The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 1

The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle:

The FAA’s Emergency Power of Revocation

Aaron L. Jones

Southeastern Oklahoma State University

Aviation Legal Problems (AVIA-3113)

Dr. Stanley Alluisi

March 1, 2012
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 2

Outline

I. Introduction:

a. Bob Hoover: Aviation Legend

II. Facts of the Case

a. The Initial Investigation

b. FAA Request for Examination & Testing

c. Hoover Surrenders his Medical Certificate

d. FAR Part 61.3(h)

e. Appeal to Federal Air Surgeon in accordance with Part 67.409

f. Informal Conferences & Emergency Revocation

III. The Court Process

a. NTSB Administrative Law Hearing

b. FAA Appeal to Full NTSB Panel

c. FAA Reversal, Reissuance of Medical Certificate

IV. Legal Aspects of the Case

a. The FAA’s Request for Examination under 49 USC § 44709(a)

b. Surrender of Hoover’s Medical Certificate

c. Emergency Revocation of Hoover’s Certificate

V. Conclusion

a. The Birth of the ‘Hoover’ Bill.

b. Closing Thoughts
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 3

I. Introduction

Bob Hoover: Aviation Legend:

As a wartime fighter pilot, airshow performer, movie stuntman, test pilot, and company

spokesman, Robert A. Hoover is widely regarded as the finest stick-and-rudder pilot of our time.

Hoover’s aviation career began when he was in the Tennessee National Guard and underwent

pilot training with the Army Air Corps (Forever Flying, p.17). During World War II, he flew

fifty-nine sorties against the Italian Regia Aeronautica and German Luftwaffe, many of those in

a Mark V Spitfire (Forever Flying, p.50). On his fifty-ninth mission he was shot down by an

FW190, captured, and eventually sent to Stalag Luft 1, where he remained for sixteen months.

Near the war’s end he was able to escape, stealing a German aircraft and flying to safety in the

allied-controlled Netherlands (Forever Flying, pp.65-73). Following World War II, Hoover

served in the U.S. Air Force as Chuck Yeager’s backup pilot during the Bell X-1 project

(Forever Flying, p. 110). After he rejoined the civilian aviation industry he continued pilot

work, becoming North American’s chief test pilot on the FJ-1/-2/-3 series of aircraft, the Air

Force’s F-86 fighter, and the F-100 (Forever Flying, p.137; Freeze, 2004).

While working for North American-Rockwell, he began performing aerobatic

demonstrations with some of their aircraft, including most notably the Rockwell/Aero

Commander ‘Shrike Commander’, a postwar twin-engine business aircraft. These

demonstrations developed into an air show routine that continued into the early 1990’s (Freeze,

2004). It was one of these flights that sparked an investigation into Hoover’s medical fitness. In

the course of these events, Hoover was instructed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

in 1993 to surrender his medical certificate. He complied, unaware that he was not required to

do so. The subsequent informal conferences led to the FAA issuing an emergency revocation
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 4

when he asked for it back. Eventually the case was brought before an administrative law judge,

who ruled in favor of Hoover before the FAA appealed it to the full National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB panel reversed the prior decision, and Hoover’s attorney

unsuccessfully argued the case all the way up to the Supreme Court, which decline to hear it.

Finally, having exhausted all legal recourse, Hoover’s medical was restored to him after a myriad

amount of medical examination at his own expense. The restoration was possibly in part due to

the immense amount of scrutiny and criticism that the FAA received, from both Congress and

the general public due to the FAA’s unrelenting stance that Hoover was not fit to fly.

This case and the controversy that surrounds it are an excellent example of the legal and

administrative processes that take place when an airman loses his certification. Bob Hoover

went through every step of the appeals process fighting to get his medical back, including: an

internal appeal, informal conferences, an appeal to an administrative law judge, the appeal to the

full NTSB panel, the review by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the request for

appeal to the Supreme Court. It is also a cautionary tale, demonstrating the power of individual

officials within the FAA as well as the NTSB and especially the Aerospace Medical Certification

Division. Finally, this case illustrates what can happen when the system does not work, and the

desperate need for measures such as the ‘Hoover Bill’. This bill gives pilots an opportunity to

appeal an emergency revocation of their certificates within 48 hours of receiving the emergency

revocation order to the NTSB, which acts as an impartial party in determining the validity of the

emergency circumstance (AOPA, 2000). It is a step in the right direction, although pilots still

lack a truly impartial party with full scope of review in a case brought by the FAA.
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 5

II. Facts of the Case

The Initial investigation:

Between the dates of June 19th and 20th 1992, Bob Hoover was performing at an airshow

in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. With his Shrike Commander 500S, he performed the same

routine he had flown proficiently since the early 1960’s. His routine involved feathering the

aircraft’s propellers at various points and continuing to perform perfectly coordinated maneuvers

at low altitude, terminating in an astounding inside loop in which he extended the gear and then

rolled level to land, engines still shut down. On a well-suited runway and parking area, Hoover

often rolled right back to the same chalks he’d left behind when he departed. He referred to this

routine as “energy management”, and it was an unparalleled crowd-pleaser (Freeze, 2004). On

this particular day, the Shrike Commander he flew developed an oil-pump cavitation issue during

the show, as well as a malfunctioning cowl flap (Dyer, 1995). These two failures caused his

performance to appear less continuous than his audience was accustomed to. Hoover was not

only performing a highly demanding and strenuous aerobatic routine, but also fighting to

maintain oil pressure in one engine while the cowl flaps of the other refused to retract, creating

an asymmetric thrust/drag situation that made the routine even more difficult. According to

Hoover, these two factors slightly affected the quality of his performance during the routine,

although he was still able to successfully complete the maneuvers (Dyer, 1995).

That day two FAA inspectors, James Kelln and Clint Boehler, from the Oklahoma City

Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) were in the audience, at separate locations on the field

(Dyer, 1995; Pacific Flyer, 1994). Both men observed the performance, apparently noticing the

less precise-than-usual performance and allegedly independently becoming concerned. When

The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 6

Hoover landed the airplane and taxied to the parking area in front of the crowd he showed

apparent difficulty exiting the cockpit, which was according to him due to his exhaustion after

the more-challenging-than-usual performance. The slow manner in which he exited the plane

was also noticed by the two FAA inspectors, as well as a few other aerobatic pilots, although the

latter understood for the most part the reason behind it, being aware of the difficulties

encountered in his flight (Dyer, 1995). His pale, fatigued appearance and sweat-stained flight

suit did little to allay the concerns Kelln and Boehler had, and when the two men discussed the

performance later, it was realized that they both held the same fears about Hoover’s advanced

age affecting his flying ability and safety (Dyer, 1994; Airport Journal, 2004; Pacific Flyer

1994). The following Monday, both men met with a safety official at their FSDO, to whom they

expressed their concerns. That individual then reported the two inspector’s concerns to the FAA

Aerospace Medical Certification Division, starting the ball rolling in what would become one of

the FAA’s most controversial airman medical certificate cases and a public relations nightmare

for the Administration.

FAA Request for Examination & Testing:

The FAA Aerospace Medical Certification Division contacted the two inspectors who

had witnessed the performance, requesting that Boehler and Kelln both submit written reports

regarding their observations during the performance and detailing their concerns about Hoover’s

fitness to fly. It was a full two months later that these reports were actually received by the

Medical Certification Division (Yodice, 1996; Dyer, 1995). After receiving these reports, the

FAA contacted Hoover, requesting that he submit to a medical examination that would re-

evaluate his fitness to hold a medical certificate. Hoover acquiesced to this request, submitting

to a battery of testing and examinations performed by a psychologist and neurologist Dr. Michael
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 7

Gold, working under the supervision of psychiatrist Dr. Garret O’Connor, who had been selected

by the FAA (Yodice, 1994). O’Connor studied the results of the testing, and having himself

examined Hoover, wrote the following statement to the FAA in 1993:

"It is my opinion that Mr. Hoover is currently fit to hold a second class medical

certificate from a neuropsychological and a neuropsychiatric point of view and should

therefore be permitted to continue his flight activities." (Yodice, 1996; Hoover v. FAA,

1994)

Hoover Surrenders his Medical Certificate:

After receiving the above statement, the FAA’s chief psychiatrist, Dr. Bart Pakull

forwarded the test results to neuropsychologist Robert Elliot, PhD., who was a paid consultant

for the FAA and had been a friend of Dr. Pakull for over a decade (Yodice, 1994; Pacific Flyer,

1994). This neuropsychologist, although not a medical doctor or qualified airman medical

examiner, reviewed the data and gave his opinion to Dr. Pakull, who then met with the FAA’s

federal air surgeon, Dr. Jon Jordan. The two then contacted Hoover and his doctor, Larry

Marinelli, an Airman Medical Examiner (AME), stating that Hoover was not fit to exercise the

privileges of his medical certificate, and instructing Hoover to surrender his certificate to his

AME. This was done in spite of Federal Aviation Regulation FAR Part 61.3(h), which states

that while airmen are required to allow FAA officials to inspect their medical certificates, airmen

are not required to surrender such certificates. If the FAA intends to suspend or revoke a

medical certificate, it must do so through the proper channels (CFR 14 FAR 61.27; Miller, Do

Not Voluntarily Surrender the Certificate).

FAR Part 61.3(h):

Hoover was either unaware of or unfamiliar with FAR Part 61.3(h), and surrendered his
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 8

certificate to Dr. Marinelli as instructed, intending to appeal what he viewed as an unjust

revocation of his medical certificate, especially in light of the fact that he’d flown thirty-three

performances since the one in Oklahoma City without incident. In reality, the FAA considered

his action to be equivalent to a voluntary surrender of his certificate, which is outlined in Part

61.27, which states:

(a) The holder of a certificate issued under this part may voluntarily surrender it for:

(1) Cancellation;

(2) Issuance of a lower grade certificate; or

(3) Another certificate with specific ratings deleted.

(b) Any request made under paragraph (a) of this section must include the following

signed statement or its equivalent: “This request is made for my own reasons, with full

knowledge that my (insert name of certificate or rating, as appropriate) may not be

reissued to me unless I again pass the tests prescribed for its issuance.” (Title 14 CFR

Part 61.27)

At the time of his surrender, Hoover did not sign the statement required by part subpart (b), nor

was he requested to by either the two FAA doctors who instructed him to surrender his medical

certificate or the AME who accepted it. This would later be brought up during the court

proceedings, where it was stated by the FAA that 61.27(b) applied only to airmen certificates,

not medical certificates (Yodice, 1996).

Appeal to Federal Air Surgeon in accordance with Part 67.409:

Hoover appealed to Dr. Jordan, the Federal Air Surgeon, exercising his right under FAR

Part 67.409, which lays out the appeal process and rights to due process that an airman has when

denied a medical (Yodice, 1994; Dyer, 1995). Dr. Jordan arranged for him to be examined at the
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 9

UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute, by a team headed by Dr. Paul Satz, who wrote the following

in the conclusion of his report: “We favor a recommendation that reinstates his license on a

temporary 3-6 month period during which his current medical and neuropsychological status is

closely monitored for potential change” (Yodice, 1994). The results and testing data from the

UCLA were forwarded by Dr. Pakull to the Georgetown Medical School for a second opinion.

Two doctors from Georgetown reviewed the material and without ever examining him

personally, wrote an opinion that Hoover was medically unfit to hold a medical certificate. The

FAA favored the opinion of the Georgetown doctors over that of the UCLA physicians who had

conducted the testing, and refused to reissue Hoover’s medical certificate (Yodice, 1994; Yodice,

1996).

Informal Conferences & Emergency Revocation:

After this refusal, Hoover enlisted the services of renowned aviation attorney John

Yodice and the assistance of Hoover’s friend and accomplished defense attorney, Lee Bailey.

The FAA agreed to informal conferences with Hoover and Yodice, who met several times over

the course of the next few months with FAA doctors from the Civil Aeronautical Medical

Institute and the Medical Certification Division. The talks were futile: neither party could come

to an agreement, nor would the FAA outline a course of action through which Hoover could

successfully restore his medical certificate (Yodice, 1994). After months of being unable to fly

solo, Hoover decided to fight. His attorneys wrote a formal request to the FAA, demanding the

return of Hoover’s medical certificate or an official revocation, which could then be appealed

and possibly overturned. In response, the FAA revoked his certificate on December 14th 1993,

issuing an emergency order of revocation under 49 U.S.C. § 46105 and 49 U.S.C. § 44709, citing

an alleged “cognitive deficit” (Yodice, 1994; NTSB 1994). This revocation gave Hoover the
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 10

right to appeal, which he did, and a trial was scheduled to take place before NTSB administrative

law judge William R. Mullins, in Oklahoma City.

In preparation for the trial, Hoover underwent an independent examination from yet

another doctor. Hoover went to Tinker AFB flight surgeon and neurologist Dr. Brent Hisey, who

with the assistance of flight psychologist Dr. David Johnson, performed yet another battery of

tests and thorough exams. The two were unable to find anything wrong with him, and in 1993

determined that he was unquestionably fit to fly, both physically and mentally (Yodice, 1994;

NTSB, 1994).
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 11

III. The Court Process

NTSB Administrative Law Hearing:

During the hearing before administrative law judge William R. Mullins, the FAA team

headed by Dr. Barton Pakull and Dr. Robert Elliot as a lead witness, brought forth a number of

doctors to testify that Hoover was cognitively impaired or deteriorated, and unfit to fly.

However, when cross-examined it was revealed that only one had actually personally examined

Hoover, and furthermore, all of the doctors testifying against him received monetary

compensation, either in grants, consultant fees, or other forms, from the FAA. Dr. Elliot was

cross-examined, and it was revealed that although he had initially found nothing wrong with

Hoover, he had expressed the opinion to Dr. Pakull that Hoover was “severely impaired” in

1993. When asked why he had not stated this to Hoover or anyone else when he had first

examined him in October of 1992, Dr. Elliot could state that he was not initially assessing fitness

to fly, but only evidence of neurosis (Yodice, 1994). Lee Bailey refuted much of the testimony,

pointing out a number of half-truths and blatant falsehoods on the part of the FAA’s medical

team. In countering the medical evidence offered by the FAA, Bailey brought in Dr. Antoinette

Appel, who was considered the premier neuropsychologist in the field at the time. She testified

that in her expert opinion Hoover was qualified, and “attacked what the FAA experts said”,

citing the fact that a research-only test had been used to disqualify Hoover, and that standardized

tests were conducted under abnormal conditions (NTSB, 1994). Dr. Hisey and Dr. Johnson, both

of whom had personally examined Hoover within the months leading up to the trial also testified

that in their professional opinion, Hoover was fit to exercise the privileges of his medical

certificate.
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 12

On the first day of the hearing, during a recess Judge Mullins actually brought the entire

court to an airport in El Reno, Oklahoma, where Hoover performed his airshow routine in a

Shrike Commander, with FAA-designated Airshow Certification Evaluator Leo Loudenslager in

the right seat as pilot-in-command. Judge Mullins also watched the videotape that Hoover’s

legal team had entered into evidence which showed him deftly handling an emergency in a T-

28B, as well as the actual footage of his 1992 performance, which had been captured by a local

television station in Oklahoma City (Yodice, 1996; NTSB, 1994).

Perhaps the most important piece of testimony in Hoover’s defense came from the mouth

of an FAA employee himself: FAA Safety Inspector Norbert J. Nester, who took the stand to

testify against the FAA, stating that the two inspectors who brought forth the initial complaint

regarding Hoover were allegedly colluding to report him even before they witnessed his

performance (Yodice, 1994; Pacific Flyer 1994). According to an interview regarding Nester’s

testimony during the trial, attorney Lee Bailey believed that it was a personal vendetta against

Hoover:

“Bailey sees it as a bias case and claims one of the two inspectors suffers from

‘Napoleonic’ envy of the lean, 6'1" Hoover. At the NTSB trial, Norbert Nester, a third

FAA inspector present at Hoover's fateful air show, supported this theory. A tall, thin

pilot himself, Nester testified that Clint Boehler, one of the inspectors who critiqued the

show, had told him, ‘I hate people like you because you are...tall and skinny. I don't like

being short and paunchy.’ Nester, who judged Hoover's performance to be smooth, also

testified he overheard Boehler say he was after Hoover because ‘the old bastard has been

around for a long time.’” (Bahrampour, 1994)

Others who testified in Hoover’s defense included Leo Loudenslager, who stated that
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 13

Hoover’s performance was flawless, as well as fellow airshow pilots Steve Oliver and Sean

Tucker, who supported Loudenslager’s testimony (NTSB, 1994; Pacific Flyer 1994). According

to a 1995 interview with Anthony J. Broderick, the FAA's chief of regulation and certification,

the two inspectors who first expressed concerns about Hoover were initially listed as witnesses

by the FAA, and then subpoenaed by the defense, but were never called to the stand, either by

the FAA or Hoover’s legal team (Dyer, 1995). After four days of testimony, Judge Mullins ruled

in favor of Hoover, ordering not only that the FAA restore Hoover’s medical certificate, “but

also commented to the FAA Administrator about the alleged criminal collusion and the apparent

bias of the FAA's experts.” (Pacific Flyer, 1994)

FAA Appeal to Full NTSB Panel:

Hoover was relieved to have won the hearing, and believed that his medical would be

restored by February 15th, the deadline required by Judge Mullins’ ruling. However, the FAA

decided to appeal the ruling, bringing the case before the five-member NTSB panel. On

February 18th, 1994 the board ruled to overturn Judge Mullins’ decision, stating in the decision

that:

“...we think all of the law judge's findings are belied by the evidence and his analysis is

clearly deficient… In the Board's view, respondent's evidence ... fails to rebut what we

consider to be overwhelming evidence of cognitive deficit that makes respondent

[Hoover] unqualified to hold an unrestricted airman medical certificate, we find that the

Administrator's expert witnesses' testimony was far more persuasive.” (NTSB, 1994)

Hoover was reportedly devastated, but refused to give up. His legal team appealed the ruling,

and Lee Bailey took the case before the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. On

November 3rd, 1994 the court ruled in favor of the FAA in a decision stating:
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 14

“This petition for review was considered on the record from the National Transportation

Safety Board and on the briefs and arguments of counsel. The court is satisfied that

appropriate disposition of the case does not call for further opinion. There is substantial

evidence in the administrative record to support the National Transportation Safety

Board's conclusion that the Administrator proved by a preponderance of the evidence that

the petitioner's license was properly revoked under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44709(b)(1)(2) and 14

C.F.R. Sec. 67.15. Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for

review be DENIED substantially for the reasons set out in the Board's Order and Opinion

No. EA-4094 of February 18, 1994.” (Hoover v. NTSB, 1994)

Once again, Hoover was defeated and denied the restoration of his medical. Lee Bailey

wrote an appeal asking for the Supreme Court to hear the case, but the court refused a writ of

certiorari (Miller, 2000). Hoover was out of the flying business, at least in the US. Throughout

the events of 1993-1994, he had acquired a first-class medical certificate from the Australian

Civil Aviation Authority, as well as a commercial pilot’s license, allowing him to fly anywhere

except the United States (Cook, 1996). He continued to perform in Australia, Mexico, Canada

and a number of other countries, but would not be satisfied until he could once again fly in his

own country (Bahrampour, 1994). In May 1995, largely due to pressure on the FAA from Dr.

Rob Liddell, the director of aviation medicine for the Australian Civil Aviation Authority,

Hoover was allowed to meet with Dr. Jon Jordan, the federal air surgeon, as well as Dr. Bob

Poole, one of the FAA’s consulting doctors. The two parties negotiated an agreement under

which Hoover would continue without legal representation, and undergo further neurological,

psychological and physical testing under the supervision of Dr. Gerry Ferris (Jordan, 2005). In

the summer of 1995, with the testing complete, Dr. Ferris wrote a seven-page letter to the federal
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 15

air surgeon, urging Dr. Jordan to restore Hoover’s medical, stating that he was fit to fly in every

aspect (Freeze, 2004; Dyer, 1995). Dr. Jordan was still skeptical, and sent the testing data and

Dr. Ferris’ finding to a second set of independent consultants.

FAA Reversal, Reissuance of Medical Certificate:

On October 18th, 1995 the FAA released a statement that Hoover’s medical condition had

‘stabilized’ and that he would be given a special issuance medical certificate under FAR Part

67.401. Allegations that this was due to personal intervention by FAA Administrator David

Hinson were denied (Dyer, 1995). On October 19th, Hoover was informed that his certificate

would be restored. His long battle was over, and he would be able once again to fly in his home

country. Hoover’s new medical was a restricted second-class, which included a prohibition on

carrying passengers or cargo for hire, and a standard third-class certificate (Dyer, 1995; Jordan

2005). Hoover continued to fly his airshow routine in his Shrike Commander, until he flew his

aircraft one last time to the Smithsonian at Washington Dulles on October 10, 2003.
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 16

IV. Legal Aspects of the Case

The FAA’s Request for Examination under 49 USC § 44709(a):

There are a number of legal issues within this case that deserve focus and review. First

and foremost, is the authority under which the FAA required Hoover to undergo medical

reevaluation. 49 USC § 44709(a) is the section of the law that authorizes the FAA to:

“…reinspect at any time a civil aircraft… or reexamine an airman holding a certificate issued

under section 44703 of this title.” (49 USC § 44709) Thus, it is apparent that the FAA had the

right to request an examination in order to reevaluate Hoover’s fitness and qualification to hold

an FAA medical certificate. While many might believe that Hoover was the first or only pilot to

be specifically picked out for reevaluation, such was not the case. According to a 1995 interview

with Dr. William Hark, one of the FAA’s medical experts involved with the case:

“[Hoover] certainly was not the first person to be evaluated for neuropsychological

testing. We do have authority for any number of reasons often in sort of the same

sequence he was asked to… again, that is not an unusual sequence of events. …. I recall

we did it with an individual who was an airline captain who had raised a ruckus when

asked to go through the security screening back when we first started screening all crew

members…. So as I say there all kinds of reasons… In this case we have a couple of

agency inspectors come to us and describe what they think is a change in both actions and

appearance which triggered the evaluation. So to say that this is something unusual and

never happened before and we singled him out is a mischaracterization.” (Dyer, 1995)

Hoover’s case was perhaps the first time that such action had been taken against a pilot of

such high profile, but it was certainly not the first time a pilot had been reexamined by the FAA,

nor the last. According to Anthony Broderick, the FAA chief of regulation and certification in
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 17

1995, the number of pilots who fail reevaluation is quite low: “Another interesting thing is that

medical denials are relatively unusual, a very small number. But when you are talking

600/700,000 pilots in the country.” (Dyer, 1995). Dr. Hark in the same interview expounded on

Broderick’s statement, stating that less than one percent of individuals who apply for a medical

and undergo the required processes are actually denied. Part of the reason for this is the fact that

once an individual has been issued a medical certificate, the burden of proof required to revoke

that certificate is on the FAA. The FAA must prove that the individual does not meet the

qualifications to exercise the privileges of the certificate. Whereas, an individual applying for a

medical certificate for the first time must prove that they do meet the requirements; the burden of

proof lies with the individual.

Surrender of Hoover’s Medical Certificate:

Hoover’s mistake, then, was in voluntarily surrendering his certificate. Although he did

not realize that he was not legally required to so when instructed by federal air surgeon Dr.

Jordan, Hoover did surrender his certificate to his AME. If he had not done so, the burden of

proof would have been in his favor: the FAA would have been required to prove by

preponderance of evidence that Hoover was unfit to fly, and would have had to issue a

revocation order initially, rather than waiting until Hoover demanded his certificate back. Once

he had surrendered his certificate, Hoover was for all intents and purposes starting from a clean

slate; he was forced to prove (by preponderance of evidence) that he was in fact medically

qualified to be issued a medical certificate. By surrendering his certificate, Hoover unknowingly

put himself in a much poorer bargaining position with the FAA. It is possible that the only

reason the FAA even ordered the emergency revocation was out of fear that Hoover would argue

he had been coerced to give up his certificate; that he had not ‘voluntarily surrendered’ it.
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 18

Emergency Revocation of Hoover’s Certificate:

The emergency revocation of Hoover’s certificate is another aspect of this case that is

interesting, especially considering the fact that Hoover had performed a number of performances

between the time the initial complaint was made and the time Hoover was contacted for

reevaluation, which was approximately two months. This does not suggest a true emergency,

nor even a particular sense of urgency within the FAA, which was something that was pointed

out during the administrative law hearing. At the time, the law that was in effect allowed the

FAA to order an emergency revocation which could then be appealed to an administrative law

judge, who would hear the issue within sixty days. The pilot could not exercise the privileges of

his certificate until the matter was decided. This placed a good deal of economic hardship on

many airmen who had careers in aviation; few commercial pilots can function for two months

without working. According to AOPA statistics, the use of emergency powers by the FAA

doubled between 1989 and 2000, many of which cases did not suggest true emergencies existed

(2000).
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 19

IV. Conclusion

The ‘Hoover Bill’:

Largely in response to the Bob Hoover medical debacle, Senator James Inhofe sponsored

a bill in March of 1999 that established an appeals process for pilots subjected to an emergency

revocation of their aeronautical certificates. Summarizing from an AOPA pilot briefing

regarding the bill, if an airman acts within 48 hours of the receipt of an emergency revocation

order, they have the right to a hearing before the NTSB, which will then consider arguments

from both the airman and the FAA and rule within five days whether a true emergency exists.

The pilot is only grounded for the duration of time required for the NTSB to rule, rather than for

sixty days before his case could be heard, as under the previous law. If the NTSB, which is

intended to act as an impartial party, determines that the emergency revocation or suspension is

valid, the order is upheld. If it does not, then the pilot is free to exercise the privileges of his

certificate until the FAA brings their revocation case against him in an expedited appeals

process. This bill was signed into law as an amendment to the FAA Reauthorization bill in the

spring of 2000, with the support of pilot-advocate groups nationwide (AOPA, 2000).

Closing thoughts:

I believe that the ‘Hoover Bill’ is a good step in the right direction in terms of limiting the

FAA’s virtually unchecked power to take action against pilots that inspectors feel should not be

flying, or against whom they have personal vendettas. Ideally, the NTSB should have a greater

involvement in not only serving as an impartial party capable of deciding cases between the FAA

and individual pilots, but also as an advocate of pilots who are unfairly targeted or ‘railroaded’,

as I believe Hoover was. Furthermore, I believe that there should be a greater level of

accountability to the public on the part of FAA inspectors and administrators who make
The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 20

decisions that harm or adversely affect pilots unfairly. Regulators in the FAA must be held

responsible when they are proven to have acted based on personal bias. This has not taken place

in the case of Bob Hoover, and even though his medical was eventually restored, I do not believe

it can be said that justice has been served.

While the ‘Hoover Bill’ prevents the exact same circumstances that Hoover encountered

from encountering today, it does not fix a broken system. According to an article first featured

in the winter 2000 issue of ‘Lawyer-Pilots Bar Association Journal’, Hillary Miller writes that:

“In the first 17 months since enactment of the “Hoover” provisions of AIR-21, 49 U.S.C.

§ 44709(e), only one of the 69 applicants for appellate review of a Federal Aviation

Administration emergency order has successfully obtained a stay. Obtaining a stay of an

emergency revocation order is practically impossible because the standard of review

requires deference to the FAA’s factual determinations underlying the sole ground for a

stay: the existence of an “emergency.” … Significant questions exist regarding …

whether the narrowness of the Board’s review and its deference to the FAA.... provide

meaningful appellate review.” (Miller, 2000)

While the NTSB does not widely publish statistics regarding the outcome of emergency

revocation cases in which it is involved, it is likely that that ratio has changed little. In my mind

this does not fulfill Congressional intent in passing the legislation. Perhaps it is time for another,

stronger bill that would establish the NTSB as a truly impartial judging party, with a greater

scope of review and wider freedom in its rulings.

The Bob Hoover Medical Debacle 21

Works Cited and References:

Amendments, Modifications, Suspensions, and Revocations of Certificates, Title 49 USC §

44709 (2012).

Cook, Marc E. (January, 1996). Justice for Hoover: Performer finally gets his due. AOPA Pilot
Magazine, Volume 39, Issue 1.

Denial of Medical Certificate, Title 14 CFR Part 67.409 (2008).

Dyer, Scott (October 27, 1995). The FAA's Anthony J. Broderick Talks About the Bob Hoover
Affair. (Aviation Consumer, October 1995 Issue), online at
<http://www.avweb.com/news/safety/183060-1.html>. (Accessed February 27, 2012)

Emergency Certificate Revocations (Hoover Bill). AOPA Issue Brief, April 2000. Online at
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