleged terrorists in Guantanamo Bay and revelations about the use of torture and the increased
apply the law in monitoring by government agencies of phone and electronic communications raised troubling
keeping with the questions about the health of individual rights in the United States. It is often said that truth is
constitution.
the first casualty of war; in a similar vein, it is often the case with countries facing external threats
Judicial review that the rule of law takes second place to national security, and needs to be rebuilt subsequently
The power of through the courts.
courts to nullify
any laws or actions
proposed or taken the role of courts
by government
officials that Constitutions are neither self-made nor self-implementing, and they need the support of
contravene the institutions that can enforce their provisions by striking down unconstitutional laws and
constitution. practices. This role has fallen to the judiciary: with their power of judicial review,
Otherwise known judges occupy a unique position both in and above politics. Few constitutions initially had
as constitutional this provision (not even the US constitution, which is often seen as a template for judicial
review.
review; the US Supreme Court gave itself this power with a decision in 1803), but the vast
 constitutions and courts 111

Focus 7.1
Amending constitutions
Times, needs, and expectations change, and constitutions should change with them, up Entrenchment
to a point. So while there should always be allowances for amendment, the procedures The question of
involved have critical implications: too many amendments can result in instability, while the legal
too few can result in stagnation. Here we meet the matter of entrenchment, a term procedures for
referring to procedures which set a higher level and wider spread of support for amending a
constitution.
amendments than is the case for ordinary legislative bills.
In the case of a flexible constitution, changes can be made relatively easily, while Flexible
changing a rigid constitution is more difficult, usually demanding super- or concurrent constitution
majorities (see Figure 7.4). Rigidity offers the benefit of a stable political framework, One that can be
and benefits rulers by limiting the damage should political opponents win power, amended more
because they would face the same barriers to change. On the other hand, non- easily, often in the
same way that
entrenchment (which is rare) offers the advantage of ready adaptability. In New ordinary legislation
Zealand, this flexibility allowed changes to the electoral system and government is passed.
administration in the 1980s and 1990s, while in the United Kingdom it allowed the
devolution of significant powers to Scotland and Wales in 1999 without much Rigid
constitutional fuss. constitution
The most extreme form of entrenchment is a clause that cannot be amended at all. One that is
For example, the French and Turkish constitutions guarantee the republican character entrenched,
requiring more
of their regimes. These statements were designed to enforce a break with the old demanding
regime, but they also provide ammunition to those who see constitutions as the amendment
dictatorship of the dead over the living. In new conditions, past solutions sometimes procedures.
have a way of turning into current problems.
A key element of the amendment procedure concerns the role of the legislature.
On the one hand, some constitutions can be amended simply through special majorities within the
legislature, thereby reducing the relative status of the constitution. This approach is found in European
states with a strong commitment to parliamentary supremacy, such as Germany: amendments there (where
permitted) require only a two-thirds majority in both houses. On the other hand, where modifications
cannot be approved by the legislature alone, the constitution stands supreme over the legislature. In
Australia, for example, amendments must be endorsed not only by the national parliament, but also by a
referendum achieving a concurrent majority in most states and in the country as a whole. A total of 44
amendments have been proposed, of which only eight won enough support to go through, the most recent
in 1977.
Changes can also be initiated by other means than a formal amendment. The most important of these
devices are judicial review (the rulings of constitutional courts), and the passage of new laws that modify
some aspect of the rules of government. And even when constitutions are codified, simple customs and
traditions should not be forgotten; there is often much about the structure of government that is not
written down, but has simply become a tradition. Political parties play a critical role in government all over
the world, for example, but there may not always be much said about them in constitutions.

majority now include some provision for review. As a result, courts have come to play an increasingly important
role in government and politics. Ginsburg (2008) describes this development as ‘a global institutional norm’
that has spread to nearly every democracy as well as several authoritarian regimes, and is increasingly seen in
transnational contexts as well. Hirschl (2008) has gone so far as to refer to the rise of juristocracy, or government
by judges.
The function of judicial review can be allocated in one of two ways. The first and more traditional method – used
in the United States and much of Latin America – is for the highest or supreme court in the ordinary judicial system to
112 chapter 7

Amendments require the approval of:

Both houses of the legislature, then a referendum achieving a
Australia
concurrent majority both overall and in a majority of states.

Both houses of the legislature and two-thirds of the provinces

Canada
containing at least half the country’s population.

Germany A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature.

A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature and approval

Nigeria
by two-thirds of state legislatures.

A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature and a

India
majority of the total membership of each house.

A majority in both houses of the legislature and majority approval

Ireland
in a national referendum.

Majority vote by two successive sessions of the legislature with an

Sweden
intervening election.

A two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature and approval

United States
by three-quarters of the states.

Figure 7.4 Comparing constitutional amendments

Notes:
Germany: The federal, social, and democratic character of the German state, and the rights of individuals within it, cannot be amended.
India: Selected amendments, such as those changing the representation of states in parliament, must also be approved by at least half the states.
United States: An alternative method, based on a special convention called by the states and by Congress, has not been used.

take on the task of constitutional protection. A supreme court rules on constitutional matters, just as it has the final say
on other questions of common and statute law. A second and more recent method – favoured in Europe – is to create
a special constitutional court, standing apart from the ordinary judicial system.

Supreme courts
Concrete
review
As the name implies, a supreme court is the highest court within a jurisdiction, whose decisions
Judgments made on are not subject to review by any other court. Supreme courts are usually the fi nal court of
the constitutional appeal, listening – if they choose – to cases appealed from a lower level. They also mainly use
validity of law in concrete review, meaning that they ask whether, given the facts of the particular case, the
the context of a decision reached at lower level was compatible with the constitution. By contrast, constitutional
specific case.
Sometimes known
courts mainly practise abstract review, judging the intrinsic constitutional validity of a law
as the American without limiting themselves to the particular case. In addition, constitutional courts can issue
model. advisory judgments on a bill at the request of the government or legislature, often without the
stimulus of a specific case. These latter judgments are often short and are usually unsigned,
Abstract lacking the legal argument used by supreme courts. So concrete review provides decisions on
review cases with constitutional implications while abstract review is a more general assessment of the
Advice (not usually constitutional validity of a law or bill.
binding) given by a
court on the Confusingly, the name of a given court does not always follow its function. Hence the su-
constitutionality of preme courts of Australia and Hong Kong go under the title of High Court, those of France
a law or public and Belgium under the title Cour de Cassation (Court of Appeal), and that of the European
policy. Sometimes Union is the European Court of Justice, while a number of European countries – including
known as the Spain – have supreme courts whose decisions (some or all) can be appealed to constitutional
European model.
courts.
 constitutions and courts 113

Table 7.1 Comparing supreme courts and constitutional courts

Supreme court Constitutional court

Form of review Primarily concrete Primarily abstract
Relationship to Highest court of appeal A separate body dealing with constitutional
other courts issues only
Recruitment Legal expertise plus political approval Political criteria more important
Normal tenure Until retirement age Typically one non-renewable term (6–9 years)
Examples Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Austria, Egypt, France, Germany, most of
Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United States Eastern Europe, Russia, South Africa

The United States is the prototypical case of a supreme court with concrete review. Although Original
the US Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction over cases to which a US state or a rep- jurisdiction
resentative of another country is a party, its main role is appellate. That is, constitutional issues The power of a
can be raised at any point in the ordinary judicial system and the Supreme Court selects only court to review
cases that
those cases that it believes raise significant constitutional questions; the vast majority of petitions
originate with the
for the Court to review a case are turned down. court itself.

Constitutional courts Appellate

This approach was born with the Austrian constitution of 1920, and became established in The power of a
continental Europe after World War II. The success of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court court to review
decisions reached
encouraged non-European countries to follow suit, such that nearly half the world’s states had
by lower courts.
such a court by 2005 (Horowitz, 2006). Where a supreme court is a judicial body making the
final ruling on all appeals (not all of which involve the constitution), a constitutional court is
more akin to an additional legislative chamber. In this system, ordinary courts are not empowered to engage in
judicial review, with appeals to the supreme court; instead, the review function is exclusive to a separate constitutional
authority (see Vanberg, 2015).
Germany has become the exemplar of the constitutional court approach. Its Federal Constitutional Court (FCC)
has the following powers: judicial review, adjudication of disputes between state and federal political institutions, pro-
tection of individual rights, and protection of the constitutional and democratic order against groups and individuals
seeking to overthrow it (Langenbacher and Conradt, 2017). The ‘eternity clause’ in Germany’s constitution (the Basic
Law) holds that the FCC’s judgments in key areas of democracy, federalism, and human rights are the final word.
The FCC’s public reputation has been enhanced by the provision of constitutional complaint, which allows citizens
to petition the Court directly once other judicial remedies are exhausted. Kommers (2006) describes the Court as ‘the
guardian of German democracy’, pointing to its decisions on voting rights, public funding of election campaigns, the
electoral system, and the rights of smaller political parties. It has also kept a careful eye on whether European Union
laws and policies detract from the autonomy of the country’s legislature, and has been active on
policy topics as varied as abortion, immigration, religion in schools, and university reform. Judicial
restraint
The view that
the role of the judiciary judges should
apply the letter of
Judicial intervention in public affairs has grown throughout the liberal democratic world since the law, leaving
1945, marking a transition from judicial restraint to judicial activism. Studies from as far politics to elected
afield as Bangladesh, India, South Africa, Canada, and the United States have reflected on the bodies.
implications of judges becoming more willing to enter political arenas that would have once
Judicial
been left to elected politicians and national parliaments (see Coutinho et al., 2015).
activism
For example, the US Supreme Court decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election The willingness of
by voting along party lines that George W. Bush had won the election in the state of Florida, judges to venture
and thus the presidential election. One outraged commentator described the vote as ‘the single beyond narrow
most corrupt decision in Supreme Court history’ and ‘a violation of the judicial oath’ because legal reasoning so
as to influence
the majority decided on the basis of ‘the personal identity and political affiliation of the litigants’
public policy.
(Dershowitz, 2001). Later, during Barack Obama’s final term in office in 2016, Republicans in
 SPOTLIGHT SOUTH AFRICA
Brief profile
South Africa languished for many decades under a system of institutionalized racial separation known as apartheid.
This ensured privileges and opportunities for white South Africans at the expense of black, mixed-race, and Asian
South Africans. In the face of growing resistance, and ostracism from much of the outside world, an agreement
was reached that paved the way for the first democratic elections in 1994. Much was originally expected from a
country with a wealth of natural resources, but corruption is a major problem, unemployment remains stubbornly
high, many still live in poverty, and South Africa faces major public security challenges: it has one of the highest
per capita homicide and violent assault rates in the world. Despite being the second largest economy in Africa
(after Nigeria), it has only partly realized its potential as a major regional power.

Form of government Unitary parliamentary republic. State formed 1910, and most recent constitution
adopted 1997.
Executive Presidential. A president heads both the state and the government, ruling with a
cabinet. The National Assembly elects the president after each general election.
Presidents limited to two five-year terms.
Legislature Bicameral Parliament: lower National Assembly (400 members) elected for
renewable five-year terms, and upper National Council of Provinces with 90
members, ten appointed from each of the nine provinces.
Judiciary The legal system mixes common and civil law. The Constitutional Court decides
constitutional matters and can strike down legislation. It has 11 members
appointed by the president for terms of 12 years.
Electoral system The National Assembly is elected by proportional representation using closed
party lists; half are elected from a national list and half from provincial lists.
Parties Dominant party. The African National Congress (ANC) has dominated since the
first full democratic and multi-racial election in 1994. The more liberal Democratic
Alliance, now the leading party in the Western Cape, forms the official opposition.

56m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$349bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$6,160 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 The constitution of South
Africa
South Africa’s transformation from a state
based on apartheid (institutionalized racial
segregation) to a more constitutional order
based on democracy was one of the most
remarkable political transitions of the late
twentieth century. In 1996, after two years of
hard bargaining between the African National
Congress (ANC) and the white National
Party (NP), agreement was reached on a new
109-page constitution to take effect in
February 1997. For a contextual analysis, see
Klug (2010).
In a phrase reminiscent of the US
constitution, South Africa’s constitution
declares that ‘the Executive power of the
Republic vests in the President’. Unlike the
Images of Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s president, on sale at the United States, though, presidents are elected
annual conference of the African National Congress, a party that has by the National Assembly after each general
dominated the country since the end of apartheid in 1994. election. They can be removed through a
Source: Getty Images/Bloomberg. vote of no confidence in the legislature
(although this event would trigger a general
election), and by impeachment. The president governs in conjunction with a large cabinet.
Each of the country’s nine provinces elects its own legislature and forms its own executive headed by a
premier. But far more than in the United States, authority and funds flow from the top down. In any case, the
ANC provides the glue linking not only executive and legislature, but also national, provincial, and municipal levels
of government. So far, at least, the rul-
ing party has dominated the governing
institutions whereas, in the United ZIMBABWE
States, the institutions have dominated BOTSWANA
the parties. MOZAMBIQUE
South Africa’s rainbow nation faces Pretoria
NAMIBIA ESWATINI
some difficulties in reconciling constitu-
tional liberal democracy with the polit- Johannesburg
ical dominance of the ANC. Some have LESOTHO
Bloemfontein
argued that the constitution should be
replaced with a document that is more Atlantic
reflective of the needs and realities of Ocean SOUTH AFRICA
African society, replacing the compro- Indian
mises that were made at the end of the Cape Town Port Ocean
Elizabeth
apartheid era. Others argue that it is a
landmark attempt to create a society
based on social, economic, and political
rights for all citizens, and that its true
Further reading
implementation has yet to be achieved
(Dixon and Roux, 2018). But the effects Butler, Anthony (2017) Contemporary South Africa, 3rd edn (Red Globe
of the constitution, more than most, Press).
should be judged by what preceded it. Deegan, Heather (2011) Politics South Africa, 2nd edn (Pearson).
By that test the achievements of the Klug, Heinz (2010) The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual
Analysis (Hart).
new South Africa are remarkable in-
deed.
116 chapter 7

the US Senate refused to consider his nominee for a vacancy in the Supreme Court, instead delaying the process in the
hope that a Republican would win the presidency and would nominate a more conservative judge (which is exactly
what happened). In Israel, meanwhile, the Supreme Court has addressed such controversial issues as the West Bank
barrier, the use of torture in investigations by the security service, and the assassination of suspected terrorists (Hirschl,
2008).
There are three key reasons for the drift from restraint to activism:

◆◆ The increasing reliance on regulation as a mode of governance encourages court intervention. A government
decision to oppose same-sex marriage, for example, is open to judicial challenge in a way that a decision to go
to war or raise taxes is not.
◆◆ International conventions give judges an extra lever to move outside the limits of national law. Documents such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights provide a base
on which judges can construct what would once have been viewed as excessively political statements. The
emergence of international courts such as the International Criminal Court (founded in 2002) has also
encouraged national courts to become more assertive.
◆◆ The continuing prestige of the judiciary has encouraged some transfer of authority to its domain. The judicial
process in most democracies has retained at least some reputation for integrity and impartiality, whereas the
standing of many other institutions – notably political parties – has declined.

Whatever the factors lying behind the expansion of judicial authority, the process seems to reinforce itself.
Sensing the growing confidence of judges in addressing broader political issues, interest groups, rights-conscious
citizens, and even political parties have become more willing to continue their struggles in the judicial arena. In
few states has judicial activism gone further than the United States. The US is founded on a constitutional contract
and legions of lawyers forever quibble over the terms. Armed with a written constitution, federalism, judicial
independence, no system of separate administrative courts, a legal system based on judge-made case law, and high
esteem for judges, the US has moved ever further into a culture of judicial activism. So far has this gone that
discussions about which way the Court will vote on an issue boil down less to constitutional principles than to the
relative number of conservatives and liberals on the nine-person bench.
Fewer conditions of judicial autonomy are met in Britain, where parliamentary sovereignty long reigned supreme.
Lacking the authority to annul legislation, judicial review in the British context normally refers to the capacity of
judges to review executive decisions against the template provided by administrative law. Even so, judicial activism
grew in Britain as the European Court of Justice established a legal order applying to all member states of the Euro-
pean Union (and has even influenced those outside the EU). Judicial assertiveness was further encouraged by Britain’s
belated adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1998, the decay of the royal prerogative which
once allowed the state to stand above the law, and the establishment of a Supreme Court for England and Wales in 2009.
This is the final court of appeal for all UK civil cases, and for criminal cases from England,Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Formal statements of rights have also encouraged judicial expansion in other English-speaking countries. In Canada,
a Charter of Rights and Freedoms was appended to the constitution in 1982, giving judges a more prominent role in
defending individual rights. Similarly, New Zealand introduced a bill of rights in 1990, protecting ‘the life and security
of the person’ and also confirming traditional, but previously uncodified, democratic and civil rights.

systems of law
As well as understanding constitutions and courts, it is also important to understand systems
of law. The two most important of these are common law and civil law, whose contrasting Common
principles are essential to an appreciation of the differences in the political role of judiciaries law
everywhere outside the Middle East. The third is religious law, the most important example Judicial rulings on
of which is the sharia law found in most Muslim countries, and coexisting with common or matters not
explicitly treated
civil law in countries with large Muslim populations, such as Nigeria, or in countries with a in legislation,
colonial history, such as Egypt. based on
precedents
Common law created by
The key feature of common law systems is that the decisions made by judges on specific decisions in
specific cases.
cases form a legal framework which remains distinct from the authority of the state. It is
 constitutions and courts 117

Focus 7.2
Judicial independence
If courts are to provide an objective assessment of the constitutionality of laws and the actions of government,
then judges need to be independent. In spite of this, Melton and Ginsburg (2014) argue that not much effort
was made until recently to insulate them from external interference. At the same time, we must make a
distinction between de facto protection and de jure protection, because giving judges legal protection does
not mean that they will always be completely isolated from the influence of political leaders, the media, or
public opinion. At the heart of judicial independence is the question of how judges are recruited and removed:
if recruitment was controlled by politicians, the judiciary would simply reinforce partisan authority, providing
an integration (rather than a separation) of powers. But is there really any way of protecting judges from
political influence?
As judicial independence has moved up the political agenda, so governments have developed multiple
possible solutions to judicial selection, ranging from democratic election to co-option by judges already in
post (see Figure 7.5). The former is democratic but political, while the latter offers the surest guarantee of
independence but can lead to a self-perpetuating elite because it runs the danger that the existing judges will
seek out new recruits with an outlook resembling their own. In between these extremes come more
conventional methods: appointment by the legislature, by the executive, and by independent panels. Many
countries combine these methods, with the government choosing from a pool of candidates prepared by a
professional body. Alternatively, and more traditionally, some judges on the senior court can be selected by
one method, while others lower down are chosen by a different method.
For most courts charged with judicial review, selection still involves a clear political dimension. For
example, the stature of the US Supreme Court combines with the unusual rule of lifetime appointments to
make sure that nominations are key decisions in which the judicial experience and legal ability of the nominee
may matter less than ideology, partisanship, and a clean personal history. A political dimension is also
apparent in selection to constitutional courts. Typically, members are selected by the legislature in a
procedure that can involve party horse-trading. For example, 8 out of the 12 members of Spain’s Constitutional
Court are appointed by the party-dominated parliament.

found mainly in Britain and in countries that were once British colonies, such as Australia, Canada (except
Quebec), India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the United States (except Louisiana). Originally based on custom
and tradition, such decisions were fi rst published as a way of standardizing legal judgments across the territory
of a state. Because judges abided by the principle of stare decisis (stand on decided cases), their verdicts created
precedents and established a predictable legal framework, contributing thereby to economic exchange and
nation-building.
Where common law is judge-made law, statute law is passed by the legislature in specific areas but these statutes
usually build on case law (the past decisions of courts) and are themselves refined through judicial interpretation.
The political significance of common law systems is that judges are an independent source of
authority. They form part of the governance, but not the government, of society. In this way, Statute law
Laws enacted by a
common law systems contribute to political pluralism. legislature.

Civil law Civil law

Civil law springs from written legal codes rather than cases, the goal being to provide a single Judicial rulings
framework for the conduct of public affairs, including business contracts. It is found throughout founded on
written legal
Latin America, in all of continental Europe, in China and Russia, and in most African codes which seek
countries that were once colonies of continental European powers. The original codes date to provide a single
back to Roman times, and have since evolved into distinct codes which are elaborated through overarching
laws passed by national legislatures. framework for the
In civil law, judges (rather than juries) identify the facts of the case, and often even direct the conduct of public
affairs.
investigation.They then apply the relevant section of the code to the matter at hand.The political
118 chapter 7

Number Tenure Process

of judges

China 13 5-year terms, limit of two Appointed by legislature

Germany 16 Single 12-year term; Elected by legislature; need two-thirds

age limit 68 majority

India 31 No fixed terms; Appointed by president on recommendation

age limit 65 of Chief Justice and four senior judges

Italy 15 Single 9-year terms Five appointed by the President, five

elected by Parliament, and five elected by
other courts

Nigeria 21 No fixed terms; Appointed by president on recommendation

age limit 70 of National Judicial Council, and confirmed
by Senate majority

Russia 19 Single 12-year terms Nominated by president, confirmed by

majority in Federation Council

United Kingdom 12 No fixed terms; age limit Appointed by monarch on advice of

70 or 75 depending on prime minister after nomination by
age on appointment selection commission

United States 9 Lifetime Nominated by the president, confirmed

by majority in Senate

Figure 7.5 Comparing judicial appointments

importance of this point is that judges are viewed as impartial officers of state, engaged in an administrative task. The
courtroom is a government space, rather than a sphere of independent authority; judge-made law would be viewed as
a threat to legislative supremacy.
The underlying codes in civil law systems often emphasize social stability as much as individual rights. The philos-
ophy is one of state-led integration, rather than pluralism. Indeed, the codes traditionally functioned as a kind of ex-
tensive constitution, systematically setting out obligations as well as freedoms. However, the more recent introduction
of distinct constitutions (which have established a strong position in relation to the codes) has
Sharia law
strengthened the liberal theme in many civil law countries. In addition, judges have inevitably
The system of found themselves filling gaps in the codes, providing decisions which function as case law, even
Islamic law – though they are not acknowledged as such.
based on the
Quran and on the Religious law
teachings and
actions of
Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the Catholic Church all have their own distinctive
Muhammad bodies of law, some of which remain important in regulating the societies in which they are
– which functions found. Some states, such as Bangladesh, also have polycentric legal systems that include
alongside Western separate provisions for different religions. Of all such religious legal systems, the one that has
law in most Islamic attracted the most international attention – and the one that is also the most widely
states.
misunderstood – is the sharia law of Muslim states.
 constitutions and courts 119

In the West, Islamic law tends to come to attention only when someone has been sentenced to be stoned to
death for adultery, or in the context of the unequal treatment of women in many Muslim societies. The result is a
misleading conception of how it works, and an unfortunate failure to understand that Islamic law is deep and so-
phisticated, with its own courts, legal experts, and judges and its own tradition of jurisprudence (see Ahmad, 2017
for a survey). At the same time, however, while the use of Islamic law is one of the ideals of an Islamic Republic (see
Chapter 6), sharia law is not universally applied in any. It is widely used in Iran, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Oman,
and Saudi Arabia, but most Islamic states use a mix of common or civil law and Islamic religious law, turning to the
former for serious crime and to the latter for family issues. Unlike Western law, where lawbreakers must account
only to the legal system, the Islamic tradition holds that lawbreakers must account to Allah and all other Muslims.
Also unlike Western law, the sharia outlines not only what is forbidden for Muslims but also what is discouraged,
recommended, and obligatory. So, for example, Muslims should not drink alcohol, gamble, steal, commit adultery, or
commit suicide, but they should pray every day, give to charity, be polite to others, dress inoffensively, and – when
they die – be buried in anonymous graves. When Muslims have doubts about whether something they are con-
sidering doing is acceptable, they are encouraged to speak to a Muslim judge, called a mufti, who will issue a legal
judgment known as a fatwa.

constitutions and courts in authoritarian states

New constitutions are costly to adopt, consuming large amounts of time and energy (even the authoritarian
regime of Myanmar needed 15 years to develop and impose its 2008 constitution, for example), and yet they are
now found just as often in authoritarian states as in democracies. Why would authoritarian regimes bother, ask
Ginsburg and Simpser (2014), when the resulting documents are often meaningless, and how can obviously sham
documents generate any legitimacy? Among the answers they offer: constitutions carry out many of the same
functions as they do in democracies (such as minimizing conflict over the responsibilities of institutions) while
also serving four additional functions: as operating manuals, billboards, blueprints, and window-dressing (see
Figure 7.6).
While exploiting constitutions to these ends, retaining a framework of law and a facade of judicial independence,
many authoritarian rulers go further by following one or both of two broad strategies in limiting the authority of
courts. One is to influence judges indirectly through recruitment, training, evaluation, promotion, and disciplinary pro-
cedures. In the more determined cases of judicial resistance, they can simply be dismissed and replaced with supporters
of the regime. Few went further than Egypt’s President Nasser when he fired 200 judges in one fell swoop in 1969
in the ‘massacre of the judges’. Uganda’s notorious military dictator Idi Amin adopted the ultimate form of control in
1971 when he had his Chief Justice shot dead.
More recently, the administration of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) used a combination of subtle
and not-so-subtle means to weaken the role of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Taylor, 2014). He began by using a
combination of threats against judges and threats of non-compliance with key rulings to weaken the court’s effective-
ness without changing the law.Then, in 2004, with the National Assembly dominated by his Fifth Republic Movement
and its allies, Chávez took the opportunity to change the law; the number of seats in the Court was expanded from

Function Effect
They provide instructions regarding how government should
Operating manual
function.

They can be used to signal the intentions of rulers to both

Billboard
domestic and international audiences.

They describe things not as they are but as they might be, so as to
Blueprint
help motivate people.

Window-dressing They are designed to cover up actual political practice.

Figure 7.6 The four functions of authoritarian constitutions

Source: Based on Ginsburg and Simpser (2014).
120 chapter 7

20 to 32, Chávez supporters were appointed to the 12 new seats, and the rules were modified so that the government
could remove judges without the two-thirds majority of the National Assembly required by the constitution. By the
time of Chávez’s death in office in March 2013, a series of incremental changes had removed almost all judicial checks
on the Venezuelan executive.
A second more subtle strategy is to bypass the judicial process. For example, many non-democratic regimes use
Declarations of Emergency as a cover to make decisions which are exempt from judicial scrutiny. In effect, a law is
passed saying there is no law. Once introduced, such ‘temporary’ emergencies can drag on for decades. Alternatively,
rulers can make use of special courts that do the regime’s bidding without much pretence of judicial independence;
Egypt’s State Security Courts were an example, hearing matters involving ‘threats’ to ‘security’ (a concept that was
interpreted broadly) until they were closed down in 2008. Military rulers have frequently extended the scope of secret
military courts to include civilian troublemakers. Ordinary courts can then continue to deal with non-political cases,
offering a thin image of legal integrity to the world.
Lurking behind the claims of constitutions, it is abundantly clear to outside observers (and to many at home) that
authoritarian regimes have a poor record on human rights. Comparative data in this area lacks the established record
of the indices we have reviewed for democracy and corruption, but the Human Freedom Index offers some useful
insights. Maintained by three think tanks from the United States, Canada, and Germany, it defines human freedom as
‘the absence of coercive constraint’ and uses nearly 80 indicators, including a mixture of economic freedoms and civil
liberties such as freedom of movement, religion, association, and expression. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 representing
the most freedom, it found that the average score for countries assessed in 2015 was 6.93, and that the lowest levels
were in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. The countries with the
lowest scores are shown in Figure 7.7.
As the figure suggests, Zimbabwe has a poor record on human freedom, having languished under the government
of Robert Mugabe between independence in 1980 and his forced removal from office in 2017. Following a period of
growing political conflict and economic decline, a new constitution was adopted in 2013, offering hope that life for
Zimbabweans might become more secure. But the governing party ZANU-PF – which won nearly three-­quarters
of the seats in the Zimbabwean legislature in deeply flawed 2013 elections – dragged its feet in implementing
the provisions of the constitution and in amending existing laws restricting freedom of expression and assembly.
Under Mugabe, media and academic freedom remained limited, opponents of the regime were routinely harassed,
­property rights were ignored, the military was used to support the regime, and the courts were manipulated to suit
the ­purposes of the governing regime. For example, they ruled the 2013 elections to be free and fair in spite of clear
evidence to the contrary.

5
Score out of 10

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Figure 7.7 Human Freedom Index: the lowest-ranked countries

Source: Vásquez and Porčnik (2017).
Note: Based on data for 2015. For context, the average global score was 6.93, and Switzerland ranked highest with 8.89. Only 159 countries ranked.
Those unranked include Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, and Somalia.
 constitutions and courts 121

Another example of an authoritarian system with a poor human rights record is Iran. To be sure, the coun-
try exhibits all the trappings of a constitution supported by a court system. The constitutional document makes
noble blueprint-style statements about an Islamic Republic ‘endorsed by the people of Iran on the basis of their
long-standing belief in the sovereignty of truth and Quranic justice’, and about the ‘exalted dignity and value of
man’ and the independence of the judiciary. But Iran has one of the weaker records on human rights in the world.
Many activists languish in jail on political charges, Iran has a rate of execution that is probably second only to that
of China (there are many capital offences in Iran, include apostasy (abandonment of Islam) and moharebeh (‘enmity
against God’)), and women and minorities face discrimination of many kinds. In contrast to Western states, the
constitution expresses Islamic more than liberal values and the court system is a channel of, rather than a limitation
on, power.
In hybrid regimes, too, constitutions and the law are subsidiary to political authority. Leaders may be elected within
a constitutional framework, but that environment has been shaped by previous leaders and the exercise of power is
rarely constrained by an independent judiciary. Presidents occupy the highest ground, defining the national interest
under the broad authority granted to them by the voters. In other words, presidential accountability is vertical (to the
voters) rather than horizontal (to the judiciary). In contrast to a democracy, where the main parties have concluded
that being ruled by law is preferable to being ruled by opponents, in a hybrid regime the commanding figure still sees
the constitution, the law, and the courts as a source of political advantage. Legal processes operate more extensively than
in pure authoritarian regimes but remain subject to political manipulation.
In states with a ruling party, courts are viewed not as a constraint upon political authority but as an aid to the
party in its policy goals. China is currently on its fourth and most recent constitution (dating from 1982), and even
though it begins by affirming the country’s socialist status, and warning against ‘sabotage of the socialist system’,
it is the least radical of the four. Offering an example of the billboard function of an authoritarian constitution, it
seeks to establish a more predictable environment for economic development and to limit the communist party’s
historic emphasis on class conflict, national self-reliance, and revolutionary struggle. The leading role of the party is

The president of the Supreme People’s Court of China and nearly 370 other judges take the oath of office at a ceremony in
Beijing. In spite of an extensive court system, China remains an authoritarian regime.
Source: Getty Images/China News Service.
122 chapter 7

now mentioned only in the preamble, with the main text even declaring that ‘all political parties must abide by the
Constitution’.
In addition to moderating the content of its constitution, today’s China also gives greater emphasis to law in general.
There were few laws at all in the early decades of the People’s Republic, reflecting a national tradition of unregulated
power, and leaving the judiciary as, essentially, a branch of the police. However, laws did become more numerous,
­precise, and significant after the hiatus of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). In 1979, the country passed its first
criminal laws; later revisions abolished the vague crime of ‘counter-revolution’ and established the right of defendants
to seek counsel. Law could prevail to the benefit of economic development. For law-abiding citizens, life became more
predictable.
Despite such changes, Chinese politics remains authoritarian. ‘Rule by law’ still means exerting political control
through law, rather than limiting the exercise of power. The courts are regarded as just one bureaucratic agency
among others, legal judgments are not tested against the constitution, and many decisions are simply ignored.
­Rulings are ­unpublished and difficult cases are often left undecided. In comparison with liberal democracies, legal
­institutions remain less specialized, and legal personnel less sophisticated. Trial procedures, while improving, still offer
only ­limited protection for the innocent. The death penalty remains in use, the police remain largely unaccountable,
political ­opponents are still imprisoned without trial, and party officials continue to occupy a protected position above
the law. Because the party still rules, power continues to trump the constitution and human rights, while Zhang (2012)
notes that political and religious rights remain dormant.
It is always important, whether reviewing democracies or authoritarian systems, to distinguish the headline-making
developments in government and politics from the underlying trends. Relatively few court decisions make the head-
lines, and when they do it is mainly because they have some notable effect tied to an issue that attracts public attention;
the routine day-to-day work of the courts, and the constitutional principles upon which they are based, meanwhile
goes on without much public attention.
This is an argument made by Hendley (2014) in regard to Russia, for example. She points to events that made
­international headlines – such as the conviction in 2012 of the punk rock group Pussy Riot after holding an anti-Putin
event in a Moscow cathedral, or the repeated arrests of opposition politician Alexei Navalny – and notes that these and
other cases have created an image of Russian law as ‘an instrument used by the state to impose its will on dissenters’.
She also argues, though, that they have obscured the role of law in the everyday life of Russians, who – in spite of
­misgivings about the weakness of judges relative to the executive – use the courts in ever-increasing numbers to resolve
their disputes.
Russia during the Soviet era had a large body of law and elected judges. It also experienced several constitutions.
But the legal structure was designed to underpin the role of the communist party, which meant that the Russian people
had to undergo a crash course in the meaning of the rule of law following the adoption of Russia’s post-communist
constitution in 1993.This set out an array of individual rights (including that of owning property); proclaimed that ‘the
individual and his rights and freedoms are the supreme value’; and established a tripartite system of general, commercial,
and constitutional courts. The introduction of the Constitutional Court, in particular, represented a major innovation
in Russian legal thinking.
Under Boris Yeltsin (in office 1991–99), notes Hendley (2014), the Constitutional Court challenged some of the
policies of president, if only indirectly. Under Vladimir Putin, though, the court has become more quiescent, and nu-
merous problems continue to plague the legal system:

◆◆ The conviction rate in criminal cases remains suspiciously high.

◆◆ Expertise and pay within the legal system are low, sustaining a culture of corruption.
◆◆ Violence by the police is common.
◆◆ Politics overwhelms the law on sensitive cases.
◆◆ Legal judgments, especially against the state, can be difficult to enforce.
◆◆ The public still shows little faith in the legal system.

Russia may have made more progress towards achieving the rule of law than has China, but assuming that law
in Russia will eventually acquire the status it possesses in liberal democracies still involves drawing a doubtful
cheque against the future. Smith (2010) concedes that much progress has been made in establishing ‘a workable and
independent judiciary and legal system’, with new laws enacted and legal reforms undertaken, but notes that ‘the
enforcement of laws has been uneven and at times politicised, which erodes public support and belief in the courts’.
This is a problem that applies to many authoritarian systems.
 constitutions and courts 123

discussion questions
◆◆ Which is best: a constitution that is short and ambiguous, leaving room for interpretation,
or one that is long and detailed, leaving less room for misunderstanding?
◆◆ What are the advantages and disadvantages of codified and uncodified constitutions?
◆◆ What are the advantages and disadvantages of supreme courts and constitutional courts?
◆◆ Judicial restraint or judicial activism – which is best for the constitutional well-being of a
state?
◆◆ What is the best way of recruiting judges, and what are the most desirable limits on their
terms in office, if any?
◆◆ Can religious and secular law coexist?

key concepts
◆◆ Abstract review ◆◆ Judicial restraint
◆◆ Appellate ◆◆ Judicial review
◆◆ Civil law ◆◆ Judiciary
◆◆ Codified constitution ◆◆ Original jurisdiction
◆◆ Common law ◆◆ Rigid constitution
◆◆ Concrete review ◆◆ Rule of law
◆◆ Constitution ◆◆ Sharia law
◆◆ Entrenchment ◆◆ Statute law
◆◆ Flexible constitution ◆◆ Uncodified constitution
◆◆ Judicial activism

further reading
Bobek, Michael (2013) Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University
Press). A study of how international trends influence judicial decisions in several European
countries.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Alberto Simpser (eds) (2014) Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes
(Cambridge University Press). An edited collection on the design, content, and
consequences of constitutions in authoritarian regimes.
Harding, Andrew, and Peter Leyland (ed.) (2009) Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study
(Wildy, Simmonds & Hill). A comparative study of constitutional courts, with cases from
Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.
Issacharoff, Samuel (2015) Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts
(Cambridge University Press). Argues that strong constitutional courts are a powerful
antidote to authoritarianism, because they help protect against external threats and the
domestic consolidation of power.
Lee, H. P. (2011) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press). An edited
collection of studies of judiciaries in Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, South
Africa, and the United States.
Rosenfeld, Michel, and András Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional
Law (Oxford University Press). A comparative collection of studies of history, types,
principles, processes, and structures of constitutions.
 8

Source: Getty Images/Kyodo News

executives
contents
◆ Executives: an overview
◆ Heads of state and
government
◆ Presidential executives
PREVIEW ◆ Parliamentary
The focus of this chapter is the most visible tier in any system of executives
government: the top level of leadership. Whether we are talking about ◆ Semi-presidential
presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, dictators, or despots, those
who sit at the peak of the pyramid of governmental power typically
executives
excite the most public interest, whether opinions are positive or ◆ Executives in
negative. To be sure, executives – in democracies, at least – consist not authoritarian states
just of individual leaders but of large networks of people and
institutions, including the ministers and secretaries who form the
cabinet or the council of ministers. But a single figure usually becomes
the best-known face of government, representing its successes and failures and acting as a focus of popular attention.
The chapter begins with a review of the roles of head of state and head of government, which are organized differ-
ently from one form of executive to another, with important and contrasting consequences. It then looks in turn at the
three major forms of executive: presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential. It compares and contrasts their roles
and powers, focusing in particular depth on the various sub-types of parliamentary executives and the experience they
have had with legislative coalitions. The chapter then looks at executives in authoritarian systems, and at the particular
qualities and effects of personal rule. Authoritarian leaders may enjoy more power than their democratic peers, but
they also enjoy fewer formal protections on their person or their tenure in office. This inevitably affects the way they
approach their positions.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ The political executive is responsible for setting priorities, mobilizing support, resolving crises, making
decisions, and overseeing their implementation.
◆◆ Executives must carry out the functions of head of state and head of government, jobs that are combined
in some political systems and divided in others.
◆◆ Although presidential executives come in many different forms, the usual arrangement is one in which
power is shared between a presidency and other branches of government.
◆◆ In parliamentary executives, the government comes out of the legislature, and the power of the executive
depends heavily on the balance of party support in the legislature.
◆◆ Semi-presidential executives combine elements of the presidential and parliamentary formats. They are
less common, and less thoroughly studied.
◆◆ Executives in authoritarian states face fewer constraints than those in liberal democracies, as well as
fewer guarantees regarding their tenure.
 executives 125

executives: an overview
The political executive is the core of government, consisting as it does of the political leaders Executive
who form the top level of the administration: presidents, prime ministers, ministers and The political
cabinets. The executives that interest us here are national leaders, but the term executive also institution
applies to leaders at lower levels, such as the governors of states or provinces, and the mayors responsible for
overseeing the
of towns and cities. The institutional approach to comparison focuses on the role of the execution of laws
executive as a government’s energizing force, setting priorities, mobilizing support, reacting and policies, and
to problems, resolving crises, making decisions, and overseeing their execution. Governing most often
without a legislature or judiciary might be feasible, but ruling without an executive is arguably associated with
impossible. In authoritarian systems, the executive is often the only institution that wields true the idea of
national
power, but – even so – other theoretical approaches such as structuralism may have more to leadership.
offer to understanding how authoritarian executives work.
It is important to distinguish the political executive (which makes policy) from the bureaucracy
(which puts policy into effect). Unlike appointed officials, the members of the political executive – in democracies, at
least – are chosen by political means, most often by election, and can be removed by the same method. The executive
is accountable for the activities of government; it is where the buck stops.The bureaucracy, meanwhile, consists mainly
of career employees without direct accountability; secretaries and ministers at the top of the bureaucratic structure are
typically political appointees, who serve at the pleasure of the government, but the vast majority of bureaucrats are
unelected, as we will see in Chapter 10. At the same time, they are very much part of the work of the executive.
In democracies, understanding the executive begins with the study of institutional arrangements. Democracies have
succeeded in the delicate and difficult task of subjecting executive power to constitutional constraint. The government
is not only elected, but remains subject to rules which limit its power; it must also face regular re-election. In au-
thoritarian regimes, by contrast, constitutional and electoral controls are either absent or ineffective. The scope of the
executive is limited not so much by the constitution as by political realities, and the executive tends to be more fluid,
patterned by informal relationships rather than formal rules.
Executives come in three main types: presidential (with two sub-categories: limited and unlimited), parliamentary, and
semi-presidential. In all three types, power is diffused, and they can each be understood as contrasting methods for divid-
ing and controlling executive authority. In presidential and semi-presidential regimes, the constitution sets up a system of
checks and balances between distinct executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. In parliamentary systems, the govern-
ment is constrained in different ways, its survival depending on retaining the confidence of the legislature.Typically, its free-
dom of action is limited by the need to sustain a coalition between parties that have agreed to share the task of governing.
Having said all this, though, there is no fixed and unchangeable template for any of these types. They change over
time, and vary within and between different countries, according to the constitutional rules, the leadership style of
office-holders, and the constantly changing balance between the executive and the legislature.
Some states fit firmly within one of these types, while others have features that are a blend of Head of state
The figurehead
types, even slowly moving from one to another as the powers of offices change.
leader of a state,
who may be
heads of state and government elected or
appointed, or – in
Before looking in turn at the different kinds of executive, it is important to distinguish the case of
monarchs – may
between two distinct roles carried out by executives:
inherit the
position.
◆◆ The head of state is a figurehead who acts as a representative of the state and all its
citizens. The head of state is expected to rise above politics and to work in the general Head of
interests of all the citizens of a state, although the lines between the ceremonial leader and government
the politician are sometimes unclear, particularly in presidential systems, where one person The elected leader
is both head of state and head of government. Much of what the head of state does is of a government,
who comes to
symbolic: for example, hosting visiting leaders, engaging in foreign state visits, and office because of
providing leadership in times of war or national crisis. the support of
◆◆ The head of government is the political leader of a government. In this capacity, the voters who
executive is either elected or is appointed by elected politicians, or – in authoritarian states – identify with their
comes to power through other less transparent means. Heads of government usually make party and
platform.
little effort to hide their partisan preferences, and they are more interested in retaining the
126 chapter 8

support of their party, voters, and supporters than in claiming to represent the broader interests of all citizens
(although partisan interests will often be couched as national interests).

The classic analysis of the differences between the two roles was offered by the Victorian British commentator
Walter Bagehot (a one-time editor of The Economist). In his book The English Constitution (1867), he wrote of the
two key elements of constitutions (boldface added):

fi rst, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the population – the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and
next the efficient parts – those by which it, in fact, works and rules … [Every] constitution must fi rst gain authority
and then use authority; it must fi rst win the loyalty and confidence of mankind, and then employ that homage in the
work of government.

In presidential executives such as the United States, Mexico, and Nigeria, the two roles are combined in one office.
The result is to mingle the dignified (symbolic) and efficient (political) functions of the executive, who might claim
that their partisan policies are in the wider interest of all citizens, or – should they lose political support – might try to
rise above politics by exploiting their role as a head of state.
In parliamentary systems, by contrast, the roles of head of state and head of government are carried out by two
different people, making it easier to differentiate the symbolic and the political. While the head of government is an
elected prime minister or chancellor, heads of state take one of two forms (see Table 8.1):

◆◆ Non-executive presidents are elected either through a popular vote (e.g. Ireland), by
Constitutional
parliament (e.g. Israel), or by a special electoral college, the latter often comprising the
monarchy national legislature plus representatives from regional or local government (e.g. Germany)
A state headed by (see Tavits, 2008).
a monarch, but ◆◆ More rarely, heads of state are monarchs who have inherited their positions. Ten European
where the countries – Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United
monarch’s political Kingdom, along with two principalities (Monaco and Liechtenstein) and a duchy
powers are
severely limited by (Luxembourg) – have a constitutional monarchy, while Malaysia’s supreme head of
constitutional state provides a rare example of an elected monarch. Most monarchs are reluctant to enter
rules. Stands in the political arena in democratic times, but royal influence can occasionally be significant,
contrast with an especially in times of crisis and transition. King Juan Carlos helped to steer Spain’s
absolute monarch transition to democracy in the 1970s, for example, while the King of Belgium played a
(see Chapter 6).
conciliatory role in his country’s long march to federal status between 1970 and 1993.

Table 8.1 Selecting the head of state in parliamentary systems

Country Head of state Method of selection Tenure

Australia, Governor-General Nominated by prime minister or government and At monarch’s
Canada, Jamaica confirmed by British monarch pleasure
Austria President Direct popular election by a two-round system 6 years
Germany President Election by a joint Bundestag and Land convention 5 years
India President Election by a college of federal and state assemblies 5 years
Italy President Election by a joint session of parliament and 7 years
regional representatives
Japan Emperor Heredity (eldest male) Life
Malaysia Supreme head of state Elected (by rulers of the nine Malay states) 5 years
Spain Monarch Heredity (eldest male) Life
Sweden Monarch Heredity (eldest child) Life
UK Monarch Heredity (eldest child) Life
 executives 127

In semi-presidential systems, the division of roles is more complicated. There is both a president and a prime
minister, but while the job of the prime minister rarely spills over into the duties of the head of state, the president
straddles the two roles. In instances where presidents are popular and have strong support in the legislature, they
will be both head of state and of government. Where they are unpopular and are working with legislatures in which
their party does not have a clear majority, presidents will fi nd themselves focusing less on government and more on
the duties of a head of state, while the prime minister is more clearly the head of government.

presidential executives
The world has many presidents, but not all are equal. At one end of the scale, the term president Presidential
applies in many parliamentary systems to someone without executive powers who serves as a executive
ceremonial head of state, and cannot make policy decisions. At the other end of the scale, An arrangement in
many authoritarian states have presidents who have managed to accumulate so much power which the
executive and the
that they have become dictators, making the presidency the only political institution that legislature are
really matters. We can subdivide presidential leadership into two core types – the limited form separately and
(covered here) and the unlimited form (covered later in the chapter) – but even within these directly elected,
two types there are multiple sub-types. As Mezey (2013) argues, ‘presidentialism is more than and have separate
simply a constitutional category; it includes a set of public perceptions, political actions, as well powers and
responsibilities.
as formal and informal political power arrangements’.
A limited presidential executive is a form of constitutional rule in which a single person Limited
governs using the authority derived from popular election, alongside an independent legislature; presidential
see Table 8.2. (For contrasts, see discussion about unlimited presidential executives later in this executive
chapter.) The election normally takes the form of a direct vote of the people, with a limit on A presidential
the number of terms a president can serve. The president directs the government and, unlike executive whose
most prime ministers in parliamentary government, also serves as head of state. The president powers are limited
by the constitution
makes appointments to other key government institutions, such as the courts and the heads of and by political
government departments, although some may be subject to confirmation by the legislature. Both realities.
president and legislature are elected for a fixed term, the president cannot dissolve the legislature,
and the legislature can only remove the president through mechanisms such as impeachment. Since neither can nor-
mally bring down the other, and there is a separation of powers, each institution has some autonomy – see Focus 8.1.
Limited presidential executives have both strengths and weaknesses. Among the strengths:

◆◆ The president’s fi xed term provides continuity in the executive, avoiding the collapse of governing coalitions to
which parliamentary governments are prone.
◆◆ Winning a presidential election requires candidates to develop widespread support across a country.
◆◆ Elected by the country at large, the president rises above the squabbles between local interests represented in the
legislature.
◆◆ A president provides a natural symbol of national unity, offering a familiar face for domestic and international
audiences alike.
◆◆ Since a presidential system necessarily involves a separation of powers, it should also encourage limited
government and thereby protect liberty.

The key weakness of limited presidential government is that only one party can win the presidency; everyone
else loses. Unless the president tries to reach across party lines, or is limited by opposition parties in the legislature,

Table 8.2 The limited presidential executive

◆◆ Elected president steers the government and makes senior appointments.

◆◆ Fixed terms of offices for the president and the legislature, neither of which can ordinarily bring down the other.
◆◆ Presidents are usually limited to a specified number of terms in office; usually two.
◆◆ Little overlap in membership between the executive and the legislature.
◆◆ President serves as head of government as well as head of state.
◆◆ Examples: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines, United States, and most of Latin America.
128 chapter 8

Focus 8.1
The separation of powers

Separation of The separation of powers is a hallmark of the limited presidential system: executives
powers have the power to lead and to execute, legislatures have the power to make law, and
An arrangement in courts have the power to adjudicate. While there is certainly an overlap in practice, the
which executive, focus of responsibilities is generally clear, and is typically reinforced by a separation of
legislature, and personnel. Neither the president nor members of the cabinet (see later in this chapter)
judiciary are given
distinct but can sit in the legislature, creating further distance between the two institutions.
complementary Similarly, legislators must resign their seats if they wish to serve in the government,
sets of powers, meaning the president’s ability to buy members’ votes with the promise of a job is self-
such that neither limiting.
can govern alone Contrasting methods of election create a natural difference of interests. Legislators
and that all should,
ideally, govern depend only on the support of voters in their home district, while the president alone
together. is elected by a broader constituency – typically, the entire country. This divergence
generates the political dynamic by which the president pursues a national agenda as
distinct from the special and local interests of the legislature. So, despite the focus on a single office,
presidential government divides power. The system creates a requirement for the executive to negotiate
with the legislature, and vice versa, and thereby ensures the triumph of deliberation over dictatorship.
The separation of power is not unique to presidential systems, though, and there is a practical separation
of powers in parliamentary systems as well. True, members of the executive also sit in the legislature, and
rather than legislators having to resign in order to serve in government, occupying a seat in the legislature
is all but a prerequisite to being appointed to a top government job, such as the head of a government
department. Nonetheless, the roles of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary in parliamentary
systems are distinct, each making separate contributions to the process of government. As a member of the
British House of Lords once put it during a debate on constitutional reform:

Parliament has a legally unchallengeable right to make whatever laws it thinks right. The executive
carries on the administration of the country in accordance with the powers conferred on it by
law. The courts interpret the laws, and see that they are obeyed. (quoted in Thompson and
Gordon, 2014)

it is a winner-take-all arrangement. Even more problematic, and as the experience of the United States shows,
deadlock can arise when executive and legislature disagree, leaving the political system unable to address pressing
problems. Presidential systems also lack the natural rallying point for opposition provided by the leaders of non-
ruling parties in some parliamentary systems. In particular, there is no natural equivalent to Britain’s notion of the
Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition – the formal leader of the major opposition party, who both keeps the pressure
on the incumbent prime minister while being a prime minister-in-waiting.
Limited presidential executives are found most often in the Americas. The United States is a representative case,
and as such provides important insights into how the presidential executive works (see Cox, 2017 and Edwards et al.,
2018). In addition to a general obligation to oversee the execution of laws, the president is given explicit duties (such
as commander-in-chief) that have been interpreted over time as giving presidents further implied powers. For example,
presidents can claim executive privilege: the right to withhold information from Congress (the legislature) and the
courts which, if released, would damage the president’s capacity to execute the laws. Presidents can also issue executive
orders, statements, and proclamations. At the same time, they also often find their hands tied, because they share im-
portant powers with Congress:

◆◆ The president is commander-in-chief but only Congress can declare war.

◆◆ The president can make government appointments and sign treaties, but only with the consent of the Senate
(the upper chamber of Congress).
 executives 129

◆◆ The president can veto legislation, but Congress can override the veto.
◆◆ Congress, not the president, controls the purse strings.

Describing the relationship between the president and Congress as a separation of powers is misleading, because
there is in reality a separation of institutions: the two share authority, each seeking to influence the other but neither
being in a position to dictate. In parliamentary systems, prime ministers can normally rely on strong support in the
legislature from their party or coalition; this is rarely the case in presidential executives.
The norm in a limited presidential system is for the president to be elected separately from the legislature – see
Spotlight Brazil as an example. Presidential survival (if not success) is thus independent of party numbers in the legisla-
ture, and the president is tied to a national constituency while members of the legislature are elected from local districts.
This is not how matters are organized in South Africa, however, which offers an interesting variation on the theme of
a limited presidential executive. It has a president, but the office-holder is elected by members of the legislature rather
than in a direct national vote. The president can also be removed from office through a legislative vote, as nearly hap-
pened in early 2018 when President Jacob Zuma – facing the loss of a vote of confidence in the wake of numerous
charges of corruption – resigned the office.
This arrangement makes the South African president more like a prime minister in a parliamentary system, par-
ticularly since the president is usually head of the largest party in the legislature. However, the South African president
is both head of state and head of government, is limited to two five-year terms in office, and while required to be a
member of the legislature in order to qualify to be president, must resign from the legislature upon election as presi-
dent (see Butler, 2017). Only two other countries – Burma and Botswana – use this system. Determining the political
impact of this rare format has been complicated by the dominance in post-apartheid South Africa of a single party, the
African National Congress. Were legislative elections to produce no clear majority party, it would be interesting to see
how the election of the president would be affected.

parliamentary executives
In contrast to presidential systems, where the chief executive is separate from the legislature and independently
elected, the parliamentary executive is organically linked to the legislature. The head of government (usually a
prime minister) is normally the head of the largest party in the legislature (or head of one of
the parties in the governing coalition), usually (but not always) continues to hold a seat in the Parliamentary
legislature while also running the country, works in conjunction with a separate head of state, executive
and is subject neither to a separate election nor to term limits; see Table 8.3. Like presidents, An arrangement in
which the
prime ministers make appointments to other key government institutions, but these are rarely executive emerges
subject to confi rmation by the legislature. Finally, in two other key distinctions with the from the
presidential executive, a prime minister can be removed from office as the result of losing a legislature (most
vote of confidence (see Chapter 9 for details), and can call new elections before the full term often in the form
of a legislature has run its course. of a coalition) and
remains
A key element in parliamentary government is the cabinet, or council of ministers. This accountable to it,
body often acts as government by committee, is the main point of contact between the executive and must maintain
and the bureaucracy, and can be the launchpad (or graveyard) of those with aspirations to become a working
prime minister. Most government ministers are also members of the legislature (although, in legislative majority
some countries – such as Sweden – this so-called dual mandate is not allowed). Presidential in order to remain
in office.
executives also have cabinets, but they are rarely as strong or used so often by the president for
policy-making. In this sense, parliamentary government is a more collective affair than presiden- Cabinet
tial government. A body consisting
Just as presidential executives come in different types, so too do parliamentary executives, of the heads of the
which vary according to a subtle and variable relationship between prime minister, cabinet, and major government
government ministers – see Figure 8.1. For Andeweg (2014), the question at the heart of that departments.
Sometimes known
relationship is whether ministers should be considered followers, team players, or leaders. Exam- as a council of
ining the balance between these nodes in the governing network, and how they are changing ministers. More
over time, helps us better appreciate the realities of parliamentary government. important in
In prime ministerial government, the guiding principle is hierarchy rather than collegiality. parliamentary than
Germany has an arrangement known as a ‘chancellor democracy’ in which the Bundestag in presidential
systems.
(Germany’s lower house) appoints the chancellor, and accountability to the Bundestag is mainly
 SPOTLIGHT BRAZIL
Brief profile
The recent rise of Brazil exemplifies the phenomenon of the emerging economy, placing it among the BRICs with
Russia, India, and China. As the world’s fifth biggest country by land and population, Brazil is also one of the
world’s largest democracies. It is the most important state in South America and has expanded its influence to
the developing world more broadly. However, Brazil still faces many domestic problems. There is a wide gap
between rich and poor, much of the arable land is owned by a few wealthy families, social conditions in its major
cities are poor, the deforestation of the Amazon basin has global ecological implications, and corruption is rife at
all levels of government. Recent economic developments have sent mixed signals, with oil discoveries pointing to
energy self-sufficiency, but an economic downturn and a return to politics as usual casts clouds over Brazil’s
continued progress.

Form of government Federal presidential republic consisting of 26 states and a federal capital district.
State formed 1822, and most recent constitution adopted 1988.
Executive Presidential. A president directly elected for no more than two consecutive four-
year terms.
Legislature Bicameral National Congress: lower Chamber of Deputies (513 members)
elected for renewable four-year terms, and upper Senate (81 members) elected
from the states (three members each) for renewable eight-year terms.
Judiciary A dual system of state and federal courts, with justices of superior courts
nominated for life by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Supreme
Federal Court serves as constitutional court: 11 members, nominated by
president and confirmed by Senate for life, but must retire at 70.
Electoral system A two-round majority system is used for elections to the presidency and the
Senate, while elections to the Chamber of Deputies use proportional
representation.
Parties Multi-party, with more than a dozen parties organized within Congress into four
main coalitions and a cluster of non-attached parties.

208m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$2tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$9,821 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating

Jair Bolsonaro campaigning ahead of his victory in the 2018 Brazilian
presidential election.
Source: Getty Images/NurPhoto.
with none winning more than 56 seats, 15 each winning less than ten seats, and the parties forming themselves
into several different groupings.
Second, party discipline is exceptionally weak. Deputies often switch party in mid-term, and are more
concerned with winning resources for their districts than with showing loyalty to their party. In response, Brazil’s
presidents are obliged to build informal
coalitions by appointing ministers from
a range of parties in an attempt to
encourage their loyalty. The result,
argue Melo and Pereira (2013), has
been a form of multi-party presiden-
tialism combining a constitutionally
strong president and a robust system
of checks and balances emerging from
healthy political competition.
The coalitions formed in Brazilian
politics are more informal, pragmatic,
and unstable than the carefully crafted
inter-party coalitions which charac-
terize parliamentary government in
Europe. In presidential systems, after
all, the collapse of a coalition does not
mean the fall of a government, reducing
the incentive to sustain a coalition. So,
although Latin American constitutions
appear to give the chief executive a
more important political role,
appearances are deceptive. The Latin
American experience confirms that
presidents operating in a democratic
setting confront inherent difficulties in
securing their programme.
The political executive in
Brazil
Brazil uses a presidential executive, but gives
its leader more constitutional powers than its
American equivalent; the president of Brazil
can issue decrees in specified areas, declare
bills to be urgent (forcing Congress to make a
prompt decision), initiate bills in the National
Congress, and propose a budget which goes
into effect, month by month, if Congress does
not itself pass a budget. But Brazilian
presidents must work with two features of
government that are absent in the United
States, and that make it more difficult to bend
Congress to their will.
First, thanks to the use of proportional
representation, they are faced by a much
more complex party landscape. The October
2018 legislative elections resulted in 30 parties
winning seats in the Chamber of Deputies,
COLOMBIA
PERU BRAZIL
BRASILIA
Pacific Atlantic
Ocean Ocean
Rio de
CHILE
Janeiro
ARGENTINA
Further reading
Melo, Marcus André, and Carlos Pereira (2013) Making Brazil Work:
Checking the President in a Multiparty System (Red Globe Press).
Reid, Michael (2014) Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power (Yale
University Press).
Roett, Riordan (2016) Brazil: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford
University Press).
132 chapter 8

Table 8.3 The parliamentary executive

◆◆ Prime minister (or chancellor, premier) is normally head of the governing party of coalition.
◆◆ Governments emerge from the legislature and the prime minister can be dismissed from office by losing a legislative
majority or a vote of confidence.
◆◆ Executives can serve an unlimited number of terms in office.
◆◆ The executive is collegial, taking the form of a cabinet (or council of ministers) in which the prime minister is traditionally
first among equals.
◆◆ Prime minister is head of government, working with a separate ceremonial head of state.
◆◆ Examples: most of Europe and Caribbean, Australia, Canada, India, Iraq, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan.

through the chancellor’s office (Langenbacher and Conradt, 2017).The chancellor answers to parliament, while minis-
ters answer to the chancellor. The strong position of Germany’s chief executive derives from the Basic Law (the Ger-
man constitution) which says that the ‘chancellor shall determine, and be responsible for, the general policy guidelines’.
Elsewhere, there have been concerns that the office of prime minister has become ‘presidentialized’ in the sense that
prime ministers have become more powerful and more prominent. This is thanks in part to greater media exposure
(more prime ministers have communications offices designed to ensure greater public coverage of their policies), the
growing international role of the chief executive, and the emerging need for policy coordination as governance be-
comes more complex (Poguntke and Webb, 2004).
For advocates of the parliamentary system, cabinet government has the advantage of encouraging more deliberation
and collective leadership than occurs in a presidential system. The system works best in smaller countries; in many
larger countries, the number and complexity of decisions means they cannot all be settled around the cabinet table.
Finland provides a clear case of cabinet government at work: by law, the Finnish State Council (the cabinet) has ex-
tensive decision-making authority, prime ministers are mainly chairs of Council meetings, and it is at these meetings
that decisions are reached and compromises made. Meanwhile, both the prime minister and individual ministers are
constrained by Finland’s complex multi-party coalitions.

Type Features Examples

Prime ministerial Prime minister is dominant figure, dealing Germany
directly with individual ministers. Ministers are
followers.

Cabinet Discussion in cabinet determines overall policy. Finland

Ministers are team players.

Ministerial Individual ministers operate with little direction Italy, Japan,

from the prime minister or cabinet. Ministers Netherlands
are leaders.

Figure 8.1 Types of parliamentary government

Note: None of these features is institutionalized or constitutionalized. Instead, each is a matter of politics and tradition.

In ministerial government, ministers operate without extensive direction from either prime minister or cabinet (except
in coalitions, where they routinely find themselves constrained by the pressures of the coalition agreement (Moury,
2013)). This decentralized pattern can emerge either from respect for expertise, or from the realities of a coalition.
Looking again at Germany, the chancellor sets the overall guidelines but the constitution goes on to say that ‘each
Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department autonomously and on his own responsibility’. Ministers
are appointed for their knowledge of the field and are expected to use their professional experience to shape their
ministry’s policy under the chancellor’s guidance. So, Germany mixes two models, operating ministerial government
within the framework of chancellor democracy.
In many coalition governments (see Focus 8.2), parties appoint their own leading figures to head particular min-
istries, again giving rise to ministerial government. In the Netherlands, for example, the prime minister does not
appoint, dismiss, or reshuffle ministers. Cabinet members serve with, but not under, the government’s formal leader.
In these conditions, the prime minister’s status is diminished, with ministers owing more loyalty to their party than
 executives 133

Focus 8.2
Executives and party numbers

One of the core distinguishing features of parliamentary systems, in contrast to presidential systems, is that
the power of the executive depends upon the party balance in the legislature following elections. There are
several different potential outcomes:
Majority government. In this case, one party wins a clear majority over all the others, and the leader of that
party normally becomes the prime minister with a strong mandate to govern. Prime ministers must still
work with a cabinet, whose support is essential, and governing effectively is also reliant on the prime
minister exerting tight discipline over members of the party in the legislature. Assuming these two conditions,
prime ministers are in a strong position.
Britain has traditionally been the classic example of parliamentary government based on a single ruling
party with a secure majority. The plurality (or winner-take-all) method of election (see Chapter 15) usually
delivers a working majority in the House of Commons to a single party, allowing the prime minister to
appoint a cabinet made up of parliamentary colleagues from the same party. Because the governing party
spans the cabinet and the legislature, domination of the parliamentary agenda is usually ensured.
Coalition government. In this case no one party wins a clear majority, obliging two or Coalition
more parties – usually with adjacent positions on the ideological spectrum – to govern government
in tandem. The success of this arrangement depends on the extent to which the An arrangement in
coalition partners reach a deal suitable to both, and the number of parties involved. which the
Majority coalitions (where two parties control a majority of seats) are the most stable, government is
formed through an
coalitions involving more and occasionally smaller partners will have less stability, and
agreement
minority coalitions in which the partner parties lack a majority are potentially the least involving two or
stable. more parties
In some cases, coalitions are promised or arranged before an election is held, helping which divide
voters to make a more informed judgement about the likely consequences of their government posts
between them.
voting choices. Most often, though, coalitions are worked out after an election, with
the outgoing government remaining in place as a caretaker while negotiations are under
way. Agreements can be reached in a matter of days, but the more complex negotiations take longer: it took
a record 541 days (18 months) for a new Belgian government to be formed in 2010–11 because of deep
divisions in the Chamber of Representatives, where 11 parties won seats.
Coalition governments are the norm in most of continental Europe, but their records vary. Denmark has
not had a majority government since 1909, and has mainly managed well on minority coalitions since the
1980s. In Germany, grand coalitions involving the two major parties (the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats) are not unusual. In Italy, meanwhile, it is a different story: see Chapter 9.
Minority government. In some cases, no party wins a majority after an election, and agreement among them
is hard to reach, leaving one party to govern as a minority or two as a minority coalition. The latter
happened, for example, in Sweden in 2014, when the Social Democrats and the Greens (having won 38 per
cent of the vote in the general election, and 39 per cent of the seats in the Riksdag) formed one of the
weakest minority coalitions ever seen in a country where coalition government is quite usual. It could only
govern effectively so long as it had the informal support of other parties in the Riksdag.

to either the prime minister or the cabinet. The chief executive is less a chief or an executive than a skilled concil-
iator. In India’s multi-party coalitions, too, open defiance of the prime minister is far from unknown (Mitra, 2017:
Chapter 4).
Moreover, in Japan, ministers must often operate without strong guidance from the prime minister. The prime
minister is more like the keeper of the helm than captain of the ship and few office-holders leave a lasting personal
stamp on government (see Shinoda, 2011). Turnover has been rapid: while France had five presidents and Britain had
134 chapter 8

Limited presidential Parliamentary Semi-presidential

Unlimited presidential Absolute monarchy Contested

No data

Map 8.1 Executive types

six prime ministers between 1990 and 2018, Japan had 15 different prime ministers, some of those terms lasting only
a matter of months.
In Japan, limits are placed on prime ministerial power by the powerful bureaucracy and upper legislative chamber,
factions within political parties, other party leaders, and the consensus style of Japanese politics. In particular, prime
ministers from the leading Liberal Democratic Party are limited by the requirement to secure regular re-election as par-
ty leader. Japanese prime ministers are far from powerless, though. They have wide-ranging powers of administration,
for example, and can hire and fire members of the cabinet and all other senior members of the government. Reflecting
the wider international trend towards a focus on the prime minister, Shinzō Abe (in office 2006–7, 2012–), has achieved
a higher domestic and international profile than most of his predecessors. Even so, the contrast with, say, Germany’s
chancellor democracy remains acute.

semi-presidential executives
The third major form of executive (but also the least closely studied; see Elgie, 2014) is a
combination of the presidential and the parliamentary, mixing both models to produce a distinct
system with its own characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages. In semi-presidential systems Semi-
(otherwise known as dual executives) there is both an elected president and a prime minister and presidential
cabinet accountable to the legislature. The president is separately elected, and shares power with executive
An arrangement in
a prime minister who heads the cabinet. The prime minister is usually appointed by the which an elected
president, but must have the support of a majority in the legislature; see Table 8.4. president coexists
In these systems, the president is head of state, and shares the duties of being head of govern- with an appointed
ment with the prime minister; the president usually has an oversight role and responsibility for prime minister and
foreign affairs, and can normally take emergency powers, while the prime minister is responsible separately elected
legislature.
for day-to-day domestic government. The president has more opportunity to play the role of
 executives 135

Table 8.4 The semi-presidential executive

◆◆ Combines an elected president and an appointed prime minister.

◆◆ President usually appoints the prime minister and can dissolve the legislature.
◆◆ President usually serves a limited number of fixed-length terms.
◆◆ Prime minister and cabinet are accountable to both the president and the legislature.
◆◆ President serves as head of state and shares the responsibilities of being head of government with the prime minister.
◆◆ Examples: France, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, several former French colonies in Africa.

head of state than is the case with a limited presidential executive, but must also deal with a divi- Cohabitation
sion of authority within the executive that creates the potential for a struggle between president An arrangement
and prime minister. found in semi-
In cases where the president’s party has a majority in the legislature, the power advantage lies presidential
systems when the
with the president; the prime minister and the cabinet both follow the president’s lead, and the presidency is held
prime minister promotes the president’s programme in the legislature. But when voters give an by a member of
opposition party a majority in the legislature, the president has no choice but to work with a one party and the
prime minister and cabinet from that party in an arrangement known as cohabitation. In such legislature is
circumstances, the prime minister must cooperate with the president in the national interest, but controlled by
another party.
also becomes the leader of the opposition in what is, in effect, a grand coalition. An ambitious
prime minister can also use the position to build the foundations for later contesting the presi-
dency.
France provides the archetype of the semi-presidential executive (see Bell and Gaffney, 2013). In an effort to move
away from the unstable Fourth Republic, which had seen 23 prime ministers in its short 12-year life, the 1958 consti-
tution of the Fifth Republic created a presidency fit for the dominating presence of its first occupant, Charles de Gaulle
(President, 1959–69). Powers are divided as follows:

◆◆ The president is seen as guarantor of national independence and the constitution, heads the armed forces,
negotiates treaties, calls referendums, presides over the Council of Ministers, dissolves the National Assembly
(but cannot veto legislation), appoints (but cannot dismiss) the prime minister, and appoints other ministers on
the recommendation of the prime minister and dismisses them. In 2000, the presidential term was reduced from
seven to five years, with two-term limits since 2008.
◆◆ Prime ministers are concerned mainly with domestic affairs, casually dismissed by de Gaulle as including such
mundane matters as ‘the price of milk’. Appointed by the president but accountable to the National Assembly,
the prime minister formally appoints ministers and coordinates their day-to-day work, operating within the
president’s style and tone. The ability of the assembly to force the prime minister and the Council of Ministers
to resign after a vote of censure (see Chapter 9) provides the parliamentary component of the semi-presidential
executive.

French presidents and prime ministers need to work in harmony, a task made easier when the same party
controls both branches of government. This is usually the case, as in 2017 when President’s Macron’s party and its
ally secured a substantial majority in the National Assembly. Occasionally, however, France has gone through a
period of divided government. Between 1986 and 1988, for example, the socialist president François Mitterrand
had to share power with the conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The latter won the presidency in 1995,
and was obliged in turn to share power with socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin between 1997 and 2002. This
arrangement intensifies competition between the two principals, and places the president in the awkward position
of leading both the country and the opposition.
Beneath the president and prime minister, the government’s day-to-day political work is carried out by senior
ministers, but the Council of Ministers is less significant than the cabinet in parliamentary systems. The Council of
Ministers involves more ritual than discussion, ministers are more autonomous because they often come to their job
with a background in their given policy area, and interventions by the prime minister and the president are often to
resolve disputes, rather than to impose an overall agenda.
136 chapter 8

Table 8.5 Comparing executives

Characteristic Presidential Parliamentary Semi-presidential

Method of election?
Separate head of state?
Does executive serve in
legislature?
Separation of powers?
Fixed terms in office?
Means for dismissal from
office?
Role of cabinet?
Can executive work with
legislature controlled by
another party?
Direct, whole country
No
No
Yes
Yes, except with unlimited
presidencies
End of term, loss of
presidential election,
impeachment, resignation
More marginal and
individualistic
Yes, but weakened, except
with unlimited
presidencies
Indirect via legislature President: direct, whole
country. Prime minister:
indirect
Yes No
Yes Prime minister only, not
president
No To some extent
No President only
Loss of legislative election, President: end of term,
loss of vote of confidence, loss of presidential
loss of party leadership, election, impeachment,
resignation resignation
More central and More marginal and
collective individualistic
Only in case of minority Yes, but weakened
government

executives in authoritarian states

Constitutional rules and political realities help define what a democratic executive can or cannot do. By contrast,
understanding executives in authoritarian states is more about the latter; there are constitutions and rules, to be sure,
but there is less constraint on their capacity to execute policy, and there are fewer formal protections on the office-
holder. As Svolik (2012) points out, dictators lack the support of independent political authorities that would help
them enforce agreements, as well as the rules that govern the work of formal government institutions. As a result, they
might be inclined to use more extreme methods to win and wield power, but they also often face greater personal
risks than their democratic counterparts. They can use the military to repress, for example, but once the military
becomes essential to the survival of a regime, it acquires leverage that it can use against the regime (Svolik, 2012).
The most common form of executive in hybrid and authoritarian regimes is presidential, but this is a quite different
kind of presidency than the limited form found in democracies. What we find instead is an unlimited presidential
executive, although the adjective unlimited should not be taken too literally: there are always
Unlimited functional limits on the powers of anyone in government, and the powers of authoritarian leaders
presidential are often less a reflection of the terms of the constitution than of the capacity of office-holders
executive to manipulate the political system to their own advantage.
A presidential
executive whose The term unlimited instead means that presidents in such systems lack most of the constitu-
powers face few tional and/or political limits of their democratic counterparts, including – in many cases – term
constitutional or limits, or the need to run in competitive elections; see Table 8.6. Even where term limits exist, a
political limits. dominant political party might be able to make sure that opposition candidates are unable to win
office, and sometimes dictators will change the rules so as to give themselves unlimited terms in
Dictatorship office. They go through the motions of running for re-election, but are able to manipulate the
A political system
in which a leader process – repressing their opponents and encouraging loyalty among their supporters (Wintrobe,
or ruling elite uses 2007) – in order to ensure themselves an unending string of victories. By this means, a dictator
a combination of creates a dictatorship (see Ezrow and Frantz, 2011).
repression and Presidential government in authoritarian settings provides a natural platform for leaders who
loyalty to remain seek to set themselves apart from – and above – all others. In such systems, the president operates
in power.
without the same constitutional restraints faced by the chief executive of a liberal democracy.
 executives 137

Table 8.6 The unlimited presidential executive

◆◆ Most significant power focused in the office of the president, the office-holder often being more important than the
office.
◆◆ Presidents usually face elections, but the outcome is assured by vote rigging, threats, and the marginalization of any
opponents.
◆◆ Presidents face few political limits on their terms in office; absolute monarchs face none.
◆◆ All other government institutions are subservient to the executive, who typically uses patronage to keep them
malleable.
◆◆ President serves as head of state and de facto head of government.
◆◆ Examples: China, Cuba, Egypt, Venezuela.

I­ nstead, presidents use what they define as their direct mandate from the people to cast a shadow over competing insti-
tutions such as the courts and the legislature.While they do not usually go so far as to reduce these bodies to completely
token status (they particularly need the courts and the bureaucracy to keep things running), they work to concentrate
power on themselves and their supporters rather than to distribute it among institutions. It is this lack of institutionali-
zation that is the central feature of the authoritarian executive, and what we find in its place is the tradition of personal
rule discussed in Chapter 6. The institutional approach to understanding government in such systems has limitations;
structuralism, with its interest in relationships among the parts of a political system, probably has more to offer.
In some instances, authoritarian leaders successfully groom family members to succeed them: examples include the
al-Assads in Syria, the Kims in North Korea, Omar Bongo and his son Ali Bongo Ondimba in Gabon, and Laurent
Kabila and his son Joseph in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In many absolute monarchies, succession is assured
by heredity. Otherwise, the lack of a succession procedure can create a conflict among potential successors not only
after the leader’s exit, but also in the run-up to it. Authoritarian leaders keep their job for as long as they can ward
off their rivals, which means that they must monitor threats and be prepared to neuter those who are becoming too
strong. Politics, as a result, comes before policy.
The price of defeat, furthermore, is high; politics in authoritarian systems can be a matter of life and death. When
the leaders of Western democracies leave office, they can often give well-paid lectures, write and sell their memoirs for
large sums, be appointed to well-paid consultancies, or set up foundations to do good works. Ousted dictators risk a
harsher fate, assuming they even live long enough to have a ‘retirement’. The lucky ones might live in wealthy exile,
while others languish in prison, and yet others are executed on the street. It is hardly surprising, then, that the govern-
ing style of authoritarian rulers inclines to the ruthless.
At the same time, personal rule is sometimes far from absolute, because many dictators find themselves constrained
by other political actors, including the military, leaders of ethnic groups, landowners, the business class, the bureaucracy,
multinational companies, and even factions in the leader’s own court. To survive, leaders must distribute the perks of
office so as to maintain a viable coalition of support, which is why personal rule is closely tied to corruption, and the
gallery of the world’s most corrupt leaders includes many who have held presidential office in authoritarian regimes;
examples include Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines (1972–86), Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Democratic Re-
public of the Congo) (1965–97), Suharto of Indonesia (1967–98), Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia (1987–2011),
and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea (1979–present).
In the Middle East, the absolute monarchs discussed in Chapter 6 continue to rule oil-rich kingdoms in traditional
patriarchal style, which emphasizes ruling over governing. In Saudi Arabia, for example, advancement within the ruling
family depends less on merit than on proximity to the family’s network of advisers, friends, and guards. Public and
private are interwoven, each forming part of the ruler’s sphere. Government posts are occupied on the basis of good
behaviour, as demonstrated by unswerving loyalty to the ruler’s personal interests. Change is in the wind, however, as an
aged leadership cedes power to a new generation, the number of young people entering the job market is expanding,
and expectations for political participation and transparency in governance are growing (Haykel et al., 2015).
Systems of personal rule have survived for centuries in the Middle East, limiting the development of strong insti-
tutions. The Arab Spring revealed their weaknesses, however, as frustrated populations in several Arab states protested
against the absence of opportunity in corrupt, conservative regimes headed by staid autocrats. But the challenges of
switching from autocracy to democracy are not easy to meet, as reflected in the example of Egypt. There, President
Hosni Mubarak was ousted from office in 2011 in the wake of demonstrations against his 30-year regime, and in 2012
the country’s first-ever truly competitive elections resulted in the victory of Mohamed Morsi.
138 chapter 8

President Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (centre) during a visit to China. One of the most enduring leaders in the
world, he claims to have never won an election with less than a 90 per cent share of the vote.
Source: Getty Images/Pool.

However, because Morsi came from the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, nervousness grew abroad, particularly in the
United States.When Morsi started showing signs of authoritarianism, he was removed in a July 2013 military coup led
by military chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The general then reinvented himself as a civilian, turning in his military
uniform for a two-piece suit, won elections held in May 2014, and quickly showed an unwillingness to tolerate oppo-
sition. After a brief and hopeful flirtation with democracy, Egypt was soon back to its old ways.This was not what most
Egyptians wanted, and opposition to the el-Sisi regime began to grow. But Egypt’s other political institutions were too
weak to resist a return to personal rule, and el-Sisi was returned to office for a second term after March 2018 elections
that were widely condemned as fraudulent.
Although it is easy to identify most autocrats, and most would probably lose office fairly quickly if they ran in truly
open and competitive elections, a few have done a convincing job of persuading most of their citizens that they are the
right person to confront their country’s challenges. Few have been as successful in this regard as Vladimir Putin, who
inherited the presidency of Russia in 1999, and whose regime has spent the years since, moving it away from democ-
racy while retaining the support of the vast majority of Russians (see Ambrosio, 2016).
Formally, Russia is a semi-presidential system arranged along French lines, with a directly elected president
­co­existing with a prime minister who is nominated by the president and approved by the Duma (the lower chamber of
the legislature). In some respects, the Russian president’s position is only slightly stronger than that of a US president:

◆◆ Both are limited to two terms in office, but the Russian leader can stand again after a term out.
◆◆ Both are subject to impeachment, but the US requires only a majority of members in favour in the House of
Representatives, while Russia requires a two-thirds majority in both parliamentary chambers plus confirmation
by the courts.
◆◆ Theoretically, the Russian president could end up with a hostile opposition in the Duma, making him or her
even weaker than the US president.

In reality, Russian presidents have a wide array of impressive powers: they are the head of state, the commander-
in-chief, and the guarantor of the constitution. They can suspend the decisions of other state bodies, issue decrees,
 executives 139

and remove ministers without the consent of the Duma. They are also charged – according to the constitution –
with ‘defining the basic directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state’, and with ‘ensuring the coordinated
functioning and collaboration of bodies of state power’. These powers affirm Russia’s long tradition of executive
power, a norm which both pre-dates and was reinforced by the communist era; strong government is regarded as a
necessary source of effective leadership for a large and sometimes lawless country.
Putin has gone further by eliminating meaningful opposition and working within the constitution to maintain
control. He had no choice but to step down as president upon the completion of his two terms in 2008, but he contin-
ued to hold on to power through the cynical means of becoming prime minister to the weak new president, Dmitry
Medvedev, who was little more than a placeholder awaiting Putin’s successful return in 2012. By then, the term of the
president increased from four years to six, so Putin was able to further strengthen his grip before sailing to an easy and
predictable victory in the 2018 presidential election. He ensured that he faced no serious competition, scooped up
nearly 77 per cent of the vote, and now has another six-year term.
Not all executive systems fit neatly into the three categories of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential, as
we find in the cases of the five remaining communist regimes: China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. These
are distinctive for the way in which executive, legislative, and judicial powers are intertwined with a one-party system,
such that leadership goes beyond simply holding executive powers. China has – at least until recently – combined some
of the formal features of a semi-presidential system with political dominance by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
In understanding this system, two points are key:

◆◆ In spite of China’s intricate governmental structure (which includes a cabinet, a legislature, and a network of
supporting agencies), these bodies do little more than legitimize the decisions already taken by the party
leadership (Saich, 2015: Chapter 4).
◆◆ Identifying who holds power is less a question of formal titles and offices than of understanding links across
institutions, personal networks, and the standing of key figures in the system. For example, Deng Xiaoping was
‘paramount leader’ of China from 1978 until his death in 1997, yet the most senior posts he ever held were those
of party vice chairman and chairman of the party’s Military Commission. By 1993, the only position of any
kind that he held was the presidency of China’s bridge association.

As China emerged out of isolation in the 1990s, changes to the rules seemed to be headed towards producing an
executive that looked in form more like some of its democratic counterparts. At the apex is the president, who is
nominated by the leadership of the Chinese legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), and then elected (or
confirmed) by the NPC for a maximum of two five-year terms. The presidency was, at first, mainly a ceremonial
head of state, but it had many conventional executive powers, such as the ability to appoint (with NPC approval)
all members of the State Council (the functional equivalent of a cabinet). The office-holder was also conventionally
head of the CCP and of the Central Military Commission, posts that provided enormous political power, and the
president also had to work with a premier, the de facto head of government, and a senior member of the party
nominated by the president and confirmed by the NPC.
Matters changed after 2013, when Xi Jinping became president and exerted more control over China, cracking
down on dissent and corruption, supporting internet censorship, and advocating a more assertive foreign policy for
China. In March 2018 he solidified his control by arranging for the CCP to abandon a clause in the constitution lim-
iting the president to two five-year terms. The old days of the paramount leader are apparently back.
Military leaders are perhaps the ultimate form of the authoritarian executive, combining as they do control over
civilian and military institutions. They are currently much more uncommon then they once were, but even if fully-
fledged military leaders are unusual, there are still many civilian leaders who rely for office on keeping the military
happy. If great power in democracies comes with great responsibilities, then power in dictatorships comes with great
risks. If executives in democratic states must always worry about their standing in the opinion polls, their capacity to
work with legislatures, and threats to their leadership from others seeking power, authoritarian leaders face threats that
are both closer to home (from within the ruling elite) and more unpredictable and violent.
The story of Nigeria’s leaders is illustrative. Since independence in 1960, it has had 15 leaders: six civilian presidents
(although two of these six were former military leaders who came back to office as civilians) and nine military leaders.
Of the 15, three were removed from office through military coups in which the leaders were killed, and four were
removed from office but survived. All have had to keep a careful eye on critics within the military, who have always
been ready to organize opposition and, if necessary, a coup to remove the incumbent.
140 chapter 8

discussion questions
◆◆ What are the advantages and disadvantages of dividing the roles of head of state and head
of government?
◆◆ How does the concept of winner-take-all help or hinder political systems with presidential
executives?
◆◆ Which option is most efficient and/or most democratic in a parliamentary system: prime
ministerial government or cabinet government?
◆◆ Have prime ministers become presidential and, if so, why?
◆◆ Do semi-presidential systems offer a useful compromise, offsetting the advantages and
disadvantages of presidential and parliamentary executives?
◆◆ Are the potentially greater risks and uncertainties experienced by authoritarian leaders
enough to discourage them from using extreme methods to govern?

key concepts
◆◆ Cabinet ◆◆ Head of state
◆◆ Coalition government ◆◆ Limited presidential executive
◆◆ Cohabitation ◆◆ Parliamentary executive
◆◆ Constitutional monarchy ◆◆ Presidential executive
◆◆ Dictatorship ◆◆ Semi-presidential executive
◆◆ Executive ◆◆ Separation of powers
◆◆ Head of government ◆◆ Unlimited presidential executive

further reading
Bennister, Mark (2012) Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia
(Palgrave Macmillan). A study of the office of prime minister, comparing two of its
leading examples.
Elgie, Robert (2011) Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance (Oxford
University Press). Examines how different forms of semi-presidentialism affect the quality
and durability of democracy.
Ezrow, Natasha M., and Erica Frantz (2011) Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes
and Their Leaders (Continuum). An assessment of the types, causes, methods, and effects
of authoritarian leadership.
Krasno, Jean, and Sean LaPides (eds) (2015) Personality, Political Leadership, and Decision Making:
A Global Perspective (Praeger). A study of a selection of individual leaders – democratic and
authoritarian – that provides helpful insight into the traits and actions of the people who
lead countries.
Mezey, Michael L. (2013) Presidentialism: Power in Comparative Perspective (Lynne Rienner). A
comparative survey of presidential executives, looking at their history, their relative
powers, and their changing character.
Rhodes, R. A. W., and Paul ‘t Hart (eds) (2014) The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership
(Oxford University Press). A general survey of political leadership, including chapters on
different kinds of executives.
 9

Source: John McCormick

legislatures
contents
◆ Legislatures: an
overview
◆ The role of legislatures
◆ One chamber or two?
PREVIEW ◆ Representatives and
Legislatures lie at the foundation of democratic politics, the words their work
used to name them reflecting their original purpose: assemblies gather, ◆ Legislatures in
congresses congregate, diets meet, dumas deliberate, legislatures pass
laws, and parliaments talk. Even if they do not always attract as much
authoritarian states
public attention as executives, they are the institutions of government
that are closest to the citizens, since they are typically directly elected
and are usually responsible for representing individual districts, rather than – as is the case with executives – the
entire country. They also carry out multiple tasks that are essential to government, including the approval of
legislation, the authorization of expenditure, the making of governments, deliberating over matters of public
importance, and oversight of the executive.
This chapter begins with a review of these multiple roles, opinion on the dynamics of which is often divided. The
chapter goes on to look at the structure of legislatures, including the differences between those with one chamber and
those with two chambers. It then considers the members of legislatures, including the diversity of roles that they can
and might play. It then discusses the problem of declining public trust in legislatures, made worse by the phenomenon
of the career politician, and encouraging more voters to think about the pros and cons of imposing term limits on
legislators. Finally, it looks at the role of legislatures in authoritarian states, pointing out that while they may appear
weak, they have a number of uses for leaders and ruling elites.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Legislatures are usually thought of as the focus of popular representation and law-making, but these are
not their only functions.
◆◆ The extent to which legislatures are involved in making law depends on their relationship with
executives and the balance of political parties.
◆◆ For most countries, a single-chamber legislature is enough. For others, a second chamber offers important
benefits to the quality of representation.
◆◆ Not all representatives are equal, and several models have been developed – including the delegate, the
trustee, and the partisan – to explain their work.
◆◆ Legislatures are often accused of being homes to career politicians, who collectively constitute a political
class with a background and interests removed from the people it represents.
◆◆ Legislatures are found in most authoritarian regimes, where co-option lies at the heart of understanding
their political role.
142 chapter 9

legislatures: an overview
Legislature Legislatures are not governing bodies, they do not take major decisions and they do not even
A multi-member normally initiate proposals for laws. Instead, their political significance arises from their
representative representative role; as the English political theorist John Locke (1690) observed:
body which
considers public It is in their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined
issues and either
together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the
accepts, amends,
commonwealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and
or rejects
proposals for new connexion: and, therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death
laws and policies. follows.

The earliest popular assemblies in the Western tradition were the Ecclesia of Athens, open to all male citizens with
two years of military service. Later, in the ancient royal courts of Europe, monarchs would judge important legal cases
and meet with nobles of the realm. Gradually these assemblies became more settled and structured, coming to represent
the various estates – the clergy, the nobility, and the towns – into which society was then divided. In the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, kings began to consult estate leaders more consistently on issues of war, administration,
commerce, and taxation. These early European assemblies were seen as having a right to be consulted long before they
became modern legislatures with the sovereign authority to pass laws.
Today, democratic legislatures contribute to the process of governance as well as to expressions of the popular will: they
can improve the quality of legislation, keep an eye on the actions of the executive, and hold influential hearings on matters
of public concern. They come in many different forms, the key difference revolving around their relationship with the
executive: whether they are led by the government or whether they help shape government. This means that they can
be looked at through the lens of institutional theory, but rational choice can also be employed to better understand the
actions of legislators, and structural approaches used to examine their relationship with executives, courts, and voters. As
representative bodies, they are closer to the citizens than the more distant political executive, and yet – ironically – they
are not always popular. Polls in many countries find that elected representatives are not well regarded as a group (see later
in this chapter), and legislatures are criticized for the slowness and the often partisan nature of their decision-making.
In authoritarian states, meanwhile, opinions are mixed about the place of legislatures. They can be useful in pro-
viding a fig leaf of legitimacy, in incorporating moderate opponents, in helping integrate centre and periphery, in
recruiting for the elite, and in containing demands for change. At the same time, recent research has suggested that there
are many nuances to the role of legislatures in authoritarian systems; the extent to which they can be used to exert
control depends on a complex three-way relationship between the executive, the legislature, and political parties, and
the extent to which legislatures can be used to co-opt opponents of the ruling regime.

the role of legislatures

Democratic legislatures have six major functions, ranging from representation to oversight (see Figure 9.1), the
balance varying from one legislature to another. They all ‘represent’ in one form or another, for example, but they
will have different roles in the budgetary process, and parliamentary legislatures are more critical to the making of
governments than those in presidential executives.

Representation
This is the role that most immediately comes to mind when most people think about legislatures, and we might
think that the meaning of representation is obvious. Ironically, though, political science has been unable to develop
a defi nition with which everyone can agree, much of the debate instead revolving around the four different ways
of understanding representation outlined in 1967 by Hanna Pitkin:

◆◆ Formalistic: This is concerned with the rules and arrangements for representation, asking how representatives
come to office, how they enforce their decisions, how they respond to their constituents, and how they are held
accountable by voters.
◆◆ Descriptive: This is concerned with the extent to which representatives resemble their constituents, asking
whether they have common interests and shared experiences. Theoretically, a legislature should be society in
miniature, with the same number of men and women, rich and poor, black and white, and so on. But how many
different segments of society should, or realistically could, be represented?
 legislatures 143

Function Features

Representation Members represent and promote the interests of those who elected
them, usually under a party label.

Whatever the source of bills, legislatures are responsible for reviewing,

Legislation
amending, and approving new laws.

Authorizing Legislatures approve or reject the annual budget prepared by the

expenditure government.

Making In most parliamentary systems, the government emerges from the

governments legislature and must retain its confidence.

Legislatures debate and provide a public airing for matters of public

Deliberation
importance.

Legislatures are responsible for overseeing or scrutinizing the executive,

Oversight
keeping it accountable.

Figure 9.1 The functions of democratic legislatures

◆◆ Symbolic: This is concerned with how representatives are viewed by their constituents. For example, are they
regarded as competent and concerned with the broad interests of their district, or are they seen to be too
partisan, captured by special interests, or unapproachable?
◆◆ Substantive: This is concerned with the extent to which representatives respond to and serve the best interests of
their voters. In turn, it depends on the extent to which voters have well-developed political needs, or understand
all the options available to them.

A fifth option is collective representation, which suggests that members of a legislature should collectively represent
the interests of all voters, not just those in their home districts. Consider the point made in 1774 by the politician
Edmund Burke just after his election to Parliament from the English constituency of Bristol. He admitted that he
knew nothing about his constituency and had played little part in the campaign, but, he continued:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interest each must maintain,
as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation,
with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general
good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him,
he is not a member for Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament. (Burke, 1774)

In spite of these competing analyses, representation in practice usually operates in a somewhat prosaic way: through
political parties. For the most part, victorious candidates owe their election to their party and they vote in the legis-
lature largely according to its commands and expectations. This is particularly true of parliamentary systems, where
representatives are expected to toe the party line; in India, since the passage of an ‘anti-defection’ law in 1985, members
of parliament can even lose their seat if they vote against their party, the theory being that they are deceiving the voters
if they switch parties after their election. Representatives are also assessed by voters in terms of party affiliation; a voter
will look on a representative as more approachable, responsive, and trustworthy if they both identify with the same
party, and less so if they are not.

Legislation
The origins of the term legislature lie in the Latin legis lator (for ‘proposer of laws’), a reflection of one of their key
functions: they are often alone in having the right to make laws, the painstaking process of introducing and shaping
new laws or amendments to existing laws. This role should not be taken too literally, though, because while the
shaping of new laws is mainly in the hands of legislators, the ideas for those laws may originate elsewhere; for
example, in the work of lobbyists and interest groups. The procedure is explicitly deliberative, involving several
readings (debates) as the bill moves from the floor to committee and back again (see Figure 9.2). In bicameral
legislatures, differences in the versions of the bill passed by each chamber must be reconciled.
144 chapter 9

Passing laws, though, is rarely the function in which ‘legislatures’ exert the greatest influence, because effective con-
trol over legislation in most liberal democracies rests with the government; bills (proposals for new laws) pass through
the legislature without being designed, or even transformed, there. In Britain, the governing party has historically
dominated law-making. As Moran (2015) points out:

The House of Commons is misunderstood if viewed as a legislator. Virtually all legislative proposals originate from,
and are shaped by, the executive, which means the government of the day, advised by the civil service. Nor are the
Commons’ extensive debates on either the principles or details of legislative proposals of great significance in shaping
the law: secure government majorities (which up to now have been the usual state of affairs) mean that legislative
proposals are hardly ever overturned wholesale, and detailed amendments are usually the result of concessions by
ministers.

In the party-dominated parliaments of Australia, Britain, and New

FIRST READING ­ ealand, the legislative function is reactive in the sense that it is reduced to
Z
No debate or Vote quality control: patching up mistakes in bills prepared in haste by ministers
and bureaucrats. (Before New Zealand adopted proportional representation
in 1996, one prime minister boasted that if an idea came to him while
­shaving, he could have it on the statute book by the evening.) By contrast,
SECOND READING committee-based legislatures (see section on deliberation) in continental
Floor debate, no amendments Europe play a more positive role in law-making, with a combination of
Vote coalition governments, influential committees, and an elite commitment to
To committee delivering laws acceptable to all sides.
In presidential systems such as the United States, Brazil and Mexico, leg-
islatures have the most autonomy in law-making. Only members of Con-
gress can formally introduce bills, although executives can work around
COMMITTEE this by finding a friendly representative to initiate a bill on its behalf. The
Detailed review with amendments separation of powers and personnel inherent in a presidential regime limits
Vote executive influence over the legislature, an institutional separation that is
To floor often reinforced by divided government (the president may come from a
different party than the one that dominates one or both chambers of the
legislature), further reducing the legislature’s willingness to convert the ad-
ministration’s proposals into laws.
REPORT Bicameral legislatures face an additional hurdle in making law, which
Only amendments discussed arises when one chamber amends a bill passed by the other. In some coun-
tries, such as Britain and Spain, the lower house is more powerful and can
decide whether to accept or reject amendments from the upper house.
In others, including Australia, Brazil, and India, there will be a joint vote
THIRD READING of both chambers, the larger lower chamber having the most numerical
No amendments or vote weight. In yet others, including France, Germany, and the United States, a
To second chamber special conference committee, made up of an equal number of members
from each chamber, will meet to work out an agreed bill. Italy takes a dif-
ferent approach, allowing amended versions of bills to shuttle indefinitely
SECOND CHAMBER between chambers until agreement is reached (if ever). The effect is illus-
Repeats above process trated by a bill on rape that was introduced in 1977 and did not become law
Vote in Italy until 1995.
To first chamber (with changes)
Authorizing expenditure
This is one of the oldest functions of legislatures, and of the lower house in
particular. Its origins stem from the original purpose of European
ROYAL ASSENT assemblies, which was to review requests for funds from monarchs. But it
Signed into law by monarch has since – in many parliamentary democracies – become nominal. What
usually happens is that the executive prepares the budget, which is then
Figure 9.2 Stages in the making of a reported to the legislature but rarely modified there.
law in the British Parliament For the legislature to possess the power of the purse, suggests Wehner
Source: UK Parliament (2018). (2006), it must have the ability to amend the budget (as opposed to simply
 legislatures 145

being authorized to make cuts), an effective committee system, enough time to consider the budget in detail, and access
to background information underlying the budget. Few countries meet all these conditions, and legislative approval is
generally given after the fact, serving to confirm compromises worked out between government departments. In many
democracies, the budget is a done deal once it reaches legislators, and if they were to unpick any part of a complicated
package, it would fall apart.
The United States is the clearest exception to the thesis of executive control of the purse. Congress remains central
to budget-making, since all money spent by executive departments must be allocated under specific headings approved
by Congress. The result is that the annual federal budget debate sometimes becomes an elaborate stand-off: the presi-
dent and Congress each hopes that the other side will accede to its own proposals before the money runs out.When it
does, as has happened several times since the passage of a new law on budgetary procedure in 1976, most government
departments must temporarily close down or furlough their staff.

Making governments
Legislatures are a key part of government, not just in the sense that they take care of government business but also
that the abilities of executives to govern depend in large part on the political make-up of legislatures. In presidential
systems such as Brazil, Mexico, or the United States, the president – being separately elected – does not rely on
sympathetic party members in the legislature to stay in office. Even so, those members play a critical role in
determining the capacity of the executive to lead; a supportive or sympathetic legislature provides a clearer path to
effective leadership, while one dominated by opposition parties will provide obstacles and road blocks.
In parliamentary systems, by contrast, the government is entirely dependent upon the party
make-up of the legislature; for Laver (2006), the most important role of a legislature in a Debating
parliamentary system is not legislating, but ‘making and breaking governments’. A party can legislature
neither take office, nor continue in power, without a supporting majority (or, at least, a work- One where floor
able minority) in the legislature. Furthermore, the strength of the ruling party or coalition in debate is the
central activity,
the legislature influences the government’s stability. As we saw in Chapter 8, a government through which
based on a single party with a legislative majority is likely to prove more stable than a minority major issues are
government. addressed and
One of the more extreme illustrations of this function can be found in Italy, which has parties gain or
long suffered from an excess of parties in its legislature. In part because of a desire to avoid the lose ground.
kind of centralization of power that allowed the dictatorship of Benito Mussolini, and in part
Plenary
because of ongoing regional and economic divisions within Italy, building stable coalitions
session
is difficult, governments regularly fall, and prime ministers routinely serve only short terms A meeting of the
in office. Between 1946 and 2016 there were 65 governments, lasting an average of less than entire legislature,
a year. Only one – the government of Silvio Berlusconi between 2001 and 2006 – saw out as distinct from
its full parliamentary term, but even he had to resign four years into his administration and committee
meetings.
form a new government. Amintore Fanfani, meanwhile, had the shortest term in office – just
21 days in January–February 1954 (although he had five more terms in office between then
Committee-
and 1987). based
legislature
Deliberation One where most
Many legislatures serve as a deliberative body, considering public matters of national work takes place
in committees,
importance. In the case of a debating legislature, deliberation takes the form of general
where members
discussion in the chamber, in what is sometimes known as a plenary session. In the British transform bills
House of Commons, for example, key issues eventually make their way to the floor of the into laws,
House of Commons where they are discussed with passion, partisanship, and sometimes flair. conducting
Floor debate becomes the arena for national political discussion, forming part of a continuous hearings, and
scrutinizing the
election campaign. The mood of the House, as revealed in debate, is often more significant
executive.
than the vote which follows. (For more on the British Parliament, see Spotlight United
Kingdom.) Committee
In the case of a committee-based legislature, by contrast (such as the US Congress and A group of
the Scandinavian parliaments) deliberation is less theatrical, taking the form of policy discussion legislators
in committees. A legislative committee is a small working group of legislators, created to cope assigned to look in
detail at proposals
with the volume and detail of legislative business, particularly in larger and busier lower chambers.
for new laws.
Committees are the workhorses of effective legislatures, offering detailed examination of matters
 SPOTLIGHT UNITED KINGDOM
Brief profile
One of the world’s oldest states, and birthplace of the parliamentary system, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and its four constituent parts (England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) has
undergone many changes since 1945 that have left troubling questions hanging over its future. The creation and
now the decay of a welfare state, the end of empire, and the country’s declining economic and military weight have
forced a redefinition of the role of government, and of Britain’s place in the world. A failed independence
referendum in Scotland in 2014 has not ended the debate over the future of the union, and the shock decision by
voters in a 2016 referendum to leave the European Union raised even more questions as the Conservative
government of Theresa May struggled during 2017–18 to decide the best terms of the exit against a background
of deep divisions in public opinion.

Form of government Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Date of state formation arguably
1066; no codified constitution.
Executive Parliamentary. The head of government is the prime minister, who is head of the
largest party or coalition, and governs in conjunction with a cabinet. The head of
state is the monarch.
Legislature Bicameral Parliament: lower House of Commons (650 members) elected for
renewable five-year terms, and upper House of Lords (about 790 members)
consisting of a mix of hereditary and life peers, and senior members of the
Church of England.
Judiciary Based on the common law tradition. The creation in 2009 of a 12-member
Supreme Court, albeit without the authority to veto legislation, strengthened
the autonomy of the judiciary. Judges appointed for life, with mandatory
retirement at 70 or 75, depending on date of appointment.
Electoral system The House of Commons is elected using single-member plurality. A range of
systems is used for elections to other bodies such as regional assemblies in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Parties Multi-party, although traditionally dominated by Conservatives on the right and
Labour on the left. Smaller parties and regional parties also significant.

65.6m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$2.6tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$39,720 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 The British Parliament
The British Parliament is often known as the
Mother of Parliaments, being the model upon
which legislatures in parliamentary systems
are based. Traditionally, it mixed omnipotence
and impotence in a seemingly impossible
combination; it was considered omnipotent
because parliamentary sovereignty, allied to
an uncodified constitution, meant there was
no higher authority in the land, but it was
considered impotent because the governing
party exercised tight control over its Members
of Parliament (MPs), turning Parliament into
The British Parliament on the banks of the Thames in London. an instrument, rather than a wielder, of
The parliamentary system was born in Britain, as a result of which power.
most comparative studies of parliaments refer back to British Parliament’s position is today less certain. It
precedent. has lost powers to the regions thanks to the
Source: Getty Images/Victor Cardoner. work of the Northern Irish, Scottish, and
Welsh parliaments, and its loss of powers to
the European Parliament was one of the complaints lodged by pro-Brexit campaigners in favour of the UK
leaving the EU. Ironically, in the debate over Brexit, Parliament found itself in a fight with the administration of
Theresa May that resulted in a greater assertion of parliamentary power.
MPs themselves have become more committed, they are increasingly drawn from professional and business
backgrounds, they devote more time to an increasing amount of constituency casework, and the number of
late sittings has been cut. The long-
held view that Parliament was out of
touch and old-fashioned has changed
in recent years and it has become NORWAY
more assertive and effective, and
more of a constraint on the SCOTLAND
government (Russell, 2016). At the NORTHERN
Edinburgh
same time, it has suffered from the IRELAND
same declining trust in government as ENGLAND
Belfast
many other legislatures, a problem WALES
pre-dating the current rise of anti- IRELAND LONDON
politics (Clarke et al., 2018).
Cardiff
The upper House of Lords occupies
an uncertain position. Its nearly 800 North Atlantic
members consist mainly of appointed Ocean FRANCE
life peers, but reform (if and when it is
finally agreed) is likely to involve a
substantial measure of election. Such a
development may well make the Lords
more assertive in challenging the
executive. Yet, even as Britain’s Further reading
Parliament updates its skills, it will Griffiths, Simon, and Robert Leach (2018) British Politics, 3rd edn (Red
continue to do what it has always done Globe Press).
best: acting as an arena for debating Heffernan, Richard, Colin Hay, Meg Russell, and Philip Cowley (eds)
issues of significance to the nation, its (2016) Developments in British Politics 10 (Red Globe Press).
government, and its leaders. Leston-Bandeira, Cristina, and Louise Thompson (2018) Exploring
Parliament (Oxford University Press).
148 chapter 9

of national interest, including executive and legislative proposals. Their practical task is to assess the government’s pro-
posals, while also providing measured oversight of its actions. This deliberative style is less dramatic than a set-piece
debate but often more constructive.

Oversight
The fi nal function of legislatures is oversight (or scrutiny) of the executive. The significance of this role in
presidential systems depends on the balance of party numbers, on whether or not the legislature is dominated by
the same party as the executive, and on whether or not the executive has a positive and constructive relationship
with the legislature. In parliamentary systems, by contrast, legislatures are usually more actively driven by the
executive, but they have several ways of monitoring the executive:

◆◆ Questions can be posed to leaders and ministers, whether oral or written. In Britain, for example, members of
the House of Commons ask numerous questions of bureaucrats and ministers, while one of the more colourful
events in Parliament is the weekly Prime Minister’s Question Time, a theatrical joust between the prime
minister and the leader of the opposition. In other legislatures, however, questions are less important, with
French ministers often failing to answer them at all.
◆◆ Interpellations are an alternative form of interrogation in some European legislatures, including Finland, France,
and Germany. A form of confidence motion, an interpellation is a substantial question demanding a prompt
response which is followed by a short debate and usually a vote on whether the government’s answer is considered
acceptable.
◆◆ Emergency debates are a higher-profi le means of calling executives to account. Typically, a minimum number of
members, together with the Presiding Officer (Speaker), must approve a proposal for an emergency debate. The
discussion usually ends with a government win; the significance lies in the debate itself and the fact of its having
been called. An emergency debate creates publicity and demands a considered response from the government’s
spokesperson.

Without question, the most important means by which legislatures can hold executives
Vote of accountable is through a vote of confidence or a censure motion. The former is a vote that –
confidence if it goes against the government – leads to compulsory resignation, while the latter indicates
A vote in a disapproval of a specific minister for a stated reason. Confidence votes are not so much a form
legislature on the
question of its
of detailed oversight as a decision on whether the government can continue in office at all.
confidence in the Such votes are rare, but they can decide the fate of an executive, with the potential to lead to
government to a change of leadership and even new elections. A recent successful example was the 2011 vote
lead. If lost, it of confidence in the minority Conservative government of Stephen Harper in Canada,
normally requires charged with failing to disclose the full fi nancial details of proposed new laws on crime and
the resignation of
the government.
on corporate tax cuts. The loss of the vote triggered a new election, resulting in gains for the
Conservatives and a majority government for Harper.
In France and Sweden, a majority of all members (not only those voting) is required to confirm a legislature’s loss
of confidence. In other countries, a confidence motion is not specifically designated but is simply any vote on which
the government would feel obliged to resign if defeated. Defeat on a motion to approve the budget would be a typical
example. In some countries, again including Sweden, votes of confidence can be directed against individual ministers
as well as the government as a whole.

one chamber or two?

Unicameral For most countries, a single-chambered (or unicameral) legislature is enough to represent
and bicameral the interests of the population and to manage its responsibilities; hence just under 60 per cent
Terms referring to of the world’s legislatures have one chamber (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2018). For reasons
the number of of history, politics, or practical need, the rest have bicameral (double-chambered) legislatures.
chambers in a South Africa even went so far between 1984 and 1994 as to have a tricameral legislature, with
legislature.
each chamber representing a different race, but this was highly unusual.
 legislatures 149

Name Examples
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Haiti, Italy, Mexico,
Chamber of Deputies
Romania, Rwanda, Spain

Afghanistan*, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, France, Greece, Hungary, Kuwait,

National Assembly Nigeria*, Pakistan, Russia**, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand*,
Turkey, Venezuela

House of Australia, Egypt, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,

Representatives Philippines, United States

House of Commons Canada, United Kingdom

House of the People Afghanistan, India

Consultative Assembly Indonesia, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia

Figure 9.3 A selection of lower chambers

Notes: * Both chambers. All others refer to lower or sole chambers only. ** Federal Assembly.

In the case of bicameral legislatures, one is usually known as the first (or lower) chamber and the other as the sec-
ond (or upper) chamber. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the lower chamber (see Figure 9.3 for examples) is usually the
bigger and the more powerful. The lower chamber is almost always the source of bills, while the second chamber plays
the role of taking a second look, and the lower chamber often has sole or dominating control over budgetary matters.
The origins of the lower/upper designation are unclear, but they probably trace back to the way in which the British
Parliament was divided between aristocrats and commoners, with the ‘Lords Spiritual and Temporal’ making up the
more historic and exclusive ‘upper’ chamber.
The choice between one and two chambers reflects contrasting visions of democracy. Unicameral legislatures
are justified by the majoritarian idea of popular control, the logic being that a legislature based on direct pop-
ular election reflects the popular will and should not be obstructed. Also, a single chamber is more accountable,
economical, and decisive; it lacks the petty point-scoring which becomes possible with two houses representing
distinct interests.
But the defenders of bicameral legislatures argue that the upper chamber offers checks and balances, provides
more considered debate because its members usually have longer terms in office, can be more collegial because it is
usually smaller, and can defend individual and group interests against a potentially oppressive majority in the lower
house. Bicameral legislatures are most often found in larger countries and in democracies, and they are universal in
federations, where the second chamber typically represents the component states or provinces
(see Chapter 11). Weak
The second chamber can also share the workload of the lower chamber, and serve as a house bicameralism
of review, revising bills, examining constitutional amendments, and eliminating intemperate This arises when
legislation. In short, it can be a second chamber for second thoughts. James Madison, one of the lower
America’s founding fathers, suggested that an upper house afforded protection against ‘an excess chamber
dominates the
of law-making’ (Hamilton, 1788b). As such, it can offer a modern approximation to the tradition- upper, providing
al idea of a council of elders, often debating in a less partisan style than the lower house. the primary focus
Where legislatures have two chambers, the question arises of the relationship between them. for government
Usually, the lower chamber dominates in an arrangement known as weak bicameralism. In this accountability.
system, which is typical of parliamentary governments in unitary systems (see Chapter 11), the
government’s survival depends on maintaining the assembly’s support, and for clarity one chamber must (or should)
become the focus of such accountability. The task of sustaining or voting down the government falls naturally to the
lower house, with its popular mandate.
150 chapter 9

Focus 9.1
Legislatures: does size matter?
It makes intuitive sense that the size of a legislature should reflect the size of a country’s population. Thus
China, the world’s most populous country, has a National People’s Congress with almost 3,000 members,
while the Congress of the South Pacific island state of Micronesia (with a population of just 105,000)
contains just 14 representatives.
However, size is a poor measure of strength and representation. Giant assemblies may seem powerful,
but their sheer size makes it difficult for them to act cohesively, and they are in constant danger of being
taken over by more coherent actors, such as political parties, or even their own committees. Ruling
communist parties, as in China, prefer a large legislature precisely because it is easier to control. By contrast,
a small chamber – numbering, say, under 100 – offers more opportunities for all deputies to have their say
in a collegial environment.
A more telling statistic is the number of representatives per head of population (see Figure 9.4). The
Chinese legislature may be large, but once its members are divided up among China’s population, it turns
out that each delegate represents about 460,000 people. By contrast, the Swedish Riksdag is much smaller,
but its 349 members each represent only 28,400 people, leaving Swedes with more intensive representation
at the national level than the Chinese.
At first glance, Indians may seem to have the worst level of political representation, with more than 2.3
million people per Member of Parliament. But India is a federal system (see Chapter 11), so Indians are also
represented in state and local legislatures. The same point applies to other countries with relatively high
numbers of people per representative, such as the United States and Nigeria. Conversely, Britain and
Sweden appear to have the most generous levels of representation, but they have weaker units of government
beneath the national than is the case with federations.
Institutionalism probably offers the most potentially productive theoretical approach to understanding
the links between the overall size, the per capita size, and the representative qualities of legislatures. At the
same time, and as the examples quoted here indicate, numbers are not the end of the story. In choosing
cases, a researcher would have to be careful to note the context of politics in different countries.

2500
People per representative, in thousands

2000

1500

1000

500

0
ia

a
a

A
on

ria

na

Ru l

an

er a
y

ce

UK
ico

en
i

yp

ad

ub
di

az

an
ric
Ira
ss
US

an
Jap
hi

ed
ige
ni
In

ex

Eg
Br

an

C
Af
C
U

Fr

Sw
N

C
h
n

G
ut
a
pe

So
ro
Eu

Figure 9.4 Comparing levels of legislative representation

Source: Calculated from data in Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018) (legislature size) and in World Bank (2018) (population). For bicameral legislatures,
the size of the lower chamber only is used. Data are for 2016.
 legislatures 151

The dominance of the lower chamber can also be seen in other ways:

◆◆ It is usually the larger house, averaging 254 members compared with 95 in the upper house (Inter-Parliamentary
Union, 2018).
◆◆ It often has special responsibility for the budget.
◆◆ It is the forum where major legislative proposals are introduced.
◆◆ It is entitled to override vetoes or amendments proffered by the second chamber. Strong
bicameralism
In presidential systems, meanwhile, where presidents are directly elected and their This occurs when
continuation in office does not depend on keeping the confidence of the legislature, there is the two chambers
are more
less need for the executive’s accountability to focus on a single chamber. Strong bicameralism
balanced, as in
can emerge in these conditions, especially when combined with federalism (see Chapter 11). federations with
The US Congress is the best illustration of this more balanced arrangement. With its presidential
constitutional position as representative of the states, the Senate plays a full part in the country’s executives.
governance.
A second question arises in bicameral legislatures: how to select the upper chamber. There is not much point in
having a bicameral legislature unless the two chambers represent public interests differently; if they are the same size, are
elected in the same way, and have the same powers, they will simply replicate one another. One means of avoiding this
duplication is to select the two chambers in different ways, to which end there are three main options: direct election,
indirect election, or appointment – see Figure 9.5.

The enormous size and short meetings of the Chinese National People’s Congress combine to leave it as little more than a
rubber-stamp for the policies of the Chinese Communist Party.
Source: Getty Images/Zhang Peng.
152 chapter 9

Other An example of indirect election can be found in France,

4% where members of the Senate are elected by members of elec-
toral colleges in each of France’s départements (counties). These
colleges are made up of regional councillors, mayors, city
councillors, and members of the National Assembly from the
area, with a weighting towards rural areas that has helped keep
Direct election the Senate politically conservative, and prevented the socialists
Appointment
28% 34% from winning a majority until 2011 (which they subsequently
lost in 2014).
An example of appointment can be found in Canada,
where all 105 members of the Senate are appointed by the
Indirect election governor-general (representative of the British monarch) on
34%
the recommendation of the prime minister. This might make
the Senate seem as undemocratic as the Federation Council
of Russia (see later in this chapter), where appointments are
controlled by the president. However, Canadian prime min-
Figure 9.5 Selecting the upper chamber isters are sensitive to regional considerations and will appoint
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018). independents and members of the opposition in addition to
Note: Based on total number of seats, not number of upper members of their own party. In any case, the Senate rarely goes
chambers. For comparison, nearly 95 per cent of members of the against the will of the lower House of Commons, and has a
first (lower) chamber are directly elected. tradition of being less partisan than the House.
Even when upper chambers are directly elected, a contrast
with the lower house is still normally achieved by o ­ ffering
members of the upper house a longer tenure: typically five or six years compared with four or five in the lower
chamber (see Table 9.1). To sharpen the contrast further, the election cycle is often staggered; hence federal senators

Table 9.1 Comparing upper chambers

Country Name Members Term Method of selection

(years)
Australia Senate 76 6 Direct election by single transferable
vote in each state.
Germany Bundesrat (Federal Council) 69 – Appointed by state governments.
India Rajya Sabha (Council of States) 245 6 233 indirectly elected through state
assemblies, and 12 appointed by the
president.
Ireland Senate 60 5 11 appointed by the prime minister, 43
elected from vocational panels, and six
from two universities.
Mexico Senate 128 6 Direct election. Biggest party in each
state wins two seats from the state,
second-placed party wins one seat, and
32 Senators elected at large for the
country.
Russia Federation Council 166 6 Elected by local legislatures and
executives with ‘approval’ of president.
United Senate 100 6 Two senators per states, with direct
States election by plurality of voters in each
state.
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018).
 legislatures 153

in the United States serve six-year terms, with one-third of the seats up for election every two years, while senators
in France serve three-year terms with half the seats up for election every three years.
A federal structure (see Chapter 11) also produces a natural divergence between chambers, because elections to
federal upper chambers are arranged by state, with smaller states given deliberate over-representation. For example, the
US Senate contains two members for each of 50 states, meaning that California (population 39 million) has the same
representation as Wyoming (580,000). The same is true of the Brazilian Senate, which has three members for each
state, meaning that São Paulo in the south (population 44 million) has the same representation as Amapá in the north
(population 750,000). Meanwhile, electoral districts for the US House of Representatives and the Brazilian Chamber
of Deputies (the lower chambers) are designed to be equal in population. The US fares better than Brazil, where the
number of citizens per deputy runs from a low of 53,000 to a high of 570,000, greatly distorting the equality of rep-
resentation.

representatives and their work

It is important to understand legislatures as institutions, but also important to understand
their members and how they go about their work, thereby moving from institutional to Model of
representation
behavioural ideas about government. Those members are expected to represent, but opinion A means for
is divided on just how that happens, and how much independence they should have from the understanding the
wishes of voters. With their origins in Burke’s idea about agents and advocates (see earlier in way in which
the chapter), and developed by the study of Wahlke et al. (1962) into US state government, at elected officials
least three models of representation have emerged: the delegate, the trustee, and the represent the
interests of their
partisan. Other suggestions have been added to these more recently, including the mediator voters and
and the advocate (see Figure 9.6) (although the possibilities are almost endless; one study of districts.
the British House of Commons (Searing, 1994) generated more than a dozen models,
including policy advocates, ideologues, high flyers, specialists, generalists, status seekers, and
spectators).
As with most similar sets of models, there is none that fully captures the nature of representation in all places and
at all times, and each has its strengths and weaknesses. They offer useful points of reference, and can be used to provide
comparative insights into the way members of legislatures work in different locations (in time and space). Whatever

Type Features

Delegate Representatives are the mouthpieces of voters. They have no autonomy,

and are expected to act as delegates for the preferences of those who
elected them, no matter what the broader national interest.

Trustee Voters give representatives the autonomy to use their best judgement and
to act in favour of the greater good, even if it sometimes goes against the
short-term interests of their voters or their district.

Representatives are members of a party, and are expected to make

Partisan
decisions in line with party policy.

Representatives must mediate between government and voters,

Mediator
aggregating citizens into representable constituencies.

Representatives must fight for the causes of voters, using their best
Advocate
judgement.

Figure 9.6 Models of representation

Notes: The mediator model was suggested by Williams (1998), and the advocate model by Urbinati (2000). See also Blomgren and Rozenberg
(2012).
154 chapter 9

100
90
80
70
60
Percentage

50
40
30
20
10
0 G rica
m

en

C ia
a

ce

ico
Sw a

ia

an
a

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So urk
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ex

U
an

Eg
Ru
Af

Br
C
et

Fr

Po
N
er
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Full/flawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states

Figure 9.7 Comparing levels of trust in national legislatures

Source: Inglehart et al. (2014).
Note: Numbers reflect the percentage of people claiming ‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot’ of trust in the national legislature.

the motivation behind their work and the role they play, however, it has become clear that many elected officials see
their job as more than temporary, and one of the most important (and troubling) developments in liberal democracies
has been the rise of the career politician: the degree-educated legislator with limited experience outside politics who
expects politics to provide a full-time, fulfilling profession. The amateurs of the past have given way to political profes-
sionals who know no other job, and for whom specialization is necessary for success.
The rise of the professional politician has led to concerns about the growth of a political
Political class class with a background and interests removed from voters, and often captured by particular
A group of interests. While professionals might offer advantages in expertise and even commitment over
professional
politicians with
amateurs, their rise can also be interpreted as a threat to representative democracy, particularly if
similar backgrounds, that class does not reflect the backgrounds and attitudes of the general population. Its existence
interests, and makes it harder for many people to run for political office, and creates a body of legislators who
values. think and behave in a similar manner (Allen, 2018). In a sense, it replaces democracy with oli-
garchy (rule by a few).
The rise of a political class has often combined with two other factors – the partisan nature of legislatures and their
perceived slowness – to make both the institutions and their members unpopular. Figure 9.7 shows polling data from
selected countries regarding trust in national legislatures, which reveals a wide range of opinion, but generally not
strongly positive views. The higher numbers in Vietnam and China are questionable given that people in authoritarian
regimes are probably less inclined to share their real feelings in polls. In established democracies, though, where polling
results are more reliable, it is normal to find less than half of respondents having faith in their legislatures. These are the
institutions that make or confirm the rules by which people live, and if people do not have faith in the institutions, they
are less likely to have faith in the rules themselves (Holmberg et al., 2017). Conversely, if trust in legislatures is high, it
is likely to mean that government will run more smoothly.
Looking at the particular case of the United States, Gallup polls held there since the 1970s have rarely found
Congressional job approval ranging above 40 per cent. There was a brief and heady moment following the 9/11 at-
tacks when a sense of national unity in the face of adversity pushed it to a record 84 per cent, but it has since fallen
dramatically, reaching an all-time low of 9 per cent in 2013 and otherwise hovering since 2010 at about 20 per cent
(Gallup, 2018). The effects have been reflected in a growing anti-incumbency movement among American voters, and
 legislatures 155

the appeal of promises made (but not really kept) by Donald Trump as a presidential candidate to ‘drain the swamp’
in Washington DC. These low and falling rates have also fed in to a discussion among Americans about the merits of
encouraging greater turnover by imposing term limits – see Focus 9.2.

legislatures in authoritarian states

Given that legislatures are symbols of popular political representation, and that public opinion plays less of a role in
authoritarian than in democratic government, they have long had less significance in the former than in the latter.
At the same time, they have been much less closely studied than authoritarian executives, which means that many
assumptions have been made about their relative powers and weaknesses. The traditional view, note Schuler and
Malesky (2014), is that legislatures and elections in authoritarian regimes were ‘tools to assist dictators without
actually holding them accountable or forcing them to make policy concessions’. Yet, just as in democracies,
legislatures in authoritarian systems come in different forms, they are difficult to extinguish, and their braver
members can sometimes emerge as the only substantial voices of opposition.
Allmark (2012) notes the tendency in political science to dismiss legislatures in authoritarian systems as rubber-stamp
institutions, but finds in his study of ten countries (including Burma, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) that – in
some cases at least – they can be a platform for dissent, can help strengthen the domestic opposition, and can pro-
mote the political education of citizens. Schuler and Malesky (2014) point to a new tendency among scholars to see
authoritarian regimes relying less on repression and more on using legislatures to either co-opt (see below), empower,
or weaken the opposition: legislatures, they argue, ‘are seen as constraints willingly constructed by dictators in order to
maximize the benefits of continued rule or increase regime stability’.
Except for a few outliers such as Saudi Arabia, whose Consultative Assembly can propose laws but cannot pass or
enforce them, all authoritarian regimes have legislatures of some description, their value being fivefold:

◆◆ They provide a fig leaf of legitimacy, both domestic and international, for the regime. Rulers can try to detract
criticism from other governments and donor agencies by pointing to their national legislature as evidence that
others are involved in government.
◆◆ They can be used to incorporate moderate opponents into the political system, providing a forum for negotiating
matters that do not threaten the key interests of rulers.
◆◆ Raising the grievances of constituents and lobbying for local interests provide a measure of integration between
centre and periphery, and between state and society. Such activity oils the political wheels without threatening
those who control the machine.
◆◆ They provide a convenient pool of potential recruits to the elite, the behaviour of representatives providing a
useful initial test of reliability.
◆◆ For dictators, argues Gandhi (2008), they serve as ‘controlled institutional channels’ through which outside
groups can make their demands and leaders can ‘make concessions without appearing to cave in to popular
protest’.

At the heart of the role of legislatures in authoritarian regimes is the idea of co-option:
authoritarian leaders may not have to worry about public opinion, but they always face the
prospect of challenges from within the elite, or at least of demands for a share of the spoils Co-option (or
of control. For that reason, it may be tactically better for rulers to try to neutralize opponents co-optation)
by bringing them into the fold of government; ‘Keep your friends close, but your enemies The process by
closer’, said one of the characters in the fi lm The Godfather. Svolik (2012) contrasts the roles which political
of legislatures in democracies, where they work to represent the diversity of political movements or
opponents are
interests, with those in authoritarian states, where their role ‘is to enhance the stability of
encouraged by
authoritarian power-sharing by alleviating commitment and monitoring problems among leaders to become
authoritarian elites’. part of the
In hybrid regimes, legislatures are an essential part of the political furniture.Their position can governing system,
be significant in areas that do not threaten the realities of executive leadership: in representing thereby
neutralizing
local districts, for example, and in passing routine legislation. However, such bodies still operate
opposition.
in the shadow of executive authority. A nose for power will lead us away from the legislature and
156 chapter 9

Focus 9.2
Term limits: pros and cons

As we saw in Chapter 8, executives in democracies are often limited in the number of terms they can serve
in office, whether by law or as a result of a simple desire for change at the helm on the part of voters or
parties. Even without fixed limits (as is the case in parliamentary systems), it is rare that executives stay in
office for more than about 8–10 years.
The story is quite different in legislatures, where representatives are rarely faced
Term limits with a term limit, and will often be re-elected as long as their energy and the tolerance
Rules that restrict of voters will last. Defining the ideal level of turnover is not easy. On the one hand, the
elected politicians return rate should be high enough to sustain professionalism, allowing the development
to a maximum of experience and expertise. On the other hand, it should not be so high as to sustain
number of periods
in office, or ban corruption or create the ‘three As’ which Jackson (1994) associated with a surfeit of
re-election incumbency: arrogance, apathy, and atrophy.
without a break. Turnover is greater in countries using party list proportional representation (see
Chapter 15), which allows party leaders to ensure at least a trickle of fresh blood. In
countries using plurality elections, turnover is mainly lower, the extreme case being
the United States, where Congress has low levels of public approval, and yet incumbents – thanks to their
visibility, their access to campaign funds and party support, and the effects of gerrymandering (see
Chapter 15) – have a greater than 90 per cent chance of being re-elected (Bardes et al., 2018: Table 8.4).
In contrast, Mexico does not allow members of Congress to serve more than one term at a time, so
deputies must step down after three years and senators after six years, returning only at the next election
(assuming they win).

Arguments in favour Arguments against

Prevents the development of career politicians and a
political class, and reduces the likelihood of
corruption.
The longer legislators stay in office, the greater the
chances of their losing touch with the needs of voters.
Brings new perspectives and generations to bear,
which can be more important than keeping
experienced legislators in office.
Provides a check on the accumulation of power by
individual legislators.
Can prevent the best legislators from staying on and
working in the national interest.
Makes it more difficult for legislators to develop
long-term relationships with their districts and
constituents.
Prevents voters from benefitting from the
accumulated experience of longer-term legislators.
Creates lame-duck legislators, who cannot plan
beyond the date of the next election.

towards the presidential office. There, we may discover an incumbent who governs by decree as well as by law and
who may, in extremis, simply dissolve a recalcitrant legislature in search of more congenial arrangements.
The political environment of hybrid regimes is particularly hostile to the idea that legislatures can hold the gov-
ernment to account through detailed oversight. On the contrary, national leaders consider themselves responsible to
the whole nation, not to what they see as corrupt, partisan, and parochial representatives in the legislature. In addition,
many hybrid systems are either new regimes, or located in relatively poor countries; both factors militate against the
development of a professional legislature with a stable membership, extensive research support, and a well-developed
committee system.
 legislatures 157

The case of the Egyptian legislature illustrates some of the problems found in hybrid regimes. Egypt has had a
legislature since 1923, but the executive has always had the capacity to override its votes or to manipulate elections
to ensure a majority of friendly legislators. The legislature was renamed the People’s Assembly in 1971, and was
granted several constitutional powers that seemed to limit those of the president: it could reject laws proposed by
the government, propose laws of its own, had close control over the national budget, and could debate govern-
ment policy. But the latter meant little in real terms, and its debates were once colourfully described by Waterbury
(1983) as follows: ‘The normal pattern … has been to tear a given policy to pieces in committee … to give ample
newspaper … coverage to the findings, and then to have the Assembly as a whole approve the policy with marginal
modifications.’
A new House of Representatives was created in 2014, but the tradition of strong executives and relatively weak
legislatures seemed destined to continue, but for different reasons. Where the old People’s Assembly was dominated
by the governing National Democratic Party, which was in turn manipulated by the president, the new legislature
suffers from too many parties: nearly 20 won seats at the 2015 elections, while nearly 60 per cent of deputies
chose to sit as independents, and voter turnout – in protest at the government of President el-Sisi – was a paltry
10 per cent. As a result, the legislature is ineffective either as a source of support for the government or as a site
of opposition.
As for wholesale authoritarian regimes, by contrast, the relationship between legislatures, ruling presidents,
and ruling parties is less clear. Dictators can stay in power by ensuring that the ruling party has a solid grip on the
majority of seats in the legislature (using illegal means to manipulate elections if necessary), or by ensuring that
most of the significant powers in government rest with the executive. Wright and Escribà-Folch (2012) also note
that legislatures can help keep a dictator in power ‘by making the dictator’s promises – to both potential
authoritarian rivals and would-be democrats – more credible’. They might thus bolster a dictator by decreasing
both the likelihood of the incumbent being replaced by a rival and the chances of democratization. On the other
hand, if rivals are not interested in democratization, but are more interested in replacing one dictator with
another, then legislatures can have the effect of destabilizing an authoritarian leader. In short, a dictator must be
careful to balance the impression of caring about opposing opinions with that of keeping a tight rein on the
opposition.
The case of Russia under Vladimir Putin shows an authoritarian leader maintaining control in a multi-party system
through the clear manipulation of the legislature. Russia has a bicameral legislature whose powers were designed by
the constitution to make sure that laws took precedence over presidential decrees. At first, during the 1990s, the Duma
(lower house) became a site of resistance to Boris Yeltsin’s reforms, producing vigorous debate. But the ambitions of
Vladimir Putin have combined with the Russian preference for strong government to tilt the balance of power to-
wards the presidency. The constitution states that Russia’s president is not only ‘guarantor of the constitution’, but is
also required to ‘ensure the coordinated functioning and collaboration of bodies of state power’. So far, presidents have
performed this role with no great regard for the legislature.
The most blatant instance of Putin’s manipulation of the legislature can be found in the upper house, the Federation
Council. Given the sheer size and diversity of Russia, and its federal structure (see Chapter 11), the Council might
logically function as a Russian Senate, providing a form of representation that could complement that provided by the
Duma. In reality, it has been openly exploited by Putin to extend his power, encouraged by the lack of detail in the
Russian constitution about how its members must be chosen. It initially consisted of two representatives elected from
each of the 83 regions and republics of Russia, who were replaced in 1995 by the chief executives and heads of the
legislatures in the regions, holding their Council positions ex officio.
In 2000, in an attempt to limit the powers of the regional leaders, Putin steered a new law through the State
Duma that replaced them with full-time representatives appointed by local legislatures and their executives. Another
change came in 2012, so that regional assemblies each elected one of their members and regional governors chose
representatives from the regional executives. In practice, though, Putin’s advisers have the final say over the selection
of members (Remington, 2014). Since the Council must approve presidential nominees to the Russian high courts,
and must approve the declaration of martial law or emergencies by the president, Putin – by extension – controls
these decisions.
In contrast to Russia, the case of China exemplifies the trend in one-party states for legislatures to acquire mod-
est significance as such regimes become a little more pluralistic. A growing emphasis on the rule of law raised the
status of the National People’s Congress (NPC), which has also more often expressed popular hostility to corrup-
tion. Many votes are no longer unanimous, proceedings are less easily choreographed, committees are growing in
158 chapter 9

authority, some professional support is available, and the Communist Party must anticipate the NPC’s reaction to
its proposals.
However, the NPC, still the world’s largest legislature with members indirectly elected through sub-national
governments and the military, remains strongly hierarchical. It meets only once a year for a session lasting about two
weeks. Even more than in committee-based legislatures in democracies, the NPC’s influence operates through ­smaller
sub-groups. The most important of these is the Standing Committee, a group of about 150 members which meets
regularly throughout the year; most also belong to the party, giving the party leadership an additional ­mechanism of
control.
Of course, party domination of legislative proceedings is also found in parliamentary systems in liberal democracies,
but there the party in command changes with the election results. Although the NPC and its sub-groups have become
part of the Chinese power network, the party’s supremacy is such that these bodies still cannot be understood through
Western notions of the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty.
 legislatures 159

discussion questions
◆◆ Which of the six roles carried out by democratic legislatures are (a) the most important,
and (b) the most influential?
◆◆ Could a legislature made up entirely of heterosexual middle-class men of the same religion
and ethnicity effectively represent a country? If not, why not?
◆◆ Other than in federal systems, do bicameral legislatures serve any real purpose?
◆◆ Which of the five models of representation outlined in this chapter do you fi nd most
compelling, either as an explanatory tool or as a guiding principle?
◆◆ Term limits: Good idea or bad?
◆◆ Are executives the only institutions that really count in authoritarian systems, or do the
five roles associated with legislatures suggest that their roles are more important than we
might at fi rst assume?

key concepts
◆◆ Bicameral ◆◆ Plenary session
◆◆ Committee ◆◆ Political class
◆◆ Committee-based legislature ◆◆ Strong bicameralism
◆◆ Co-option ◆◆ Term limits
◆◆ Debating legislature ◆◆ Unicameral
◆◆ Legislature ◆◆ Vote of confidence
◆◆ Model of representation ◆◆ Weak bicameralism

further reading
Arter, David (ed.) (2013) Comparing and Classifying Legislatures (Routledge). A survey of the
state of knowledge about legislatures, with chapters on European, Latin American, and
African cases.
Blomgren, Magnus, and Olivier Rozenberg (eds) (2012) Parliamentary Roles in Modern
Legislatures (Routledge). An edited collection on the different roles played by members of
parliament, using cases in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.
Fish, M. Stephen, and Matthew Kroenig (2011) The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global
Survey (Cambridge University Press). An extensive reference work assessing the powers of
national legislatures by their autonomy, capacity, influence, and powers.
Loewenberg, Gerhard (2016) On Legislatures: The Puzzle of Representation (Routledge). A
review of some of the puzzles and contradictions inherent in the way that legislatures
work.
Martin, Shane, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare W. Strøm (eds) (2014) The Oxford Handbook of
Legislative Studies (Oxford University Press). A comprehensive edited collection of essays
on legislatures.
Olson, David M., and Gabriella Ilonszki (2012) Post-Communist Parliaments: Change and Stability
in the Second Decade (Routledge). An edited collection looking at the way in which
legislatures in post-communist Europe have improvised their transition to democracy.
bureaucracies 10

Source: iStock/mihalec
contents
◆ Bureaucracies: an
overview
◆ Origins and evolution
◆ E-government
PREVIEW ◆ How bureaucracies are
As the institutions responsible for implementing public policy, organized
bureaucracies are a key part of the structure of government. Bureaucrats ◆ How bureaucrats are
are the only employees of the government with whom most of us have
much direct contact, whether we are applying for a driving licence or
recruited
a passport, paying our taxes, or buying property. In spite of this ◆ Bureaucracies in
familiarity, bureaucracies are routinely misunderstood, and just as authoritarian states
routinely criticized for their failings as praised for their achievements.
Rarely formally studied in the West until Max Weber turned his at-
tention to them in the early twentieth century, the stereotype of bureau-
cracies is that they are hierarchical, driven by procedure, and unresponsive to customer needs.Yet they are an essential
part of government, and in order to understand their dynamics we need to understand how they are structured, the
political and professional pressures that come to bear on the work of bureaucrats, and how bureaucracies are changing.
This chapter begins with a review of how bureaucracies evolved, taking the story through the rise of the new pub-
lic management approach and onto the more recent growth of e-government. It then looks at how bureaucracies are
organized in democracies, ranging from government departments down through the divisions within each department
to the non-departmental public bodies that are increasingly used to deliver public services. The chapter then looks at
how bureaucrats are recruited and kept accountable, and ends with a review of the dynamics of bureaucracies in au-
thoritarian regimes, which show some surprising similarities to those of their democratic peers.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Weber’s traditional model of bureaucracy is the starting point for understanding the modern bureaucracy.
◆◆ New public management and outsourcing have changed the way in which bureaucracies work and
relate to the public.
◆◆ E-government means easier access to government but also raises concerns about surveillance, privacy,
and data protection.
◆◆ In democracies, the public sector is a complex network encompassing departments, divisions, and
regulatory agencies.
◆◆ Two key factors determine the quality of public employees: how best to recruit them, and how best to
keep them accountable.
◆◆ Bureaucracies are among the exceptions to the rule of marginal political institutions in authoritarian
regimes. Dictators cannot dictate without officials to give effect to their will.
 bureaucracies 161

bureaucracies: an overview
The study of the bureaucracy (also known as the civil service) focuses on the networks of Bureaucracy
central departments and public agencies that underpin the political executive. These networks Literally, rule by
have two main functions: they give advice to politicians before policy is made, and they help officials. In the
to implement decisions once reached. The head of department offering advice to the context of
comparative
government minister or secretary, the inspector checking tax returns, the engineer trying to politics, describes
work out the cause of a plane crash – all are part of the complex operation that is the public the people and
bureaucracy. The notion of bureaucracy can be extended further: the administrative staff of organizations who
any large organization – such as a university, a political party, or a corporation – can be form the public
considered a bureaucracy, and the personality of the organizations of which they are a part administration.
gives them many of the same incentives, limitations, and motives as we fi nd in the public
bureaucracy.
Traditionally, studies of the bureaucracy focused on the permanent salaried officials employed in government
departments. These elite officials, and the departments they occupy, remain of obvious importance, and the term
bureaucracy is sometimes confined to them. However, attention increasingly focuses on the wider governance be-
yond: in semi-independent agencies, local governments, and even the non-governmental organizations and the
private corporations to which the delivery of public programmes is increasingly outsourced. We refer here to all
public networks as comprising the bureaucracy; others use such terms as public administration or public management to
denote the study of the public sector in this wider sense. Whatever the labels, understanding the modern state, and
following a career within it, requires a mental map of what are remarkably complex networks. Structural theory plays
a useful role in helping us understand the networks, linkages, and interactions that bind bureaucracies to other parts
of government.
In understanding bureaucracies, we need to review how they are internally structured, how
their staff are recruited and held accountable, how best to achieve coordination across depart- Red tape
ments, and how to ensure that services are delivered efficiently in the absence of a normal mar- The classic image
ket. Seeking out the best recruits and then giving employees of public agencies – particularly of bureaucracies
those at the less skilled and lower paid end of the spectrum – a sense of mission and a desire tied up in
procedure and
to serve is not easy. Professionals providing a key public service – such as doctors and nurses in rules, deriving
a public health system – will have the highest sense of mission, but the stereotypical view of from the habit in
bureaucrats pushing paper (literally or metaphorically) and tying up services in red tape still some sixteenth-
often holds true. century European
Bureaucracies have undergone substantial changes in recent decades, however, pressed by countries of
binding
efforts to reform the delivery of public services, and caught up in the transition to e-government. administrative
Two major themes in understanding the modern bureaucracy (in wealthier democracies at least) documents in red
are the outsourcing that has led to many services being transferred to private contractors, and the tape.
switch to a reliance on the provision of information and services through the internet.

origins and evolution

Ancient kingdoms and empires had some form of bureaucracy, perhaps the most famous being Meritocracy
that of China. Based on principles set down by Confucius in the sixth century bce, China A system in
established the fi rst meritocracy, with bureaucrats earning their positions through which career
examination and being used by emperors to run the country (a relationship that generally advancement
worked well in good times, but collapsed occasionally in bad times, as in the wake of war). In and leadership is
based on talent,
medieval Europe, meanwhile, clerical servants were originally agents of the royal household, qualifications, and
serving under the personal direction of the monarch. Many features of modern bureaucracies – achievement.
regular salaries, pensions, open recruitment – arose from a successful attempt to overcome this
idea of public employment as personal service to the monarch.
Karl Marx (1818–83) was one of the first to theorize about the bureaucracy, arguing that its development was a
natural counterpart to the development of the private corporation, and that the two were mutually reliant. The first
systematic study of the bureaucracy, however, was undertaken by the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920),
and many of his arguments continue to underpin our understanding of Western bureaucracy. Weber’s model was
based on the traditional institutional view of public administration as a disciplined hierarchy in which salaried officials
162 chapter 10

Feature Qualities

Work A carefully defined division of tasks.

Decisions Reached by methodically applying rules to particular cases.

Recruitment Based on proven (or, at least, potential) competence.

Competent officials can expect secure jobs and salaries, and

Careers
promotion based on seniority and merit.

A disciplined hierarchy in which lower officials are subject to the

Structure
authority of their superiors.

Figure 10.1 Weber’s model of bureaucracy

who are recruited and promoted on merit reach rational decisions by applying explicit rules to the facts before them
(see Figure 10.1).
Weber’s model imagined public service as professional and legalistic, rather than managerial and business-like. His
central claim was that bureaucracy made administration more efficient, providing the means by which the techniques
of industry and military organization could be brought to bear on civil affairs:

The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-
mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, clarity, knowledge of fi les, continuity, discretion, unity, strict
subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the
strictly bureaucratic administration. (quoted in Kalberg, 2005)

While Weber’s ideas were highly influential in continental Europe, they were less so in North America, where civil
services developed in more pragmatic fashion. Lacking the European monarchical and state tradition, public manage-
ment was at first considered to be a routine application of political directives. In the United States, for example, the
original philosophy was one of governance by the common person; almost every citizen, it was assumed, qualified for
almost every public job. The notion of a professional civil service was considered elitist and undemocratic.
This populist theory of bureaucracy conveniently underpinned the spoils system, a term deriving from the phrase
‘to the victor, the spoils’. In the United States, the system ensured that the election of a new
Spoils system president led to an almost complete turnover of employees in what was then a small federal gov-
A patronage-based ernment. It continued at least until 1883, when the Pendleton Act created a Civil Service Com-
arrangement in
which elected
mission to recruit and regulate federal employees. In Canada, the merit principle was introduced
politicians in 1908 and adopted fully in the Civil Service Act 1918.
distribute Western bureaucracies reached their zenith in the twentieth century. The depression and two
government jobs world wars vastly expanded the work and the reach of government, and therefore the size of
to those with the bureaucracies. At the same time, the welfare state, completed in Western and especially Northern
foresight to
support the
European countries in the decades following World War II (see Chapter 20), required a mas-
winning candidate. sive bureaucratic apparatus to distribute grants, allowances, and pensions. By the 1970s, public
employment accounted for almost one-third of the total workforce in Britain and the Scandina-
New public vian countries, even if much of this expansion had taken place at local level.
management All was not well, though, because the closing decades of the twentieth century saw declin-
An approach to ing faith in bureaucratic solutions and growing calls for reform. As early as 1971, Niskanen was
bureaucracy that pointing out how critics saw civil servants as being engaged in unproductive games to increase
emerged in the
1980s, based on the budgets and staff of their sections. One reforming initiative in democracies came in the form
the idea that of outsourcing government services (see Focus 10.1), a change that had the effect of reducing
market-oriented any monopoly that central government civil servants might once have had over policy execution.
principles would Another initiative came in the form of a market-oriented approach to bureaucracy that came to
make it more be known as new public management (NPM), sweeping through the world of bureaucracies
efficient.
in democracies in the closing decades of the twentieth century.
 bureaucracies 163

Focus 10.1
Outsourcing government work: pros and cons

Many governments have long relied on outside contractors to provide them with goods Outsourcing
and supporting services, a practice that has deepened and widened in recent decades The practice of
with more outsourcing. This is one reason, for example, why the number of federal contracting
government employees in the United States fell from 4.3 per cent of the work force in private
1966 to 2 per cent in 2013, and why the number of people working through contracts contractors to
provide services
was double that employed directly by the federal government (US Bureau of Labor previously under
Statistics, 2018). the control of the
There have been many start-up problems as governments and contractors work public
through the process and learn what is possible (or not), but the trends suggest that bureaucracy.
outsourcing is here to stay; more jobs and services are shifting out of government to the
private sector, boosted in part by the internet, but primarily by a desire on the part of
governments to save money. Examples of outsourcing include the collection of garbage, water and wastewater
treatment, security services, equipment servicing, technology support, the management of public schools
and hospitals, and even private prisons (home to almost one-fifth of prisoners in Australia). One variation
on the theme is co-sourcing, where work is shared between public and private agencies.
On the positive side of the ledger, outsourcing means competition among potential contractors, which
helps bring down costs and makes it easier to terminate under-performing workers. Knowing that they are
competing for work, employees in private agencies should be more concerned with customer satisfaction,
and private contractors have incentives to manage their tasks more efficiently. They may also be less subject
to political manipulation and control.
On the negative side of the ledger, outsourcing can – without careful choices and monitoring – result in
a reduction in the quality of services, and there is less direct and political accountability with private
contractors. Also, government departments often have a larger store of knowledge and experience than
private companies entering a field for the first time. Additionally, once a contract is awarded, the private
provider is typically the only supplier, in effect substituting a private monopoly for a public one. Finally, there
is a limit to how much can be outsourced, because not all government services lend themselves to provision
by private contractors (e.g. policing).

First introduced in the early 1980s by the Reagan administration in the United States and the Thatcher govern-
ment in Britain, the goals of NPM went beyond outsourcing. The objectives were to use the methods of private
companies to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector, to improve the accountability of man-
agers, and to cut public spending (Christensen and Lægreid, 2016). Among its ideas: splitting up public organizations
horizontally and vertically, and creating more autonomous agencies and more specialized ‘single-purpose’ agencies.
Managers were allowed to operate more freely, and public and private providers were allowed to compete for govern-
ment contracts. The significance of these reforms lay in the sharp break they represented with Weber’s view that the
job of a bureaucrat was simply to apply fixed rules to cases. Public administration, it was alleged, had been displaced
by public management.
One of the pioneers of the approach was New Zealand. In the 1980s and 1990s, it undertook what was probably
‘the most comprehensive and radical set of reforms of any Western democracy’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). One
particular feature of the new model was its massive use of contracts, going far beyond the standard fare of using private
firms to supply local services, such as refuse collection. Instead, private suppliers were contracted to address even such
sensitive areas as debt collection. By such means, the number of bureaucrats in New Zealand was reduced from 88,000
in 1988 to 37,000 in 1994 (even if some were simply reallocated elsewhere). In addition, contracts were introduced
within New Zealand’s public sector to govern the relationships between purchasers (e.g. the Transport Department)
and providers (e.g. Transit New Zealand, responsible for roads).
164 chapter 10

Although interest in NPM is now past its peak, its longer-term effects can still be felt. The biggest contribution of
NPM has probably been a change in thinking, and promotion of ‘visions of privatization, marketization, participation,
deregulation, and flexibility’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). At the same time, there are those (such as Christensen and
Lægreid, 2016) who argue that it may have evolved into what is described as new public governance, meaning the
delivery of public services by multiple actors prompted by concerns about a loss of control in the face of ongoing eco-
nomic problems in many countries, and the deepening of problems such as terrorism, climate change, and the spread
of infectious diseases.
Insights into some of the changes that have taken place are afforded by looking comparatively at the size of bureau-
cracies in different countries. First, we can look at overall numbers, which are an indicator of the size of government,
and of the extent to which different governments choose to provide services such as education and health care through
public programmes. Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) indicate that the wealthy Scandinavian
states have the biggest public sectors when measured by share of employment, while South Korea and Japan have
among the smallest – see Figure 10.2.
Second, we can look at the balance between those employed by central and local government, which is an indicator
of different levels of centralization. ILO data (see Figure 10.3) indicate that most democracies employ the majority of

50
Government employees as percentage

45
40
35
of the labour force

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
ay

en

ry

ce

SA

ey

an
ad

re
an
ar

ag

U
ga
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an

rk

Jap
ed

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er

an

m
or

un

Tu
Fr
Sw
en

er
av

C
N

h
G
D

ut
D
EC

So
O

Figure 10.2 Comparing the size of bureaucracies

Source: International Labour Organization, quoted in OECD (2017a).
Note: Figures are for 2015, for all levels of government.
Bureaucrats working in central government

100
90
as percentage of the total

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ia

a
ey

ce
d

an

il
e

ico

en
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ad

an

az
ric
ec
lan

ss

US
an
rk

Jap
ed
ex

Br
an

m
rla
re

Ru
Af
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Fr

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C
he
h

G
ut

et
So

Figure 10.3 Comparing the size of central government

Source: International Labour Organization, quoted in OECD (2017a).
Note: Figures are for 2015.
 bureaucracies 165

their civil servants at the sub-national rather than at the national level, the numbers working at the national level being
smallest in federal systems such as the United States, Canada, Germany, and Brazil. Unitary Sweden also devolves most
policy implementation to the local level.

e-government
The most recent trend in bureaucracy is the emergence of e-government, built on the
opportunities created by the internet to open new channels of communication among and E-government
between governments, government departments, and citizens. As e-government expands, we (or digital era
governance)
should not forget the lesson inherent in NPM that anticipated efficiency gains often disappear as The use of
new channels supplement old ones without replacing them. We also need to be aware that while information and
e-government can ease citizen access to government departments and to public information, as communication
well as reducing government costs, it also carries the increased risk of cyberattacks on governments, technology to
and can make it easier for governments to keep an eye on citizens. Even so, a combination of provide public
services.
outsourcing and e-government could mean that we are in the middle of a revolution in the
operation of bureaucracy, and the way bureaucrats and citizens relate to one another.
Montargil (2010) suggests that the development of e-government comes in four stages:

◆◆ The provision of information, perhaps with a website outlining the details of a public service. This is useful for
people looking for basic information on the work of a department or agency.
◆◆ Interaction, as when users download a form or send an email.
◆◆ Transaction, as when users pay a bill online or submit an application.
◆◆ Integration, meaning that users can access all government services – from applying for a driving licence to registering
a business – from one site, with a single registration and digital signature. Such portals, or electronic one-stop
shops, are difficult to implement, though, requiring the integration of databases from multiple departments.

Integration creates opportunities for public services to be more proactive. If your year of birth and address are
available across government, then, as you move through life, the transport department can send you information
about applying for a driving licence, the interior ministry can supply a voter registration form, and the health
service can send home testing kits for age-related illnesses. Similarly, linking school records to a national database
of children could help to locate children who have moved elsewhere. In such ways, e-government can give effect
to joined-up government.
E-government is most advanced in wealthier countries with the most extensive internet access. Table 10.1 shows
the top ten countries ranked for the use of e-government in a periodic survey compiled by the United Nations. The
2016 survey notes that more countries are making data – such as that on public spending – available for scrutiny.
E-government has, in other words, made governments more transparent. The UN report also notes that most coun-
tries have reached the transaction stage, and that there has been a sharp increase in the number of countries achieving
the integration stage, up from 45 countries in 2003 to 90 countries in 2016. More countries are also moving towards
participatory or at least consultative decision-making, such as asking people their opinions on local economic devel-
opment initiatives.

Table 10.1 The world’s top ten countries for e-government

1 Britain 6 Sweden
2 Australia 7 Netherlands
3 South Korea 8 New Zealand
4 Singapore 9 Denmark
5 Finland 10 France
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2016).
Note: Ranking is for 2016, and based on the availability of online services, the quality of telecommunications
infrastructure, and overall education levels.
166 chapter 10

At the same time, as we will see in Chapter 14, access to e-government remains unequal. The provision of fixed
and wireless broadband services has almost reached saturation point in Europe, for example, but Africa lags a long
way behind. Even within countries, there is more access in more heavily populated regions and less access elsewhere.
Australia provides an example of the latter phenomenon.While it has one of the most digitally connected governments
in the world, with policies to expand e-government dating back to the mid-1990s, it has also found exclusion based
not just on technological capacity but also on a host of social and economic barriers such as poverty. Australia is also a
large country with a few large concentrations of population, and small and widely dispersed rural populations that are
not easy to reach. The irony in Australia, as in many other countries, is that those most likely to benefit from access to
e-government are also those least likely to have such access (Baum, 2014).
The other concerns with e-government relate to the loss of privacy, the new opportunities for political misuse such
as the unauthorized transfer of data to third parties (including private companies and foreign states), and the increased
danger posed by hacking of government services. Public suspicion of e-government is heightened by awareness that
private electronic records – such as text messages, phone calls, and internet use – can also be accessed by government
in response to security threats. Privacy and data protection codes, such as the European Union’s comprehensive Data
Protection Regulation (2016) (superseding its 1995 Data Protection Directive) offer only limited reassurance. Access
to one’s own personal records allows accuracy to be checked but does not prevent misuse.

how bureaucracies are organized

Just as executives, legislatures, and systems of courts come in different forms with different powers, so too do
bureaucracies. Their structures and labels vary from one country to another, emphasizing the importance of taking
structural factors into account when we study them. Running through the differences, we can distinguish three
main kinds and levels of institution: departments, divisions, and non-departmental public bodies.

Department Departments (or ministries)

(or ministry) The centrepiece of modern bureaucracies is what is known in some countries as a department,
An administrative and in others as a ministry. The total number varies but is typically between 12 and 24: there
unit over which a
secretary or
are almost always departments dealing with foreign affairs, the economy, justice, health care,
minister exercises and the environment, with others added depending on the list of policy areas considered
direct important and the responsibilities of central government (see Figure 10.4). These departments
management also have cabinet-level status, meaning that they are headed by secretaries or ministers who
control. Usually are members of the cabinet or the council of ministers, which gives them a more central role
structured as a
formal hierarchy,
in government. There is also a clear pecking order: the most important departments typically
often established include foreign affairs, fi nance, defence, and justice.
by statute, and Both the range of public activities and their organization in government varies across countries.
usually having While most, for example, have a single Department of Energy, Nigeria has separate departments
cabinet-level of energy, petroleum resources, and power. Some countries have a department of culture but
status.
many do not, the United States is almost unique in having a cabinet-level Department of Veterans
Affairs, and countries vary in how they allocate responsibility for economic policy, finance,
investment, and monetary affairs. Finally, departments will periodically be renamed, split, or combined according to
changing circumstances, producing a changing departmental landscape. In 2018, for example, Britain had a department
overseeing the country’s exit from the European Union, while Japan had ministers appointed to deal with matters as
varied as the declining birth-rate, ‘working-style reform’, and nuclear emergency preparedness. (For more details on
the Japanese bureaucracy, see Spotlight Japan.)
Most countries have followed a similar sequence in creating departments, a pattern that reflects the expansion of
the state. The oldest are typically those performing essential state functions such as finance, law and order, defence,
and foreign affairs. Britain has a treasury dating back at least to the Norman invasion of 1066, the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs can be traced back at least to the sixteenth century, and the United States has Departments of State and
the Treasury dating from 1789. Subsequently, countries added new departments to deal with new functions, including
agriculture, trade, and labour. Later in the twentieth century came welfare departments dealing with social security, ed-
ucation, health, and housing. Among the more important recent additions have been departments of the environment,
founded in nearly every country since the late 1960s. Several countries – including Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, New
Zealand, South Africa, and Sri Lanka – have departments dealing with women’s affairs.
 bureaucracies 167

Policy area United States Britain Japan Mexico Nigeria Russia

Foreign
Treasury/ finance
Defence
Health
Internal affairs
Education
Justice
Labour
Trade
Transport
Agriculture
Environment
Culture
Regional affairs
Urban
Energy
Business
Local government
Other
TOTAL 15 22 19 19 29 22
Policy areas in which countries have departments Policy areas in which countries do not have
departments

Figure 10.4 Government departments in selected countries

Source: Government websites of the six countries.
Note: Arrangements as of mid-2018 (names, number, and distribution of departments change over time). Excludes divisions, agencies, and regulatory
bodies.

Reflecting Weber’s principles, the internal structure of departments is usually hierarchical (see Figure 10.5). At
the top there are secretaries or ministers and their deputies, who are political appointees and who will come and
go as they are reshuffled or as governments change. Below them sits the permanent career civil service, headed by a
senior department official responsible both for administration and for providing the crucial bridge between political
and administrative levels. In theory, secretaries direct and
career bureaucrats execute, but the behavioural approach
Secretary or minister to comparison reveals that the reality is more complex and
perhaps even disturbing. After all, permanent officials have
the advantage over transient political secretaries of longer
Deputy secretary Deputy secretary service, deeper experience, more information and denser
or minister of minister networks of peers in other departments. In these circum-
stances, providing the department with effective political
Senior Political level
leadership requires skills for which secretaries are usually
department inadequately prepared.
official Administrative level Two factors can facilitate political control of a depart-
ment. First, the greater the number of appointments made
by a secretary within a department, the easier it is to impose
Head of Head of Head of a specific direction. Recognizing that senior bureaucrats
division division division themselves require political craft, many democracies now
tend to staff important departments with politically loyal
Figure 10.5 The structure of a government department and sympathetic bureaucrats. This practice, long familiar in
168
SPOTLIGHT JAPAN
chapter 10

Brief profile
Japan is a leading example of a state where modern ideals of liberal democracy have been grafted onto a society
with its own distinctive traditions. Notable for its long history of isolation (helped by its physical isolation from
the Asian continent), and for its reinvention following defeat in World War II, Japan’s experience suggests that it
is possible for a society to change without losing sight of its identity. The most obvious signs of its modernity can
be found in its economic and technological development; it is the third largest economy in the world, and a major
source of global capital and credit, as well as home to many of the world’s major corporations. Its political system
has, however, been compromised by traditional Japanese ideas about faction, obligation, and group identity,
resulting in its recent downgrading in the Democracy Index from a full to a flawed democracy.

Form of government Unitary parliamentary democracy with a ceremonial emperor. Date of state
formation debatable, and most recent constitution adopted 1947.
Executive Parliamentary. The head of government is the prime minister, who is head of the
largest party or coalition, and governs in conjunction with a cabinet. The head of
state is the emperor.
Legislature Bicameral Diet: lower House of Representatives (465 members) elected for
renewable four-year terms, and upper House of Councillors (242 members)
elected for renewable six-year terms, which is less significant.
Judiciary The 15-member Supreme Court possesses the power of judicial review but has
proved unassertive. Unusually, the Court’s justices are directly appointed by the
cabinet, and subject to voter confirmation at the first general election that
follows, and every ten years thereafter, with mandatory retirement at age 70.
Electoral system Mixed member majoritarian system: 296 members of the lower house are elected
using single-member plurality, and 179 through party list proportional
representation (PR). In the upper house, 146 elected using single non-transferable
vote, and 96 through PR.
Parties Multi-party. Long dominated by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP). The Democratic Party is more socially liberal, the Innovation Party is
nationalist, and Japan still has an active Communist Party.

127m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$4.9tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$38,428 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 The bureaucracy in Japan
Relative to their counterparts in most other
democracies, Japanese bureaucrats are
remarkably powerful. Their authority is born
of exclusivity; in 2017, only 1,900 (or 9 per cent)
of the more than 20,500 people who took the
civil service entrance exam passed ( Japan
Times, 2017). Working in the bureaucracy is
also a high status career offering good benefits
and the prospect of desirable post-retirement
jobs in the private sector and local
government.
The influence of Japanese bureaucrats is
enhanced by the relative weakness of the
legislature and of political parties, the high
turnover of government ministers (because of the
short life of most Japanese administrations –
Office workers in central Tokyo, home to the central government and
see Chapter 8), the close association between
bureaucracy of Japan. Japanese bureaucrats are notable for the
government departments and the elements of
demanding entrance exam they must pass and the long hours they are
society they serve, and the ability of bureaucrats
expected to work.
to issue ordinances that are designed to clarify
Source: iStock/kobbydagan.
the technical content of laws, but that often
have the effect of changing the intent of laws (Hayes, 2017). Little wonder, then, that Miyamoto Masao, a civil servant
in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, once quipped (with a hint of hyperbole) that ‘power in Japan is held 90 per
cent by bureaucrats and only 10 per cent by politicians’ (cited in Beason and Patterson, 2004).
The bureaucracy played a substantial role in Japanese post-war reconstruction, and was closely intertwined
with the governing Liberal Democratic Party as well as big business. In the post-war decades of high growth, Japan
provided the pre-eminent example of
how a small, merit-based bureaucracy,
operating largely on the basis of RUSSIA
persuasion, could guide rapid economic CHINA
development within a mainly market
framework. But this changed in the PACIFIC
1990s, against a background of state-
NORTH KOREA
JAPAN OCEAN
led deflation and the involvement of
bureaucrats in bribery cases, scandals TOKYO
which made some large companies SOUTH KOREA Osaka
more wary of hiring retired
bureaucrats. More fundamentally, civil
servants could no longer offer the
same strategic direction to industry in
a global economy, given that the largest
companies now operated on a world Further reading
scale and some overseas corporations Hayes, Louis D. (2017) Introduction to Japanese Politics, 6th edn (Routledge).
had become established in Japan. Even Stockwin, Arthur, and Kweku Ampiah (2017) Rethinking Japan: The
so, Japanese bureaucrats remain Politics of Contested Nationalism (Lexington).
powerful, professional, and small in Sugimoto, Yoshio (2015) An Introduction to Japanese Society, 4th edn
number when compared to many (Cambridge University Press).
other democracies.
170 chapter 10

Germany and Finland, has spread to other Western democracies (Peters, 2013). Deepening the political tier gives the
secretary more friends in the department.
Second, direction can be helped by providing secretaries with political advisory staff . Because such advisers do not
form part of the department’s permanent staff , they can act as their secretary’s eyes and ears, reporting back on issues
which might otherwise be lost in the official hierarchy. In New Zealand, every minister’s office featured a political
adviser by 2006 (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2007). Alternatively, as in France, ministers are helped by a personal cabinet of
about 15 to 20 people who form an advisory staff working directly under the control of the secretary. This model is
reflected in the European Commission, the main bureaucratic and executive body of the European Union, where the
commissioners (equivalent to ministers) each have a cabinet of advisers, with rules designed to ensure a good mix from
several EU countries. Where bureaucrats know that they can outlast a particularly difficult secretary, personal advisers
realize that their position depends on providing effective support to the current occupant (see also Focus 10.2 on
keeping bureaucrats accountable).

Divisions
Division Government departments are typically arranged into divisions or sections, each responsible
An operating unit for a particular aspect of the department’s work. An education department, for example, might
of a department, include separate divisions for primary, secondary, and higher education. Divisions are the
responsible to the operating units of departments, the sections within which the work gets done. They are the
secretary but workhorses of government, the store of its experience and, in practice, the site where many
often with
considerable
important decisions are reached.
independence. In some democracies, divisions have added importance because they are partially autono-
Also known as mous from their parent department. The extreme case is the United States, whose bureaucracy
sections or bureaus, is the great exception to Weber’s principle of hierarchy within departments. US federal gov-
or (confusingly) as ernment departments are more like multinational corporations, containing many divisions (or
departments in
countries where
agencies) jostling within a single shell. For example, the Department of Health and Human
the larger unit is a Services includes 12 operating divisions (see Table 10.2). The autonomy of bureaus within US
ministry. departments derives from their direct funding by Congress, and is a major and underestimated
reason why US presidents have such difficulty in imposing their will on the federal adminis-
trative process.
Even in governments with more hierarchical departments, it would be wrong to suppose that working practices
correspond exactly to organizational charts. Rarely does information move smoothly up and down the administrative
pyramid. For example, the many divisions in Germany’s 14 federal ministries have a concentration of expertise that
enables them to block, or at least circumvent, reforms proposed from on high. A monopoly of knowledge creates the
potential to neutralize change. In most democracies, divisions within departments also have their own ethos derived
from long experience with their subject area. This entrenched in-house view breeds a natural cynicism towards the
latest political initiative, and helps to account for the frustration many newly appointed secretaries feel in steering their
department in new directions.

Table 10.2 Divisions within the US Department of Health and Human Services

Administration for Children and Families Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Administration for Community Living Food and Drug Administration
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Health Resources and Services Administration
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Indian Health Service
Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood National Institutes of Health
Partnerships Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Administration

Source: US Department of Health and Human Services (2018).

 bureaucracies 171

Non-departmental public bodies

Departments and their internal divisions are what we usually associate with bureaucracies, but Non-
there is another type of public organization that is growing in importance: the non- departmental
departmental public body. These operate at one remove from government departments, public body
with a formal relationship of at least semi-independence. Throughout the democratic world, Operates at one
such bodies are growing in number, complicating not only the academic task of mapping or more removes
from the
government, but also the practical job of ensuring that the government as a whole acts
government,
coherently. providing
These bodies include state-owned entities (such as postal services or health care services), management
agencies contracted to deliver government services, agencies providing advice to government, flexibility and
and agencies charged with regulating an aspect of social life in which the public interest is at political
independence.
stake. They occupy an ambivalent position, created and funded by the government, but – unlike
divisions within a department – free from day-to-day secretarial control. Once appointed by the
government, their leaders and staff operate with considerable autonomy.
There are several reasons behind their creation and continued existence:

◆◆ To operate with more flexibility (and at lower cost) than would be acceptable for a department.
◆◆ To acknowledge the professional status and autonomy of their staff.
◆◆ As a response to short-term pressures to do something about a problem.
◆◆ To allow departments to focus on policy-making.
Regulatory
◆◆ To provide protection from political interference in day-to-day operations.
agency
An independent
One type is a regulatory agency. This is a body set up to oversee the implementation of government body
government regulations, in areas that include natural monopolies (such as water or energy created to set and
supply), communications, elections, food standards, and environmental quality. Regulatory impose standards
agencies are increasing in number in nearly all democracies, partly to balance risks which cannot in a focused area
of activity.
be well judged by the private sector. For example, weighing the benefits of introducing a new

The Federal District of Brasilia, the capital city of Brazil that was founded in 1960. Although intended to help bring Brazil
together, its impressive design and organization has failed to address corruption and economic inequality.
Source: iStock/tirc83.
172 chapter 10

drug against the danger of side effects is a task for public-minded experts, rather than for self-interested drug
companies. Britain has embraced regulatory agencies with enthusiasm; over 140 agencies, from the Food Standards
Agency to Ofcom (the regulator of the communications industries) now provide a central device through which the
state seeks to oversee society.
The United States offers the most established system of independent regulatory agencies. The first such body
created there was the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887–1995), which has since been joined by the Federal
Communications Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and a host of others.The idea behind these bodies is that they should operate in a technical
and non-political fashion. Despite their power to make, implement, and settle disputes about regulations in their sector,
commissioners do not report to the president and can only be dismissed by the president for specific reasons set out
in the law creating the agency.
The European Union has also been active on the regulatory front. Its rules include regulations that are applicable in
all the member states and that typically set a technical standard or goal that member states are required to implement
by a target date. Along the way, it has created an expanding body of specialized agencies that are charged with helping
make or oversee policy in areas ranging from drugs and drug addiction to health and safety at work, new medicinal
products, trademarks, maritime and aviation safety, food safety, disease prevention, and electronic communication (see
McCormick, 2015, Chapter 14). In many cases – such as the registration of new chemicals – the EU has gone on to
establish global standards and to compel regulatory change in its major trading partners.

Unified
recruitment how bureaucrats are recruited
An approach
based on Recruitment lies at the heart of the debate about bureaucracies; how bureaucrats are selected,
recruitment to the and the kinds of people employed, are studied carefully because of what they tell us about the
civil service as a character of bureaucracies. The main difference is between unified and departmental
whole, not to a recruitment; the former is based on recruitment to the bureaucracy as a whole, and the
specific job within
it, and in which latter on recruitment to specific departments based on technical skills. Britain exemplifies
administrative the unified approach, where administration is seen as the art of judgement, born of intelligence
work is conceived and matured by experience. Specialist knowledge is valuable, but a good administrator is
as requiring expected to serve in a variety of departments and is considered more rounded for having
intelligence and done so.
education, rather
than technical One variation on the unified approach is to recruit to a corps (body) of civil servants, rather
knowledge. than to a specific job in a ministry. France is an example of this approach. It recruits civil serv-
ants through competitive examinations to such bodies as the Diplomatic Corps and the Finance
Departmental Inspectorate. Although recruitment is to a specific corps with a specialized title, it is as much an
recruitment enrolment into an elite within which more than one-third of corps members are working away
An approach based from their home corps at any one time (Proeller and Schedler, 2007).
on recruiting
In the departmental recruitment model, by contrast, recruiters look for specialist experts
people with
technical for individual departments; so the finance department will employ economists and the health
backgrounds to a department will employ staff with medical training. When staff leave, they often move to
specific similar jobs in the private sector rather than to different departments in government. This
department or job. approach is common in countries with a relatively weak state, such as the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the United States. In the Netherlands, for example, each department sets its own
Affirmative
recruitment standards, usually requiring prior training and expertise in its own area. Once
action
Policies designed appointed, worker mobility is limited: staff who remain in public service typically stay in the
to overcome the same department for their entire career (Andeweg and Irwin, 2014). The notion of recruit-
legacy of past ing talented young graduates to an elite, unified civil service, or even to a corps, is weak or
discrimination by non-existent.
emphasizing the One exception to the general rule of selection on merit is affirmative action, found
recruitment of
women, ethnic in countries that have worked to address the dominating position in the higher levels of the
minorities, and bureaucracy of men from the major ethnic group and from middle- or upper-class families with
other groups a background in public affairs. The goal here has been to make the bureaucracy more represent-
under-represented ative of the wider population, by gender, race, education, and economic background. In a logic
in the related to the idea of descriptive representation in legislatures (see Chapter 8), there are various
bureaucracy.
arguments in favour:
 bureaucracies 173

80
70

Percentage share of total

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
en

SA

ico

an

ey
ad

an
lan
U

rk
Jap
ed

ex
an

m
Po

Tu
Sw

er

M
C

G
Women in the bureaucracy Women in total labour force

Figure 10.6 Women in the bureaucracy and the labour force

Source: International Labour Organization, quoted in OECD (2017a).
Note: Figures are for 2016.

◆◆ Bureaucrats whose work involves direct contact with a specific group will perform better at the job if they
themselves belong to that group.
◆◆ A public sector drawn from a range of religions and regions will encourage stability in divided societies.
◆◆ A diverse and representative bureaucracy, involving participation by all major social groups, will enhance the
acceptability of decisions among the public at large.
◆◆ Employment of minorities in the public sector will ripple through the labour market, including private
companies.

Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, considerable efforts were made in the United States to ensure that staff
profiles matched those of the wider population. Something similar happened in Canada, where governments
wanted to improve recruitment from French-speakers. However, such schemes never achieved the same popularity
in Europe, perhaps because they would have involved accepting the inadequacy of the constitutional requirement
of neutrality imposed on some civil services.
At least in democracies, women today make up a larger percentage of the workforce in government than in the
general labour force (see Figure 10.6). This has been the result not just of affirmative action but also of efforts by gov-
ernment to offer more flexible working conditions, paid parental leave, subsidized childcare, and other benefits that
make it easier for women to work. The numbers, though, are due at least in part to the over-representation of women
in secretarial, part-time, and social care positions, and they remain under-represented at the higher administrative levels
(OECD, 2017a).

bureaucracies in authoritarian states

Nigeria is a country with a lengthy experience of military government: nearly 30 years in all, since becoming
independent in 1960. Because military governments almost always suspend civilian governing institutions when
they come to power, it might be reasonable to suppose that they also suspend the bureaucracy. In fact, the
opposite has been true in Nigeria. When soldiers come to power, they need the knowledge and experience of
bureaucrats to make sure that government keeps running, so the bureaucrats remain in office. During early
military administrations (1966–79), Nigeria was governed through two bodies: a Supreme Military Council
(SMC) made up of senior officers, and which functioned as the principal policy-making forum, and a Federal
Executive Council made up of senior bureaucrats, which was responsible for implementing the decisions of the
SMC. Much the same happened during the second military era (1983–99): the new Armed Forces Ruling
Council worked alongside a group of senior bureaucrats charged with making sure that military directives were
implemented.
174 chapter 10

Focus 10.2
Keeping bureaucrats accountable

In the campaign that led up to the June 2016 Brexit vote in Britain, one of the complaints most often levelled
at the European Union was that it was run by ‘unelected and unaccountable’ bureaucrats. This was a
disingenuous assertion: none of the staff of government departments in member states and international
organizations are elected, while senior staff in the EU institutions are appointed by elected governments,
just as they are in national government. But how important is the question of accountability? Bureaucrats
can be seen as servants. Clearly, while bureaucrats are the servants of government they are also the servants
of either the state or the people (or increasingly of both). The balance between these conceptions varies
across countries and, within them, over time.
Max Weber warned of the difficulties of keeping bureaucrats accountable, and of preventing them from
obstructing the goals of elected governments. Commentators continue to recognize that the bureaucracy’s
expertise, permanence, scale, and control of implementation mean that it is bound to be more than a mere
conduit for political directives. Increasingly, democratic governments have sought to broaden the
interpretation of accountability, requiring senior officials to defend their behaviour after the fact, rather
than regarding them solely as advisers on and executors of political decisions. In this way, accountability
both acknowledges and potentially defuses Weber’s fear of bureaucratic power.
Specifically, senior officials are made accountable not only to ministers in their own departments, but
also to the executive, to the legislatures that usually control the purse strings, to legislative committees, and
even to courts. Finally, outsourcing has helped changed the channels of accountability, because issuing and
renewing contracts is tied directly to performance.
A distinctively European tool of accountability that has much unmet potential is the
Ombudsman
A public official
ombudsman. A public watchdog that investigates claims of maladministration, the
appointed by a first ombudsman was created in Sweden in 1809, but the idea was not emulated
legislature to elsewhere until much later: 1919 in Finland, after 1945 in other democracies, and 1995
investigate in the European Union (see Hoffmann and Ziller, 2017). They are now found in about
allegations of 90 countries, but most work at the local or sectional level; states with a national
maladministration
in the public
ombudsman include most European countries as well as Argentina, Australia, Botswana,
sector. Gambia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Peru. A single advocate may cover the
entire public sector, or separate commissioners may be appointed for specific areas.

What this example illustrates is the difficulty of making distinctions between the place of bureaucracies in
democracies and in authoritarian regimes. In almost all the other chapters in this book, there are relatively clear
differences: institutions and channels of representation – such as elections, competitive parties, and freely organized
interest groups – are weaker in authoritarian states than in democracies, because control is top-down rather than
bottom-up. When it comes to bureaucracies, however, the usual rules do not apply: while dictators can manipulate
or even dispense with elections or legislatures, they – like their democratic counterparts – fi nd it hard to govern
effectively without officials to keep their countries running.
Consider the results of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) that is published annually by the World Economic
Forum, comparing the different factors that drive national levels of economic productivity around the world. The
index combines more than 110 indicators, among which the efficiency of bureaucracies looms large. Education, infra-
structure, technology, tax rates, and corruption are all important as well, but an inefficient bureaucracy will be a major
handicap, not just in regard to the quality of governance but also in its effects on corruption, policy stability, labour
regulations, and access to finance.
While it might reasonably be supposed that the bureaucracies of democracies will fare well on the GCI, and those
of authoritarian systems not so well, this is always not the case:

◆◆ In multiple hybrid and authoritarian states – such as Algeria, Bangladesh, China, and Iran – an inefficient
bureaucracy is ranked, as we might expect, among the major handicaps to good business. At the same time, it
 bureaucracies 175

is considered less troublesome in several authoritarian states blighted by corruption and political instability, such
as Venezuela, Vietnam, and Yemen.
◆◆ At the same time, an inefficient bureaucracy is also seen as a leading problem in several democracies, including
Australia, Austria, Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and multiple Eastern
European states that have still not shaken off the heritage of their Soviet-dominated past.
◆◆ Meanwhile, in Russia – heartland of the infamously inefficient Soviet bureaucracy – bureaucratic inefficiency
is considered only a middle-ranking problem for business, significantly below corruption and prohibitive
tax rates.

It is important to note that the GCI ranking is based in large part on the perception of those doing business in
each of these countries (nearly 15,000 business executives were surveyed in order to compile the index), that the
role of different barriers to business is relative from one country to another, and that several countries that do not
do well on the efficiency of their bureaucracies are ranked highly on overall competitiveness (Switzerland, for
example, ranks fi rst on overall competitiveness, but ranks low on the efficiency of its bureaucracy – see Figure 10.7).
Nonetheless, the index illustrates the broader point about the difficulty of drawing general contrasts between
bureaucracies in democracies and authoritarian states.
Indeed, much of the discussion about bureaucracies in authoritarian regimes has focused
on how they can play a positive role in economic development even against a background of Bureaucratic
authoritarian government. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, bureaucrats helped to foster authoritaria-
economic modernization in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa. In Latin nism
Regimes in which
America, this phenomenon prompted the coining of the term bureaucratic authoritarianism bureaucrats
(O’Donnell, 1973) to describe the manner in which bureaucracies in countries such as Argentina impose economic
and Brazil ruthlessly pursued economic reform under a cover provided by repressive military stability under the
leadership. A similar pattern was later repeated in the high-performing economies of East Asia, protection of a
such as Indonesia and Malaysia, the effect being – as in the cases of Argentina and Brazil – military
government.
to help pull them out of authoritarianism.

Costa Rica
Canada
Switzerland
New Zealand
Japan
Mexico
Brazil
France
Iran
UK
Nigeria
Egypt
Germany
Turkey
China
Venezuela
South Africa
Sweden
Russia
USA
India
Singapore

0 5 10 15 20 25
% of respondents identifying inefficient bureaucracy as a barrier to doing business

Full/flawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states

Figure 10.7 Comparing perceptions of bureaucratic inefficiency

Source: Based on data in Global Competitiveness Report 2017–18 (Schwab, 2018).
176 chapter 10

Developmen- This concept overlaps with that of the developmental state, first used by Johnson (1982)
tal state to describe Japan, and situations in which a country that was late to industrialize was pushed
One in which the by active government intervention. The term has since been used more broadly to describe
state intervenes countries where economic policy is guided and overseen by powerful bureaucratic elites;
heavily in the
examples include flawed democracies such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, hybrids such as Thai-
economy through
regulation and land, and authoritarian states such as China and Vietnam. Following the Japanese and South
planning, relying Korean model, most of these developmental states have seen rapid economic progress, and
on an efficient even – in some of them – democratization. The contrast is with so-called predatory states such
bureaucracy. as Venezuela and Zimbabwe, which extract resources, provide little of value in return to their
people, and see no democratization. The broader point is that governments can be encouraged
Crony by their bureaucrats to use what might seem to be quasi-authoritarian means to push a country
capitalism
A phenomenon in
to a take-off level of economic development, generating further growth that might then induce
which economic pressures to democratize.
development is China is a key example of this process. So (2015) argues that it has moved from a revolu-
based on a close tionary state to a development state, following many of the steps taken earlier by (now more
relationship democratic) East Asian states. The autonomy of the Chinese state, he argues, gives it the capacity
between
government
to make and implement policy, to suppress dissent so as to make sure that foreign and domestic
officials and investors are not scared away, and to allow bureaucrats to play a key role in turning state-owned
business leaders, enterprises into profit-making concerns. All, though, is not well in China, which has particularly
reflected in special suffered – along with Russia – from the effects of what is called crony capitalism (a prob-
tax breaks and lem found not just in authoritarian regimes, but also in democracies such as the United States,
favouritism in
issuing contracts,
Britain, and India).
permits, or grants. Described by Pei (2016) as ‘collusion among elites’, the problem of crony capitalism in China
helped spur President Xi Jinping into launching an anti-corruption drive in 2012 that resulted
in numerous bureaucrats being sent to jail. This form of collusive corruption, argues Pei, is more
destructive than individual corruption because it undermines the organizational fabric of the state, is more difficult to
detect, produces greater financial gains for its perpetrators, and undermines the ability of local government to provide
public goods. In the worst cases, he continue,‘corruption networks, consisting of officials, businessmen, and gangsters, seize
control of [local government] jurisdictions and turn them into local mafia states’.
Even though there are examples of the bureaucracy instigating successful modernization in authoritarian regimes,
there are also cases of bureaucracies that have inhibited, rather than encouraged, growth. In many sub-Saharan
African states, for example, authoritarian leaders have often used their control over public appointments as a political
reward, undermining the delicate distinction between politics and administration. This cavalier approach to public
appointments has even extended to absorbing excess labour (especially among new graduates) into the administra-
tion. Public sector expansion was often used as a method of buying support, or at least of preventing the emergence
of opposition, such that by the early 1990s, public employment accounted for most non-agricultural employment
in much of the region (Smith, 2013). Once appointed, public employees found that ties of kinship meant that they
were duty-bound to use their privileged positions to reward their families and ethnic group, producing further
employment growth.
Bureaucracies became bloated, over-politicized, and inefficient, acting as a drag on further progress, and becoming
incapable of acting as an effective instrument for development. Instead, the administrative class extracted resources from
society for its own benefit, continuing rather than replacing the colonial model. With the main sources of national
wealth (e.g. commodity exports) under state control, public employment became the highway to riches, creating a
bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Only relatively recently, under pressure from international agencies, have attempts made to
rein in the public sector through an emphasis on building administrative capacity (Turner et
Administra- al., 2015).
tive capacity Moving away from the economic role of bureaucrats, and looking instead at their politi-
The ability of a cal role, we find another area in which the differences between democracies and authoritarian
bureaucracy to
systems are not always as great as might be expected: in both contexts, and in spite of the Webe-
address social
problems through rian idea of specialization that discourages lateral moves, we find that working in administration
effective can sometimes be as much a path for recruitment to the political elite as experience in elective
management and politics. We will see this in Chapter 18 with discussion about the existence in democracies of
implementation of revolving doors and iron triangles, and the close political relationship that often exists between
public policy.
interest groups, legislatures, and government ministries. Similar dynamics are sometimes found
 bureaucracies 177

also in authoritarian systems, where bureaucrats can use careers in state administration as a launchpad for achieving
prominence in business or politics.
Russia offers a good example. There, notes Huskey (2010), thanks to the elimination of the Communist Party as
the key path to influence or high office in government, and thanks to the efforts by the Putin administration to exert
control, careers in the bureaucracy have overtaken those in business or politics as the major paths to influence and high
office. Among the effects: those in senior political and administrative positions are highly unrepresentative of the social
background of Russians as a whole, enhanced elite cohesion means less openness and political competition, and –
­lacking links to society – ‘political elites are atomized actors in a vast bureaucracy where the only protection comes
from membership in an informal network or, increasingly, loyalty to the president’.
The power of senior Russian bureaucrats has been deepened by the centralization of the nominally federal Russian
state under President Putin (see Chapter 11). Slider (2014) points out that the structure of the Russian bureaucracy has
helped build the power of its senior members: instead of a single channel of authority reaching down from the centre
to the parts, there are many dozens of channels, with federal ministries and agencies overseeing their own chains of
command. This has resulted in an explosion in the number of federal employees working in Moscow as well as in the
regions. In spite of proposals to decentralize, and thereby improve the efficiency of government and reduce opportu-
nities for corruption, President Putin has opted for a centralized system, thereby clearly strengthening his control over
his vast country.
178 chapter 10

discussion questions
◆◆ What images most immediately come to mind when you think of bureaucrats, and to what
extent do you think those images reflect reality?
◆◆ Outsourcing: good idea or bad? Are there some services that cannot or should not be
carried out by private contractors? If so, which ones and why?
◆◆ To what extent is e-government changing the personality of bureaucracy? Are the changes
good or bad?
◆◆ Should senior bureaucrats be elected? What would be the implications of making such a
change?
◆◆ Should more governments introduce the idea of allowing senior government ministers/
secretaries to have political advisory staff ?
◆◆ What accounts for the looseness of the correlation between bureaucratic efficiency in
democracies and authoritarian systems?

key terms
◆◆ Administrative capacity ◆◆ Meritocracy
◆◆ Affirmative action ◆◆ New public management
◆◆ Bureaucracy ◆◆ Non-departmental public body
◆◆ Bureaucratic authoritarianism ◆◆ Ombudsman
◆◆ Crony capitalism ◆◆ Outsourcing
◆◆ Department ◆◆ Red tape
◆◆ Departmental recruitment ◆◆ Regulatory agency
◆◆ Developmental state ◆◆ Spoils system
◆◆ Division ◆◆ Unified recruitment
◆◆ E-government

further reading
Hummel, Ralph P. (2015) The Bureaucratic Experience: The Post-Modern Challenge, 5th edn
(Routledge). Argues that despite frequent talk of bureaucratic reform, its organizational
structure continues to remain mainly unchanged.
Massey, Andrew (ed.) (2011) International Handbook on Civil Service Systems (Edward Elgar). A
comparative assessment of the structure of bureaucracies, including chapters on Europe,
the United States, China, Japan, India, and other countries.
Nixon, Paul G., Vassiliki N. Koutrakou, and Rajash Rawal (eds) (2010) Understanding
E-Government in Europe: Issues and Challenges (Routledge). The mainly thematic chapters
in this book examine the impact of information and communication technology on
governance in Europe.
Peters, B. Guy (2018) The Politics of Bureaucracy: An Introduction to Comparative Public
Administration, 7th edn (Routledge). A widely used comparative introduction to
bureaucracy.
Van der Meer, Frits M., Jos C. N. Raadschelders, and Theo A. J. Toonen (eds) (2015)
Comparative Civil Service Systems in the 21st Century, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan).
Includes chapters on bureaucracies in western and eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Van der Wal, Zeger (2017) The 21st Century Public Manager (Red Globe Press). Although
written for aspiring and current public managers, this is a useful assessment of the world
of bureaucracies.
sub-national
11

Source: iStock/Lukas Bischoff

governments
contents
◆ Sub-national
governments: an
overview
◆ Multi-level governance
PREVIEW ◆ Unitary systems
Comparative politics tends to focus mostly on activities at the national ◆ Federal systems
level, but it can just as easily compare government and politics at the ◆ Local government
regional, city, and local levels. The functional equivalents of national
executives, legislatures, and courts can all be found at some or all of ◆ Sub-national
these levels, particularly in federal systems, meaning that no study of government in
politics and government in a given state can afford to ignore them. authoritarian states
Ironically, most voters tend to overlook the work of sub-national
government: many of the services that most immediately impact their
lives come from regional and local government, and local officials are
usually more accessible than their national counterparts, and yet turnout at regional and local elections is much
lower than at national elections.
This chapter begins with a review of the concept of multi-level governance, which describes the many horizontal
and vertical interactions that often exist among different tiers of government. It then looks at the two most common
models for the functioning of systems of national government: unitary and federal. Unitary systems are found in
most countries, and work best in those that are both smaller and more homogeneous. Federal systems are rarer, but
they are found in most of the world’s larger countries, expanding their reach and global significance. The chapter
then looks at the structures and functions of local government, touching on the growing importance of urban
government, and ending with a review of the dynamics of sub-national government in authoritarian regimes,
where traditional rulers sometimes still play a role.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Multi-level governance is a framework for examining the relationships among different levels of
administration (supranational, national, regional, and local).
◆◆ Most countries use a unitary form of government, in which regional and local units are subsidiary to
national government.
◆◆ Other countries are federal, made up of two or more levels of government with independent powers.
◆◆ Unitary states are just as tiered as federal states, and often more so. The strengthening of regional
government is a significant trend within unitary states.
◆◆ Local government is still the place where the citizen most often meets the state, and yet it is studied
much less than it deserves.
◆◆ Sub-national government in authoritarian states has less formal power and independence than its
democratic equivalent, but authoritarian rulers might rely on local leaders to sustain their grip on power.
180 chapter 11

sub-national governments: an overview

While national or central government (the terms are interchangeable) concerns itself with the interests of the entire
state, and with the relationships that exist among sovereign states, sub-national government focuses almost entirely
on domestic matters. It involves different kinds of mid-level government (states, provinces, or regions within a
country), as well as local government units of the kinds found in towns, cities, and other localities, and coming
under a variety of names, including boroughs, communes, counties, districts, municipalities, parishes, and
prefectures.
Every country broadly orders sub-national government in one of two ways: as a unitary
Unitary system or as a federal system. In the former, national government has sole sovereignty,
system meaning that regional and local government exists at the pleasure of national government,
One in which with only as much power as is granted to it by the centre. In the latter, the national and
sovereignty rests
with the national
regional governments have independent existence and powers; neither level can abolish the
government, and other. There are many nuances in the manner in which unitary and federal systems are
regional or local arranged, a picture that is further complicated by federal systems that function more like
units have no unitary systems (such as Russia), and unitary systems that function more like federal systems
independent (such as Britain and Spain).
powers.
About two dozen countries are constitutionally established as federations, but because they
Federal include almost all the largest countries (the most notable exception being China), they contain
system a large share of the world’s population: about 37 per cent to be exact. Meanwhile, nearly 90
One in which per cent of the member states of the United Nations are unitary, but because many of them are
sovereignty is so small, they are home to only 63 per cent of the world’s population (or only 43 per cent if
shared between we exclude China) (calculation based on data in World Bank, 2018).
two or more
The internal relationships within unitary states differ from those in federal states, as do the
levels of
government, each ways in which citizens view government. In unitary systems, politics tend to be focused at the
with independent national level. Lower tiers still matter, but the most substantial political issues are national in
powers and scope, and there is more of a sense among citizens that they are part of the national political
responsibilities. community. In federal systems, by contrast, the regional units have more independence, their
agendas can achieve more prominence, and they matter more in the political calculations of
citizens. Furthermore, because they have independent powers, states within federations have more leverage relative
to national government than is the case in unitary systems.
While the common unit of analysis in comparative politics is the state, we should not ignore local government,
which deals with matters that are close to our daily lives, including police and emergency services, public transport,
land use planning, and public works such as road maintenance and waste removal. With more than half the
population of the world now living in towns and cities, we particularly need to understand how urban government
is structured, how it makes decisions, and the pressures that come to bear on those decisions. In authoritarian
systems, meanwhile, local politics is often more real to people than the decisions of distant urban elites. Without
the same capacity for centralization found in many democracies, local leaders are given much leeway to govern, so
long as their actions do not threaten the national government.

Multi-level
governance multi-level governance
An administrative
system in which Multi-level governance (MLG) is a term used to describe how policy-makers and interest
power is groups in liberal democracies fi nd themselves discussing, persuading, and negotiating across
distributed and multiple tiers in their efforts to deliver coherent policy in specific functional areas such as
shared transport and education. The underlying argument is that no one level of government acting
horizontally and alone can resolve most policy problems, with the result that multiple levels must cooperate
vertically among
different levels of with one another. MLG is defi ned by Niemann and Schmitter (2009) as follows:
government, from
the supranational an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically
to the local, with independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels of
considerable territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/ deliberation/implementation,
interaction among and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable hierarchy of political
the parts.
authority to any of these levels.
 sub-national governments 181

International agreements

EU institutions

Transnational Transnational
Governments of EU states
cooperation cooperation

Local actors Local authorities Local actors

Citizens

Figure 11.1 Multi-level governance in the European Union

Communication is not confined to officials working at the same or adjacent levels. Rather, international,
national, regional, and local officials in a given sector will form their own policy networks, with interaction
through all tiers. The use of the term governance instead of government directs our attention to these relationships
between institutions, rather than simply the organizations themselves. The dynamic is well illustrated in the case
of the European Union, a unique arrangement in which there is cooperation and influence at every level from the
international to the local, bringing in government and other interests at every level – see Figure 11.1.
The idea of multi-level governance carries a further implication. As with pluralism (see Chapter 18), it recognizes
that actors from a range of sectors – public, private, and voluntary – help to regulate society. In the field of
education, for example, the central government department will want to improve educational achievement in
schools, but in order to achieve its target it will need to work not only with lower tiers within the public sector
(such as education boards), but also with wider interests such as parent associations, teachers’ unions, private sector
suppliers, and educational researchers.
In common with pluralism, MLG can be portrayed in a positive or negative light. On the plus side, it implies a
pragmatic concern with finding solutions to shared problems through give-and-take among affected interests. On
the negative side, it points to a complicated, slow-moving form of regulation by insider groups, resisting both
democratic control and penetration by less mainstream groups and thinking. Multi-level governance may be a
fashionable term but its popularity should not lead us to assume that the form of rule it describes is optimal.
Understanding MLG requires an appreciation of the resources that all tiers of government bring to the table; see
Figure 11.2. Typically, the national level has the most political visibility, large budgets and strategic objectives, but
officials from regional and local levels will have their own power cards: detailed knowledge of the problem and the
ability to judge the quality of the remedies proposed. If lower tiers have both resources and enthusiasm, they can
make a difference; if not, they may lose interest, limiting the ability of the centre to achieve its policy goals.
It would be wrong to infer that power in multi-level governance is merely the ability to persuade. Communication
still operates in a constitutional framework that provides both limits and opportunities for representatives from each
tier. If the constitution allocates responsibility for education to central government, local authorities are unlikely to
build new schools unless the Department of Education signs the cheque. Thus, the formal allocation of responsibilities
remains the rock on which multi-level governance is built; it develops from, without replacing, multi-level
government.

unitary systems
Most of the world’s states have a unitary form of government, meaning that while they have regional and local
political institutions, sovereignty lies ultimately with the national government. Sub-national administrations,
whether regional or local, can make and implement policy, but they do so by leave of the centre. And while sub-
182 chapter 11

Level Features Examples

Supranational Works above the level of European Union
states, bringing together two
or more states with shared
interests

National or Works at the level of a state, Any of the world’s sovereign,

central focusing on the interests of quasi-, or de facto states
the state as a whole

Regional Works at a middle level States or provinces within

between states and local federal systems, or regions
government within unitary states

Local Works at the level closest to Districts, counties, cities,

ordinary citizens, focusing on towns, and communes
local interests

Figure 11.2 Four tiers of government

national government can make and adopt local laws and regulations, it can only do so on matters that are not the
preserve of national government. Reflecting this central supremacy, the national legislature in most unitary states
has only one chamber, since there is no need for a second house to balance national and sub-national interests.
Unitary systems have emerged naturally in societies with a history of rule by sovereign monarchs and emperors,
such as Britain, France, and Japan. In such circumstances, authority radiates from an historic core located in the capital
city. Unitary structures are also the norm in smaller democracies, particularly those without strong ethnic divisions.
In Latin America, nearly all the smaller countries (but none of the three giants, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) are
unitary. The countries of Eastern Europe have also chosen a unitary structure for their post-communist constitutions,
viewing federalism as a spurious device through which Russia tried to obscure its dominance of the Soviet Union.
In contrast to the complexities of federalism (discussed later in this chapter), a unitary structure may seem
straightforward and efficient: there is one central government that holds all the important cards, lower levels doing
only what they are allowed to do by the centre. However, the location of sovereignty is rarely an adequate guide to
political realities, because unitary government is often decentralized. Indeed, there has been an effort in recent
decades in many unitary states to push responsibility for more functions to lower levels.
There are three ways in which this can happen (see Figure 11.3). The first is deconcentration, through which
central government tasks are relocated from the capital to other parts of the country. This spreads the work around,
can help bring jobs and new income to poorer parts of the country, reduces costs by allowing activities to move to
less expensive areas, and frees central departments to focus on policy-making rather than execution. So, for example,
routine tasks such as issuing passports can be deconcentrated to an area with higher unemployment and lower costs.
Deconcentration is made easier by the internet, because so much government work can be done online that
geographical location has become less important.
The second and politically more significant way of dispersing power is through delegation. This involves
transferring or delegating powers from central government to sub-national bodies, and has been very much in favour
in recent decades. Supporters see it as a means of bringing government closer to citizens, but critics charge that many
policy problems – such as economic management – are better dealt with in a unified fashion at the national level.
Scandinavia is the classic example of delegation, where local governments put into effect many welfare
programmes agreed at national level. Sweden in particular has seen a wide array of tasks delegated by the national
parliament (the Riksdag) to regional and local authorities. County councils focus in particular on health care and
aspects of transport and tourism, while lower-level municipalities administer a wide range of responsibilities,
including education, city planning, rescue services, water and sewage, waste collection and disposal, and civil
defence. Together with transparency, accountability, and autonomy for civil servants, such extensive delegation
forms part of what has been described as the ‘Swedish model’ (Levin, 2009).
The third and most radical form of power dispersal is devolution. This occurs when the centre grants decision-
making autonomy (including some legislative powers) to lower levels. Spain is an example here. Where once it was
 sub-national governments 183

Definition
Deconcentration Central government tasks
are shifted from offices in
the capital to those in the
regions or local districts
Example
Britain’s Office of National
Statistics relocated from
London to Wales in 2006,
saving money but also
risking the quality of its data

Delegation Central government Local governments

responsibilities are shifted administer national welfare
to semi-autonomous programmes in Scandinavia
bodies accountable to
central government

Devolution Central government The creation of regional

transfers some decision- governments in France, Italy,
making autonomy to lower Spain, and the UK
levels

Figure 11.3 Dispersing power in unitary systems

Note: Deconcentration and decentralization occur in federal as well as unitary states.

tightly controlled from the centre, its regions were strengthened in the transition to democracy following the death
of Francisco Franco in 1975, and devolution has continued apace ever since. The Basque region in the north of the
country has substantial self-government, and Catalonia in the east was recognized as a distinct nationality in 2006.
Devolution has reached the point where Spain might legally be a unitary state, but in many ways looks and acts
more like a federation.
In Britain, too, power is highly devolved (see Deacon, 2012). There is a national government and Parliament in
London, and Britain is formally a unitary state, but devolved regional assemblies were created in Northern Ireland
in 1998 and in Scotland and Wales in 1999. They could theoretically be abolished by a change of law in London,
and problems in Northern Ireland led to the suspension of its regional assembly between 2002 and 2007, and the
postponement of elections. This could not normally happen in a federal system. But the continued union of Britain
depends to a high degree on balancing government from London with that in the regions, the sensitivity of the
situation in Scotland being emphasized by the narrow defeat in 2014 of a referendum on Scottish independence,
and the huge gains made by the pro-independence Scottish National Party at national elections in 2015, when it
won 56 of the 59 national parliamentary seats in Scotland (although it then lost many of them at the 2017 election).

Regional government
The creation and expansion of the middle tier of government – the regional level – has been an important trend in
many unitary states. (The term regional is used here to describe government below the level of the state, not – as also
happens – cooperation among groups of states.) In a study of 42 mainly high-income countries between 1950
and 2006, Hooghe et al. (2010) found that 29 saw an increase in regional authority compared with only two
showing a decline. The larger the country, the more powerful this middle tier tended to be. As a result of these
developments, unitary states such as France, Italy, and Poland now have three levels of sub-national government:
regional, provincial, and local (see Table 11.1 and Spotlight France). By contrast, China has gone further, with five
levels ranging from provinces to villages. The result is an intricate multi-level system of government.
In origin, many regions were merely spatial units created by the centre to draw attention
to inequalities within a country and to spark policies to reduce them. But in most large
unitary states, specific regional organizations were soon established, and became an Regional
government
administrative vehicle through which the centre could decentralize planning. Regional bodies Middle-level
took responsibility for economic development and related public infrastructure; notably, government in
transport. These bodies were not always directly elected, and were typically created by a unitary states that
push from the centre, rather than a pull from the regions. Regions now provide a valuable takes place below
middle-level perspective below that of the country as a whole but above that of local areas. the national level
and above the
Amalgamation of local governments can achieve some of the same effect but often at greater local level.
political cost, given the importance of traditional communities to many inhabitants.
184 chapter 11

Table 11.1 Regional government in unitary states

Tier Number of units

France Italy UK Poland Sweden China
Highest 26 20 3 16 – 33
Middle 101 103 35 314 20 2,862
Lowest 36,683 8,101 434 2,478 290 41,636
Source: European data from Loughlin et al. (2011), Appendix 1.

Regionalism has been encouraged in the European Union even as its member states have worked to cooperate
in a wide range of policy areas; there is integration at the European level even as there is a greater recognition
of local identities within the member states. A European Regional Development Fund invests directly in the
regions, rather than through central governments, and the EU has a Committee of the Regions composed of
sub-national authorities. Regional cooperation has been at the heart of the development of an EU cohesion
policy aimed at evening out economic and social differences among the member states, involving investments
in poorer parts of the EU and the building of trans-European transport and energy supply networks (see
McCann, 2015).

federal systems
In contrast to unitary systems, where the central government is supreme, and the sub-national levels of government
only do as much as central government allows, authority in federal systems is shared among different levels of
government with entrenched and independent powers. By definition there must be at least two such levels, but
there are typically three: national, regional, and local. (The terminology can be confusing: the national or central
government is usually known as the federal government, and the regional governments are known variously as
states, provinces, or – in Germany and Austria – as Länder (see Table 11.2).) Federalism usually works best either in
large or divided countries, and about two dozen countries meet the definition of a federation, including Brazil,
India, Russia, and the United States; see Map 11.1. Despite its size and diversity, China remains unitary because this
allows for tighter control by the communist party – see later in this chapter.
The key point about a federal partnership is that neither the central nor the regional tier can abolish or reshape
the other, and it is this constitutionally protected position of regional governments – not the extent of their
powers – that distinguishes federations from unitary states. Federations allocate specific functions to each tier,
so that the centre usually takes care of external relations (defence, foreign affairs, trade, and immigration) as well
as key domestic functions, such as the national currency. The regions, meanwhile, are usually left in charge of
matters such as education, local transport, housing, and law enforcement, and residual powers often lie with the
states, not the centre. In nearly all federations, the states have a guaranteed voice in national policy-making
through an upper chamber of the national legislature, in which each state normally receives equal or nearly equal
representation.
There are two routes to a federation: the first – and most common – involves creating a new central authority for
previously separate political units (‘coming together’), and the second involves transferring sovereignty from an
existing national government to lower levels (‘holding together’); see Focus 11.1. Australia, Canada, Nigeria,
Switzerland, and the United States are examples of the first kind, while Belgium is the main example of the second.
First established in 1830, Belgium has long been beset by divisions between its French- and Dutch-speaking regions.
The country finally became a federation in 1993, with three regions (see Map 11.2):

◆◆ Dutch-speaking Vlaanderen in the north.

◆◆ Predominantly French-speaking Wallonia in the south, including a small German-speaking community.
◆◆ The Brussels region, centred on the bilingual but mainly French-speaking capital.

Variations on the theme of federalism

Just as there is no fixed template for a unitary system of government, so federations differ in terms of their internal
dynamics, and in the advantages and disadvantages they bring to government – see Table 11.3. The baseline would
be a neatly organized arrangement in which powers were uniformly divided between the whole and the parts, but
 sub-national governments 185

Map 11.1 The world’s federations

Table 11.2 The world’s federations

Country Year established Population Area (world Number of units in federation

as a federation (world ranking) ranking)
India 1947 2 7 29 states and seven union territories
United States 1789 3 4 50 states and one capital district
Brazil 1891 5 5 26 states and one Federal District
Pakistan 1947 6 33 Four provinces, two federal territories,
two autonomous territories
Nigeria 1960 7 31 36 states and one Federal Capital Territory
Russia 1991 9 1 85 ‘subjects’, including oblasts, republics,
and three federal cities
Mexico 1810 10 13 31 states and one Federal District
Germany 1949 16 62 16 Länder (states)
Canada 1867 37 2 10 provinces and three territories
Australia 1901 52 6 Six states and two territories
Belgium 1993 76 137 Three regions
Switzerland 1848 98 132 26 cantons

Other federations
Argentina Micronesia South Sudan
Austria Nepal Sudan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Palau United Arab Emirates
Ethiopia St Kitts and Nevis Venezuela
Iraq Somalia

Transitional or quasi-federations
Comoros Malaysia Spain
Democratic Republic of Congo South Africa
Source: Based on list in Watts (2008).
Note: The biggest federations are ranked in this table by population. Missing from the ten biggest countries are China (ranked 1), Indonesia (4), and
Bangladesh (8), all of which are unitary.
 SPOTLIGHT FRANCE
Brief profile
France is an important European state facing the challenge of adapting its unique traditions to a more competitive
world. The country has a reputation for exceptionalism based on the long-term impact of the French Revolution
of 1789, which created a distinctive ethos within France. As with other states built on revolution – such as the
United States – France can be considered an ideal as well as a country. However, where American ideals led to
pluralism, the French state is still expected to take the lead in implementing the revolution’s ideals of liberty,
equality, and fraternity. As the country became more modern, urban, and industrial after 1945, however, so
French uniqueness declined: retreat from empire left France, as Britain, as a middle-ranking power with a new
base in the European Union, its society made more complex by immigration from North Africa, and its economy
and governing elites challenged by globalization.

Form of government Unitary semi-presidential republic. Date of state formation debatable, and most
recent constitution (the Fifth Republic) adopted 1958.
Executive Semi-presidential. A president directly elected for no more than two five-year
terms, governing with a prime minister who leads a Council of Ministers accountable
to the National Assembly. There is no vice-president.
Legislature Bicameral Parliament: lower National Assembly (577 members) elected for renewable
five-year terms, and upper Senate (348 members) indirectly elected through local
governments for six-year terms.
Judiciary French law is based on the Napoleonic Codes (1804–11). The Constitutional Council
has grown in significance and has had the power of judicial review since 2008. It has nine
members serving single nine-year terms, with three each appointed by the incumbent
president, the National Assembly, and the Senate. As many as three former presidents
of France may also serve on the Council, although few actually do.
Electoral system A two-round system is used for both presidential and legislative elections, with a
majority vote needed for victory on the first round.
Parties Multi-party, with the Socialists dominating on the left, backed by Greens, leftists,
and radicals, while the Republicans (formerly Union for a Popular Movement)
dominate on the right, and a new centrist party (En Marche!, or Forward!) was the
base for the victory of President Emmanuel Macron in 2017. The far-right National
Rally has also been making gains.

66.9m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$2.6tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$38,477 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Unitary government in
France
France has seen much reorganization of its
sub-national government in recent decades,
leaving it with three levels: regions (16),
départements (96), and communes
(municipalities) (nearly 37,000). Adding to the
complexity of the picture, it also has five
overseas regions or counties (including
French Guiana and Guadeloupe), and
‘intercommunalities’, which bring together
départements and municipalities. Meanwhile,
the three largest French cities – Paris, Lyon,
and Marseille – are further subdivided into
arrondissements.
The distinctive skyline of the French capital of Paris. Along with Lyon
France was once a highly centralized
and Marseille, Paris has a separate status within the French system of
political system, with just two tiers of sub-
local government.
Source: Getty Images/James Farley.
national government: départements and
communes. The network of départements was
created by Napoleon early in the nineteenth century, and each is run by its own prefect and elected assembly.
Napoleon called prefects ‘emperors with small feet’ but, in practice, the prefect must cooperate with local and
regional councils, rather than simply oversee them. Prefects are now agents of départements, representing
interests upwards as much as transmitting commands downwards. In 1972, the départements were grouped into
22 regions, each with their own elected councils, as well as regional economic and social committees that have an
advisory role. (The number of regions was reduced in 2016 to 16.)
Meanwhile, the basic unit of government is the commune, governed by a mayor and a council based in the local
city hall. Communes vary in size from a few dozen people to several tens of thousands, although most have
populations of less than 1,500; a recent
trend has been for the smallest
communes to amalgamate with their GERMANY
neighbours. More pressures have been
exerted on local government by the PARIS
efforts of the French government to SWITZERLAND
cut spending in order to control the FRANCE
national budget deficit. In spite of this, Bay of
Biscay Lyon
every commune has the same powers ITALY
regardless of size.
In France, national politicians often
become or remain mayor of their home SPAIN Corsica
town. This simultaneous occupancy of
posts at different tiers is known in
France as the cumul des mandats
(accumulation of offices). Even after the Further reading
rules were tightened in 1985 and 2000,
the most popular cumul – combining Cole, Alistair (2017) French Politics and Society, 3rd edn (Routledge).
the office of local mayor with Cole, Alistair, Sophie Meunier, and Vincent Tiberj (eds) (2013)
Developments in French Politics 5 (Red Globe Press).
membership of the National Assembly –
Elgie, Robert, Emiliano Grossman, and Amy G. Mazur (eds) (2016) The
is still allowed, reflecting the fused Oxford Handbook of French Politics (Oxford University Press).
character of French public authority
even in an era of decentralization.
188 chapter 11

NETHERLANDS

Dutch-speaking Vlaanderen
Brussels region
(bilingual)
German-
speaking
Liège

French-speaking
Wallonia GERMANY

FRANCE

LUXEMBOURG

Map 11.2 The regions of Belgium

this never happens, and the relationship changes with both time and place. It was usual in most federations during
the twentieth century for national governments to steadily gain power, helped by the emergence of national
economies and the flow of wealth to the centre as tax revenues grew with the expansion of economies and
workforces. Since the 1980s, however, the trends have become less clear-cut, leading to different ideas about the
relative powers of central and regional governments.
Where dual federalism provided the original inspiration for the United States, Europe
Dual (and especially Germany and Austria) has found more appeal in the contrasting notion of
federalism cooperative federalism. Where the US was based on a contract in which the states joined
National and local together to form a national government with limited functions, the European form rests on
levels of the idea of cooperation between levels, with a shared commitment to a united nation binding
government
function the participants together. In both cases, though, the operating principle is subsidiarity. The
independently national government offers overall leadership but implementation is the duty of lower levels:
from one another, a division, rather than a separation, of tasks.
with separate Since its inception in 1949, Germany has been based on interdependence, not independence.
responsibilities. All the Länder (states) are expected to contribute to the success of the whole, and in return are
entitled to respect from the centre. The federal government makes policy but the Länder
Cooperative
implement it, a division of administrative labour expressed in the constitutional requirement
federalism
The layers are that ‘the Länder shall execute federal laws as matters of their own concern’. But this cooperative
intermingled and it ethos has come under increasing pressure from a growing perception that decision-making
is difficult always has become cumbersome and opaque. Constitutional reforms in 2006 were designed to
to see who has establish clearer lines of responsibility between Berlin and the Länder, giving the latter – for
ultimate
example – more autonomy in education and environmental protection. Although this
responsibility.
represented a move away from cooperative federalism towards greater subsidiarity, consultation
Subsidiarity remains embedded in German political practice.
The principle that It would also be helpful, for the sake of consistency and balance, if all the states within a
decisions should federal union were similar in size, wealth and influence, but – again – this never happens.
be taken at the Historical circumstances have ensured that some states within a union have evolved to be
lowest feasible
bigger, wealthier, and more powerful than others. In India, for example, Uttar Pradesh in
level.
India is 182 times bigger in terms of population than the state of Mizoram, while the Brazilian
 sub-national governments 189

Focus 11.1
The motives behind creating federations
The motives behind the creation of federations tend to be more often negative than positive; fear of the
consequences of remaining separate overcome the natural desire to preserve independence. Rubin and
Feeley (2008) suggest that federalism becomes a solution when, in an emerging state, ‘the strong are not
strong enough to vanquish the weak and the weak are not strong enough to go their separate ways’.
Historically, the main incentive for coming together has been to exploit the economic and military
bonus of size, especially in response to strong competitors. Riker (1996) emphasizes the military factor,
arguing that federations emerge in response to an external threat. The 13 original American states, for
example, joined together partly because they felt vulnerable in a predatory world. However, US and
Australian federalists also believed that a common market would promote economic development.
A more recent motivation has been ethnic federalism, as with the Belgian case. Further south,
Switzerland integrates 26 cantons, four languages (German, French, Italian, and Romansh), and two
religions (Catholic and Protestant) into a stable federal framework. But the danger with federalizing a
divided society is that it can reinforce the divisions it was designed to accommodate. The risk is particularly
acute when only two communities are involved, because the gains of one group are the losses of another.
Federations are more effective when they cut across (rather than entrench) ethnic divisions, and when
they marginalize (rather than reinforce) social divisions.
The challenges faced by Nigeria are illustrative. It became independent in 1960 with three regions, added
a fourth in 1963, replaced them with 12 states in 1967, and has since cut the national cake into ever smaller
pieces in an effort to prevent the development of states based around particular ethnic groups. There are
now 36 states and a federal capital territory, and yet regionalism and ethnic divisions continue to handicap
efforts to build a sense of Nigerian unity.

Table 11.3 The strengths and weaknesses of federalism

Strength
A practical arrangement for large or divided
countries.
Provides stronger checks and balances.
Allows for the recognition of diversity.
Reduces overload at the centre.
Encourages competition between states or provinces
and allows citizens to move between them.
Offers opportunities for policy experiments.
Allows small units to cooperate in achieving the
economic and military advantages of size.
Brings government closer to the people.
Weakness
May be less effective in responding to national security threats.
Decision-making is slower and more complicated.
Can entrench internal divisions.
The centre finds it more difficult to launch national initiatives.
How citizens are treated depends on where they live.
Complicates accountability: who is responsible for addressing
problems?
May permit majorities within a province to exploit a minority.
Basing representation in the upper chamber on states violates
the principle of one person, one vote.

state of São Paulo is 88 times bigger than the state of Roraima. In Mexico, meanwhile, more than 15 per cent of
the population lives in and around Mexico City, which is also by far the wealthiest part of the country when
measured by per capita GDP. Another kind of imbalance is sometimes found in cultural differences, as in the case
of Quebec nationalists who have long argued for special recognition for their French-speaking province within
Canada, which they view as a compact between two ‘equal’ communities (English- and French-speaking, the
former outnumbering the latter by 4:1) rather than as a contract between ten equal provinces.
190 chapter 11

The waters of federalism have been further muddied by developments in countries that consider themselves to
be de jure federations but function as de facto unitary systems, and others that have never legally declared themselves
to be federations, but where the transfer of powers to regional units of government has resulted in a process of
federalization. An example of the former is found in Malaysia, which was formed out of multiple states colonized
by Britain. Ranked in the Democracy Index as a flawed democracy, it is one of the most ethnically diverse countries
in the world, and is formally a federation of 13 states and three territories. Yet the national government has much
more control over local decisions than is normally the case in a federal system. Centralization has been encouraged
by the dominance of the Barisan National party coalition, which won ten straight election victories between 1974
and 2013. However, (Wah, 2015) sees the rise of the Pakatan Rakyat opposition as suggesting that changes may be
afoot, and that Malaysia may be moving towards a more decentralized form of federalism. In an election surrounded
by charges of manipulation and vote rigging, Pakatan Rakyat won enough seats in May 2018 to form a government
under 92-year-old Mahathir Mohamad, who had been prime minister from 1981 to 2003.
In Britain, meanwhile, the creation in the 1990s of regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland
made all three more like states within a federal United Kingdom; all that is missing is an equivalent English
regional assembly. In Argentina, Spain, and South Africa, too, powers have devolved to provinces and local
communities without the formal creation of a federation, creating de facto federations or quasi-federations.
South Africa is an interesting case of a quasi-federation. When the Union of South Africa
Quasi- was created in 1910, it brought together four British colonies that had different and distinctive
federation
A system of
histories, and that might have followed the Australian and Canadian lead and formed a
administration federation. It did not, though, and had four provinces until 1994, when the map was redrawn
that is formally to include nine provinces – see Map 11.3. Each has its own premier and cabinet, and the
unitary but has provinces are represented in the upper chamber of Parliament, known as the National
some of the Council of Provinces. Each province has ten delegates to the Council, regardless of
features of a
federation.
population differences among the provinces, the party breakdown within each delegation
reflecting party support in each provincial legislature. This might just as well be a federal
Confedera- system, but the long tradition of centralized control over the country continues.
tion The fi nal variation on the theme of federalism is a looser form of political cooperation
A looser form of a known as a confederation. Where a federation is a unified state, within which power is
federation, divided between national and sub-national levels of government, and where there is a direct
consisting of a
link between government and citizens (the national government exercises authority over
union of states
with more powers citizens, and is answerable directly to the citizens), a confederation is a group of sovereign
left in the hands of states with a central authority deriving its authority from those states, and citizens linked to
the constituent the central authority through the states in which they live. The central authority remains the
members. junior partner and acts merely as an agent of the component states, which retain their own
sovereignty.
There have been few examples in history of confederations, and none have lasted; they include the United
States from 1781 to 1789, Switzerland from 1815 to 1848, and Germany from 1815 to 1866. The only political
association that might today be described as a confederation is the European Union (see McCormick, 2015:
Chapter 1). It is not a federal United States of Europe, but neither has it formally declared itself to be a
confederation, leaving it literally nameless as a political form. Many commentators avoid giving it a label at all,
simply describing it as sui generis, or unique. The extent to which it has or has not federalized is best illustrated
through comparison; Table 11.4 compares the United States and the EU, showing some areas of similarity but
others of marked contrast.

Local local government

government If national government works at the level of entire states and regional government works at a
The lowest tier of
government,
middle level, local government is focused on contained, local matters. It is found in unitary
taking place at a and federal states alike, and it is where the kind of political business that is closest to the needs
geographically and interests of most people takes place. The kinds of national economic and security issues
contained local dealt with by national government are critical to all citizens, but it is often more immediate
level, as in a needs such as good schools, rubbish collection, and the repair of roads that make themselves
county, town, or
city.
most clearly felt in our lives. Given its role in service delivery, local government should not be
what it tends to be: the forgotten tier. We should also not forget the quip of the American
 sub-national governments 191

MOZAMBIQUE
Limpopo
BOTSWANA

a
Gauteng

uit n
g
pr ala
NAMIBIA North West

N um
Pretoria

INI
Johannesburg

els
p

AT
M

ESW
Free State KwaZulu
Natal

O
Bloemfontein
Northern Cape

TH
SO
Durban

LE
Eastern Cape

Western Cape
Cape Town

Map 11.3 The provinces of South Africa

Table 11.4 Comparing the United States and the European Union

United States European Union

Founding document A constitution Treaties
Single federal government Yes No
Elected legislature Yes Yes
Single market (free movement of people, Yes Almost, but not completely
money, goods, services)
Single currency Yes In most but not all states
Single legal citizenship Yes No
Federal tax Yes No
Common trade policy Yes Yes
Common foreign and defence policies Yes Much collaboration, but no common
policies as such
Combined armed forces Yes No
Single seat at meetings of international Yes Some, but not in United Nations, for
organizations example
Shared identity Yes Yes, but most Europeans identify primarily
with their home state
192 chapter 11

politician Tip O’Neill that ‘all politics is local’, implying as it does that the success of politicians at every level is
closely tied to their ability to meet the demands of local voters.
At its best, local government expresses the virtues of limited scale. It can represent natural communities, remain
accessible to its citizens, reinforce local identities, offer a practical education in politics, provide a recruiting ground
to higher posts, serve as a first port of call for citizens, and distribute the kinds of resources that matter most
immediately to people. Yet, local governments also have weaknesses: they are often too small to deliver services
efficiently, lack sufficient funds to set their own priorities, and are easily dominated by traditional elites.
The balance struck between intimacy and efficiency varies over time. In the second half of the twentieth
century, local governments were encouraged to become more efficient, leading to larger units. For example, the
number of Swedish municipalities fell from 2,500 in 1951 to 274 in 1974 (Rose, 2005), and today stands at 290. In
Britain, where efficiency concerns have been a high priority, the average population served by local authorities had
reached more than 142,000 by 2007, the highest in Europe (Loughlin et al., 2011: Appendix 1).
Towards the end of the twentieth century, signs emerged of a rebirth of interest in citizen involvement, stimulated
by the need to respond to declining turnout at local elections. In New Zealand, successful managerial reforms
introduced in 1989 were followed by the Local Government Act 2002, which outlined a more expansive,
participatory vision for local authorities. Similarly, where Dutch local government had once been preoccupied with
a concern for effectiveness and efficiency, the emphasis during the 1990s switched to public responsiveness (Denters
and Klok, 2005). In 1995, Norway resolved that ‘no further amalgamations should be imposed against the wishes
of a majority of residents in the municipalities concerned’ (Rose, 2005). This cycling between efficiency and
participation concerns suggests not only a real trade-off between the two, but also the difficulty of arriving at a
stable balance between them.
The broad tasks of local governments are twofold:

◆◆ To provide an often significant range of local public services, including police and emergency services, public
libraries, land use planning, public transport, primary and secondary education, parks and recreation, street
cleaning, and waste management (the list varies from one country to another, and between unitary and federal
systems).
◆◆ To implement national welfare policies.

This static description of functions fails to reveal how the role of local government has evolved in recent decades,
particularly in those countries where large local governments perform significant functions. One important trend,
especially prominent in the English-speaking world and Scandinavia (as we saw in Chapter 10), has been for
municipal authorities to reduce their direct provision of services by outsourcing to non-governmental organizations.
In theory, most local government services can be outsourced, with potential gains in efficiency and service quality.
But in practice these benefits are not always achieved, creating some risk in the transfer, and leaving us with the
broader question of whether direct provision of services by a local government to the citizen is intrinsically
preferable to delivery by a contractor to a consumer.
There are two broad ways of organizing local government (see Table 11.5). The first and most traditional
method is the council system, which concentrates authority in a college of elected councillors. The council often
operates through powerful committees covering the main local services, and there is a mayor – appointed either by
the council or by central government – with relatively few powers. (For a study of European mayors, see Heinelt
et al., 2018.)
One example of the council system is the historic network of panchayat (literally, ‘assemblies of five’) found in
India and in neighbouring Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan. Traditionally consisting of groups of respected elders
chosen by the village to settle disputes, India’s panchayat have grown in significance (and acquired a more structured
character) as more administrative functions have been moved to the local level, and as the bigger gram panchayats
have been elected, each with a sarpanch (elected leader). There are now three levels of panchayat: those based in
individual villages (of which there are nearly 600,000 in India), those bringing together clusters of villages, and
those covering districts within India’s 29 states. Although their financial resources remain limited, panchayats are
protected by the constitution and remain embedded in India’s cultural attachment to the ideal of village self-
governance.
The second method of organization is the mayor-council system. More presidential than parliamentary, it is based
on a separation of powers between an elected mayor and an elected council: the mayor is chief executive, while the
council has legislative and budget-approving powers. Used in Brazil, Japan, and many large American cities (such
 sub-national governments 193

Table 11.5 The structures of local government

Description
Council Elected councillors form a council which operates
system through a smaller sub-group or functional
committees. The unelected mayor is appointed by
the council, or by central government.
Mayor- An elected mayor serves as chief executive.
council Councillors elected from local wards form a council
system with legislative and financial authority.
Examples
Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, England,
Ireland, South Africa, Australia, Egypt, India.
Brazil, Japan, Poland, and about half the cities
in the United States, including Chicago and
New York.

as New York and Chicago), this highly political format allows a range of urban interests to be represented within
an elaborate framework. The mayor is usually elected at large (from the entire area), while councillors represent
specific neighbourhoods.
The powers given to the mayor and council vary considerably. In the ‘strong mayor’ version (such as New York
City), the mayor is the focus of authority and accountability, with the power to appoint and dismiss department
heads without council approval. In the ‘weak mayor’ format (such as London), the council has both legislative and
executive authority, keeping the mayor on a shorter leash. Whether strong or weak, an elected mayor does at least
offer a public face for the area. The political significance of mayors in the largest cities has grown with the emergence
of global cities; see Focus 11.2.
In an era of falling voter turnout (which tends to be worst at local elections because of their second-order
qualities; see Chapter 15), new efforts have been made in recent years to make local decision-making more visible
to voters. One means for doing this – tried, for example, in Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands – has been to
repackage mayors as public figureheads of the districts they represent, and to introduce direct mayoral elections. A
high-profile mayor can enhance the district’s visibility not only within the area but also, and equally importantly,
among potential visitors and investors.

sub-national government in authoritarian states

Studying the relationship between centre and periphery in authoritarian states confirms the relative weakness of
institutions in non-democracies. Sub-national government is marginal, authority flows mainly from the top down,
and bottom-up institutions of representation are subordinate. When national power is exercised by the military or
a ruling party, these bodies typically establish a parallel presence in the regions, where their authority overrides that
of formal state officials. For a humble mayor in such a situation, the main skill required is to lie low and avoid
offending the real power-holders. Little of the pluralistic policy-making suggested by the notion of multi-level
governance takes place and the more general description ‘central local relations’ is preferable.
It would be wrong, though, to dismiss local government altogether. In truth, central rulers – just like medieval
monarchs – often depend on provincial leaders to sustain their own, sometimes tenuous, grip on power. Central-
local relations therefore tend to be more personal and less formalized than in a liberal democracy. Particularly in
smaller countries, the hold on power of regional leaders is not embedded in local institutions; instead, such rulers
command their fiefdoms in a personal fashion, replicating the authoritarian pattern found at national level. Central
and local rulers are integrated by patronage: the national ruler effectively buys the support of local bigwigs who, in
turn, maintain their position by selectively distributing state resources to their own supporters. Patronage, not
institutions, is the rope that binds.
Traditional rulers and governing structures are also important, reflecting the weakness of imported modern
institutions of sub-national government in many authoritarian regimes. Nigeria offers an example. There, as in
many of its colonies, Britain had strengthened the position of local rulers by governing indirectly through them,
and these traditional elites remain influential. Nowhere is this clearer than in Sokoto, a Nigerian state created in
1976 but with origins in an Islamic Sokoto caliphate of the early nineteenth century. Sokoto state is led by a
governor, but the position of sultan, who once ruled the caliphate, continues to exist. Indeed, the sultan remains
the spiritual leader of Nigeria’s Muslims. In this way, traditional Islamic leadership coexists alongside conventional
sub-national government.
194 chapter 11

Focus 11.2
The government of cities

With a majority of the world’s people now living in urban areas, the question of how cities are best governed
has become more pressing, as has the question of how best to treat the interdependence of cities and
suburbs. The argument that they should be treated as single metropolitan areas – as city regions – has
proved difficult to address given traditional boundaries. To complicate matters, cities have distinctive
problems, not least because they are more diverse than rural areas; their boundaries contain rich and poor,
natives and immigrants, black and white, gay and straight, believers and atheists, and almost every other
combination known to human society.
Not all countries have made a success of metropolitan governance, as the case of Australia shows (Gleeson
and Steele, 2012). It is a nation of cities, with the five largest state capitals – Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne,
Perth, and Sydney – being home to nearly two-thirds of the country’s people (see Map 11.4). These urban
areas are inadequately governed in the existing three-tier (national, state, local) federation. National
involvement in running cities is limited by the constitution; state administrations must
Global city
A city that holds a
also confront other pressures (including those from rural areas); and local government
key place within itself is subordinate and fragmented, with 34 local authorities operating in Sydney alone.
the global system A federal structure does not mesh well with a population concentrated in a few large
via its financial, cities.
trade, In the governance of cities, the national capital occupies a special place. As an important
communications,
or manufacturing
component of the national brand, the capital’s leaders merit regular communication with
links. Examples the central government. But the capital’s international connections (and even those of
include Dubai, major non-capital cities such as Frankfurt, New York, Hong Kong, Mumbai, and São
London, Moscow, Paulo) mean it can become semi-detached from its national moorings, as implied by the
New York, Paris, notion of a global city. Even though they are located in the same country, the interests
Shanghai, and
Tokyo.
of the centre and the capital can diverge. Inevitably, the capital is treated differently from
other cities, providing further complexity to the idea of multi-level governance.

Darwin
Indian Ocean

Northern
Territory Queensland

Western Australia
Brisbane

South Australia
New South Wales
Perth

Adelaide Sydney
CANBERRA
Victoria Melbourne

Tasmania

Map 11.4 The cities of Australia

 sub-national governments 195

Traditional political units in Nigeria have the advantages over modern, postcolonial units of deep roots in local
culture. By contrast, elected legislatures and competing political parties based far off in state capitals or the national
capital of Abuja are alien, and have difficulty establishing fi rm foundations. Nigerian federal governments face a
dilemma: should the special place of traditional leaders in the community be exploited to extend the reach of
federal government and to support programmes of modernization and democratization (thereby perhaps weakening
the authority of the federal government), or should traditional leaders be bypassed and their powers reduced (thereby
risking the anger of local Islamic communities and reducing the credibility of the federal government)?
In some of the least stable authoritarian states, the institutions of sub-national government
Warlords
are supplanted by opportunistic and/or informal control in the form of warlords. While Informal leaders
much has been made of warlords’ recent role in Afghanistan and Somalia, they are far from a who use military
new phenomenon, and in some ways are perhaps the oldest form of political domination. force and
Basing their control on military power, they are found sprinkled through the history of patronage to
Europe, China, Japan, and Mongolia, and have been a more recent phenomenon in several control territory
within weak states
parts of Africa and Asia. Many, argue Felbab-Brown et al., (2018), are the consequence of a with unstable
breakdown in domestic governmental institutions, step in to the resulting vacuum, and central
develop popularity and support among local populations. They even sometimes develop their governments.
own enduring institutions, often undermining the legitimacy of the national state.
Field research on warlords is by defi nition dangerous, but our understanding of their motives and methods has
improved thanks to their new prominence in several parts of the world. In one early study of their role in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Reno (1997) made the link between warlords and weak
states with rich resources such as diamonds, cobalt, and timber. For Marten (2012), warlords are not state-builders,
like some of their feudal Asian and European predecessors, but instead rely on private militias to extract resources,

General Germain Katanga (left foreground) – a warlord with the nickname Simba the lion – appears before a military court
in Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo, charged with crimes against humanity.
Source: Getty Images/Papy Mulongo/ Stringer.
196 chapter 11

enforce support, and threaten state officials. They thrive on their capacity to provide brutal political control in
situations where the formal institutions of state have failed to develop or simply failed.
In larger authoritarian states, such as China and Russia, sub-national government is more developed. Personal
links remain important but institutional arrangements cannot be dismissed. Instead, sub-national government is
actively exploited so as to ensure the continued power of the centre. China, for example, is a massive unitary state
whose regions (with exceptions such as Hong Kong and Tibet) are ruled in imperial fashion from Beijing.
Sub-national government takes the form of 22 provinces, six of which – Guangdong, Shandong, Henan, Sichuan,
Jiangsu, and Hebei – each contain more than 70 million people, making them bigger than most countries. There
are further subdivisions into either counties and townships, or cities and districts.
The Communist Party adds to this by providing a means of integrating centre and periphery. In particular, the
circulation of party leaders between national and provincial posts helps to connect the two tiers, creating China’s
equivalent to the French cumul des mandats. Several provincial leaders serve on the party’s central politburo, and
most members of this key body have worked in top provincial posts at some point in their career. It is these party
linkages that provide the key channel through which Beijing maintains a measure of control over the country.
However, recent research suggests that the balance between the centre and the parts has changed. Zhong (2015)
shows that after more than a decade of administrative and economic reform, central government has become
increasingly remote and less important for many localities, and that the centre’s mobilization capacity has weakened.
Increasingly, central government policies are ignored and local officials are often more interested in local or even
personal projects than in centrally directed economic plans. This effective decentralization allows provinces to
become laboratories for new policies but simultaneously accentuates inequalities between them, leading to
occasional expressions of concern about the possibility of the country disintegrating.
Chinese leaders want to keep control, a goal that is more easily achieved in a unitary system than in a federal
system. It might be logical to assume, then, that most hybrid and authoritarian states would avoid either maintaining
or creating a federal system. And yet about half the world’s federations are either hybrid or authoritarian states,
including Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, and Venezuela. Assuming that the divided powers
inherent in a federal system are not clearly helping move each of them towards democracy, how have they made
this work? The short answer is that they have worked out a means for remaining federations while ensuring
centralized control over key political issues.
This is certainly true of Russia, which is a federation, to be sure, but one in which the parts have less
independence from the centre than is usually associated with federalism. Although Russia saw a decentralization
of power under Boris Yeltsin (President, 1991–99), Vladimir Putin has since overseen a recentralization of power,
providing a contrast to the decline of central control in China. Putin’s success is based on several developments
(Slider, 2014):

◆◆ Setting up an administrative system that allowed him to better monitor the work of regional executives without
having to depend on information those executives provided.
◆◆ Dividing Russia into seven new extra-constitutional federal okrugs (districts) to oversee lower-level units. Each
okrug is overseen by a ‘representative’ of the president, whose first job is to work to bring regional law back into
line with federal law. The representatives also ensure that branches of the federal government in the regions
remain loyal to Moscow.
◆◆ Obliging all regional governors to give up their previous party affiliations and to join the ruling United Russia
party, and working to win majorities for United Russia in every regional assembly.
◆◆ Reducing the powers of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the national legislature, by giving the
president the authority to appoint its members.

Through these devices, Putin has increased the capacity of the central state to govern the Russian people, so
much so that Ross (2010) concludes that ‘Russia is now a unitary state masquerading as a federation’. Certainly,
Putin’s reforms contributed to his project of creating what he termed a ‘sovereign democracy’ in Russia. In Putin’s
eyes, a sovereign democracy is not built on the uncertain pluralistic foundations of multi-level governance. Rather,
it gives priority to the interests of Russia, which include an effective central state capable of controlling its
population. On that foundation, the Russian state seeks to strengthen its position in what it still sees as a hostile
international environment.
 sub-national governments 197

While Russia is a large and diverse country, perhaps best thought of as the product of an empire rather than of
a more conventional process of state-building, Venezuela is a much smaller and more homogeneous country, that
also happens to be authoritarian. Why, then, is it a federation? It became one immediately upon independence in
1821, and remains one today, even though it has a population of just 31 million people concentrated in its coastal
regions. To a large extent, though, Venezuelan federalism is nominal. A combination of political instability, oil
wealth (see discussion on the resource curse in Chapter 20) and populist military dictatorship has prevented
devolution, and while the constitution argues that the states are given all the powers not reserved to the federal
government or to municipalities, the federal government has the lion’s share of those powers, including control of
elections, education, health, agriculture, and labour. Even where states have the authority to make their own laws,
they must use federal laws as a framework (Brewer-Carías and Kleinheisterkamp, 2013). The division of powers,
then, does not amount to much, and Venezuela is mainly federal in name alone.
198 chapter 11

discussion questions
◆◆ In what circumstances is a unitary system a more appropriate form of government, and in
what circumstances is a federal system more appropriate?
◆◆ Why is there no exact template for a unitary or a federal system, and does it matter?
◆◆ Should all local governments replicate national governments and be headed by elected
legislatures and executive mayors?
◆◆ Does your country have any global cities? If so, how do they relate to the rest of the
country? If it has none, does this matter to national or local politics?
◆◆ Why is local government studied so much less than national government?
◆◆ Does the experience of authoritarian states, where local government is often important,
suggest that power in democracies has become too centralized?

key concepts
◆◆ Confederation ◆◆ Local government
◆◆ Cooperative federalism ◆◆ Multi-level governance
◆◆ Deconcentration ◆◆ Quasi-federation
◆◆ Delegation ◆◆ Regional government
◆◆ Devolution ◆◆ Subsidiarity
◆◆ Dual federalism ◆◆ Unitary system
◆◆ Federal system ◆◆ Warlord
◆◆ Global city

further reading
Bache, Ian, and Matthew Flinders (eds) (2004) Multi-level Governance (Oxford University
Press). Examines multi-level governance and applies the notion to specific policy sectors.
Haider-Markel, Donald P. (2014) The Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government (Oxford
University Press). An edited collection of essays on state and local political institutions and
public policies.
Hueglin, Thomas O., and Alan Fenna (2015) Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry, 2nd
edn (University of Toronto Press). A survey of the meaning of federalism, comparing how
it works in theory and in practice in different societies.
Parker, Simon (2011) Cities, Politics and Power (Routledge). A study of the government of cities
and the way in which their power is structured and used, illustrated by cases from Europe,
the Americas, and China.
Pierre, Jon (2011) The Politics of Urban Governance (Red Globe Press). Assesses four models of
governance in light of the challenges facing cities.
Watts, Ronald J. (2008) Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd edn (McGill-Queen’s University Press).
Considers the design and operation of a wide range of federations.
 12

Source: iStock/thehague
political culture
contents
◆ Political culture: an
overview
◆ Understanding political
culture
PREVIEW ◆ From The Civic Culture
Political culture describes the beliefs, values, attitudes, and norms that to post-materialism
characterize political systems. What do people expect of government, ◆ Political trust
how much do they trust (or distrust) it, how do values vary in space
and time, and how do attitudes compare in democratic and
◆ A clash of civilizations?
authoritarian systems? The answers to these questions are all essential ◆ Political culture in
to an understanding of government and politics in its many varieties. authoritarian states
Reviewing the structure, rules, and dynamics of institutions – as we
have done in the preceding chapters – is important, but in order to
compare effectively, we need also to understand the ‘personalities’ of
different political systems.
Offering a key point of reference, this chapter begins with a discussion of the idea of civic culture, a particular
form of political culture based on an acceptance of the authority of the state and a belief in civic participation; in
other words, probably the ideal when it comes to understanding how democracies should work. After looking at
identity politics, multiculturalism, and post-materialism, it goes on to look at the causes and effects of the decline
in political trust in democracies. It then reviews the controversial arguments made by Samuel Huntington in his
book The Clash of Civilizations, and considers what this analysis might tell us about political culture at the global
level. Finally, the chapter looks at the particular challenges of understanding political culture in authoritarian
regimes, where there have been fewer substantive studies, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between
indigenous and imported political values.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ The concept of political culture is attractive, but can be misused: cultures do not always coincide with
states, and we should avoid the pitfalls of stereotypes about national cultures.
◆◆ Ideas such as civic culture, identity politics, and political trust have all been used in an effort to identify
the attitudes most supportive of stable liberal democracy.
◆◆ The drift to post-materialism is an interesting attempt to understand how political cultures change.
◆◆ Political trust has been decaying in many democracies, but at different rates and for different reasons.
◆◆ The idea of confl ict between transnational civilizations is a controversial attempt to apply cultural
analysis to a post-ideological world.
◆◆ Much of the evidence suggests that there is more support in authoritarian regimes for strong leaders than
for freedom and self-expression.
200 chapter 12

political culture: an overview

In its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO (2001) defi nes culture as ‘the set of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group … [encompassing], in addition to
art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs’. Unlike nature (with
which it is often contrasted), culture involves values, symbols, meanings, and expectations. It tells us who we are,
what is important to us, and how we should behave.
The concept of political culture flows from this idea, describing the pattern of beliefs,
Political attitudes, and values in a given society towards politics and the political system. It is concerned
culture with what is considered normal and acceptable, as well as abnormal and unacceptable. We can
The sum of usefully contrast political culture with political ideology, which – as we saw in Chapter 1, and
individual values
will come to see again in Chapter 16 – refers to the packages of ideas that people, and especially
and norms
regarding politics elites, hold about the role of government and the goals of public policy. These ideologies will
and the political influence what individuals think about competing leaders, candidates, parties, and policies. By
system, or the contrast, political culture is less systematic in character, reflecting wider social norms. Political
culture of a group culture comes closer to Linz’s notion (1975) of mentalities: ‘ways of thinking and feeling, more
which gives shared
emotional than rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to different situations’.
meaning to
political action. Political culture is broader, more diff use, and more widely applicable than political ideology,
and with the decay of ideology, has become a major highway into understanding the role of
beliefs and attitudes in politics.
While we can usually identify major themes in a national political culture, we must also recognize some
potential dangers. First, almost every country – except perhaps the very smallest – will contain multiple culturally
distinctive social groups. The result may be either a national political culture with one or more subcultures, or
even, as for example in Brazil and India, a multicultural society. Second, we must appreciate that political culture
can change over time; it is far from a static concept, and can both influence and be influenced by broader changes
in the way societies approach government and politics. Finally, there is a danger of invoking cultural factors when
we can think of nothing else: ‘it’s just part of their culture’. Above all, we should always beware of reducing political
culture to a stereotyped ‘national character’.
In comparative politics, political culture is most often studied from a behavioural perspective, using surveys of
the attitudes of individuals. This approach is defensible if perhaps rather narrow. It downplays the notion of political
culture as shared symbols and stories expressed in the public realm, in arenas such as advertising, art, campaigns,
ceremonies, literature, museums, and mass media (Ross, 2009). Given that politics is a collective activity, there is
certainly a case for studying political culture in its public manifestations. Public statements, though, may not be
matched by personal opinion, in spite of how many times we hear the leader of country X telling us that ‘the people
of X have spoken’, or ‘this is what the people of X want’. What they are usually really saying is ‘this is what my
group of supporters or my section of the electorate is saying’. For all these reasons, political culture can be a helpful
way of comparing political systems, but we must also beware its shortcomings.

understanding political culture

Political culture has a natural appeal for comparativists. Studying, and especially visiting, another country for the
fi rst time, we are naturally drawn to the differences with our home culture. Yet, it is dangerously easy to use
cultural contrasts as an explanation for political differences. Although culture can influence how the political game
is played – the rituals, the moves, and the language do not necessarily affect the content of politics.
An example of this is offered by Australian political debate, whose occasionally coarse nature does not necessarily
indicate the presence of sharper underlying confl ict than might be found in a country with a more restrained
political style, such as Sweden. Instead, debate by insult is simply found more often in the Australian political
conversation. A leading exponent of the style was Paul Keating, prime minister from 1991 to 1996, who once
described the debating skills of an opposition party leader as ‘like being flogged with a warm lettuce’, and described
another prime minister – John Howard – as like ‘a dead carcass, swinging in the breeze’. The topic of the political
insult has even been addressed in discussions about the meaning of the Australian constitution, one analyst arguing
that ‘insults are a legitimate part of the political discussion protected by the Constitution’ (quoted in Stone, 2018).
We should also beware mistaking a dominant culture for a national culture. It is easy and tempting to assume
that what we see or hear about politics in a given country reflects the wider political culture of that country, but
 political culture 201

we would probably be wrong. To begin with, much of what we associate with a given society Elite political
is actually elite political culture; the values of elites are more explicit than are those of the culture
population at large, and much of what we associate with a state or a society is less what we The values and
see through the words and deeds of ordinary people than how it is represented through the norms regarding
politics and the
words and deeds of political leaders, party leaders, and media owners, editors, and
political system
commentators. held by those
Take, for example, the case of Japan, a country where political culture offers support to closest to the
established elites, even if it is not always driven by them. Political power has long been based centres of political
on notions of group identity, as reflected in loyalty, obligation, and hierarchy, with a web of power, including
elected officials,
social and fi nancial ties binding a small political elite together and promoting nepotism and
bureaucrats, and
factionalism. This distinctive culture is expressed in the way workers tend to stay with one business leaders.
company all their lives, in the persistence of factions within political parties, and in the
frequency of influence peddling in politics. The emphasis on status and rank means that all
people are made aware of their position in the group, that a premium is placed on allegiance to the group, and that
criticism from below is discouraged as a threat to group harmony (McCargo, 2012). These values have received
increasing criticism for acting as a brake on Japan’s political modernization, for interfering with the free exchange
of ideas, and for contributing to complacency and conservatism in the management of the country’s largest
corporations.
In few cases have the priorities of the elite come to defi ne the bigger picture than in the work of the European
Union. In the post-war construction of a united Europe from the ashes of a shattered continent, it was mainly heads
of government and their bureaucrats who took the initiatives, wrote the rules, and shaped the policies. Without
their sustained commitment, this achievement would have been impossible. It was a triumph not only of interests,
but also of the will of a particular generation of European leaders. Today, however, critics of the EU often charge
it with being not only a construction of elites, but also a club run by – and promoting the interests of – elites. This
was certainly one of the motivations behind the Brexit vote in the UK in 2016.
At the same time, the absence of a dominant national culture is often reflected in the extent to which most
societies are subject to the phenomenon of multiculturalism (see Chapter 2). Few states are entirely or even nearly
homogeneous, and most consist of multiple cultural or ethnic groups. The extent to which these groups have
learned to live with one another varies, but in few cases have matters worked out well. Liberal democracies, for
example, are based in large part on the principle of equality, and yet few have been able to assimilate all their
citizens of different cultures into a unified national culture. This has prompted the political leaders of Britain,
France, and Germany at various times to declare the failure of multiculturalism. Meanwhile, several of the
country cases used in this book – notably the United States, South Africa, India, and Nigeria – are deeply
divided, struggling with domestic cultural tensions, and even occasionally with problems over the defi nition of
their national identity. Further challenges have been posed by the twin pressures of identity politics and
globalization – see Focus 12.1.
Finally, in addition to the differences contained within elite culture and multiculturalism, we also fi nd differences
in political culture based on factors such as geography and historical circumstances. India is a case in point,
containing – as it does – a unique level of diversity (see Tenhunen and Säävälä, 2012):

◆◆ It contains regions with long but separate histories.

◆◆ Its southern and western states are generally better off economically than those in the north and the east.
◆◆ Levels of poverty range widely, as do patterns of social development and foreign investment.
◆◆ Society is divided into a complex system of castes based originally on profession (priests were distinguished
from warriors, farmers, and labourers, for example), and which persists despite efforts to weaken its hold.
◆◆ There is a clear urban-rural divide, with millions of Indians still living a simple village life while millions more
congregate in many fast-growing cities, some (such as Mumbai and Delhi) with strong international
connections.
◆◆ More than 1,000 languages are spoken in India, with 18 considered national languages.
◆◆ Although 80 per cent of Indians are Hindu, 13 per cent are Muslim, and the balance follow minority
religions.

Under the circumstances, it is correct to talk of multiple Indian political cultures but not of a single national
political culture.
202 chapter 12

Focus 12.1
Identity politics and globalization

Thanks to improved research methods, and a greater understanding of the dimensions of political culture as
a concept, many intriguing new lines of enquiry have been opened to scholars. One of these has made it
clear that political culture is pulling many states in different directions as they come under the influence of
identity politics and globalization. Identity politics is an effort by groups within larger societies to reassert
themselves in order to have their perspectives acknowledged and better understood (a move, in other
words, towards greater heterogeneity), while globalization creates a set of pressures that is bringing
countries together, pushing us – according to many of its critics – towards greater
Identity homogeneity.
politics Identity politics is the idea that a group of people with a particular identity can or
Political positions should form political alliances and promote their group interests within the wider
and activities
based on
context of the society or the community of which they are a part. Emerging in the
association with a second half of the last century, this point of view brought new attention to the interests
particular identity, of such groups as feminists, the LGBTQ+ community, members of ethnic minorities,
such as gender, and members of different generations. The list of possibilities is extensive, the main
age, ethnicity, point of commonality being that the members of such groups feel vulnerable to
religion, disability,
or sexual
oppression, exclusion, or discrimination as a result of their membership of that group,
orientation. and – by identifying together – are encouraged to raise consciousness of their situation.
One of the effects is to further emphasize the differences within national political
cultures.
Globalization initially had the opposite effect, offsetting group interests by building connections among
states, promoting interdependence, emphasizing the problems and needs that communities have in common,
and heightening the sense of a shared humanity. Globalization also challenges traditional ethnic, cultural, and
religious identities, notes Parekh (2008). The state remains important in people’s lives, but:

it is subject to unprecedented pressures from above and below, raising acute questions about the
nature and basis of the national identity on which it traditionally relied to maintain its unity and
stability. Cultural communities are constantly exposed to, and having to change in response to, each
other, and can no longer define and maintain their identities as they did before.

The pressure on states from separate identities can be seen in all of the cases on which this book focuses,
ranging from the multinationalism of Britain to the multiculturalism of Brazil to the caste divisions of India
and the ethnic divisions of Nigeria and South Africa. At the same time, they are all subject to the political,
economic, and cultural pressures inherent in globalization, including the new divisions emerging within
developed countries between the winners (well-educated, mobile professionals), and losers (poorly
educated, low-skilled manufacturing workers) in a competitive global economy.

from the civic culture to post-materialism

The role of political culture in political science generally, and in comparative politics more specifically, has
undergone something of a rollercoaster ride in recent decades as we have learned more about differences in attitudes
towards politics and government. Everyone agrees – argues Wiarda (2014) – that political culture is important in
terms of understanding different countries and regions, but there has long been disagreement about the degree of
the difference, and on how precisely to measure its effect. It was long criticized for being impressionistic and for
engaging in stereotyping, and was often rejected for the problems inherent in quantifying it. Since the 1960s,
though, the study of political culture has been more methodical and empirically based, and has undergone a revival
 political culture 203

that has made it, in Wiarda’s view, one of the leading explanatory paradigms in political Civic culture
science, along with structuralism and institutionalism. A moderate
Much of the change can be dated from the publication in 1963 of The Civic Culture, written political culture in
by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. Their investigation was the fi rst systematic study of which most
people accept the
political culture, using large-scale public opinion surveys for the fi rst time, and thus seeking
obligation to
to discover what people actually thought rather than what other people thought they thought. participate in
In seeking to identify the culture within which a liberal democracy is most likely to develop politics while
and consolidate, they identified what they called a civic culture. This is a particular form of acknowledging the
allegiant political culture in which most citizens accept the authority of the state and believe authority of the
state and its right
in civic participation, and includes such features as an expectation of fair treatment by
to take decisions.
government authorities, the ability to talk freely about politics, tolerance towards opposition,
and civic cooperation and trust.
In thinking about liberal democracy, we might defi ne a healthy political system as one whose citizens believe
they can contribute to, and are affected by, government decisions. But Almond and Verba rejected this proposition,
arguing instead that the ideal conditions for democracy emerge when a participant culture is balanced by low levels
of behavioural participation; citizens are not constantly involved in politics, but have the potential to act if needed.
Armed with this theory, and with sample surveys in Britain, Italy, Mexico, the United States, and West Germany,
they found that Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, came closest to the civic ideal. In both countries,
citizens felt they could influence the government but often chose not to do so, thus conferring on the government
its required flexibility. By contrast, the political cultures of Italy, Mexico, and what was then West Germany all
deviated in various ways from the ideal. (See Spotlight Germany for a more recent assessment.)
Like most original research, Almond and Verba’s study attracted much criticism, often highlighting limitations
in the concept of political culture itself. First, critics alleged that the whole notion of a national political culture
was inherently vague; they suggested that the authors should have focused more on subcultures of race and class.
Had they done so, suggested Macpherson (1977), they would have discovered that the most active participants
were the educated middle class, while those least engaged with formal politics were the poorly educated
working class.
Second, critics pointed out that Almond and Verba failed to offer a detailed account of the origins and evolution
of political culture. It was instead largely presented as a given, raising the suspicion that the concept was little more
than a sophisticated restatement of simplistic assumptions about national character. Critics suggested that a country’s
political culture should not be seen as fi xed and stable but should instead be regarded as a dynamic concept which
was at least partly shaped by the operation of politics itself. This argument seemed to be borne out within a matter
of years, as politics in many liberal democracies hit turbulent waters, shaken by student activism, oil crises, fi nancial
crises, separatist movements in some, environmental and feminist movements in others, interspersed with phases of
growth and unparalleled prosperity.
One of the effects of this turbulence was to draw new attention to the advantages that many Post-
of those raised after World War II had come to take for granted. The American social scientist materialism
Ronald Inglehart coined the term post-materialism in the early 1970s to distinguish the A set of values
new cultural focus on quality of life issues – such as environmental protection, nuclear emphasizing the
disarmament, gender equality, and freedom of expression – from so-called materialist interest quality of life over
materialist values
in economic growth and security. The idea was that Westerners born after World War II had such as economic
grown up during a time of unprecedented prosperity and relative international peace, with an growth and
expanded welfare state offering security to many against the demands of illness, unemployment, physical security.
and old age. Freed from the kinds of precarious security concerns about survival that had
influenced earlier generations, post-war generations were more inclined to focus on the quality of their lives, giving
the educated young in particular different priorities from the generation of their parents and grandparents.
According to Inglehart (1971), this unique combination of affluence, peace, and security led to a ‘silent revolution’
in Western political cultures. Based on extensive survey evidence, Inglehart showed that the more affluent a
democracy, the higher the proportion of post-materialists within its borders. Within Europe, for example, post-
materialism came fi rst to, and made deepest inroads in, the wealthiest democracies such as Denmark, the Netherlands,
and West Germany. Norway apart, the other affluent Scandinavian countries were also receptive to these values.
Post-materialism was less common in poorer European democracies with lower levels of education, such as Greece
(Knutsen, 1996).
204
SPOTLIGHT GERMANY
chapter 12

Brief profile
Germany provides a fascinating case study for comparative politics. Created in 1871, it went on to play a key role
in two world wars, was then divided into separate democratic and communist countries, was reunited in 1990,
and has played a key role as a leader and paymaster of European integration. Because Germany naturally views
European developments through the lens of its own system of government, the country’s political institutions are
of continental significance. Within a parliamentary framework, Germany offers a distinctive form: a chancellor
democracy in which the nation’s leader determines government policy, appoints cabinet ministers, heads a large
staff, and can be removed from office only when the legislature can agree a named successor. Germany boasts the
largest economy in Europe, and its skilled employees, working in capital-intensive factories, produce premium
manufactured goods for export. Its military influence in the world, however, is distinctly limited.

Form of Federal parliamentary republic consisting of 16 Länder (states). Modern state formed
government 1871, and most recent constitution (the Basic Law) adopted 1949.
Executive Parliamentary. The chancellor leads a cabinet of between 16 and 22 ministers, while a
president (elected to five-year terms – renewable once – by a special convention of the
Bundestag and Länder) serves as mainly ceremonial head of state.
Legislature Unicameral: a 631-member Bundestag elected for renewable four-year terms. Although it
functions like an elected upper house, the 61-member Bundesrat consists of delegates
drawn from the Länder.
Judiciary The Federal Constitutional Court has proved to be highly influential as an arbiter of the
constitution. It has 16 members, half elected by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat
for single 12-year terms with mandatory retirement at age 68.
Electoral The Bundestag is elected through a complex mixed member proportional representation
system system, with half elected using single-member plurality, half using Länder party list
proportional representation, and adjustments made to ensure that the number of seats
for each party reflects the extent of their support. Members of the Bundesrat are
nominated by the Länder.
Parties Multi-party. The leading parties are the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), with its
Bavarian partner the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Other significant players are the Green Party and the right-wing Alternative for Germany.

82.5m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$3.7tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$44,470 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 political culture 205

Political culture in Germany

Political culture is shaped in large part by a
country’s history, and the post-war division of
Germany provides a rare natural experiment,
allowing us to gauge how these developments
affected popular thinking.
Two main processes can be observed. The
first is the positive impact of post-war
economic recovery on political culture in
western Germany. Between 1959 and 1988,
the proportion of West Germans expressing
pride in their political institutions increased
from 7 to 51 per cent. Over a similar period,
support for a multi-party system grew from
53 to 92 per cent. This experience showed
The Bundestag in Berlin, symbolic of the political reconstruction of that economic growth could deliver political
Germany, a country that still struggles to define its political culture in legitimacy, and offered hope to other
the wake of reunification. transitional countries seeking to build a
Source: John McCormick. democratic culture on an authoritarian
history.
The second process is the impact of reunification. At the time of German reunification in 1990, people in the
east were significantly less trusting of the legislature, the legal system, and each other than were people in the
west. The experience of living under a communist regime, particularly one which engaged in such close surveillance
of its population, had left its mark (Rainer and Siedler, 2009).
There has since been evidence of declining contrasts between east and west, but considerable differences
remain: disposable income and the percentage of younger people are both higher in the west, while unemployment
and support for right-wing political
parties is higher in the east. Easterners North
tend to perceive westerners as Sea
bourgeois, patronizing, materialistic,
and individualistic, while many Hamburg
westerners seem to look down on NETHERLANDS BERLIN POLAND
easterners, and certainly are perceived
to do so by easterners themselves.
BELGIUM
GERMANY
Ironically, a 2014 poll found that 75
per cent of easterners considered CZECH
reunification to have been a success, REPUB
LIC
but only 50 per cent of westerners felt
the same way (Noack, 2014). FRANCE Munich AUSTRIA
It is reasonable to suppose that
cultural contrasts will continue to
weaken if (and this is a big If) living
standards in the east converge on those
in the west. In such circumstances, the
Further Reading
more materialistic culture in the east is Langenbacher, Eric, and David P. Conradt (2017) The German Polity, 11th
likely to acquire the post-material tinge edn (Rowman & Littlefield).
long found in the west. For now, Padgett, Stephen, William E. Paterson, and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (eds)
though, unification without unity (2014) Developments in German Politics 4 (Red Globe Press).
Roberts, Geoffrey K. (2016) German Politics Today, 3rd edn (Manchester
remains a common theme in discussions
University Press).
of German political culture.
206 chapter 12

When Inglehart began his studies in the early 1970s, materialists outnumbered post-materialists by about four
to one in many Western countries. By 2000, the two groups were more even in size, a change that represented a
major transformation in political culture. Globalization plays a key role in spreading post-materialist values even
more widely, as does the expansion of education. In fact, experience of higher education (especially in the arts and
social sciences) is the best single predictor of a post-material outlook. Liberal values acquired or reinforced at college
are then sustained through careers in expanding professions where knowledge, rather than wealth or management
authority, is the key to success. In France, surveys conducted between 2005 and 2008 showed that 56 per cent of
those with at least some university education were post-materialists, compared with only 25 per cent among those
with lower educational achievement (Dalton, 2013).
The reach of post-materialism should not be overstated, though. Not only have many conservative parties continued
to prosper in the post-material age, but extreme right-wing and populist parties have emerged in several European
democracies, partly as a reaction against post-material values. The distinctive challenges of the twenty-first century
include issues such as terrorism, energy supply, climate change, immigration, youth unemployment, and social security.
These problems have encouraged a renewed focus on the value of security and survival, forcing themselves onto the
political agenda with an energy that has offset some of the cultural change that had emerged generationally.
Even if opinion is divided on the value of post-materialism as an analytical tool, its advent was indicative of the
continued sophistication of approaches to measuring and understanding values, including those at the foundation
of political culture. In 1981, the European Values Study was founded in the Netherlands with the goal of better
measuring and understanding values in selected European countries. This was followed soon afterwards by the
World Values Survey (in which Ronald Inglehart was involved), which has gone on to carry out several waves of
survey research, the most recent in 2017–19, covering more than half the countries in the world. The US-based Pew
Research Center has also generated a considerable body of survey research on political values and attitudes that can
be usefully used to compare political culture in many different countries.
The results of one recent Pew survey – asking people whether or not they consider life in their country to have
improved in the last 50 years – is shown in Figure 12.1. Even a glance at the results is enough to reveal that there is
little correlation between rich countries and poor countries, or democracies and authoritarian regimes. For example,
the group of countries where large majorities feel that life is better include two wealthy and politically stable
democracies (Germany and Sweden), an emerging democracy with widespread poverty (India), and a country
whose politics has recently stumbled towards authoritarianism (Turkey). Meanwhile, and more predictably, three

80

70

60

50
Percentage

40

30

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10

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Better Worse

Figure 12.1 Is life better or worse than 50 years ago?

Source: Pew Research Center (2017a).
Note: Responses to the statement: ‘Life in our country today is _______ than it was 50 years ago for people like me.’
 political culture 207

flawed democracies (the United States, Brazil, and France) have more negative results, while the greatest numbers
of people who see life as worse are found in a flawed democracy (Mexico) and an authoritarian system (Venezuela).

political trust
When Almond and Verba were undertaking their research, it was widely assumed that one of Political trust
the hallmarks of a successful liberal democracy was a high degree of political trust. Such The belief that
trust exists when there is a belief that political systems and the institutions of government will rulers are
generate competent decisions which reflect the concern of leaders for those they govern. generally
well-intentioned
Hardin (2006) makes a distinction between trust and trustworthiness, suggesting that if the and effective in
former is on the decline, then so must be the latter. ‘The value of trustworthiness’, he argues, serving the
‘is that it makes social cooperation easier and even possible, so that its decline would entail interests of the
losses of cooperativeness … [and] might even lead us to avoid interactions with most others’. governed.
Particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, the conventional wisdom was that political trust was
decaying in many Western democracies. However, the trend was by no means consistent across countries, and it
was driven more by public confidence in the performance of democratic institutions than on the principle of
democracy itself. These conclusions, though, tended to be based on the study of a select few democracies. More
recently, Dalton and Welzel (2014) – taking Almond and Verba’s study as their base – undertook a wider study of
multiple countries around the world and found that many people had turned away from allegiance, adopting a
newly assertive attitude towards politics. They had become more distrustful of electoral politics, institutions, and
representatives and were more ready to confront elites with their demands.
These results are confi rmed by surveys undertaken for the Trust Barometer by Edelman, a US-based marketing
consultancy, which has been researching levels of trust in four sets of institutions (government, business, media, and
non-governmental) since 2001. It has found those levels changing according to economic and political circumstances,
with – for example – trust in business overtaking government and the media in 2007–8, but then falling in the
wake of the global fi nancial crisis. Trust in all four institutions reached a new post-crisis peak in 2016, before falling
again in 2017–18. Its surveys have also revealed quite different levels of trust comparatively, as reflected in the data
for 2018 shown in Figure 12.2.

90
Percentage trusting government to ‘do what is right’

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
na

ey

en

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an

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Figure 12.2 Comparing trust in government

Source: Edelman (2018).
Note: Based on fieldwork in 28 countries.
208 chapter 12

90

Percentage trusting government in Washington DC

80

70

always or most of the time

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
58

64

67
71

75

80

83
87

91

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01

04

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19

19

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19

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19
19

20

20

20

20

20

20
Figure 12.3 Trust in government in the United States
Source: Various, compiled by Pew Research Center (2017b).

Such data are helpful and interesting, but it is often left to others to provide the explanations. Are the record
levels of trust in China an indication of true faith in the political system, for example, or a reflection of Chinese
concerns about being critical of the authoritarian regime under which they live? For all its years of stability, Sweden
comes in surprisingly low; it ranks high on the Democracy Index, Freedom in the World, and the Corruption
Perceptions Index, yet less than half of Swedes trust their government. (For Linde and Erlingsson (2012), one cause
of this is a suspicion among Swedes that corruption is a wider problem in their country than usually supposed.) The
Russian figure is a reflection of the country’s political uncertainties, and yet it stands in contrast to the high approval
ratings recently enjoyed by Vladimir Putin – see later in this chapter. The low British figure, meanwhile, can be
explained in part by the disruptions caused by Brexit, while the low numbers in Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa
are unsurprising, not least because corruption is such a problem in all three countries.
The United States is an interesting case (see Figure 12.3). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, about three-quarters
of Americans felt that they could trust the federal government most or all of the time. By 1994, that number had
fallen to just one-fifth. It then improved somewhat, with Americans rallying around the flag in the fallout from the
attacks of September 2001. Then, with the intelligence failings exposed by 9/11, mixed opinions about the wisdom
of invading Iraq in 2003, and the financial crisis that broke in 2007, trust fell back to new lows. More deeply, many
Americans – particularly those in rural parts of the country – were beginning to feel threatened by the changes they
saw around them, with jobs lost or transformed by globalization, a growing gap between the rich and poor, doubts
about the rise of a political class, and concerns among working white men about the effects of immigration and
social change and about their ‘traditional’ political and economic role (Wuthnow, 2018).

a clash of civilizations?
Political culture is not only a national or a local phenomenon, but can also be understood at the global level. A key
example of global-scale analysis is offered by the best-selling (and controversial) study by the American political
scientist Samuel Huntington titled The Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996). It was particularly influential in
introducing the issue of religion into the discussion about political culture.
Writing before the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Huntington suggested that cultures, rather than countries,
would become the leading source of political conflict in the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War would
not mean the end of cultural divisions, he said. Instead, he predicted that the focus would shift from a battle of
ideologies to a clash of civilizations. Since such groupings were supranational, Huntington claimed that political
culture had escaped its national moorings to embrace wider identities: civilizations were the broadest cultural
entities in the world, he argued, or ‘cultures writ large’.
Huntington saw seven or eight of them in all: Western, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin
American, Chinese, and (possibly) African. Between the contradictory worldviews of these civilizations, he argued,
 political culture 209

Table 12.1 Huntington’s states and civilizations

Type Qualities Example

Core state The most powerful and culturally central state in a civilization. India (Hindu)
Member A state fully identified with a particular civilization. UK (Western)
state
Lone state A state lacking cultural commonality with other societies. Japan (Japanese)
Source: Huntington (1996).

there was little room for compromise, and while economic conflicts could be bargained away, cultural differences
carried no easy solutions. Huntington noted, for example, how cultural kinship influenced the choice of sides in
the wars of the 1990s: in the conflicts in Yugoslavia, ‘Russia provided diplomatic support to the Serbs, not for
reasons of ideology or power politics or economic interest but because of cultural kinship.’ Later, cultural kinship
was the excuse for takeover of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia’s Vladimir Putin in 2014 and his subsequent efforts
to destabilize eastern Ukraine, a country long torn between Europe and Russia.
How do states relate to Huntington’s civilizations? He provided an intriguing classification of core, member, and
lone states – see Table 12.1. Huntington also discussed mixed or torn states whose leaders try to move their country
from one civilization to another, an effort about which Huntington was sceptical. Australia had failed to reinvent
itself as an Asian country, he said, simply because – in cultural terms – it was not Asian. Cultural differences also
explain why Turkey has had such problems with its application to join the European Union; there has always been
a question of whether the country is primarily European or Asian, and of how an Islamic state (even if it is
traditionally a secular one) can integrate with Christian states (even ones where church attendance has declined).
Huntington’s thesis has drawn considerable criticism, with many scholars either rejecting the idea of distinct
civilizations, or at least questioning the evidence of clashes between them. The thesis has been particularly criticized
for its assessment of the relationship between Islam and the West, which Huntington had portrayed as a permanent
conflict of civilizations:

The underlying problem of the West is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority
of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is the West, a different
civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and who believe that their superior, if
declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world.

Many critics rejected such ideas. In an article titled ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, for example, the scholar Edward
Said (2001) referred to ‘unedifying’ labels such as Islam and the West, arguing that ‘they mislead and confuse the
mind, which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality that won’t be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as
all that’. For his part, Stepan (2001) interpreted Islam as multi-vocal, capable of varying its voice across place and
time. Consider the contrasts offered by Turkey and Saudi Arabia: both are Muslim countries, but Turkey’s
traditionally secular state has become more explicitly Islamic under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (President since 2014).
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian regime was historically guided by a severe form of Islam but has recently
made modest moves in a more liberal direction. Such contrasts show the value of Gregorian’s description (2004) of
Islam as ‘a mosaic, not a monolith’. The reaction to 9/11 confirmed Islam’s multi-vocal character: the hijackers
undoubtedly drew on one anti-Western dialect within Islam but most Muslims, as most Christians, regarded the
attacks as morally unjustified (Saikal, 2003).
Furthermore, the idea of a monolithic Islam is invalidated by the tensions that have long existed between Sunni
and Shia Muslims, and by the increasingly overt expression of this divide within Middle Eastern societies following
the Arab Spring of 2011. (Sunnis make up about 80 per cent of all Muslims, and found their practices on the actions
of Muhammad, while accepting some separation of political and religious authority, while Shia Muslims advocate
a more direct political role for religious leaders, and form a majority in Iran and Iraq.) The monolithic nature of
Christianity is also a myth; for centuries, the major cause of war in Europe was religious differences, and even today
there are tensions between Protestants, Catholics, and the myriad other doctrines to be found within the broad
label of Christianity.
In spite of the criticisms, Huntington’s thesis of a divide succeeded in stimulating badly needed research into the
cultural differences between Muslim and Western countries, which have mainly revealed only limited differences
210 chapter 12

in political attitudes between the two worlds. From their study of more than 50 countries between 1995 and 2001,
for example, Norris and Inglehart (2011) concluded that there were ‘no significant differences between the publics
living in the West and in Muslim religious cultures in approval of how democracy works in practice, in support for
democratic ideals, and in approval of strong leadership’. But the study did find Muslim publics supporting a stronger
social role for religious authorities, although this difference proved to be a case of the West versus the rest, rather
than the West versus Islam. In this respect, the secular character of Western civilization proved to be the odd one
out. It is instructive for the West, accustomed to imagining the Islamic world as an alien other, to see its own secular
civilization as the exception.
There are bigger differences when it comes to sexual and gender issues, with Norris and Inglehart (2011)
drawing the following conclusion:

All the Western nations, led by Sweden, Germany, and Norway, strongly favor equality for women and also prove
tolerant of homosexuality … In contrast, the Muslim cultures, including Egypt, Bangladesh, Jordan, Iran, and
Azerbaijan, all display the most traditional social attitudes, with only Albania proving slightly more liberal.

Other studies have confirmed these differences, but the overall conclusion to be drawn from the debate about
Huntington’s work is that neither cultural differences nor the historical record justify the thesis of an inherent clash
of civilizations between the Islamic world and the West.
Another and less controversial example of a global-scale analysis of political culture is offered by the Inglehart–
Welzel cultural map of the world (see Figure 12.4). This plots most of the countries of the world on a two-
dimensional graph, based on two scales:

◆◆ Traditional to secular–rational. The former emphasizes religion, the family, deference to authority, patriotism, and
conservative positions on matters such as divorce and abortion, while the latter takes opposite positions.
2.5

2.0
JAPAN Protestant
Europe SWEDEN
1.5 Baltic Confucian
Estonia
Lithuania Finland Norway
CHINA Taiwan Hong Kong
Czech Rep. Netherlands
Traditional vs. seculur–rational values

Belarus S. Korea Denmark

1.0 Latvia
Slovenia GERMANY
Bulgaria
Andorra
Catholic
RUSSIA Hungary Austria FRANCE Switzerland Iceland
Ukraine Europe
0.5 Spain Luxembourg
Serbia Australia
Montenegro Slovakia New Zealand
Albania Italy Belgium
Moldova Bosnia Croatia Greece South UNITED KINGDOM
0.0 Orthodox Lebanon Bahrain Portugal INDIA Asia
Macedonia UNITED STATES
Kazakhstan Vietnam Uruguay
Indonesia Thailand Canada
Romania Cyprus SOUTH Chile
Kyrgyzstan AFRICA English speaking
–0.5 Azerbaijan Georgia Ethiopia Argentina N. Ireland
Poland Ireland
Zambia
Tunisia Armenia
Iraq Algeria BRAZIL
–1.0 Palestine Malaysia Kosovo Peru
Morocco Rwanda
TURKEY Pakistan Malta
Yemen
Burkina Faso
Mali
Latin
Zimbabwe Philippines America
–1.5 NIGERIA
Jordan Guatemala MEXICO
African-Islamic Ecuador
Colombia
Trinidad
–2.0 Ghana
Qatar
Muslim-majority countries are in italics

–2.5
–2.0 –1.5 –1.0 – 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Survival vs. self-expression values
Note: higher scores indicate a greater emphasis on secular–rational and self-expression values

Figure 12.4 The Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world

Source: World Values Survey (2018).
Note: Muslim majority countries are in lower-case italics.
 political culture 211

◆◆ Survival and self-expression. Building on Inglehart’s distinction between material and post-material values,
survival concerns denote an emphasis on economic and physical security, resulting in low levels of trust and
tolerance, while a broader concern with self-expression gives priority to environmental protection, tolerance of
foreigners, gender equality, and greater participation in political and economic decision-making.

Using this framework, Inglehart and Welzel divide the world into nine types based on a somewhat uncomfortable
combination of religion, geography, and language. This has allowed them to draw conclusions about a number of
qualities related to political culture, including democratic aspirations, the empowerment of citizens, globalization,
gender values, religion, and life satisfaction. Among the 18 cases on which this book focuses, Sweden sits furthest
towards secular–rational and self-expression, Mexico towards traditional and self-expression, China towards
secular–rational and survival, and Turkey towards traditional and survival. More broadly, most democracies sit in
the secular–rational and self-expression quadrant, while most authoritarian states sit in the traditional and survival
quadrant.
As with almost any analysis involving the slippery notion of culture, the Inglehart–Welzel map raises as many
questions as it answers. Why, for example, is language used as a category only in the case of English-speaking
countries (and why is the UK not considered part of Protestant Europe, or Ireland part of Catholic Europe)? Does
it make sense to place Islamic and (often non-Islamic) African states in the same cluster? Why do the three Baltic
States merit their own group (surrounding China)? In spite of the doubts, the map provides an interesting point of
reference, and the World Values Survey has generated a large body of research, often suggesting interesting new
themes of research. To offer just one example, Minkov and Hostede (2011) have used this data to argue against the
existence of multiple cultural identities within states that would compromise the idea of a national culture. Their
study suggests that states ‘overwhelmingly cluster along national lines on basic cultural values’, and a mingling of
cultures across borders is relatively rare. This is true, they argue, even of countries with multiple languages,
religions, ethnic groups, historical experiences, and traditions.

political culture in authoritarian states

Just as Almond and Verba argued that the ideal of a stable liberal democracy includes a pluralist civic culture
emphasizing self-expression, so Welzel and Inglehart (2009) suggest that many authoritarian regimes are sustained
by a cultural emphasis among their populations on security. From this perspective, it is wrong to see non-democratic
rule as secured only by repression of a disaffected citizenry. Rather, authoritarian regimes can be as legitimate as
democracies; it is only the basis of their authority that differs. So, we have here a cultural theory of political stability
in authoritarian settings.
Specifically, Welzel and Inglehart (2009) suggest that people in low-income countries prioritize authority and
strong leadership over freedom and self-expression. What is more, if a democracy does emerge in such unsympathetic
cultures, it may be unstable: ‘democracy is fragile when it is a “democracy without democrats”’, they argue. Even
if people reject the current leaders of an authoritarian government, they may simply want to replace them with
another set of non-democratic rulers. In other words, Western analysts who interpret all dissent in dictatorships as
a plea for democracy may simply be seeing what they wish for. Furthermore, people living under non-democratic
governments who favour democracy may interpret the term as referring not so much to self-rule as to social order,
national autonomy, and a strong economy.
A good example of an authoritarian culture centred on security and order is Russia. Many in the West wanted
to believe that they were witnessing a transition to liberal democracy in Russia throughout the 1990s, and were
then surprised to see a ‘return’ to authoritarianism during the Putin years. But Russian political culture includes
only limited support for democratic principles, while Russians – as we saw earlier – have low levels of trust in
government (44 per cent). However, they have even lower levels of trust in business (41 per cent), the media (35 per
cent), and non-governmental organizations (25 per cent) (Edelman, 2018).
To some extent, Russia is still living with what McAllister (2014) describes as ‘the burden of history’ (a point
that, in fairness, could be made of almost any society when considering its political culture). Political attitudes and
behaviour are strongly driven by childhood experiences, and there are many in Russia who still remember the
Soviet era, look back on it with nostalgia, and have had difficulties transitioning to a new political and economic
system with less security and predictability. This is changing with the generations, though, and support for the old
regime is much weaker among younger Russians than among their parents and grandparents.
212 chapter 12

It is revealing that in spite of the criticism that has been directed at Putin from abroad since Russia injected itself
into Georgian affairs in 2008 (ostensibly to protect Russian interests in the breakaway region of South Ossetia), and
that moved into even higher gear as Russia injected itself into Ukrainian affairs in 2014, Putin has enjoyed
remarkably high approval ratings in Russia (Taylor, 2014). Polls from both state-run and independent sources found
that he had the approval of 72 per cent of Russians in March 2014, a three-year high. (President Obama meanwhile
had 43 per cent approval and President Hollande of France less than 20 per cent approval.) His approval subsequently
slipped in the wake of concerns about the economy and the persistence of corruption, but was still at levels rarely
found in the case of liberal democratic leaders. Clearly, Russians are rejecting the old regime, but they still admire
strong and decisive leadership, even – seemingly – if it involves breaking international law.
One objection to the position that non-democratic regimes are supported by political culture is that the
relationship is really the other way round. As we have already suggested, culture can reflect rather than sustain the
nature of a regime. In the case of Russia, the lack of political trust there may well reflect the country’s non-
democratic history and the corrupt nature of its contemporary governance. Were a secure liberal democracy to take
root in Russia, by whatever means, the nation’s political culture would probably also shift in a democratic direction.
In other words, over the longer-term political culture reflects the nature of the regime, rather than vice versa.
Interestingly, Welzel and Inglehart (2009) reject this idea. They insist, as did Gabriel Almond a generation
earlier, that political culture is an independent force. In rejecting the view that it is merely a mirror of the current
political system, they suggest that ‘high levels of intrinsic support for democracy emerged in many authoritarian

Focus 12.2
Revolutions and political culture
Earlier in this chapter, we saw that there is a common inclination to equate the dominant political culture of
a country with its national culture, and to define the dominant culture in terms of the values of political
elites. This, as we also saw, would be a mistake. It is particularly mistaken in the case of authoritarian states
where rule is often by a political elite whose membership is narrower and smaller than is the case in
democracies, where the values of elites are often counterbalanced by the capacity of multiple groups in
society to make themselves heard.
Occasionally in authoritarian systems, we find elites being removed – whether through popular uprisings
or through electoral upsets – and being replaced by new regimes that go about redefining what might be
regarded as ‘normal’ in regard to beliefs, attitudes, and values as they pertain to politics and the political
system. This has happened, for example, in almost every case of a revolution that has toppled an old
regime, whether in the case of France in 1789, Mexico in 1910–20, Russia in 1917, Egypt in 1952, Cuba in
the 1950s, or Iran in 1979. More recently, a similar story of change has come to Venezuela, albeit by
different means; rather than overthrowing an existing regime, Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 by
winning an election, at which point he launched his Bolivarian revolution.
Named for Venezuelan revolutionary leader Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), the revolution came in the wake
of austerity measures imposed in Venezuela and several other Latin American countries in their effort to
recover from the regional debt crisis of the mid-1980s. Its core features are described by Strønen (2017) as
an effort to challenge a political culture shaped by the country’s history as a major oil producer, and to break
the hegemony of the middle and upper classes by mobilizing the poor and reforming state institutions. But
Chávez died in office in 2013, leaving behind a deeply divided society, a chaotic economy, many unmet
promises for change, and widespread disillusion with continuous political reform. His personalist rule
weakened rather than strengthened state institutions, and the independent force of political culture that
was identified by Welzel and Inglehart cannot be reshaped so quickly.
Placed within its wider context, it is important to note that relatively little is known about political
culture in Latin America, making it more difficult to assess the meaning of the Venezuelan case. Booth and
Richard (2015) point out that electoral democracy has long been scarce in the region, tends to break down
when it emerges, and that while much progress has been made as Latin American countries have thrown off
military dictatorships, the staying power of electoral democracy is uncertain at best. The Venezuelan case,
they conclude, raises questions about the commitment of elites and masses alike to democracy.
 political culture 213

Supporters celebrate the 2014 victory of Egyptian president Mohammed el-Sisi, who had reinvented himself as a civilian
candidate soon after coming to power in a military coup.
Source: Getty Images/NurPhoto.

societies before they made the transition to democracy’, citing such examples as South Korea and Taiwan. Their view
is that, as societies modernize, so their better-educated segments give more emphasis to self-expression and post-
material values. This cultural shift then leads to pressure to democratize. The case of Venezuela, however, would
seem to suggest otherwise given the extent to which its middle and upper classes held on to power and have resisted
change in recent years – see Focus 12.2.
In many non-democratic Islamic countries, authoritarian rulers seek to draw from the well of Islamic culture in
a way that supports their hold on power. They present democracy as an alien Western concept which in practice
leads to licence rather than freedom, to an emphasis on material rather than spiritual values, and to the pursuit of
individual self-interest rather than social harmony. For example, Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of
Malaysia (1981–2003, and again from 2018), condemned Western democracies in which ‘political leaders are afraid
to do what is right, where the people and their leaders live in fear of the free media which they so loudly proclaim
as inviolable’. Through such statements, authoritarian rule can be presented as expressing an indigenous cultural
tradition inherently opposed to Western liberalism.
But how should we explain the recent story of Egypt? First we see its people standing at the forefront of the Arab
Spring, with massive public demonstrations in early 2011 that led to the toppling in February of the Mubarak
regime, in office for nearly 30 years. Egyptians then embraced democracy, taking part in competitive elections in
2011–12, and electing the government of Mohammed Morsi, who was notable not just for heading the first Islamist
government in Egypt’s history, but also for being the only civilian among the five leaders that Egypt has had since
the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952. When Morsi began to show signs of authoritarianism, he was removed by
the military in July 2013, and eventually replaced by the then little-known head of the Egyptian military, Abdel
Fattah el-Sisi.
For Maghraoui (2014), the dynamics behind el-Sisi’s rise are ‘a mystery when abstracted from the general
context of Egypt’s authoritarian past. He is a man with no charisma, no political experience, no warrior’s aura, no
214 chapter 12

distinct ideology, and no clear plan of how to tackle Egypt’s chronic social and economic problems.’ It seems that
in spite of the support that Egyptians gave to democratic change in 2011, many still hold on to the idea of strong
leadership, suggesting that there is still a core streak of authoritarianism within Egyptian political culture, at least
among older Egyptians if not the mainly younger protestors who were at the forefront of the protests against
Mubarak and Morsi. El-Sisi made the ‘war on terror’ a cornerstone of his government, an idea that appealed to
many Egyptians and that helped strengthen his base of support. In the view of Cambanis (2015), el-Sisi needed ‘just
enough power to stay in charge, and enough international support to ignore the outrage of Egyptians who want
civil rights, political freedom, and genuine economic development’. How long he can make this last, however,
remains to be seen.
When it comes to much of sub-Saharan Africa, one of the key challenges faced by political scientists is to
distinguish indigenous political values from those created by the fallout from the colonial experience. When the
borders of European states were formed, it was as a result of conflict and competition among Europeans themselves.
The borders of African (and Middle Eastern) states were, by contrast, imposed from outside, by European colonial
powers, paying no heed to political, cultural, or religious realities. The result was the creation of contrived political
units in which ethnic communities with different histories were expected to work together and to build a sense of
national unity while also ruling with partly formed political systems and underdeveloped economies.
Nigeria is a case in point of the resulting problems. In pre-colonial times, ethnic groups in the region such as
the Hausa and Yoruba had worked out a balance between themselves that protected them from too much
interference. The creation of Nigeria by British colonialism forced these groups to live and work together and to
build shared systems of government and administration, setting them on a path of mutual hostility as they competed
for power and resources and struggled to preserve their identity. Lacking a state tradition, Nigerians continue to
find it hard to trust government officials, so they look instead to their communities for stability, and they believe
that loyalty to the community is the paramount virtue. So persistent have Nigeria’s ethnic divisions become that
they once led a frustrated Wole Soyinka (1997) – the Nigerian novelist and 1986 Nobel laureate for literature – to
dismiss the idea of a Nigerian nation as a ‘farcical illusion’.
One of the consequences is a tradition of systemic corruption, which has become so normal that many locals
call it ‘the Nigerian factor’. As well as reflecting all the obvious and standard features discussed in Chapter 6, the
Nigerian brand of corruption has gone international via the multiple emails sent from Nigeria to Western recipients
offering millions of dollars to help settle the affairs of people who have allegedly died and left no successors. Named
419 scams after the section of the Nigerian penal code dealing with fraud, they have been so successful that they
have become Nigeria’s second biggest source of foreign revenues after oil (Smith, 2007).
How much of the Nigerian experience with political culture is truly Nigerian, and how much is a consequence
of Nigeria’s difficulties in building a sense of national unity? Can modernization make a difference in such
circumstances? Does Nigeria even have discernible political cultural trends that have roots in Nigerian society and
that are subject to the same kinds of pressures and influences as the trends we find in more democratic Western
states with a longer history of relatively stable national identity? Or is the best that we can say about political culture
in authoritarian systems that it exists, but that it is fundamentally negative in nature?
 political culture 215

discussion questions
◆◆ How healthy is the civic culture in today’s democracies?
◆◆ What can be done to reverse the decline in political trust?
◆◆ Does post-materialism still make sense as a way of understanding political culture in the
West?
◆◆ Is there a clash of civilizations between the Muslim and Western worlds?
◆◆ Is there such a thing as a Western political culture, and – if so – what are its features?
◆◆ Can revolutions change political culture, or does change take much longer?

key concepts
◆◆ Civic culture ◆◆ Political culture
◆◆ Elite political culture ◆◆ Political trust
◆◆ Identity politics ◆◆ Post-materialism

further reading
Dalton, Russell, J., and Christian Welzel (eds) (2014) The Civic Culture Transformed: From
Allegiant to Assertive Citizens (Cambridge University Press). A reassessment of the concept
of civic culture, noting the shift in many countries towards a distrust of government that
has encouraged more confrontation with political elites.
Fukuyama, Francis (2018) Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (Farrar,
Straus and Giroux). A controversial author tackles the subject of identity politics, arguing
that liberal democracy is being challenged by narrower forms of recognition based on
nation, religion, sect, race, ethnicity, or gender.
Inglehart, Ronald (2018) Cultural Evolution: People’s Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the
World (Cambridge University Press). A new assessment of post-materialism by the
originator of the idea, arguing that diminishing job security and rising inequality have
led in recent decades to an authoritarian reaction.
Norris, Pippa (2011) Democratic Defi cit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge University Press).
Based on extensive survey analysis, this book challenges the claim that liberal democracies
have experienced a continuously rising tide of public disaffection since the early 1970s.
Uslaner, Eric M. (ed.) (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust (Oxford University
Press). An edited collection of studies of the sources and outcomes of social and political
trust, including several comparative chapters.
Wiarda, Howard J. (2014) Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics: An Uneasy
Alliance (Ashgate). An assessment of the fall and rise of political culture as an explanatory
paradigm in political science.
 Source: iStock/Lucy Brown – loca4motion
political
participation 13
contents
◆ Political participation: an
overview
◆ Who participates, and
why?
PREVIEW ◆ Public opinion
The quality of democracy depends to a high degree on the extent to ◆ The dynamics of public
which citizens are willing or able to take part in the process of opinion
governing. There are many different channels available for
participation, ranging from the conventional to the unconventional,
◆ Women in government
but no guarantees that people will want to use them. Two points will and politics
become clear in this chapter. First, the quantity and the quality of ◆ Political participation in
participation vary not only between regime types but also within authoritarian states
individual countries over time and among different social groups.
Even in democracies, rates of participation are far from equal. Second,
even as the variety of forms of participation expands, many people
still choose not to express themselves, or are poorly informed about the issues at stake. In authoritarian systems,
of course, their views and opinions are not usually entertained to begin with.
This chapter begins with an assessment of who participates and why, looking in particular at the problem of
political exclusion, and reviewing the distinctions between conventional, unconventional, and illegal forms of
participation. It then ties participation to public opinion, explaining how opinion is measured, and discusses the
implications of variable levels of knowledge about political affairs. The chapter then considers the particular place
of women in politics, looking at barriers to their participation and asking why government is still often dominated
by men. The chapter ends with a discussion of how participation is managed and limited in authoritarian states,
pointing out that levels of participation are often higher than might be expected.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ We know who participates in democracies, and who does not, but the reasons behind patterns of
participation vary by time and place.
◆◆ Studies of participation in democracies show a bias towards privileged social groups, reflecting
inequalities of resources and interest.
◆◆ While political participation may seem to be declining in many parts of the world, it may be that more
people are choosing a wider variety of means to express themselves.
◆◆ The science of measuring public opinion has improved dramatically, but the political and technological
challenges it faces have grown.
◆◆ While political engagement by women has increased substantially, inequalities in their access to positions
of power continue.
◆◆ In authoritarian regimes, clientelism and mobilized participation are important phenomena, but gauging
public opinion is often difficult.
 political participation 217

political participation: an overview

Political Political participation describes the ways in which people actively seek to influence the
participation composition or policies of government. Conventional forms of participation include voting
Actions by in elections, citizens contacting their representatives, activists campaigning for their favoured
individuals candidate, and – increasingly – engagement via social media. But participation can also take
intended to
influence who
unconventional forms – such as taking part in a demonstration – and may even involve
governs or the breaking the law or turning to violence, as in the case of terrorist acts against the state. The
decisions taken by distinctions between conventional and unconventional types are becoming less clear as the
those who do. options for political participation widen and change, leading Theocharis and van Deth (2018)
to ask how we can any longer recognize participation when we see it.
Conventional In a liberal democracy, people can choose whether to be involved in politics, to what
participation extent, and through what channels. Participation is also found in authoritarian regimes, even
Takes place within
formal politics and if it is only to create a facade of engagement, manipulated so as to support, rather than threaten,
the law. the existing rulers. The forms and the costs of participation are somewhat different.
What expectations should be brought to the study of participation? One perspective, dating
Unconven- back to the ancient Greeks, is that involvement in collective decision-making is both an
tional obligation owed to the community and an exercise in personal development, widening
participation individual horizons and providing political education. From this standpoint, participation
Takes place
benefits both the political system and the individual, and non-participants are free-riders who
outside formal
politics or even gain from the efforts of others.
the law. A second perspective, rooted in practical realities more than high ideals, sets a lower bar.
This suggests that people are not naturally political animals, and that extensive participation
is less a sign of a healthy democracy than of unresolved tensions within a political system. Demonstrations, protests,
and even high voter turnout may be indicative of a system that is overheating, rather than one that is in good health.
In normal times, limited participation may indicate the system’s success in meeting popular demands, freeing
citizens to pursue more fulfi lling activities.
In these two accounts, all that matters in a liberal democracy is that citizens monitor political events, and
become involved as necessary; that the channels are open, not that they are in constant use. Schudson (1998)
suggests that, even when citizens appear inactive, they remain poised for action, like parents watching their children
play in a swimming pool. Especially in an age when some conventional forms of participation have declined, such
surveillance can even be seen as a central mechanism of democracy: ‘To be watchful, alert, and on guard are
essential attributes of citizenship’, suggests Rosanvallon (2008), who argues that monitoring should be understood
as a form of participation, and vigilance as ‘a mode of action’.
A third perspective argues that many of those who fail to participate do so because they feel marginalized or
alienated, or think that their involvement will make no difference, or see government as a set of institutions
dominated by elites. Humans may not be political animals, but they routinely make cost–benefit calculations, and
some make the rational calculation that participating is not worth the time or the trouble. This is a view that has
become more evident as levels of trust in government have fallen.

who participates, and why?

Rates and types of participation have been the subject of much study over recent decades, with concerns expressed
about declining political participation and the implications of different levels of engagement by different social
groups, and what the numbers tell us about satisfaction, cynicism, and alienation. For democracy to work, a
sufficient number of people must engage with government and believe that their engagement matters. As we will
see in Chapter 17, turnout at elections in many countries is declining, which would seem – at fi rst glance – to be a
sign of a problem. Another sign of a potential problem, as we will also see in Chapter 17, is that support for political
parties is declining. But voting and party activities are only two parts of the overall picture, rates and trends vary
from one country to another (and even within countries), and while trends may be downwards in terms of certain
kinds of activities, they are heading upwards in other kinds, particularly those associated with social media.
For decades, the most striking result of studies of participation in democracies was how little most people
involved themselves other than through voting; only a small minority engage themselves activity in politics, while
a large minority chooses not to engage at all, or only rarely. In an influential comparative analysis of participation
218 chapter 13

in the United States that drew an analogy from ancient Rome, Milbrath and Goel (1977) divided the population
into a small group of active gladiators, a large group of spectators, and a mid-sized group of disengaged apathetics
(see Figure 13.1). This classification has since been applied to other liberal democracies.
The small proportion of gladiators probably comes as no surprise, and yet while these people are likely to exert
political influence, they are far from a cross-section of society. In most democracies, levels of participation are
greatest among well-educated, upper-income, white men. In addition, for all but protest behaviour (found
disproportionately among the young), participation peaks among the middle-aged. This bias in participation
towards upper social groups is significant because it suggests that apathy may not, after all, be a sign of satisfaction
with the existing order. In that case, we would expect the well-heeled to be less involved in politics because they
have relatively little to complain about – exactly the opposite of the observed pattern.
So, why does participation increase as we move up the social scale? According to Verba et al. (1995), two factors
are influential. First, resources are important. People in high-status groups have such assets as education, money,
status, and communication skills. Education gives access to information and strengthens the ability to interpret it,
money buys the luxury of time for political activity, status provides the opportunity to obtain a respectful hearing,
and communication skills help in presenting one’s views persuasively. Resources will also help provide the
confidence that an individual can make a difference. Added together, these resources provide a useful tool kit for
effective political intervention; their unequal distribution helps to account for under-participation by less-privileged
social groups.
Second, political interest is important. High-status individuals are more likely to be engaged with politics
because they have the motive as well as the means to become involved. No longer preoccupied with the daily
struggle, they can take satisfaction from engagement in collective activity (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010). The
wealthy are also more likely to be able to see how politics can impact their wealth and prospects. So, higher social
groups have a greater interest in politics and can afford to put their concerns into practice. Conversely, those in
lower social strata are more likely to come from a family and a community where the main focus is on the
challenges of daily life, rather than the remote goings-on of national politics.
As for the spectators in the study by Milbrath and Goel, their characteristics are harder to pin down, but their
role has changed with the increased availability of information. The internet and the rise of social media have made
it possible to gather political information at a level of detail that was impossible even a generation ago. If watching
without necessarily speaking is a form of participation, then the channels through which we can observe have
grown enormously, such that political spectating may now be a leading and highly influential form of participation.
In an age of spectatorship, suggests Green (2010), the disciplinary gaze of the people – their eyes, rather than their
voice – has become the source of their power.
While the emphasis of research on political participation is on explaining what distinguishes the gladiators from
the spectators, we should not ignore the apathetics: the people who do not participate at all. This group raises the

Gladiators
Fight the
political battles
5–7%

Spectators
Watch political
developments but only
participate directly
through voting
About 60%

Apathetics
Avoid formal politics altogether
About 35%

Figure 13.1 Political participation in democracies

 political participation 219

problem of political exclusion. As Verba et al. (1995) write, the apathetics effectively exclude Political
themselves – or, sometimes, are deliberately excluded – from the normal means by which exclusion
citizens collectively shape their society. The archetypal non-participant might be an The phenomenon
unemployed young person with no qualifications, inhabiting a high-crime, inner-city by which some –
such as the poor
neighbourhood, often from a minority culture and perhaps not even speaking the dominant
and the
language. Such a profi le may encourage radical activity among a few but, in general, a unemployed – are
preoccupation with everyday life limits or eliminates participation in conventional political discouraged from
processes. taking part in
Because participation in most liberal democracies is an option rather than a requirement collective
decision-making
(however, see discussion about mandatory voting in Chapter 15), and because inequalities in
because of their
participation are deeply rooted in differences in resources and interest, it is unlikely ever to be marginal position
equal; the active minority is sure to remain sociologically unrepresentative of the passive in society.
majority. But our understanding of participation will always be incomplete without an
understanding of the motives behind political apathy. The aims of universal participation and Paradox of
political equality coexist alongside the facts of limited and unequal involvement. participation
Having asked who participates in politics, it is also worth briefly asking why they take part. The idea that
voting is an
Rational choice theorists suggest that voting is an irrational act, given the amount of time and irrational act given
effort that it takes to remain engaged and informed, and the minimal chance that participating the time and effort
will actually make any difference (Downs, 1957). This is the paradox of participation. Of involved and the
course, though, if everyone thought this way then no one would participate and democracy would minimal chance
cease to function. There are several more focused reasons for making the effort to participate: that any one voter
can make a
difference.
◆◆ Idealism. Some believe in the possibilities of democracy and wish to bring about change.
◆◆ Responsibility. Some feel that it is their civic responsibility, and might think about the
amount of blood that has been shed over the centuries to win the right to vote and to freely express opinions.
◆◆ Concern. Some will participate because they are concerned about the problems facing society, and wish to be
counted as part of the potential solution, and/or wish to promote parties and politicians that they believe are
willing and able to address these problems.
◆◆ Mobilization. Some will take part because they have been encouraged by parties or political leaders to oppose the
incumbents or to offset a threat from the opposition.
◆◆ Enjoyment. Some will participate because they fi nd it enjoyable, whether for social reasons, engagement with the
community, or the thrill of the competition.

In addition to voting, the conventional forms of participation (at least, as usually defi ned) include anything
involving contact with – or active support for – elected officials, political parties, or interest groups (see Table 13.1).
They also include several options that were considered unconventional until recently, but have become more usual
and less remarkable; prime among these is expressing opinions, debating, or mobilizing others via social media. At
the other end of the scale, attracting particularly those who are among the most marginalized and distrustful
members of society, is participation that is intent on breaking the law, or the kind of extremism that leads to
political violence and terrorism.
Between these two poles, there is the option of unconventional participation, chosen particularly by younger
citizens, who are tired of government and ‘politics as usual’, but are not so much apathetic as leading the move
towards a diversification of participation, using less conventional means such as protests and the use of consumer
politics – see Focus 13.1. Precisely what is happening here is uncertain, the work of two scholars emphasizing that
uncertainty. On the one hand, Grasso (2016) has used data from Western Europe to argue that there is a generational
shift under way, with younger citizens becoming disengaged, and less likely to participate in voting, supporting
parties, or even political activism.
On the other hand, Peters (2018) argues that rather than people becoming more apathetic, they have instead
reallocated their time and attention to new forms of engagement. She also raises two interesting questions about
how we should understand and defi ne participation: should it involve both active and passive forms (learning about
politics is passive, and yet is also a form of engagement), and should it include activities aimed only at government,
or can those aimed at institutions outside government (such as business) also be considered a form of participation?
Perhaps we have for too long had too limited a defi nition of the meaning of political participation, and – particularly
in the age of the internet – we need to expand that defi nition.
220 chapter 13

Table 13.1 Forms of political participation

Conventional Voting in elections

Joining or donating to political parties
Joining, supporting, or donating to interest groups
Contacting elected representatives
Signing petitions
Expressing opinions, debating, or mobilizing through social media
Volunteering in political campaigns or running elections
Organizing community campaigns
Attending political rallies or meetings
Wearing badges or displaying political signs or posters
Raising money for candidates, parties, or causes
Running for elected office
Less conventional/ Taking part in peaceful demonstrations, protests, or walkouts
unconventional Organizing or taking part in consumer boycotts and buycotts
Illegal Civil disobedience
Occupation of buildings or public spaces
Sabotaging the efforts of parties, candidates, or elected officials
Politically motivated crime
Political violence, including terrorism and assassination

public opinion
Public opinion
The range of views
If participation can take the form of monitoring political events, even if that surveillance does
held on an issue of not lead to participatory behaviour, then we can think of public opinion as an arena of
public concern by political participation. When people discuss the issues of the day in a way that shapes public
the members of an opinion, they are taking part not simply in politics, but also in democratic politics.
affected Public opinion matters especially, but not only, in democracies. Opinion pollsters measure
community.
public opinion through survey research, internet research companies monitor social media
Opinion poll trends, and the political class engages in a continuous debate on what ‘the public’ thinks about
A series of particular issues. They do this because they know that politicians take note, even if they
questions asked in routinely deny this, claiming that the only poll that matters is the vote on Election Day. A case
a standard way of can even be made that public opinion is a more powerful influence on political decisions than
a systematic elections, given that public opinion is measured continuously and on specific issues while
sample of the
population in
elections only happen once in a while. What applied during the French Revolution still speaks
order to gauge to us today:
public opinion.
Public opinion was a power that manifested itself always and everywhere without being
Sample represented or instituted in any particular place. Hence it became the essential manifestation
survey of the people as an active and permanent presence. (Rosanvallon, 2008)
Similar to an
opinion poll but Although we can define public opinion as whatever the general population thinks about a
involving a more given issue, and assume that it can be measured using polls, this simple definition fails to capture
detailed
questionnaire.
what most politicians understand by ‘public’ opinion. Their thinking is sensitive to organized
Such surveys are opinion as expressed through the conventional media or by opinion leaders. This more political
often perspective links the idea of a ‘public’ to an informed community sharing basic political principles.
commissioned by Social media have made the measurement of opinion more difficult, because a much wider
governments or variety of preferences are now expressed, and it is much harder to take representative examples.
academic
researchers.
In terms of how public opinion is measured, there are several options available. Prime
among these are opinion polls and sample surveys, traditionally the most accurate
 political participation 221

Focus 13.1
The consumer as a political participant
One form of political participation that rarely appears on most lists of options, in spite of being a device
with which many people engage, is consumer politics (see Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). This involves a
decision to buy or boycott goods or services for political reasons. It is nothing new,
and can be an effective way of making a point or achieving a goal at little cost to the Consumer
person making that point. These boycotts have long been used to express opinions politics
Buying or
about everything from human rights to consumer safety, animal rights, public health, boycotting goods
and the environment. or services for
One of the most famous examples of consumer politics was the start of the US war political or ethical
of independence, which was sparked by protests in the American colonies about trade reasons.
policies pursued by England. Two other examples were the ‘Don’t Buy Jewish’ campaign
that emerged in parts of Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, and the boycott of Jewish-owned
businesses imposed by the Nazis in Germany. More recent examples include the efforts made by consumers
to reduce their own energy consumption (or that of targeted companies) so as so to limit their carbon
footprints, seeking out fair trade products that offer a higher or guaranteed price to the original producers,
and boycotts of retail chains that exploit sweat-shop labour.
More broadly, argues Heldman (2017), consumer activism is ‘a democratizing force that improves
political participation, self-governance, and the accountability of corporations and the government’. In
particular, she points out, socially responsible investing, social media campaigns, and direct consumer
actions all highlight the ways in which consumer activism can act as a countervailing force against corporate
power in politics.
Conversely, consumers have also been known to organize anti-boycotts, or ‘buycotts’, where a deliberate
effort is made to make purchases in the face of efforts to express political protest through boycotts. For
example, when a campaign was launched in the Middle East to use a boycott to protest the publication in
Denmark in 2005 of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad, a counter-protest was organized in the
form of the Buy Danish campaign, aimed at offsetting the effects of the boycott.

methods of identifying what people profess to believe. Although the public itself remains resolutely sceptical of
sample surveys, their accuracy is now well attested, at least in predicting election outcomes in countries where
pollsters know how to interpret the numbers. In modern presidential elections in the United States, for example,
the difference between the number of votes projected for the eventual winner and the fi nal result has rarely been
more than 3 per cent. One pollster – Nate Silver of the New York Times – was even able to correctly predict the
winner in 49 out of 50 states in 2008, and all 50 states in 2012. Even though polls were often criticized for
‘getting it wrong’ in 2016 when most projected that Hillary Clinton would beat Donald Trump, they were
actually quite accurate: they had her winning the popular vote by 3.2 per cent, and – in the event – she won by
2.1 per cent.
But in an era of declining turnout at elections, changes in technology, voters who make up their mind only at
the last minute, and a falling response rate to surveys, pollsters face increasing challenges. In the 2015 British
general election, for example, they significantly underestimated the number of seats that the Conservatives would
win. One factor here seems to have been the tendency for Labour supporters in particular to exaggerate their
likelihood of voting. Another explanation distinguishes between values and choices. Voters might not like the
values of a particular political party (such as the Conservatives), but still vote for it because they judge that it will
govern more effectively than the alternatives, not least on the economy (Booth, 2015).
Counter-intuitive though it may be, a group of 1,000 people carefully selected for an opinion poll can accurately
represent the whole population. The key phrase here is ‘carefully selected’. The procedure must be systematic, and
the sample must be compared with known figures for the population, with adjustments (known as ‘weighting’) for
any discrepancies. Weighting is particularly important when the sample is self-selected, as with people who agree
to take part in polls conducted through the internet. Weighting or not, some self-selected samples, such as the small
222 chapter 13

minority of constituents who contact their representative about their pet topic, should not be regarded as a valid
basis for estimating public opinion at all – at least not when public opinion is equated with the whole adult
population.
Even when a sample is chosen systematically, it would be wrong to overstate the reliability of opinion polls in
measuring the opinions of individual respondents. Polls are usually commissioned by political parties or mass
media, not by the ordinary people who answer the questions. As a result, people may never
Focus group have thought about a topic before they are invited to answer questions on it, they may give an
A moderated opinion when they have none, or they may agree to a statement because it is the easiest thing
discussion among to do (‘yea-saying’) or because it is socially acceptable. Certainly, one danger of opinion polls
a small group of is that they help to construct the public opinions they claim they are simply measuring.
respondents on a
particular topic,
A focus group overcomes some of these difficulties by allowing researchers to gather
used to explore small groups of people – typically eight to ten – with a common characteristic: they may be
the thinking and non-voters, for example, or donors to a particular party. The idea is to explore, in open-
emotions behind ended style, the perspectives through which participants view the issue. Unlike an opinion
people’s attitudes. poll, the agenda can be at least partly driven by those taking part. A focus group is a qualitative
technique, smaller in scale than an opinion poll and often self-selected, but aiming at a
Deliberative
deeper understanding than is possible with the pre-coded answers used in most quantitative
opinion poll
An arrangement surveys.
by which people Because opinion polls do not give respondents a chance to discuss the issue before expressing
are briefed by, and their views, their results are criticized by those who favour more ambitious interpretations of
can question, the public’s role. Building on a richer view of the public’s capacity, scholars have developed the
experts and
idea of a deliberative opinion poll or citizens’ jury (Fishkin, 2011). This technique involves
politicians on a
given topic before exposing a small sample of voters to a range of viewpoints on a selected topic, perhaps through
their own opinions presentations by experts and politicians. With the background to the problem established, the
are measured. group proceeds to a discussion and a judgement. Opinion is only measured when the issues
have been thoroughly aired. As Fishkin (1991) explains, an opinion poll ‘models what the
public thinks, given how little it knows’, while a deliberative opinion poll ‘models what the public would think, if
it had a more adequate chance to think about the questions at issue’.
Deliberative polling can therefore be used to anticipate how opinion might develop on new issues. It is also
helpful on issues with a large technical content, such as global warming or genetic testing, or on complex matters
of international politics and security. In such areas, expert explanation can usefully precede an expression of public
opinion. Though not widely used, citizens’ juries are an ingenious attempt to overcome the problem of ill-informed
replies which bedevils conventional opinion polls.

the dynamics of public opinion

In some ways, public opinion pervades and drives all policy-making, guiding the direction taken by policy debates,
forming the environment within which politicians work, and determining what governments do or do not do. In
these circumstances, public opinion usually performs one of two roles: acting either as a prompt or as a veto. ‘Public
opinion demands we do something about traffic congestion’ is an example of the former; ‘public opinion would
never accept restrictions on vehicle use’ illustrates the latter.
Yet, public opinion is never all-powerful, even in liberal democracies. It informs agendas rather than policy, and
four limits are worth noting:

◆◆ Public opinion offers few detailed policy prescriptions. A few important objectives preoccupy the public but
most policies are routine and uncontroversial. In detailed policy-making, expert and organized opinion matters
more than public opinion.
◆◆ The public as a whole is often ill-informed, especially, but not only, on foreign policy (see Focus 13.2). In
preparing for the 2016 British referendum on continued membership of the European Union, for example, it
was suggested that the wording of the referendum should be ‘Do you think the UK should be a member of the
European Union?’ This was rejected, though, when the UK Electoral Commission warned that enough Britons
did not know that the UK was already a member as to create confusion and a flawed result (McCormick, 2014).
◆◆ Public opinion can evade trade-offs but governments cannot, though they sometimes try. The public may want
lower taxes, more government spending, and a lower budget deficit, for example, but leaders must choose
 political participation 223

Focus 13.2
The uninformed citizen
The quality and quantity of political participation are both driven in part by the knowledge of citizens: those
who keep up with public affairs and have well-formed opinions about public matters are more likely to
participate than those who do not. But there is no guarantee even that those who participate really know
much about the issues at stake. In reality, most people are poorly or selectively informed on most public
issues most of the time. This raises the troubling question of the uninformed citizen, and how low levels of
knowledge impact government and politics.
This is far from a new problem. In The Republic, Plato argued that government was best conducted by
knowledgeable experts, free from the influence of the uninformed majority. In Leviathan, Hobbes suggested
that the role of the public should not extend much further than the formation of government. Alexander
Hamilton spoke of ‘the imprudence of democracy’ and of the ‘turbulent and changing’ nature of the people,
who could ‘seldom judge or determine right’ (Morris, 1966). Others – including Machiavelli, Hume, and
Hegel – conceded that while the involvement of citizens in government was important, it was no more than
a necessary evil. John Stuart Mill (1861) regarded public opinion as representing the views of a ‘collective
mediocrity’, and favoured a weighted system that gave more votes to university graduates on the grounds
that they were more politically competent.
However, many political scientists favour a more nuanced approach. They argue that voters can use
effective shortcuts such as party labels, expert endorsements, and campaign cues to help them make more
informed choices. Downs (1957) suggested that voters can infer the policy stance of candidates in an election
from their party affiliations, while Popkin (1994) argued that most of the information voters learned about
politics was picked up as a by-product of activities pursued as a part of daily life; the media helped, he argued,
by explaining the actions of political leaders and parties, and the relevance of those actions for voters, while
campaigns helped to clarify the issues. For Lupia (1994), the use of shortcuts can in certain cases allow badly
informed voters to emulate the behaviour of relatively well-informed voters. Uninformed voters, it seems,
are far from unintelligent.

between these incompatible objectives. Further, the risks associated with a policy are usually only superficially
assessed by the public, and are far more complex than most people think, leaving them often surprised and
disappointed by outcomes. The Brexit vote again offers an example; no one knew for certain what would
happen if and when Britain decided to leave, many of the effects on jobs and the economy were unanticipated,
and Britain’s government found itself saddled with unexpectedly complex negotiations on a wide range of
issues.
◆◆ The perceptions held by politicians about public opinion are often inaccurate, because they are often influenced
by personal contacts, by what their advisers are telling them, and by their focus on the problems and the policies
in which they are most interested, rather than in what the wider electorate thinks.

Public opinion is most influential when it is seen to change. Only foolhardy politicians ignore developments in
the overall climate of opinion, and many politicians are sensitive to changes in the national mood. So same-sex
marriage can be an irrelevance one year and the topic everyone is talking about the next; a skilled politician can
spot and respond to such agenda shifts. What this tells us is that changes in public opinion matter as much as the
levels of opinion. But just how far political leaders should follow the public mood, and how far they should actually
lead, is another matter, as we saw in Chapter 8.

women in government and politics

Participation by women is an interesting sub-field within the broader field of political engagement. It is an area
where significant trends are apparent within liberal democracies, reinforced in some countries by policies aimed at
increasing the proportion of women legislators. Yet, in spite of the removal in most countries of formal barriers to
women’s participation in politics, subtle barriers to full involvement remain; this applies not only to political
224 chapter 13

Jacinda Arden, the third woman to hold the position of prime minister in New Zealand, a country that has been a global
leader in removing barriers to the engagement of women in government and politics.
Source: Getty Images/AFP.

engagement and participation, but also to election or appointment to political office (Henderson and Jeydel, 2013).
Part of the explanation lies in the relatively late arrival of women to politics: New Zealand may have been the first
country in the world to allow women to vote (in 1893), and Finland may have been the first country to have a
woman elected to its national legislature (in 1907), but women’s suffrage only spread more widely after World
War II in tandem with the creation of new states.
Taking voter turnout as a simple indicator, data generated by the World Values Survey (WVS) (see Solijonov,
2016) finds that – in 59 countries surveyed – men and women turned out in 2010–14 in approximately similar
numbers: 61 per cent of men and 59 per cent of women claimed that they ‘always’ voted, and 22/23 per cent
respectively claimed that they ‘sometimes’ voted. When broken down by country, though, significant differences
were found: women were more active than men in about one-third of the countries surveyed (including Russia,
New Zealand, Brazil, South Africa, and Sweden), while men were more active in the Middle East, North Africa,
and Asia (notably Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, and Japan).
Having said this, though, the WVS data are based on opinion polls, and hard data on gender turnout is difficult
to find for the simple reason that – because of voting secrecy laws – it is rarely collected. One of the few countries
with such data over an extended period of time is the United States. There, in presidential elections, the gender gap
has grown steadily in favour of women, who are now regularly outvoting men by about four percentage points – see
Figure 13.2. There are several possible reasons for this: women often deal with government more directly in their
daily lives than men (through welfare, education, and health care, for example), social norms are changing as more
active younger women supersede their less-involved mothers and grandmothers, and women’s issues (such as
abortion, gender rights, child care, and equal pay) have achieved a new prominence on the political agenda
(Rampell, 2014).
In most forms of formal political participation beyond voting, though, men still hold the lead; they tend to
dominate political party activities, making direct contact with politicians and bureaucrats, and protest activities.
 political participation 225

Percentage of eligible population who

70
68
66
64

reported voting
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

Women Men

Figure 13.2 Voter turnout by gender in United States presidential elections

Source: Center for American Women and Politics (2017).

When it comes to holding political office, women are found disproportionately at the local rather than the national
level (Stokes, 2005: Part V), and the higher the political office, the more likely it will be that a man will hold the
post. The number of women elected as legislative representatives is growing, to be sure (see Figure 13.3), but high-
level politics continues to be dominated by men. There are several possible reasons for this, some specific to
particular countries and cultures, others more universal:

◆◆ Many men (particularly outside Europe) are not ready to vote women into office.
◆◆ Women face more obstacles in accessing the resources needed to run for office, or in being
selected by major political parties. Gendered
◆◆ Women are less likely than men to think they are qualified to run for office, and are also institution
less competitive and more risk averse than men (Lawless and Fox, 2012). A body that
operates with
◆◆ In some countries (mainly in the Middle East) women are barred from running for elective
formal rules and
office. It was only in 2015 that the fi rst women in Saudi Arabia were elected into public informal
office, for example. As Figure 13.3 indicates, there are no women members in the Yemeni conventions which,
legislature, the Majlis. intentionally or
◆◆ Legislatures in particular are gendered institutions, meaning that they still advantage men unintentionally,
advantage men
over women by, for example, having working hours that are unwelcoming to women with
over women.
more than their fair share of family responsibilities (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012).

70
Percentage of total in lower chamber

60

50

40

30

20

10

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da

M a
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Fr ica
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K
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Figure 13.3 Comparing women in legislatures

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (2018).
226 chapter 13

Numerous intriguing questions are raised by the impact of women on politics, whether as voters or politicians.
Several are posed by Paxton and Hughes (2017: Chapter 8): Are women in power more likely to see women
constituents as a distinctive group? Do women differ from men in their attitudes towards policy priorities, and do
they prioritize different issues? To what extent can we say that some policy issues – such as domestic violence or
abortion – are more distinctly women’s rather than men’s issues? Are women in power taking the initiative to act
on behalf of women? Do women have a different legislative style from men, and are they changing the rules of the
political game? It may be premature to assume that the increase in office-holding by women will be enough by itself
to transform the policy agenda or predominant political style. Where party systems are strong, the behaviour of
both male and female legislators may continue to be shaped more by party than by gender.
Many countries have adopted formal means to increase the number of women in legislatures, but this is a
relatively recent development, with the 1995 UN-sponsored Beijing Platform for Action providing new momentum.
Three main methods are used, the oldest and rarest of which is reserved seats, by which a party selects women
members for special seats granted in proportion to its share of the vote; the more seats a party wins in the general
election, the more reserved seats it is allocated. In Pakistan, where this format is well established, 60 of the 342 seats
in the National Assembly are reserved for women. The method is also used in Rwanda, which has the world’s
highest proportion of female legislators. There, 24 of 80 seats in the lower Chamber of Deputies are reserved for
women; other female candidates are elected directly.
The second and by far the most common method is the party quota. Introduced and prevalent in Europe, this
occurs when one party adopts a quota (typically 25–50 per cent) for women candidates (or, more neutrally, for
candidates from each gender) and others follow in order to avoid being seen as falling behind. To forestall a token
effort, additional stipulations may require some women to be placed high on a party’s list (in party list electoral
systems), or to be selected for winnable districts (in plurality systems).
The third and most recent method, which is particularly common in Latin America, is the legal mandate. This
operates in a similar way to the party quota except that it is mandated by law and applies to all parties. Argentina
was the first country in the world to adopt such a law, in 1991, since when almost every other Latin American
country has followed suit. The requirements range from 50 per cent in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and
Panama to 30 per cent in Argentina and Brazil, and 20 per cent in Paraguay (Piscopo, 2015). Setting a target,
though, does not necessarily mean achieving that target. Mexico established its 50 per cent mandate in 1996, for
example, but only 37 per cent of its Senators were women after the 2012 election. The problem stems from
loopholes (closed in 2014) such as women placed on the ballot being encouraged to cede their place to male reserve
replacements (often their husbands), or being placed too low down the list of candidates in the proportional
representation element to stand much chance of winning (Glover, 2014). Brazil has fared even worse: while its 30
per cent mandate was set in 1997, only 15 per cent were women in the Senate in 2014 and only 11 per cent were
women in the House of Representatives.
Quotas are no cure-all, not least because they can be seen as a remedy that fails to address the underlying causes
of unequal representation. Also, they do not always work, thanks to the kinds of loopholes found in cases such as
Mexico, or to the failure of political parties to deliver on the quotas to which they have subscribed. Even so, they
are a widely used device for influencing patterns of participation and have rapidly become a global standard (Krook,
2009).
Even though more than half the countries in the world now have gender quotas, remarkably little is understood
about their impact on the number of women elected or appointed to higher political office. Critics have argued
that quotas undermine women, because they might be seen as a form of political stigma that compromises the
ability of women to be treated in government as the equal of men, and to undermine the idea of leadership based
on merit. A study by O’Brien and Rickne (2016), however, using Sweden as a case, finds that quotas increase not
just the number of women in legislatures, but also the supply of female politicians able to use this as a launch pad
for higher office.
The number of women being elected to the highest offices has only grown, such that when a woman is elected
as a president or prime minister it is much less noteworthy than it once was. Since the election in July 1960 of the
world’s first female head of government of the modern era – Sirimavo Bandaranaike, prime minister of Ceylon
(now Sri Lanka) – more than four dozen countries have had women as national executives – see Table 13.2 for some
examples.
Globally, the number of women holding cabinet positions has also grown, with several countries – including
Finland, France, Iceland, Norway, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland – having achieved, or coming
close to achieving, an equal number of women as men in cabinet. While many women ministers are still found in
 political participation 227

Table 13.2 Women executives (selected)

Country Name In office

Sri Lanka Sirimavo Bandaranaike 1960–65, 1970–77, 1994–2000
India Indira Gandhi 1966–77, 1980–84
Israel Golda Meir 1969–74
Britain Margaret Thatcher 1979–90
Theresa May 2016–
Dominica Eugenia Charles 1980–95
Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland 1981, 1986–89, 1990–96
Pakistan Benazir Bhutto 1988–90, 1993–96
Philippines Corazon Aquino 1986–92
New Zealand Jenny Clark 1999–2008
Jacinda Arden 2017–
Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri 2001–04
Mozambique Luisa Diogo 2004–10
Germany Angela Merkel 2005–
Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 2006–18
Iceland Jóhanna Sigurŏardóttir1 2009–13
Katrín Jakobsdóttir 2017–
Australia Julia Gillard 2010–13
Brazil Dilma Rousseff 2011–16
South Korea Park Geun-hye 2013–16
Poland Ewa Kopacz 2014–15
Beata Szydło 2015–17
Note: 1 World’s first openly lesbian head of government.

the ‘soft’ areas of education and social policy, they have also moved into more powerful fields such as defence,
finance, and foreign policy (Paxton and Hughes, 2015). Despite this progress, it is as well to remember that the glass
of participation remains well over half empty. In a large majority of countries, most ministers and legislators – as
well as most top business executives – are still men.

political participation in authoritarian states

The argument is sometimes made that political participation, at least as understood in liberal democracies, is an
empty concept in non-democratic settings. After all, the nature of authoritarian regimes is that they must seek to
control popular activity in order to ensure their own survival and retention of power. Yet the evidence suggests that
while rates of participation vary more widely than is the case in democracies (they are generally higher in the
Middle East and Africa, and lower in Asia – see Figure 13.4), some of the patterns of participation found in hybrid
and authoritarian states are not that different from those found in democracies: older people are more likely to vote,
for example, while younger people are more likely to participate in less conventional ways, and more educated
citizens are more likely to participate generally.
Having said that, the limits and nature of participation in authoritarian regimes are often subject to an implicit
dialogue as opponents and activists test the boundaries of the acceptable: see Spotlight Russia. Authoritarian rulers
may allow free speech in those areas such as local politics which do not directly threaten the central leadership.
They may permit the expression of opinion on the internet even as they censor television broadcasts. Further, as
228 chapter 13

70

60

Percentage participation
50

40

30

20

10

0
t

a*

la

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ia

n*
yp

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ta
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kis
Ke

ne

kr

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N

Pa
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High Medium Low

Figure 13.4 Political participation in hybrid and authoritarian states

Source: Pew Research Center (2014).
Note: Participation is measured by frequency of voting, participation in protests, signing petitions, and other forms of engagement.
* Hybrid regimes; all others are authoritarian.

societies grow more complex, rulers often come to realize that responding to popular pressure on non-sensitive
issues can limit dissent and enhance political stability. They will only allow this to go so far, however.
China offers an example of these tensions. Against the background of a long history of authoritarianism, the
Communist Party has opened some social space in which sponsored groups can operate with relative freedom. For
example, more than 150,000 civic associations were registered in 2007, providing an opportunity for citizen-to-
citizen communication under the party’s watchful eye in such areas as education and the environment (Guo, 2007).
Explicit opposition to the party, however, remains forbidden. The topic may go unmentioned, but memories
remain of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, when the army’s tanks turned on pro-democracy demonstrators
in Beijing. At the local level, sometimes violent protests continue against corruption, unemployment, pollution,
illegal levies, or non-payment of wages or pensions. Demonstrations by ethnic minorities aside, these local protests
do not threaten the party’s dominance but are directed at local failures to implement national policies.
Elsewhere, a common technique for channelling, but also controlling, participation in authoritarian states is
clientelism, or patron–client relationships. These are traditional, informal hierarchies fuelled by exchanges
between a high-status patron and clients of lower status. The colloquial phrase ‘big man/small boy’ conveys the
nature of the interaction: patrons are landlords, employers, party leaders, government ministers, ethnic leaders, or
anyone with control over resources, and around whom clients – lacking resources of their own – gather for
protection and security.
Although patron–client relationships are found to some extent in all political systems, including
Clientelism
Politics based on
democracies, they are of greatest political significance in authoritarian regimes. Particularly in
patron–client low-income countries, and unequal societies with weak governing institutions, personal networks
relationships. A of patrons and clients can be the main instrument for bringing ordinary people into contact with
powerful figure formal politics, and are often the central organizing structure of politics itself (Figure 13.5).
(the patron) Despite their informality, these networks underpin, and often overwhelm, more formal channels
provides
protection to
of participation such as political parties.
lower-status Political patrons control the votes of their clients and persuade them to attend meetings, join
clients in return organizations, or simply follow their patron around in a deferential manner. Participation by
for their clients is controlled and mobilized, but the patron–client relationship is based on personal
unqualified exchange rather than a political party or a shared political outlook. The patron’s power, and its
allegiance and
support.
inhibiting effect on democracy, is illustrated in this comment by Egypt’s President Abdul Nasser
(in power 1956–70), interviewed in 1957 when he was still a reforming leader (Owen, 1993):
 political participation 229

President

Government Government Government

minister minister minister

Regional Regional Regional

leader leader leader

Local Local Local

landowner landowner landowner

Peasant Peasant Peasant

Resources flow downwards, support flows upwards.

Figure 13.5 A patronage network linking centre and periphery

We were supposed to have a democratic system between 1923 and 1953. But what good was this democracy to our
people? You have seen the landowners driving the peasants to the polling booths. There they would vote according
to the instructions of their masters. I want the peasants to be able to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ without this in any way affecting
their livelihood and daily bread. This in my view is the basis for freedom and democracy.

Participation through patronage appeals in authoritarian settings because it links elite and mass, centre and
periphery, in a context of inequality. Although inequality provides the soil in which patronage networks flourish,
these relationships still act as political glue, binding the highest of the high with the lowest of the low.
By linking people across social levels, patron–client relationships limit the expression of solidarity among people
of the same class, such as peasants. For the elite, they are a useful tactic of divide and rule. The decay of such
hierarchical networks of dependence can be an indication of a transition to a more modern society in which people
have acquired sufficient resources to be able to participate in an autonomous fashion. Put bluntly, security means
people no longer need to trade their vote. Poverty and authoritarian rule provide a setting in which patron–client
relationships flourish; affluence and democracy generate a climate in which they decay.
One phenomenon unique to authoritarian states is mobilized participation. In contrast to the autonomous
participation found in liberal democracies, where citizens make their own choices as it suits them, mobilized
participation is managed, manipulated, and obligatory. Although the term was originally
Mobilized
used mainly in the context of communist countries, and still reappears in discussions about participation
participation in China, it actually has wider application, usefully describing any instance Elite-controlled
where people may be encouraged to take part in political events or rallies in return for involvement in
rewards such as food, entertainment, or just a cash payment, or may be induced to do so by politics designed
threats. (It might even appear occasionally in democracies, when mass events such as to express popular
support for the
conferences are organized by political parties and stage-managed for maximum media regime.
coverage.)
 SPOTLIGHT RUSSIA
Brief profile
Russia has undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. For nearly 70 years, it was the dominant partner in the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a state that most Westerners feared and misunderstood. The USSR
collapsed in 1991, but its state socialist political and economic system still casts a shadow over modern Russia. For
democrats, the challenge has been to build a multi-party democracy in a culture unfamiliar with and unsympathetic
to democracy. Its leaders have never lost sight of the national tradition of strong executive authority, and
understanding Russia today is as much a question of assessing the actions and motives of President Vladimir Putin,
and the clique around him, as of comprehending the country’s governing institutions. Putin served two terms in
office between 2000 and 2008, then stepped down as required by the constitution, winning re-election in 2012
and 2018. Despite a static economy and population, Putin seeks to reassert what he sees as Russia’s rightful
position as a leading power confronting a hostile international system.

Form of government Federal semi-presidential republic consisting of 83 ‘subjects’, including republics, provinces,
and territories. Date of state formation debatable, and most recent constitution adopted
1993.
Executive Semi-presidential. The president is directly elected, and limited to two consecutive
six-year terms. The prime minister comes out of the Duma, heads the Council of
Ministers, and succeeds the president if needed (there is no vice-president).
Legislature Bicameral Federal Assembly: a 450-member State Duma elected for five-year terms, and
a relatively weak 166-member Federation Council with two members appointed by the
president from each federal unit.
Judiciary Based on civil law and the constitution of 1993. Headed by a 19-member Constitutional
Court (members nominated for 12-year terms by the president and confirmed by the
Federation Council) and, for civil and administrative cases, a Supreme Court.
Electoral system Direct elections for the president, with the possibility of two rounds if no one wins a
majority in the first ballot. Party list proportional representation is used for the State Duma.
Parties Multi-party, but parties are weak and unstable – reflecting, rather than shaping, power.
The leading party, United Russia, provides a foundation for the authoritarian rule of
Vladimir Putin.

144m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$1.6tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$10,743 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Participation in Russia
Russia offers a case of the limits of political
participation in an authoritarian regime. On
the one hand, it is an intensely political society
with an educated people interested in
domestic and international affairs. On the
other hand, political participation is shallow,
held back by pervasive cynicism about the
capacity of ordinary people to make a
difference, and handicapped by government
control of the media, and the manipulation of
elections. The authoritarianism of the past
and the present pervades political attitudes,
creating a country with an unusually passive
Supporters of the Putin government march in Moscow during the majority. According to a 2017 survey, 48 per
annual celebration of National Unity Day, marking the anniversary of cent of Russians still supported the view that
the expulsion of Polish forces from the Kremlin in 1612. a strong leader who could make decisions
Source: iStock/NickolayV. without interference from the legislature or
the courts was a good thing. Globally, only
26 per cent of people had the same view, sinking to 13 per cent in most European countries (Pew Research
Center, 2017c).
Suspicion of organizations is endemic, with more people distrusting than trusting even the highest-rated
institutions (the army and the Church), and placing most of their trust in personal networks of friends and family.
Political parties languish near the bottom of the trust list, being mainly the creatures of politicians and the
president, and proving themselves to be unstable, with an insecure social base.
Few people belong to any voluntary public organizations, membership of trade unions is low, and regular church
attendance is uncommon. Few social organizations have lasted long or built large memberships, while others have
been incorporated into the regime, and
any with foreign links are charged by Arctic
the Putin administration with being Ocean
engaged in espionage. With few
organizations standing between citizen RUSSIA
and state, mass political participation is St Petersburg
concentrated on national elections, and MOSCOW
Russia remains a distinctly uncivil UKRAINE
KAZAKHSTAN MONGOLIA
society. The Russian people are subjects
first and participants second. CHINA
Public protest in Russia against Putin’s
manipulation of parliamentary elections
in 2011, and of the presidential contest
of 2012, represented an important Further reading
development. Younger, better-educated
Colton, Timothy J. (2016) Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford
people in the largest cities, notably University Press).
Moscow, showed their dissatisfaction Monaghan, Andrew (2016) The New Politics of Russia: Interpreting Change
with their country’s highly managed (Manchester University Press).
politics. At least in the short term, White, Stephen, Richard Sakwa, and Henry E. Hale (eds) (2019)
however, the most concrete outcome Developments in Russian Politics 9 (Red Globe Press).
was a new law restricting (but not
banning) such protests.
232 chapter 13

Many authoritarian states in sub-Saharan Africa use mobilized participation to give the impression of enthusiastic
support for the regime. A case in point is Zimbabwe, where the ruling ZANU-PF party will regularly organize
rallies in sports stadiums, bussing in large numbers of ‘supporters’ dressed in clothing bearing the party colours (red,
black, green, and yellow) and pictures of the president, and encourage them to dance and clap and sing and
generally give the impression that they could not hope for a better leader or government. North Korea also has
fine-tuned the process, not only staging massive military parades at which Kim Jong-Un is always the star of the
show, but also organizing events at which Kim is shown talking (always happily) to a group of soldiers, or workers,
or scientists, while multiple members of the group carefully take notes as though not wishing to miss a word of his
imparted wisdom.
One problem with understanding participation in the many authoritarian regimes stems from the difficulties of
measuring public opinion in such states:

◆◆ In poorer countries where most people are focused on daily survival, and both education and communication
are limited, there may be no such thing as public opinion on anything beyond local matters.
◆◆ Sample surveys are hard to run when it is unclear how to define a representative sample.
◆◆ Since urban elites are the easiest to reach, they will be the people most often surveyed, but their interests (and
levels of participation or engagement) will differ from those of the rural poor.
◆◆ People may be unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the formal interviewing techniques used in liberal
democracies. More appropriate formats may be less systematic. In authoritarian states, people will be naturally
suspicious of pollsters, and unwilling to express their true feelings.

It might be natural to suppose that authoritarian leaders are not much interested in what their citizens think, but
this is not necessarily the case: authoritarian leaders will want information on those groups in order to monitor
threats to their own survival in office. Pulling together that information, though, is another matter.
 political participation 233

discussion questions
◆◆ Is political participation rational?
◆◆ Is consumer politics an effective means by which individuals can express their political
preferences?
◆◆ What do you think of the argument that people can use information shortcuts to help
them make informed decisions?
◆◆ As a means of addressing inequalities in the participation of men and women in politics and
government, are reserved seats, party quotas, and legal mandates a good idea?
◆◆ What differences – if any – would we see if men and women participated equally in
government and politics, and had equal access to positions of power?
◆◆ Is the idea of political participation in non-democratic settings as empty as it fi rst appears?

KEY CONCEPTS
◆◆ Clientelism ◆◆ Opinion poll
◆◆ Consumer politics ◆◆ Paradox of participation
◆◆ Conventional participation ◆◆ Political exclusion
◆◆ Deliberative opinion poll ◆◆ Political participation
◆◆ Focus group ◆◆ Public opinion
◆◆ Gendered institution ◆◆ Sample survey
◆◆ Mobilized participation ◆◆ Unconventional participation

further reading
Dalton, Russell J. (2014) Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial
Democracies, 6th edn (Sage). This comparative text provides a wide-ranging review of
political attitudes and behaviour in liberal democracies.
Lupia, Arthur (2016) Uninformed: Why People Seem to Know So Little About Politics and What We
Can Do About It (Oxford University Press). An assessment of the causes of – and possible
responses to – the uninformed citizen by a leading scholar on the topic.
Paxton, Pamela M., and Melanie M. Hughes (2017) Women, Politics, and Power: A Global
Perspective, 3rd edn (CQ Press). A survey of the changing place of women in politics,
including analysis of the development of women’s rights, and chapters on different regions
of the world.
Somin, Illya (2016) Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter, 2nd
edn (Stanford University Press). Uses the US case to make wider arguments about the low
state of voter knowledge and its impact on the quality of democracy.
Stolle, Dietlind, and Michele Micheletti (2013) Political Consumerism: Global Responsibility in
Action (Cambridge University Press). A study of the ways in which citizens, consumers,
and political activists use the market as their arena for political participation.
Theocharis, Yannis, and Jan W. van Deth (2018) Political Participation in a Changing World:
Conceptual and Empirical Challenges in the Study of Citizen Engagement (Routledge). Offers a
new way of understanding changing patterns of political participation, contrasting
conventional forms with new kinds of political activity.
political
14

Source: iStock/NickolayV
communication
contents
◆ Political communication:
an overview
◆ The evolution of mass
media
PREVIEW ◆ Into the digital age
Mass communication lies at the heart of political discourse. It informs ◆ Media influence
governments and citizens, it defi nes the limits of expression, and it ◆ Recent trends in
provides us with ‘mental maps’ of the political world outside our
direct experience. The technology of mass political communication
political communication
has changed dramatically over the past century, taking us from a time ◆ Political communication
when newspapers dominated to the era of broadcasting (fi rst radio and in authoritarian states
then television), and bringing us to the current age of the internet,
with instant information in unparalleled quantities from numerous
sources. As that technology has changed, so have the dynamics of
political communication: consumers now play a critical role in defi ning what constitutes ‘the news’, changing the
relationship between the governed and the government, and the nature of political communication.
This chapter begins with a brief survey of the evolution of the mass media and political communication, ending
with an assessment of the not-yet-entirely understood implications of digital media. It then looks at how the political
influence of mass media is felt, reviewing the key mechanisms of that influence: reinforcement, agenda-setting, framing,
and priming. After considering the content and effect of recent trends in political communication (commercialization,
fragmentation, globalization, and interaction), the chapter ends with an assessment of political communication in au-
thoritarian states. There, the marketplace of ideas is more closely controlled, though the internet in general, and social
media in particular, have created more space for free communication among some citizens.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ A free flow of political information provides a key test of the difference between democracies and
authoritarian regimes.
◆◆ The impact of the internet and social media on political communication has been substantial, but is not
yet fully understood.
◆◆ The internet has made more political information more widely available, but it has also exacerbated the
problems of the echo chamber and fake news.
◆◆ There are four main classes of media effects (reinforcement, agenda-setting, framing, and priming),
whose dynamics are changing thanks to the internet.
◆◆ The shift to more commercial, fragmented, global, and interactive media is reshaping political
communication.
◆◆ Studies fi nd that the differences in the quality of political communication between democracies and
authoritarian states are not as clear as they might at fi rst seem.
 political communication 235

political communication: an overview

Society – and, with it, government and politics – is created, sustained, and modified through communication.
Without a continuous exchange of information, society would not exist, and political participation would be
impossible. Efficient and responsive government depends on such an exchange, without which leaders would not
know what citizens needed, and citizens would not know what government was doing (or not doing). Mass
communication is also a technique of control: ‘Give me a balcony and I will be president’, said José Maria Velasco,
five times president of Ecuador. It is, in short, a core political activity, allowing meaning to be constructed, needs
transmitted, and authority exercised.
Assessments of the quality of political communication are key to the process of under-
standing political systems. Democracies are characterized by a free flow of information through Political
open and multiple channels, with Dahl (1998) arguing that a liberal democracy must provide communica-
opportunities for what he calls enlightened understanding: ‘each member [of a political associa- tion
The means by
tion] must have equal and effective opportunities for learning about relevant alternative policies which political
and their likely consequences’. In hybrid regimes, by contrast, the dominance of media outlets information is
is a tool through which leaders maintain their ascendancy over potential challengers. For their produced and
part, authoritarian regimes typically allow no explicit dissent. Media channels are limited and disseminated,
and the effects
manipulated, and citizens must often rely more on unofficial channels, including the rumour mill,
that it has on the
for their political news. political process.
Even though much recent research in political communication focuses on the messages sent
and the meanings embedded within them, the danger of focusing solely on content is that we
learn nothing about the receivers and even less about the political effect of those messages. Blaming media bias for why
others fail to see the world as we do can be tempting, but is usually superficial and unenlightening. The transmission
model is – as we will see – a helpful way of understanding the process of communication via mass media. This takes
into consideration the sender of the message, the nature of the message itself, the channel used, the user, and the impact
of the message.
At the same time, media technology has never been static, even if we moved at a snail’s pace from the first printed
book to the advent of mass communication (a process that took the best part of 1,300 years). The speed of change
has since greatly accelerated, notably during the digital age as media have gone online and the means and methods of
political communication have had to change to keep up. The shape, the effects, the reach, and the power of political
communication have all changed; it has become more globalized, networked, interactive, and participatory (McNair,
2018), and these dramatic developments continue to evolve at a speed that makes it hard to keep up and adapt. We
understand some of the effects of those changes, but not others, and much that we once thought of as fairly predictable
has become highly volatile and unpredictable. The media remain our primary point of connection to political infor-
mation, but while ‘the news’ has always been exploited and distorted to political ends, the extent of that distortion has
grown and the means used to change the message have become more sophisticated. No one can yet be certain of the
long-term impact on the political process.

the evolution of mass media Fourth

The political significance of the media is famously encapsulated in the quip attributed estate
A term used to
(depending on the source used) either to Edmund Burke or to Thomas Macaulay, both British describe the
politicians. Noting the existence of three existing political ‘estates’ (the nobility, the clergy, political role of
and commoners), Burke or Macaulay referred to the reporters sitting in the gallery of the journalists.
House of Commons as the fourth estate, a term that has since been used to denote the
political significance of journalists. That significance has evolved with the changing technology Mass media
of media, whose structure and content matters because, as Chaffee (2001) notes, ‘the structure Channels of
communication
of communication shapes the structure of politics, both because so much of political activity that reach a
consists of communication and because constraints on communication limit the exercise of large number of
power’. people.
Although we take access to a variety of mass media for granted, their rise has been a Television, radio,
relatively recent development, dating back no more than two centuries (see Figure 14.1). The and the internet
are examples.
first printed book dates from China in 686, the Gutenberg press started printing with moveable
236 chapter 14

Late 19th and Popular newspapers emerge, often with mass circulation.
early 20th centuries

Radio’s golden age. For the first time, politicians broadcast directly into
1930s
the homes of voters.

Television becomes the most popular mass medium. By regulation or state

1950s–1960s
ownership, politicians secure access to the medium.

TV audiences begin to fragment with an increase in the number of

1970s–1980s
channels, distribution by cable and satellite, and the use of video.

International communication broadens with the rise of the internet,

1990s
mobile phone use, and 24-hour global television news.

Mobile phone access expands to many low-income countries for the

2000s
first time. Sharp decline in readership of printed newspapers.

Continued expansion of social media, further extending horizontal

2010s communication among citizens. The internet is increasingly
accessed via smartphones.

Figure 14.1 The evolution of mass media

type in 1453, and the first newspaper appeared in 1605. But most of what we now consider mass media came with
developments in technology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, allowing communication to the mass level.
This, in turn, facilitated the emergence of common national identities and the growth of the state. For the first time,
political communication meant a shared experience for dispersed populations, providing a glue to connect the citizens
of large political units.

Newspapers
The key development in political communication during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the
emergence of popular newspapers in Western states, encouraged by widespread literacy in shared languages.
Advances in printing and distribution opened up the prospect of transforming party journals with a small circulation
into populist and profitable papers funded by advertising. By growing away from their party roots, newspapers
became not only more popular but also, paradoxically, more important to politics.
In compact countries with national distribution, such as Britain and Japan, newspapers built enormous circulations,
and owners became powerful political figures. In interwar Britain, for example, four newspaper barons – Lords Beaver-
brook, Rothermere, Camrose, and Kemsley – owned papers with a combined circulation of over 13 million, amount-
ing to half of all daily papers sold. Stanley Baldwin, a prime minister of the time, famously described such proprietors as
‘aiming at power without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages’ (Curran and Seaton, 2019).

Broadcasting
Although newspapers remained significant channels of political communication, their primacy was supplanted in
the twentieth century by broadcasting. Cinema newsreels, radio, and then television enabled communication with
the mass public to take place in a new form: spoken rather than written, personal rather than abstract, and –
increasingly – live rather than reported. Communication also went international, beginning in the 1920s with the
development of shortwave radio, used by Britain and the Netherlands to broadcast to their empires. Nazi Germany,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and other major Western states followed.
Domestically, broadcasting’s impact in Western liberal democracies was at first relatively benign. A small number of
national television channels initially dominated the airwaves in most countries after World War II, providing a shared
experience of national events and popular entertainment. By offering some common ground to societies which were,
in these early post-war decades, still strongly divided by class and religion, these new media initially served as agents
of national integration.
 political communication 237

Donald Trump is swamped by national and international media during his presidential campaign in 2016, once again
emphasizing the extent to which broadcasting and politics have become intertwined.
Source: Getty Images/Joe Sohm/Visions of America.

More dramatic was the impact of broadcasting on politicians themselves. While a public speech to a live audience
encouraged expansive words and dramatic gestures, a quieter tone was needed for transmission from the broadcasting
studio direct to the living room. The art was to talk to the millions as though they were individuals. President Frank-
lin Roosevelt’s fireside chats, broadcast live by radio to the American population in the 1930s, exemplified this new
approach. The impact of his folksy idiom was undeniable, and he talked less to the citizens than as a citizen, thereby
earning his country’s trust. In this way, broadcasting – and the medium of radio, specifically – transformed not only the
reach, but also the style, of political communication.
This was even more true of television, where candidates and leaders had to think not just about what they were
saying, but also about how they looked while they were saying it. This was first brought home forcefully with the tele-
vised Nixon–Kennedy debates during the 1960 presidential election in the United States.The debates marked the first
time that candidates had faced off against each other on television, and although there were four, it was the first of the
debates that went on to receive the most analysis. Kennedy appeared healthy and relaxed on television, while Nixon
appeared nervous and unwell, but while a majority of those who watched the debate on television felt that Kennedy
had performed best, a majority of those who listened on radio thought that Nixon had performed best.Thereafter, tele-
vision moved to the centre of political campaigning, and how candidates and leaders presented themselves on t­ elevision
became central to their communication strategy.
Broadcasting also made a substantial contribution to political communication in most low-income countries, thanks
to its two major advantages over print media: it does not require physical distribution to users, and it is accessible to
the 15 per cent of the world’s population who cannot read. These factors initially encouraged the spread of radio,
with distant villagers being able to gather around the shared set to hear the latest news, not least on the price of local
crops. Satellite television and mobile phones have since become accessible to many of the world’s poor, expanding
opportunities not only for downward communication from the elite, but also for horizontal communication between
ordinary people.
In Kenya, for example, internet access was expensive and slow until 2002, when the government opened up the
mobile phone market.This sparked a fierce war for market share among carriers, leading to a simultaneous reduction in
prices and a broadening of options. Safaricom became a successful local provider, and many Kenyans now have access
to M-Pesa, a mobile banking platform that allows bills to be paid and funds moved online.
238 chapter 14

Social media into the digital age

Interactive
online platforms The birth and growth of digital technology has had the effect of throwing a series of rocks into
which facilitate the pond of political communication: it has created splashes and ripples, but also much
collective or disturbance, making it difficult to see into the reaches of the pond in order to establish the
individual
effects. This has all happened in a remarkably short period of time: the fi rst commercial
communication
for the exchange internet providers date back only to the 1980s, the World Wide Web was invented only in
of user- 1989, Google was founded in 1998, Wi-Fi emerged a year later, and most of the sites, habits,
generated and expectations that we associate with social media are barely into their second decade of
content. existence; see Table 14.1.
The rise of the internet has brought the fastest and most widespread changes ever seen in
Echo mass communication, meaning that scholars are today at least as busy simply documenting the
chamber
The phenomenon
changes as they are trying to understand those changes. At first, argue van Dijk and Hacker
by which ideas (2018), it was presumed that digital communication would have many positive political effects,
circulate inside a such as improved information retrieval, more public debate, and even higher rates of political
closed system, participation. While some of this has indeed happened, there have also been many negative
and users seek effects.
out only those
sources of
The good news is that copious new amounts of information have been made available via
information that the internet, while social media in particular have changed the ways in which governments and
confirm or amplify citizens communicate, and in which citizens communicate with one another. Political leaders
their values. and parties can communicate more often and more directly with citizens via social media, and
social media connects people who would not previously have been able to communicate with
Internet troll one another, helping bring like-minded groups of people together in coordinated political events
Someone who
deliberately tries
or demonstrations to a degree that was previously impossible.
to offend or to The bad news takes several parts. First, there are now so many sources of information that
start online users can become overwhelmed, and might be tempted to exert control by seeking out (and
arguments by being reinforced by) sources and information that align with their existing values and pref-
posting erences. Before the internet, there was more chance of people being exposed to contrasting
inflammatory
and provocative
ideas; now, they are more likely to feel the effects of the echo chamber. The quality of polit-
comments. ical debate has also been undermined by the manner in which internet users can be dragged
into exchanges with ubiquitous and uncivil internet trolls. The result: interference with the
Bot free marketplace of ideas, the reinforcement of biases and closed minds, and the promotion of
An application myths and a narrow interpretation of events. It should be no surprise, argues Sustein (2017),
that runs that people of different political views find it increasingly difficult even to understand one
automated tasks
on the internet,
another.
including the Second, users of social media in particular can have their opinions manipulated by the use of
mass distribution automated bots or robo-tweets, or by increasingly sophisticated algorithms that feed users with
of political stories based on past habits. A study by Bessi and Ferrara (2016) into the use of bots in US elec-
messages. tions finds that they have been used to support some candidates, oppose others, point internet

Table 14.1 Forms of social media

Type Features Examples

Social networking Allows people to connect with one
another and to share information and ideas.
Media sharing Allows users to upload pictures, videos, and
other media.
Collaborative sites Allows users to post content.
Blogs and microblogs Allows users to share ideas and hold online
conversations on matters of shared interest.
Facebook (created in 2004), LinkedIn,
MySpace, Instagram, Snapchat, VK (Russia),
and Google+.
YouTube (created 2005), Reddit, and
Pinterest.
Wikipedia is the best known, created in 2001.
Twitter (created 2006), Tumblr, and Weibo
(China).
 political communication 239

Focus 14.1
The problem of fake news
The advent of the Trump administration in the United States drew new attention to an old problem: the
accuracy of the news we read, hear, or watch (and of the claims made by leaders). As long as it has been
shared, whether by word of mouth from one villager to another, or on a global scale via television or the
internet, news has always been subject to manipulation and distortion. Outright lies might be told,
inaccuracies may be passed on, subtle efforts may be made to selectively shape facts to create a false
impression, or such facts may simply not be reported. Authoritarian states, including communist governments
such as China’s, are adept at such manipulation. The bigger the lie, implied Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf, the
more people are likely to believe it.
Yet fake news is also a growing problem in democracies. In the United States, Donald Trump has proved
particularly sensitive to what he considers to be false reporting of his administration, often referring to
‘fake news’, describing reporters at his press conferences as ‘unbelievable liars’ and ‘the most dishonest
people’, and dismissing the news media (as once did Joseph Stalin) as ‘enemies of the people’. Early in his
administration, one of his advisers – in taking issue with reports of the number of people who attended
Trump’s inauguration – even went so far as to say that his administration had ‘alternative facts’ to offer on
the subject.
It was all the more ironic, then, when the Washington Post reported in May 2018 that, during his first 466
days in office, President Trump had made just over 3,000 verifiably false or misleading assertions (Kessler et al.,
2018). These included claims about the size of the crowds at his inauguration, about the size of a tax cut he had
signed into law, about the number of jobs created since he had come to office, about the amount spent by the
US on wars in the Middle East, and about the size of the US trade deficit with China.
Among the effects of the internet is that hackers can break in to websites and alter information, that
social media can be manipulated to introduce falsehoods to potentially large audiences, and that ordinary
people can engage in distortion by posting comments online. The old adage that a lie can travel around the
world in the time is takes for the truth to get its boots on has taken on new meaning thanks to lies and
misrepresentations that can be subject to ‘rumour cascades’ as they are copied and spread online. In looking
at several thousand such cascades, Vosoughi et al. (2018) came to the conclusion that falsehoods spread
‘significantly farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information’, that
fake news was a particular problem with political news, and that the actions of ordinary humans were at
least as much involved as were automated internet bots.

users to websites with fake news (see Focus 14.1), automatically retweet messages on Twitter
Post-truth
containing key words or phrases, trawl search engines and post news stories meeting specified The idea that
criteria, and post tweets automatically. Few skills are needed to do this, it is often unknown who appeals to
is involved, and the bots are difficult to block. emotions and
The third problem accentuated by the internet is that of fake news. Studies find that while personal beliefs
have become
most people agree that the internet offers access to a far wider range of views than is the case
more influential
with traditional media, it has also increased the influence of more extreme views, and poses in shaping public
new challenges to users in separating truth from fiction. The internet was once described as an opinion and
information superhighway, but perhaps it is better regarded as a series of gated information com- public policy than
munities, and those communities are often not what they seem: as users seek out fewer sources objective facts.
of news and are subjected more to the influence of bots, algorithms, and echo chambers, so the
problems of fake news and the post-truth society grow – see Focus 14.1.
It is also important to note that access to the internet is far from equal. Many people have no access at all (because
they have no access to electricity and/or computers and/or smart phones and/or broadband services), authoritarian
regimes such as China and Iran continue to censor the internet, even in wealthy countries there are still many older
citizens who remain unconnected, and there are many people who do not use the internet for news, or use it only in
a selective manner.
240 chapter 14

100

Percentage of individuals using

80
the internet
60

40

20

0
pe

Cs
s
s

es

es
ic
S

ld
r ic
te
ica
CI

cif

tr i

tr i
ro

or

LD
sta

Af
er

Pa

un

n
Eu

ou
Am

ab
ia

co

gc
As

Ar

pin
pe
elo

elo
ev

ev
D

D
Total population Ages 15 –24

Figure 14.2 Comparing internet access

Source: International Telecommunication Union (2017).
Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States (former USSR). LDCs = least developed countries.

As of 2017, just over half the people in the world still did not have internet access, with rates of connection rang-
ing from 80 per cent in Europe to 66 per cent in the Americas, 44 per cent in Asia and the Pacific, and 22 per cent
in Africa (see Figure 14.2). Younger people are more connected to the internet than older people, though, hinting at
broader generational changes yet to come. It might also be suggested that the Western dominance of the internet has
created a new form of information imperialism, but the balance has changed with the rise of Chinese equivalents (Jin,
2015). These include Baidu (a search engine), Weibo (equivalent to Twitter), Taobao (an online market), and Youku
(YouTube).
As to the long-term effect of social media on mass media in general, we will have to wait and see. Frame
(2015) notes that the past development of new media has routinely led to proclamations of the imminent de-
mise of pre-existing media, but that these predictions never came true. Instead, society adopts the new form of
communication while the ‘old media’ specialize and adapt. Radio and television were once seen to threaten the
existence of print media, for example, and yet all three learned to coexist, and this pattern might happen also
with social media.

media influence
Much political communication seeks to persuade rather than to inform. Whether we are
Transmis- receiving information directly from political leaders and parties, or via the mass media, that
sion model information is subject to value judgements and biases that create – according to Kaid et al.
A model that (1991) – at least three different ‘realities’:
distinguishes
between five ◆◆ The objective political reality of events as they actually occurred.
different
◆◆ The subjective reality of events as they are perceived by governments, politicians, and
elements or
components in citizens.
any ◆◆ The constructed reality of events as they are covered and presented by the media.
communication,
of which the In seeking to understand how the mass media help shape these realities, we can use the
message itself is
transmission model as a guide. This distinguishes five components in any act of political
only one.
communication: who says what to whom, through which medium, and with what effects (see
 political communication 241

Component Quality Example

Sender Who? A political party organization

Message What? Encouraging voting at a

forthcoming election

Channel How? Leaflets, emails,

social media posts

Receiver To whom? Potential or actual party

supporters

Impact Effect? Voter turnout goes up

Figure 14.3 The transmission model of political communication

Mechanism Features
The media strengthen existing opinions. In other words, people consume
media which support their existing outlook (selective exposure), interpret
Reinforcement information to render it consistent with their prior opinions (selective
interpretation), and forget information that runs counter to their existing
beliefs (selective recall).

The media influence what we think and talk about. The compressed nature
of news, especially on television, means that coverage is highly selective.
Agenda-setting
Reported events are widely discussed by the public but non-reported
events lose visibility.

The media decide how an event is narrated. By focusing on particular

aspects of a problem – including its origins, remedies, and evaluation – the
Framing
media encourage viewers and readers to interpret the topic in a similar
way.

The media influence how we interpret events beyond those in a particular

story. For example, coverage of a crime story in the national media may
Priming
encourage voters to judge candidates for election by their law and order
policies.

Figure 14.4 Mechanisms of media impact

Figure 14.3). Working our way through these components, it soon becomes clear that the
Self-
media offer a structure within which many people can live their entire political lives. Just how selection
they do that, though, is a matter of debate, the thinking having evolved with changes in the The choice of
technology of delivery, and the impact of those changes on four mechanisms: reinforcement, media sources
agenda-setting, framing, and priming (see Figure 14.4). made by an
In the 1950s, before television became pre-eminent, the reinforcement thesis – also known individual. For
example, people
as the ‘minimal effects model’ – held sway (Klapper, 1960). The argument here was that party who are already
loyalties initially transmitted through the family acted as a political sunscreen protecting people conservative will
from media effects. People saw what they wanted to see and remembered what they wanted to most likely
recall. In Britain, for example, where national newspapers were strongly partisan, many working- choose
class people brought up in Labour households continued to read Labour newspapers as adults.The conservative
sources of news.
correlation between the partisanship of newspapers and their readers reflected self-selection
242 chapter 14

by readers, rather than the propaganda impact of the press. Given strong self-selection, the most the press could
do was to reinforce readers’ existing dispositions, encouraging them to stay loyal to the cause and to turn out on
Election Day.
The reinforcement theory is still highly relevant, as we can see in the polarized environment that exists in some seg-
ments of the American media. The typical viewer of Fox News or reader of the Wall Street Journal is more likely to be
a conservative drawn to these outlets than to be an ex-liberal converted to the right as a result of stumbling upon their
news coverage. To some extent, at least, Fox News and the Wall Street Journal preach to the converted. Reinforcement
has also been at the heart of the effect of the internet and social media on political communication.
The second mechanism of media impact is agenda-setting, or the idea that the media influence what we think
about, though not necessarily what we think.The media write certain items onto the agenda and, by implication, keep
other issues away from the public’s gaze. The press, argued Walter Lippman in 1922, ‘is like a beam of a searchlight that
moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and then another out of the darkness and into vision’. In an election cam-
paign, for example, television directs our attention to major candidates and to the race for victory; by contrast, fringe
candidates and the issues are often treated as secondary.
Agenda-setting is influence by editorial choices designed to attract users away from the competition. Whatever
medium or media we use for our political information, we will find editors asking questions such as these:

◆◆ Will the story have a strong impact on the audience?

◆◆ Does the story involve violence? (‘If it bleeds, it leads.’)
◆◆ Is the story current and novel?
◆◆ Does the story involve well-known people?

Because news programmes often focus on the exceptional, or sometimes – for light relief – the amusingly
quirky, their content is invariably an unrepresentative record of events. Policy fiascos receive more attention than
policy successes; corruption is a story but integrity is a bore; a fresh story gathers more coverage than a new
development of a tired theme. The familiar is also preferable to the unfamiliar, which means that we will hear much
more news from those parts of the world in which editors think we are interested. As a result, agenda-setting creates
a warped image of the world.
But the responsiveness of editors to their consumers limits the impact of agenda-setting. Editors do not select stories on
a whim, but are instead highly sensitive to the potential impact of different items on audience size and appreciation, and
are paid to demonstrate their news sense; if they consistently fail to do so, they lose their jobs. Hence it is naive to attribute
broad agenda-setting power to editors simply because they make specific judgements about what is to appear on screen
or on the front page. Media professionals may simply be providing what they think their viewers and readers want.
The third mechanism of media impact concerns the framing of a story, or the way in which reports construct
a narrative about an event. This is a more recent attempt to understand media impact, and a prime example of the
interpretive approach to understanding politics, reflecting Plato’s observation that ‘those who tell the stories also rule
society’. The journalist’s words, and the camera’s images, help to frame the story, providing a narrative which encour-
ages a particular reaction from the viewer.
For example, are immigrants presented as a stimulus to the economy, or as a threat to society? Do media in particular
European countries portray membership of the European Union critically or positively? Is a criminal who has been
sentenced to be executed receiving justice, or a cruel and unusual punishment? As the concept of a ‘story’ suggests, the
journalist must translate the event covered into an organized narrative which connects with the receiver: the shorter
the report, the greater the reliance on the shared, if sometimes simplistic, presuppositions which Jamieson and Waldman
(2003) term ‘consensus frames’.
Finally, the media may have a priming effect, encouraging people to apply the criteria implicit in one story to new
information and topics. For example, the more the media focus their coverage on foreign policy, the more likely it is
that voters will be primed to judge parties and candidates according to their policies in this area, and perhaps even to
vote accordingly. Similarly, it is possible that coverage of racist attacks may prompt some individuals to engage in similar
acts themselves, should the opportunity arise in their neighbourhood.

recent trends in political communication

Four broad changes in political communication have been underway in higher-income countries, the combined
effect of which has changed the nature of news and the choices available to consumers. Where the mass media once
 political communication 243

brought people together (because there were few sources), they have since tended to splinter the traditional national
audience, as they have become more commercial, fragmented, global, and interactive.

Commercialization
The commercialization of the mass media has meant the decline of public broadcasting and the rise of for-profit
media treating users as consumers rather than citizens. Public radio and television is still active in most democracies,
producing high quality and usually well-balanced political reporting for a discerning audience (consider National
Public Radio in the United States, the BBC in Britain, ARD in Germany, and the multiple countries in Europe
that support public television with a required television licence fee). In an increasingly commercial environment,
though, channels in search of profit devote little time to serious political information, and even less time to in-
depth political analysis, instead concentrating on soft news covering celebrity, entertainment, and lifestyle topics.
They argue that it is preferable to reach a mass audience with limited but stimulating political coverage than to offer
extensive political programming which, in reality, only ever reached a minority with a deep interest in public
affairs. Specialist political programmes continue for political junkies but such broadcasts can no longer be foisted
on larger but unwilling audiences.

Fragmentation
With more TV and radio channels, and more internet sites, consumers have an enhanced ability to download,
stream, and consume programmes on demand, leaving them increasingly able to watch, hear, and read what they
want, when they want, and where they want. Long gone are the days when TV viewers were restricted to a few
major stations or networks, available only at home and at predetermined times; distribution by cable, satellite, the
internet, and mobile devices allows viewers to receive a greater range of content, and through the use of DVRs,
on-demand services, or streaming, they can record and create programming to suit their personal tastes and
schedules.
In the United States, these changes are reflected in the falling audience shares for nightly news on the three major
television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC), down from 42 per cent of the adult population in 1980 to just 16 per
cent in 2012, since when it has remained steady (Pew Research Center, 2017d). Printed newspaper circulations are
also plummeting throughout the developed world: by 23 per cent for dailies in the United States and by 16 per cent
in Western Europe between 2006 and 2015. Even as many local and evening newspapers are closing, though, some
are reinventing themselves online, with some shift of printed material to generally less political free papers. Globally,
meanwhile, circulation actually grew by 5 per cent between 2011 and 2016, thanks mainly to demand in India and other
parts of Asia: about 2.7 billion people, or about one in three of the world’s population, still reads newspapers in print
(World Association of Newspapers, 2017).
The political implications of this transition from mass broadcasting are substantial. Where earlier generations would
passively watch whatever appeared on their television screen, the internet is user-driven, and TV is rapidly following
suit. In response, political parties are forced to adopt a greater range and sophistication of marketing strategies, including
the use of personalized but expensive contact techniques such as direct mail, email, social networks, and telephone – as
skilfully exploited by Barack Obama in securing donations and volunteers for his successful presidential campaigns in
2008 and 2012 (Kreiss, 2012).
In this more fragmented media environment, politicians continue their migration from television news to higher-
rated talk shows, blurring the distinction between the politician and the celebrity in the expanding Pollywood zone
where Politics meets Hollywood (Street, 2011: Chapter 9). They compete for followers on Facebook and Twitter
against sports personalities, movie stars, and the latest reality TV show. The sound bite, never unimportant, becomes
even more vital as politicians learn to articulate their agenda in a short interview, or an even briefer commercial.

Globalization
In 1776, the English reaction to the American Declaration of Independence took 50 days to filter back to the
United States. By 1991, global viewers were watching broadcasts of Operation Desert Storm (the US-led invasion
of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait) in real time. We now take for granted the almost immediate transmission of newsworthy
events around the world, and even authoritarian governments find it harder than ever to isolate their populations
from international developments. Even before the internet, communist states found it difficult to jam foreign radio
broadcasts aimed at their people. Today, China’s iron curtain of censorship can be circumvented by those of its
people who take the trouble to access the range of overseas blogs and sites documenting the latest developments
within their country (see Negro, 2017).
 SPOTLIGHT VENEZUELA
Brief profile
Venezuela should by all rights be a Latin American success story, but a combination of political and economic
difficulties has resulted in its recent downgrading in the Democracy Index from a hybrid to an authoritarian
regime. It is rich in oil (as well as coal, iron ore, bauxite, and other minerals) but most of its people live in poverty.
The wealth of the rich, displayed through imported luxury cars, manicured suburbs, and gated communities,
coexists with public squalor. Much of the failure can be attributed to Hugo Chávez, elected president in 1998 on
a populist left-wing platform. His supporters, known as chavistas, claim that his policies of economic nationalization
and expanded social programmes helped the poor, but his critics charge that they contributed to inflation and
unemployment. He died in 2013, but his successor Nicolás Maduro has built on the Chávez legacy, continuing to
distort the economy, demonize opponents, and over-politicize the country’s culture.

Form of government Federal presidential republic consisting of 23 states and a Capital District. State
formed 1811, and most recent constitution adopted 1999.
Legislature Unicameral National Assembly of 165 members elected for fixed and renewable
five-year terms.
Executive Presidential. A president elected for an unlimited number of six-year terms,
supported by vice-president and cabinet of ministers.
Judiciary Supreme Tribunal of Justice, with 32 members elected by the National Assembly
to 12-year terms.
Electoral system President elected in national contest using a plurality system. National Assembly
elected using mixed member proportional representation, with 60 per cent
elected by single-member plurality and the balance by proportional
representation.
Parties Multi-party, with a changing roster of parties currently dominated by the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela.

31.6m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
— Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

— capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
Note: No data available for GDP and per capita GDP.
 Political communication in Venezuela
One of the sources of Venezuela’s low ranking in indices of
democracy is its poor record on media freedom. As elsewhere
in Latin America, the media establishment is privately owned,
but this status does not prevent chronic intervention by
government. In its Freedom of the Press report, Freedom House
(2017) ranks Venezuela as Not Free, and the annual reports
published by Reporters Without Borders (a French-based
group that promotes press freedom) charge the government
with imposing pressure on independent media. The means used
include a travel ban on editors and media executives, the biased
adjudication of court cases involving journalists, a reduction in
access to newsprint, and even death threats against journalists.
The Venezuelan constitution guarantees freedom of
expression, but a 2004 law includes wording that limits
expression; for example, news that could ‘incite or promote
A newspaper vendor in Caracas, the capital of
hatred’ or foment the ‘anxiety’ of Venezuelan citizens can be
Venezuela, with newspapers headlining the
banned, as can media coverage considered to ‘disrespect
re-election victory of President Nicolás Maduro,
authorities’. Regulations also allow the president to interrupt
leader of a regime that has seen growing limits on
regular television programming to deliver what are known as
media freedom.
cadenas, or live official broadcasts that can include attacks on
Source: Getty Images/Luis Robayo.
the opposition.
The constitution guarantees the rights of citizens to access public information, but journalists find it hard to
implement these rights. The government actively bars access to information that would reflect poorly on its
policies. For example, when reports
broke in 2014 of the possible outbreak
of a mosquito-borne disease in a
coastal province of Venezuela, Maracaibo
President Maduro accused journalists
who wanted to issue public warnings of CARACAS
practising ‘terrorism’, and issued orders
for their prosecution.
VENEZUELA GUYANA

The political style of former

president Hugo Chávez provides a
good example of a populist leader using COLOMBIA
broadcast media to influence the
poorer voters who are his natural
support base. Many callers to his
lengthy Sunday morning broadcast BRAZIL
show, ¡Aló, Presidente!, petitioned the
president for help in securing a job or
social security benefit, usually citing in
the process the callousness of the
preceding regime. The president Further reading
created a special office to handle these
requests. In Chávez’s governing style, Derham, Michael (2010) Politics in Venezuela: Explaining Hugo Chávez
we saw how the leader of an (Oxford University Press).
Matos, Carolina (2012) Media and Politics in Latin America: Globalization,
authoritarian regime could strengthen
Democracy and Identity (London: I B Tauris).
his authority through dominance of
Tinker Salas, Miguel (2015) Venezuela: What Everyone Needs to Know
the broadcast media even against the (Oxford University Press).
opposition of many media professionals
themselves.
246 chapter 14

Recent technological developments also facilitate underground opposition to authoritarian regimes. A small group
with internet access now has the potential to draw the world’s attention to political abuses, providing source material
for alert journalists. The governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia have each felt the effects of overseas groups in this way,
though both regimes remain in place. The internet can also be used by small groups to convey less edifying messages.
Both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) have been adept at releasing online images that can be seen by anyone with
access to the internet, containing propaganda, warnings, and scenes of violence intended both to encourage supporters
and to scare enemies.
Further evidence of globalization can be seen in the rise of global 24-hour news stations. These trace their roots
to national all-news stations such as CNN, which began broadcasting in the United States in 1980. It was followed by
CNN International in 1985, and then by BBC World (1991), Deutsche Welle from Germany (1992), Al-Jazeera from
Qatar (1996), NHK World from Japan (1998), RT from Russia (2005), and France 24 (2006). These stations have not
always been profitable, and they reach only those audiences that have access to cable or satellite, but global television
broadens the options for sources of political information.

Interaction
Undoubtedly the most important development in political communication has been its increased interactivity.
Radio phone-ins have long allowed ordinary people to listen to their peers discussing current issues, without
mediation by a politician; social media perform the same function in cyberspace, and to much bigger and wider
audiences. Messaging systems and social media are inherently interactive, allowing peer-to-peer interchanges
which tend to crowd out top-down communication from politicians to voters. A new generation that has known
little but interactive media is raising an important question to which politicians have yet to find an adequate
answer: why should we listen to you when we have the option to interact electronically with others who share our
interests?
Interaction is a key theme in speculation about the future of political communication, with a series of scenarios
developed by the Dutch Journalism Fund (Kasem et al., 2015) offering alternatives that range from dominance of the
political, economic, and social agenda by a handful of internet giants to a world dominated by start-ups and cooperative
relationships, with government restricted to a facilitating role. The conclusion of René van Zanten (quoted by Ireton,
2015), General Director of the Netherlands Press Fund, is particularly interesting:

The most important thing to emerge seems to be the new and very important role that users play in the process …
News is no longer the news that journalists and editors think that is important. People have opinions about that. They
show you the way to their world by clicking and scrolling. Media had better take that seriously and prepare not only
for new ways of publishing, but also new ways of defining news.

If it was only well-meaning humans who were determining the pace and the quality of the interaction, then we
could see this as a healthy development in the marketplace of ideas. Unfortunately, as we saw earlier, many who mean
harm are also involved in this interactivity, and the spread of news has even been automated to a large degree.

political communication in authoritarian states

Freedom House, as well as publishing the annual Freedom in the World report that has been used in part in this book
to help distinguish democracies from authoritarian systems, has also published since 1980 an annual report titled
Freedom of the Press. This compares the legal environment for the media, political pressures that influence reporting,
state intrusion into the media, and the degree of safety enjoyed (or not) by journalists. In its 2017 report (Freedom
House, 2017), it painted a grim picture. Under the heading ‘Press freedom’s dark horizon’, it made several alarming
points:

◆◆ Global press freedom had declined to its lowest point in 13 years amid unprecedented threats to journalists and
media outlets in major democracies, and new controls imposed in authoritarian states.
◆◆ Only 13 per cent of the human population enjoyed access to a free press.
◆◆ Nearly half the world’s population lived in countries where the media environment was classified as Not Free.
◆◆ Never in the time that Freedom House had been monitoring press freedom had the United States figured so
prominently in its analysis, with no US president ‘in recent memory’ showing ‘greater contempt for the press’
than Donald Trump.
 political communication 247

100

80
Score out of 100

60

40

20

K
ay

en

SA

ce

an

N l
ria

ico

Ve e y

e la

ia

na

or Iran

a
i
ad

ric

di

re
an

az
U

ss
w

an

rk
Jap

hi
ed

ige
U

zu
In

ex
Br

Ko
an

Ru
Af
or

C
Tu
Fr
Sw

ne
er

M
C
N

th
G

ut
So

N
Free Partly Free Not Free

Figure 14.5 Comparing media freedom

Source: Based on data in Freedom House (2017).
Notes: Scores are out of 100, with lower scores indicating greater freedom. Norway ranks highest (8) and North Korea lowest (98).

◆◆ Iran, North Korea, and Syria ranked among the ten lowest-rated countries in the Freedom House assessment,
and countries such as Turkey and Venezuela had increasingly used political or social unrest as a pretext to
impose more press controls; see Spotlight Venezuela.

The results for a selection of countries are shown in Figure 14.5, but while democracies seem to come out well,
and authoritarian states do not, the picture is not that simple. Democracies might boast about the extent to which
their citizens enjoy the benefits of a free flow of information, and may criticize authoritarian states for their efforts
to limit that flow, but they both – in their own ways – impose limits on information, and make efforts to shape the
message. The difference is only one of degree. The most that we can say is that media coverage of politics in
democracies is relatively open, while in authoritarian states it is relatively subdued and subservient. Having said
that, though, we know less about the dynamics of communication in authoritarian settings: supporters of
authoritarian governments are unwilling to be frank about how they work, while opponents are unwilling to speak
out, or have been driven underground.
We know that a lack of resources within the media sector in authoritarian states limits professionalism and increases
vulnerability to pressure. Official television stations and subsidized newspapers reproduce the regime’s line, while crit-
ical journalists are harassed and the media sector develops an instinct for self-preservation through self-censorship. The
consequence is an inadequate information flow to the top, expanding the gap between state and society, and leading
ultimately to flawed decisions.
A thoughtful dictator responds to this problem by encouraging the media to expose malfeasance at the local level,
thus providing a check on governance away from the centre. But there is no escape from the paradox of authoritari-
anism: by controlling information, rulers may secure their power in the short run, but they also reduce the quality of
governance, potentially threatening their own survival over the longer term.The more developed
the country, the more severe is the damage inflicted by an information deficit at the top. Propaganda
How exactly do authoritarian rulers limit independent journalism? The constraints are var- Information used
ied, ranging from the crass to the subtle. In the worst cases, there are simply no free institutional to promote a
particular
media. In North Korea, for example, which is ranked in last place by Freedom House in terms political cause or
of media freedom, the media serve the purpose not of providing objective information, but of ideology with a
providing propaganda in support of the regime. News leads with activities of the leadership, and view to
statements by the government or the ruling Workers’ Party, while entertainment programming controlling or
includes dramas and operas conveying revolutionary messages, and internet access is severely changing public
minds.
controlled.
248 chapter 14

At the same time, matters are not as negative as we might think. Authoritarian governments can control formal
media outlets, but they cannot control the rumour mill or the information underground. Complete control of internet
access is also difficult to implement. Based on interviews with defectors, Baek (2016) paints a picture of a network of
citizens in North Korea who take great risks to circulate illicit media content such as foreign films, television shows,
soap operas, books, and encyclopaedias, much of it circulated using USB drives that are hard for officials to find. More
information is made available using the now dated technology of shortwave radios.This circulation fosters an awareness
of life outside North Korea, she argues, affecting the social and political consciousness of North Koreans.
Other states with a nominal communist allegiance also keep close control over the means of mass communication.
In China, access to information has traditionally been provided on a need-to-know basis. The country’s rulers work to
limit dissenting voices, even though they do now permit ‘newspapers, magazines, television stations and news websites
to compete fiercely for audiences and advertising revenue’ (Shirk, 2011). In 2011, the communist party even cancelled
Super Girl, a television talent show with a peak audience of 400 million, fearing the subversive effect of allowing the
audience to vote for their favourite act.
Although the Chinese government promotes e-commerce, internet users who search for ‘inappropriate’ topics such
as democracy or Tibetan independence will find their searches blocked and their access to search engines withdrawn.
The government even pays selected citizens to post pro-government messages online (Fox and Ramos, 2012). One
study (King et al., 2013) meanwhile finds that China is less likely to censor online criticism of the state, its leaders, and
its policies than it is to censor collective action that could spur social mobilization. Of course, as in other authoritarian
states, sophisticated users find a way round the regime’s electronic censorship, producing a parallel communications
system which may eventually prove to be politically transformative, but for now the Great Firewall of China holds.
He (2009) describes political communication in China as taking place in two separate ‘discourse universes’.The first
is the official universe, which occupies the public space, while the second is the private universe, which consists mainly
of oral and person-to-person communication. He argues that applying Western theories of political communication
to the Chinese context is difficult, because these models assume free and democratic elections. Since most political
communication in China is controlled by the communist party, and takes the form of propaganda, a specialized field
of political communication studies has less meaning there than it does in the West.
In hybrid regimes, control over the media is less extensive than in authoritarian states. The press and the internet,
are often left substantially alone, offering a forum for debate which perhaps offers some value, as well as danger, to the
rulers. Yet the leading political force also dominates broadcast coverage, even where explicit or implicit censorship is
absent. To some extent, such an emphasis reflects political reality: a viewer is naturally most interested in those who
exert the greatest influence over his or her life.
In some countries, controls on the media are uncompromising, with opposition journalists being threatened, im-
prisoned, forced into exile, or murdered. UNESCO (2018) maintains a website dedicated to listing the names of
journalists killed in the exercise of their profession, and identified 930 deaths between 2006 and 2016 (some killed
in conflicts, others murdered). In other instances, media controls are more subtle. In her study of sub-Saharan Africa
before the wave of liberalization in the 1990s, for example, Bourgault (1995) identified several means by which media
development could be limited:

◆◆ Declaring lengthy states of emergency which formally limit media freedom.

◆◆ Passing broad libel laws that can be selectively applied.
◆◆ Threatening the withdrawal of government advertising.
◆◆ Selectively restricting access to newsprint.
◆◆ Requiring publications and journalists to be licensed.
◆◆ Taxing printing equipment at a high rate.
◆◆ Requiring a bond to be deposited with the government before new publications can launch.

We should not assume that the Western idea of a free press garners universal appeal, as illustrated by the case of
Islamic states, which often stress the media’s role in affirming religious values and social norms. The question is
posed: why should we import Western ideas of freedom if the practical result is the availability of pornography?
When society is viewed as the expression of an overarching moral code, whether Islamic or otherwise, the Western
tradition of free speech appears alien – and even unethical. The injection of new ideas by the internet – and their
circulation within closed systems – was illustrated by the example of the Arab Spring, which may not have resulted
in the kinds of long-term democratic change that many hoped, but brought unprecedented challenges that might
arise again as internet use continues to expand – see Focus 14.2.
 political communication 249

Authoritarianism is clearly on show in Russia, where pressures on the media – from powerful business people, as
well as politicians – remain intense. Broadcasting was long the main way of reaching a dispersed population for whom
free television had greater appeal than papers for which they must pay. In a 2008 survey, for example, 82 per cent
of Russians said they watched television routinely, compared with just 22 per cent who said they were regular

Focus 14.2
Online activism and the Arab Spring
The use of online platforms for interaction among citizens has weakened political control in some authoritarian
regimes, the case of the Arab Spring offering a revealing illustration. As Table 14.2 shows, internet access grew
dramatically in the first decade of the new millennium in the Middle East and North Africa, allowing peer-to-
peer communication among alienated urban youth, as in Iran’s Blogistan (Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010). This
growth was not confined to those countries experiencing regime change in 2011 but became a significant
factor in some overthrows, notably in Egypt and Tunisia.
Online facilities not only permitted rapid circulation of news about the latest protest venues, but also
created a rare free space for social interaction – for example, between people of the opposite sex (Bayat,
2010). The word on the tweet proved harder to censor than the word on the street. In this way, social
media created a model of a free and exciting democratic society against which authoritarian political systems
in the Arab world seemed ever more ossified. Facebook became the freedom forum, leading Lynch (2011)
to claim boldly that ‘the long term evolution of a new kind of public sphere may matter more than immediate
political outcomes’. Wheeler and Mintz (2012) argue along similar lines when they suggest that ‘The ground
for significant political change in authoritarian contexts can be readied by people using new media tools to
discover and generate new spaces within which they can voice their dissent and assert their presence in
pursuit of bettering their lives.’
As we saw in Chapter 6, the Arab Spring promised more than it finally delivered, because the democratic
upsurge died quickly in most of those countries where it had emerged. At the same time, it is too early to
write off the possibilities of using the internet to increase the pressure for change in the Arab world.
Internet access is far from universal, notes Nordenson (2017), but the potential importance of platforms
such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube remains clear, even if – as noted earlier in this chapter – scholars
are still too busy documenting the changes to be able fully to understand their impact. Even as they do this,
internet access continues to grow in the Arab world, as it does everywhere – as Table 14.2 shows, the
percentage of the population using the internet in 2016 was substantially higher than in 2009.

Table 14.2 The internet and the Arab Spring

Country Internet users Population using Regime Population using

the internet (%) overthrown in the internet (%)
2000 2009
2009 2011? 2016
Morocco 100,000 10.3 million 33 No 58
Saudi Arabia 200,000 7.7 million 27 No 74
Tunisia 100,000 2.8 million 27 Yes 51
Egypt 450,000 12.6 million 16 Yes 39
Algeria 50,000 4.1 million 12 No 43
Libya 10,000 323,000 5 Yes 20
Yemen 15,000 370,000 2 Yes 25
Source: Adapted from Wheeler and Mintz (2012: Table 10.1), updated with 2016 figures from International Telecommunication Union (2018).
250 chapter 14

readers of national newspapers (Oates, 2014). Television has since been replaced by the internet as the main source
of information: in 2017, 72 per cent of Russians used the internet for news and analysis, compared to 65 per cent
who used television, and 31 per cent who used social media. Levels of trust in all three sources were low, however:
only 40 per cent trusted the internet, 30 per cent trusted television, and a paltry 11 per cent trusted social media
(Deloitte, 2017).
With over 100 laws governing media conduct in Russia, and the occasional journalist still found murdered by
unknown assailants, self-censorship – the voice in the editor’s head which asks ‘Am I taking a risk in publishing this
story?’ – remains rife. Because editors know where their best interests lie, there is no need for politicians to take the
political risk involved in explicit instruction. The internal censor allows the president to maintain deniability. ‘Censor-
ship? What censorship?’ he can ask, with a smile.
By comparison with television, the internet and the press are less explicitly controlled in Russia, an important
change to the all-embracing censorship of the communist era. Internet access, in particular, has allowed younger ­people
in urban areas to express and organize opposition to the authoritarian style of President Vladimir Putin. As befits a
competitive authoritarian regime, dominance of the major media does not imply complete censorship.
 political communication 251

discussion questions
◆◆ Politically speaking, are social media more a threat or an opportunity?
◆◆ What can ordinary people do to protect themselves from fake news?
◆◆ Do the media shape or reflect public opinion?
◆◆ On balance, is the fragmentation of the media environment good or bad for political
discourse, and why?
◆◆ On balance, is greater interaction within the media environment good or bad for political
discourse, and why?
◆◆ Is the problem of propaganda notably worse in authoritarian than in democratic systems,
or are the attempts to influence public thinking simply couched differently?

key concepts
◆◆ Agenda-setting ◆◆ Post-truth
◆◆ Bot ◆◆ Priming
◆◆ Echo chamber ◆◆ Propaganda
◆◆ Fourth estate ◆◆ Reinforcement
◆◆ Framing ◆◆ Self-selection
◆◆ Internet troll ◆◆ Social media
◆◆ Mass media ◆◆ Transmission model
◆◆ Political communication

further reading
Ekström, Mats, and Andrew Tolson (eds) (2013) Media Talk and Political Elections in Europe and
America (Palgrave Macmillan). An analysis of the links between media and elections,
including chapters on the political interview, political debates, and uses of the internet to
engage with voters.
Kenski, Kate, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (eds) (2017) The Oxford Handbook of Political
Communication (Oxford University Press). An edited collection of studies of the history,
current shape, effects, and potential future of political communication.
McNair, Brian (2018) An Introduction to Political Communication, 6th edn (Routledge). A survey
of the means and effects of political communication, including an analysis of developments
in the use of the internet.
Robertson, Alexa (2015) Media and Politics in a Globalizing World (Polity). An assessment of the
impact of globalization and technology on the relationship between media and politics.
Semetko, Holli A., and Margaret Scammell (eds) (2012) The Sage Handbook of Political
Communication (Sage). Another edited collection that helps bring together themes in a
fragmented and multi-disciplinary field.
van Dijk, Jan A. G. M., and Kenneth L. Hacker (2018) Internet and Democracy in the Network
Society (Routledge). An assessment of the impact of the internet on politics, asking
whether the positive effects once predicted have actually happened.
 15

Source: Getty Images/Pius Utomi

elections

Ekpei
contents
◆ Elections: an overview
◆ Legislative elections
◆ Executive elections
◆ Referendums, initiatives,
PREVIEW and recalls
Elections lie at the heart of representative democracy. They are the ◆ Elections in
primary means by which most voters connect with government, they authoritarian states
provide the brief moment during which politicians and parties are
supplicants rather than supervisors, and they serve as a competition for
office and a means of holding the government to account. But election
campaigns also provide an opportunity for a dialogue between voters and parties, and between society and state:
‘no part of the education of a politician is more indispensable than the fighting of elections’, claimed Winston
Churchill. Competitive elections endow office-holders with authority (contributing to the effectiveness with which
leaders can perform their duties), and facilitate choice, accountability, dialogue, and legitimacy.
This is all well and good, but ensuring that elections result in fair and accurate representation is easier said than done.
Multiple electoral systems have been developed, ranging from plurality to majority and proportional systems, but none
has yet resulted in the perfect form of representation. This chapter begins by looking in turn at each of these systems
and at their use in legislative and presidential elections.The results differ according to the methods used, reflecting con-
trasting ideas of representation and of democracy itself. The chapter then looks at the particular effects of referendums,
initiatives, and recalls. It ends with a discussion of the role of elections in authoritarian regimes, where – despite active
manipulation of outcomes – elections still perform several key political functions.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ There are many different electoral systems in use, but all of them fall short of the core goal of accurately
translating votes into seats.
◆◆ Legislative and executive elections differ in both their mechanics and their implications; voting for a
multi-member legislature requires different rules than electing a one-person chief executive.
◆◆ Election campaigns are less important for the result they produce than for their role as learning
opportunities for voters, candidates, and parties.
◆◆ The political impact of an election depends on the narrative established about it after the results are in,
with exaggeration often being the order of the day.
◆◆ Referendums, initiatives, and recalls make voters into decision-makers, but questions remain about how
desirable they are for democracy.
◆◆ Numerous controls are imposed on elections in authoritarian regimes, but the effect is usually to curb
rather than to eliminate political choice.
 elections 253

elections: an overview
Elections lie at the heart of the democratic process, their purpose being to ensure that the preferences of voters are
reflected in the make-up of legislatures and governments. The quality of representation is directly related to the
quality, regularity, and arithmetic of elections, and one of the most telling distinctions between democracies and
authoritarian systems is that elections in the former are generally free and fair, while in the latter they are not. An
electoral system cannot be expected by itself to resolve underlying social confl icts, but it can be considered to be
doing its job if it is both widely acceptable and stable over time, if the winners do not try to alter the system to their
own advantage, and if the losers do not blame the election rules for their defeat.
In terms of the mechanics of elections, the manner in which votes are computed into choices
for executives and legislatures varies: the major alternatives are plurality, majority, proportional, First-order
and mixed systems. Whatever the system, voter preferences are rarely exactly reflected in who elections
wins the executive or how legislatures are made up, but the extent of the bias varies greatly. Elections in
Elections also vary in terms of their significance; where the stakes are higher in first-order which the stakes
are highest,
elections, second-order elections include less significant mid-term and local elections. usually involving
In parliamentary systems, for example, general elections are clearly first-order elections because the possibility of
they might result in a change of government. Hence they draw much more attention, and usually a change of
attract much higher voter turnout, than do local elections. Meanwhile, local elections – usually government.
held at a different time from general elections – are clearly second-order elections: they attract
less voter interest and turnout, and voters often use them to comment on national government. Second-
They weaken the link between the performance of representatives and the response of voters, order
elections
such that a competent local administration might find itself dismissed for no other reason than Elections in
the unpopularity of its party at the national level. which the stakes
In understanding elections, we also need to consider their scope: while American government are lower, such
includes more than 500,000 elected posts (a figure reflecting a strong tradition of local self- as local or
government), European voters have traditionally been limited to voting for their nation- mid-term
elections.
al legislatures and their local governments, with regional and European elections added more
recently. To illustrate the contrast, Dalton and Gray (2003) calculated that between 1995 and
2000 a resident of Oxford in England could have voted just four times, while a resident of Irvine, California, could
have cast more than 50 votes in 2000 alone.
There are dangers in too many elections, not least of which is voter fatigue, leading to a fall in interest, turnout,
and quality of choice. In authoritarian systems, a different dynamic is at work: levels of interest and turnout are
often exaggerated, and there is no real choice. The question, then, is not about the structure of the electoral system
so much as it is about how elections are manipulated and exploited to keep the ruling elite and/or the ruling party
in power.
Electoral
system
legislative elections A general term
for the rules
Who governs? At various time during the nineteenth century, a Belgian lawyer, a French governing an
mathematician, an English lawyer, a Danish mathematician, and an American architect all election,
wrestled with this question, working to develop an electoral system that accurately reflected including the
the wishes of voters. For Victor d’Hondt and André Sainte-Laguë, the solution lay in a list structure of the
proportional representation (PR) system. For Thomas Hare and Carl George Andrae, it lay in ballot (e.g. how
many candidates
a single transferrable vote. For W. R. Ware, it lay in the alternative vote. While PR went on are listed per
to be a popular option in much of Europe, none of these men fully solved the problem; all party), the
methods of converting votes to seats have their own set of strengths and weaknesses. electoral
At first glance, the subject of elections might seem fairly simple: elective offices need to formula (how
be filled, there will usually be competing candidates, voters are asked to make a choice, and votes are
converted to
the person with the most votes is declared the winner. However, even a cursory glance at the seats), and
arithmetic involved reveals numerous problems; in spite of the core claims of a representative districting (the
democracy, votes are not equal in their effects, and the electoral formula employed rarely division of the
translates the share of votes won by a party into exactly the same percentage share of seats in a territory into
legislature. For executives meanwhile, those who vote for losing candidates have little to show separate
constituencies).
for their efforts.
254 chapter 15

Numerous electoral systems have been proposed or used, but in this section we boil them down to the four options
most often used for legislative elections (summarized in Table 15.1), followed in the next section with a discussion
about executive elections. The simplest system – single-member plurality – has one of the best records at producing
majority governments, but one of the worst records in turning share of the vote into the same share of seats. Mean-
while, the systems that do best at reflecting voter preferences – notably proportional representation – are more complex
in their mechanics and often yield coalition governments that are determined by post-election bargaining between the
parties represented in the legislature.

Table 15.1 Comparing legislative electoral systems

System Procedure Examples

PLURALITY SYSTEM
Single-member plurality (SMP) Parties contest single-member Bangladesh, Canada, India,
districts, with the candidate winning Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, UK,
the most votes (not necessarily a USA
majority) winning the seat.
MAJORITY SYSTEMS
Two-round system If no candidate wins a majority, the Belarus, France, Haiti, Iran,
leading candidates face a second, runoff Vietnam
election. Used more often for
executive elections.
Alternative vote (AV) All candidates are ranked by voters. Australia, Papua New Guinea
Anyone winning a majority of first
preference votes is declared the
winner. Failing this, lowest-placed
candidates are eliminated and their
votes reassigned until one person has
won a majority.
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
List system Parties contest multi-member Most of Europe and Latin America,
districts and publish lists of South Africa, Turkey
candidates. Votes are cast for a party,
and seats in the district are divided up
among parties in proportion to their
shares of the vote.
Single transferable vote (STV) Similar to AV in that voters rank Australia (upper house), Ireland,
candidates, but winners are India (upper house), Malta
determined by a quota based on a
formula and a series of counts.
MIXED SYSTEMS
Parallel, or mixed member Some seats are determined by PR and Egypt, Hungary, Japan, Mexico,
majoritarian (MMM) others by SMP or two-round elections. Philippines, Russia, South Korea,
Effectively two separate elections. Ukraine, Venezuela
Mixed member proportional Much like MMM except that PR seats are Bolivia, Germany, New Zealand
(MMP) used to adjust the total share of seats.
In most cases, the examples refer to the lower chamber of the legislature (in bicameral systems) or the only chamber
in unicameral systems. For a full list of electoral systems and the countries that use them, see International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) at www.idea.int.
 elections 255

Plurality system
In the single-member plurality (SMP) format (also known as ‘fi rst-past-the-post’ (FPTP)
or ‘winner-take-all’), territories are divided into districts (or constituencies) that are each Single-
member
represented by a single member of the legislature. Each district is contested by multiple
plurality
candidates, and the winner is the one receiving the greatest number of votes, whether this is An electoral
a plurality (more than anyone else) or a majority (more than 50 per cent). Despite its antiquity, system based on
the plurality system is becoming less common, surviving mainly in Britain and British- districts that
influenced states. However, because several are so populous (such as India, Pakistan, the each have one
representative,
United States, and Nigeria), more people living in democracies vote using this method than
and in which the
any other (Farrell, 2011). winner is the
The main advantages of SMP are its simplicity and the fact that it produces a single district candidate with
representative, but its critical disadvantage is the prospect of unbalanced results: for example, par- the most votes.
ties with strong blocks of support in parts of a country tend to win more seats than parties whose
support is spread more thinly. Consider the following examples:

◆◆ In 17 of the 20 general elections held in Britain between 1945 and 2017, a single party won a majority in the
House of Commons, even though no party ever won a majority of votes.
◆◆ In the 2014 general election in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party won only 31 per cent of votes but nearly 52 per
cent of seats in the national parliament.
◆◆ In the 2015 elections in Canada, the Liberals won 54 per cent of seats with less than 40 per cent of votes, while
the other parties combined won more than 60 per cent of votes but only 46 per cent of seats (see Figure 15.1).

Majority systems
As the label implies, majority electoral systems require the winning candidate to earn a majority of votes, the
democratic argument being that no candidate should be elected to office without proving themselves acceptable to
most voters. There are two usual ways of doing this: through a two-round election (also known as a runoff
election), or – more uncommonly – using an alternative vote (AV) arrangement.
In the case of the former, all candidates run against each other in a district, and if one wins more than 50 per cent
of the vote they are declared the winner. But if no one passes the 50 per cent mark, the top two candidates from the
first round compete in a second round held soon afterwards, thereby ensuring that one wins a majority. (In France,
any candidate winning more than 12.5 per cent of the vote in the first round can run in the second, although deals
are often brokered in order to clear the way for the leading candidates to compete in the second and decisive round.)

60

50
Percentage share of votes/seats won

40

30

20

10

0
Liberals Conservatives New Democrats Bloc Québécois Greens

Votes Seats

Figure 15.1 The Canadian federal election, 2015

256 chapter 15

Focus 15.1
Who should be allowed to vote?
The question of the franchise (who can vote) is given surprisingly little attention in discussions about
elections. Voting restrictions have been lifted steadily over the past century or so, the most recent change
in most democracies being a reduction of the voting age to 18 in the 1960s and 1970s. But questions remain.
Should the age be reduced to 16, as in Austria and Brazil? Should prisoners be allowed to vote? Should non-
citizen legal residents be allowed to vote?
In a few countries, many convicted criminals are still denied the vote; many states in the United States
are prime examples. The total number of disenfranchised felons and ex-felons in the United States exceeds
six million, or about 2.5 per cent of the voting-age population (Uggen et al., 2016). Britain has also taken a
tough line, resisting rulings from the European Court of Human Rights to grant the vote to all prisoners
until a compromise was agreed in 2017. Former Prime Minister David Cameron once claimed that the
prospect of inmates voting made him ‘physically sick’.
Although Weale (2007: 157) suggests that ‘there are probably as many arguments against depriving
prisoners of the right to vote as there are in favour’, not everyone accepts that being locked up should
also mean being locked out. Canada’s highest court has ruled that prisoner disenfranchisement ‘has no
place in a democracy built upon the principles of inclusiveness, equality and citizen participation’. Israel’s
Supreme Court even restored the right to vote to the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
declaring that ‘we must separate contempt for his act from respect for his right’ (Manza and Uggen,
2008: 232).
There also remains the question of non-citizen residents; should they be granted the vote in the country
where they live, work, and pay taxes alongside citizens? If so, should they also retain the vote in their home
country? The slow trend here is to greater inclusiveness, with nearly 40 countries (mostly in Europe) having
approved some form of non-citizen voting rights (Immigrant Voting Project, 2018). Within the European
Union, all EU citizens living legally in a country of which they are not a national can vote and can stand as a
candidate at local and European elections. This policy is a tangible step towards maintaining voting rights in
an age of mobility.

Although once common in much of Western Europe, runoffs are now significant for legislative elections only in
France and its ex-colonies. They are used more often for executive elections, and so are covered in more detail later
in this chapter.
The rare AV arrangement takes matters to a higher level of complexity and demands more thought from voters.
All candidates must be ranked by voters, and if one wins a majority of so-called ‘first preference’ votes, that candidate
is elected. But if no one wins a majority, the last-placed candidate is eliminated and his/her votes reassigned, a process
which continues until one candidate has a majority. Only Australia and Papua New Guinea use
this system for national legislative elections, but it is also used in some local elections in Britain,
Proportional
representa-
New Zealand, and the United States (where it is known as instant-runoff or ranked-choice
tion voting). An effort to introduce AV for British general elections was heavily defeated in a 2011
An electoral national referendum, in part because voters found AV so complex.
system in which
the number of Proportional representation
seats won by The most common electoral system found in Europe and Latin America is proportional
each of the
competing representation (PR), by which seats are assigned in the legislature in proportion to the
parties is number of votes that each party wins, and voters make their choices more on the basis of
proportional to parties than of individual candidates. Because a single party rarely wins a majority of seats, the
the number of usual result is a coalition government – see Chapter 8.
votes they each There are two variations on the theme of PR: the party list system and the single transferrable
win.
vote. The list system is the most common, and itself comes in several varieties. Constituencies
 elections 257

are represented by multiple members (in contrast to the single

members in plurality systems), each of the parties contesting
an election puts forward a list of candidates (typically the same
Other 19%
number of names as there are seats to be filled from the dis-
trict), and voters choose among the parties offering those lists. Majority 34%
The number of votes won by a party determines how many
candidates are elected from each party list, while the order in Mixed 14%
which candidates appear on the list (predetermined by the
party itself) usually determines who is elected.
Many countries – such as Belgium, South Africa, and Proportional 33%
Spain – use closed lists that allow voters only a straight
choice among parties. In this format, party officials exert
enormous control over the writing of each list, including
the ability to include women and minorities near the top.
However, most European countries use open lists that give Figure 15.2 Electoral systems
voters at least some choice between candidates. This op- Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2018).
tion, known as preference voting, allows voters to select Note: The IPU bundles plurality and majority systems together
one or more named candidates from the party list. The to- under the label ‘majority’. Data indicate percentage of countries
tal of votes cast for a given list still determines the party’s using different systems.
overall representation, but a candidate’s preference votes
influence (to varying degrees) which candidates on each
list are elected.
The second and less common variety of proportional representation is the single transferable vote (STV) system,
which is not easy either to describe or for voters to understand. It requires voters to rank the candidates running in
their district, and when one of the candidates reaches a pre-set quota of first preferences, they are declared elected
and their surplus first preferences distributed to other candidates according to second preferences. Candidates with
the fewest votes are eliminated. This process continues until all the seats available have been filled. Unlike the party list
system, it allows votes to be cast for individual candidates, and minimizes the ‘wasting’ of votes. At the national level it
is used only in Ireland and Malta.
Most PR systems include a minimum threshold, so that if a party’s share of the vote falls below a given level it
wins no seats. The threshold varies, with a range of 3–5 per cent in most countries, and a high of 10 per cent in
Turkey. Explicit thresholds help to protect the legislature from fragmentation and extreme parties, or the problem
of the tail wagging the dog. The potential cost of a threshold that is too low is reflected in Israel, where the 2013
election – based on a 2 per cent threshold – saw 12 parties winning seats in the 120-member Knesset. Six of these
parties each won less than 5 per cent of the vote, but among them they controlled 25 seats, while the biggest party,
Likud, controlled only 31. The threshold was raised in 2014 to 3.25 per cent, but it only reduced the number of
parties to ten after the 2015 elections, at which the six smallest parties each won less than 8 per cent of the vote but
among them held 42 seats.

Mixed systems
The fourth kind of electoral system involves a hybrid of plurality and PR systems, designed to maximize their
respective advantages and minimize their disadvantages. The simplest of the variations is parallel voting, or mixed
member majority (MMM), which uses unlinked SMP/majority and party list votes, amounting to what is effectively
two separate campaigns; voters choose among competing candidates to represent their local district, and among
party lists to represent larger regions. In Japan’s House of Representatives, for example, 300 members are elected
by SMP and 180 by PR. Voters cast two ballots (one for a candidate and one for a party), and because parties can
assign candidates to both the single-member districts and the PR lists, candidates who lose in the former still have
a chance of winning in the latter.
MMM contains no mechanism to secure a proportional result, but another version of a mixed system – mixed
member proportional (MMP) (sometimes called ‘compensatory PR’) – is proportional in character. This format uses a
hybrid of SMP and PR, but links the two tiers by using the PR list vote to ‘top up’ seats so as to deliver a proportional
outcome overall. Germany is the inspiration for this system.Voters in Germany’s 299 electoral districts cast a ‘personal’
ballot to elect representatives from their local districts on the basis of SMP, while also filling an additional 410 seats by
258 chapter 15

Table 15.2 The German federal election, 2017

Direct vote Party list Total seats

Party % share Seats % share % share Seats
votes seats votes
Christian Democrats 30.2 185 62.9 26.8 15 200
Social Democrats 24.6 59 19.7 20.5 94 153
Alternative for Germany 11.5 3 1.0 12.6 91 94
Free Democrats 7.0 0 0 10.7 80 80
The Left 8.6 5 1.7 9.2 64 69
Alliance 90/the Greens 8.0 1 0.3 8.9 66 67
Christian Social Union 7.0 46 15.4 6.2 0 46
Other parties 3.1 0 0 5.1 0 0
TOTAL 100 299 100 100 410 709

casting a ‘party’ ballot to choose among parties running in Germany’s 16 Länder (states) on the basis of PR. The ideal
is that each party wins the same proportion of SMP seats and PR seats, but this rarely happens, so some topping up is
done using 31 ‘balance’ or ‘overhang’ seats. Parties that win more district seats than PR seats will be given the fewest
of the balance seats, while parties that win fewer district seats than PR seats will be given more of the balance seats
(see Farrell, 2011).
The result is not an exact correlation between votes cast and seats won, as the 2017 election results reveal (see Table
15.2), but it allows for adjustments to be made. The PR element particularly helped the smaller parties: the right-wing
Alternative for Germany, the centrist Free Democrats, the Left party and the Greens, which among them won just nine
district seats, but 301 party list and balance seats. The system is not easy to describe or to understand, but it has proved
influential because it seems to provide a fairly accurate reflection of voter preferences while retaining a representative
for each district.

executive elections
While the electoral systems used for legislatures are varied and often complex, those used for presidents are relatively
straightforward, since a one-person presidency cannot be shared between parties. This eliminates PR as an option,
leaving the main choice between plurality and majority systems.
While plurality systems tend to be the simplest, they can also fail to produce a convincing
mandate (see Focus 15.2): the more candidates contesting the election, the more this is likely
to happen. Presidents who win office without a majority will have less credibility and less ability
Mandate
A commission to to pursue their policy agendas. This problem is particularly acute when the victorious candidate
act on another’s secures only a small plurality of the total vote. For example, Fidel Ramos became president of
behalf in a the Philippines in 1992 with just 24 per cent of the vote – hardly a resounding endorsement
specific area. An with which to send the winner to the highest executive office in the land. Rodrigo Duterte
election
won in 2016 with 39 per cent of the vote; better, but still far short of a majority. In Mexico,
mandate is an
authorization since electoral reforms in the 1990s, winning candidate have rarely done well: Felipe Calderón’s
from the people winning share of the vote in 2006 was just 36 per cent, and Enrique Peña Nieto’s share in 2012
for the was just 38 per cent. It was not until 2018 that Andrés Manuel López Obrador was able to win
government to a more convincing 53 per cent share.
follow a
For this reason, most presidential electoral systems require a majority by using a two-round
particular
course. system. In the first round, all eligible candidates compete, and if one wins more than half the
vote, that candidate is declared the winner. If no one wins more than half the vote, then a second
 elections 259

Focus 15.2
Electoral messages and mandates
An election does not end when the results are declared. Far from it. After the declaration comes the
interpretation, which plays a large part in shaping the impact of an election on the politics that follow. Was
it a mandate for change? A repudiation of the government? A referendum on the economy? Have ‘the
people’ indeed spoken? If so, what have they said? Here we can see the relevance of an interpretive approach
to politics (see Chapter 2); the election narrative can influence later politics, even if vote shares or the party
composition of the government remain unchanged.
The primary focus is usually on the winner, or on a small party that has done surprisingly well; losers tend
to be quickly forgotten unless the scale of the loss is dramatic. The larger and more unexpected the winner’s
margin, the greater the demand for a narrative giving positive reasons for the victor’s triumph. Claiming that
Party X won because of Party Y’s unpopularity, or that Candidate A won because Candidate B performed
poorly, rarely fits the bill. One benign effect of this search for the winning party’s merits is to add to its
authority as it begins to govern.
Interpretations of election results focus on the opaque notion of a mandate. Winners routinely claim that
their victory is a repudiation of the former government and confirmation of the changes they propose to
make, and the media can often be persuaded to agree. Only individual voters, not the electorate as a whole,
have reasons for their decisions. Even so, editorials and blogs can be found after every campaign explaining
what the electorate intended by its collective judgement.
The case of the 2015 British general election offers an example. For five years, the Conservative party
of David Cameron had been governing in a troubled coalition with the much smaller Liberal Democrats,
and faced three major issues: the economy, a Scottish independence movement, and a debate over
membership of the UK in the European Union. The polls had the Conservative and Labour parties tied in
votes but in fact the Conservatives won a majority of seats, enabling them to form a single-party
government. The result was greeted with terms such as surprising, stunning, and astonishing, and was
interpreted both as a mandate for the Conservatives to continue with their pro-market policies and as a
rejection of Labour’s more radical approach. But the Conservative majority was just 12 seats on just 37
per cent of the vote (a modest 0.7 per cent increase over 2010), and Labour’s defeat probably reflected
doubts about its governing capacity more than its left-wing policies. Still, the story was written, the
message was transmitted, and the mandate was secured. And all (or mainly) because the polls underestimated
Conservative support.

round is held between the two top-placed candidates, usually within two to three weeks of the first contest. As well
as ensuring that the winner attracts the support of the majority of voters, the two-round system also encourages
the two runoff candidates to reach out to unsuccessful candidates from the first round, which may be helpful in
promoting more broadly based politics. On the other hand, two-round elections extend the campaign season and its
associated costs, run the danger that turnout may fall in the second round, and open the door to tactical voting in
the first round.
France is an influential case (see Lewis-Beck et al., 2011). French voters, it is said, vote with their hearts in the first
round and with their heads in the second, which creates the possibility of unexpected surprises, as in the case of the
2002 presidential election (see Table 15.3). The incumbent, Jacques Chirac, was running for a second term, but had
lost popularity and the election was held against a background of concerns about law and order. It was expected that
the two major contenders would be Chirac and his socialist opponent, Lionel Jospin, but many voters expressed their
displeasure with Chirac by voting for minor candidates in the first round. While Chirac came out top, it was by only a
small margin (just over three percentage points), and Jospin was knocked into third place by the right-wing National
Front candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen. Shocked by the result, most voters determined to block Le Pen at the second
round, turnout grew to nearly 80 per cent, and Chirac won more than 82 per cent of the vote, the biggest winning
margin for a president in the history of democratic France.
260 chapter 15

Table 15.3 The French presidential election, 2002

Candidate Party First round (%) Second round (%)

Jacques Chirac Rally for the Republic 19.88 82.21
Jean-Marie Le Pen National Front 16.86 17.79
Lionel Jospin Socialist 16.18 –
François Bayrou Union for French Democracy 6.84 –
Arlette Laguiller Workers’ Struggle 5.72 –
11 other candidates 34.52 –
Votes cast 28.5 million 31.0 million
Percentage turnout 71.6 79.7

As an interesting side-note, three countries – Indonesia, Kenya, and Nigeria – go beyond a

Distribution
require-
simple runoff by requiring winning candidates to meet additional distribution requirements
ments proving the breadth as well as the depth of their support. In the case of Nigeria, which has sub-
Rules specifying stantial ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, a victorious president must demonstrate regional
how a winning as well as national support. In the first round, the winning target is a majority of all votes cast and
candidate’s votes at least 25 per cent of the vote in at least two-thirds of Nigeria’s 36 states. If no candidate crosses
must be
this barrier, a second round is held with the same requirements. If the barrier is still not crossed,
arranged across
different regions a third round is held between the two top finishers, a simple majority sufficing.
or social groups. Indirect election is still used in several countries to elect the president. Examples include sev-
eral parliamentary systems where the president possesses few meaningful executive powers, such
as Germany and India. The United States is now highly unusual in using an Electoral College
to elect an executive president (see discussion in Bugh, 2016). The College was originally designed to filter the voice
of the people through an assembly of ‘wise men’; votes were cast for members of the College, rather than directly for
presidential candidates. Opinion is divided today on whether it should be kept or abolished. Complicating matters, all
but two states use a winner-take-all formula where the candidate with the biggest popular vote in the state wins all
the College votes from that state.
The folly of this system has been on clear display in recent presidential elections. In 2000, the winner of the popular
vote (Al Gore) lost the Electoral College vote to George W. Bush, against a background of deeply flawed vote recording
and rules on access to voting booths. In 2008, Barack Obama won 68 per cent of the votes in the Electoral College,
despite winning just 53 per cent of the popular vote. In 2016, Hillary Clinton won 2.8 million more votes than Donald
Trump (48.3 per cent of the popular vote to Trump’s 46.1 per cent), and yet she lost the Electoral College vote – and
the election – to Trump by a margin of 304 votes to 227. (See also Spotlight United States.)
Three other features of presidential elections, whether direct or indirect, are worth noting. First, presidential terms
are sometimes longer, but rarely shorter, than those for legislators. The longer the term, the easier it is for presidents
to adopt a broad perspective free from the immediate burden of re-election. With terms of just four years, first-term
presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and the United States are likely to find themselves building experience during their first
year and campaigning during their fourth year, leaving only the middle phase for real accomplishments.
Second, presidents are more likely than legislators to be subject to term limits; it is usual to restrict an incum-
bent to just one or two terms in office, or to require a cap of no more than two consecutive terms (see Table 15.4).
The fear is that without such constraints presidents will be able to exploit their unique position to secure endless
re-election. But term limits can have unintended consequences: a president who cannot be re-elected is no longer
directly accountable to the voters, a reality which constitutes a limitation on democracy. Also, such presidents often
lose political clout as their term nears its end. At the same time, term limits prevent popular and effective presidents
from continuing to bring their experience to bear. One of the more stringent sets of limits is found in Mexico,
where neither presidents nor state governors can serve more than one term, and legislators are barred from serving
consecutive terms.
 elections 261

Table 15.4 Comparing presidential elections

Country Method Term (years) Limits

Argentina Two round 4 Maximum two consecutive terms

Nigeria Up to three rounds 4 Two terms

Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Iran Two round 4 Two terms

Chile Two round 4 No consecutive terms allowed

United States Electoral college 4 Two terms

South Africa Elected by legislature 5 Two terms

China Elected by legislature 5 Unlimited

France, Turkey Two round 5 Two terms

Russia Two round 5 Maximum two consecutive terms

Peru Two round 5 No consecutive terms allowed

Mexico, Philippines Plurality 6 One term

Finland Plurality 6 No consecutive terms allowed

Venezuela Plurality 6 Unlimited

Third, the timing of presidential elections matters. When they occur at the same time as elections to the legislature,
the successful candidate is more likely to be drawn from the largest party in the legislature. Without threatening the
separation of powers, concurrent elections limit fragmentation, increasing the likelihood that the president and the
legislature will be of similar mind. Such thinking lay behind the decision in 2000 to reduce the French president’s term
from seven years to five years, the same tenure as that of the National Assembly.

referendums, initiatives, and recalls

Elections may be instruments of representative democracy, but the role of the people is only to decide who will
decide. By contrast, devices such as the referendum, the initiative, and the recall make voters into decision-makers;
they cast votes on focused issues that usually result directly in forming policy. But while they are good examples of
direct democracy, are they necessarily good for democracy?

Referendums
The referendum is the most important form of direct democracy. Referendums may be Referendum
mandatory (meaning that they must be called on specified topics, such as constitutional A vote of the
amendments), optional, or even constitutionally forbidden on a few reserved subjects such as electorate on a
taxation and public spending. Their outcome may be binding, as with constitutional limited issue of
public policy
amendments requiring popular approval, or merely advisory, as with Britain’s vote in 2016 on
such as a
continued membership of the European Union (which came down opposed). constitutional
Referendums are growing in frequency (see Figure 15.3). Switzerland heads the list, holding amendment.
nearly 500 referendums between 1940 and 2017 on a range of issues including nuclear power,
same-sex partnerships, and immigration. Australia, too, makes use of state and national referendums, but only in relation
to changes to the constitution: more than 40 have been held since the creation of the federation of Australia in 1901,
although less than a quarter have resulted in a Yes vote. One of the more notable was the 1999 referendum on whether
or not Australia should cut its last links with the British crown and become a republic; nearly 55 per cent of voters said
No, but the issue has not gone away. Few other countries have made more than occasional use of the device, although
they have become more common in the European Union, where they have been used for decisions on joining the EU
or the euro, and for adopting new EU treaties.
 SPOTLIGHT UNITED STATES
Brief profile
As the world’s pre-eminent economic and military power, the United States has both driven and been deeply
affected by the global changes of the last few decades. During the Cold War, it led the Western alliance against
the Soviet Union and its clients, and was seen as the political, economic, and military leader of the ‘free world’.
Today it must use its continuing strengths to confront a more complex set of international challenges: it is caught
up in the struggle against global terrorism and faces economic competition on an unprecedented level. Domestically,
it suffers the effects of social divisions, a record national debt, persistent racial tensions, decaying infrastructure,
an expanding gap between rich and poor, and concerns over immigration. Problems in the functioning of
government recently earned the United States a downgrading on the Democracy Index from a full to a flawed
democracy.

Form of government Federal presidential republic consisting of 50 states and the District of Columbia.
State formed 1776, and most recent constitution adopted 1787.
Executive Presidential. A president elected for a maximum of two four-year terms,
supported by a vice-president, an Executive Office of the President, a White
House Office, and a federal cabinet.
Legislature Bicameral Congress: lower House of Representatives (435 members) elected
for renewable two-year terms, and upper Senate (100 members) containing two
senators from each state, elected for renewable six-year terms.
Judiciary A dual system of federal and state courts headed by the federal Supreme Court
with nine members appointed by the president (and confirmed by the Senate)
for lifetime terms.
Electoral system One of the few large countries still employing the single-member plurality
method. Formally, the president is elected indirectly through an electoral
college.
Parties Multi-party, but dominated by the moderately conservative Republican Party
and the moderately liberal Democratic Party.

323m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$19.4tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$59,531 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating

A national political party convention in the United States. The time culture that emphasizes equality and accountability.
and money spent on US elections contrasts with the growing
cynicism that many Americans show towards party politics.
Source: Getty Images/Jessica Kourkounis/Stringer.
While the large amounts spent on campaigning are no guarantee of electoral success, it is all but impossible
to make a mark on the electorate without having access to large advertising budgets. The numbers have
snowballed in recent elections, from $3 billion in the 2000 election season (all offices), to more than $5 billion
in 2008, nearly $6.2 billion in 2012, and nearly
$6.5 billion in 2016 (Center for Responsive
Politics, 2017). In the name of free speech, a
2010 Supreme Court ruling overturned some
previous limits on campaign financing and
allowed all but unlimited spending, often by
groups protected by anonymity.
The undemocratic results produced by the
Electoral College are troubling, but even more
consistently troubling is the quintessentially
American problem of gerrymandering. With
the majority political parties in most states
allowed to design Congressional electoral
districts, many have chosen to manipulate the
lines in their favour, producing often strangely
shaped districts based on the distribution of
party supporters or voters from ethnic minorities.
The result is skewed and manipulated election
results, in which – it is often said – legislators
choose voters rather than vice versa. Legal HAWAII
challenges are being mounted to gerrymandering,
a test case occurring in the state of Pennsylvania
in 2018 when it was ordered to redraw its
districts so as to make them less partisan.
Gerrymandering
A phenomenon (associated mainly with the United
States) involving the deliberate redrawing of
electoral districts to favour one political party over
another.
Elections in the United States
Elections in the United States are unusual (or even
unique) in at least three ways: in the sheer number
of elected offices, in the astonishing amounts of
money that are spent on campaigns, and in the
extent to which their democratic qualities are
undermined by the use of an Electoral College for
the presidential election, and by the manipulation
of electoral districts for Congressional elections.
The large number of elected posts – ranging
from the president down through state govern-
ments to local judges and sheriffs – reflects not
only the practical requirements of governing a
large and one-time frontier society, but also a
In addition, the distinctly American institution of
primary elections opens up the selection of a
party’s candidates to the general population.
CANADA
Seattle
Chicago
New York
USA WASHINGTON
D.C
Los Angeles
MEXICO
ALASKA
CANADA
Los Angeles
Seattle
Further reading
Barbour, Christine, and Gerald Wright (2017) Keeping the
Republic: Power and Citizenship in American Politics: The
Essentials, 8th edn (Sage).
Duncan, Russell, and Joe Goddard (2018) Contemporary United
States, 5th edn (Red Globe Press).
Wasserman, Harry (2015) The Basics of American Politics, 15th edn
(Pearson).
264 chapter 15

400

Number of referendums 80

60

40

20

0
d

ly

nd

lia

ce

en

ain
k
ar
lan

lan
Ita

ra

an

ed
ala

Sp
m
er

Ire

st

Fr

Sw
Ze

en
Au
itz

D
ew
Sw

Figure 15.3 The use of referendums

Source: Adapted from Morel (2007): Table 1, containing data for the period 1940–2007. Updated to 2017 using information in public domain.

Referendums have several advantages. First, they provide a channel by which governments can hear directly
from voters rather than via elected officials, parties, or interest groups. Second, there is evidence that they help
improve voter understanding of the issue at stake, and increase their confidence in their own political abilities and
their faith in government responsiveness (Setälä and Schiller, 2009). Third, they can inform politicians. For example,
the rejection of the proposed European Union constitutional treaty by French and Dutch voters in 2005 taught
the European elite that national electorates had grown weary of grand European projects. Finally, they can provide
a safety valve, allowing governments, particularly coalitions, to put an issue to the people when it is incapable of
reaching a decision itself.
At the same time, they pose several problems:

◆◆ Referendums can be expensive to organize and to hold.

◆◆ The issues at stake may be too complex for a straight Yes/No choice.
◆◆ They can polarize the electorate by creating controversy and division.
◆◆ In order to be fully effective, voters must do their research.
◆◆ The timing of the vote can be critical.
◆◆ Too many referendums can tire the voters, depressing turnout.
◆◆ There is no mechanism for ensuring consistency in referendum decisions; neither is it always clear for how long
the results should be considered decisive.
◆◆ Voter judgements are often informed by wider considerations than the specific proposition on the ballot.

Many referendums have the additional complication of being ad hoc in character, with the government
picking and choosing topics on which it feels a ballot would be to its political benefit. More crudely,
rulers can simply ignore the result of a referendum. In 1955, for example, Swedes voted decisively in a
referendum to continue driving on the left; eight years later, the legislature passed a law introducing driving
on the right.
In addition to all these difficulties, referendums can easily be compromised by confusion about the precise wording
of the question to be put to the voters.We saw in Chapter 13 the problems arising from the wording of the 2016 Brexit
referendum in Britain. Two years earlier, in the case of the referendum about Scottish independence held in 2014, the
Scottish National Party initially proposed the question, ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent coun-
try?’ The Electoral Commission intervened, arguing successfully that ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’
was more neutral. Later, though, there were concerns that the wording made the pro-independence campaign into a
positive Yes campaign, and the anti-independence campaign into a negative No campaign. Such intricacies of wording
and tone do not arise with conventional elections.
 elections 265

A shopper in Switzerland walks past posters displaying slogans in support of, and in opposition to, a 2014 referendum on whether
or not her country should reimpose immigration quotes. The vote came down in favour of the proposal by a slim margin.
Source: Getty Images/Fabrice Coffrini.

Initiatives
As its name suggests, an initiative allows citizens to take the lead in calling for a referendum on – or requiring the
legislature to discuss – a particular topic. There are two kinds of initiative, the fi rst being a referendum initiative,
which allows a given number of citizens to initiate a popular vote on a given proposal. Nearly 40 countries, most
of them in Europe and Latin America, allow this option. In Switzerland, for example, 100,000 electors can propose
a new law at canton level, or an amendment to the constitution at federal level. The
government offers advice, usually to reject, before the ballot. Elsewhere, referendum Initiative
initiatives can be used more broadly, for ballots on proposed or existing policies. Referendum A procedure
initiatives are commonly included in post-authoritarian constitutions in an attempt to prevent which allows
citizens to
a return to dictatorship, and they have also been adopted by many western states in the initiate a
United States, notably California. popular vote on
The second type is an agenda initiative, which functions as a petition to the legislature, requiring a given proposal
it to discuss a particular topic if the required number of voter signatures is reached. One advantage (a referendum
of this technique is that it allows minorities to place their concerns on the table.This mechanism initiative) or to
place it on the
was introduced to the constitutions of several European countries (e.g. Austria and Spain) after legislature’s
World War I and has since been extended to other states (e.g. Poland and Thailand) (International agenda (an
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018a). Agenda initiatives are particularly well agenda
established in Austria (Giese, 2012). In 2006, for example, over 250,000 signatories requested a initiative).
national referendum in the event that Turkey be proposed for European Union membership by
the EU, a demand accepted by Austria’s Prime Minister. In Britain, a petition obtaining at least Recall
A popular vote
100,000 signatures must now be considered by the House of Commons for debate, provided at on whether an
least one member speaks in support of a debate. elected official
should be
Recalls removed from
A recall is a ballot on whether an elected official should be removed from office during office during
normal tenure.
normal tenure. A vote is initiated by a petition signed by a minimum proportion (typically,
266 chapter 15

around 25 per cent) of the votes cast for that office at the previous election, making the recall a form of popular
initiative. Unlike impeachment, the recall is a political rather than legal device, a modern equivalent of the old
device of denunciation (Rosanvallon, 2008). Where an election is a vote of confidence, the recall is a vote of no
confidence. It seeks to improve governance by removing incompetent or corrupt incumbents before their normal
term is up.
One of the few countries to employ recalls at the national level is Venezuela. There, a recall vote can be held on any
elected official, including the president, on the initiative of 20 per cent of the relevant electorate. Fifteen US states also
make provision for recall elections for all state officials, with even more allowing the recall of local officials. The device
has rarely been used, although it did make international headlines in 2003 when film star and body-builder Arnold
Schwarzenegger became governor of California following the successful recall of incumbent Gray Davis.

elections in authoritarian states

There are few countries that have entirely done away with elections: Brunei has not had one since 1962 (it has a
legislative council with only advisory powers), and Somalia had none between 1980 and 2012, but only because of
a breakdown in the system of government. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Eritrea have national elections, but they do
have local elections. In the last few remaining communist systems, meanwhile, elections are held within the ruling
party system at the local level, with each level electing the next until the pinnacle of the system is reached.
All of which serves to emphasize that even though six out of every ten people in the world lives under authoritarian
rule, few of them go without elections. True, the outcome of these elections is usually predetermined, and the votes
are often rife with manipulation and corruption, occasionally producing turnout numbers and shares of support for
the ‘winner’ that beggar belief. Also true, elections in these countries do not operate on as free and fair a playing field
as in a liberal democracy. Nonetheless, they are still organized, which raises the obvious question: why? Do they really
serve any purpose, or are they simply window-dressing? Understandably, there has been less research on elections in
authoritarian regimes than in democracies, but to the extent that we can draw broader conclusions, the answer is that
while there often is a high degree of pretence involved in the process of holding elections, they also serve a number of
useful functions for rulers and elites – see Figure 15.4.

Role Features
Co-option of the Rulers can use elections to co-opt elites, party members, or large social
elite groups by spreading the spoils of office.

Co-option of the Allowing some opposition members to be elected, thereby sharing out
opposition some of the advantages of office and dividing the opposition.

The regime can cajole voters into turning out and ‘supporting’ it,
Maintaining ties deterring defections from the ruling elite, and producing electoral
results that suggest that opposition is futile.

Providing Elections help the regime identify its supporters and opponents, allowing
information them to reward the former and punish the latter.

Neutralizing
Allowing the poor to be elected can avert the threat of revolution.
opposition

Limited local-level democracy can encourage voter engagement and hold

Engaging citizens
local politicians to account.

Elections signal to domestic and international audiences that the regime

Legitimacy
can claim to be based on popular will, even if its assertion is groundless.

Figure 15.4 Seven roles of elections in authoritarian states

Source: Adapted from Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009).
 elections 267

In hybrid regimes such as Nigeria and Turkey, elections play an important part in confirming the authority of the
ruler; indeed, they are central to its democratic pretensions. The election outcome is more than just a routine accept-
ance by the people of the realities of power. Explicit vote-rigging is avoided, some candidates from non-governing
parties win election, and the possibility of a low turnout, and even defeat, cannot be entirely dismissed.
During campaigns, what is sometimes known (in Africa, at least) as ‘big man politics’ comes into play as the leading
figure dominates media coverage, using television to trumpet his sometimes real achievements in office. In contrast to
authoritarian regimes, the emphasis in hybrids is as much on the carrot (providing reasons for voting for the dominant
figure) as on the stick (threatening opposition supporters). Even if there has been progress with multi-party elections in
Africa, though, such elections can create their own problems when there is an outbreak of violence during campaigns
or following disputed results (Kovacs and Bjarnesen, 2018).
Incumbents in hybrid regimes can also exploit unique resources. They are well known to voters, draw on the state’s
coffers for their campaign, implement a favourable electoral system, lead extensive patronage networks, give hand-outs
to their election districts, and call in political credits carefully acquired while in office. Anticipating the president’s
re-election, underlings currying favour will seek to help the campaign. Credible opponents will be deterred from
embarking on a hopeless fight: why annoy the candidate who is sure to win?
Moving on to authoritarian regimes, the dynamics of elections are quite different. In communist states, there is
little pretence at offering choice, and there is no possibility that a ruling party could be defeated, or even seriously
opposed, through elections. Vietnam, for example, regularly holds elections to its National Assembly, and the Com-
munist Party just as routinely wins 95 per cent or more of the seats. In China, meanwhile, there are national elections.
Voters instead elect delegates to county and township congresses, who elect delegates to provincial congresses, who
elect delegates to the National People’s Congress. The latter meets for only two to three weeks annually to confirm
decisions already taken by the party. Multiple candidates are allowed to run in elections, and secret ballots are allowed.
However, no explicit opposition to the policy platform of the Chinese Communist Party is allowed. In many villages,
real authority still resides not with elected committees but rather with the local party official, who in any case may
also serve as chair of the village committee. In fact, a revision to the election law in 1997 explicitly affirmed the
party’s supervisory role.
Neither in the countryside nor in the towns are there many signs of elections threatening the party’s control. The
remarkable free election in 2012 in the southern Chinese village of Wukan, agreed by the communist party after ex-
tensive local protests against corrupt land sales, was an exception. In general, tight limits on what elections can achieve
may increase popular frustration. In that respect, manipulated elections are worse than no elections at all.
In the case of elections in non-communist authoritarian regimes, competition is usually constrained rather than
eliminated. Some opposition victories may be allowed, but too few to affect the overall result. Independent candidates
find themselves operating in a threatening environment. The secret police follow them around, breaking up some of
their meetings. Using arbitrary registration rules, independent politicians may be banned from standing. Control over
the media, the electoral system, and the government is exploited to favour the ruling party. Through its conduct of
campaigns, the regime projects both the illusion of choice (not least for outsiders) and the reality of power (for the
domestic population). It usually secures its victory without needing to falsify the count – though this option remains,
if all else fails.
Until the Arab Spring uprisings, Egypt provided an example of such manipulated elections. From 1976, numer-
ous parties competed for seats in the People’s Assembly, offering the appearance of a vigorous multi-party system.
But President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party held its dominant position throughout. According to
official figures, turnout at legislative elections was 80 per cent or more, but the figures were almost certainly inflated
by the government. Mubarak himself claimed to have won each of his five elections with 88–98 per cent or more
of the vote.
In 1990, with most of the opposition parties boycotting the election in protest at government controls over
the process, only 15 per cent of eligible voters turned out, and only one opposition party won enough votes to be
represented in the People’s Assembly. At the 1995 elections, turnout was back up to 48 per cent, but only 13 oppo-
sition deputies were elected. In more than half the districts, opposition candidates challenged the results in court.
Few Egyptians were fooled by the outcome, and a popular joke circulated about a man who dared to vote against
the government in a parliamentary election. On his way home, he started imagining all the ways in which he and
his family could suffer if his vote was discovered, so he hurried back to the polling station. There, he apologized to
the police officer in charge, saying he thought he had made a mistake on his ballot paper. ‘Yes, you did,’ replied the
officer, ‘but not to worry. Fortunately we spotted your mistake and have already corrected it. Please be more careful
next time’ (Whitaker, 2005).
268 chapter 15

These ‘contests’ contributed to public cynicism and, eventually, to the overthrow of the regime in 2011. Egypt today
has many more active political parties than ever before, and no fewer than 19 won seats after the 2015 elections. None
came anywhere close to winning a majority, though, and they were outnumbered by a factor of 3:2 by independents.
Meanwhile, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi – the former military leader who has repackaged himself as a civilian – romped home
with an alleged 97 per cent share of the vote in the 2014 presidential election, and again in the 2018 election. Clearly,
not much has changed in Egypt.
A similar case of manipulation hiding behind free choice is offered by Iran. It has an incomplete system of political
representation in the sense that while it holds regular elections for its president and legislature, the Supreme Leader
of the country is exempt (he is appointed for life), political parties are non-existent, and elections are manipulated by
Iran’s religious elite to reduce the prospects of regime opponents. The Supreme Leader uses his powers to undermine
any candidates who might threaten the conservative Islamic agenda that has dominated Iranian politics since 1979,
and the Guardian Council (a group of 12 clerics and jurists) checks the credentials of all candidates to ensure that they
support the ideals of the revolution. All candidates are required to proclaim their loyalty both to the rule of the Leader
and to the proposition that religious clerics hold ultimate political power. In this way, a large number of potentially
troublesome candidates are excluded. The Guardian Council has also interpreted the constitutional requirement that
candidates should be ‘religious or political personalities’ to ban women from standing for president.
In Russia,Vladimir Putin has proved to be a skilled exponent of election ‘management’ in an authoritarian regime,
even if he has failed to meet the standard of fraud set by the Communist Party during the Soviet era: in order to ‘prove’
its legitimacy (to itself and to the international community), it allowed people to vote on behalf of their entire family,
and rigged the results in other ways so as to produce turnout numbers as high as 99.99 per cent. Putin has since had to
deal with a multi-party system and declining voter turnout (only 67 per cent of voters turned out at the 2018 presi-
dential election), but he still manages to prevail, using a variety of means (White, 2014):
Ballot
◆◆ Political parties must be formally registered, which means – in effect – that they must be stuffing
approved by the administration. A form of
electoral fraud
◆◆ The registration process is expensive and time-consuming.
in which a
◆◆ Access to the media (particularly television) is controlled in favour of the ruling party and person limited
other approved parties. by law to a single
◆◆ The organization of public demonstrations is strictly controlled. vote is able to
◆◆ On Election Day, workers in state-funded institutions (such as factories, hospitals, and cast multiple
votes in a single
military bases) are ordered to vote, preferably for the ruling party.
booth or to vote
◆◆ Instances of ballot stuffi ng and the deliberate spoiling of ballots by vote counters are in multiple
typically rife. locations.

Electoral manipulation is not unique to authoritarian systems, it must be said, and is found also in democracies,
where it is occasionally – as in the case of gerrymandering in the United States – quite legal. The difference
between democratic and authoritarian systems is nonetheless fundamental; fraud is typically more subtle and less
easy to measure in the former than in the latter.
 elections 269

discussion questions
◆◆ Is there such a thing as a perfect electoral system?
◆◆ What is the best electoral system for choosing (a) a legislature, and (b) a president, and why?
◆◆ Which, if any, of these groups should be entitled to vote in national elections: (a) non-
citizen legal residents, (b) prisoners, (c) 16–17-year-olds?
◆◆ What would it take for a newly elected leader, party, or government to convincingly claim
a mandate for change?
◆◆ Referendums: good idea or bad?
◆◆ Why do authoritarian regimes hold elections?

key concepts
◆◆ Ballot stuffing ◆◆ Mandate
◆◆ Distribution requirements ◆◆ Proportional representation
◆◆ Electoral formula ◆◆ Recall
◆◆ Electoral system ◆◆ Referendum
◆◆ First-order elections ◆◆ Second-order elections
◆◆ Gerrymandering ◆◆ Single-member plurality
◆◆ Initiative

further reading
Farrell, David M. (2011) Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction, 2nd edn (Red Globe Press).
Provides a helpful and accessible guide to electoral systems.
Geissel, Brigitte, and Kenneth Newton (eds) (2012) Evaluating Democratic Innovations: Curing
the Democratic Malaise? (Routledge). This comparative volume analyses and evaluates
devices of direct and deliberative democracy.
Herron, Erik S., Robert J. Pekkanen, and Matthew S. Shugart (2018) The Oxford Handbook of
Electoral Systems (Oxford University Press). An edited collection on the structure and
effects of different electoral systems, including individual chapters on elections in 18
different countries.
LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris (eds) (2014) Comparing Democracies 4:
Elections and Voting in a Changing World (Sage). A comparative review of elections and
voting that includes chapters on electoral systems, parties, campaigns, the media,
participation, the economy, and women in elections.
Michalik, Susanne (2015) Multiparty Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Explaining their Introduction
and Effects (Springer). A study which argues that elections in authoritarian systems are
much more than window-dressing, helping them to resolve internal struggles and to
remain in power.
Qvortrup, Matt (2014) Referendums Around the World: The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy
(Palgrave Macmillan). An edited collection of studies of referendums and their political
effects in different parts of the world.
 16

Source: Getty Images/Dmitry Astakhov

political parties
contents
◆ Political parties: an
overview
◆ Origins and roles
◆ Party systems
PREVIEW ◆ Party organization
For most residents of democracies, political parties are the channel ◆ Political parties in
through which they most often relate to government and politics. authoritarian states
Parties offer them competing sets of policies, encourage them to take
part in the political process, and are the key determinant of who
governs, and who does not. It is all the more ironic, then, that while
parties are so central to the political process, they are not always well regarded by citizens. They are often seen less
as a means for engaging citizens than as self-serving channels for the promotion of the interests of politicians; as a
result, support for parties is declining as people seek other channels for political expression. In authoritarian regimes
the story is even unhappier: parties have routinely been the means through which elites manipulate public opinion,
and have been both the shields and the instruments of power.
This chapter begins with a survey of the origins and changing roles of parties, before looking at the variety of party
systems around the world, ranging from states where parties are not allowed through single-party, dominant party, and
two-party systems to the multi-party systems found in most democracies. It reviews the different dynamics of parties in
these different systems, then looks at the manner in which parties are organized, and at how leaders and candidates are
recruited. After discussing the ways in which parties are financed, and reviewing the pros and cons of public funding,
it concludes with an examination of the roles parties play in authoritarian systems.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Political parties were once key agents of society and forces for political mobilization, but disillusion with
their impact and political role has grown.
◆◆ Political parties have six core roles, including guiding and mobilizing voters, aggregating political
interests, and providing a foundation for governments.
◆◆ Party systems come in several different forms, the major theme being the decline of dominant party and
two-party systems, and the rise of multi-party systems.
◆◆ The selection process for party leaders and candidates has been changing, but the effects on candidate
quality are unclear.
◆◆ The growth in public funding of parties has changed their political role and their character.
◆◆ Parties in authoritarian regimes are a means for resolving confl ict, balancing threats, managing elections,
extending influence, and educating voters.
 political parties 271

political parties: an overview

It would be hard to imagine political systems functioning without political parties, and yet Political party
their history is shorter than most people might imagine. The nineteenth-century Russian- A group identified
born political thinker Moisei Ostrogorski was one of the fi rst to recognize their growing by name and
importance in politics. His study of parties in Britain and the United States was less interested, ideology that
fields candidates at
as he said, in political forms than in political forces; ‘wherever this life of parties is developed,’ elections in order
he argued, ‘it focuses the political feelings and the active wills of its citizens’ (1902). His to win public
conclusions were fully justified: in Western Europe, mass parties were founded to battle for office and control
the votes of enlarged electorates; in communist and fascist states, ruling parties monopolized government.
power in an attempt to reconstruct society; in the developing world, nationalist parties became
the vehicle for driving colonial rulers back to their imperial homeland.
Parties were a key mobilizing device of the twentieth century, drawing millions of people into the national polit-
ical process for the first time. They jettisoned their original image as private factions engaged in capturing, and even
perverting, the public interest. Instead, they became accepted as the central representative device of liberal democracy.
Reflecting this new status, they began to be mentioned explicitly in new constitutions, some countries even banning
non-party candidates from standing for the legislature, or preventing members from switching parties once elected.
Such restrictions were deemed necessary for ensuring party-based elections. By the century’s end, parties had become
part of most political systems, providing functions ranging from being the very foundations of government, to aggre-
gating interests, mobilizing voters, and recruiting candidates for office. Most liberal democracies even offered some
public funding to support party work.
Therein rests the problem. No longer do parties seem to be energetic agents of society, seeking to bend the state
towards their supporters’ interests. Instead, they appear to be at risk of capture by the state itself. They also often seem
to be less concerned with offering voters alternatives than with promoting their own interests, and competing for
power for its own sake. As a result, parties have lost much of their attraction to the politically engaged, who seem to be
increasingly disillusioned with achieving democracy through competing political parties.
In authoritarian states, meanwhile, parties are either non-existent (in a few cases) or else are operated as a tool of
the ruling elite. The notion of competitive parties does not fit with the idea of non-democratic control, and parties
are not so much the representatives of groups or interests as tools by which authoritarian leaders can build, keep, and
express their power. Excepting the enormous power of ruling communist parties, they tend to be weak, lacking auton-
omy from the national leader, and reinforcing elite control of society. In countries that are poor and ethnically divided,
parties typically lack the ideological contrasts that provided a base of party systems in most liberal democracies, and are
instead come to be identified with the interests of one social group over another.

origins and roles

Political parties are neither as old nor as central to government as we might think. They might seem to be the
lifeblood of democratic politics, and yet governments and states have long been wary of their potentially harmful
impact on national unity, which is one reason why parties – unlike the formal institutions of government – went
unmentioned in early constitutions.
In looking at the origins of parties, we can distinguish between two types:

◆◆ Cadre (or elite) parties were formed by members within a legislature joining together around common concerns
and fighting campaigns in an enlarged electorate. The earliest nineteenth-century parties
were of this type; they include the conservative parties of Britain, Canada, and Scandinavia, Political
and the fi rst American parties (the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans). Cadre cleavage
parties are sometimes known as ‘caucus’ parties, the caucus denoting a closed meeting of The practice by
the members of a party in a legislature. Such parties remain heavily committed to their which voters are
divided into
leader’s authority, with ordinary members playing a supporting role. like-minded voting
◆◆ Mass parties – which emerged later – originated outside legislatures, formed around groups based on
political cleavages and designed, for example, to help social groups achieve representation national ethnic,
as a way of achieving their policy objectives. The working-class socialist parties that spread religious, linguistic,
across Western Europe around the turn of the twentieth century epitomized this type. or social
differences.
Mass parties acquired an enormous membership organized in local branches, and – unlike
272 chapter 16

cadre parties – tried to keep their representatives on a tight rein. They played an important role in education
and political socialization, funding education, organizing workshops, and running party newspapers, all
designed to tie their members closer to their party.

As cadre and mass parties matured, so they tended to evolve into catch-all parties
Catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966). These respond to a mobilized political system in which electoral
party communication takes place through mass media, bypassing the membership. Such parties seek
A political party
that works to
to govern in the national interest, rather than as representatives of a social group, the reality
attract voters with being that ‘a party large enough to get a majority has to be so catch-all that it cannot have a
a wide variety of unique ideological program’ (Kirchheimer, quoted in Krouwel, 2003). Catch-all parties
political views and (otherwise known as big-tent parties) seek electoral support wherever they can fi nd it, their
ideologies. purpose being to govern rather than to represent.
The classic case of the transition to catch-all status can be found in the broadening of Chris-
tian Democratic parties in Europe from religious defence organizations to broader parties of the centre-right. The
subsequent transformation of several mass socialist parties into leader-dominated social democratic parties, as in Spain
and Britain, is another example. While most major parties are now of the catch-all type, their origins inside or beyond
legislatures continue to influence party style, the autonomy of their leaders, and the standing of ordinary members.
Modern democratic parties fulfil several functions that are critical to the formation of governments and the en-
gagement of voters (see Figure 16.1). Prime among these (in parliamentary systems) is the formation of governments.
They also (at least ideally) offer voters guidance by helping them make choices among different sets of policies, help
voters make themselves heard by pulling together like-minded segments of the electorate and filtering their demands,
encourage voters to participate in politics, and feed government by recruiting candidates for public office. In authori-
tarian regimes, meanwhile, they carry out some – but not all – of these functions, and are mainly
Party system designed to control voters rather than to offer genuine choices.
The overall
configuration of
political parties, party systems
based on their
number, variety, The best way of comparing and understanding political parties is to think of them as examples
relative of contrasting party systems. By focusing on the number, variety, and roles of parties, the
importance, structure of a party system helps us understand how they interact with one another, and the
interactions, and impact of their interactions on the countries they govern. Party systems fall into one of five
the laws that types: no-party, single-party, dominant party, two-party, and multi-party (summarized in
regulate them.
Figure 16.2). Since the collapse of communism, single-party systems have become unusual,

Role Features

Government Providing a foundation for the exercise of power by governments,

offering them direction.

Giving voters coherent and contrasting sets of policies from which

Guidance
to choose, giving effect to the idea of liberal democracy.

Aggregating interests, filtering many specific demands into

Aggregation
manageable and prioritized packages of proposals.

Encouraging citizens to take part in politics by campaigning, raising

Mobilization
funds, or voting.

Recruitment Recruiting and preparing candidates for public office.

In authoritarian regimes, parties are designed less to offer

Control
alternatives than to limit those alternatives. See Figure 16.4.

Figure 16.1 Six roles of political parties

 political parties 273

while dominant and two-party systems are in decline in democracies, where multi-party systems have become
more common. In authoritarian states, meanwhile, no-party and dominant party systems tend to be the most
common.

No-party systems
There are a small number of authoritarian states – mainly in the Middle East – that either do not allow political
parties to form and operate, or where no parties have been formed. In the cases of Oman and Saudi Arabia, there
is no legislature and the formation of parties is banned, although there are several movements in place that would
evolve into parties if allowed, and Saudi Islamists made a largely symbolic request to the king in 2011 that they be
allowed to form a party. In Iran, meanwhile, candidates for office and elected officials are distinguished from each
other mainly by their different views about the role of Islam in public life: conservatives follow a stricter line on the
links between religion and politics, pragmatists take a more moderate line, and reformers place a greater stress on
political institutions and public opinion. If parties were to be legalized, these three strands would form a natural
base for the creation of political parties.

Single-party systems
These were once common, being found throughout the communist world as well as in most African and Arab
countries. Today they are found only in the world’s few remaining communist systems. The argument made by
most communist parties is that communism is the answer to all needs, alternative ideologies are moot, and
democracy exists within communist parties in a phenomenon dubbed ‘democratic centralism’ by Lenin. The idea
is that in a hierarchical system, each level is elected by the one below, to which it must in turn account (the democratic
part), but decisions reached by higher levels are to be accepted and implemented by lower levels (the centralism part).
In truth, the party is anything but democratic, and is instead highly elitist. In addition, membership is restricted,
and offers a gateway to political influence and economic privileges, with non-party members being marginalized
and, as a result, often resentful.

Features Examples
No-party No political parties are Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
allowed to compete with
the ruler’s authority.

Single-party Only one party matters. Any China, Cuba, North Korea,
minor ‘parties’ are strictly Laos, Vietnam
subordinate.

Dominant One party is almost always Algeria, Angola, Japan, Hungary,

party in government, whether Russia, Singapore, South Africa,
alone or in coalition. Syria, Tanzania, Turkey

Two-party Two major parties Australia, United States

compete to form
single-party governments

Multi-party The assembly is composed of Most of Europe

several minority parties,
leading to government by
coalition or a minority party.

Figure 16.2 Comparing party systems

274 chapter 16

In China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the source of all meaningful political power, controls all other
political organizations, plays a key role in deciding the outcome of elections, and dominates both state and government.
True, China allows eight ‘democratic parties and groups’ with alternative policy platforms to function, and they held
about 28 per cent of the seats in the Thirteenth National People’s Congress in 2018–23. The Front, however, is or-
ganized by the CCP, and its members and leaders are mainly selected by the CCP. Policy changes come not through a
change of party at an election or a substantial public debate, but rather through changes in the balance of power within
the leadership of the party (see Lam, 2018).
From a base of four million primary party organizations – found in villages, factories, military units, and other local
communities – the party works its way up through an elaborate hierarchy to the National Party Congress, which meets
infrequently and delegates authority to a 200-member Central Committee, to a 25-member Politburo, and finally to
the six to ten people who make up the Standing Committee of the Politburo, from which they exert enormous influ-
ence over the most populous country on earth – in itself, an astonishing political achievement.

Dominant party systems

In a dominant party system, one party outdistances all the others and becomes the natural party of government,
even if it sometimes governs in coalition with junior partners. The very strength of dominant parties means that
factions tend to develop internally, leading to introspection, careerism, and corruption. This is not to suggest that
a dominant party system is inherently undemocratic, though, and there are several examples of parties that once
dominated but which have had to learn to share power; these include the Indian National Congress, Sweden’s
Social Democrats (which since 1932 has been in government for all but 16 years), Italy’s Christian Democrats, and
the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico; see Spotlight Mexico.
The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has governed the country since 1955, except for breaks in 1993–96
and 2009–12. Although supposedly a united political party, it is made up of several factions, each with its own leader,
and these factions provide a form of intra-party competition. During times of LDP rule, the prime minister is not
necessarily the leader of the LDP, nor even the leader of the biggest faction, nor even the leader of any faction, but
rather the person who wins enough support among the competing factions to form a government. The LDP has kept
a grip on power for many reasons, including its association with Japan’s post-war economic renaissance, an impressive
network of grass-roots supporter groups, and the inability of opposition parties to mount an effective challenge (see
Hrebenar and Nakamura, 2016).
Another example of a dominant party is offered by the People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, a flawed democ-
racy. PAP has won every election in the city-state since independence in 1959, in several years achieving a clean sweep
of seats in parliament even with only a 70 per cent share of the vote. Lee Kuan Yew, the island’s Prime Minister until
1990, acknowledged that his party post, rather than his executive office, was the real source of his authority. As if the
dominance of PAP was not enough, Singapore also has a family dynasty in power: Lee’s eldest son Lee Hsien Loong
has been prime minister (and leader of the party) since 2003. Singapore is one of the world’s wealthiest countries, the
dominance of PAP flying in the face of the general rule that wealth and democracy go hand in hand. Reyes (2015)
ascribes PAP’s success to the national elections agency being part of the prime minister’s office, an electoral system that
leaves opposition parties with few resources, and state control of the media.
A younger example of a dominant party is South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC). This party has multi-
ple advantages, stemming not only from cultural memories of its opposition to apartheid and from its strong position
among the black majority, but also from its use of office to reward its own supporters. There were five sets of elections
in South Africa between the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 and 2014, and the ANC never won less than 62 of
the vote, a remarkable achievement. However, factions and corruption are growing problems, and they now threaten
the ANC’s supremacy.

Two-party systems
In a two-party system, two major parties of comparable size compete for electoral support, providing the framework
for political competition while other parties exert little, if any, influence on the formation and policies of
governments. The two major parties alternate in power, with one or the other always enjoying a majority. Having
said that, though, the two-party format – like dominant parties – is a dying breed.
The United States is one of the last hold-outs, governed as it has been since 1860 by the Democrats and the Repub-
licans. These two parties have been able to hold their positions in part because of the arithmetic of plurality electoral
systems (see Chapter 15), and in part because – in most US states – the parties decide the borders of electoral districts
 political parties 275

and can design them to maximize their chances of winning seats. In particular, winning a US presidential election is
a political mountain which can only be climbed by major parties capable of building a broad national coalition and
of raising the astronomical funding needed to launch a bid. In the temple of free market economics, the two leading
parties form a powerful duopoly.
Australia is another example of a two-party system, again reinforced by a non-proportional electoral system. Liberals
and Labor have consistently been the two biggest parties since World War II, winning 80–90 per cent of the seats in
parliament between them. They have only been stopped from forming a US-style duopoly by the much smaller Na-
tional Party, whose base lies in the rural areas, and which usually picks up about 5–7 per cent of the vote. Government
in Australia has alternated between Labor governing alone and the Liberals governing in coalition with the Nationals.
Elsewhere, Britain was long presented as an emblem of the two-party pattern, but it has recently struggled to pass
the test. The Conservative and Labour parties once regularly alternated in office, with plurality elections meaning that
their share of seats exceeded their share of votes, but third parties have gained ground. In 2010, the centre Liberal
Democrats won 57 seats in a parliament of 650 members, forming a coalition with the Conservatives after no party
won an overall majority. However, the Conservatives were able to win with a small majority in 2015 when the Liberal
Democrats imploded and Labour failed to offer a credible challenge. Both parties have also faced a challenge from the
regional Scottish National Party.

Multi-party systems
By far the most common party system found in democracies, a multi-party system is one in which several parties
each win enough seats in the legislature to become serious contenders for a place in a governing coalition. The
underlying dynamic is that political parties represent specific social groups (or opinion constituencies such as
environmentalists) in divided societies. The legislature then serves as an arena of conciliation, with coalitions
forming and falling in response to often minor changes in the political balance. Europe exemplifies the
phenomenon, most countries in the region having parties drawn from some, but not all, of nine major party
families (see Table 16.1).
A good example is offered by Denmark, where no party has held a majority in the unicameral Folketing since
1909. The country’s complex party system has been managed through careful consensus-seeking but this practice has
come under some pressure from the rise of new parties. In an explosive election in 1973, three new parties achieved
representation and, since then, a minimum of seven parties have won seats in the legislature. The centre-right ‘Blue’
coalition that followed the 2015 election comprised five of these, controlling 90 seats, or just five more than the
opposition five-party ‘Red’ coalition.

Table 16.1 Europe’s major party families

Position Examples
Far left Communists (France, Portugal), Left Party (Sweden), Podemos (Spain), Syriza (Greece).
Green Alliance ’90/the Greens (Germany), Green League (Finland), Greens (Sweden).
Social Democrat Social Democrats (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), Democratic Party (Italy), Labour (UK and
Ireland), Socialists (France), Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party.
Christian Democrat Christian Democratic Union (Germany), Fine Gael (Ireland), People’s Party (Spain), Polish
People’s Party.
Conservative Conservative Party (UK, Norway).
Centre Centre Party (Finland, Norway, Sweden), Free Democrats (Germany), Civic Platform (Poland).
Liberal People’s Party (Netherlands), Venstre (Denmark), Liberal Democrats (UK), Liberals (Sweden),
La République En Marche! (France).
Far right New Flemish Alliance (Belgium), National Front (France), Party for Freedom (Netherlands),
Sweden Democrats, Alternative for Germany, Law and Justice (Poland), Fidesz (Hungary).
Regional Scottish National Party, Christian Social Union (Bavaria), New Flemish Alliance (Belgium).
 SPOTLIGHT MEXICO
Brief profile
One of the powerhouses of Latin America, Mexico has undergone a programme of democratization since the
1990s that has resulted in a more competitive political landscape. Meanwhile, Mexico’s economic reforms have
brought greater freedom to a large emerging market and have broadened the economic base of one of the world’s
biggest oil producers. Unfortunately, the intertwined problems of corruption, party factionalism, and political
centralization continue, as does the persistent gap between the rich and the poor, the effects made worse by a
drug war since 2006 that has taken more than 230,000 lives. Political scientists are divided about how best to
describe Mexico, their analyses peppered with terms such as bureaucratic, elitist, and patrimonial. It is ranked as
a flawed democracy in the Democracy Index, and Freedom House downgraded it in 2011 from Free to Partly
Free.

Form of government Federal presidential republic consisting of 31 states and the Federal District of
Mexico City. State formed in 1821, and most recent constitution adopted 1917.
Executive Presidential. A president is elected for a single six-year term, and there is no vice-
president.
Legislature Bicameral National Congress: lower Chamber of Deputies (500 members)
elected for three-year terms, and upper Senate (128 members) elected for six-
year terms. Members may not serve consecutive terms.
Judiciary A Supreme Court of 11 members nominated for single 15-year terms by the
president and confirmed by the Senate.
Electoral system A straight plurality vote determines the presidency, while mixed member
majoritarian is used for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate: 300 single-
member plurality (SMP) seats and 200 proportional representation seats in the
Chamber, and a combination of SMP, first minority and at-large seats in the
Senate.
Parties Multi-party. Mexico was long a one-party system, but democratic reforms since
the 1990s have broadened the field such that three major parties now compete
at the national and state level, with a cluster of smaller parties.

127.5m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$1.15tn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$8,902 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Political parties in Mexico
Mexico has seen a transformation in recent
decades from a one-party dominant system
to a more competitive multi-party system,
with three major national parties capable of
winning the highest offices: a greater
selection than is offered in the country’s
northern neighbour, the United States. But
just how far this has moved Mexico along the
road to a democracy is still questioned, with
several analysts pointing to the country’s
problems with corruption, factionalism, and
political centralization.
Between 1929 and 2000, power was all
but monopolized by the Institutional
Supporters of Andrés Manuel López Obrador celebrate his victory in Revolutionary Party (PRI), which won every
the 2018 Mexican presidential election, at the head of a new party presidential election, held large majorities
promising yet more change in Mexican party politics. in both chambers of Congress, and won
Source: Getty Images/Guillermo Arias. almost all state and local elections as well. It
kept its grip on power by multiple means,
including being a source of patronage, incorporating the major social and economic sectors in Mexico, mobilizing
voters during elections, and overseeing the electoral process.
When economic problems began to grip Mexico in the 1990s, PRI could not blame the opposition. Mexicans were
also becoming better educated and more affluent, with increasing demand for more choice in their political system.
Changes to the rules were made that
resulted in more competitive elections,
as a result of which PRI lost its first USA
national legislative elections in 1997, and Ciudad Juárez
lost the presidency for the first time in
2000, to the more conservative National
Action Party (PAN). Gulf of Mexico
Questions continue to be asked MEXICO
about the fairness of elections (Camp,
2013), but today Mexican voters have a Guadalajara CUBA
wide array of political parties from
which to choose, ranging across the MEXICO CITY
political spectrum: PAN sits on the Pacific Ocean
right, PRI straddles the centre, the
Party of the Democratic Revolution GUATEMALA
BELIZE
(PRD) sits on the left, and the cross-
party National Regeneration Movement
(Morena) was set up in 2012 as a basis
for the election campaign of Andrés Further reading
Manuel López Obrador, otherwise
known as AMLO. Against a background Camp, Roderic Ai (ed.) (2012) The Oxford Handbook of Mexican Politics
(Oxford University Press).
of public concerns about corruption,
Camp, Roderic Ai (2013) Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation
factionalism, and drug violence,
or Decline? 6th edn (Oxford University Press).
Obrador was successfully elected as Deeds, Susan M., Michael C. Meyer, and William L. Sherman (2017) The
president in July 2018 (taking office in Course of Mexican History, 11th edn (Oxford University Press).
December that year).
278 chapter 16

Brazil has developed a particularly colourful multi-party system since its return to civilian government in 1985.
No fewer than 28 parties won seats in the 2014 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, representing a wide range
of opinions and interests that coalesced into a pro-government coalition, two opposition coalitions, and a cluster of
stand-alone parties. Twelve parties each had less than ten members, and the pro-government coalition contained nine
parties that together controlled 59 per cent of the seats. The picture in Brazil is complicated by a widespread aversion
to right-wing parties (stemming from the heritage of the military years), weak discipline within many of the smaller
parties, and the powerful role played by other actors, such as state governors. The result is a system that has been labelled
‘coalition presidentialism’, describing presidents who must rely on large and unstable coalitions to pass legislation (Gómez
Bruera, 2013).
Two important elements of multi-party systems in several countries are niche parties that operate outside traditional
party divisions (see Focus 16.1), and parties that operate only at the regional level, or at the state level in federations. In
the latter case, Britain – for example – has parties that represent the interests of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,
while the German Christian Democratic Union is in a sustained coalition with the Christian Social Union, which
operates only in the state of Bavaria. Few countries offer a more varied array of regional parties than India, where such
parties now play an expanded role in national politics. For example, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance re-
lied heavily after the 2009 elections on regional parties in the states of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra. The

Focus 16.1
The rise of niche parties
A recent phenomenon in many European countries has been the rise of the niche
Niche party
A political party party, which is one that appeals to a narrower part of the electorate. These have been
that appeals to a defined in several different ways: non-centrist or extremist, limited-issue, or even
narrow section of single-issue parties, as parties that focus on non-economic issues, and as parties that
the electorate, cut across traditional social cleavages and partisan alignments (see discussion in Wagner,
usually highlighting
2012). For many European countries, the niche is often ideological, producing parties
non-economic
issues. with far right, nationalist, and/or populist agendas. Unlike main mainstream parties, they
rarely prosper by moderating their position, instead achieving most success from
exploiting their natural but limited support group (Meguid, 2008). Several of these
parties – including Austria’s Freedom Party and Switzerland’s People’s Party – have participated in coalitions,
while others (such as the UK Independence Party in Britain) have succeeded in influencing the agenda of
mainstream parties.
Niche parties of the far right are an exception to the thesis that parties emerge to represent well-defined
social interests. Evidence suggests that they draw heavily on the often transient support of less educated and
unemployed young men. Disillusioned with orthodox democracy and by the move of established conservative
parties to the centre, this constituency is attracted to parties that blame immigrants, asylum seekers, and
other minorities not only for crime in general, but also for its own economic and cultural insecurity in a
changing world (Akkerman, et al., 2016).
It is tempting to identify a new cleavage here: between the winners and losers from contemporary labour
markets. In the winner’s enclosure stand well-educated, affluent professionals, proudly displaying their
tolerant post-material liberalism. Outside the enclosure we find those without qualifications, without jobs,
and without prospects in economies where full-time unskilled jobs have been exported to lower-cost
producers. In this context, the perceived economic success of immigrants, especially those of a different
colour, is easily regarded with resentment.
Matters are not quite that simple, though. This is not a cleavage in the usual sense, because far-right
parties are supported by alienated individuals whose concerns are overlooked by mainstream parties. Many
protest voters might cease to vote for niche parties if they became leading parties, thus creating a natural
ceiling to their support. Even joining a coalition dilutes the party’s outsider image. In the long term, niche
parties lack the resilience of those based on a more secure and traditional cleavage (McDonnell and Newell,
2011).
 political parties 279

2014 election resulted in an 11-seat majority for the Bharatiya Janata Party, but it continued to be part of a coalition
originally formed in 1998, in which it worked with nearly 30 regional parties with nearly 60 seats in the Lok Sabha,
the lower chamber of the Indian parliament.

party organization
Large political parties are multi-level organizations, ranging from the party leadership, major funders, and research
departments down through different strata to volunteers working at national, regional, and local levels. This
complexity means that any large party is decentralized, and that while references to ‘the party’ as a single entity are
unavoidable, the idea of party ‘organization’ is sometimes too grand a term. Below the centre, and especially in
areas where the party is electorally weak, the party’s organization may be little more than an empty shell, and
coordination between levels is often weak. Some authors even draw a comparison between parties and franchise
organizations such as McDonald’s (Carty, 2004). In a franchise structure, the centre sets policy priorities, manages
the brand, runs marketing campaigns, and supports the operating units. Local agents, whether McDonald’s outlets
or local party branches, are left to get on with key tasks. Local parties, for example, are charged with selecting
candidates and implementing election strategy at local level.
The thinking about party organization was long dominated by the arguments made by the German scholar Robert
Michels (1875–1936). In Political Parties (1911), he argued that even organizations with democratic pretensions become
dominated by a ruling clique of leaders and supporting officials. He suggested that leaders developed organizational
skills, expert knowledge, and an interest in their own continuation in power, while ordinary members – aware of their
inferior knowledge and amateur status – accepted their own subordination as natural. Michels’s
pessimism was expressed in his famous iron law of oligarchy: ‘to say organization is to say a
tendency to oligarchy’ (often reproduced as ‘who says organization, says oligarchy’). Iron law of
Much has since changed. Recruitment to elected office continues to be a vital and continuing oligarchy
States that the
function of parties, which – even as they decline in other ways – continue to dominate elections
organization of
to the national legislatures from which, in democracies, most political leaders are drawn. Given political parties
that candidates nominated for safe districts, or appearing near the top of their party’s list, are – even those
virtually guaranteed a place in the legislature, it is the ‘selectorate’, not the electorate, which formally
makes what Rahat (2007) calls ‘the choice before the choice’. At the same time, there is evidence committed to
democracy
of a growing role for ordinary party members in the selection of leaders as well as candidates, a
– becomes
finding which suggests that Michels’s iron law is corroding as parties seek to retain members by dominated by a
giving them a greater voice in party affairs (Cross and Katz, 2013). ruling elite.

Party leaders Safe district

The method of selecting the party leader deserves more attention than it usually receives (Pilet An electoral
district in which a
and Cross, 2014), for the obvious reason that major party leaders in most parliamentary systems political party has
stand a good chance of becoming prime minister. In some countries, to be sure, including such strong
many in continental Europe, the chair of the party is not allowed to be the party’s nominee support that its
for the top post in government (Cross and Blais, 2012). In Germany, for example, the party’s candidate/s are all
candidate for chancellor is appointed separately from the party leader and need not be the same but assured of
victory.
person. In the United States, the presidential candidate and chair of the party’s national
committee are different people; indeed, the former usually chooses the latter. Otherwise, it is Selectorate
important to review the mechanics and implications of the selection of the party’s leaders. The members
There are several different options, the traditional method being election by members of the who nominate a
party in the legislature, as still used in several parliamentary systems, including Australia, Den- party’s candidates
mark, and New Zealand. Interestingly, some parties give a voice both to members of parliament for an election.
and ordinary members, either through a special congress or a two-stage ballot. For example, the
British Conservatives offer ordinary members a choice between two candidates chosen by the parliamentary party.
Although this would appear to be a more democratic option, it can lead to problems when the rank-and-file membership
is out of step with the national party, resulting in the triumph of local over national interests.
A vote of the party’s members of the legislature alone is, of course, a narrow constituency. And the ability of po-
tential leaders to instil confidence in their parliamentary peers may say little about their capacity to win a general
election fought through television and social media. Even so, colleagues in the legislature will have a close knowledge
of a candidate’s abilities; they provide an expert constituency for judging the capacity to lead not only the party, but
280 chapter 16

also – more importantly – the country. Members of a legislature appear to be more influenced by experience than are
ordinary party members. It is perhaps for this reason that many parties still allow the parliamentary party to remove the
leader, even if the initial selection now extends to other groups (Cross and Blais, 2012).

Candidates
There are several options available for selecting legislative candidates, ranging from the inclusive (an open vote of
the entire electorate) to the exclusive (selection by the party leader) (see Figure 16.3). Reflecting the complexity of
party organization, the nomination process is generally decentralized; a few parties give control to the national
leadership, but even here the leaders usually choose from a list generated at lower levels. More often, local parties
are the active force, either acting autonomously or putting forward nominations to be ratified at national level.
Smaller and more extreme parties tend to be the most decentralized in their selection procedures. Generally,
though, the voter can sometimes seem to fit the cynical defi nition once offered by Bierce (1970) as someone who
enjoys the ‘sacred privilege’ of voting for the person of another person’s choice.
The nomination task is limited by three wider features of the political system:

◆◆ The electoral system: Choosing candidates for individual constituencies in a plurality system is a more decentralized
task than preparing a single national list in a party list system (see Chapter 16).
◆◆ Incumbents: Sitting members of a legislature have an advantage almost everywhere, usually winning reselection
without much fuss. Often, candidates for office are only truly ‘chosen’ when the incumbent stands down.
◆◆ Rules: Nearly all countries impose conditions such as citizenship on members of the legislature while many
parties – as we saw in Chapter 13 – have adopted gender quotas for candidates.

Consider how the electoral system affects the nomination process. Under the list form of proportional representation,
parties must develop a ranked list of candidates to present to the electorate. This requires central coordination, even
if candidates are suggested locally. In the Netherlands, for example, each party needs to present a single list of
candidates for the whole country. The major parties use a nominating committee to examine applications received
either from local branches, or directly from individuals. A senior party board then produces the final ordering.
In the few countries still using the single-member plurality method, the nomination procedure is typically more
decentralized. Candidates must win selection by a local party in a specific district, though often they must pre-qualify
by gaining inclusion on a central master list of approved candidates. The result of this can be to put the interests of the
local party and individual districts above the interests of the national party and voters at large.
The United States has gone furthest in opening up the selection process. There, primary
Primary elections enable a party’s supporters to choose their candidates for a particular office, ranging as
election high as the presidency. In the absence of a tradition of direct party membership, a ‘supporter’ is
A contest in which generously defined in most states as anyone who declares, in advance, an affiliation to that party,
the relevant and can thereby take part in a closed primary. The holding of an open primary extends the
electorate selects choice still further: to any registered elector.
its candidate for a
subsequent A growing number of countries use a mixed electoral system, in which voters make choices for
election. A closed both a party list and a district candidate. This complicates the party’s task of selecting candidates,
primary is requiring a national or regional list, plus local constituency nominees. In this situation, individual
limited to a party’s politicians also face a choice: should they seek election by means of the party list, or through a
registered constituency? Many senior figures ensure they appear on both ballots, using a high position on
supporters.
the party’s list as insurance against restlessness in their home district.

Entire Registered
electorate supporters Party
(open (closed Party committee/ Party
primary) primary) members convention leader

INCLUSIVE EXCLUSIVE
SELECTORATE SELECTORATE

Figure 16.3 Who selects candidates for legislative elections?

Source: Adapted from Hazan and Rahat (2010: Fig. 3.1).
 political parties 281

Party finance
Becoming a member of a political party was once an important means of taking part in politics, but this is no longer
the case: most major European countries, for example, have seen a dramatic fall in party membership since the
1960s. Falling membership means reduced income for parties in an era when expenses (not least for election
campaigns) continue to rise. As a result, the problem of funding for political parties has become significant. Should
members, donors, or the state pay for their work? Should private donations be encouraged (to increase funds and
encourage participation) or restricted (to maintain fairness and reduce scandals)? Do limits on contributions and
spending interfere with free speech? (See Focus 16.2.)
In the main, the battle for public funding has been won. State support for national parties is now all but universal in
liberal democracies. On a global level, research by the Swedish-based International Institute for Democracy and Elec-
toral Assistance (IDEA) has found that more than two-thirds of the countries for which there are data made provision
for public funding of parties in 2017; the exceptions included Egypt, India, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and
the Philippines (IDEA, 2017). State subsidies have also developed quickly in the new democracies of Eastern Europe,
where party memberships are far smaller than in the West.
Typically, support is provided for legislative groups, election campaigns, or both. Campaign support, in turn, may
be offered to parties, candidates, or both. In an effort to limit state dependence, public funding may be restricted to
matching the funds raised by the party from other means, including its members. In any case, most funding regimes
only reimburse a specified amount of party spending.
There are costs and benefits involved in the question of public funding of parties. On the positive side of the ledger,
it helps create a level playing field for parties, and decreases the opportunities for corruption. On the negative side,
public funding reduces the incentive for parties to attract members, tends to create parties that serve the state, and in
practice favours large, established parties. Some scholars have argued that the transition to public funding has led to a
convergence of the state and major parties on a single system of rule. Governing parties, in effect, authorize subsidies

Focus 16.2
Money, parties, and politics
On a worldwide basis, and including authoritarian regimes in which parties are permitted, nearly all countries
now regulate donations to parties in some way. The vast majority ban donations by government and its
agencies to parties and candidates (other than through regulated public funding); most also disallow
donations from overseas parties and candidates. However, only a few countries place limits on the size of
donations, financial reports are often inadequately monitored, and restrictions are easily circumvented by
helping candidates directly, or by ignoring the limits altogether. The role of money in politics, argues the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2014), is ‘the biggest threat to democracy
today’. It goes on:

This global threat knows no boundaries, and is evident across all continents from huge corporate
campaign donations in the United States and drug money seeping into politics in Latin America, to
corruption scandals throughout Asia and Europe. Attempts to tackle these challenges through political
finance laws and regulations are often undermined by a lack of political will or capacity, as well as
poorly designed and enforced measures.

In few places is the role of money in politics as troubling as in the United States, where campaigns are
uniquely expensive and few limits have been imposed on the sources of funding. According to the Center
for Responsive Politics (2017), a Washington DC-based watchdog body, spending on American elections
grew from $3 billion in the 2000 cycle to nearly $6.5 billion in the 2016 cycle. Such massive figures are
beyond compare, and detailed regulation of contributions has proved ineffective; there is no cap on
spending (except for presidential candidates unwise enough to accept public funding), campaign costs
continue to escalate, and the US Supreme Court has determined that limits on contributions are
unconstitutional on the grounds of free speech. Campaign advertising by groups which are independent of
candidates is also unrestricted.
282 chapter 16

Cartel party for themselves, a process captured by Katz and Mair’s idea (1995) of cartel parties: ‘colluding
A leading party parties become agents of the state and employ its resources to ensure their own survival’. The
that exploits its danger of cartel parties is that they become part of the political establishment, weakening their
dominance of the historic role as agents of particular social groups and inhibiting the growth of new parties in the
political market to
establish rules of
political market.
the game, such as
public funding,
which reinforces
political parties in authoritarian states
its own strong ‘Yes, we have lots of parties here,’ says President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan. ‘I created them all’
position.
(quoted in Cummings, 2005). This quote reflects the secondary character of parties in most
authoritarian regimes. Rather than being a channel for guidance, aggregation, mobilization,
and recruitment, the party is a means of governing, and neither a source of power in itself nor a channel through
which elections are contested, won, and lost. As Lawson (2013) says of parties under dictatorships, ‘the party is a
shield and instrument of power. Its function is to carry out the work of government as directed by other agents with
greater power (the military or the demagogue and his entourage).’ In doing this, it often presents itself as pursuing
a national agenda based on a key theme such as anti-imperialism, national unity, or economic development, but
such messages are often a means of legitimizing power rather than a substantive commitment.
Geddes (2006) argues that in spite of the risks potentially posed to authoritarian regimes by allowing parties and
elections, there are several roles they can fulfil that dictators find useful, ranging from conflict resolution to public
education – see Figure 16.4. The longer-term result is that what she describes as ‘support parties’ can prolong the
political life not just of individual leaders but also of the regimes themselves. Of course, many of these functions are
also performed by parties in democracies, but the latter provide additional value: they were often founded as a result
of social cleavages, and continue today to appeal to groups of voters based on competing views about economic and
social issues. In many poorer authoritarian states, politics is driven more by differences of identity and interest rather
than policy. Ethnic, religious, and local identities matter more than policy preferences.
Nigeria illustrates these points. It has a long history of political party activity, pre-dating its independence from
Britain in 1960. Its first party – the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons – was founded in 1944 on a
platform of Nigerian nationalism, but was quickly joined (in 1948 and 1949 respectively) by two regionally based
parties: the Action Group in the west and the Northern People’s Congress in the north. Following independence,
parties continued to work along ethnic lines, leading to the collapse of two civilian governments in 1966 and 1983.
A still-born effort was made by the military government in 1987 to invent two national political parties named the
Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention. Concerns remain that in a strongly regional coun-
try, parties will continue to drift towards identification with the different ethnic groups. However, a peaceful election

Role Features

Helping solve intra-regime conflicts – or enforcing elite bargains – that

Conflict resolution
might otherwise end or destabilize the rule of the dictator.

A ruling party provides a counter-balance to other potential threats,

Balancing threats
notably the military.

A dominant party can oversee elections, distribute bribes to voters, and

Managing elections
reward loyal members.

A national party must organize supporter networks throughout the

Extending influence
country, thereby extending the government’s reach into outlying districts.

A governing party educates and socializes voters to support the regime’s

Education
ideology and economic strategy.

Figure 16.4 Five roles of political parties in authoritarian states

 political parties 283

in 2015 did witness the first-ever defeat for an incumbent president standing for re-election, suggesting a maturing of
the country’s party system and a transition to a more democratic order. Nonetheless, it remains a hybrid regime.
Political parties in sub-Saharan Africa are a puzzle, in the sense that many seemingly similar countries have had very
different records. Following independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the heroes of the nationalist struggle routinely put
a stop to party competition, and one-party systems were established; the official party was often justified in terms of
the need to build national unity, even if it only served as the leader’s personal vehicle. The tradition of the benevolent
chief was skilfully exploited by dictators such as President Mobutu Sese Seko (leader of Zaire, now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, between 1965 and 1997):

In our African tradition, there are never two chiefs; there is sometimes a natural heir to the chief, but can anyone tell
me that he has known a village that has two chiefs? That is why we Congolese, in the desire to conform to the
traditions of our continent, have resolved to group all the energies of the citizens of our country under the banner of
a single national party. (quoted in Meredith, 2006)

But these single parties proved to be weak, they lacked autonomy from the national leader, and rather than
building unity they merely entrenched the control of the elites. As with government itself, they had an urban bias,
lacking a strong presence in the rural areas, and showed little concern with policy. True, the party was one of the few
national political organizations and proved useful in recruiting supporters to public office, but these functions could
not disguise a lack of cohesion, direction, and organization. Indeed, when the founder-leader eventually departed, his
party would sometimes disappear at the same time. This was what happened, for example, with the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, another hybrid regime. Founded in 1959, UNIP formed the first government
of an independent Zambia in 1964, and stayed in power – as did Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda – until 1990.
Following riots and a coup attempt that year, free elections were held in 1991 at which Kaunda was defeated. He
retired from politics and UNIP sank into obscurity: his son Tiljenyi ran as the party’s presidential candidate in 2011
and 2016, but won less than 1 per cent of the vote, and the party has no seats in the Zambian National Assembly.

Supporters of the governing ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe celebrate the victory of Emmerson Mnangagwa in the 2018
presidential election, a result that ensured continued control by a party that has been in power since 1980.
Source: Getty Images/Luis Tato.
284 chapter 16

Despite recent economic growth, many African states still experience poverty, cultural heterogeneity, and
centralized political systems that would seem to pose severe handicaps to democracy. Even so, Riedl (2014) finds
that nearly two dozen have achieved a measure of democratic competition since the early 1990s; these include
South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique. She suggests that the nature of the democratic transition
shapes its success (see Chapter 5). In what might seem to be a counter-intuitive conclusion, she argues that where
authoritarian incumbents are strong, they tightly control the democratic transition, leading to a stronger party system.
Where the ruling party is weak, it loses control of the transition, allowing others to enter the process, resulting in a
weaker party system.
The difficulties of establishing party competition in hybrid regimes is illustrated by recent events in Tanzania, yet
another hybrid regime. Dominated for decades by a single party – Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), or Party of the
Revolution, which has won 70–75 per cent of the seats in the country’s recent legislative elections – Tanzania has been
led since 2015 by President John Magufuli. Chosen by the party as an outsider who was untainted by allegations of
corruption, he at first seemed to be a reformer, paying unannounced visits to government offices to make sure that
bureaucrats were at their desks, and firing officials on live television. But he also cracked down on political opposition,
and exploited his dual powers as president of the country and chair of the party to remove opponents and appoint
supporters to key positions. A recent tendency towards pluralism in Tanzania appears to have become undone, notes
The Economist (2018), because CCM is the most stable and powerful institution in Tanzania, and too little has been done
to strengthen other institutions and limit the powers of the presidency.
Moving the focus to Latin America, there is a wide variation in the nature of party systems, both across countries
and within countries over time. Many explanations have been proposed for this, including the strength of executives,
and different social circumstances. A historical study by Frantz and Geddes (2016) looks at the impact of dictatorship
on party systems, and at what happens when dictators leave office and countries work to restore democracy. It begins
by suggesting that dictators usually have three choices when taking power:

1. Repressing all parties, as in the case of Venezuela.

2. Allying themselves with a traditional party and using it to help them govern, as in the cases of Colombia,
Nicaragua, and Paraguay.
3. Repressing pre-existing parties and creating a new one to support themselves, as in the case of the Dominican
Republic.

The study found that when options 1 or 2 were chosen, the effect – when the dictator left office and the country
began to re-democratize – was to contribute to a stable new political system. This has even been the case in
instances of long-term repression of parties, which tend to go underground and then to re-emerge – as if from a
freezer – when allowed to function again. Options 1 and 2 tend to preserve the old party system, preventing the
rise of new parties. When option 3 was chosen, however, long-term party stability was undermined. This is because
the new party has only shallow roots, and once the dictator leaves office, all institutions created to support the
regime tend to fall by the wayside.
It will be interesting to see what happens in Venezuela if and when it returns to democracy. An earlier phase of
dictatorship saw the outlawing in 1948 of multiple parties, only for them to re-emerge almost as soon as the military
regime fell in 1958. Two pre-existing parties – the centrist Democratic Action (AD) and the moderately conservative
Copei – became active again, producing every president until 1993. A new party was formed in 1997 to support the
presidential campaign of Hugo Chávez, and has since gone on – as the United Socialist Party – to dominate Venezuelan
politics, with the AD and Copei joining other parties in opposition, and often refusing to take part in what they see
as deeply flawed elections.
A quite different set of circumstances can be found in Russia, which had no history of competitive party politics
when the Soviet Union came to an end in 1991. At first glance, Russia would now seem to have a wide range
of political parties from which its voters can choose. However, few of these have been able to develop either
permanence or real influence. In fact, so many new parties were formed in the early years of democracy in the 1990s
that they were often disparagingly described as ‘taxi-cab parties’ (driving around in circles, and stopping occasionally
to let old members off and new ones on), or even ‘divan parties’ (they were so small that all their members could fit
on a single piece of furniture). Clearly, when parties cease to exist from one election to the next, it is impossible for
them to be held to account. Not surprisingly, they are the least trusted public organizations in a suspicious society
(Levada Centre, 2017).
 political parties 285

90

80

70

Percentage share of vote

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1991 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2018

Party of power Communists Liberal Democrats Other

Figure 16.5 Trends in Russian presidential elections

Far more than is the case in other presidential or semi-presidential systems, voters in Russia’s presidential elections
are choosing between candidates, not parties. There has been an ideological line tying its three post-communist presi-
dents (Boris Yeltsin,Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev), and while all have formally run at elections as independ-
ents, they have mainly had the support of a single mainstream party, which has always been the vehicle rather than the
driver. In the 1990s there was a modicum of competition, such that the 1996 election had to go to a second round,
but since then the biggest party (first Unity, and now United Russia) has opened up a commanding position – see
Figure 16.5. United Russia is what Russians term a ‘party of power’, meaning that the Kremlin uses threats and bribes
to ensure it is supported by powerful ministers, regional governors, and large companies.
Given the weak position of Russia’s parties, it is not surprising that they are poorly organized, with a small mem-
bership and minimal capacity to integrate a large and diverse country. In a manner typical of authoritarian regimes, the
rules concerning the registration of parties, the nomination of candidates, and the receipt of state funding are skewed
in favour of larger parties. Minor parties are trapped: they cannot grow until they become more significant but their
importance cannot increase until they are larger (Kulik, 2007).
Party weakness of another kind is found in Haiti, also ranked as an authoritarian regime in the Democracy Index.
A country that suffers at least as much from natural disasters as from political problems, Haiti is currently working off
its 23rd constitution since becoming independent in 1804. Such changeability is both a cause and an effect of Hai-
ti’s political difficulties, and its political parties suffer even less consistency than its formal political institutions. It has
elections, but they are rarely fair or efficient. It has a long history of political party activity, but has never developed
durable parties with deep social roots. Party activity is at its greatest during presidential election seasons, when new
parties emerge around the campaigns of the leading candidates. These have represented a wide range of issues, from
Haitian nationalism to the interests of rural peasants, Haitian youth, communism, workers’ rights, and opposition to the
incumbent government. However, they rarely survive much longer than the terms in office of the leaders with whom
they are associated, and so parties play only a peripheral role in Haitian politics.
286 chapter 16

discussion questions
◆◆ Do we need political parties? If so, what are the most valuable functions they perform?
◆◆ Which is better: a two-party system, or a multi-party system?
◆◆ Which type of party system exists in your country? Does it reflect social divisions, voter
preferences, the structure of government, or something else?
◆◆ Is it more democratic and effective for parties to choose leaders and candidates themselves,
or for the choice to be put in the hands of voters?
◆◆ What is the fairest and most democratic means of fi nancing political parties and election
campaigns?
◆◆ Looking at the five roles of political parties in authoritarian regimes, are they all that
different – except in degree – to the roles of parties in democracies?

key concepts
◆◆ Cartel party
◆◆ Catch-all party
◆◆ Closed primary
◆◆ Iron law of oligarchy
◆◆ Niche party
◆◆ Party system
◆◆ Political cleavage
◆◆ Political party
◆◆ Primary election
◆◆ Safe district
◆◆ Selectorate

further reading
Cross William P., and Richard S. Katz (eds) (2013) The Challenges of IntraParty Democracy
(Oxford University Press). This book considers the principal issues that parties and the
state must address in introducing greater democracy within parties.
Gauja, Anika (2016) Political Parties and Elections: Legislating for Representative Democracy
(Routledge). A comparative assessment of the way in which democracies try to regulate
the behaviour of political parties.
Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat (2010) Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection
Methods and Their Political Consequences (Oxford University Press). A comparative analysis
of candidate selection methods.
Lawson, Kay, and Jorge Lanzaro (eds) (2010) Political Parties and Democracy (Praeger). A five-
volume edited collection looking at political parties in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa,
and the Arab World.
Pettit, Robin T. (2014) Contemporary Party Politics (Red Globe Press). An assessment of party
politics in democracies, looking at different party systems, party ideologies, party
members, and the future of parties.
Riedl, Rachel Beatty (2014) Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa (Cambridge
University Press). A study of parties in Africa, looking at the challenging transitions from
authoritarianism to competitive party systems.
 17

Source: iStock/luismmolina
voters
contents
◆ Voters: an overview
◆ Party identification
◆ How voters choose
◆ Voter turnout
PREVIEW ◆ Voters in authoritarian
How do voters make choices at elections? How do they decide even states
whether or not it is worth taking part in those elections? These are
among the most intensively studied questions in political science, and
yet there are no agreed answers. Media coverage of election results
tends to focus on often small and short-term shifts in party support, while academic studies are focused on broader
sociological and psychological questions such as social class, economic change, and party allegiance.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the long-term forces shaping electoral choice. It looks at party
identification and at trends suggesting that the ties between parties and voters are eroding. It then reviews the main
factors involved in helping us explain voter choice: social class (whose influence is declining), religion, political
issues, the economy, and the personality of leaders. The effects of all of these are both debated and debatable.
The chapter also looks at rational choice analysis of voters and parties, a topic which gives us a case study of one
of the theoretical approaches we reviewed in Chapter 2. It then discusses the more specific question of voter
turnout: the declines seen in recent decades in many democracies, the reasons behind that decline, the impact of
turnout on the quality of democracy, and the implications of compulsory voting. The chapter closes with a review
of voting in authoritarian states, and of the different ways in which voters are limited, manipulated, and coerced.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ The habits and motivations of voters have long been a puzzle, with several different explanatory theories
developed, but none offering universal answers.
◆◆ Party identification is key to understanding voters, but there are questions about exactly how it applies,
particularly in light of partisan dealignment.
◆◆ The social bases of voting have mainly weakened in recent decades, although religion continues to play
an important role in several countries.
◆◆ The evidence of short-term explanations for voter choice – such as issue voting, the economy, and the
personality of leaders – is variable.
◆◆ Voter turnout has been on the decline in most democracies, although the reasons vary by time and place.
◆◆ Voting patterns in authoritarian states are less a matter of understanding voter motives than of
understanding ruler motives.
288 chapter 17

voters: an overview
If elections lie at the heart of democracy, as we saw in the previous chapter, then voters are the lifeblood of those
elections. Although the primary role of voters in a representative democracy is to decide between the choices
offered by parties, the values, preferences, agendas, instincts, and understandings of voters all combine to shape
the policies that parties place on the campaign table. The challenge is to understand how voters choose among the
different options, in which regard there are several alternatives, broadly categorized into the sociological and
the psychological.
The former include a focus on the social and economic background of voters, which might
Social class result in parties of the left having an advantage among poorer voters, ethnic minorities, and
A hierarchical urban residents, while those of the right might tend to attract the support of wealthier and
division of society
based on older voters, and residents of the suburbs and rural areas. By contrast, psychological explanations
measures such as focus on what goes on in the mind of voters, and what they think about parties, candidates,
wealth, education, and issues. The argument here is that choices depend on dynamic factors such as changing
occupation, and public agendas, and not just on more static factors such as social class.
status. Identification with a party has long been a key element linking these two approaches.
Voters develop a long-term commitment to ‘their’ party, which in turn shapes their values,
opinions, and voting choice. This psychological attachment will in turn be shaped and reinforced by the social
position of voters: their family background, their peer group, and their workmates. There has been a weakening of
the bonds between voters and parties, however, as social divisions weaken, education becomes more available,
people become more mobile, parties change in order to widen their appeal, and some voters become more
disillusioned with politics.
Increasingly, shorter-term influences have supplemented long-term influences in explaining voter behaviour:
not just which party to support, but also whether to vote at all. As the impact of social class declines, and that of
religion wavers, so voters are more likely to be influenced by the particular issues they care about most, such as the
state of the economy, and the personalities of party leaders and candidates. Voter choice is increasingly responsive,
rather than based on ‘push’ factors such as social class or religion. This means that interpretive theories about voters
and their motivations become increasingly helpful. When it comes to the economy, for example, most voters
choose less on the basis of their grasp of complex economic issues than on the basis of factors that make intuitive
sense: unemployment rates, the number of new jobs being created, changes in the cost of living, and the state of the
local economy.
Voter behaviour in authoritarian regimes, meanwhile, is subject to quite different influences, driven mainly by
the desire of leaders and elites to retain their hold on power using means which would not be acceptable in a
democracy. In a democratic setting, voting is an autonomous endeavour; voters will have their opinions formed by
multiple influences, but it is still ultimately up to them how to vote. In authoritarian regimes, voters are more likely
to be influenced by having their choices restricted, whether through a limit on the number of parties running, or
through manipulation and coercion, or through the use of illegal means to shape election outcomes. Even in
democracies, it is important to note, ruling politicians use their privileged position to tilt the playing field in their
favour; they have more access to more funds, exploit their name recognition, offer incentives to their constituents,
and manipulate the electoral system to their benefit. That said, democratic leaders have fewer such techniques
available than their authoritarian counterparts.

party identification
The starting point for any discussion of voting in democracies is The American Voter (Campbell
Party et al., 1960). This classic book established a way of studying voters, and of thinking about
identification
Long-term
how voters decide, and remains influential even today. Its authors took national sample
attachment to a surveys of individual voters and assessed the attitudes expressed in these polls. The task was
particular political judged to be one of objective investigation into subjective states – the behavioural approach
party, which at work. Other traditions, notably those placing the individual voter in the social and spatial
provides a filter context provided by family, friends, neighbours, workmates, electoral districts, and regions,
for understanding
political events.
lost ground.
The central concept in The American Voter was party identification, meaning a
commitment to a particular party which helps voters decide which party to vote for as well as
 voters 289

providing them with a road map through the complex world of politics. As with many other identities, party
allegiance usually emerges in childhood and early adolescence, influenced by parents and peer groups, and then
deepens as a person moves through adulthood, reinforced by the allegiance of social groups to which that person
belongs. Party identification is the engine of the voter’s political belief system; the best leaders are seen to come
from the voter’s favoured party, and the best policies must be those the party supports. The more often voters
choose the party with which they identify, the stronger their allegiance becomes.
Party identification means not so much enthusiastic support for a party as an underlying disposition to support
that party. Just as regularly buying a particular brand of car short-circuits the need to make a full-scale assessment
of a new model and all its options with every purchase, so voting for a given party becomes a standing commitment
which precludes the need to go for a political test drive at each election. For many, voting for a given party is a
pragmatic, long-term brand choice. Occasionally, special circumstances might lead a Toyota buyer to choose a
Ford, and a liberal to vote for a conservative party, but the homing tendency will do its job and normality will be
restored next time.
Few countries have shown such consistent patterns of party identification as the United States. Thanks to a
combination of the distinctive features of the American political system – including an entrenched two-party
system, closed party primaries, and the ability to vote a straight party ticket for the large number of elected offices –
the numbers have changed little in recent decades. Between 1992 and 2017, the electorate could be split approximately
into three equally sized groups: those identifying with the Democrats, those identifying with
the Republicans, and those identifying as independents (Pew Research Center, 2018). Partisan
In Europe, the landscape looks quite different. Voters historically identified with class and dealignment
religion, and the labour unions and churches expressing these affi liations, which – in turn – The weakening
bonds between
encouraged them to vote for one party over another. Today, though, Europeans have a greater voters and parties,
range of parties from which to choose, meaning more opportunity to move from one to reflected both in a
another. Also, wider issues have come into play in regard to voter choice, such as the fall in the
environment, globalization, immigration, terrorism, crime, and the European Union. Partly proportion of
as a result, the bonds between voters and parties have weakened, in a process known as voters identifying
with any party and
partisan dealignment. (This may also be true of some emerging states, but their parties do a decline in the
not have as long a history as those in democracies, and survey research is often less sophisticated strength of
in these cases, making it difficult to fi nd meaningful comparative data (see discussion about allegiance among
polling in India in Kumar and Rai, 2013)). those with a party
In one recent study of 19 advanced industrial democracies for which there are long-term loyalty.
survey data, 17 were found to have seen a decrease in the percentage of partisans, as well as a
decrease in the strength of partisanship (Dalton, 2013). Britain is a striking example. Between 1964–66 and 2010,
the proportion of voters identifying with a party fell from 90 to 82 per cent. This may not seem very much, but
over the same period the proportion of respondents with a ‘very strong’ allegiance to any party collapsed from 40
to 11 per cent. The result, say Denver et al. (2012), is that strong Conservative and Labour identifiers are ‘now
something of an endangered species’.
Comparable changes can be seen in Germany, with the rise of a class of independent voters who – argues Dalton
(2014) – ‘are more sophisticated apartisans who are politically engaged even though they lack party ties’. As shown
in Figure 17.1, the number of western Germans with very strong or strong party identification fell between 1972
and 2009 from 55 per cent to 32 per cent, while the number with weak or no party identification rose from 40 per
cent to 64 per cent. There has been an even more precipitous decline in Sweden, where the number of people
identifying with a party halved between 1968 and 2006 (see Figure 17.2).
What has caused this changing view about parties? Although commentators within a country often concentrate
on national influences, comparison across borders points to a common set of sociological and political factors (see
Figure 17.3). Sociologically, the weakening of historic social divisions, the changing place of religion, and the
expansion of education have contributed to a thinning of political identities. Dalton (2013) suggests that what he
calls ‘cognitive mobilization’ is an increasingly common way in which citizens connect themselves to politics. By
this, he means that educated and politically interested voters can orient themselves to politics on their own, using
the media for information and their own understanding to interpret it.
Psychologically, there have been several factors at work. We have seen the diversification of channels of
participation away from party membership (as discussed in Chapter 13 and again in Chapter 18, where we look at
support for interest groups), the declining importance of party members for the funding of parties (discussed in
Chapter 16), the growth of anti-establishment populist parties drawing on disillusionment among sections of the
290 chapter 17

80

70

60

50
Percentage

40

30

20

10

0
72

76

80

83

87

90

94

98

02

05

09
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20
Very strong/Strong Weak/No party/DK

Figure 17.1 Partisan dealignment in Germany

Note: Data are for western Germany only.
Source: Dalton (2014).

70

60

50
Percentage

40

30

20

10

0
56

60

64

68

70

73

76

79

82

85

88

91

94

98

02

06
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

Strong identifiers Identifiers (no data before 1968)

Figure 17.2 Partisan dealignment in Sweden

Source: Oscarsson and Holmberg (2010).

population, and the effects of declining voter trust in the wake of scandals and corruption involving parties in
multiple countries. In the next section, we look at some of these changes in more depth as we review the factors
that influence the way that voters make their choices.

how voters choose

How do voters make their choices? The evidence suggests that class has been weakening as an indicator, while
religion remains a factor in a surprising number of supposedly secular democracies. What about the effect of
shorter-term influences, such as issue voting, the state of the economy, and the personality of political leaders?
 voters 291

These tend to draw most of the media attention during election campaigns, but does that attention reflect their
actual effect or just their imagined effect? While different influences play different roles in different places, in
general the personality of leaders is easily exaggerated, economic performance is a consistent influence, and the
impact of issues sharpens as levels of education increase (see summary in Figure 17.4).

Social class
Since the industrial revolution, social class has been a key factor in voter choice throughout the democratic world:
the working class has been inclined to support parties of the left, while the middle class has leaned towards parties
of the right. In recent decades, though, there has been a decline in class voting, particularly in those Western
European countries where it was once highest. The explanation for this change lies in a combination of political
and economic factors:

◆◆ Politically, the collapse of socialism initiated a move to the centre by many left-wing parties, where traditional
class themes were played down.
◆◆ Economically, the move from industry to services in advanced economies has meant that large unionized
factories have been replaced by smaller service companies offering more diverse work to qualified staff. These
skilled employees derive their power in the labour market from their individual qualifications, experience, and
ability, and – unlike manual employees performing uniform tasks – are not drawn to labour unions promoting
a class-based party of the left.

These trends may have been offset to some extent in countries – notably the United States and Britain – by rising
income inequality; populist resentment has grown against excessive earnings by high-level management. Even so,
individual income is not a dominant influence on how people vote, and this theme of resentment against the highest
earners lacks the same resonance in other democracies, such as the Nordic countries, where there is less inequality.

Religion
Religion has long been a factor in voter choice in many democracies, offering a contrast to the fall in class voting.
As long ago as the 1960s, Rose and Urwin (1969) concluded that ‘religious divisions, not class, are the main social
bases of parties in the Western world today’. More recently, Esmer and Pettersson (2007) found that ‘religiosity still
significantly shapes electoral choice in most European countries’ (the exceptions include Scandinavia and Britain).
In some respects, religion matters more than class, and class matters only when religion does not. Religion is not a
single variable, however, and can be studied from three main angles:

◆◆ We can distinguish broadly between religious and secular voters, the former tending to vote for the right and
the latter for the left.
◆◆ We can separate voters by the importance of religion in their lives; voters with the strongest religious beliefs will
allow religion to be more of a factor in their choice of party, and will also have higher participation rates.
◆◆ We can separate voters by the impact of specific denominations. Catholics, for example,
might be inclined to vote for the right and Jewish voters for the left. Secularization
The declining
Just as industrial change has contributed to the decline of class voting, so secularization space occupied by
might be expected to lead to a fall in religious voting; as societies modernize, so they naturally religion in political,
social, and
become more secular. Certainly, religious belief continues to decline in many democracies, personal life.
not least in Europe (and increasingly in the United States). Yet it is difficult to fi nd evidence
that religious voting has declined to the same extent as class voting. Overall, the religious base Issue voter
of electoral behaviour has considerable staying power. A voter who
makes choices at
Issues elections based on
the policies that
Election campaigns routinely revolve around issues such as the economy, crime, security, the most interest
environment, foreign affairs, education, public spending, and taxation, the implication being them, rather than
that they are a key element in voter choice. In reality, there are several barriers to cross before solely on the basis
someone can be described as an issue voter. They must (1) be aware of the issue, (2) have an of sociological or
demographic
opinion on the issue, (3) believe that parties differ on the issue, and (4) vote for the party closest
factors.
to their position.
292 chapter 17

Factor Trend

Decay of social
Declining class differences have led to weakening party loyalty.
divisions

Rising education Educated voters can interpret events with less need for party cues.

Voters have drifted away from parties towards different channels for
Diversification
political participation.

Funding More has come from the state than from party members.

Seeking to increase their share of the political market, many mainstream

Policy convergence
parties have become less distinct in their policies.

Disillusionment Scandals and corruption have reduced popular trust in parties.

Figure 17.3 Causes of partisan dealignment

Factor Interpretation

Social class The class base of political parties has been eroding.

Religion Still a factor in most democracies, though declining modestly.

Increasingly important, aided by rising levels of education, but far

Issues
from the dominant factor in voter decisions.

The economy Nearly always important, but not always decisive.

Leader personalities Debatable; impact easily exaggerated.

Figure 17.4 Key factors explaining voter choice

Studies conducted during the era of party alignment concluded that only a minority of voters crossed all these
barriers. Later studies suggested that voting on the basis of specific policies (and also broader ideologies) had
increased: in 1992, for example, Franklin concluded from a study of 17 democracies that the rise of issue voting
matched more or less precisely a decline in voting on the basis of social position. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) later
reached a similar conclusion for the United States, where comparable information is available for the longest
period:

The level of education within the American electorate has increased sharply since the 1950s, and this is reflected in
more frequent issue voting, greater overall clarity in the structure of mass issue attitudes, and enhanced salience of
ideological themes within the public’s political thinking.
 voters 293

Focus 17.1
Are voters rational?
The behavioural account offers one means for understanding voters. Another is offered by the rational
choice approach, which assumes that voters are rational participants in the political market, and seek to
maximize their utility. The most influential study by far along these lines is Anthony Downs’s An Economic
Theory of Democracy, published in 1957. Downs was concerned not only with voters but also with parties,
and even more with the relationship between the two.
He asked us to imagine that parties acted as if they were motivated by power alone, and that voters
wanted only a government which reflected their self-interest, as represented in their policy preferences. He
also assumed that voter policy preferences could be shown on a simple left-right scale, with the left end
representing full government control of the economy and the right end a completely free market. Given
these assumptions, he asked, what policies should parties adopt to maximize their vote?
The crucial result, now known as the median voter theorem, is that vote-maximizing parties in a two-
party system will converge at the midpoint of the distribution, and that the position of the median voter is
critical. A party may start at one extreme but it will move towards the centre because there are more votes
to be won there. In moving to the centre, the party remains close to voters at its own extreme, but it also
attracts middle-of-the-road voters who were previously closer to the competitor. Once parties have
converged at the position of the median voter, they reach a position of equilibrium and have no incentive to
change their position.
But what should we make of Downs’s assumption that voters behave rationally by voting for the party
closest to their policy preferences on a single left-right scale? Three objections were raised by Ansolabehere
(2006):

◆◆ Why would self-interested voters turn out to vote at all, given the small possibility of a single ballot
determining the outcome?
◆◆ Since no single ballot is likely to be decisive, why should voters go to the trouble of acquiring the
information needed to cast a rational vote?
◆◆ We can question the assumption that elections are best understood as debates over policies on which
voters adopt different positions.

Overall, Downs’s theory leads us to some interesting paradoxes. His notions of self-interest and
rationality, while standard for rational choice thinking, appear to result in ignorant voters who fail to vote
and in parties that adopt virtually indistinguishable policy positions. Still, the very process of comparing
predictions with reality does generate puzzles whose resolution creates insight.

This may have been true then, but questions remain, as we saw in Chapter 13, about the quality of voter
knowledge, a problem that has been made worse – as we saw in Chapter 14 – by the twin effects of the echo
chamber and fake news. Many people are aware of issues and have an opinion on them, but how many know much
about the details of those issues, and about their causes and effects?

The economy
During the 1992 presidential election in the United States, a sign was hung in the headquarters of the Bill Clinton
campaign that was designed to keep workers on message. Written by campaign strategist James Carville, the sign
had just three items: ‘change vs. more of the same’, ‘the economy, stupid’, and ‘don’t forget health care’. The middle
of these three soon became a slogan for the Clinton campaign, and has since appeared in multiple variations,
including ‘it’s the deficit, stupid’ and ‘it’s the voters, stupid’.
There is a large body of evidence, sustained over time, to suggest that the state of the economy affects not only
government popularity, but also voter choice. This is reflected, for example, in a study by Hellwig (2010), who
combined the results of surveys conducted in 28 countries between 1996 and 2002 to examine the electoral effect
of respondent perceptions of whether the state of the economy over the previous 12 months had improved, stayed
294 chapter 17

Table 17.1 The economy and voter choice

Perception of the economy over the past Percentage voting for the party of the
12 months incumbent president or prime minister
Has got better 46
Has stayed the same 31
Has got worse 23
Source: Adapted from Hellwig (2010: Table 9.1), rebased to 100 per cent.

about the same, or worsened. As Table 17.1 shows, the results were striking: voters who believed the economy had
improved were twice as likely to vote for the party of the incumbent president or prime minister as voters who
thought the state of the economy had worsened. Of course, those who already support the governing party are
inclined to view the economy through rose-tinted glasses, exaggerating the real economic vote. Even so, the
observed relationship between economic assessments and electoral choice is strong.
The actions of poor voters – whether they live in wealthy or poor countries – sets up an interesting paradox.
Many studies have shown that a significant number often vote for parties that do not appear to stand for their
material interests, and that instead seem to represent the interests of the wealthy. Huber and Stanig (2009) point
out, for example, that large numbers of voters in wealthy democracies support parties that are opposed to the kind
of higher taxes and redistributive policies from which such voters would benefit. This was reflected in the 2016
victory of Donald Trump: he won much of his support from voters who felt marginalized by political and economic
elites, and who backed his promises to control immigration and create new jobs. Yet most of those he appointed to
his administration were, like him, wealthy individuals from corporate backgrounds, and many of his policies were
designed to reduce the tax burden on the wealthy and corporations, and to set up trade barriers that had the effect
of raising prices on imports and undercutting exports.
Turning to voting in poorer (and flawed) democracies, which have been much less studied than in their wealthier
counterparts, the evidence gathered to date points to a different kind of economic incentive: vote buying, or the
promise of tangible vote-related material rewards. According to Schaffer (2007), these may take the form of cash,
of commodities (he lists everything from cigarettes to watches, coffins, haircuts, bags of rice, birthday cakes, and
TV sets), or of services.
Thachil (2014) looks at the case of India, and specifically at the curious success of the
Vote buying Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (a party usually identified with India’s privileged upper castes)
The process
among poorer Indians. The explanation, he suggests, lies in the way the BJP has won over
whereby parties
and candidates disadvantaged voters by providing them with basic social services via grass-roots affi liates.
provide material This ‘outsourcing’ allows the party to continue to represent the policy interests of its privileged
benefits to voters base, while also drawing in many votes from the poor.
in return for their Brazil provides an example of vote buying operating within the political elite. A major
support at
scandal broke there in 2005, with charges that the ruling Workers’ Party had paid a number
elections.
of Congressional deputies a monthly stipend in return for their support for legislation supported
by the party. Known as the Mensalão (big monthly stipend) scandal, it threatened to bring
down the government of President Lula da Silva (in office 2003–10). Lula himself won election to a second term,
but 25 of the 38 defendants in the resulting court case were found guilty of a variety of charges.
The trial came to exemplify the issue of corruption in Brazil, a problem reflected in more low-level instances of
candidates paying cash to voters for their support. The problem, argues Yadav (2011) has worsened with the advent
of stronger political parties able to exploit the Brazilian state as a source of funds. (In April 2018, Lula began a nine-
year prison sentence after having been found guilty of money laundering and receiving bribes.)
The phenomenon of vote buying is far from limited to poorer states or communities. Governments legally
and routinely ‘buy’ the votes of other governments in meetings of international organizations (Lockwood,
2013), for example, and almost any instance where elected representatives can point to a new factory, school,
or military facility that was brought to their district through their efforts might be defi ned as vote buying. Is
there much difference between buying a voter in, say, India and buying an electoral district in, say, the United
States?
 voters 295

Crowds turn out in Sao Paulo, Brazil, to demonstrate against ongoing corruption scandals in the ruling Workers’ Party.
Voter protests helped bring about the impeachment and removal from office in 2016 of President Dilma Rousseff.
Source: iStock/Willbrasil21.

Leader personality
As we saw in Chapter 14, the most famous example of the importance of appearance, style, and likeability for
political candidates came in 1960 with the first television debate involving presidential candidates in the United
States, between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Personality has long been a factor in political choice and in
the levels of support given to leaders, but it only become more important in the age of television. While she was
prime minister of Britain, for example, Margaret Thatcher was encouraged by her advisers to lower the tone of her
voice so as to sound more authoritative. In France and the US, polls found that François Hollande and Barack
Obama won their respective presidential elections in 2012 at least in part because they were seen as more likeable
than their competitors, Nicolas Sarkozy and Mitt Romney. Donald Trump, meanwhile, offered a different kind of
personality: one who threw out much of the rulebook regarding appropriate behaviour, encouraging his supporters
and often horrifying his critics.
There are many problems in suggesting that the personality of leaders is a factor in voter choice, not least being
the difficulty of measuring such a subjective commodity. The effects of personality on electoral choice can cancel
out, with as many voters being attracted as repelled by a particular candidate’s personality, resulting in no net
impact. The discussion of leaders also often reveals a selection bias, focusing on the characterful while forgetting
the anonymous.
In the first comparative study of the subject, King (2002) attempted to assess the role of the personalities of
leaders on the results of 52 elections held between 1960 and 2001 in Canada, France, Britain, Russia, and the
United States. As to whether it had any impact, his results were as follows:

◆◆ No in 37 cases.
◆◆ Possibly in 6 cases.
◆◆ Probably in 5 cases.
◆◆ Yes in just 4 cases: Harold Wilson, Britain, 1964 and February 1974; Charles de Gaulle, France, 1965; and Pierre
Trudeau, Canada, 1968.
296 chapter 17

King’s general conclusion was that ‘most elections remain overwhelmingly political contests, and political parties
would do well to choose their leaders and candidates in light of that fact’. Much subsequent research has confi rmed
King’s views, with a statistical study of nine democracies edited by Aarts et al. (2011) confi rming the unimportance
of the characteristics of leaders. Leader traits are only a part, and often a minor part, of the factors shaping individual
votes and overall election results.
Where leader traits do make a difference, the key characteristics appear to be those directly linked to performance
in office, such as competence and integrity. By comparison, purely personal characteristics, such as appearance and
likeability, are unimportant. In their analysis of Australia, Germany, and Sweden, Ohr and Oscarsson (2011)
conclude that ‘politically relevant and performance-related leader traits are important criteria for voters’ political
judgements’, but that leader evaluations ‘are fi rmly based on politically “rational” considerations’. If personal traits
matter, it is because they are judged to be relevant to government performance.

voter turnout
Voter turnout So far, this chapter has focused on the forces shaping voter choice. Equally important for a
The number of comparative understanding of government and politics, perhaps, is the topic of voter turnout.
voters who take Rates vary by time and place, ranging from a high of about 90 per cent or more to a low of
part in an election,
expressed as a about 20–30 per cent, with an average in most democracies of about 50–70 per cent. Figure 17.5
percentage of the offers some examples, showing little correlation between turnout levels and the quality of
total number of democracy: Turkey and Nigeria are both hybrids, for example, but Turkey has a turnout rate
eligible voters. almost double that of Nigeria. Meanwhile, turnout rates in Australia and Sweden are more
than double those in France, in spite of all three countries being democracies.
One phenomenon witnessed in many democracies in recent decades has been declining turnout. Despite
improved education, turnout rates have fallen since the 1950s in most of the democratic world, as illustrated in
Figure 17.6. Numbers are down by 35 percentage points in the US, for example, by 31 points in France, by 20

Australia
Sweden
Turkey
Brazil
Germany
South Africa
Venezuela
UK
India
USA
Iran
Japan
Mexico
Russia
Nigeria
France
Afghanistan
Egypt

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage
Full/flawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states

Figure 17.5 Comparing voter turnout

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2018b).
Notes: Figures are for voting-age population in most recent national legislative elections. No data for China, which does not hold national elections.
 voters 297

100

Percentage turnout 90

80

70

60

50

40
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s

Germany UK Canada Japan USA Mexico France

Figure 17.6 Comparing trends in voter turnout

Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2018b).
Note: Figures are for voting age population in national legislative elections.

points in Japan, and by 12 points in Germany. What has caused this drop? Are there common factors involved?
Should we even consider low turnout to be a problem?
On the one hand, it might be a reflection of limited engagement based on a lack of faith in government, but – on
the other hand – it could also be a sign of contentment; why vote when all seems to be going well? Low turnout
could also be a reflection of the diversification of participation discussed in Chapter 13; citizens may still be
engaged, but through different means. Meanwhile, high turnout could be interpreted as a sign of healthy civic
engagement, but it might also be a result of over-intense party competition or concern about the direction being
taken by government.
In an influential analysis, Franklin (2004) linked the decline of turnout to the diminishing significance of
elections. He suggested that the success of many democracies in sustaining welfare states and full employment in
the post-war era (see Chapter 20) resolved long-standing conflicts between capital and labour. With class conflict
on the decrease, citizens had fewer incentives to vote. As he wrote, ‘elections in recent years may show lower
turnout for the simple reason that these elections decide issues of lesser importance than elections did in the late
1950s’. In other words, when less is at stake, people are more likely to stay at home.
But declining satisfaction with the performance of democratic governments has also played its part. We have
seen in several other chapters in this book how trust in government has fallen in many democracies; even though
support for democratic principles remains strong, rising cynicism about government performance has so far
encouraged more people to stay away from the polls. But there are also some very practical reasons for deflated
turnout, as reflected in the recipe for higher turnout in Table 17.2. Overall, and fitting with ideas about rational
choice, turnout tends to be higher in those countries where the costs or effort of voting are low and the perceived
benefits are high.
On the cost side, turnout is reduced when voters are required to take the initiative in registering, as in the
United States. In most European countries, by contrast, registration is the responsibility of government, helping
encourage turnout. Turnout is also lower when citizens must vote in person and during a weekday, and hence
higher turnout can be encouraged by allowing voting at the weekend, by proxy, by mail, by electronic means, and
at convenient locations such as supermarkets. The ability to vote in advance is also helpful; the number of voters
casting their ballot in advance of election day has been growing steadily in the United States, reaching a new record
in 2016 of 47 million (United States Elections Project, 2016).
On the benefit side, the greater the impact of a single vote, the more willing voters are to incur the costs of
voting. Thus, the closer the contest, the higher the turnout. Multiple studies over several decades have made the
298 chapter 17

Table 17.2 A recipe for higher voter turnout

Features of the political system Features of voters

Compulsory voting Middle aged
Automatic registration Well educated
Voting by post and by proxy permitted Married
Advance voting permitted Higher income
Weekend polling Employed
Election decides who governs Home owner
Cohesive parties Strong party loyalty
Proportional representation Church-goer
Close result anticipated Member of a labour union
Small electorate Has not changed residences recently
Expensive campaigns Voted in previous elections
Elections for several posts held at the same time
Sources: Endersby et al. (2006), Geys (2006), IDEA (2018a).

Table 17.3 Countries where voting is compulsory

Compulsory voting enforced Compulsory voting not enforced

Argentina Luxembourg Bolivia Honduras
Australia Nauru Bulgaria Mexico
Belgium Peru Costa Rica Paraguay
Brazil Singapore Dominican Republic Thailand
Cyprus Turkey Egypt
Ecuador Uruguay Gabon
Source: IDEA (2018c).
Note: Voting is also compulsory in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Panama, but there is no information regarding whether or not it
is enforced. Countries that no longer use compulsory voting include Chile, Fiji, Italy, and Venezuela.

point that proportional representation is the most effective electoral system (see Chapter 15) in terms of encouraging
turnout, in part because the benefits of voting are clearer: each vote counts because seats gained directly reflect
votes won. In the single-member plurality system, by contrast, most electoral districts are secure for a particular
party, meaning that individual votes are unlikely to affect the result.
Within countries, variations in turnout reflect the pattern found with other forms of political participation; the
likelihood of voting is shaped by an individual’s political resources and political interest (see Table 17.2, right
column). Those most likely to vote are educated, affluent, married, middle-aged citizens with a job and a strong
party loyalty, who belong to a church or a trade union, and are long-term residents of a community. These are the
people with both resources and an interest in formal politics. By contrast, those least likely to vote have fewer
resources and less reason to be committed to party politics; the archetypal non-voter is a young, poorly educated,
single, unemployed man who belongs to no organizations, lacks party ties, and has recently moved home.
Attempts to boost turnout must be sensitive to political realities: while increased participation may benefit the
system as a whole, it will have an unequal impact on the parties within it. Conservative parties in particular will be
cautious about schemes for encouraging turnout, because abstainers would probably vote disproportionately for
parties of the left. There remains one other blunt but effective tool for promoting turnout: compulsory voting (see
Focus 17.2).

voters in authoritarian states

So far in this chapter the focus has been on the influences that shape voter choice in democracies, the emphasis
being on the noun choice: voters are faced with alternatives and bring multiple considerations to bear in deciding
which party or leader to support, or even whether to vote at all. Looking now at authoritarian states, they almost
 voters 299

all have elections (as we saw in Chapter 15), but the dynamics of voting are different. Although voting in authoritarian
states is less well studied and understood than is the case with democracies, it is clear that understanding the motives
of rulers is more important than understanding the motives of voters.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from democracies are a handful of Middle Eastern no-party states where
the choices are straightforward: there are none, at least in terms of elections. People must fi nd other and more subtle
ways of making their views known to the regime, and must be careful what they say, and how they say it. Moving
along the spectrum, we fi nd a handful of communist one-party systems where voters are not given much in the way
of alternatives but may still be expected to endorse the party’s candidates by turning out to vote. In such systems,
ruling parties cannot be meaningfully opposed or defeated, and official candidates are simply
presented to voters for ritual endorsement. For an example, see Spotlight Iran. Electoral
Any opinions that voters might have about the electoral process in an authoritarian regime, authoritari-
or about party policies or pressing public issues, are not for expression in the voting booth. anism
Undoubtedly voters do have such opinions, because politics in such states is more central to An arrangement in
ordinary life than in democracies, and people are adept at distinguishing between national which a regime
gives the
propaganda and local reality. With such limited choices on election day, however, such opinions appearance of
are effectively suppressed. This phenomenon ties in with what we saw in Chapter 13 about being democratic,
mobilized participation, where the actions of voters are managed and obligatory, their involvement and offering voters
organized by leaders and elites in order to give the impression of support for the regime. choice, while
These no-party and one-party systems are rare, though, which means that the vast majority concealing its
authoritarian
of authoritarian systems have two or more parties vying for the votes of citizens, in an qualities.
arrangement sometimes known as electoral authoritarianism. Like so many concepts in

Focus 17.2
Compulsory voting: pros and cons
In the effort to encourage higher voter turnout, making it compulsory can be considered the nuclear option.
Compulsory voting was first introduced in Belgium in 1892, and then in Argentina in 1914 and Australia in
1924. Although it is today used in less than 30 countries – some of which enforce it (using fines, imprisonment,
or disenfranchisement as a sanction) and some of which do not (see Table 17.3) – voter turnout in these
countries is about seven percentage points higher on average than in countries where voting is voluntary
(Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018c).
The case for compulsory voting is worth making. A full turnout means the electorate is more representative
and the authority of the government is enhanced, disengaged groups are drawn into the political process,
more voters will lead to a more informed electorate, and parties no longer need to devote resources to
encourage their supporters to vote. Most citizens acknowledge that it is their civic duty to pay taxes, serve
on a jury, and perhaps even fight in a war; why, then, should they not want to invest the small amount of
effort involved in voting at elections? Without it, abstainers take a free ride at the expense of the
conscientious.
But the arguments against are also strong. Mandatory voting undermines the liberty which is an essential
part of democracy: requiring people to participate smacks of authoritarianism rather than free choice. Also,
abstention may reflect contentment, meaning that low turnout is not necessarily a problem. Most problematic
of all, compulsory voting gives influence to less-informed and less-engaged voters. Brennan (2011) argues
that nothing is more integral to democracy than voting, and that most people endorse the ‘folk theory’ that
all citizens have a civic duty to vote. ‘However,’ he continues, ‘if citizens do vote, they must vote well, on the
basis of sound evidence for what is likely to promote the common good’. If they lack the ‘motive, knowledge,
rationality, or ability to vote well’, he concludes, they should not vote at all. Clearly, compulsory voting
militates against this.
In all democracies, elections still attract more than enough votes to form a decision. There is no evidence
that high turnout increases the quality of the political choices made, so why not continue to rely on the
natural division of labour between interested voters and indifferent abstainers?
 SPOTLIGHT IRAN
Brief profile
Iran has long played a critical role in the Middle East, first because of the oil reserves that the British long sought,
then because of the close strategic relationship between the United States and the regime of the Shah of Iran, and
now because of the significance of the Islamic Republic created in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. It has
an elected president and legislature, but power is manipulated by an unelected Supreme Leader surrounded by
competing cliques, candidates for public office are vetted, laws must be approved by an unelected clerical-juridical
council, political rights are limited, and women are marginalized. It is a poor country that controls enormous oil
and mineral wealth, and is socially diverse. Even if most Iranians are joined by a shared religion, they are still
divided between those espousing conservative and reformist views. These differences are strongly structured by
gender, generation, and level of education.

Form of government Unitary Islamic Republic. Date of state formation debatable, and most
recent constitution adopted 1979.
Executive Presidential. President elected for maximum of two consecutive four-
year terms, but shares power with a Supreme Leader appointed for life
by an Assembly of Experts (effectively an electoral college), who must
be an expert in Islamic law, and acts as head of state with considerable
executive powers.
Legislature Unicameral Majlis, with 290 members elected for renewable four-year
terms.
Judiciary Supreme Court with members appointed for five-year terms. The
Iranian legal system is based on a combination of Islamic law (sharia)
and civil law.
Electoral system Single-member plurality for the legislature, simple majority for the
president.
Parties No-party system. Only Islamist parties can operate legally, but
organizations that look like parties operate regardless. They are not
formal political parties as conventionally understood, however, and
instead operate as loose coalitions representing conservative and
reformist positions.

80.3m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$439bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$5,415 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Voters in Iran
Iran does not fare well on comparative
democratic rankings. Since the 1979
revolution that removed the Western-backed
(and authoritarian) regime of the Shah of Iran,
and ushered in the era of the ayatollahs (high-
ranking Shi’ah clerics), Iran has possessed a
pariah status in the eyes of most Western
governments. It has been accused of
repression at home, of efforts to support
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and of covert plans to build nuclear
weapons.
It is all the more ironic, then, that it seems
to have an active electorate faced with a
Iranian voters line up at a polling station during local elections in 2017. significant number of circumscribed choices
In spite of the ban on political parties in Iran, and charges of electoral at the polls. The ruling clerics and the military
fraud, voters are presented with an array of candidates representing still wield considerable power, many in the
different policy positions. political opposition languish in jail, and
Source: Getty Images/Majid Saeedi/Stringer. elections are contested less by political
parties than by religiously based factions. This
does not mean, however, that many Iranians do not hanker after democratic choice, nor that they are unwilling
to voice opposition to the regime and support reform-minded candidates at elections.
The 2009, 2013, and 2017 presidential elections, for example, provided choice among candidates opting for
different solutions to the country’s
severe economic problems. Open TURKMENISTAN
campaigning included debates involving
the major candidates. While there is no
TEHRAN
dependable way to measure Iranian
public opinion, it was clear that many
citizens – particularly younger voters
suffering the most from high
IRAQ IRAN AFGHANISTAN
unemployment – were willing to
express themselves. Turnout in 2013
and 2017 was estimated to have
exceeded 70 per cent, but charges of
fraud continue to surround Iranian
elections, although they are hard to SAUDI ARABIA
verify in the absence of independent
election monitoring.
With problems ranging from high
population growth to unemployment,
inflation, pollution, drug addiction, and
poverty, Iran faces difficulties which Further reading
the ruling regime has intensified rather
Axworthy, Michael (2016) Iran: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford
than resolved. But there is hope in the University Press).
substantial desire for change among Boroujerdi, Mehrzad, and Kourosh Rahimkhani (2018) Post-revolutionary
its many young, educated voters, Iran: A Political Handbook (Syracuse University Press).
hinting – in the view of Brumberg and Brumberg, Daniel, and Farideh Farhi (2016) Power and Change in Iran:
Farhi (2016) – at the possibility of Politics of Contention and Conciliation (Indiana University Press).
multiple opportunities for change and
transformation.
302 chapter 17

the social sciences, its exact meaning is disputed, and it can be applied across a wide spectrum of political system
types. Schedler (2009) uses it to describe regimes that ‘play the game of multiparty elections’ while violating ‘the
liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections
instruments of authoritarian rule rather than “instruments of democracy”’. Elsewhere, Schedler (2013) describes
the features of electoral authoritarianism as follows:

governments deploy a broad repertoire of manipulative strategies to keep winning elections. They ban parties,
prosecute candidates, harass journalists, intimidate voters, forge election results, and so forth. Their proximate goal
is to contain the uncertainty of electoral outcomes, their ultimate goal to prevent the uncertainties of regime change.
Opposition parties sometimes refuse to participate in electoral charades, at other times they do so under protest.

In other words, there are regular elections with multiple candidates, but voting is so manipulated as to effectively
remove the possibility of defeat for the existing government. Meaningful competition may operate locally but is
not allowed to shape the national outcome. The result (typically known in advance) is proclaimed by the regime as
signalling support for its policies. In effect, voters are co-opted, even against their will, to ‘approve’ the work of the
regime.
Egypt is an example of electoral authoritarianism at work. There were five presidential ‘elections’ during the
administration of Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), but the first four were actually referendums in which he ran
unopposed and never (officially) won less than 94 per cent of the votes cast. He had two opponents in 2005, but was
still able to win nearly 89 per cent of the vote. There were also seven rounds of legislative elections during his
administration, ostensibly contested by multiple parties, but his ruling National Democratic Party always managed
to win overwhelming majorities. The cause of the ruling regime was underpinned by the large number of voters
who were prevented from participating by not being allowed to register to vote (see Figure 17.7).
By 2010, there were more than 20 million unregistered voters in Egypt, amounting to two out of every five
eligible voters. Following the 2011 revolution, the laws were changed to arrange for automatic universal voter
registration, which had the effect of registering almost all eligible voters and increasing turnout in 2015 by more
than 200 per cent. The enthusiasm for Egypt’s new democracy was to be short-lived, however, and while the
numbers of registered and eligible voters remained about the same in 2015, turnout collapsed to Mubarak-era levels
thanks to voter disenchantment with the return of electoral fraud.
A variation on the theme of electoral authoritarianism is found in states where there is a modicum of political
choice, but the meaning of that choice is undermined by the manner in which government turns a blind eye to
the manipulation of voters, or is itself involved in that manipulation. Two presidential elections in early 2018 –
in Russia and Egypt – were foregone conclusions not just because the governing regimes in both countries made
sure that opponents would be discouraged from running, but also because the elections themselves were Percentage turnout of voting-age population

60
60
Voting-age population and registered voters,

50
50

40
40
in millions

30
30

20
20

10
10

0
0
76

84

87

90

95

05

10

12

15
19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

Voting-age population Registered voters Turnout of voting-age population

Figure 17.7 Voter turnout trends in Egypt

Source: IDEA data quoted in Solijonov (2016).
Note: Figures are for national legislative elections.
 voters 303

surrounded by fraud. In spite of the problems, turnout at elections in Russia has been quite high, falling only
slightly from a high of about 65–75 per cent in the mid-1990s to about 60–70 per cent since 2010. The trend,
though, is clearly downhill. McAllister (2014) notes that the reasons behind abstention are often the same as
those in democracies (non-voters are likely to be poorer, less educated, and to have less interest in politics).
However, he notes that abstention can also be explained by disillusionment with politics in general and with the
choices on offer, by a growing sense of the unfair conduct of elections, and by the exceptional weakness of civil
society in Russia.
Patterns of party identification are not as easy to measure in authoritarian states as in democracies, if only
because their parties do not often have long histories. To the extent that it is possible to tell, though, the relationship
between parties and voters in these states is neither strong nor stable (Hagopian, 2007). One reflection of this is
found in studies of electoral volatility. The original measure of such volatility was developed by Pedersen (1979),
who produced an index that ranges between 0 per cent (no parties gain or lose votes from one election to the next)
and 100 per cent (no parties from the last election win any seats at the new election). As a point of reference,
Pedersen’s original study of parties in Western Europe between 1948 and 1977 produced an average figure of 8.1
per cent; that is, low volatility. By contrast, later research revealed much higher levels of volatility in hybrid and
authoritarian states, ranging as high as 45 per cent or more in Eastern Europe and Russia (see Figure 17.8).
One factor impacting elections and voter behaviour where democracies and authoritarian
states part company is the potential for political violence. Voters in democracies might have
Electoral
to deal with intimidation, but they rarely have to put their lives on the line (as they once often
volatility
did) in order to support campaigns or cast a ballot. In authoritarian states, by contrast, a A measure of the
dangerous combination of intimidation by the regime and domestic social or ethnic divisions degree of change
means that elections – and political activity more broadly – can be accompanied by death and in support for
destruction. When election management by the regime ceases to be effective, the outcome political parties
can be direct and short-term confl ict among competing groups during election campaigns, from one election
to another.
with its primary impact being on voters. In this way, elections can become a source of
instability rather than a means of reinforcing the regime’s authority. There is no comprehensive Political
data on election violence, which means that little is known for certain about why it happens, violence
but it has been a problem in multiple countries in recent years, including Afghanistan, Côte Violence
d’Ivoire, Honduras, Pakistan, and the Philippines. perpetrated by
The problem of political violence has been particularly serious in Nigeria, a hybrid system one group on
another for
with a large, divided, and volatile society where voters identify above all with their ethnicity, political ends.
where parties have routinely reflected ethnic divisions, and where ethnic, religious, and

60

50
Percentage level of volatility

40

30

20

10

0
SA

en

ce

an

ico

il

ry

ela

ia

ia

ru

e
nd

di
az

ain
liv

ss
U

ga

Pe
an

Jap
ed
U

zu
In
ex

Br
rla

Ru
Bo

kr
un
Fr
Sw

ne
M
he

U
H

Ve
et
N

Full democracies Flawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states

Figure 17.8 Comparing levels of electoral volatility

Source: Mainwaring and Torcal (2006).
Note: Figures are for legislative elections held at different times between 1978 and 2003.
304 chapter 17

community tensions have generated considerable violence. The International Society for Civil Liberties and the
Rule of Law and Human Rights Watch estimated that, between 1999 and 2010, the number of Nigerians killed in
such violence ranged between 11,000 and 13,500 (quoted in Campbell, 2013). Instability from another source – the
infiltration of the Boko Haram Islamist movement into north-eastern Nigeria – was the immediate reason given
for the postponement by six weeks of presidential and legislative elections in Nigeria in 2015. Critics, however,
charged that the motive was politics rather than security, and was aimed at giving the incumbent president Goodluck
Jonathan more time to rebuild flagging support for his campaign. In the event, he lost to his northern opponent,
Muhammadu Buhari, providing the first occasion on which an incumbent president in Nigeria had lost a re-
election contest.
On the other side of the continent of Africa, Kenya (another hybrid) has recently been a cause for concern
because of outbreaks of political violence during elections. Like Nigeria, it is divided ethnically, and there has long
been tension between its two major groups, the Kikuyu of central Kenya and the Luo of western Kenya. In the
1960s, Kenya was governed by nationalist leader Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and one of his main adversaries was
Oginga Odinga, a Luo. Their two sons – Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga – played a key role in the 2007
elections, the former as a party organizer and the latter as a candidate for the presidency. Odinga lost the election,
which was surrounded by unprecedented levels of civil unrest that resulted in the deaths of more than 1,300
Kenyans. Kenyatta and Odinga competed against each other in the 2013 and 2017 elections, both of which were
won by Kenyatta against a background of fraud charges and more political violence.
Turning back to the question of voter turnout in authoritarian states, reliable data are hard to find because of the
problem of manipulated results. When dead people are listed as having voted, sometimes several times, we can be
sure that there has been electoral fraud. Another indicator of manipulation is much easier to spot: unrealistically
high turnout figures and winning margins. Few outcomes so patently beggar belief as the claim by Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein that he won the 2002 election (actually, a referendum) with 100 per cent support on 100 per cent
turnout. Such absurd figures can be seen as an expression and reinforcement of the powers of dictators, which
include the capacity to prevent anyone from contradicting turnout numbers and election results.
Where dependable independent data are available, however, and the numbers are more realistic, we find that
turnout in authoritarian states is often comparable with that in democracies. Based on polls asking people if they
had voted at the most recent election, for example, de Miguel et al. (2015) found that turnout in seven Arab
countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen) ranged between 51 and 72 per cent,
with an average of 61 per cent.
It would be reasonable to ask why voters make the effort to turn out in elections in authoritarian states, given
the combination of their probable cynicism about the process and their distance from the interests of the elites. In
their study of Arab elections, de Miguel et al. (2015) reject the standard view of elections in the region as purely
patronage contests. While conceding that patronage does play a role, they argue that voters also care about policy
and use elections to express their views about the regime and its performance, particularly on the economy.
‘Positive evaluations of economic performance’, they conclude, ‘lead individuals to have more positive overall
evaluations of the regime, which in turn increases the likelihood of voting.’
 voters 305

discussion questions
◆◆ If identification with parties is declining, what prevents them from disappearing altogether?
◆◆ Is it irrational to vote?
◆◆ Is the role of personality underrated or overrated as an explanation for voter choices?
◆◆ Low voter turnout: good or bad?
◆◆ Compulsory voting: good idea or bad?
◆◆ The motives of leaders are more important than the motives of voters in explaining voting
behaviour in authoritarian states. To what extent can the same logic be applied to
democracies?

key concepts
◆◆ Electoral authoritarianism ◆◆ Political violence
◆◆ Electoral volatility ◆◆ Secularization
◆◆ Issue voter ◆◆ Social class
◆◆ Partisan dealignment ◆◆ Vote buying
◆◆ Party identification ◆◆ Voter turnout

further reading
Aarts, Kees, André Blais, and Hermann Schmitt (eds) (2011) Political Leaders and Democratic
Elections (Oxford University Press). Assesses the role of political leaders in voting decisions
in nine democracies, suggesting that characteristics of leaders are less important than
conventional wisdom imagines.
Arzheimer, Kai, Jocelyn Evans, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck (2017) The Sage Handbook of
Electoral Behaviour (Sage). A two-volume set covering different approaches to studying
voter behaviour, with examples from a wide range of countries.
Caplan, Bryan (2007) The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
(Princeton University Press). A study by an economist of the misconceptions and biases
held by voters, and how these make them choose badly at elections.
Duch, Raymond M., and Randolph T. Stevenson (2008) The Economic Vote: How Political and
Economic Institutions Condition Election Results (Cambridge University Press). An
authoritative analysis of economic voting in democracies.
Schedler, Andreas (2013) The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral
Authoritarianism (Oxford University Press). An assessment of the dynamics of electoral
authoritarianism.
Solijonov, Abdurashid (2016) Voter Turnout Trends Around the World (International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance). A short report from a Stockholm-based research
centre, packed with data and analysis on recent turnout trends and their possible meaning.
 18

Source: Alamy/Trinity Mirror/Mirrorpix

interest groups
contents
◆ Interest groups: an
overview
◆ Origins and types of
groups
PREVIEW ◆ Channels of influence
Where most of the institutions of government are listed in a national ◆ Ingredients of influence
constitution, interest groups (like political parties) are mainly founded ◆ The dynamics of
and operate outside these formal structures. They have evolved
separately, their core purpose being to influence the shaping of policy
interest groups
without becoming part of government; another example of governance ◆ Interest groups in
at work. They come in several types, and use different methods – both authoritarian states
direct and indirect – to achieve their goals. A vibrant interest group
community is generally a sign of a healthy civil society, but where the
influence of different interests and the groups that support those
interests is unbalanced, it can also become a barrier to the implementation of the popular will as expressed in
elections.
This chapter begins with a survey of the origins and the different types of groups, and the manner in which they
work. It assesses the channels of influence used by groups before looking at the ingredients of influence and asking
what gives particular groups the ability to persuade.The chapter then discusses and critiques the idea of pluralism, con-
trasting the free marketplace of ideas with the privileged role that groups can come to play within the political process.
It then looks at the distinctive qualities and effects of social movements, before assessing the global state of civil society
and discussing the place of interest groups in authoritarian regimes, where they are typically seen either as a threat to
the power of the regime or as a device through which the regime can maintain its control over society.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Interest groups come in many shapes and sizes, with a wide variety of objectives, methods, and levels of
influence.
◆◆ Much like political parties, interest groups are a relatively recent addition to the formal processes of
government.
◆◆ Interest groups use a combination of direct and indirect channels of influence. Where ties with
government are particularly strong, the danger arises of the emergence of sub-governments enjoying
preferred access.
◆◆ Pluralism is closely associated with studies of interest groups, but there are reasons to question whether
it describes how groups operate in practice.
◆◆ Interest groups are often complemented by wider social movements, whose activities challenge
conventional channels of participation.
◆◆ Where the governments of democracies may be too heavily influenced by powerful groups, the problem
can be reversed in authoritarian states.
 interest groups 307

interest groups: an overview

Interest groups are bodies which seek to influence public policy from outside the formal Interest group
structures of government. They do this through a combination of direct pressure on A body that works
government and the bureaucracy, and indirect pressure via the media and public opinion. outside
They come in many different forms, including employer organizations, consumer groups, government to
influence public
professional bodies, labour unions, and single-issue groups. They work primarily at the
policy. Also known
national level, but can also be found in local and international arenas. Like political parties, as a non-
interest groups are a crucial channel of communication between society and government, governmental
especially in democracies. Unlike parties, they pursue specialized concerns, working to organization
influence government without becoming the government. They are not election-fighting (NGO).
organizations; instead, they typically adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with whatever
power structure confronts them, using whatever channels are legally (and sometimes illegally) available to them.
Although many interest groups go about their work quietly, their activity is pervasive. Their staff can be found ne-
gotiating with bureaucrats over the details of proposed laws and regulations, pressing their case in legislative committee
hearings, and taking journalists out to lunch in their efforts to influence media coverage. As Finer (1966) once noted,
‘their day-to-day activities pervade every sphere of domestic policy, every day, every way, at every nook and cranny
of government’. Without question, interest groups are central to a system of functional representation, especially on
detailed issues of policy. Even so, there are different ways of defining the relationship between interest groups and the
state. Thus groups can be seen as:

◆◆ An essential component of a free society, separate from the state.

◆◆ Partners with the state in achieving a well-regulated society.
◆◆ Providers of information and watchdogs on the performance of government.
◆◆ An additional channel through which citizens can be politically engaged.
◆◆ Promoters of elitism, offering particular sectors privileged access to government.

Interest groups are also a critical part of a healthy civil society. In a democracy, the limited Civil society
role of government leaves space for groups and movements of all kinds to emerge and address The arena that
exists between
shared problems, often without government intervention. A rich civic tradition also provides
the state and the
the context in which interest groups can develop their capacity to influence government. individual, and
Some interests can become too powerful, though, developing a privileged status with within which
government, and compromising the principle of equal access. In authoritarian regimes, groups take
meanwhile, there are typically restrictions on the work of interest groups, because rulers see collective action
on shared
them as a potential threat, and seek either to repress them or incorporate them into the regime.
interests.
As a result, civil society in authoritarian regimes is constrained.

origins and types of groups

Interest groups pre-date parties, and in many ways can be seen as a more natural form of
political organization: the earliest groups were created either to provide a service not yet
Lobbying
addressed by government, or to bring together a group of people with shared interests who Efforts to
wanted to make a joint case to government. Individual citizens could press their case and try influence the
to influence political decisions, but to do so as part of a group always made more strategic decisions made by
sense, and the bigger the group, the more likely government was to listen. One of the core elected officials or
bureaucrats on
methods of pressing influence is lobbying, a concept whose origins lie in the lobby that
behalf of
separates the chambers of the House of Commons and the House of Lords in the British individuals, groups,
Parliament. In this space, citizens could once approach their Members of Parliament in order or organizations.
to plead their case or request help, and from this habit derived the terms lobbying and lobbyist
(see Focus 18.1).
The earliest interest groups of the modern era date back to the industrial revolution, and include charitable organ-
izations formed to help the poor, or bodies formed to campaign on political or social issues. In Britain, examples of
the latter included the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, formed in 1787, and the Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, formed in 1824. These were followed by groups formed to promote the interests of
308 chapter 18

industrial and agricultural employers or workers, the latter evolving into trade unions (which had long been illegal in
most industrial countries). In the early twentieth century, new associations were formed to represent the interests of
professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers. Later, with the emergence after World War II of the post-material
ideas discussed in Chapter 12, groups with a wider variety of agendas began to develop, pro-
moting the rights of women and ethnic minorities, and campaigning on behalf of issues such as
Protective
group
human rights and the environment.
An interest group Interest groups today come in many shapes and sizes, with a wide range of objectives, meth-
that seeks ods, and levels of influence. Many have been founded for practical or charitable purposes rather
selective benefits than for political action, but have developed a political dimension as they have worked either to
for its members modify public policy or to resist unfavourable changes. Some will have a few hundred members
and insider status
with relevant
focusing on a short-term local issue and working with local government, while others will have
government millions of members and work in many different countries, targeting national governments or
departments. international organizations. Their variety, in fact, is so great, their methods so varied, and their
overlap so considerable that it is not easy to develop a list of discrete types (Figure 18.1).
Nimby To help us understand this variety, it is helpful to distinguish between protective and promo-
An acronym for tional groups. Protective groups are the most prominent and powerful, articulating the material
‘not in my back
yard’, describing
interests of their members: workers, employers, professionals, retirees, military veterans, and so on.
the efforts of Sometimes known as ‘sectional’ or ‘functional’ groups, these bodies represent clear interests, and
some local are usually well established, well connected, and well resourced.They give priority to influencing
interest groups to government, and can invoke sanctions to help them achieve their goals: workers can go on strike,
block and business organizations can withdraw their cooperation with government.
geographically
focused
Protective groups can also be based on local, rather than functional, interests. Geographic
developments. groups emerge when the shared interests of people living in the same location are threatened
by plans for, say, a new highway, a power station, or public housing for low-income residents.
Promotional Because of their negative stance, these kinds of bodies are sometimes known as Nimby groups,
group meaning ‘not in my back yard’. Collectively, Nimby groups can generate a Banana outcome:
An ‘interest’ group ‘build absolutely nothing anywhere near anyone’. Unlike permanent functional organizations,
that promotes
however, Nimby groups often come and go in response to particular threats and changing levels
wider issues and
causes than is the of public interest.
case with In contrast to the narrow interests of protective bodies (see Table 18.1), promotional groups
protective groups are broader in outlook, which is why they are also known as advocacy, attitude, campaign or cause
focused on the groups, or even public interest groups (although just how far they work in the true public interest
tangible interests
is a matter of some debate). They do not expect to profit directly from the causes they pursue,
of their members.
nor do they have a material stake in how those causes are resolved. Instead, they seek broad policy

Type Focus of interest

Groups of people with material economic interests, such as business, industry, producers,
Economic
trades, and workers.
Public concerns, such as consumer, public health, human rights, and environmental
Public
interests.

Professional Specific professions, such as lawyers, doctors, and university professors.

Single-issue Distinct and narrow issues, such as animal rights or domestic violence.

Religious Causes and issues tied to particular religions, often with a significant moral element.

Represent the interests of city, local and regional governments to the national
Government
administration.
Public organizations that influence government even though they are not organized as
Institutional
interest groups. Examples include hospitals, universities, and the armed forces.

Figure 18.1 Types of interest group

 interest groups 309

Table 18.1 Comparing protective and promotional interest groups

Protective Promotional
Aims Defends an interest Promotes a cause

Membership Closed: membership is restricted Open: anyone can join

Status Insider: frequently consulted by government Outsider: consulted less often by government;
and actively seeks this role targets public opinion and the media

Benefits Selective: only group members benefit Collective: benefits go to both members and
non-members

Focus Aim to influence national government on Also seek to influence national and global
specific issues affecting members bodies on broad policy matters

changes in the issues that interest them, which include consumer safety, women’s interests, driver Peak
safety, the environment, or economic development. Their growth in recent decades constitutes a association
major trend in interest politics, even if many who join promotional groups are credit card affiliates An umbrella
only; they send donations or sign up for membership, and perhaps follow news about the issue organization
representing the
concerned, but otherwise remain unengaged. For this reason, the effectiveness of promotional
broad interests of
bodies as schools for democracy can easily be overstated (Maloney, 2009). business or labour
Protective interest groups representing a specific industry not only lobby government directly, to government.
but will often also join a peak association, or an umbrella body for like-minded organizations.
Their members are not individuals but businesses, trade associations, and labour unions. For
example, industrial associations and corporations may join a wider body representing business interests to government,
and labour unions may do the same for wider bodies representing worker interests. Examples of peak associations
include the Federal Organization of German Employers, the National Association of Manufacturers in the United
States, and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in the UK. According to its website, membership of the
CBI gives its member businesses influence in government, insight into policy trends, and access to political leaders
(Confederation of British Industry, 2018).
Despite the widespread decline in union membership and labour militancy (see later in this chapter), many labour
peak associations still speak with a powerful voice. In 2018, the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) com-
prised eight unions with a total of nearly six million individual members, while Britain’s Trades Union Congress had
49 affiliated unions in 2018, representing a comparable number of working people. Such numbers are usually enough
to earn a seat at the policy table.
In working to influence public policy, peak associations usually succeed, because they are attuned to national gov-
ernment, have a strong research capacity, and represent significant economic interests. For example, the DGB (2018)
describes itself as follows:

The DGB is the political umbrella organization of the German trade unions and is the voice of working people in
Germany. It unites and represents the interests of its unions and their members to politicians and other organizations
at all levels: from local government to European and international bodies … The DGB and its member unions are
committed to the principles of a ‘general trade union’. This means they have no affi liations relating to religion, belief,
ideology, and party politics, and unite workers regardless of their industry, employment relationship, political views,
or beliefs.

The place of peak associations has been changing, though, because of the rise of pro-market thinking, international
markets, and smaller service companies. Trade union membership has fallen, and the voice of business is now often
expressed directly by leading companies. In addition, the task of influencing the government is increasingly delegated
to specialist lobbying companies. In response to these trends, peak associations have tended to become policy-influenc-
ing and service-providing bodies, not just organizations negotiating collectively with government on behalf of their
members.
310 chapter 18

Think-tank Another kind of interest group is the think-tank, or policy institute. This is a private organ-
A private ization set up to undertake research with a view to influencing both the public and the political
organization that debate. Think-tanks typically publish reports, organize conferences, and host seminars, all with
conducts research the goal of encouraging debate over the issues in which they are interested, and to influence
into a given area
of policy with the
government and legislators either directly or indirectly. Most are privately funded, but some are
goal of fostering supported by governments, political parties, or corporations, and have a clear national, corporate,
public debate and or ideological agenda. The work of several such bodies has been used in this book: Freedom
political change. House (United States) on democracy, Transparency International (Germany) on corruption, the
Fraser Institute (Canada) on economic freedom, and Civicus (South Africa) on civil society – see
later in this chapter.

channels of influence
Interest groups have a nose for where policy is made, and are adept at following the debate to the arenas where it
is resolved. They are also adept at using different means for shaping and changing the political agenda; their
methods include fund-raising (and spending), promoting public awareness, generating information, mobilizing
their members, lobbying government, advising legislators, and encouraging favourable media coverage of the
issues they care about. These methods can be categorized broadly into two sets: direct and indirect (summarized
in Figure 18.2).

Direct influence on policy-makers

Those who make policy are the ultimate target of most groups. Direct conversations with government ministers
are the ideal, and talking with ministers before specific policies have crystallized is particularly valuable because it

Target Influence Channels Features

Policy-makers Direct Executive Talking with government ministers
before policy is finalized

Bureaucracy Focusing on details, which are easier

to change than broader policy

Legislature Lobbying legislators with the goal of

influencing their views and votes on
law and policy

Courts Used by groups to launch legal

challenges

Parties, media and Indirect Parties Exclusive links with political parties
public opinion are declining

Traditional media Paid advertising and favourable

editorial coverage

Social media Direct engagement with the public

Figure 18.2 Channels of interest group influence

 interest groups 311

enables a group to enter the policy process at a formative stage. But such privileges are usually confined to a select
few, and most interest group activity focuses in practice on the bureaucracy, the legislature, and the courts. Of
these, the bureaucracy is the main pressure point: interest groups follow power and it is in the offices of bureaucrats
that detailed decisions are often formed.
While the bureaucracy is invariably a crucial arena for groups, the significance of the legislature depends on its
political weight. Comparing the United States and Canada illustrates the differences:

◆◆ The US Congress (and, especially, its committees) is a vital cog in the policy machinery. Members of Congress
realize they are under constant public scrutiny, not least in the House of Representatives, where a two-year
election cycle means that politicians must be continually aware of their ratings by interest groups, and are
constantly looking for sources of funding for election campaigns. The ability of groups to endorse particular
candidates keeps legislators sensitive to group demands, especially those which resonate in their home districts
(see Cigler et al., 2015).
◆◆ In Canada, as in most democracies, Parliament is more reactive than proactive; as a result, interest groups treat
its members as opinion-formers rather than policy-makers. Party voting is entrenched in the House of Commons,
extending beyond floor votes to committees and, in any case, ‘committees seldom modify in more than marginal
ways what is placed before them and virtually never derail any bill that the government has introduced’ (Brooks
and Ménard, 2017). Such a disciplined environment offers few opportunities for influence.

Lobbying is central to the idea of direct influence over policy-makers (see Focus 18.1), but it raises many
troubling questions. Is lobbying just a fancy word for bribery? Is it possible for wealthy interest groups and
corporations simply to pay a fee to a lobbying firm to ensure that a bill is defeated or a regulation deferred? On the
whole, the answer is ‘no’. Lobbyists are inclined to exaggerate their own impact for commercial reasons but, except
in countries where there are particularly strong links between government and key interests (such as Japan – see
later in this chapter), most can achieve little more than access to relevant politicians and, perhaps, bureaucrats. One
study of lobbying in the United States, for example, found that six out of ten of the campaigns studied failed to
change policy despite millions of dollars in spending (Baumgartner, et al., 2009).
Despites its practical limitations, professional lobbying does contribute to effective political communication. It
can focus the client’s message on relevant decision-makers, ensuring that the client’s voice is heard by those who
need to hear it. Furthermore, lobbyists spend most time with sympathetic legislators, contributing to their pro-
motion of a cause in which they already believe. Long-time Brussels-based commercial lobbyist Stanley Crossick
(quoted in Thomas and Hrebenar, 2009) said that ‘successful lobbying involves getting the right message over to the
right people in the right form at the right time on the right issue’. In that respect, at least, it enhances the efficiency
of governance.

Indirect influence through public opinion

Public opinion is a critical target for promotional interest groups, the goals being to change public perceptions
and habits, and to aggregate public interest in such a way as to bring pressure for policy change on government.
This wider audience can be addressed by focusing on paid advertising, by promoting favourable coverage in
conventional media (public relations), and by using social media to promote ideas and bring together like-minded
constituencies.
Political parties are less important as targets of influence than they once were. In Europe, for example, labour un-
ions and socialist parties long had a close relationship in their efforts to promote broad working-class interests, and the
environmental movement spawned both promotional interest groups dealing with specific problems (such as pollution,
waste, and threats to wildlife) and green political parties. Interest groups have often since become more specialized
while parties have developed broader agendas. As a result, most groups now seek to hedge their bets. Loose, pragmatic
links are the norm, with interests tending to follow power, not parties.
Media, though, remain at least as important as ever, although the fragmentation discussed in Chapter 14 has meant
that groups have had to develop media strategies that are both broader (using as many outlets as possible) while also
being more targeted on the social media outlets in which their supporters are most likely to be interested. Either
way, favourable coverage of the issues about which a given group cares is the ultimate target. Especially when groups
sense that public opinion is already onside, they increasingly follow a dual strategy, appealing both to the public and
to law-makers.
312 chapter 18

Focus 18.1
Lobbying
Even though it has moved far beyond its origins in the lobby of the British Parliament, lobbying remains the
key means by which groups try to influence law-makers (see Godwin, et al., 2013, and Bitonti and Harris,
2018). Lobbyists are usually professionals, often working for corporations or even for lobbying firms
consisting of hired guns in the business of interest group communication. Such services are offered not only
by specialist government relations companies, but also by divisions within law firms and management
consultancies. These operations are growing in number in democracies, with some companies even operating
internationally.
Lobbying is on the rise for three main reasons:

◆◆ Government regulation continues to grow. A specialist lobbying firm working for several interest groups
can often monitor proposed laws and regulations more efficiently than would be the case if each interest
group undertook the task separately.
◆◆ Public relations campaigns are becoming increasingly sophisticated, often seeking to influence interest
group members, public opinion, and the government in one integrated project. Professional agencies
come into their own in planning and delivering multifaceted campaigns, which can be too complex for an
interest group client to manage directly.
◆◆ Many corporations now approach government directly, rather than working through their trade
association. Companies, both large and small, find that using a lobbying company to help them contact a
government agency or a sympathetic legislator can yield results more quickly than working through an
industry body.

Revolving The central feature of the lobbying business is its intensely personal character,
door reaching its most troubling degree in the United States where the revolving door is
The phenomenon well established. Lobbying is about who you know, and a legislator is most likely to
in which return a call from a lobbyist if the caller is a former colleague. One study of the
personnel move
revolving door phenomenon, however, suggests that rather than seeking privileged
between roles as
law-makers or insider access, special interests are more focused on how lobbyists with personal
bureaucrats and as experience of the political process can act as a form of insurance for their clients
members of against a political system that is increasingly dysfunctional and unpredictable (LaPira
industries and Thomas, 2017).
impacted by laws
and regulations.

ingredients of influence
There is no doubt that some interest groups exert more influence over government than others. So, what is it that
gives particular groups the ability to persuade? Much of the answer is to be found in four attributes ranging from
the general to the specific: legitimacy, membership, resources, and sanctions.
Density First, the degree of legitimacy achieved by a particular group is important. Interests enjoying
The proportion of high prestige are most likely to prevail on particular issues. Groups whose members stand for
all those eligible to social respectability can, on occasion, be as militant and as restrictive in their practices as trade
join a group who
actually do so. The unions once were, but professionals such as lawyers and doctors escape the public hostility that
higher the density, unions continue to attract. Similarly, the intrinsic importance of business to economic perfor-
the stronger a mance means that its representatives can usually be heard in government.
group’s authority Second, a group’s influence depends on its membership. This is a matter of density and
and bargaining commitment, as well as sheer numbers. For example, labour unions have seen their influence fall
position.
as the proportion of workers belonging to unions has fallen in nearly all democracies, especially
 interest groups 313

in the private sector (see Figure 18.3). Except in Scandinavia, union members are now a minority of the workforce,
weakening labour’s bargaining power with government and employers alike.
New Zealand is a particular stand-out in this regard (see Edwards, 2016). In 1985, union membership reached
an all-time high, with about half of the workforce being in a union. By 2016, the number had fallen to fewer than
one in five. The decline began in 1991 with the passage of a law ending compulsory membership of unions, and
continued with the restructuring and privatization of government services. Unions are also not well regarded, a 2016
survey revealing that they were trusted by only 30 per cent of New Zealanders, placing them in second to last place
above the media. Furthermore, unions have suffered from changes in the workplace, as large sites with regular hours
and low turnover have been replaced (as they have in most post-industrial societies) with smaller and more scattered
workplaces with variable hours of work.
Numbers are not by themselves an indication of influence, though, as reflected in the achievements in the United
States of the National Rifle Association (NRA), described by the New York Times as ‘the most fearsome lobbying or-
ganization in America’ (Draper, 2013). Although it refuses to release data, most educated guesses suggest that the NRA
has a membership of about five million people, or less than 2 per cent of the US population, with a preponderance
of older white men. So effective has the NRA become in its lobbying activities, though, and so willing are many of
its members to contact their local and national representatives in pursuit of the group’s goal of preserving the right to
own guns, that the United States has some of the least restrictive gun laws in the world, resulting in by far the highest
per capita rate of deaths from guns in the democratic world.
The third measure of group power is found in resources. In the European Union for example, as more decisions
have been made at the EU level, so more interest groups have opened offices in Brussels, the seat of the major EU
institutions (see Bitonti and Harris, 2018: Chapter 1). This has given them a greater capacity to work with those insti-
tutions, adding to the effects of their contacts with local, regional, and national government. Several cross-sectoral and
multi-state federations have been created to represent wider economic interests. The latter include Business Europe
(with national business federations as members), the European Consumers’ Organization, the European Trade Union
Confederation, and the European Roundtable of Industrialists, an informal forum of chief executives from nearly 50
major European corporations. As elsewhere, individual corporations are increasingly represented either directly or
through lobbying firms.

90
80
70
Percentage of work force

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
en

da

ds

an

ico

SA
ay

ly

y
K
d

nd

d
ar

an
Ita
lan

lan

lan
U

lan

Jap
a
w
ed

U
ex
ala
m

an

m
or
Fin

Ire

Po
Sw

r
en

M
er
C

Ze

he
N
D

et
ew

N
N

1980 2016

Figure 18.3 Comparing trade union membership

Source: OECD (2017b).
Note: Earlier figure for Poland is from 1990, and for Mexico from 1992.
314 chapter 18

Finally, the ability of a group to invoke sanctions is clearly important. The prime example is offered by a labour un-
ion that goes on strike, but this route is now more rarely taken thanks to the declining power of unions. Other sanctions
are more focused, such as an interest group rescinding its endorsement for a political party or a candidate for office
(meaningful only if the group has a large membership or is one that is valuable to the party or candidate, as is often
the case with the US National Rifle Association). Peak associations might also withdraw their cooperation in forming
policy. As a rule, promotional groups (such as those with environmental interests) have fewer sanctions available to use
as a bargaining chip, and their influence suffers accordingly.

the dynamics of interest groups

Pluralism
Debate on the role of interest groups has long centred on the concept of pluralism, a model
A political system that regards competition between freely organized interest groups as a form of democracy. In
in which an ideal world, interest groups can represent all major sectors of society so that each sector’s
competing interest interests receive political expression. Groups would compete for influence over government
groups exert on a level playing field, with the state showing little bias towards one over others. As new
influence over a
responsive
interests and identities emerge, groups would form to represent them, quickly fi nding a place
government. in the house of power. Overall, pluralism depicts a wholesome process of dispersed decision-
making in which government’s openness allows its policies to reflect developments in the
economy and society.
The reality of interest group dynamics differs from this ideal, and the original pluralist portrayal of the relationship
between groups and government is now widely seen as one-sided and superficial (McFarland, 2010). Criticism focuses
on four areas:

◆◆ Interest groups do not compete on a level playing field. Some interests, such as business, are inherently more
powerful, while others are less powerful, and even marginal. The result is that groups form a hierarchy of
influence, with their ranking reflecting their resources, their value to government, and public support for their
cause.
◆◆ Pluralism overlooks the bias of the political culture and political system in favour of some interests over others.
Groups advocating modest reforms within the established order are usually heard more sympathetically than
those seeking radical change, while some interests have more trouble being heard, such as those working for the
poor and the homeless.
◆◆ The state is more than a neutral umpire. In addition to deciding which groups to hear, it may regulate their
operation and even encourage their formation in areas it considers important, thus shaping the interest-group
landscape itself.
◆◆ Pluralist confl ict diverts attention away from the interests shared by leaders of mainstream groups, such as their
common membership of the same class and ethnic group. There is still truth in the conclusion drawn in 1956
by C. Wright Mills, who famously argued in his book The Power Elite that leaders of industry, the military, and
government formed an interlocking power elite, rather than separate power centres. He was referring to the
United States, but the principle applies more widely.

One famous analysis with critical implications for pluralist theory was offered in 1965 by the political scientist
Mancur Olson in his book The Logic of Collective Action. Until then, it had often been assumed that all interests could
achieve an approximately equal place at the bargaining table. But, Olson argued, it was difficult for people with
diff use interests to fi nd each other, to come together, to organize themselves, and to compete against narrower and
better-organized interests. This helped explain why it was so hard, for example, for ordinary citizens to compete
against large corporations, which had funds, resources, contacts, and much else that could be used to influence
policy-makers. Olson’s analysis overlapped with rational choice arguments that citizens did not have sufficient
incentives to become informed about politics and to engage with other citizens.
Not everyone agrees with this analysis, however. Since Olson’s day, organizations representing consumers and many
other dispersed groups have emerged, grown, and acquired a sometimes significant voice. Trumbull (2012) argues that
it is a misreading of history to believe that diffuse interests are impossible to organize or too weak to influence policy.
Indeed, he suggests that weak interests often do prevail. His proposition is that organization is less important than
 interest groups 315

Demonstrators take part in the Women’s March on Washington DC in 2017, an event designed to protest the
administration of President Donald Trump, and organized mainly through social media.
Source: Leanne McCormick.

legitimation: in other words, alliances forged among activists and regulators can form ‘legitimacy coalitions’ linking
their agendas to the broader public interest. Hence, for example, such coalitions have limited the influence not only of
the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors in Europe, but also of some multinational companies in some ­developing
­countries. The rise of multiple social movements in different places and at different times also suggests that forces
­greater than individuals and groups come into play – see Focus 18.2.
Olson was also arguing many years before the advent of the internet and social media, which have combined to make
it much easier for people with shared interests to find each other. This may not result in the creation of new ­interest
groups, but anyone with access to the internet can now create advocacy sites and invite users to follow them, post
information, debate the issues, network with like-minded users, and engage opponents. Opening an account or a site by
clicking a button takes little effort, and engagement may not go much beyond posting a comment or sharing a meme,
but these online conversations can create informal communities that add up to larger movements ­influencing public
opinion, and engaging in direct political action. Recent examples of the latter include the d­ emocracy ­movements in
Egypt in 2011 and in Ukraine in 2014, the campaigns for and against Brexit in the UK in 2016, and – in the United
States – the organization in 2017 of the Women’s March in support of women’s rights and immigration reform, and
protests in 2018 by high school students against gun violence.
The limits of pluralist thinking are also illustrated by the cases of the United States and Japan, where group
­access to government is unbalanced, but for different reasons. The United States is often considered as an exemplar
of the pluralist model, home as it is to numerous, visible, organized, competitive, well resourced, and successful
interest groups. One directory, for example, listed more than 27,000 organizations politically active in Washington
DC between 1981 and 2006 (Schlozman, 2010). The separation of powers gives interest groups several points of
leverage, including C­ ongressional committees, executive agencies, and the courts. In addition, other groups work
to influence policy at the state and local levels. But – charge the critics – government entrenches the interests of
316 chapter 18

Focus 18.2
Social movements

Social No study of the work of interest groups can ignore the impact of social movements,
movement a less conventional form of participation through which people come together in a
A movement collective and non-institutionalized effort to bring about (or block) social change (Flacks,
emerging from 2005). These movements may grow out of the work of pre-existing interest groups, or
society to pursue they may result in the creation of new groups, but – either way – groups are often at
non-establishment
goals through
their heart. Movements have coalesced around a wide variety of issues – see Table 18.2 –
non- and their participants use a wide range of methods, extending to demonstrations,
institutionalized sit-ins, boycotts, and political strikes (see Staggenborg, 2016).
means. Its Consider the example of the protestors who occupied Zuccotti Park in New York
objectives are City’s financial district in 2011 to express their disapproval of growing income inequality,
broad rather than
sectional and its
especially in the financial sector. Using the slogan ‘We are the 99 per cent’, Occupy Wall
style involves a Street rapidly became not only a national, but also an international phenomenon, with
challenge by tented encampments emerging in many countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada,
traditional France, Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey. Without
outsiders to putting up candidates for election or engaging in conventional lobbying, the Occupy
existing elites.
protests succeeded in focusing public attention (albeit briefly) on income disparities and
unchecked corporate power.
To better appreciate the character of social movements, we can compare them with parties and interest
groups (see Table 18.3). Movements are more loosely organized, typically lacking the precise membership,
subscriptions, and leadership of parties. As with those parties whose origins lie outside the legislature,
movements emerge from society to challenge the political establishment. However, movements do not seek
to craft distinct interests into an overall package; rather, they claim the moral high ground in one specific
area.
The supporters of social movements do not always need much in the way of resources to make an
impression; sheer numbers may be enough, provided that the goals are clear. This means that social
movements lend themselves well to political participation in poorer societies, where movements also
benefit from the direct and immediate interest of many participants in encouraging policy change. A good
example is the Green Belt Movement that has been active in Kenya since its foundation in 1977. It mobilizes
rural women to plant trees in an effort to stop deforestation and soil erosion, and to provide wood fuel and
income. In 2004, its founder – Wangari Maathai – became the first African woman to win the Nobel Peace
Prize.
Developments in communications have lowered the barriers to entry for new movements, facilitating
their rapid emergence when ordinary politics has been deemed to fail. Take the protests against agricultural
policy in France (including falling prices, cheaper imports, and environmental regulation), which often brings
protesting farmers onto the streets in large numbers and using multiple techniques: blocking traffic by
driving their tractors slowly along highways, dumping tons of vegetables or manure onto city squares, or
setting fire to hay outside public buildings.

those who are already wealthy and powerful, including financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’. The general
interest often drowns in a sea of special pleading, avoiding majority dictatorship but substituting the risk of tyranny
by minorities.
Japan, too, is a society that places an emphasis on group politics, and so would seem to be a natural habitat for
pluralism. Many groups are active, using standard tactics such as lobbying and generating public awareness, but Pharr
(2005) once described most of them as being characterized by the ‘four smalls’: small membership, small number
of professional staff, small budgets, and small areas of operation. By contrast, there has long been a close relation-
ship between business and government, and more specifically between large corporations and the dominant Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP). Public policy in Japan has emerged less from electoral competition and public debate than
 interest groups 317

Table 18.2 Examples of social movements

Issue Time and place Focus

Fair trade 1960s–present, originally in Europe Higher prices and sustainable techniques for producers
of commodities exporting from the developing to the
developed world
Chipko movement 1960s–1980s, India Village- and rural-based protests against deforestation
Landless workers Mid-1980s–present, Brazil Land reform and access to land for the poor
Anti-globalization Late 1980s–present, many countries Critical of the power of global corporate capitalism
LGBTQ+ rights Most active since 1990s in advanced Equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
democracies people
#MeToo Since 2017, starting in US and Opposition to sexual abuse, harassment, and assault
spreading internationally

Table 18.3 Comparing parties, interest groups, and social movements

Political parties Interest groups Social movements

Seek to influence government? Yes Yes Usually
Seek to become government? Yes No No
Focus on a single issue? Rarely Often Yes
Formally organized? Yes Yes Not usually
Tactics used? Conventional Mixture Unconventional
Main levels of operation? National, regional Global, national, local Global, national, local

from bargaining within an iron triangle involving the higher levels of the LDP, the bureaucracy,
Iron triangle
and business, with small business being relatively marginalized. The outcome of this distinctly
A policy-
non-pluralist pattern, it used to be said, was a rich country with poor people. influencing
The US also experiences the problem of an iron triangle, involving the bureaucracy, Congres- relationship
sional committees, and either corporations or interest groups (see Figure 18.4). In policy sectors involving (in the
where resources are available for distribution, legislative committees in Congress appropriate United States)
interest groups,
funds which are spent by government departments for the benefit of members of interest groups, the bureaucracy,
which in turn offer electoral support and campaign funds for members of the legislature. Perhaps and legislative
most (in)famous among these triangles is the military–industrial complex of which President committees, and a
Eisenhower warned in his farewell address. It describes the close relationship between the US three-way trading
Department of Defense, the armed services committees in Congress, and the defence contractors of information,
favours, and
that provide most of the country’s weapons. In many sectors, these relationships have loosened, support.
but they remain exceptions to the pluralist model of competitive policy-making.
The hold of iron triangles has weakened of late, thanks to closer media scrutiny, new public Issue network
interest groups that protest loudly when they spot the public being taken for a ride, legislators A loose and
who are more willing to speak out against closed and even corrupt policy-making, and the public flexible set of
forum offered by social media. Policy issues have also become more complex, drawing more interest groups,
government
groups into the policy process, and making it harder to stitch together insider deals. Reflecting
departments,
more open government, there is more talk of the concept of issue networks originally suggested legislative
by Heclo (1978). These refer to relationships between the familiar set of organizations involved committees, and
in policy-making: government departments, interest groups, and legislative committees, with the experts that work
addition of expert outsiders. However, issue networks are more open than iron triangles; a wider on policy
proposals of
range of interests take part in decisions, the bias towards protective groups is reduced, new groups mutual interest.
can enter the debate, and a sound argument carries greater weight.
318 chapter 18

Congressional
committee

To CC: Electoral support, To GD: Funding and

funds, information more staff
To IG: Friendly legislation, To CC: Policy suggestions,
contracts information

Interest group To GD: Support in Congress Government

or corporation To IG: Favourable regulation department/s

Figure 18.4 Iron triangles: the case of the United States

interest groups in authoritarian states

Interest groups, as we have seen, can both add to and detract from the quality of democracy. They can allow more
voices to be heard and can contribute to a healthy, pluralistic civil society, but they can also result in a few voices
being heard more loudly than others. Their relative roles depend on differences in their capacity to mobilize and
persuade, or even in the way they are regulated, controlled, or promoted by government. Their power and status
is a reflection of the political, economic, and social priorities of the states within which they function.
Many of the same factors come to bear on the work of groups in authoritarian states, with the obvious difference
that authoritarian governments are more clearly working to control the access of groups to power. In democracies,
there is an effort, at least, to encourage pluralism, even if it is often undermined by the privileged access of insider
groups to government. In authoritarian states, by contrast, the controls and limitations imposed on groups – known
more commonly as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs) – are more strin-
gent, and civil society is more constrained. Authoritarian rulers see freely organized groups as a potential threat to
their own power, and will seek either to repress such groups, or to incorporate them within their power structure; see
Spotlight Egypt for an example of this dynamic at work.
As for social movements, while they face stronger opposition and run greater risks for the lives and well-being of
their participants, they have occasionally been a significant feature in many authoritarian regimes. They tend to mo-
bilize the poor and the marginalized, as people facing acute problems of daily life collaborate to improve their living
conditions in a hostile political environment.The urban poor organizing soup kitchens, the inhabitants of shanty towns
lobbying for land reform, groups of mothers pressing for information on their sons who had ‘disappeared’ under mili-
tary rule – all have been examples of this blossoming of popular political activity.
As with so much in the field of politics and government, it is hard to build a clear picture of the work of interest
groups without comparative assessments, in which regard the work of Civicus is helpful. A think-tank based in Johan-
nesburg, South Africa, it is an alliance of more than 4,000 national groups from about 175 countries, and since 2011
it has published an annual report on the state of civil society, placing countries (authoritarian or otherwise) into one
of five categories according to the degree of openness in its civic space – see Map 18.1. Among the countries used as
examples in this book, Sweden and Germany do best with a rating of Open, flawed democracies such as the United
States and Japan are classified as Narrowed, other flawed democracies (such as India and Brazil) are rated as Obstructed,
Turkey and Venezuela are rated as Repressed, and China and Iran are rated as Closed.
In its 2017 report, Civicus (2017) claimed that ‘just three per cent of the world’s population live in countries where
civic space is fully open’, and offered the following pessimistic summary of trends:

Around the world, it is becoming increasingly dangerous to challenge power, and to do so risks reprisals … A
consistent pattern is emerging of attacks on civil society organisations and activists engaged in defending human
rights and fundamental freedoms from repressive state machinery, extremist groups and criminal forces linked to big
business … [The] restriction of civic space has become the norm rather than the exception. It should now be
considered a global emergency.
 interest groups 319

Closed

Repressed

Obstructed

Narrowed

Open

Map 18.1 The global state of civil society

Source: Civicus (2018).

In its 2018 report, Civicus (2018) continued to be concerned, noting the ongoing impact of populist ideas in mul-
tiple countries, the polarization of politics, and the undermining of democratic institutions by personal rule. However,
it also concluded that a reaction was taking place and that civil society organizations were strengthening their resistance
to such trends.
Few communist or formerly communist countries have a good record in regard to interest groups, with China,
Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam all rated by Civicus as Closed societies, while Belarus and Russia are rated
as Repressed. Throughout the communist era, no independent groups were permitted in the communist world, and
communist rulers sought to harness all organizations into so-called ‘transmission belts’ for party policy. Trade unions,
the media, youth groups, and professional associations were little more than branches of the party, serving the cause of
communist construction – in other words, the interests of the ruling party.
Elements of this tradition can still be found in China (see Table 18.4). At first, the Chinese Communist Party wanted
nothing to stand between the state and the individual, so all interest group activity was banned beyond the work of a
cluster of ‘mass organizations’ that were led by party officials and worked to transmit policy downwards, rather than
popular concerns upwards. However, what Saich (2015) describes as ‘new social organizations’ later emerged in China,
giving the impression of civil society while also confirming the state’s continuing control. Typically, only one body is
officially recognized in each sector, examples including the China Family Planning Association, Friends of Nature, the
Private Enterprises Association, and the Federation of Industry and Commerce.

Table 18.4 Social organizations in China

Group Type Features

All-China Federation
of Trade Unions
All-China Women’s
Federation
China Family Planning
Association
Friends of Nature
Source: Adapted from Saich (2015).
Mass organization Traditional transmission belt for the communist party
Mass organization Traditionally a party-led body, this federation has created some
space for autonomous action
Non-governmental Sponsored by the State Family Planning Commission, this
organization association operates at international and local level
Non-governmental Operates with some autonomy in the field of environmental
organization education
 SPOTLIGHT EGYPT
Brief profile
Egypt has long been a major player in Middle East politics, thanks not only to its pioneering role in the promotion
of Arab nationalism but also to its strategic significance in the Cold War and in the Arab–Israeli conflict. It was
also at the heart of the Arab Spring, with pro-democracy demonstrations leading to the fall from power of Hosni
Mubarak in 2011. Democratic elections brought Mohammed Morsi to power in 2012, but he was removed in a
military coup the following year. Egyptians now face uncertainties that resulted in its recent downgrading in the
Democracy Index from hybrid to authoritarian. Egypt has the second biggest economy in the Arab world, after
Saudi Arabia, but is resource-poor. It relies heavily on tourism, agriculture, and remittances from Egyptian workers
abroad and struggles to meet the needs of its rapidly growing population while seeking to offset the potential
threat of Islamic militancy.

Form of government Unitary semi-presidential republic. Modern state formed 1952, and most recent
constitution adopted 2014.
Executive Semi-presidential. A president directly elected for no more than two four-year
terms, governing with a prime minister who leads a cabinet accountable to the
People’s Assembly. There is no vice-president.
Legislature Unicameral People’s Assembly (Majlis el-Shaab) with 567 members, of whom 540
are elected for renewable four-year terms and 27 can be appointed by the
president.
Judiciary Egyptian law is based on a combination of British, Italian, and Napoleonic codes.
The Supreme Constitutional Court has been close to recent political changes in
Egypt; it has 21 members appointed for life by the president, with mandatory
retirement at age 70.
Electoral system A two-round system is used for presidential elections, with a majority vote
needed for victory in the first round, while a mixed member majoritarian system
is used for People’s Assembly elections; two-thirds of members are elected using
party list proportional representation, and one-third in an unusual multi-member
plurality system in two large districts.
Parties Multi-party, but unsettled because of recent instability. Parties represent a wide
range of positions and ideologies.

95.7m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$135bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$2,412 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating

An Egyptian protester waves the victory sign during
demonstrations in Cairo that were part of the Arab Spring,
a movement that took many political scientists by surprise.
Source: Getty Images/Mosa’ab Elshamy.
Industries lobbied for economic liberalization, including the abolition of fixed prices. The leaders of professional
groups such as the Journalists Syndicate, the Lawyers Syndicate, and the Engineers Syndicate used their personal
contacts in government to win concessions for their members.
Interest groups became so numerous
that the Mubarak government felt the
need to monitor them more closely,
requiring that they be officially
registered, and taking the controversial
step in 1999 of passing a law that gave
the government considerable powers to
interfere in the work of groups. It could
hire and fire board members, cancel
board decisions, and even dissolve a
group by court order. Groups were also
barred from taking part in political
activity, and their members were
subject to imprisonment for a variety
of vague and general crimes, including
‘undermining national unity’.
Egyptian civil society reached new
heights during the revolution that
overthrew Mubarak, and since coming
to power in 2013, the administration of
Abdul Fattah el-Sisi has promised to
replace the 1999 law with one that
would make it easier for groups to
function. However, the government
continues to see group activity through
the narrow prism of national security
concerns (Braun, 2016), and even with a
change in the law, restrictions on
protests and measures against terrorism
and Islamic militancy continue to place
limits on the activities of groups.
Interest groups in Egypt
We saw in Chapter 6 how, in authoritarian political
systems based on personal rule, access to policy-
makers depends on patronage, clients, and
contacts – proof of the adage that who you know
is more important than what you know. Egypt is a
case in point. It would seem to have a healthy and
varied interest group community, representing
business, agriculture, the professions, and religious
groups, but government has long kept a close eye
on access. At the same time, though, some interest
groups have developed sufficient power and
authority as to exert the influence usually
associated with interest groups in democracies.
The number and reach of groups in Egypt
grew sharply during the administration of Hosni
Mubarak (1981–2011). Bodies such as the
Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of
Mediterranean Sea JORDAN
Alexandria Gaza
ISRAEL
CAIRO Suez Canal
Nile
SAUDI
Re
ARABIA
dS
Luxor
LIBYA
ea
EGYPT
Aswan
SUDAN
Further reading
Hassan, Abdalla F. (2015) Media, Revolution and Politics in Egypt
(I. B. Tauris).
Ketchley, Neil (2017) Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics
and the Arab Spring (Cambridge University Press).
Springborg, Robert (2018) Egypt (Polity Press).
322 chapter 18

In recent years, the number of NGOs in China has exploded, with several sources (including Hasmath, 2016)
suggesting that there are as many as 500,000 registered bodies in China, working in areas such as education, poverty
alleviation, community development, the environment, and health, and being increasingly active overseas in countries
where China has commercial and investment interests. However, recent changes imposed by the administration of Xi
Jinping have restricted the activities of NGOs, signalling some reversal – concludes Loeb (2017) – towards ‘governance
that has little tolerance for pluralism, and increased capacity for social control’.
China also stands as a leading example of the phenomenon of government-organized non-governmental organiza-
tions (GONGOs). These are bodies that are founded, funded, and staffed by governments, often to provide services that
governments are unable or unwilling to provide. GONGOs are preferred over autonomous NGOs – argue Hasmath et al.
(2016) – because ‘they are more easily integrated into a government’s corporatist structure, are less likely to serve as a
threat to government’s power … and more able to promote a certain agenda’. As well as acting as a conduit between
the state and society, Hasmath et al. continue, GONGOs can be a safe proving ground where governments can test
experimental policies, and insulate themselves from blame should the policies go wrong.
GONGOs are found in democracies, also, but are more often found in authoritarian states, where
Corporatism they are an outgrowth of the phenomenon of corporatism. This is a term with a wide variety of
An arrangement in contested meanings, ranging from its application to fascist Italy, on the one hand, to the democratic
which – in
contrast to the
corporatism found in Scandinavia, on the other. Here, it is used to describe political systems in
competition for which the state exerts control over a small number of interests, bringing them in to decision-making
influence and ideas in return for their support of the governing regime.The term was long associated in particular with
suggested by Latin American states such as Brazil and Mexico before they began to democratize.
pluralism One exception to the Latin American corporatist tradition is offered by Venezuela, which
– selected
interests in a
has seen the role of interest groups move from pluralism to confrontation as the country has
society are become more polarized in the wake of the Chávez revolution; its civil society was rated in 2018
formally involved as Repressed. Poverty and inequality were driving forces in the work of NGOs in the 1980s,
in government, followed in the 1990s by a middle-class reaction to the declining legitimacy of political leaders
and provide (Lean, 2012). Since the ‘Bolivarian’ revolution instituted by Hugo Chávez after 1998, govern-
support in return
for access.
ment and interest groups have come into more open conflict, taking positions based either on
support for or opposition to the radical changes the country has seen. Many have had to focus
on the humanitarian crisis that Venezuela has faced, and on the undermining of human rights.
In hybrid regimes such as Nigeria and Turkey, the position of interest groups lies somewhere between their relative
autonomy in democracies and their marginal status in authoritarian states. The borders between the public and private
sectors are poorly policed, allowing presidents and their allies to intervene in the economy so as to reward friends and
punish enemies. But this involvement is selective, rather than comprehensive, occasionally overriding normal business
practices but not seeking to replace them.
At least in the more developed hybrid regimes, the result can be a dual system of representation, combining a role
for interest groups on routine matters, with more personal relationships (nurtured by patronage) on matters that are
of key importance to the president and the ruling elite. In the most sensitive economic areas (control over energy re-
sources, for example), employer is set against employer in a competition for political influence, leaving little room for
the development of influential business associations. The general point is that, even though hybrid regimes allow some
interests to be expressed, interest groups are far less significant than in a liberal democracy.
In the case of Russia, with its long history of authoritarian rule (first under the tsars, then under the communists,
and now under Putin), interest groups have faced the same problems as Russia’s political parties in defining a place
in the political system. Thousands of new organizations were created in the 1990s, and the government took steps
to encourage them to be a source of assistance rather than opposition (Robertson, 2014). This included the creation
of a national Civic Chamber designed to give ‘citizens’ a voice in public policy; it met for the first time in 2005, and
was soon joined by regional equivalents in other parts of the country. Since the Chambers manage a system of federal
funding for which NGOs compete, however, and since 40 of the 166 members of the national Chamber are appointed
by Putin, there is clearly an element of manipulation involved. In a manner resembling China’s GONGOs, the state
works to collaborate with favoured groups, while condemning others to irrelevance.
The Russian government’s strong nationalist tone has led to particular criticism of those groups (such as women’s
associations) which have depended on overseas support to survive in an unsympathetic domestic environment. Few pro-
motional groups in Russia possess a significant mass membership; most groups operate solely at grass-roots level, work-
ing on local projects such as education or the environment. As in China, these groups operate under state supervision,
so Russia’s combination of an assertive state and a weak civil society continues to inhibit interest group development.
 interest groups 323

discussion questions
◆◆ What do interest groups add to democracy, and what do they subtract?
◆◆ Is there a hierarchy of interests, giving some groups advantages over others, or does the
sheer number and variety of groups result in a balancing of interests?
◆◆ To what extent do special interests limit the functioning of the market of political ideas?
◆◆ Is lobbying a natural and inevitable part of the democratic process?
◆◆ Does pluralism exist, or is it just a theoretical possibility that has been undermined by the
unequal influence of different interests?
◆◆ To what extent is corporatism found in democracies as well as authoritarian regimes?

key concepts
◆◆ Civil society ◆◆ Peak association
◆◆ Corporatism ◆◆ Pluralism
◆◆ Density ◆◆ Promotional group
◆◆ Interest group ◆◆ Protective group
◆◆ Iron triangle ◆◆ Revolving door
◆◆ Issue network ◆◆ Social movement
◆◆ Lobbying ◆◆ Think-tank
◆◆ Nimby

further reading
Bitonti, Alberto, and Phil Harris (eds) (2018) Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying
Industry in 28 EU Countries (Palgrave Macmillan). An assessment of lobbying in the
European Union, including short chapters on each of its member states.
Cavatorta, Francesco (ed.) (2012) Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative
Perspective (Routledge). One of the few recent studies of the activities of interest groups in
authoritarian settings.
Edwards, Michael (ed.) (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society (Oxford University Press).
An edited collection of studies on civil society, including chapters on different sectors and
on different parts of the world.
Staggenborg, Suzanne (2016) Social Movements, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press). A textbook
survey of social movements, their methods, and their effects, with cases including the
women’s, the LGBTQ+, and the environmental movements.
Yadav, Vineeta (2011) Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries
(Oxford University Press). A study of the relationship between business lobbying and
corruption in developing countries.
Zetter, Lionel (2014) Lobbying: The Art of Political Persuasion, 3rd edn (Harriman House). A
global view of the dynamics of lobbying, including chapters on Europe, the United States,
Asia, and the Middle East.
public policy 19

Source: iStock/jsmith
contents
◆ Public policy: an
overview
◆ Models of the policy
process
PREVIEW ◆ The policy cycle
Public policy is concerned with the outcomes of the political process: ◆ Policy diffusion and
if the core purpose of government is to manage and address the needs convergence
of society, then the approaches that it adopts and the actions it takes
(or avoids) collectively constitute its policies. Policies are the product
◆ Public policy in
of the political interactions we have reviewed throughout the authoritarian states
preceding chapters: policy is shaped by ideology, institutions, political
culture, participation by citizens, and the influence of the media,
political parties, and interest groups. This chapter looks in more detail at how policy is formed and implemented,
the actors involved in the process, and the influences on that process. In order to provide more focus, it uses the
cases of education, health care, and environmental policy to illustrate the possibilities and limitations of policy.
The chapter begins with a review of three models of the policy process: the rational, the incremental, and the
garbage-can models. It then goes on to look at the policy cycle, an artificial means for imposing some order on what is,
in reality, a disorderly process.The problems experienced at each step in the cycle – initiation, formulation, implemen-
tation, evaluation, and review – give us insight into why so many public policies fall short of their goals. The chapter
then looks at the related phenomena of policy diffusion and policy convergence, before ending with a review of the
dynamics of policy in authoritarian systems, where – with greater centralization of power – it has its own distinctive
qualities and dynamic.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ Studying public policy involves understanding what governments do (or do not do), as well as the
institutional framework within which they do it.
◆◆ There is always a danger of imagining policy-making as a rational process with precise goals. The
incremental and garbage-can models offer a useful dose of realism.
◆◆ There are multiple policy instruments available to governments, which can be divided broadly into
sticks, carrots, and sermons.
◆◆ Breaking the policy process down into its component stages, from initiation to review, helps in analysing
and comparing policies.
◆◆ The study of policy diffusion and convergence helps us explain how policies evolve in similar directions
in multiple countries.
◆◆ On almost every count – ranging from the balance of power among institutions to the methods,
motivations, qualifications, and priorities of policy-makers – democracies and authoritarian states differ
fundamentally.
 public policy 325

public policy: an overview

Public policy is a collective term for the actions of government. It is more than a decision or Public policy
even a set of decisions, but instead describes the approaches that rulers adopt in dealing with The positions
the demands of their office, and the actions they take (or avoid taking) to address public needs. adopted and the
The choices they make are driven by multiple influences, including their own priorities, their actions taken (or
avoided) by
political ideology, the demands placed on them, the economic and political climate, and the governments as
available budget. Policies consist both of aims (say, to reverse climate change) and of means they address the
(switching to renewable sources of energy in order to cut carbon dioxide emissions). needs of society.
When parties or candidates compete for political office, they will have a shopping list of issues
they wish to address, and the positions they take in office will be their policies. These are usually
expressed in the form of public statements, government programmes, laws, and actions. If policy was limited to pub-
lished objectives then it might be relatively easy to understand and measure. However, government and governance are
also influenced by opportunism, the ebb and flow of political and public interest, the requirement to fix unsuccessful
policies, and the need to respond to new problems as they arise.
Once in office, political leaders will often find that their priorities and preferred responses will change because of
circumstances. They may be diverted by other more urgent problems, or find that their proposals lack adequate politi-
cal support or funding, or discover that implementation is more difficult then they anticipated. In understanding how
policy is made and implemented, it is important to avoid imposing too much order on a process that is often driven by
changing political considerations: policies can be contradictory, they can be nothing more than window-dressing (an
attempt to be seen to be doing something, but without any realistic expectation that the objective will be achieved),
and policy statements may be a cover for acting in the opposite way to the one stated.
Whatever the course taken and the eventual outcome, the actions of government (combined with their inaction)
constitute their policies.These policies become the defining qualities of governments and their leaders, and the records
of these policies in addressing and alleviating problems will become the reference points by which governments and
leaders are assessed, and a key factor in determining whether or not they will be returned to another term in office.
This is less true of authoritarian leaders, where survival usually depends less on good policy than on distributing
enough patronage to allies and supporters.
The particular task of policy analysis is to understand what governments do, how they do
Policy analysis
it, and what difference it makes (Dye, 2012). So, the focus is on the content, instruments, impact, The systematic
and evaluation of public policy, as well as on the influences that come to bear on the policy pro- study of the
cess. The emphasis is downstream (on implementation and results) as much as upstream (on the content and
institutional sources of policy). Because analysts are concerned with improving the quality and impact of public
efficacy of public policy, the subject exudes a practical air. Policy analysts want to know whether policy.
and why a policy is working, and how else its objectives might be pursued. Unfortunately, this is
often easier said than done.

models of the policy process

In analysing the manner in which policy is made, scholars have developed three competing models: the rational
model associated with Herbert Simon (1983), the incremental model developed by Charles Lindblom (1959, 1979),
and the garbage-can model, so named by Michael Cohen et al. (1972). Moving through each of these models in
order (see Table 19.1) is, in part, a transition from ideal to reality:

◆◆ The rational model sets a baseline by elaborating an ideal approach to policy-making without assuming that its
conclusions are reflected in what actually happens.
◆◆ The incremental model views policy as a compromise between actors with ill-defi ned or even contradictory
goals, and can be seen either as an account of how politics ought to proceed (namely, peacefully reconciling
different interests), or as a description of how policy is actually made.
◆◆ The garbage-can model highlights the many limitations of the policy-making process within many organizations,
looking only at what is, not what ought to be.

The lesson is that we should recognize the different functions that these models highlight, rather than seeing
them as wholly competitive.
326 chapter 19

The rational model

Suppose you are the Secretary (or Minister) of Education and your key policy goal is an improvement in student
performance. If you opt for the rational model, you would fi rst ensure that you had a complete and accurate set
of data on performance levels, then you would set your goals (for example, a 10 per cent increase in the number of
students completing high school within five years), and then you would list and consider the most efficient means
of achieving those goals. You might choose to increase the number of teachers, improve teacher training, expand
the size or the number of schools, deepen support for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, improve facilities,
or some combination of these approaches. Your approach focuses on gathering solid data, specifying goals and
values, developing specific options, checking all the results of choosing each option against each value, and selecting
the option that achieves the most values.
You would be engaging, in other words, in a comprehensive process of cost–benefit analysis (CBA). Although it
is hard to foresee the unforeseeable and measure the unmeasurable, trying to analyse the costs and benefits associated
with each possible decision does have strengths, particularly when a choice must be made from a small set of options
(see Boardman et al., 2018). Specifically, CBA brings submerged assumptions to the surface, drawing attention to those
interests that would otherwise lack political clout (for example, the benefit to the national economy from a new airport
runway is factored in, not ignored by politicians overreacting to vociferous local opposition). In
Rational addition, CBA discourages symbolic policy-making which addresses a concern without attempting
model
An approach to
anything more specific. It also contributes to transparent policy-making by forcing decision-
understanding makers to account for policies whose costs exceed benefits.
policy that However, CBA, and with it the rational model of policy, also has a host of weaknesses:
assumes the
methodical ◆◆ It underplays soft factors such as fairness and the quality of life.
identification of
the most efficient
◆◆ It calculates the net distribution of costs and benefits but ignores their distribution across
means of achieving social groups.
specific goals. ◆◆ It is cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming.
◆◆ It does not automatically incorporate estimates of the likelihood that claimed benefits will
Cost–benefit be achieved.
analysis ◆◆ There is often no agreement on what constitutes a cost or a benefit.
An effort to make
decisions on the
basis of a Take, for example, the problem of air pollution. We know it exists (particularly in and around
systematic review large urban areas), we know its sources, we have a good idea of how to control and prevent it, and
of the relative there is little question that it causes health problems and can reduce overall life expectancy.
costs and benefits However, it affects people differently, because some have a greater capacity than others to live and
of available
function in a polluted environment. The precise links between pollution and illness or death are
options.
often unclear, we cannot be sure how much health care costs are impacted by higher levels

Table 19.1 Three models of policy-making

Model Goals and means Optimum policy Analysis Guidance

outcome
Rational Goals are set before Policies will achieve Comprehensive; all Theory.
means. explicit goals. effects of all options
are addressed.

Incremental Goals and means are Policies will be agreed Selective; the goal is Comparison with
considered together. by all the main actors. the most acceptable similar problems.
policy, not the best
policy.
Garbage-can Goals are discovered Some problems are Little; government Trial and error, plus
through actions taken partly addressed acts rather than some memory of
and are not specified some of the time. decides. recent experiences.
separately.
 public policy 327

Air pollution in Shanghai, China. The rational approach to environmental policy-making is undermined by the difficulties of
quantifying the costs and benefits of economic development and clean air.
Source: iStock/Mlenny.

of pollution, and it is hard to place a value on a human life, or – more specifically – on extending life expectancy
(Koren, 2017). It is also hard to calculate the relative costs and benefits of economic development that takes pollution
control into account versus such development that does not. The result of difficulties such as these is that, in the real
political world, the value of the rational policy model is limited.

The incremental model

Where the rational model starts with goals, the incremental model starts with interests. Incremental
Taking again the example of improved educational performance, an education secretary model
proceeding incrementally would consult with the various stakeholders, including teachers’ An approach to
unions, local governments, and educational researchers. A consensus acceptable to all interests policy-making that
might emerge on how extra resources should be allocated. The long-term goals might not be sees policy
evolution as taking
measured or even specified, but there would instead be a focus on developing a policy the form of small
acceptable to all. Such an approach is policy-making by evolution, not revolution; an increment changes following
is literally a small increase in an existing sequence. It ties in to the idea of path dependence negotiation with
discussed in Chapter 3 (the outcome of a process depends on earlier decisions that lead policy affected interests.
down a particular path).
The incremental model was developed by Lindblom (1979) as part of a reaction against the
rational model. Rather than viewing policy-making as a systematic trawl through all the options, and a focus on a
single comprehensive plan, Lindblom argued that policy is continually remade in a series of minor adjustments to
the existing direction, in a process that he described as ‘the science of muddling through’. What matters here is that
those involved should agree on policies, not objectives. Agreement can be reached on the desirability of following
a particular course, even when objectives differ. Hence, policy emerges from, rather than precedes, negotiation with
interested groups.
328 chapter 19

This approach may not lead to achieving grand objectives but, by taking one step at a time, it at least avoids
making huge mistakes.Yet, the model also reveals its limits in situations that can only be remedied by strategic action.
As Lindblom (1990) himself came to recognize, incremental policy-making deals with existing problems, rather than
with avoiding future difficulties. It is politically safe, but unadventurous; remedial, rather than innovative. The threat of
environmental disaster, for example, has arisen precisely from our failure to consider the long-term, cumulative effect
of human activities. Incrementalism is also better suited to stable high-income liberal democracies than to low-income
countries seeking to transform themselves through development. It is pluralistic policy-making for normal times.

The garbage-can model

How would the garbage-can model interpret policy-making to improve educational performance? The answer
is that it would doubt the significance of such clear objectives. It would suggest that, within the government’s
education department, separate divisions and individuals engage in their own routine work,
Garbage-can interacting through assorted committees whose composition varies over time. Unsatisfactory
model exam scores may be a concern of school administrators and other solutions may be worth
An approach to
understanding considering, such as online learning. But whether participants with a solution encounter those
policy-making that with a problem, and in a way that generates a successful resolution, is as unpredictable and
emphasizes its fluctuating as the arrangement of different types of waste in a garbage can.
partial, fluid, and So, the garbage-can model presents an unsettling image of decision-making. Where both the
disorganized rational and incremental models offer some prescription, the garbage-can expresses the perspec-
qualities.
tive of a jaundiced realist. Cohen et al. (1972) describe it as follows:

a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might
be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work.

Policy-making is seen as partial, fluid, chaotic, anarchic, and incomplete. Organizations are conceived as loose col-
lections of ideas, rather than as holders of clear preferences. To the extent that problems are addressed at all, they must
wait their turn and join the queue. Actions, when taken, typically reflect the requirement for an immediate response
in a specific area, rather than the pursuit of a definite policy goal. At best, some problems are partly addressed some
of the time.
This model can be difficult to grasp, a fact that shows how deeply our minds try to impose rationality on the
policy process. Large, decentralized, public organizations such as universities provide a good illustration. On most
university campuses, decisions emerge from committees which operate largely independently. The energy-saving
group may not know what instruments can achieve its goals, while the engineering faculty, fully informed about
appropriate devices, may not know that the energy-saving committee exists. The committee on standards may want
to raise overall admissions qualifications, while the equal opportunity group may be more interested in encouraging
applications from minorities. Even within a single group, the position adopted may depend on which people happen
to attend a meeting.
Government is a classic example of an entity that is both large and decentralized. It is not a single entity but, rather,
an array of departments and agencies using different means to achieve their goals; see Focus 19.1. Several government
departments may deal with different aspects of a problem, with none having an overall perspective. Or one department
may be charged with reducing pollution while another works to attract investments in new polluting factories. By
considering the garbage-can model, we can see why we should be sceptical about hard promises from candidates about
what they plan to achieve while in office, or their statements beginning ‘my policy is …’

the policy cycle

One way of thinking about public policy is to see it as a cyclical series of stages. This risks painting a picture of an
orderly sequence that is unmatched by political reality, but it helps impose some order on a phenomenon that is
often enormously complex. There are various ways of outlining the cycle, one of which is to distinguish between
initiation, formulation, implementation, evaluation, and review (see Figure 19.1). Of course, these divisions are
more analytical than chronological, because – in the real world – they often overlap, and the later stages might
never be reached. Nonetheless, a review of these stages can help elaborate the particular focus of policy analysis,
including its concern with what happens after a policy is agreed.
 public policy 329

Focus 19.1
Sticks, carrots, and sermons
As well as understanding how policies are made and implemented, it is also important to understand the
tools that government have available to them. In other words, how exactly do governments govern? It might
seem as though a legislature can establish a legal entitlement to a welfare benefit, for example, and then
arrange for local governments to provide that benefit to those who are eligible. In reality, however, legislation
and direct provision are just two of many policy instruments, and by no means the most common.
Policy instruments can be categorized as sticks (sanctions), carrots (rewards), and sermons (information
and persuasion) (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998). Using the example of efforts to reduce tobacco consumption
(see Table 19.2), sticks include traditional command-and-control functions, such as banning or limiting the
use of tobacco, carrots include financial incentives such as taxing tobacco use or subsidizing the use of
nicotine replacement products, and sermons include that stalwart of agencies seeking to show their concern:
the public information campaign.
In addition to these traditional tools, market-based instruments (MBIs) have emerged as an interesting
addition to the repertoire of policy instruments. Returning to our example of air pollution, a method known
as emissions trading has been used successfully in the United States and the European Union: limits are set
on emissions, and companies or countries that fall below the limits can sell the ‘right’ to pollute to those
that fail to meet the limits. This way, there is a financial benefit to cutting emissions, and a financial penalty
for exceeding the limits. In theory, MBIs resolve the conflict between regulation and markets; they aim to
regulate by creating new, if in reality often imperfect, markets (Kreiser et al., 2013).
Given a range of tools, how should policy-makers choose between them? In practice, instrument selection
is strongly influenced by past practice, by national policy styles, and by political factors, such as visibility
(something must be seen to be done). Policy-makers can also review questions such as effectiveness,
efficiency, equity, appropriateness, and simplicity. Since most policies use a combination of tools, the overall
configuration should also be addressed. Instruments should not exert opposite effects and they should
ideally form a logical sequence.

Table 19.2 Policy instruments: the example of tobacco

Category Type Content

Command and Legislation The health department takes measures to limit passive smoking.
control
Regulation Tobacco use in restaurants is banned.
(sticks)
Services Public Public health clinics are given funding to provide smoking cessation sessions.
Private Private agencies are paid to run smoking cessation sessions.
Finance Taxation Tobacco products are taxed.
(carrots)
Subsidy Rebates are offered on purchases of nicotine replacement products.
Advocacy Information Publicity campaigns are conducted on the harmful effects of smoking.
(sermons)
Persuasion Publicity campaigns are conducted to encourage people to stop smoking.
Civil society Anti-smoking groups are created and funded.

Initiation and formulation

Policies must start from somewhere, but identifying the point of departure is not easy. What we can say for certain
is that in democracies much of the agenda bubbles up from below, delivered by bureaucrats in the form of problems
demanding immediate attention. These problems might be entirely new, but they more often include the need to
fi x the unforeseen impacts of earlier decisions, leading to the notion of policy as its own cause (Wildavsky, 1979).
330 chapter 19

Initiation
Placing a problem on the
public agenda

Review
Formulation
Deciding what to
Developing a response
do next

Evaluation Implementation
Assessing the effects Acting upon the policy
of the policy

Figure 19.1 Stages in the policy process

For example, if we set out to tackle air pollution by cutting back on the use of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, we
have to consider the economic effects on the coal and oil industries, the technology of renewable energy sources
such as solar and wind power, and the need to reconfigure the way we generate electricity and the way we power
all our transport systems.
Rather like the development of law, public policy naturally tends to thicken over time; the workload increases,
and cases of backpedalling – such as rescinding government regulations – are uncommon. In addition, much political
business, including the annual budget, occurs on a regular cycle, dictating attention at predictable intervals. Hence
policy-makers find that routine business always presses, and to a large extent they are responding to an agenda that
drives itself. Within that broad characterization, policy initiation differs somewhat between the United States and
European (and other party-led) liberal democracies.
Policy In the pluralistic world of US politics, success for a proposal depends on the opening of policy
entrepre- windows, such as the opportunities created by the election of a new administration. Kingdon
neurs (2010) suggests that policy entrepreneurs help to seize the moment. Like surfers, these initia-
Those who tors must ride the big wave by convincing the political elite not only of the scale of the problem,
promote new but also of the timeliness of their proposal for its resolution. However, policy openings soon
policies or policy close: the cycle of attention to a particular issue is short, as political debate and the public mood
ideas by raising
the profile of an moves on.
issue, framing how Concepts such as policy entrepreneur and policy opening carry less resonance in the more structured,
it is discussed, or party-based democracies of Europe. Here, the political agenda is under firmer, if still incomplete,
showing new ways control, and party manifestos and coalition agreements set out a more explicit agenda for govern-
of applying old ment. Normally, policy-formers operate within a narrow range of options, and will seek solutions
ideas.
which are consistent with broader currents of opinion and previous policies within the sector.
Top-down
implementa-
Implementation
tion After a policy has been agreed, it must be put into effect – an obvious point, of course, but
Sees the task of frequently overlooked in the debates about policy. Often, the political imperative is just to
policy have a policy; whether it works, in some further sense, is neither here nor there. Coalition
implementation as governments, in particular, are often based on elaborate agreements between parties on what
ensuring that
policy execution should be done, not on what is actually done. We can distinguish two philosophies of
delivers the implementation:
outputs and
outcomes ◆◆ The top-down approach is the traditional view. The question posed is the classical
specified by the
problem of bureaucracy: how to ensure the political direction of unruly public servants.
policy-makers.
Ministers and secretaries come and go, and fi nd it hard to secure compliance from
 public policy 331

departments already committed to pet projects of their own. Without vigilance from Bottom-up
above, sound policies can be hijacked by lower-level officials committed to existing implementa-
procedures, diluting the impact of new initiatives (Dunn, 2016). tion
◆◆ The starting point for the contrasting bottom-up perspective is that policy-makers Judges that those
should try to engage – rather than control – those who translate policy into practice. who execute
policy should be
Scholars in this tradition, such as Hill and Hupe (2014), ask what if circumstances have encouraged to
changed since the policy was formulated? What if the policy itself is poorly designed? adapt to local and
Much legislation, after all, is based on uncertain information and is general in content. changing
Often, it cannot be followed to the letter because there is no letter to follow. circumstances.

Many policy analysts now suggest that objectives are more likely to be met if those who execute policy are given
not only encouragement and resources, but also flexibility. Setting one specific target for a government department
expected to deliver multiple goals simply leads to unbalanced delivery. Furthermore, it is important to recognize
that at street level – the point where policy is delivered – policy emerges from interactions between local bureaucrats
and affected groups. Here, at the sharp end, goals can often be best achieved by adapting them to local circumstances.
For example, policies on education, health care, and the environment will differ between rural areas and the inner
city, and between poorer and wealthier parts of a country.
Further, local implementers will often be the only people with full knowledge of how policies interact. They will
know that, if two policies have incompatible goals, something has to give. They will know the significant actors in the
locality, including the for-profit and voluntary agencies involved in policy execution. Implementation is often a matter
of building relationships between organizations operating in the field, an art which is rarely covered in central manuals.
The idea of all politics being local, quoted in Chapter 11, applies with particular force to policy implementation. A
bottom-up approach reflects an incremental view of policy-making in which implementation is seen as policy-making
by other means.This approach is also attuned to the contemporary emphasis on governance, with its stress on the many
stakeholders involved in the policy process. The challenge is to ensure that local coalitions work for the policy, rather
than forming a conspiracy against it.

Evaluation
Just as policy analysis has increased awareness of the importance of policy implementation, so too has it sharpened
the focus on evaluation: has a programme achieved its goals, and – if so – how efficiently and effectively? This is
not an easy question to answer, in part because public policies, and the organizations created to put them into
practice, lack the yardstick of profitability used in the private sector. How do we evaluate defence policy if there
are no wars and, therefore, no win–loss record? Which is the best measure of policing: an approach that solves the
greatest number of crimes, or one that results in the fewest crimes to solve?
Evaluation is complicated further because goals are often modified during the process of implementation, trans-
forming a failing policy into a different but more successful one. This ‘mushiness of goals’, to use Kettl’s phrase (2018),
means that the intent of policy-makers is often a poor benchmark for evaluation. Consider the case of the European
Union’s attempts to inject more rapid growth into the European economy. Much was made of the launch in 2000 of
the Lisbon Strategy, whose goal was to make the EU ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in
the world within a decade’. It soon became clear that member states were failing to make the necessary changes (such
as reducing regulation and opening markets), so the Lisbon Strategy was transformed into the
Policy outputs
Europe 2020 strategy, changing some of the specific goals and extending the target by a decade. The actions of
Evaluation studies distinguish between policy outputs and policy outcomes. Outputs are government,
relatively easily measured by quantitative indicators of activities: visits, trips, treatments, inspec- which are
tions. The danger is that outputs turn into targets; the focus becomes what was done, rather than relatively easily
what was achieved. So, outcomes – the actual results – should be a more important component identified and
measured.
of evaluation.The problem is that outcomes are easier to define than to measure; they are resistant
to change and, as a result, the cost per unit of impact can be high, with gains often proving to Policy
be only temporary. Further, outcomes can be manipulated by agencies seeking to portray their outcomes
performance in the best light. They have multiple devious devices available to them, including The achievements
creaming, offloading, and reframing (see Table 19.3). of government,
With social programmes, in particular, a creaming process often dilutes the impact. For which are more
example, a drug addiction treatment centre will find it easiest to reach those users who would difficult to confirm
and measure.
have been most likely to overcome their drug use anyway. The agency will want to chalk up as
332 chapter 19

Table 19.3 Manipulating policy outcomes

Device Definition Example, using an employment service

Creaming Give most help to the easiest clients. Focus on those unemployed clients who are most
employable.
Offloading Keep difficult cases off the books, or Refuse to take on unemployed people with mental health
remove them. difficulties, or remove them from the list.
Reframing Relabel the category. Remove unemployed people from the labour market by
treating them as unemployable or disabled.
Source: Adapted from Rein (2006).

successes cases to which it did not, in fact, make the decisive difference. Meanwhile, the hardest cases remain unreached.
Just as regulated companies are usually in a position to outwit their regulator, so too do public agencies finesse
measured outcomes using their unique knowledge of their policy sector.
The stickiness of social reality means that attempts to ‘remedy the deficiencies in the quality of human life’ can
never be a complete success. Indeed, they can be, and sometimes are, a total failure (Gardner and Brindis, 2017). If our
expectations of a policy’s outcomes were more realistic, we might be less disappointed with limited results. So, we can
understand why agencies evaluating their own programmes often prefer to describe their impressive outputs, rather
than their limited outcomes.

Review
Once a policy has been evaluated, or even if it has not, three options are left: continue, revise, or terminate. Most
policies continue with only minor revisions. Once a role for government is established, it tends to continue, even
if the agencies charged with performing the function might change over time, either because a task is split between
two or more agencies, or because previously separate functions are consolidated into a single organization (Bauer
et al., 2012). So the observation that there is nothing as permanent as a temporary government organization appears
to be wide of the mark.
Yet, even if agency termination is surprisingly common, why is policy termination so rare? Why does government
as a whole seem to prefer to adopt new functions than to drop old ones? Bardach (1976) suggested five possible ex-
planations that are still relevant:

◆◆ Policies are designed to last a long time, creating expectations of future benefits.
◆◆ Policy termination brings confl icts which leave too much blood on the floor.
◆◆ No one wants to admit that the policy was a bad idea.
◆◆ Policy termination may affect other programmes and interests.
◆◆ Politics rewards innovation rather than tidy housekeeping.

The nineteenth-century Prussian general Helmuth von Moltke is often credited with saying that no battle plan
ever survives contact with the enemy. In much the same spirit, and looking at the policy cycle, it is clear that no
public policy ever fully survives contact with the object of that policy. In spite of the orderly progression suggested
by the cycle, policy remains an exercise in expediency, fluidity, and responses to changing circumstances. Much of
the explanation for cross-national differences in policy-making and policy outcomes also comes down to the more
general idea of policy style; different countries have different influences on policy (see Spotlight Sweden for one
example), resulting in different ways of approaching similar problems.

Policy policy diffusion and convergence

diffusion
The tendency for Once, there were no speed limits, no seat belts, no nutritional labels, no restrictions
policy on advertising cigarettes, no gender quotas for party candidates, and no state subsidies for
programmes to political parties. Now, there are. Most democracies have introduced broadly similar policies
spread across in these and many other areas – and often at a similar time. So, how did they move in tandem
countries.
from then to now? The answer lies in a combination of policy diffusion (Evans, 2010) and
 public policy 333

policy convergence. The former refers to the spread of policy programmes from one country Policy
to another, though with less emphasis on deliberate emulation than is suggested by related convergence
terms such as policy transfer, policy learning, or lesson-drawing. Policy convergence refers to a The tendency for
tendency for policies to become more similar across countries, a phenomenon which can policies in
occur without explicit diff usion if different countries respond to common problems (e.g. an different countries
to become more
ageing population) in a similar way (e.g. raising the age of retirement). Both diff usion and alike.
convergence address the comparative dimension in public policy analysis.
Although policy diffusion has attracted attention as an example of international influence on
national policy, examples of countries clearly emulating innovations from abroad remain thin on the ground. In theory,
the whole world could be a laboratory for testing policy innovation; in practice, most policy-making still runs in a
national groove. How, then, do we explain why convergence occurs without explicit emulation? In other words, why
do democracies adopt broadly similar policies in the same time period without the self-aware learning from abroad
that policy convergence suggests?
A useful point of departure is offered by Rogers (2003), whose analysis distinguishes between a few innovators and
early adopters, a majority in the middle (divided into two groups by time of adoption), and a small number of laggards,
with non-adopters excluded (see Figure 19.2). Although not designed with cross-national policy diffusion in mind, this
approach allows us to interpret the spread of a particular policy and to ask why certain countries are innovators, either
in a particular case, or in general. Innovation is perhaps most likely to emerge in high-income countries with (a) the
most acute manifestation of a particular problem, (b) the resources to commit to a new policy, and (c) the governance
capacity to authorize and deliver.
Knill and Tosun (2012) identify a series of factors encouraging policy convergence (see Table 19.4). The first of
these is independent problem-solving: as countries modernize, they develop similar problems calling for a policy
response. At an early stage of development, for example, issues such as urban squalor, inadequate education, and the
need for social security force themselves onto the agenda. The problems of development come later: the epidemic of
obesity, for example, or the rising social cost of care for the elderly. In national responses to such difficulties, we often
see policy-making in parallel, rather than by diffusion. Even if the response in one country is influenced by policy
innovations elsewhere, it is still the need to respond to domestic problems that drives policy.
Second, policy convergence can result from conformity to the ever-expanding array of international agreements.
Covering everything from the design of nuclear reactors to the rights of children, these are agreed by state governments
and monitored by intergovernmental organizations.The signature of such agreements is voluntary, and the content may
be shaped by the strongest states (the standard-makers rather than the standard-takers), but international norms remain
a strong factor in encouraging policy convergence.
Number of adoptions

Early Late
majority majority

Early
adopters
Laggards
Innovators

Time of adoption

Figure 19.2 The diffusion of innovation

Source: Adapted from Rogers (2003).
 SPOTLIGHT SWEDEN
Brief profile
Sweden ranks at or near the top of international league tables focused on democracy, political stability, economic
development, education, and social equality; in this sense, it can be seen as one of the most successful countries
addressed in this book. The Social Democrats have held a plurality in the Swedish parliament since 1917, Sweden
has traditionally lacked significant internal divisions (other than class), and it has long followed public policies that
have helped to keep economic productivity high and unemployment low. The country combines a high standard
of living with a comparatively equal distribution of income, showing – with other Scandinavian states – that mass
affluence and limited inequality are compatible. Meanwhile, Sweden is neutral in international affairs, remaining
outside NATO but being a committed member of the European Union.

Form of government Unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. Date of state formation

debatable, and oldest element of constitution dates from 1810.
Executive Parliamentary. The head of government is the prime minister, who is head
of the largest party or coalition, and governs in conjunction with a cabinet.
The head of state is the monarch.
Legislature Unicameral Riksdag (‘meeting of the realm’) with 349 members, elected for
renewable four-year terms.
Judiciary The constitution consists of four entrenched laws: the Instrument of
Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act, and the
Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. The Supreme Court (16
members appointed until retirement at the age of 67) is traditionally
restrained.
Electoral system The Riksdag is elected by party list proportional representation, with an
additional tier of seats used to enhance proportionality. The national vote
threshold (the share of votes needed to be awarded any seats) is 4 per cent.
Parties Multi-party. The Social Democrats were historically the leading party,
sharing their position on the left with the Left Party and the Greens.
However, a centre-right coalition (led by the conservative Moderates and
including the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats, and the Liberals) has
recently gained ground.

9.9m Population
Full
Very High
Democracy
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$528bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$53,442 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 Public policy in Sweden
Swedish policy-making was once described as
‘open, rationalistic, consensual and
extraordinarily deliberative’ (Anton, 1969).
Later, Richardson et al. (1982) characterized
Sweden’s policy style as anticipatory and
consensus-seeking. Little has changed since
then. Even in a small unitary state with
sovereignty firmly based on a unicameral
legislature, Sweden has avoided the potential
for centralization and has developed an
elaborate negotiating democracy which is
culturally and institutionally secure.
One factor sustaining this policy style is
the compact size and policy focus of Sweden’s
The Riksdag in Stockholm, the national legislature that lies at the heart 11 central government departments, which
of Sweden’s notably transparent and consensual style of policy-making. together employ about 4,600 staff. The
Source: iStock/TomasSereda.
objective, as grandly outlined on the web site
of the Government Offices of Sweden (2018)
is ‘an innovative and interactive central government administration that is legally certain and efficient, has a high
degree of quality, service and accessibility, and thereby contributes to Sweden’s development and effective
[European Union] work’. Most technical issues, and the services provided by the extensive welfare state, are
contracted out to more than 300 public agencies and to local government. This division of tasks is sustained by
high levels of transparency and trust.
Committees of enquiry (also known
as ‘commissions’) are key to the
process. Typically, the government
appoints a committee to research a
Norwegian
topic and present recommendations.
Sea
The commission consults with relevant
D
N

LAN

interests and political parties, its

EDE
AY

recommendations are published and

FIN
RW

SW

discussed, the relevant ministry STOCKHOLM

RUSSIA
NO

examines the report, a government bill

is drafted if needed, and the bill is then North
discussed in the Riksdag, where it may Sea
be modified before reaching the statute
book. This procedure is slow, but it is
also both rational (in that information is
collected and analysed) and incremental
(in that organized opponents of the
proposal are given ample opportunity
to voice their concerns).
There are downsides – extensive Further reading
deliberation may contribute to bland
Bergh, Andreas (2014) Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare
rather than innovative policy, and the State (Edward Elgar).
emphasis on policy formulation may be Miles, Lee (2015) The New Politics of Sweden (London: Bloomsbury
at the expense of insufficient focus on Academic).
implementation – but the style is Pierre, Jon (2016) The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford:
distinctively Swedish. It offers a useful Oxford University Press).
yardstick against which to compare the
less measured policy-making styles
found in other liberal democracies.
336 chapter 19

Table 19.4 Mechanisms of policy convergence

Type Effect Example

Independent As countries develop, similar problems
problem-solving emerge, often resulting in similar policies.
International National policies converge as countries
agreements seek to comply with international laws,
regulations, and standards.
International Policies providing an economic or political
competition advantage will be replicated elsewhere.
Policy learning Explicit lesson-drawing can occur even
when no competitive advantage ensues.
Coercion and One country makes policy requirements of
conditionality another, for example in return for aid.
Source: Adapted from Knill and Tosun (2012).
Under-regulated industrial development leads
to air and water pollution.
Membership of the World Trade Organization
imposes common rules on member states.
Higher levels of economic freedom and lower
levels of corruption encourage increased
investment.
Capital punishment is abolished because
evidence from other countries indicates a
limited impact on crime rates.
Reforms imposed on Greece in return for
helping it respond to euro crisis in 2009.

Third, and moving beyond formal international regulation, international competition generates pressures to ­emulate
winning policies. Here, an expanding supply of league tables produced by international bodies provides benchmarks
that can have the effect of nudging governments in the direction favoured by the producer. One of those is the World
Bank’s Doing Business Index, which ranks countries based on criteria such as the ease of starting a business, registering
a property, and securing an electricity supply. Table 19.5 lists the top ten countries in the 2017 league, along with the
other cases used in this book, and – for context – last-placed Somalia.
In the competition for foreign direct investment, for example, what government would want to occupy a lowly
position in the World Bank’s table? Note, however, that there is more than one way to achieve a goal. In seeking over-
seas investment, some governments emphasize workforce quality (a race to the top), while others give priority to low
labour costs (a race to the bottom). Competition generates similar pressures but not identical policies; rather, it encour-
ages countries to exploit their natural advantages, yielding divergence, rather than convergence.

Table 19.5 The Doing Business Index

Rank Country Rank Country Rank Country

1 New Zealand 18 Canada 125 Brazil
2 Singapore 20 Germany 128 Egypt
3 Denmark 31 France 145 Nigeria
4 South Korea 34 Japan 188 Venezuela
5 Hong Kong* 35 Russia 190 Somalia
6 United States 49 Mexico
7 UK 60 Turkey
8 Norway 78 China
9 Georgia 100 India
10 Sweden 124 Iran
Source: World Bank (2017).
Note: Data are for June 2017.
* Hong Kong often appears in league tables of this kind, even though it is not an independent state, but a Special Administrative Region of China.
 public policy 337

The fourth (and perhaps weakest) mechanism behind policy convergence is direct policy learning. Governments do
not select from a full slate of options but must operate in the context of national debates and their own past decisions.
So, tweaking is more common than innovating, and two conditions apply:

◆◆ Foreign models are only likely to be considered seriously when the domestic agenda seems to be incapable of
resolving a problem. Even then, the search will not be global but will focus on similar or neighbouring countries
with which the learning country has a long-standing and friendly relationship.
◆◆ Policies themselves often evolve in the process of diffusion; they are translated rather than transported. Even if
a government does cite foreign examples, it may be to justify a policy adopted for domestic political reasons. In
general, governments find it more difficult to learn than do individuals.

Turning again to the example of health policy, consider the case of universal health care: that which is made
available to everyone at little or no direct cost, regardless of pre-existing conditions or ability to pay. Every wealthy
democracy (with the notable exception of the United States) has some form of universal health care, even allowing
for local variations. In the poorest states, however – including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya, and Nigeria
– health care is neither free nor universal.
A fifth factor encouraging policy convergence (not included by Knill and Tosun (2012) in their list) is coercion
and the imposing of conditions by one country on another. In extreme cases, victory in war allows the dominant
power to impose its vision on vanquished states, as with the forced construction of democracy in Germany and
Japan by the victorious allies after World War II, and by the United States on Iraq more recently. More commonly,
economic vulnerability gives weak countries little choice but to submit to more powerful countries and to inter-
national organizations. For example, the practice of attaching strings to aid became an important theme in inter-
national politics in the 1990s, after many developing countries had become massively indebted to Western banks.
Similarly, international creditors (including the International Monetary Fund) imposed reforms on Greece in 2010
in an effort to reduce that country’s severe financial indebtedness. The difficulty with coercion as a policy-shaping
instrument is that the receiving country may lack genuine commitment to the reforms, leading to their failure over
the long term.
Overall, we should think in terms of the diffusion of ideas rather than policies. Even if policies remain attached to
national anchors, ideas – at least for stronger states – know no boundaries. Broad agendas (where do we need policy?)
and frameworks (how should we think about this area?) are often transnational in character and refined by discussions
in international organizations. Ideas provide a climate within which national policies are made, whether or not national
policy-makers are aware of this influence. In public policy, as in politics generally, ideas matter even if their influence is
difficult to analyse on other than a case-by-case basis.

public policy in authoritarian states

Superficially, at least, there may not seem to be many differences in the way that public policy is approached in
democracies and authoritarian states. The two types mainly have the same institutions of government, the same
broad relationship between the government and the bureaucracy, and the same sets of demands from their citizens;
whether people live in democracies or dictatorships, they all want schools, hospitals, supplies of energy and clean
water, public safety, and a working transport system, for example. Beneath the surface, though, there are many
differences, of which five in particular stand out – see Table 19.6.
First, the balance of power among institutions is quite different. In democracies, policy is shaped by a complex
intermingling of the interests of executive, legislatures, courts, parties, the media, and public opinion, the balance
changing according to their relative resources and standing. In authoritarian states, the executive (as we saw in
Chapter 8) will have more power relative to the legislature and the courts, and leaders make policy decisions
based less on public opinion or the need to attract favourable media coverage (it will almost always be favoura-
ble given state control of most media and the weakness of opposition media). Fewer people are engaged in the
policy process (members of a ruling elite, a ruling family, a ruling party, or a dominant ethnic group), and – as
we saw in Chapter 6 – patronage lies more clearly at the heart of policy processes in authoritarian states than in
democracies. Webs of allegiance are more important than general welfare in determining where action will be
taken and money spent.
In the cases of single-party systems such as China and Cuba, or authoritarian dominant party systems such as Russia
and Venezuela, policy-making is dominated by party institutions. This means that understanding how policy is shaped
338 chapter 19

Table 19.6 Comparing policy in democracies and authoritarian states

Feature Democracies Authoritarian states

Institutions Authority divided, with multiple Authority focused in leadership or ruling party/
motivations. elite.
Methods Concern for inclusion and public opinion. A focus on leading, with more emphasis on
More carrots and sermons. coercion.
Motivations To shape policy, make a difference, and To stay in power as long as possible, and to
secure re-election. exploit policy for sectional and personal gain.
Qualifications Government leaders usually have political Government leaders often come to power with
experience. less experience or understanding of
government.
Policy priorities Wide-ranging, with a strong emphasis on Fewer social concerns, more focus on security
social programmes and economic matters.
management.

is more a question of understanding internal party priorities than of understanding the wider policy landscape. Getting
to grips with policy-making is in some ways easier, because the process is more focused, but also more difficult, because
it is less transparent.
Second, policy methods are quite different. In democracies, we find a complex system by which information is
gathered and processed, and a combination of sticks, carrots, and sermons is used to achieve policy goals. In authori-
tarian states, policy is accompanied – as we saw in Chapter 6 – by a higher degree of coercion, with more sticks and
fewer carrots or sermons. Rulers decide what they want done (or not done) and they set out to impose their wishes,
concerned less with public opinion than with keeping the supporting elite happy.
Having said that, though, one of the ironies of policy in authoritarian systems is that while policy-making insti-
tutions may be strong, this does not mean that policy is successfully implemented. As Brooker (2014) notes, the poli-
cy-implementing role of the bureaucracy in an authoritarian state tends to obscure its policy-making role; even when
it is ‘making’ policy, it is usually doing little more than advising political leaders. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) long ago
noted the gap between making and implementing policy when they noted the paradox faced by many African leaders
of having the relative freedom to make policies but considerable constraints in terms of implementing or enforcing
them.
The third difference between democracies and authoritarian states is that policy-makers have different motivations.
The desire to control and to ‘make a difference’ is as much a motivation for those in democracies as it is for those
in authoritarian states, and there are parallels in both situations regarding the desire to keep particular constituencies
happy. Democratic leaders, though, know that their days are numbered, either by the constitutional clock or by the
insecurities involved in holding on to the reins of power. They want to use the days they have to push policy in the
direction they prefer while limiting the influence of the opposition. For authoritarian leaders, the motivations are quite
different – see Focus 19.2.
The fourth difference between democracies and authoritarian states lies in the qualifications for office, which
produce different kinds of rule. For the most part, democratic leaders have political experience before coming to
office. This does not guarantee greater competence or higher quality leadership, but it usually means greater fa-
miliarity with the process of government. True enough, several modern leaders of authoritarian states had political
experience before becoming president of their respective countries; this was true of Vladimir Putin of Russia, for
example, as well as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani of Iran, and Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela. Recent
Chinese leaders have all survived the cut-throat process of working their way to the top echelons of the Chinese
Communist Party.
Many, though, have either come to power through the violent overthrow of their predecessors, through a military
coup, or through a family dynasty. This leaves them often less experienced in administration and less knowledgeable
about how to encourage supporters and to identify opponents. Such problems are especially common in military re-
gimes whose leaders know much more about the hierarchical responsibility structures of the armed forces than they
do about the more fluid kinds of decision-making found in civilian government. The generals sometimes seize power
 public policy 339

Focus 19.2
Public policy and political survival
Public policy everywhere is impacted to a large extent by how long leaders expect to stay in office, and by
the means they use to remain in office. Leaders in democracies are motivated by a complex mix of political
legacies, keeping their constituents happy, and making sure that even if their terms are limited by the
constitution, their parties remain in control and opposition parties stay out of office. In authoritarian
regimes, by contrast, political survival has a very different meaning.
Authoritarian rulers know that their days are numbered, but they hope to give themselves as many of
those days as possible. Their key priority is to play off domestic political forces against each other so as to
ensure their own continuation in office, and to benefit their supporters as far as possible. Uncertain of their
survival, and willing to use as many means as possible to keep the support of their constituents, they may
be more tempted to enrich themselves, their family, and their supporters while they remain in control of
the state’s resources. Those resources, meanwhile, are diverted away from more broadly useful uses, such
as investments in economic and social development. These related goals of political survival and personal
enrichment are hardly conducive to orderly policy, and least of all to good economic policy.
A good example is offered by Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (in power 1980–2017), who governed over a
country with valuable human, natural, and agricultural resources, but was too concerned with the needs of
his supporters to focus on developing a broad base of policy initiatives. He may not have enriched himself
as much as many other African dictators, but he instituted a policy of land grabs by which valuable farms
were confiscated from their mainly white owners and given to Mugabe’s supporters, many of whom were
described by the government as veterans of the war of independence, even if they were far too young to
have fought. Previously productive farms were driven into ruin because few of the new owners had any
farming knowledge or experience.
Meanwhile, Mugabe’s wife Grace – 41 years younger than him – exploited her husband’s power to live a
life of luxury in a country where the majority of people were either unemployed or making a living in the
so-called informal sector. She earned the nickname ‘Gucci Grace’ for her tastes, which involved shopping
trips abroad on aircraft appropriated by her husband for the purpose from the state airline, Air Zimbabwe,
which was pushed into near-bankruptcy. Rumours that Mugabe was preparing the way for his wife to
succeed him as president were part of the reason why he was removed from power in 2017.

in an honest attempt to improve public policy-making but then discover that good governance requires skills they do
not possess.
Finally, the priorities of policy differ between democracies and authoritarian states. Governments in democracies are
faced with a wide range of policy needs, and place a strong emphasis on social programme and economic management.
In other words, they are incentivized by the next election to keep their people healthy, well-educated, and employed.
Because authoritarian regimes are less concerned with the contentment of the broader population than they are with
their supporting networks, and because they also tend to be poorer than democracies, they are less interested in – or
capable of – focusing much on social policies. They take care of technical matters (such as maintaining roads, after a
fashion, and building schools) and they also often have high levels of spending on the military (with an eye to internal
rather than external security), but will usually spend less on social security or health care.
As always, however, it is important to distinguish between different types of authoritarian government. At one ex-
treme, many military and personal rulers show immense concern about their own prosperity but none at all for that of
their country, leading to a policy shortage. At the other extreme, modernizing regimes whose ruling elite display a clear
sense of national goals and a secure hold on power follow long-term policies, especially for economic development.
Such countries do not suffer from inertia, but instead find it easier to push through substantial policy change, because
they can suppress the short-term demands that would arise in a more open political system.
340 chapter 19

Some surviving communist states, notably China, offer an example of the latter approach. China survives as an
authoritarian regime partly because it pursues policies leading to rapid economic development. The capacity of the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to form and implement coherent policy in the world’s most populous
country is a remarkable achievement. It owes much to political flexibility, the country’s authoritarian tradition, and
the legitimacy the regime has derived from economic growth. The leadership’s sensitivity to public concerns, unusual
in authoritarian regimes, is seen not only in the achievement of economic development but also in attempts to limit
its unequal consequences. For example, the party’s 2006 programme, Building a Harmonious Society, sought to reduce
income inequality, improve access to medical care for rural-dwellers and urban migrants, extend social security, and
contain the environmental damage from industrialization (Saich, 2015).
The story in post-communist Russia has been different. After the initial chaotic transition from communism, the
country’s rulers achieved considerable policy successes. A more predictable environment was created for business in-
vestment, a recentralization of power encouraged the more uniform application of a newly codified legal system, tax
revenues improved, and social policy became more coherent with a controversial 2005 reform that replaced the bulk
of Soviet-era privileges (such as free or subsidized housing, transportation, and medicine) with ‘supposedly equivalent
cash payments’ (Twigg, 2005).
But policy-making remains subject to the political requirements of the ruling elite. Industrialists who pose a po-
litical threat to President Putin still find that numerous rules and regulations are invoked selectively against them. The
government has tightened its control over oil and gas, political and economic power remain tightly interwoven, pre-
cluding – at the highest level – uniform policy implementation, and public control of export commodities enables the
Russian elite to sustain its own position even if it neglects the development of closer connections with the Russian
population. As the country’s rulers extract resources from the economy to build their personal wealth, deep-rooted
social problems such as poverty, alcoholism, violent crime, and rural depopulation are denied the priority they would
receive in a democracy.
As in many poor countries, even-handed policy implementation is impossible in Russia because many public offi-
cials are so badly paid that corruption remains an essential tool for making ends meet. It may be true that sunlight is
the best disinfectant, but the improved policy process enabled by an escape from corruption and rent-seeking cannot
be achieved simply by calling for more transparency.The dilemma is that transparency flows naturally from broad-based
economic development, but such development itself requires a reduction in corruption.
 public policy 341

discussion questions
◆◆ Which of the three models of the policy process offers the most insight into the realities of
the policy process?
◆◆ Given the complexities of policy-making, why do politicians keep making unrealistic
promises, and why do voters keep accepting them?
◆◆ What additional steps, if any, would you add to the policy cycle?
◆◆ Which policy instruments are likely to be most effective in reducing (a) obesity, (b) drug
addiction, (c) texting while driving, and (d) climate change?
◆◆ Why does policy often fail to achieve its objectives?
◆◆ The chapter outlines five differences between democracies and authoritarian systems in
their approach to policy. To what extent are they substantial, and to what extent are they
simply a matter of degree?

key concepts
◆◆ Bottom-up implementation ◆◆ Policy entrepreneurs
◆◆ Cost–benefit analysis ◆◆ Policy outcomes
◆◆ Garbage-can model ◆◆ Policy outputs
◆◆ Incremental model ◆◆ Public policy
◆◆ Policy analysis ◆◆ Rational model
◆◆ Policy convergence ◆◆ Top-down implementation
◆◆ Policy diff usion

further reading
Birkland, Thomas A. (2015) An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of
Public Making, 4th edn (Routledge). A thematic introduction to public policy with a
particular focus on policy stages.
Dodds, Anneliese (2018) Comparative Public Policy, 2nd edn (Red Globe Press). A survey of
comparison in public policy, with chapters on specific issues such as economic, welfare,
and environmental policy.
Dunn, William N. (2016) Public Policy Analysis, 5th edn (Routledge). A guide to the different
methods and approaches involved in studying how policy is made and implemented.
Knill, Christoph, and Jale Tosun (2012) Public Policy: A New Introduction (Red Globe Press).
A thematic overview of public policy, emphasizing theories and concepts.
Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Weible (eds) (2014) Theories of the Policy Process
(Westview). Offers a survey of competing theoretical approaches to the study of public
policy.
Weible, Christopher M., and Paul A. Sabatier (eds) (2017) Theories of the Policy Process, 4th edn
(Routledge). A survey and comparison of theoretical approaches to the policy process.
political
economy 20

Source: Pixabay
contents
◆ Political economy: an
overview
◆ Understanding political
economy
PREVIEW ◆ Comparative political
This chapter focuses on the links between politics and economics, economy
showing how important they are to each other. After decades during ◆ The welfare state
which they were studied in isolation, they have been reconnected
since the 1960s as political scientists and economists have worked to
◆ Development and global
better understand the intersection between politics and economics. divisions
Just as it is important to understand how political systems work, and ◆ Political economy in
how democracy and authoritarianism differ, so it is important to authoritarian states
understand how economic systems work, as well as how and why
governments take different approaches to the economy.
The chapter begins with a survey of political economy and of the
kinds of questions it addresses. It then looks in turn at four major perspectives on political economy, ranging from clas-
sical liberalism to radicalism, economic nationalism, and modern liberalism, along with several of their more important
sub-categories. Modern liberalism is the perspective found most often in liberal democracies today, although there are
signs in several countries of a return to policies of economic nationalism.
The chapter then continues with an assessment of the dynamics of development as it applies to emerging states, and
of the welfare state as it has evolved in mainly wealthier liberal democracies. It then looks at the meaning of develop-
ment in a changing global environment, and at the implications of a changing global balance of economic power. The
chapter ends with a review of political economy in authoritarian states, focusing particularly on how state capitalism
has taken hold in countries such as China and Russia.

KEY ARGUMENTS
◆◆ The revival of the study of political economy has offered new insights into the interaction between
politics and economics.
◆◆ The classical liberal emphasis on free markets offers the foundation for political economy, and continues
to be found in many countries in the form of neoliberalism.
◆◆ Radicalism arose as a reaction to the weaknesses of the free market, but its analyses were hurt by the
excesses of communism and state socialism.
◆◆ Most democracies today are based on modern liberal views about free markets and redistribution, with
a revival of economic nationalism in some.
◆◆ There are few agreements on the best approaches to economic development, while opinions about the
welfare state have been reviewed in the wake of international fi nancial pressures.
◆◆ State capitalism is a distinctive approach to understanding political economy now found in many
authoritarian states.
 political economy 343

political economy: an overview

The study of political economy is the study of the intersection of politics and economics. These are two fields
that are impossible to fully divorce from one another: to a large degree, political decisions are driven by economic
needs and pressures, while a government’s economic choices are influenced by political
considerations. Political economy is both a means of undertaking political analysis generally Political
and also an approach to the study of any number of more focused topics, ranging from economy
agriculture to communications, culture, education, the environment, fi nance, gender, labour, A branch of the
migration, trade, and war. So far in this book our attention has been focused on the political social sciences
that studies the
side of the relationship; in this chapter we switch to the economic perspective, referring back relationships
to the institutions and processes discussed in preceding chapters. Our interest is in how between markets
economic trends impact political decisions, and vice versa. and the state.
Theorists as diverse as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx studied society from
the combined perspective of politics and economics, or political economy. In the latter half of New political
the nineteenth century there was a move to divide these perspectives as economists, political economy
A resurrection of
scientists, and sociologists began to head in separate directions, prompted by differences in their
earlier approaches
views about the appropriate role of government and about approaches to research (economists to economics,
taking a more quantitative approach than most political scientists, for example). More recently, combining them
there has been a trend back towards an integrated approach, even to the point where we often see with the tools of
references to new political economy, a term implying a combination of the original integrated modern economic
analysis.
approach to politics and economics, on the one hand, and the more recent research methods
developed by economists, on the other.
This chapter offers a survey of political economy, beginning with an introduction to some of the key terms
involved, and a discussion of the dimensions of different economic systems. It then compares the four major per-
spectives on political economy. The point of departure is the classical liberal view that individuals and societies are
most likely to prosper if they are allowed to pursue their interests with minimal intervention from government.
Radicals disagree, arguing that government intervention is essential in the interests of ensuring equality and justice.
Economic nationalism opts for government protection of national economies, while modern liberalism believes
that government should protect rights while engaging in the redistribution of wealth and opportunity. The latter
point can be seen in the work of the welfare state that has been so central to thinking about political economy in
wealthier democracies.
Coming to grips with political economy in authoritarian states is not just a matter of comparing dictators and dem-
ocrats, or wealth and poverty, but instead of looking in more depth at the interactions between politics and economic
policy. In most cases, both are used to exert control, but while it has often resulted in what is known as state capitalism,
which has frequently led to inefficiency and corruption, the experiences of authoritarian systems are more complex
and nuanced than the use of simple models suggests.

understanding political economy

‘Political economy’, claims Clark (2016), ‘was the original social science’. The use of the term dates back to
seventeenth-century France, when it referred to the fi nancial management of the royal household. It then
expanded to describe the study of the causes of the wealth of nations (reflected in the classic work of that title by
Adam Smith, 1776), assessing the policies governments should follow as they sought to build the economies of
the societies they ruled. The classical liberal view of political economy was that markets worked best when left
free of any government intervention short of laws aimed at protecting property rights. It was not long, though,
before the costs of this approach became apparent (in the industrial world, at least) in the form of problems such
as pollution, child labour, urban blight, unemployment (as workers were replaced by machines), crime, and social
unrest. Clearly, argued some, governments needed to take a more radical and interventionist approach to the
management of markets.
At the same time, the study of political economy fell out of favour as economists sought to divorce the study of
their discipline from other related factors, including politics. They built new models based on the assumption that
344 chapter 20

Economics people made rational decisions based on calculations of costs and benefits. They also argued that
The study of the economics and politics had different interests and points of departure (see Clark, 2016):
theory and
practice of the ◆◆ Individuals drove economic choices, while political choices were collective.
production,
distribution, and
◆◆ Economic decisions were based on a desire to achieve prosperity, while political decisions
consumption of were targeted on the achievement of justice.
goods and ◆◆ Economic decisions took place within the market, while political decisions took place
services. within government.

Markets After several decades during which political scientists and economists followed different
The arenas within trajectories, there was an effort in the 1960s to bring them back together, since when the field
which goods and
of political economy has undergone a resurgence. The dominant view today is that politics
services are
bought and sold, and economics have close connections, and that studying one without the other will result in
with prices a failure to produce an accurate understanding of how societies function. Political economy
determined mainly must take into account the contrasting dynamics of different economic and political systems,
by supply and the impact of globalization on domestic and international policy decisions, and a wide array
demand.
of more particular questions: for example, how rising consumer demand can be balanced
against the depletion of resources, how changes in patterns of production and the organization
Microecono-
mics of the workplace relate to politics, and how the different priorities of democracies and
The study of authoritarian regimes are shaped.
small-scale or Before going into more depth, we need to come to grips with some of the key terms used
individual in this chapter. The first of these is economics. We saw in Chapter 1 that political science is
economic the study of the theory and practice of government and politics, focusing on the structure and
decisions, and the
interactions of
dynamics of institutions, political processes, and political behaviour. This is paralleled by eco-
individual nomics, which focuses on matters such as production, the creation and distribution of wealth, the
economic actors. causes and effects of scarcity, the relationship between supply and demand, and the efficient use
of resources. The study of economics is concerned with markets, finance, banking, business, and
Macroecono- trade, the scope ranging from the study of microeconomics to the study of macroeconomics.
mics The key actors involved range from individual consumers to small business, large business, mul-
The study of
tinational corporations, and – of course – governments.
entire economic
systems and their The questions addressed by political economy include the following:
complex internal
dynamics. ◆◆ How are economies structured and how do these structures vary?
◆◆ Why are some countries or societies wealthy while others are poor?
◆◆ How and when is government intervention in the economy appropriate?
◆◆ How should governments respond to recessions and unemployment?
◆◆ Why do men earn more than women for the same work?
Economic ◆◆ What are the implications of tax policy?
system
The interactions We also saw in Chapter 1 that a political system consists of the interactions and organizations
and institutions through which a society reaches and successfully enforces collective decisions. As we have
through which a seen, political systems come in many different forms, beginning with the broad differences
society chooses to
manage between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and moving to the more detailed differences
production, in the way that institutions are structured, people participate in politics, and elections are
distribution, and organized.
consumption, For its part, an economic system consists of similar sets of interactions and organizations
involving different as they relate to the market, and such systems also come in many different forms. In much
degrees of
interaction the same way as different political systems are identified by the extent to which citizens
between participate in government, and can expect government to protect their rights, so different
governments and economic systems are characterized by the manner in which citizens participate in the mar-
markets. ketplace, and – again – can or should expect government to protect their rights. Some eco-
nomic systems limit themselves to management tasks with the goal of allowing individuals to
take the initiative in the creation of new businesses, or in deciding which goods or services they wish to buy or sell,
and in what quantities. Others will take a more active role in shaping the marketplace, and in deciding what will
be made, in what quantities it will be made, and at what price it will be sold.
 political economy 345

Table 20.1 Five perspectives on political economy

Perspective Main features Application

Classical liberalism Individuals should be allowed to pursue
their interests with minimal intervention
from government.
Radicalism Government intervention is essential in the
interests of ensuring equality and justice.
Economic Government should place the needs and
nationalism priorities of national economies above
those of others.
Modern liberalism Government should protect rights, and also
redistribute wealth and opportunity.
State capitalism Government takes responsibility for many
of the functions normally left to the free
market.
Fell out of favour following the Great
Depression, but reborn in the 1980s as
neoliberalism.
Fell out of favour after association with
Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism.
Mercantilism as practised once by Britain and
France, and protectionism as promoted more
recently by Japan and by the United States
under Donald Trump.
The form of political economy found most
often today in most liberal democracies.
Recent growth in many authoritarian states,
such as China and Russia.

comparative political economy

Coming to grips with political economy demands an appreciation of the different opinions about how markets
work, about how they interact with politics and society, and about how they are best managed. A useful guide
through the maze is offered by Clark (2016), who identifies several major perspectives on the
Capitalism
confluence between politics and economics, each based on different views about the interests An economic
of individuals and societies, and of the appropriate role of government. (Another perspective, principle based on
known as state capitalism, is addressed later in the chapter.) (See summary in Table 20.1.) leaving as many
decisions as
Classical liberalism possible on
production,
This is the original approach to political economy, its roots dating back to the origins of distribution, and
capitalism in the fourteenth century. The core idea here is that humans will do best, and prices to the free
society will most likely flourish, if individuals are allowed to pursue their own interests market.
without the intervention of government, which should serve as little more than a night-
watchman state. Night-
Where medieval thinking saw individuals situated within a social hierarchy dominated by the watchman
power of the state and the church, classical liberalism was based instead on notions of individual state
One which
choice and initiative, and of the importance of private property (see Brennan and Tomasi, 2012). performs limited
In this view – developed by such thinkers and philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, functions, such as
Adam Smith, and Friedrich Hayek – humans were seen to be self-interested and capable of maintaining law
identifying and pursuing the means best suited to meeting their needs. The free market was the and order,
providing national
best means for encouraging new discoveries and creative solutions to problems, and society was
defence, enforcing
no more than an accumulation of individuals and their needs. Government served to protect the contracts, and
natural rights of individuals, to offer public services such as education, and to address inequalities dealing with
created by the market, but not much more. As Thomas Jefferson once famously suggested, ‘that emergencies.
government is best which governs least’.
Classical liberalism was dealt a severe blow with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the effects of which led
many to believe that the free market was not necessarily the best means for shaping economic activities. Capi-
talism seemed to be unable to overcome macroeconomic fluctuations in economic activity, and the market was
not a level playing field, containing – as it did – many structural problems, such as a tendency for monopolies
to develop, and for powerful economic interests to exert more political influence. Classical liberalism was also
(somewhat unfairly) charged with paying too little heed to the idea of community welfare: individual progress
was all very well, but society and the economy itself needed good education, health care, and infrastructure, most
346 chapter 20

Externalities of which was under-supplied by the free market and better or only provided by government.
The consequences Classical liberalism also failed to account for what economists describe as externalities.
of economic These can be negative, as with pollution or drunk driving, or positive, as with the benefits
activity of education and of research and development.
experienced by
unrelated third
With peace achieved after World War II, the result of such concerns was a resurgence of gov-
parties. ernment activity in the form of redistributive policies based on higher and graduated tax rates,
more government regulation, and more government investments in education, health care, and
Neoliberalism social welfare. A reaction against this expansion of the state came in the 1980s when – under the
An economic leadership of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States – classical
philosophy liberalism was reborn as neoliberalism, an approach to political economy defined by Harvey
representing a
revival of classical
(2007) as one in which ‘human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entre-
liberalism that has preneurial freedoms and skills with an institutional framework characterized by strong private
been adopted by property rights, free markets, and free trade’. This philosophy later expanded to other advanced
conservatives in economies, to international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Mon-
many democracies etary Fund, and even to emerging countries such as China (Jones, 2012). It has often been
since the 1980s.
criticized, though, as ‘capitalism without a conscience’, and for focusing too much on profit and
growth at the expense of economic and political equality (see Monbiot, 2016).

Radicalism
The core idea behind the radical perspective (which overlapped with – and grew out of – classical liberalism) is
that society is more than a collection of individuals, that government represents their collective interests, and
that democratic government intervention in the marketplace is essential to ensuring
Communism equality and justice. Early radical thought was sparked by industrialization in Western
An ideological Europe and the visible problems and inequalities it created, and was based on the argument
position which that society would benefit from trade unions, a minimum wage, and welfare, all of which
suggests that a
class war will lead could only be guaranteed by government. The key contributors to this line of thought
to power and included Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Lenin.
property being Rousseau (1712–78) wrote of inequalities in wealth that allowed some property owners to
held in common, dominate others, and of the importance of everyone participating in politics so that personal
with the state interests could be blended with public interests. For Marx (1818–83), meanwhile, capitalism was
withering away.
a necessary stage on the road to communism, because it undermined the ability of individuals
State to shape society, and created a class consciousness that would lead eventually to revolution, the
socialism overthrow of the capitalist system, and its replacement with a new communist system and the
The political ‘withering away of the state’ (see Boucher, 2014). In the event, the revolution predicted by Marx
system found in was ‘forced’ by Lenin and his Russian Bolsheviks, and came not to the advanced industrial coun-
‘communist’ tries, as Marx had suggested that it would, but instead to less advanced countries such as Russia
states, involving
and China. True communism, meanwhile, was achieved nowhere.
wholesale
centralization of In the Soviet case, we saw the emergence of state socialism, a system in which there was
political and little or no economic freedom. The most extreme form was that practised by the Stalin regime
economic control. between 1928 and 1953, where economic control was accompanied by the centralization of
political authority, government by a single political party supported by a large bureaucracy, and
Command little respect for individual rights. There was large-scale state intervention in the economy, the
economy elimination of the formal free market and competition, state ownership of property, the creation
An economic
system in which all
of state-owned monopolies, and the use of a centrally planned command economy in which
decisions about large government departments used quotas, price controls, subsidies, and five-year plans to decide
production, what would be produced, where and when it would be produced, how it would be distributed,
supply, and costs and at what prices it would be sold.
are made by The brutality and inefficiency of the Stalin era was not what radicals had in mind, and nor was
government
planners. its later equivalent in China under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Mao’s contribution was to rethink
Marxism-Leninism for agricultural and peasant societies and to develop a populist and anti-elitist
form of Marxism that inspired nationalist movements in Africa and Latin America. State socialism
may have largely disappeared (often to be replaced by state capitalism – see section on authoritarian states), but Marxian
ideas remain relevant to understanding how capitalism works, or does not work.
 political economy 347

Economic nationalism
This is a point of view that espouses a focus on the domestic economy in the national interest, and on building
national economies so as to keep as much economic activity as possible within national borders. It is critical of
globalization and free trade, is open to the idea of controls on trade, and supports restrictions on the movement of
labour, capital, and goods. It is reflected in the mercantilism that was found in several European states from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, aimed at promoting the power of the state over that of rival economies, even
if this meant going to war. France and Britain were leading exponents of this idea, and Adam Smith was a leading
critic, arguing that it focused too much on production rather than consumption, and was a form of rent-seeking
(see later in this chapter). The protectionist ideas inherent in economic nationalism might help build national
industries and corporations, but they also create protected markets that allow producers to raise prices, and make
them less prone to competition, as well as inviting reciprocal protectionism from other countries. The Trump
administration in the United States offers a recent example of the revival of economic nationalism, favouring as it
does a more equal balance of trade with China, support for the domestic steel and coal industries, and investments
in domestic infrastructure.

Modern liberalism
Modern liberalism – often (and confusingly) described simply as liberalism – is an outgrowth Welfare
of classical liberalism, integrating elements of radicalism, and based on arguments developed economics
by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls (see Ryan, The branch of
2012). In spite of the recent revival of support for classical liberalism in the form of neoliberalism, economics that
focuses on the
and in spite of signs of a revival in some countries of economic nationalism, modern liberalism
effect of the
is the form of political economy found most often today in most liberal democracies. It allocation of goods
recognizes the flaws in capitalism and democracy, but also regards both as valuable; the purpose and services on
of government, argue modern liberals, is to protect rights so that individuals can collectively overall social
pursue the goals that the free market cannot provide, while focusing only on those activities welfare.
that support the public interest.
A key part of this idea is found in welfare economics, which is based on the idea that the Convergence
thesis
free market does not necessarily optimize social welfare; the free market might lead to economic The idea that the
efficiency while overlooking the needs of the poor, and the challenges they face in improving political
the quality of their lives. Governments should therefore be responsible for more than protecting economies of
property rights, but should also be involved in redistributing wealth and opportunity so as to high-income
maximize social welfare. As we saw in Chapter 10, one of the key effects of the Great Depression economies are
adopting a
and of two world wars was to greatly increase the role of government in many democracies, and common format
the creation of welfare states (see later in this chapter), a move mainly supported by public opin- based on a liberal,
ion in liberal democracies until the 1960s. At that point, a reaction took place in some countries pro-market
against so-called ‘big government’, feeding in to the declining faith and trust in government that response while
we have discussed in other parts of this book. As to what effect this had on political economy, also restraining
welfare spending
opinion is divided. and encouraging
One view, the convergence thesis, holds that advanced economies and welfare states policies to expand
are coalescing around the modern liberal idea, helped by the pressures of an increasingly the workforce.
globalized economy. This relates to a more general decline in national distinctiveness; in
earlier chapters, we saw a growing concentration of national political systems on codified constitutions, consti-
tutional courts, liberal democracy, multi-party systems, and proportional representation. Why not, then, a similar
trajectory on the economic front? However, the evidence for convergence among high-income democracies is far
from clear-cut (see Hay, 2017), and what we may actually be seeing is a fragmentation of perspectives on political
economy. We find different leaders, parties, and governments espousing different views about the best economic
policies to pursue, and about the appropriate role of government in the marketplace.
One measure of the differences is found in comparative data on economic freedom – see Focus 20.1. Furthermore,
whatever has happened, or will happen, among liberal democracies, we cannot overlook developments in other parts
of the world. These were, at first, impacted by policies pursued by wealthier democracies, but the balance has changed
as emerging countries became more powerful and influential. Changes currently taking place in China, in particular,
are bringing new ideas into the debate about political economy.
348 chapter 20

Focus 20.1
Comparing levels of economic freedom
Just as we have comparative indices for measuring democracy – including the Democracy Index and Freedom
in the World – so we have various means for measuring and comparing different levels of government
intervention in the marketplace. One of these is the Index of Economic Freedom maintained by the
Fraser Institute, a conservative Canadian think-tank (see Gwartney et al., 2016). The index is based on 42
measures that rate countries according to such factors as the size and reach of government, approaches to
property rights, levels of access to sound money, and regulation of credit. Each country is given a score out of
10, with the freest economies earning the highest scores and the more controlled economies earning the
lowest scores.
Figure 20.1 gives examples from the 2016 index, which show that all states have some government
intervention in their economies. Hong Kong and Singapore had the highest ratings, most democracies were
placed in the range of 7.0 or higher, and most hybrids and authoritarian states had lower levels of economic
freedom. Interestingly, the four BRICs (see Chapter 8) were only at the middle level of the rankings, ranging
between India at 6.6 and Brazil at 5.8. Venezuela was placed last with a score of 2.92, while more than 30
countries were not ranked at all because of a lack of reliable information.

Hong Kong 1
Singapore 2
New Zealand 3
UK 6
USA 11
Germany 23
Japan 39
France 52
Mexico 76
Turkey 81
India 95
South Africa 95
Russia 100
China 112
Nigeria 114
Brazil 137
Egypt 140
Iran 150
Venezuela 159
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Score out of 10
Full/flawed democracies Hybrid/authoritarian states

Figure 20.1 The Index of Economic Freedom

Source: Based on data in Fraser Institute (2015).
Note: Ranking indicated at the end of each column.

the welfare state

For many, the welfare state is the major policy achievement of the liberal democratic state. Even as economic
fortunes ebb and flow, liberal democracies still manage to maintain welfare programmes, which often account
for the bulk of their national budgets. This is true even in the United States, where many people mistakenly
 political economy 349

believe that national defence is the biggest item on the federal budget. In fact, about two- Social
thirds of federal spending is directed at programmes such as social security, unemployment security
benefits, public health care, and related programmes, compared to the 16 per cent that is A collective term
spent on the military (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). To fully understand political for welfare
programmes
economy, then, we must examine the welfare state, and also compare how states vary in
targeted at people
terms of securing the welfare of their people, an exercise that reveals important cross- with inadequate
national differences in the substance of citizenship. income, or no
Like many concepts in comparative politics, the notion of the welfare state enters public income.
debates more often in some countries than in others. The phrase is found most often in Europe,
where it is also most likely to carry positive connotations. In some respects, just as Europe is the natural arena in which
to study multi-party systems and coalition governments, so too is it the home of the most developed regimes of social
support. Even though the term welfare state came into use in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s, its origins lie further
back, in late-nineteenth century Germany (Pierson and Leimgruber, 2010). In an effort to offset the influence both of
socialist parties and the Catholic Church, Otto von Bismarck (Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871–90) pioneered
compulsory social insurance schemes in response to risks such as accidents and illness, at least for industrial workers.
Building on these foundations, other Western European states gradually introduced and extended welfare, begin-
ning with support for the poor and the unemployed, and then providing coverage that included pensions, family allow-
ances, and more groups in the population (e.g. rural people and dependents of industrial workers). This complicated
patchwork – see Table 20.2 – is typically funded by national government and delivered either directly, or through local
government or other public or private agencies. By the 1970s, in most democracies virtually the entire population was
covered for the main aspects of welfare.
Table 20.2 Forms of welfare
The transformation of developed liberal democracies to
welfare states was completed in the twentieth century, and Pensions for the retired
particularly in the three ‘golden decades’ following World War Unemployment benefits
II.The expansion took place at different rates at different times Leave for new mothers (and sometimes for fathers)
in different countries, resulting in different levels of spending – Insurance against workplace accidents
see Figure 20.2. Among the relatively wealthy members of the Free or subsidized health care
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Free or subsidized education
(OECD), the average share of spending by all public bodies Support for the disabled
(local as well as national) on social programmes was 20 per Subsidized housing
cent in 2016, although shares varied from a high of 31 per cent Family allowances
in France to a low of 7 per cent in Mexico. Social services (such as residential care homes)

35
Public social spending as percentage of GDP

30

25

20

15

10

0
lia
ce

d
ly

y
ain

an

SA
en

nd

Tu a
ey

le

ico
ad
an
lan

an
Ita

hi
EC

ra
an

rk
Jap
ed

ala

U
Sp

ex
m

an

C
l

st
Fin

Po
Fr

O
Sw

Ze
er

M
C
Au
G

ew
N

Figure 20.2 Comparing welfare spending

Source: OECD (2018b).
Note: Figures are for 2016. Includes all financial flows from public bodies for social purposes. Does not include tax breaks or private spending, which
would particularly increase figures for USA, UK, and Japan.
350 chapter 20

In an influential study, Esping-Andersen (1990) identified three types of welfare state found in high-income liberal
democracies:

◆◆ The liberal (or limited) welfare state. Here the rules for gaining benefits are strict and the benefits are relatively
modest. Claimants are a small, workless and sometimes stigmatized segment of the population. This is not so
much a welfare state as state welfare – a tradition reflecting the night-watchman state. The traditional examples
are found in the English-speaking world, notably Australia, Canada, and the United States.
◆◆ The conservative welfare state. Here the state is the main provider but benefits are linked to occupation, depend
on personal contributions, and reflect salary levels. Positions which serve the state, especially jobs in the civil
service, often receive generous treatment in health benefits and pensions. Reflecting the influence of the church,
this system favours the family and encourages parenthood. It predominates in continental Europe, with
Germany being the classic case, and others including Austria, France, and Italy.
◆◆ The social democratic welfare state. This less common system is based on the principle of equal, flat rate benefits
for all citizens. Based on need rather than contributions, it takes direct responsibility for caring for children and
the elderly. Scandinavian countries are the best examples of this extensive, expensive, and egalitarian system.

The 1980s signalled an end to the golden age of the welfare state, with recessions and then financial crises
reducing the resources available. The demand for welfare has continued to grow, though, as the average age of the
population has increased, raising the cost of pensions, medical care, and support services. Part of the problem is that
welfare states are based on open-ended commitments, with governments guaranteeing to treat everyone who is
poor, or unemployed, or disabled, or retired. In so doing, some of life’s risks are removed from the individual but are
transferred to the state.
International pressures also make a difference. If the cost of one country’s welfare system is higher than all the rest,
its international competitiveness may suffer – or be seen to do so. Pierson (2006) suggested that the move to a more
open international economy ‘curtailed opportunities for the further development of national welfare states’. Asia’s
rising importance in the global economy comes with the advantage that its welfare systems are relatively inexpensive,
giving it an advantage over the older and more expensive systems of Europe and North America.

In spite of the best intentions of the welfare state, not all have benefited from economic growth, and poverty
remains a widespread problem even in the wealthiest countries.
Source: iStock/CatLane.
 political economy 351

These problems have led to some retrenchment of the welfare state (Bonoli and Natali, 2012):

◆◆ Benefits have been reduced.

◆◆ Eligibility rules have been tightened, notably by raising the retirement age.
◆◆ Some charges have been introduced for services such as medical treatment.
◆◆ Efforts have been made to revive older agencies of care, notably charities and churches.
◆◆ Employment benefits have been reduced for new and part-time workers.

This edging away from a fully comprehensive welfare state has also reflected a general shift in government
priorities, from the social to the economic. In particular, efforts to put people back to work have intensified as
governments have tried to raise economic output – and tax revenues – so as to address their fiscal challenges,
especially since the global fi nancial crisis. Even as welfare spending remained high, unemployment benefits were
reduced in many countries (Levy, 2010).

development and global divisions

The four perspectives outlined earlier were based mainly on experiences in the industrialized West, which was the
source even of the radical ideas that were adopted in China and other less-urbanized communist states. With the
end of the colonial era, however, and the slow end of military government in Latin America, the debate over
political economy changed. Now, there were a growing number of what were initially known as less developed
countries (LDCs), developing countries, or underdeveloped countries, with quite different political and economic
circumstances from those found in the liberal democratic West. The challenge of understanding development
moved up the political economic agenda, even if there was little agreement on how it could
Development
best be understood, or on how emerging countries – most of which had long been in an
The improvement
unequal and exploited relationship with their colonial powers – could address the new of the economic
opportunities presented by independence and improve their place in the global system, in both and social
absolute and relative terms (see Todaro and Smith, 2016). well-being of
As they applied to LDCs, the four Western perspectives on political economy took predict- peoples,
communities, or
ably different positions (Clark, 2016). For classical liberals, the key was to leave the market to
states. Often used
function with minimal government interference. This was hard to achieve in LDCs, given that only in the
many had ineffective governments that were vulnerable to manipulation by particular interests, context of poorer
received foreign aid that created a form of dependency, found it hard to protect their markets states.
from free trade, often lacked profitable resources, needed long-term investment to develop inad-
equate infrastructure, and had communal cultures that impeded the entrepreneurial abilities of Dependency
individuals. theory
A perspective
For radicals such as Lenin (1917), poorer countries had become integrated through the based on the
exploitation of cheap labour and natural resources, which was helping rich industrialists offset argument that
revolutionary discontent at home. This idea fed into a new dependency theory that became resources flow
popular in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in the work of Latin American economists. This from a periphery
argued that European colonialism undermined indigenous social and economic institutions, of poor states to a
core of wealthy
along with their capacity to develop independently of their relationship with European colonial states, creating
powers. Development was focused on a few key resources such as minerals, timber, and agri- political and
culture, most of the profits from which went to Europe. LDCs were therefore encouraged to economic
minimize their contacts with rich countries, and to better protect home industries, so that they dependency.
had a better chance of developing independently.
Conservatives in the developed world accorded LDCs lower priority; their concern was political economy arrange-
ments at home. Their support for traditional ideas and institutions – combined with their isolationist philosophy –
spilled over in their views about LDCs, in regard to which they encouraged support for pre-capitalist values such as
loyalty, authority, and the community, support for protectionism, and opposition to foreign aid. Their opposition to
communism, however, encouraged them to support authoritarian governments that took anti-communist positions,
such as Iran, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Turkey, and Venezuela.
Finally, the modern liberal perspective suggests that the problems of LDCs stemmed from a combination of under-
developed markets, ineffective government, extremes in inequality, and the harm posed to LDCs by unequal trade
relationships. Its recipe for success includes balancing growth with fairness (rising GDP combined with improvements
in the life of the average person through better education and health care, for example), the expansion of opportunities
352 chapter 20

Fair trade for individuals, fair trade, striking a balance between free trade and protectionism, reaching
The idea that equitable free trade agreements, and providing aid that creates new opportunities rather than
producers in dependency (see Brown, 2013).
poorer countries The end of the Cold War in about 1989–91 not only signalled the collapse of the commu-
should earn a
bigger share of the
nist bloc as a distinctive actor in the global system, but also emphasized and accelerated the
profits from the economic emergence of Asia and Latin America. The potential of many countries in these
sale of their regions had long been understood, but their strengthening global positions now became
commodities. more obvious, helped by trends towards greater democracy in several of them. As we saw in
Chapter 4, the changing economic balance was exemplified by the invention in 2001 of the
acronym BRIC to summarize the strengthening roles of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. By 2012, Jim O’Neill –
the investment banker who had invented the acronym – was talking of the Next 11, or N11: a secondary group of
emerging markets that included Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, and Vietnam (Martin, 2012). While there
were positive trends in these countries, however, many others continued to lag behind, suffering underdeveloped
economies, inadequate primary education and health care, environmental unsustainability, and – in the worst cases
– extreme poverty and hunger.
A shock came to the international system in 2007 with the breaking of a global financial
Global
financial crisis crisis that was the worst of its kind since the Great Depression of the 1930s. More a North
The crisis sparked Atlantic crisis than one with truly global proportions, it had its origins in inadequate financial
in 2007 by regulation in the United States. The problem expanded to Europe when banks and financial
financial institutions there took advantage of opportunities for quick profits. When the housing market
deregulation and collapsed in the United States, many institutions on both sides of the Atlantic either went bank-
speculation in the
United States,
rupt or turned to the government for help, stock prices plummeted, many people lost their jobs
which spread and their homes, and shrinking consumer demand led to financial woes for business.
quickly to Europe. The rapid spread of the crisis emphasized the extent to which wealthier capitalist democra-
cies had failed to develop and implement effective domestic financial regulations. At the same
time, the extent to which many emerging economies were relatively unaffected emphasized how far they had gone
in achieving their own momentum. Meanwhile, the persistence of poverty and economic dysfunction in numerous
countries that long ago emerged from the unbalanced relationship inherent in colonialism underlines how much
remains to be done to understand the dynamics of political economy. We live in a world that is transforming rapidly
in economic terms, and that is increasingly globalized, and yet is also one that still contains enormous inequalities and
much unmet economic potential.

political economy in authoritarian states

It might be supposed that just as authoritarian regimes use political means to keep control, so they also use economic
means, and that both their political and their economic development suffers as a result. The picture is not this
simple, though. True enough, dictators are usually less concerned than democrats with promoting the general
welfare of citizens, and we often fi nd authoritarian states blighted by privilege, nepotism, and corruption, and
lagging economically. At the same time, some of the fastest-growing economies of recent years have been
authoritarian states such as China, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
The challenges of understanding the links are illustrated by Haddad (2012) in his case study of Syria and of how
political economy played into the Arab Spring. Criticizing the efforts made to frame the Arab uprisings in terms of
‘generic economic arguments about poverty and destitution’, and to see the uprisings as a reaction to decades of
authoritarian rule, he argues the importance of assessing the role in these uprisings of the interaction between eco-
nomic and political variables. He describes the dynamic that played out in Syria as follows:

When authoritarian elites began to build relations with capitalists or the business class in the 1970s and 1980s they
were doing more than simply pursuing their own interests. They were trying to respond to growing economic
troubles or crisis. However, with time, these political elites and their off spring were increasingly becoming the
economic elite. Their interests were reflected in their policy preferences, their lifestyles, and their changing social
alliances (if not tastes).

With new abilities to transform economic wealth into political power, Haddad continues, more state officials and
their families were drawn into a ‘crony-dominated market’ in which economic policy was shaped by the mutual interests
 political economy 353

of business and the authoritarian government of Hafez al-Assad (in office 1971–2000) and his son Bashar al-Assad
(in office from 2000).The pressures that helped to trigger the Syrian civil war, in other words, were about more than
democrats versus dictators, and lay in a more nuanced set of factors related to political economy.
The political economy of authoritarianism has taken on a more predictable structure in
the form of state capitalism, a phenomenon found in several hybrid and authoritarian states, State
capitalism
including China, Russia, and Turkey; see Spotlight Turkey. While this is far from a new idea, and
A system in which
is not limited to authoritarian states (it has been found also in France, Japan, and South Korea at the state wields a
different times), and can be seen as a fifth perspective on political economy to add to the four high degree of
discussed earlier in this chapter, it has undergone a revival in recent decades. The approach is control over the
based on the state taking a more hands-on approach to economic management, mainly through economy, taking
responsibility for
its ownership of large companies – known as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – that are active in
many of the
strategically important fields, such as energy and technology. (They were once also important in functions and
Europe, as in the case of the British and Dutch East India Companies.) Instead of seeing them activities that
as a step in the direction of liberal capitalism, many such countries now see these SOEs as per- would be left – in
manent, even if they operate on the basis of small profits. a capitalist system
– to the free
Kurlantzick (2016) points out that state capitalist principles can be found in democracies
market.
(albeit mainly flawed ones) such as Brazil and India, but that it has developed furthest in more
authoritarian states such as Russia and China. He argues that this trend has contributed to
declines in democracy, as governments have tightened their political control. State capitalism, he warns, is ‘more pro-
tectionist, more dangerous to global security and prosperity, and more threatening to political freedom’ than free
market economics.
In the case of China, state capitalism has redirected a policy of privatization that was instituted by Mao’s succes-
sors in the 1980s, instead encouraging the creation of enormous SOEs such as State Grid, Sinopec, and China National
Petroleum; in 2018, these three energy companies occupied three of the four top slots on the Fortune Global 500 list of
the world’s biggest companies (Fortune, 2018). Helped by a law that requires that all industries of strategic value (such
as energy and arms manufacturers) be owned by the state, such corporations have accounted for more than 80 per cent
of the value of the Chinese stock market in recent years (Li, 2015). Although often inefficient, they have nonetheless
helped China to become more competitive at a global level, while strengthening the grip of the Communist Party
over the Chinese economy.
Similar patterns can be found in Russia, where the share of the state sector grew from 35 per cent of gross domestic
product in 2005 to 70 per cent in 2015 (Aslund, 2017). Vladimir Putin, argues Djankov (2015), has encouraged state
ownership of key sectors such as energy and finance, has used Russia’s exports of oil and natural gas as a tool in foreign
policy, has used plentiful revenues from Russia’s natural resources as an excuse for failing to make reforms to health care
and welfare, has neglected to address the problem of extreme wealth accumulating in the hands of a growing number
of billionaires with whom he has close links, and has been able to weather sanctions imposed on Russia by the Euro-
pean Union and the United States (which have actually had the effect of increasing the level of state ownership in the
economy). All of which, of course, has played into Putin’s style of strong and assertive leadership.
For Aslund (2017), Russia’s SOEs – including the energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft, and the technology
company Rostec – are little more than a cover for the development of the kind of crony capitalism discussed in
Chapter 10. They give the impression of being run in the fashion of modern businesses, issuing annual reports and
holding annual shareholder meetings, for example, but appearances deceive:

They are not even really run by the state. Instead, they are controlled by a small group of cronies – former KGB
officers, ministers, and senior officials in the president’s administration – who act as Putin’s personal representatives.

Loyal executives enjoy long tenures in these companies (regardless of their management abilities), managers favour
friends and associates through the awarding of contracts and the selling of assets, and family members are appointed
to senior positions regardless of age or experience. The result, Aslund suggests, is a form of ‘neo-feudal capitalism’ that
poses a threat to Russia’s social and political stability.
More generally in authoritarian states, the key challenge for dictators is to play off domestic political forces against
each other so as to ensure their own continuation in office. Economic means play a key role in these efforts, and – as
a result – coherent economic development usually suffers. The public sector often becomes bloated, as we saw in
Chapter 10, with poorly paid employees seeking to enrich themselves at the expense of business. A company’s success,
and its tax burden, comes to depend more on its political contacts than its business strengths. Economics and politics
 SPOTLIGHT TURKEY
Brief profile
Once the centre of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a secular republic that straddles Asia and Europe. It has long
sought membership of the European Union, but its efforts have stalled over concerns about its human rights
record and democratic trajectory. Matters have worsened in recent years as Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, who came to
power in 2003 and spent 11 years as prime minister, was elected president in 2014 and set about converting the
previously ceremonial role into an executive position with strong powers. An attempted coup in 2016 sparked a
crackdown that strengthened Erdoǧan’s powers, and a flawed 2017 referendum narrowly approved a switch to a
presidential system of government. Freedom House downgraded Turkey from Partly Free to Not Free in 2018,
concerned about abuses of free expression, freedom of association, and the rule of law. It is ranked as a hybrid in
the Democracy Index.

Form of government Unitary presidential republic. State formed in 1923. The 1982 constitution was
the sixth since 1876, and it has been amended nearly 20 times.
Executive Presidential, in the process of a transition from a parliamentary system. A
president directly elected for no more than two five-year terms, supported by
several vice-presidents and a Council of Ministers. Office of prime minister
abolished in 2017.
Legislature Unicameral Grand National Assembly with 600 members elected for renewable
five-year terms.
Judiciary Constitutional Court with 17 members serving non-renewable 12-year terms,
with three elected by the Grand National Assembly and the rest appointed by the
president based on nominations from lower courts.
Electoral system The Grand National Assembly is elected using proportional representation with
a (relatively high) 10 per cent threshold. The president has been directly elected
only since 2014. Presidential candidates must be nominated by at least 20
members of the Grand National Assembly and compete against each other using
a majority system.
Parties Multi-party, with the conservative and Islamist Justice and Development Party
(AKP) (formed in 2001) dominating and the social democratic Republican People’s
Party as the major opposition.

81m Population
Full
Democracy Very High
Free
Flawed High
Democracy Partly Free
Gross Medium
$851bn Hybrid Regime Not Free
Domestic Low
Product Authoritarian Not Rated
Not Rated
Not Rated

Per Democracy Freedom Human

$10,540 capita Index rating House rating Development
GDP Index rating
 The political economy of
Turkey
Turkey is an emerging economy that occupies
an important strategic position between
Europe and the Middle East. With a
population almost as big as that of Germany,
it has seen steady growth in recent years,
quickly recovering from the effects of the
global financial crisis, making significant
inroads into its poverty rate, witnessing
rapid urban growth, and earning a ranking by
the World Bank as an upper-middle-income
country (on a par with China, Brazil, and
Mexico). For Önis and Kutlay (2013), Turkey
is a ‘near-BRIC’. The International Monetary
A poster announces an election rally in Istanbul for Turkey’s President Fund, meanwhile, classifies Turkey as an
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, who has increased his grip on power since first emerging market economy, or one that has
coming to national office in 2003. some but not all of the economic features of
Source: Getty Images/Chris McGrath.
a developed economy. In short, Turkey’s
economic potential is significant.
Questions hover, though, over its political economy trajectory. Turkey had been moving towards strengthening
its democratic credentials, and making efforts to amend laws and regulations in the interests of its long-held hope
of joining the European Union. Since coming to power in 2003, however, Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan has undone many
of the democratic gains, accumulating new powers for a redesigned presidency, and pursuing a policy platform that
has been variously described as populist, nationalist, Islamist, conservative, and anti-Western. The political doubts
raised by his administration have raised
economic doubts as well. Fuelled in RUSSIA
part by Erdoǧan’s claims that he plans Black Sea
to take control over the setting of
interest rates, and in part by growing Istanbul
inflation, the Turkish currency lost
one-fifth of its value in early 2018.
ANKARA
Many have seen signs of neoliberalism TURKEY
in Turkey, reflected – for example – in
a policy of privatization, and a move IRAN
away from an already modest welfare
state towards greater support for CYPRUS SYRIA
private health care and private social
insurance. However, Karadag (2010) Mediterranean IRAQ
summarizes trends in Turkish political
economy as a move away from state
capitalism towards what he describes
as ‘an oligarchic form of capitalism’. He Further reading
defines this as consisting of political
fragmentation and the establishment Başer, Bahar, and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk (eds) (2017) Authoritarian Politics
of closed elite political business cartels, in Turkey: Elections, Resistance and the AKP (I.B. Tauris).
Finkel, Andrew (2012) Turkey: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford
a trend that helps explain Turkey’s
University Press).
persistent problems with corruption. Genç, Kaya (2016) Under the Shadow: Rage and Revolution in Modern
There is, in short, an unsurprising Turkey (I.B. Tauris).
overlap between current political and
economic trends in Turkey.
356 chapter 20

do not marry well, resulting in the inefficient use of capital. Alternatively, rulers may just want to enrich themselves,
their families and their ethnic or religious group by taking resources out of the economy and often out of the country.
Inherent corruption, among leading officials as well as bureaucrats dealing directly with the public, is a tax on both
economic growth and regime legitimacy. Such problems are particularly acute when states suffer a resource curse –
see Focus 20.2.

Focus 20.2
The resource curse

Resource A particular problem that has skewed economic policy in several authoritarian states is
curse the so-called resource curse (Auty, 1993; Collier and Bannon, 2003), or the ‘paradox
A phenomenon by of plenty’ as it is sometimes known. This exists when a country is well endowed in a
which a state that resource that could and should be the foundation for sound economic development,
is well endowed in but instead alters the economic and political balance such as to focus attention on a
a particular
single sector, reducing economic growth below the expected level.
natural resource,
or a limited Several wealthy democracies, such as Canada and Norway, have faced similar risks
selection of but have been able to avoid its worst effects by pursuing careful and transparent
resources, policies, and making sure their economies were based on a broad foundation. In the
experiences lower case of many poorer (and often authoritarian) countries, however, their rush to
economic growth
develop has produced different results. Oil has turned out to be a problem, for
thanks to
unbalanced policy, example, for several sub-Saharan African states, such as Angola, Chad, Equatorial
extensive Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan. The resource curse is also a factor in countries
corruption, and rich in easily exploitable minerals such as copper or uranium, or in precious gems such
internal conflict. as diamonds.
The policy element of the ‘curse’ stems from four main factors:

◆◆ Because these resources are usually relatively easy to exploit and can bring quick and often profitable
returns, a state will focus its development efforts almost entirely in that sector, investing little in other
sectors. This is the so-called ‘Dutch disease’, named for the effects of the discovery of natural gas in the
North Sea off the coast of the Netherlands in the 1970s (Humphreys et al., 2007). It will thereby have an
imbalanced economy and will become dependent on a product whose value may be held hostage to
fluctuations in its price on the international market.
◆◆ When a government can raise adequate revenue from simply taxing a major natural resource, it lacks
incentive to improve economic performance by developing the skills of its people, thus damaging growth
over the long run.
◆◆ The profits that come from these commodities can encourage theft and corruption, ensuring that they
find their way into the bank accounts of the rich and powerful rather than being reinvested back into the
economy.
◆◆ The effect of the curse is to encourage internal conflict, when poorer regions of the country find that
they are not benefitting equally from the profits of resources found in other parts of the country. In the
most extreme cases, the outcome can be violence and civil war.

One country that might have been hurt by a resource curse, but that has instead pursued coherent
economic policy, is Botswana. One of the poorest countries in the world at the time of its independence in
1966, it also discovered that it was sitting on enormous diamond wealth. It could have misused this asset for
a quick financial return, but it instead set up the Debswana Mining Company, a joint venture between the
government of Botswana and De Beers, a company which at the time had a monopoly on the global diamond
trade. Diamond mining has since fuelled the economic development of Botswana, which now ranks as a
middle-income country.
 political economy 357

Stagnation is reinforced, in many authoritarian states as well as in democracies, through a habit Rent-seeking
known as rent-seeking (Congleton and Hillman, 2015). This might be pursued by an individ- Efforts to make a
ual, a company, or even an entire regime. For example, governments might take over control of profit or an
valuable natural resources and charge citizens for their use, or they might require import licenses income from
selling a resource
for companies bringing new products into a country, or charge visitors fees for visas. Equally, gov- without using that
ernment officials might take bribes to provide a licence to a company, or a passport to a citizen. resource to
In all these cases, resources are being used unproductively to generate unearned benefits, hidden generate wealth
taxes are imposed on the economy and society, and no value is added to the wider marketplace. or to benefit
For governments reliant on rent-seeking, there is less motivation to set up the formal structures society.
needed to collect taxes, expand the economy, and develop human capital. Rather, a stand-off of
mutual distrust develops between rulers and ruled, creating a context which is incompatible with the more sophisti-
cated policy initiatives found in many liberal democracies.
Rent-seeking is related to the phenomenon of the rentier state. This label applies to coun- Rentier state
tries that earn most of their revenue from exporting a natural resource. In economic terms, the One which derives
rentier state makes an income from owning an asset which it exports, usually through licensing most or all of its
private and often foreign contractors, making a profit but adding little value to the local econ- national revenues
omy. For example, agricultural commodities may be exported raw, with processing taking place from exporting
raw materials or
elsewhere. The authoritarian rulers of these rentier states receive a direct income from overseas, leasing natural
reducing their need to raise taxes, and reducing pressures for representation. A portion of the resources to
resource ‘rent’ can be distributed to the population as hand-outs or through providing jobs in foreign companies.
a swollen public sector, thus buying popular acquiescence to a non-democratic regime, and
delaying a transition to democracy. The phenomenon of the rentier state is one of the explanations for the lack of
democracy in many states rich in key resources such as oil.
Most of the major Middle Eastern oil states – including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States – have at various
times earned the label rentier state.This has applied most obviously at times when the global price of oil has been high,
though, and the long-term decline in the place of oil in the world economy may be having important implications for
Saudi Arabia, among others. Its recent budget deficits have been exacerbated by the falling price of oil, encouraging the
government to cut subsidies, to impose its first-ever general tax (in the form of a value added tax), and even to think
about privatizing Aramco, the world’s largest oil company. The long-term result, suggests Seznec (2016), might be that
Saudi Arabia’s political economy moves away from being ‘the epitome of a rentier state’ and instead begins to resemble
those of more advanced industrial democracies.
358 chapter 20

discussion questions
◆◆ What are the key benefits of studying the interaction between politics and economics?
◆◆ To what extent are classical liberal views still reflected in the modern practice of political
economy in liberal democracies?
◆◆ To what extent are radical views still reflected in the modern practice of political economy?
◆◆ What is the future likely to hold for the welfare state?
◆◆ What are the differences between state socialism and state capitalism?
◆◆ Why have well-endowed liberal democracies managed to avoid the effects of the resource
curse, while many authoritarian systems have not?

key concepts
◆◆ Capitalism ◆◆ Microeconomics
◆◆ Command economy ◆◆ Neoliberalism
◆◆ Communism ◆◆ New political economy
◆◆ Convergence thesis ◆◆ Night-watchman state
◆◆ Dependency theory ◆◆ Political economy
◆◆ Development ◆◆ Rent-seeking
◆◆ Economic system ◆◆ Rentier state
◆◆ Economics ◆◆ Resource curse
◆◆ Externalities ◆◆ Social security
◆◆ Fair trade ◆◆ State capitalism
◆◆ Global fi nancial crisis ◆◆ State socialism
◆◆ Macroeconomics ◆◆ Welfare economics
◆◆ Markets

further reading
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perspectives, and on topics such as unemployment, inflation, trade, and the environment.
Clift, Ben (2014) Comparative Political Economy: States, Markets and Global Capitalism (Red
Globe Press). An outline of the approaches and analytical tools used to understand
contemporary capitalism.
Kurlantzick, Joshua (2016) State Capitalism: How the Return of Statism is Transforming the World
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its implications for studies of political economy.
Ravenhill, John (ed.) (2017) Global Political Economy, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press). A textbook on political economy as it applies to trade, fi nance, and development at
the global level.
Ryan, Alan (2012) The Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press). A detailed assessment of the origins, evolution, and contemporary features of
modern liberalism.
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index
References for concept definitions
are shown in bold.
A political participation 227–9, 232
absolute monarchy 95–6, 137
see also constitutional monarchy
accountability (bureaucracy) 174
Acton, Lord 12, 102
Afghanistan 99, 195
affirmative action see bureaucracy
anarchism 10
Arab Spring xiii, 90, 96, 98, 99, 137,
209, 213, 248
and online activism 249
origins and events 84–5, 93
Argentina 175, 182, 226
Aristotle 5, 13, 36, 72
assembly see legislature
Athens, Ancient 72, 73, 142
Australia 112, 209
bureaucracy 166
city government 194
constitution 111
electoral system 256
federalism 190
legislature 144
political culture 200
political parties 275
referendums 261
voting 296
Austria 45, 113, 265
authoritarian rule 90
absolute monarchy 95–6, 137
authoritarian regime 91–4
bureaucracies 173–7
bureaucratic authoritarianism 175
civil society 319–20, 321
clientelism 228
coercion 93, 288, 338
communist parties 97–8
constitutions and courts 119–22
corruption 102–4
cult of personality 97, 103
despotism 90, 93
forms of authoritarian rule 94–9
elections 266–8
electoral authoritarianism 299, 302
executives 136–9
interest groups 318–19, 322
Islamic Republic 99, 119, 121, 300
legislatures 155–8
military government 98–9
patronage 94, 102, 104, 162, 193,
229, 304
personal rule 96–7, 137–8, 321, 339 organization 166–7, 170–2
political communication 246–50 origins and evolution 161–5
political culture 211–14 outsourcing 163
political economy 352–3, 356–7 recruitment 172–3
political parties 282–5
red tape 161
regulatory agency 171–2
public policy 337–40 spoils system 162
ruling parties 97–8 unified recruitment 172
sub-national government 193–7 Weber’s model of 161–3, 167, 170,
theocracy 99, 102 174, 176
totalitarianism 97, 101, 103 Burke, Edmund 143, 235
voters 298–304
see also hybrid regimes
authority 5, 9, 54, 55, 56, 59–60, 63, 77, C
95, 102, 116–17, 121, 184, 190, 193
cabinet 129, 134–5, 226
cabinet government 132–3, 166
B Canada 148
bureaucracy 162, 173
Bagehot, Walter 126 elections 255
behaviouralism 21, 153, 167 200, interest groups 311
288, 293 legislature 152
Belarus 96 multiculturalism 30, 189
Belgium 63, 126, 184 multinationalism 63
Botswana 356 capitalism 26, 79, 345, 346, 347, 353
Brazil career politicians 154
authoritarianism 175 cartel party 282
and BRICs 61, 352 case study method 36–9
executive 131 catch-all party 272
legislature 153 checks and balances 77, 125, 149
political parties 278 China
Spotlight 130–1 as authoritarian state 8, 101
vote buying 294 and BRICs 61, 352
women in politics 226 bureaucracy 161, 174
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Communist Party 97, 101, 121–2,
China) 61, 348, 352 139, 150, 158, 196, 228, 248,
see also individual countries 267, 274, 319, 353
Britain see United Kingdom as communist state 97–8, 346, 347
broadcasting 236–7 constitution and courts 121–2
bureaucracy 161 crony capitalism 176
accountability 174 elections 267
administrative capacity 176 executive 139
affirmative action 172–3 interest groups 319, 322
in authoritarian states 173–7 legislature 150, 154, 157–8
bureaucratic authoritarianism 175 political communication 243, 248
crony capitalism 176, 353 political participation 228, 229
departmental recruitment 172 political parties 274
departments 166–7, 170 political trust 208
developmental state 176 public policy 340
divisions 170 regional government 183
e-government 165–6 Spotlight 100–1
meritocracy 161 state 55–6
new public management 162–4 state capitalism 353
non-departmental public sub-national government 39
bodies 171–2 Taiwan 54
ombudsman 174 unitary government 184, 196

Christian democracy 272
Churchill, Winston 71, 93, 252
citizen, defined 55–6
city government 194
civic culture 203
civil law 116, 117–18, 119
civil liberties 76, 90, 91
civil service see bureaucracy
civil society 91, 92, 232, 303, 307
authoritarian states 319–20, 321
Clausewitz, Carl von 5
clientelism 228
coalition government 12, 38, 132,
133, 144, 254, 256, 330, 349
coercion see authoritarian rule
cohabitation 135
Cold War 13, 20, 21, 75, 83, 85, 86,
208, 352
collective action problem 27, 314
collective decision making 2, 5,
71, 217
colonial/ism 21, 40
and Latin America 351
decolonization 53, 79
effects on Africa 214
postcolonial/ism 57, 59, 195
command economy 103, 346
committees see legislatures
common law 107, 116–17
communism/communist 13, 39, 42,
90, 346, 351
communist parties 97–8, 139, 150,
177, 273, 274
and elections 267, 299
and interest groups 319
and public policy 340
see also China, Communist Party
comparative method 36
comparative politics 11
challenges of comparison 46–50
classifying political systems 12–15
comparing economies 15–16
goals and purposes 11–12
and prediction
see also research methods, theoretical
approaches
concept, defined 2
confederation 44, 47, 190
confirmation bias 47–8
constitutional courts see courts
constitutional monarchy 96, 126
see also absolute monarchy
constitutions 107
amendments 111, 112
in authoritarian states 119–22
character 107–9
codified constitution 107–8
durability 109–10
entrenchment 111
flexible constitution 111
rigid constitution 111
rule of law 91, 107, 110, 122, 157
systems of law 116–19
uncodified constitutions 107–8
consumer politics 221
convergence thesis 347
cooperative federalism 188
corporatism 322
corruption 25, 85, 91, 92, 94, 102–4,
137, 174, 175, 208, 274, 294
in China 101, 139, 176
in Mexico 277
in Nigeria 214
in Russia 340
cost–benefit analysis 326
council of ministers see cabinet
counterfactual 46
coup d’etat 7, 40, 82, 83, 86, 91, 93, 97,
98–9, 138, 139, 320, 338, 353
courts
abstract review 112
appellate 113
in authoritarian states 119–22
concrete review 112–13
constitutional courts 113
judicial activism 113, 116
judicial independence 117
judicial restraint 113, 116
judicial review 110–11
judiciary 110, 113, 116
juristocracy 111
original jurisdiction 113
role of 110–13
supreme courts 112–13
systems of law 116–19
critical juncture 44, 45
crony capitalism 176, 353
Cuba 42, 212
cult of personality 97, 103
cultural approach to comparison
30–1, 48
D voting 302
Dahl, Robert 8, 21, 235
de facto states 60
Democracy Index 13, 14, 71, 75, 78,
86, 90, 92
democratic rule 71
checks and balances 77, 125, 149
civil liberties 76, 90, 91
democracy, defined 71
democratization 83–5
direct democracy 72–3
e-democracy 72–3
future of democracy 85–7
liberal democracy 76–7
liberalism 76
limited government 76
modern/modernization 77–8
modernization and
democracy 77–9
number of democracies 75
political regime 83
populism xiii, 22, 87, 206, 244,
245, 289–90, 291, 319, 346, 355
representative democracy 73–5
index 375
structural violence 77
waves of democratization 79, 82–3
democratization 21–2, 23, 71, 79,
82–3, 83–5, 98, 157, 176
Denmark 103, 133, 221, 275
dependency theory 351
despotism 90, 93
development, defined 351
developmental state 176
devolution 62, 111, 182–3, 197
dictatorship 4, 71, 83, 94, 97, 136,
139, 197, 282, 284
direct democracy see democracy
Doing Business Index 336
dual federalism 188
E
echo chamber 238, 239, 293
economic development 16, 62, 77–8,
79, 175, 176, 327, 340
economic nationalism 343, 347
economic system 344
economics, defined 344
Economist Intelligence Unit 14
e-democracy 72–3
e-government 161, 165–6
Egypt 228–9
and Arab Spring 137–8, 213–14,
249
as authoritarian regime 99, 119,
213–14
courts 120
elections 267–8, 302
interest groups 321
legislature 157
political parties 98
Spotlight 320–1
election campaigns 281, 291, 303
elections 253
in authoritarian states 266–8
ballot stuffing 268
closed primary 280
distribution requirements 260
electoral formula 253
electoral fraud 102, 268, 304
electoral messages 259
executive 258–61
first-order 253
franchise 256
initiatives 265, 266
legislative 253–8
mandate 258, 259
primary election 280, 263
recalls 265–6
second-order 253
see also referendums
electoral authoritarianism 299, 302
electoral college 126, 152
United States 260, 263
electoral formula 253
electoral systems 253
376 index
executive 258–61
legislative 253–8
majority system 255–6
mixed system 257–8
plurality system 255
proportional representation 26,
43, 131, 156, 226, 253, 256–7,
280, 298
single-member plurality see plurality
system
electoral volatility 303
elite political culture 201
el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 98, 138, 157,
213–14, 268, 321
end of history xiii, 85
England see United Kingdom
entrenchment 111
European Union 41, 46, 166, 242,
329, 331, 353, 354, 355
Brexit see United Kingdom
Bureaucracy 174
compared to the USA 191
confederation 190
Court of Justice 112, 116
democracy 75, 83
electoral system 256
elitist political culture 201
European Commission 170
governance 4
Greek financial crisis 45
interest groups 313
multilevel governance 181
public opinion 222
referendums 261, 264, 265
regional integration 184
regulations 172
Spotlight 64–5
system of governance 44
voters 289
executives 125
absolute monarchy 95–6, 137
in authoritarian states 136–9
cabinet 129, 132–3, 134–5,
166, 226
cabinet government 132–3, 166
coalition government 133
constitutional monarchy 96, 126
dictatorship 4, 71, 83, 94, 97, 136,
139, 197, 282, 284
head of government 125–7, 129,
134, 139
head of state 125–7, 129, 134–5,
138, 139
limited presidential
executive 127–9, 135
ministerial government 132–4
parliamentary executive 129,
132–4, 142
personal rule 96–7, 137–8, 321, 339
presidential executive 126, 127–9,
131, 136
semi-presidential executive 134–5
separation of powers 128
unlimited presidential
executive 131, 136
F government, defined 2–4
failing state 67
fair trade 221, 352
fascism 10, 57
federal systems 180, 184–5, 188–90
confederations 44, 47, 190
cooperative federalism 188
dual federalism
quasi federation 190
Finland 68, 132, 174, 224
flexible constitution 111
focus group 40, 222
fourth estate 235
France
bureaucracy 170
economic nationalism 347
elections 152, 153, 255–6, 259–60
personality of leaders 295
political culture 206
revolutionary era 10, 212
semi-presidential system 135
social movements 316
Spotlight 186–7
sub-national government 187
trade unions 45
voter turnout 296–7
Freedom House 13, 14, 15, 86, 87,
245, 246–7, 310
freedom of speech 77
French Revolution 9, 55, 56, 220
G
garbage-can policy model 325, 326,
328
gendered institution 225–6
see also women in government and
politics
Germany 5, 30, 97, 337
Bureaucracy 170
coalition governments 133
constitution (Basic Law) 82, 111
constitutional court 113
electoral system 257–8
executive (chancellor) 132
federalism 188
political culture 203, 205
political parties 279
Spotlight 204–5
welfare state 350
gerrymandering 156, 263, 268
global city 194
Global Competitiveness Index
174–5
global financial crisis 61, 208, 352
globalization xiii, 12, 19, 66, 206,
344, 347
and comparison 49–50
and identity politics 202
and political communication 243,
246
and the state 67
governance, defined 4
multi-level 180–1
limited government 76
representative 73–5
self-government 71, 72, 73
grand theory 21
Greece 13, 72, 203
financial crisis 45, 337
gross domestic product 16
H
Haiti 109
as hybrid regime 91
political parties 285
Hamilton, Alexander 109, 223
head of government 125–7, 129,
134, 139
head of state 125–7, 129, 134–5,
138, 139
Hobbes, Thomas 3, 223, 345
Human Development Index 16
Huntington, Samuel
Clash of Civilizations 208–10
waves of democracy 79, 82–3
Hussain, Saddam 304
hybrid regimes 14, 90–1, 92, 196
constitutions 121
elections 267
interest groups 322
legislatures 155–6
political communication 235, 248
political parties 284
I
Iceland 63, 108
identity politics 201, 202
ideology 9–10, 45, 47, 200
anarchism 10
fascism 10, 57
incremental policy model 327–8
India 39, 82, 243
and BRICs 61, 352
coalitions 133
constitution 109–10
democracy 78, 81
economy 62
electoral system 255
federalism 188
legislature 143, 150
local government 192
multiculturalism 201
political parties 278–9
Spotlight 80–1
structural violence 77
voters 294
Inglehart, Ronald 203, 206, 210–11
initiatives 265, 266
institution, defined 2
institutionalism 23–5, 29, 150
institutionalization 24–5, 137
interest groups 307
in authoritarian states 318–19, 322

channels of influence 310–12
corporatism 322
density 312–13
dynamics of groups 314–18
ingredients of influence 312–14
iron triangle 317, 318
issue network 317
lobbying 307, 311, 312, 313
origins and types 307–10
peak association 309
pluralism 22, 92, 118, 181,
314–16, 322
promotional group 308, 309
protective group 308, 309, 317
revolving door 176, 312
social movements 316–17, 318
think tank 47, 120, 310, 318, 348
see also civic culture, civil society
intergovernmental
organizations 66–7
internet 72, 163, 182
access 239–40
and Arab Spring 248–9
control of 248
e-democracy 72–3
e-government 161, 165–6
and fake news 239
and interest groups 315
and political communication
238–40, 243, 246, 250
and political participation 218
and public opinion surveys 220, 221
trolls 73
see also social media
interpretive approach to
comparison 31–3, 242, 259, 288
Iran 4, 44
electoral manipulation 268
human rights 121
media 94
no-party system 273
revolution 32, 39
Spotlight 300–1
theocracy 99, 102
voters 301
iron law of oligarchy 279
iron triangle 317, 318
Islam and politics 86, 91, 95, 118–19,
121, 193, 213, 248, 273
Clash of Civilizations, The 208–10
see also sharia law
Islamic republic 99, 119, 121, 300
Israel 82, 116, 256, 257
issue network 317
issue voter 291–3
Italy 82, 144, 145
J electoral system 280
Japan 78, 337
bureaucracy 166, 169, 176
electoral system 257
executive 133–4
interest groups 316–17
iron triangle 317
as nation state 63
nuclear disaster 8
political culture 201
political parties 274
Spotlight 168–9
judiciary see courts
K framing 241, 242
Kenya 237, 304, 316
Keynes, John Maynard 57, 347
KOF Globalization Index 49
Kurds 62–3
Kuwait
L democratization 84
law, systems of 116–19
see also constitutions; courts
legislatures 142
in authoritarian states 155–8
committee-based legislature 145
committees 145, 148
co-option 155
debating legislature 145
elections 253–8
functions 142–5, 148
model of representation 153
plenary session 145
political class 154
representatives 153–5
role of 142–5, 148
separation of powers 128
size of 150
strong bicameralism 151
term limits 156, 160
unicameral and bicameral 148–53
vote of confidence 148
weak bicameralism 149–51
women in 226
legitimacy, defined 9
level of analysis 36
liberal democracy 76–7
see also democratic rule
liberalism
democratic 76, 213
economic, classical 343, 345–6
economic, modern 347
ideological 10
Libya 85, 93
limited government 76
limited presidential executive 127–9,
135
lobbying 307, 311, 312, 313
local government 190–3
Locke, John 3, 56, 76, 142, 345
Lukes, Steven 5, 8
M new institutionalism 23
Machiavelli, Niccolò 20, 26, 223
macroeconomics 344, 345
Malaysia 126, 190, 213
mandate, electoral 258, 259
index 377
Mao Zedong 5, 100, 101, 346, 353
Marx, Karl 26, 161, 346
Marxism 10, 45, 97, 346
mass media 235–7
see also political communication,
social media
media influence 240–2
agenda-setting 241, 242
priming 241, 242
reinforcement 241
self-selection 241–2
transmission model 240–1
meritocracy 161
Mexico
corporatism 322
electoral system 258
federalism 189
political culture 203
political parties 84, 277
Spotlight 276–7
term limits 156, 260
women in politics 226
Michels, Robert 279
microeconomics 344
microstates 59
military government 98–9
coup d’etat 7, 40, 82, 83, 86, 91,
93, 97, 98–9, 138, 139, 320,
338, 353
Mill, John Stuart 63, 223, 343, 347
ministerial government 132–4
mobilized participation 229, 232
modern/modernization 77–8
Moltke, Helmuth von 332
monarchy
absolute 95–6, 137
constitutional 96, 126
Moore, Barrington 29
Mugabe, Robert 96–7, 120, 339
multiculturalism 30, 39, 189, 201
multi-level governance 180–1
multinational state 63
N
nation, defined 62
nation-state 63
nationalism xiii, 11, 39–40, 62–3,
66, 282
economic 343, 347
natural rights 56
neoliberalism 346, 347, 355
Netherlands
bureaucracy 172
coalition governments 132–3
resource curse 356
new public management 162–4
New Zealand 170
bureaucracy 163
constitution 111, 116
corruption 103
378 index
interest groups 313
local government 192
women in politics 224
newspapers 226
Nigeria 48, 116, 166, 202, 296
elections 260, 267
federalism 189
government and politics 7
legislature 41–2
military government 98–9,
139, 173
political culture 214
political parties 282–3
political violence 303–4
Spotlight 6–7
sub national government
193, 195
night-watchman state 345, 350
nimby 308
non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) see interest groups
North Korea 14, 137
authoritarianism 97
corruption 104
mobilized participation 232
propaganda 247–8
totalitarianism 103
O see also crony capitalism
Obama, Barack 38, 113, 116, 212,
243, 260, 295
Oman 95, 273
ombudsman 174
O’Neill, Tip 192
opinion poll see public opinion
orientalism 31
Ostrogorski, Moisei 271
P economic system 344
Paine, Thomas 73
Pakistan 226
parliamentary executive 129,
132–4, 142
parties see political parties
partisan dealignment 289, 290, 292
party identification 288–90
path dependence 44
patronage 94, 102, 104, 162, 193,
229, 304
personal rule 96–7, 137–8, 321, 339
Philippines 258
pluralism 22, 92, 118, 181,
314–16, 322
political cleavage 271–2
political communication 235
in authoritarian states 246–50
bots 238–9
digital media 238–40
echo chamber 238, 239, 293
fake news 239
fourth estate 235
internet troll 238
mass media 235–6
media types 236–7
post-truth 239
propaganda 242, 247–8
trends in 242–3, 246
see also media influence, social
media
political culture 200
in authoritarian states 211–14
civic culture 202–3
Clash of Civilizations, The
208–10
elite political culture 201
identity politics 201, 202
Inglehart-Welzel cultural
map 210–11
multiculturalism 30, 39, 189, 201
political capital
political trust 207–8, 212
post-materialism 46, 203, 206
and revolutions 212
understanding political
culture 200–2
political economy 343
in authoritarian states 352–3,
356–7
capitalism 26, 79, 345, 346,
347, 353
command economy 103, 346
communism 13, 39, 42, 90,
346, 351
comparative 345–8
comparative economic
freedom 348
convergence thesis 347
dependency theory 351
development, defined 351
economic nationalism 347
economics 344
externalities 346
fair trade 221, 352
global financial crisis 61, 208,
352
liberalism, classical 345–6
liberalism, modern 347
macroeconomics 344, 345
markets, defined 344
microeconomics 344
neoliberalism 346, 347, 355
new political economy 343
night-watchman state 345, 350
radicalism 346
rent-seeking 340, 347, 357
rentier state 357
resource curse 94, 197, 356
social security 166, 206, 333,
340, 349
state capitalism 343, 353
state socialism 346, 353, 355
understanding political
economy 343–5
welfare economics 347
welfare state 57, 162, 203, 297,
347, 348–51
political exclusion 219
political institutions 25
see also bureaucracy; courts;
executives; interest groups;
legislatures; political parties
political leaders see executives
political participation 217
in authoritarian states
227–9, 232
clientelism 228
conventional forms 217
mobilized participation
229, 232
paradox of participation 219
patterns of 217–20
political exclusion 219
unconventional forms 217
see also public opinion; women in
government and politics
political parties 271
in authoritarian states 282–5
candidates 280
cartel parties 281–2
catch-all party 272
iron law of oligarchy 279
money, role of 281
niche parties 278
organization 279–82
origins and roles 271–2
partisan dealignment 289,
290, 292
party leaders 279–80
party systems 272–5, 278–9
political cleavage 271–2
primary election 280, 263
ruling parties 97–8
safe district 279
selectorate 279, 280
political regime 83
political science xii, 2, 11, 12, 19–20,
21, 23, 26, 36
political system xii, xiii, 2, 3–4, 9, 11,
20, 25, 32, 77, 99, 200, 203, 217,
271, 280
classification of 12–16
political theory see theoretical
approaches
political trust 207–8, 212
political violence 303–4
politics, defined 4–5
populism xiii, 22, 87, 206, 244, 245,
289–90, 291, 319, 346, 355
post-materialism 46, 203, 206
post-truth 239
power, defined 5, 8
presidential executive 126, 127–9,
131, 136
limited 127–9, 135
unlimited 131, 136
primary election 280, 263
propaganda 242, 247–8

proportional representation 26,
43, 131, 156, 226, 253, 256–7,
280, 298
public opinion 220
deliberative opinion poll 222
dynamics of public opinion
222–3
focus group 222
opinion poll 220–2
sample survey 220–2
uninformed citizens 223
public policy 325
in authoritarian states 337–40
bottom-up implementation 331
coercion 337
cost-benefit analysis 326
garbage-can model 325, 326, 328
incremental model 327–8
policy analysis 325
policy convergence 333, 336–7
policy cycle 328–32
policy diffusion 332–3
policy entrepreneurs 330
policy models 325–8
policy outcomes 331
policy outputs 331
and political survival 339
rational model 326–7
sticks, carrots and sermons 329
top-down implementation 330–1
Putin, Vladimir 28–9, 85, 122, 138,
209, 229, 268, 322, 338
approval ratings 212
political methods/style 139, 157,
177, 196, 250, 353
Q constitution and courts 122
qualitative method 39–41
quantitative method 41–3
quasi-federation 190
quasi-state 60
R political economy 346, 353
rational choice theory 21, 26–9, 142,
219, 293, 297, 314
rational policy model 326–7
recalls 265–6
referendums 4, 72, 91, 108, 111, 257,
261, 264–5, 302, 354
Australia 261
Brexit 66, 222
Scotland 146, 183
regional government 183–4
regional integration 4, 65
see also European Union
regulatory agency 171–2
religious law 118–19
rent-seeking 340, 347, 357
rentier state 357
representative democracy see
democratic rule
index 379
research methods in comparative Schumpeter, Joseph 73–4
politics 36 secularization 291
case study method 36–9 selectorate 280, 279
challenges of comparison 46–50 self-determination 62
comparative method 36 semi-presidential executive 134–5
confirmation bias 47–8 separation of powers 128
correlation 41, 43, 78, 206, 258, sharia law 7, 118–19
296 Singapore, political parties 274
counterfactual 46 single-member plurality see elections
critical juncture 44, 45 social class 288, 291
dependent variable 39, 40, 41, 47 social media 108, 238, 240, 246
generalizability 46–7 and the Arab Spring 249
historical method 43–5 in authoritarian states 250
hypothesis 40, 42 e-democracy 72–3
independent variable 40, 41 and elections 38, 74
level of analysis 36 and fake news 239
methodology 36 interest groups 311, 315
most different/similar systems 40–1 political communication
outliers 41–2 political participation 217, 219
path dependence 44 public opinion 220
process tracing 44 see also internet
qualitative method 39–41 social movements 316–17, 318
quantitative method 41–3 social science 2, 12, 19, 21, 26, 343
regression line 41 social security 166, 206, 333, 340,
selection bias 46–7, 295 349
sequencing 44–5 Somalia 336
slow-moving cause 45 corruption 104
survivorship bias 47 elections 266
unit of analysis 36 instability of state 60
value bias 47 South Africa
variable 40 as quasi-federation 190
resource curse 94, 197, 356 constitution 109, 115
revolving door 176, 312 executive 129
rule of law 91, 107, 110, 122, 157 legislature 148
Russia 77 political institutionalization 25
authoritarianism in 44, 47, 85–6 political parties 274
bureaucracy 175, 177 Spotlight 114–15
South Korea 176, 212–13
electoral manipulation 38, 74, 268 sovereignty 53, 55, 56, 59, 180, 181,
executive 138–9 182, 184
interest groups 322 Spain 112, 117, 126
legislature 157 sub-national government 182–3
political communication 249–50 spoils system 162
political culture 209, 211–12 state 53
political participation 231
citizenship 55
de facto states 60
political parties 284–5 diversity of 59–62
presidential elections 285 emergence 55–7
public policy 340 expansion 57–9
Spotlight 230–1 failing state 67–8
sub-national government 196 features 53–5
trust in government 208, 212 future 63, 66–8
and Ukraine 9, 59, 212 income 60–2
voters 28–9, 303 microstates 59
nations and nationalism 62–3
natural rights 56
S number 54
origins and evolution 55–9
Said, Edward 31 political authority 59–60
Saudi Arabia 155, 225 population 59
as absolute monarchy 96, 137 quasi-states 60
no-party system 273 security state 66
political culture 209 sovereignty 53, 55, 56, 59, 180,
political economy 357 181, 182, 184
380 index
total war 57
welfare state 57
Westphalian system 56, 63
state capitalism 343, 353
state socialism 346, 353, 355
statute law 112, 117
structural violence 77
structuralism 29–30, 137, 161, 166
sub-national government 180
in authoritarian states 193–7
city government 194
confederation 44, 47, 190
cooperative federalism 188
deconcentration 182–3
delegation 182–3
devolution 62, 111, 182–3, 197
dual federalism 188
federal systems 180, 184–5,
188–90
global city 194
local government 190–3
multi-level governance 180–1
quasi-federation 190
regional government 183–4
subsidiarity 188
unitary systems 180, 181–4, 188,
190, 196
warlords 67, 195
subsidiarity 188
supreme courts see courts
Sweden
bureaucracy 165, 174
constitution 108
minority governments 133
partisan dealignment 289, 299
political culture 211
public policy 335
Spotlight 334–5
sub-national government 182
trust in government 208
votes of confidence 148
women in politics 226
Switzerland 49, 59, 175, 189
referendums 261, 265
T leader personality and voters 295
Taiwan 54
Tanzania 284
term limits 129, 135, 136, 156, 160,
260
terrorism 66, 110, 214, 217
Thailand, military government 98
Thatcher, Margaret 163, 295, 346
theocracy 99, 102
theoretical approaches to comparative
politics 19
behaviouralism 21, 153, 167 200,
288, 293
cultural approach 30–1, 48
empirical perspectives 26
grand theory 21
institutionalism 23–5, 29, 150
institutionalization 24–5, 137
interpretive approach 31–3, 242,
259, 288
new institutionalism 23
normative perspectives 26
rational choice 21, 26–9, 142,
219, 293, 297, 314
structural approach 29–30, 137,
161, 166
theory, defined 19
think-tank 47, 120, 310, 318, 348
Three Worlds system 13
total war 57
totalitarianism 97, 101, 103
trade/labour unions 309, 312–13
Trump, Donald 28, 29, 66, 87, 155,
221, 239, 246, 260, 294, 295, 347
Tunisia 84
Turkey
elections 257
as hybrid regime 90–1
political culture 209
political economy 355
Spotlight 354–5
voter turnout 296
typology 12–14
U Spotlight 262–3
Ukraine 59, 209
unit of analysis 36
unitary systems 180, 181–4, 188,
190, 196
United Kingdom
Brexit 28, 65, 66, 68, 147, 174,
201, 208, 222, 223, 261,
264, 315
bureaucracy 163, 166, 172
constitution 107–8, 111
courts 116
democracy 29–30
compared to US 77
elections 221, 257, 259
electoral system 255, 256
legislature 144, 145, 147, 148,
149, 153
mass media 236, 241
nationalism in 60, 63
parliamentary system 38, 77, 128,
144, 265
political culture 203
political parties 272, 276, 278,
279, 289
Spotlight 146–7
sub-national government 183,
190, 191, 192
vote, expansion of 82
United States of America
bureaucracy 162, 163, 166, 170,
172, 173
comparative politics, study
of 20, 21
compared to the European
Union 191
constitution 110
courts 113, 116
democracy, compared to UK 77
elections 221, 225, 253, 260, 263
Electoral College 260, 263
electoral system 256, 280
executive 128–9, 145
fake news in 239
federalism 56, 188, 189, 190
gerrymandering 156, 263, 268
global financial crisis 352
interest groups 8, 311, 312, 313
iron triangles 317, 318
legislature 144, 145, 152–3,
154–5, 156
money and politics 281
party identification 288–9
pluralism 314, 315
political communication 237, 242,
243, 295
political culture 30, 203
political economy 347, 348–9
political parties 271, 274–5
public policy 330, 337
social media and elections 38
trust in government 208
vote, expansion of 82, 256
voters 292–3, 297
unlimited presidential
executive 131, 136
Uzbekistan 58, 96
V
Venezuela
constitution 119–20
economic freedom 348
elections 266
federalism 197
interest groups 322
political communication 245
political culture 212, 213
political parties 284
Spotlight 244–5
vote of confidence 148
voter turnout 296–8
voters 288
in authoritarian states 298–9, 302–4
behaviour 288, 303
compulsory voting 299
electoral authoritarianism 299
electoral volatility 303
issue voters 291–3
partisan dealignment 289, 292
party identification 288–90
political violence 303–4
rational choice 293
 index 381

secularization 291 on the state 53

social class 288 welfare economics 347 Y
turnout 296–8 welfare state 57, 162, 203, 297, 347, Yemen 32, 225
vote buying 294 348–51
voter choice 290–6 Westphalian system 56, 63
women in government and
politics 86, 223–7
Z
W in bureaucracy 172–3 Zambia 283
gendered institution 225–6 Zimbabwe 176
warlords 67, 195 constitution 120
in higher office 226–7
waves of democratization 79, 82–3 personal rule 96–7
in legislatures 226
Weber, Max political participation 232
in Muslim societies 119, 225
on authority 9 public policy 339
voting rights 82
model of bureaucracy 161–3, 167,
World Trade Organization 24
170, 174, 176