Pericles the Younger and the Citizenship Law

Author(s): Edwin Carawan

Source: The Classical Journal , Apr., - May, 2008, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Apr., - May, 2008), pp.
383-406
Published by: The Classical Association of the Middle West and South, Inc. (CAMWS)

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 PERICLES THE YOUNGER AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW

Abstract: Pericles' law of 451/0 would have denied citizenship to h

Aspasia. Scholars have generally supposed that citizenship was grant
cree, as a privilege for Pericles alone. This paper argues instead that th
ship law was amended in 430/29, allowing a father to adopt his nothos
no surviving gnesioi. This adaptation was overshadowed by developmen
413, canceled in 403/2 and obscured by dubious testimony in late antiq

n the last years of his life Pericles lost his two legitimat
to the plague and enrolled in their place his nothos, t
I born to him by Aspasia. In doing so, he contravened the law
restricting citizenship to those whose parents were both astoi,
which he had authored 20 years before. From Plutarch's account'
it was once supposed that Pericles appealed to the people's sym-
pathy to amend or abrogate the law at a time when many other
oikoi must have been similarly devastated; this was Ernst Curtius'
reading, through several editions of his Griechische Geschichte.2
Other scholars of Curtius' era saw this concession by the demos as
a singular exemption for Pericles alone. There is in fact testimony
from late antiquity that Pericles II was a demopoietos (enfranchised
by decree). This reading was attractive for those who supposed
that Pericles' law regarding nothoi was a procedural measure rein-
forcing an old rule: the later "loosening of the law" was an excep-
tion to the procedure, not a change in the criteria for citizenship.3
That explanation gained credence with the publication of the
Athenaion Politeia, which suggests that Pericles made new law in
451, but shows no change in qualifications thereafter.4

1 "Awful as it was for the law that prevailed against so many to be undone by
the author himself (T6V KaTa TooovTGoV i)oXioavTa v6pov iTrr' arro0 T-rra)dv AXuOval
TOO ypa'avTOS), the misfortune that beset Pericles in his own house broke the
Athenians' hearts, as if he had paid for his arrogance ... and deserved compassion;
they consented to him enrolling his nothos in the phratry (ouvEXcApr-oav dTro-
yp&yao6aI TOv v660V EiS TOlS q)pd'TopaS), giving the boy his own name" (Per. 37.5).
2 Curtius (1888) 2.414. Like most scholars of his era, Curtius supposed that
nothoi were excluded by an old law (pp. 263-4), probably Solon's, which Pericles
revived and enforced (with a new rule for scrutinies). Thus it applied retroactively
(as Plutarch interprets the diapsephisis of 445/4); cf. Zimmerman (1886) 27-44.
3Zimmerman (1886) 1-5 summarizes earlier scholarship.
4 Ath. Pol. 26.4 (n. 12, below). Cf. Miuller (1899) 820 dismissing Curtius' view:
"es wurde nicht etwa das Gesetz vom Jahre 451 aufgehoben ... sondern allein dem
v6Oos des Perikles gegeniiber eine Ausnahme gemacht."
THE CLASSICAL JOURNAL 103.4 (2008) 383-406

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 384 EDWIN CARAWAN

Yet the preponderance of th

near consensus. A privilege su
against all the rules for confer
decree; and while there is noth
ence to Pericles demopoietos, the
alization benefiting nothoi. After
wording is as Curtius read it, th
ans to change the law when it
implication is not that he was
other families would naturally
after the law had been in force f
In this essay I offer a new recons
in the winter of 430/29 Pericles authored an amendment to his
law, a measure benefiting all those who found themselves in the
same predicament. There was probably a wider reform after 413,
and this development obscured the more modest revision in
430/29. That first amendment was tailored to Pericles' case and
consistent with Solonian law (or what was thought to be Solon's):
if no "rightly born" offspring survived to sustain the oikos, the
father could adopt his nothos.
Let us first reconsider the narrow basis for the conventional
view, beginning with Plutarch's account, and then follow the im-
plications of the broader evidence.

I. That "the law be undone"--AuOfvat -rT v6 pov-should natu-

rally mean that the law was rendered invalid or inapplicable.5
This strong sense might imply that the law was abrogated or
rescinded; the variant taXuOfivat would make that meaning un-
mistakable. Modern scholars have generally preferred a weaker
sense of "break the law" found in a few early instances, but these
refer to unwritten, customary rules, not statutes.7 The context and
closest parallels in Plutarch suggest something closer to the
strong sense: the statute of 451 was suspended or offset by a con-

' That is by far the prevailing usage. By the mid-4th century the legislative
process at Athens had probably fixed the implication--AXEtv T6v v6pov means to
rescind (e.g., D. 3.12; 20.6, 12, 14, 58, 87, 89, 93, 99; 24.18, 33-4, 109, 142; cf. Plu. Sol.
8.3, "repealing the law" on Salamis; C. Gracchus 13.3).
6 Thus Verilhac and Vial (1998) 54-9, esp. 56, "La abrogation est certaine."
Similarly Figueira (1991) 235-6: "Perikles is not only the proposer of the citizen-
ship law, but later of its rescinding"; he drew upon his personal tragedy "to gain
sympathy for a radical change" that war demanded.
7 Thus Hdt. 6.106.3 refers to the Spartan rule not to campaign before the full
moon; in Th. 6.14 Nicias urges the prytanis to put the question to a vote a second
time. On nomos as customary practice, see Ostwald (1961) 41-54. In this context to
"break the law" is close to invalidating it (making new precedent).

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 385

travening rule.8 Thus Aristides 8.1 refers to the reca

leaders on the eve of the Persian invasion: "undoing
decreed that those who had gone abroad might retur
TOV v6pov Eprjp)ioavTo TOY SIPEOEOTCAOI K6080OV). At
firms that "all those ostracized" were recalled. The Themistocles
Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 23) represents the same tradition:9 "those
who had gone abroad for [ten] years" were to muster at Salamis
(as Aristides did), and in the last fragmentary lines 44-7 there is a
further provision for other political exiles. This was probably un-
derstood as part of a general reprieve for atimoi, such as the Athe-
nians enacted in other crises (And. 1.73). But even if the recall was
limited to "all those ostracized" (as Ath. Pol. has it), this is still a
suspension of the law in favor of all those affected by it, not a
privilege for Aristides alone. The suspension may have favored a
select group, but it was not a decree trr' dv8pi.
To be sure, Plutarch treats the undoing of the law as a com-
passionate act, which has encouraged scholars to suppose that the
Athenians pitied Pericles so much, that they decreed that he alone
might break the law or be exempt from it. Plutarch sets the tone
by telling how Pericles broke down in tears at the loss of his sec-
ond son. Soon thereafter the people were fed up with other gen-
erals, "yearning for Pericles and calling him to [command] ...
[they] apologized for their senselessness..." and elected him gen-
eral again. He then pleaded that the law concerning nothoi be un-
done for the sake of his own household, "that he not leave his
name and genos barren of successors."" But Plutarch does not say
that this measure took the form of a special privilege and, if that
was what his source indicated, it would certainly have served the
moralizing cast of this narrative to make the distinction clear.
Plutarch now digresses to explain the citizenship law and its
dire effects, and the digression is also misleading. Pericles at the

' Cf. Ages. Pomp. Comp. 2.2, referring to amnesty for the survivors of Leuctra
(Ages. 30.3, "let the laws sleep for that day") as XAoat TroJS v6pou i-rri Tc) o oat
TOVS TroXiTas. Mor. 861f, the only passage in Plutarch that clearly refers to "breaking
the law" rather than changing it, is a quote from Hdt. 6.106.3 (n. 7, above).
9 See esp. Habicht (1961) 1-11: the reconstructed decree is evidently cited as
early as D. 19.303; among the anachronisms is the requirement that trierarchs have
legitimate sons to succeed them. As the career of Aristides shows, those reprieved
from ostracism retained their standing after the crisis, though the law was revived
and others were ostracized. A similar limitation may have been recognized or
implicit in Pericles' amendment; nothoi adopted under this measure would retain
their rights whenever the law regained its force against others.
to Thus Holden (1894) 202, "Xu6fivat, 'should be broken,' i.e., an exception
should be made to it in this one instance." Cf. Stadter (1989) 340.
" Per. 37.2: r'T'oaTo vu6fivat T6V TrEpi Tcv v66cov v6p1ov ... c pi~ flTrra T-rraotv
Eprngia btao0XfiS [T6v OTKOV] KKXtiTrOI TOUVOpIa Kai TO y'voS.

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386 EDWIN CARAWAN

height of his power had defined t

parents were both astoi would sha
later nearly a quarter of the cit
Plutarch implicitly blames this pu
In fact, Pericles' measure may
situation, but Plutarch's tally is ex
that all were victims of the Peric
taken.13 Be that as it may, on this
storyline with the crucial passag
Athenians consented (GuvEXcbplqo
his nothos in the phratry, and mo
reference to a specific decree. B
moralizing; he portrays the people
their leader and apologizing for th
"they consented," he is conjuring
legislation. His turn of phrase (ou
tance and is especially suited to
ous candidate into the phratry.
first objected (o0i ... ouvEXchpst)
dotage, tried to enroll a (probably
try. But he later relented when E
chief, "if [Philoctemon] would not
we apply that reading to Plutarc
upon popular sympathy to ame
reversal to his own advantage-a
son to resent this maneuver, they
course, was a unique figure, and t
would give him preferential treat
cal to frame that dispensation as a
prerogative.

12 More clearly stated in Ath. Pol. 26.4:

ITOXITc~V -TTEpIKXEOUS EiT6VTO5 iyvcooav Pi
doTolv i~ yEyovc's. On the reinstatement c
13 The most likely scenario runs as follo
son (1981) 95-7): The new requirement or
all new members would be subject to the r
no provision for scrutiny of old member
applied retroactively and arbitrarily in
prove that both parents were astoi probab
ing the dole). The tally of nearly 5000 d
F 119) is probably an error: it may be that
of citizens who received a grain allotment
citizen total to arrive at the number of
probably would not have participated in
smaller, it is doubtful that the purge wa
cutions by graphai xenias (as Jacoby supp
head (1977) 169 and (1986) 99-100); see furt

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 387

In drafting the amendment, Pericles took adva

ordinary protocol for establishing inheritance right
ship. Induction into the phratry was the pivotal ste
cess, for the phratry was the proper guardian of
succession in its constituent oikoi. A new son, as an i
sented to the phratry at the Apatouria; at his kourei
his qualifications were confirmed by the phratry; a
in the phratry, that he faced any initial challenge t
tions.' Admission to the deme was practically au
young man's qualifications had been confirmed i
and witnesses would attest to it.15 So while the phr
not conveyed citizenship since Cleisthenes, it did
qualifications. Pericles therefore had every reason t
if his son was accepted there, he would have to be a
wider forum of the deme.
Each institution, phratry and deme, reached its own decision,
but the rights they conveyed were practically inseparable. It is
conceivable that if a person were denied citizenship by the deme,
he might remain in the phratry, an astos though not a polites.16 But
the evidence is slim, and it is more reasonable to insist that nothoi
of the other sort-sons of two Athenians without enguetic mar-
riage-were citizens, though barred from inheritance.17 That too,
however, was probably rare: the ordinary assumption was that a
nothos was the child of a non-citizen mother (slave, metic or bride
of foreign descent); it is precisely for that reason that Pericles' law
of 451/0 could be described as "the law regarding nothoi." In any
case, a man could not claim citizenship in the deme without first
confirming his place in the phratry-unless, of course, he were
granted citizenship by decree.
If Pericles secured citizenship for his son by special decree,
the boy's qualification would not depend on the phratry's recog-
nition; we would then expect the tradition to emphasize enroll-
ment in the deme rather than the phratry.18 But the tradition in

14 For full discussion, see Lambert (1998) 143-89.

15 Initial scrutiny in the deme: Ath. Pol. 42.1. Challenges in the deme would
arise on the occasion of some special scrutiny of all members (diapsiphisis); these
were city-wide, as in 445/4 and 346/5 (probably also in the decade after 403).
16 For this distinction between astoi and politai, cf. Cohen (2000) 58-9 with n. 62.
New politai by decree were occasionally given demes but not phratries (e.g. the
Plataeans: [D.] 59.104).
17 Notably Lipsius (1905-15) 506-8; Paoli (1930) 273-4; Harrison (1968) 65-6;
de Ste. Croix (2004), esp. 234-9. To the contrary: Wolff (1944) 76-7, relying on D. 39;
Ogden (1996), esp. 151-74.
18 Citizenship decrees ordinarily called for the newcomers to choose their deme
and phratry-"invariably" in the case of individuals-bypassing the usual
qualification in the phratry; see Osborne (1983) 158.

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 388 EDWIN CARAWAN

Plutarch emphasizes his enrollm

heir and successor in the oikos; acc
only in the consent of the Athen
suggests that the "undoing" of th
qualifications and not a citizenshi
The only explicit indication of
the Suda's description of the youn
The Suda's source appears to be
torical details. After all, Aelian
exempla, and he seems to have r
summary he found.20 The Suda's 8
gloss Aelian adopted from his s
Suda's authority.
Ogden has argued that Plutarc
Aelian's both derive ultimately fr
sis.22 This is an intriguing idea, b
pervasive theme. The play is cit
appears to identify Pericles as o
Plutarch invokes the spell of "just
explain the Athenians' compassio
work in Pericles' case: having disfr
only his own nothos. There is noth
firm that Aelian even knew the o
Aelian is the Suda's source, and
Cratinus (by way of an intermedi
suggests how the term rl-poTro(r
cord. If comedy invented the idea
could reprieve Pericles from th

19 Suda 8 451, s.v. 8rlpoTroirlToS = Ael.

6T6 lT6 -TOO lB'O EiOTrOtflEi5 Kai yEyOV'35 T
ypyaS TOV Pl p&lpoIv rOVTUTrOX(rTv .Pi)
arro3aXcAv ... 6 .i Kai IP6Ai& T6V V66Ov oi iTraiBa TOV f AoTraaia5 Ti MhXrloia5
ETOTirloE 811lpOTrOrlTov. Ael. VH 6.10 seems to think that Pericles was simply left
without an heir; 13.24 cites Pericles, childless but for his nothos, among great
examples of planning gone wrong. That theme carried over into the lost work TEpi
TTpovoias, from which the Suda entry probably derives (but see n. 21, below).
20 Thus Kindstrand (1998) 2955. For Aelian's tenuous grasp of Athenian
history, see Wilson's introduction to the Loeb edition (1997) 8-12. Conventions of
the miscellany allow considerable distortion. In NA 11.40, Aelian states that he
personally saw a five-footed cow dedicated in Alexandria, though elsewhere he
insists (more plausibly) that he never left Italy; the phrase, "I myself have seen" is
either a trope or is carried over from the source. Cf. Kindstrand (1998) 2960.
21 Discrepancies suggest that the Varia Historia we have is somewhat abridged
(Dilts (1971) 4-6). Kindstrand (1998) 2292-3 cautions against the casual assumption
that the Suda's citations come from Aelian-even where he is cited.
22 Ogden (1996) 61. For Cratinus' treatment of Aspasia and Pericles, see Henry
(1995) 20-2.

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 389

would be natural for a later writer to gloss the b

ON
The term 8qrpoTro
tury,23 and is almost
islation. Of course,
there were many ind
those who suppose t
of such a decree may
"Check list of natura
Pericles' is the only
the son of a tradition
citizen residents, su
or grants to the son
ods).24 Ordinarily a
no question of legiti
kind of grant supp
have infringed upon
and genos) that estab
Finally, let us co
stands up to the find
law itself. It was on
was especially aimed
primarily metroxeno
no popular support
That rationale now
argued, the recover
surge in non-Athen
ceeded in being enro
By the 450s these m

23 The earliest instances

Themistius or. 2; Aeschin.
Jensen, ap. Harp. E 134). 4
politai or kata psephism
demopoietos to gloss passa
[D.] 59; cf. Plu. Sol. 24.4.
24 Cf. Osborne (1983) 2
pattern.
25 As in the Demotionid decrees, IG II2 1237. The phratry's control is most
striking in "posthumous adoption" (without a will or any proof of what the de
cuius intended); see Rubinstein (1993) 41-9.
26 Jacoby offered a provocative statement of this view in his appendix to
Philochorus FGrH 328 F 119 (IIIb Suppl. (1954) 471-82, esp. 478-80): the aim may
have been broadly to undermine elite opposition-the threat of a ypaq)'i Evias
"must have hung over Kimon like a sword of Damocles.... Against Thucydides,
who merely (to speak in the terms of German racial legislation) had a 'half-Aryan
wife' or 'one Jewish grandmother,"' prosecution was perhaps less credible, but the
prejudice contributed to ostracism.

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 390 EDWIN CARAWAN

and some would have already in

marriages into their phratries. T
by providing statutory grounds
he tried to enroll a son (or reco
able to prove that both parents w
ics for this period, but Patterson
take the blinders off the convent
The problem of incoming ali
diminish with the growth of emp
gate the legal and social compli
cleruchies and colonies, the more
ticularly affected families involv
early 5th century, Athenian se
perhaps even Lemnos and the C
a practical complication into th
bers in the phratry: if a child wa
might be no neighbors in Athen
family background. Such "sons
cepted without difficulty, but in
be suspected that fathers residin
vantage of obscurity to enroll
probably contributed to Pericles'
be necessary to provide witnesse
instance, that the mother was th
out such support it would be dif
a disaffected uncle or cousin hop
there were no heir.
The effect of Pericles' law in 451 was to regularize what was
commonly assumed but poorly enforced; children of "mixed
27 Ogden (1996) 68-9 raises objections; but see Podlecki (1998) 160-1, with
nn. 4-8 (p. 211).
28 Figueira (1.991) 40-73 shows that klerouchos and apoikos widely overlap and
that many apoikoi retained their rights as Athenians. A useful summary of what we
know about settlements in the 5th century, with members maintaining strong links
to Athens, is given by Cargill (1995) 1-8; cf. Salomon (1997) 190-213. Some settle-
ments drew largely upon the lower classes, zeugitai and thetes (as at Brea, IG 13
46.43-6), but others were open to all; cf. Cargill (1995) 192 with n. 127; Figueira
(1991) 59-60.
29 IS. 6.12-13 (364 BC) illustrates the kind of uncertainty that must have been
even more troublesome in the 5th century: when claimants to the estate of Eucte-
mon tried to establish that they were legitimate sons, but were unable to document
their mother's status, they initially claimed that she was a Lemnian and asked for a
continuance on that account. They probably maintained that she was born to Athe-
nians on Lemnos-and the proof would have to come from Lemnos. Ogden (1996)
71, 177-9 supposes that Lemnians were granted epigamia, and that this "Lemnian
alternative" accounts for the epikleros in Terence's Phormio. But a large community
of settlers on Lemnos had retained their rights as Athenians, at least since the mid-
5th century. On the plight of epikleroi in New Comedy and its roots in Athenian
law, see Scafuro (1997) 281-304, esp. 294-300 on Phormio.

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 391

marriages"-where one parent was not an Atheni

expressly disfranchised on that account. The term
embraces a wider category, describing any offspr
"unequal partnership."30 But it was normally ass
mother was a non-citizen, and Pericles' law was pa
cerned to bar such offspring (whatever the status of
This comes at a time when cleruchies and colonies w
an instrument of imperial expansion.31 Cleruch
who retained Athenian citizenship would raise ch
and expect to enroll them in their phratries at A
cials" of doubtful parentage and dubious loyalties m
the ranks of the demos, if there were no check upon
tions.
This concern with status-confusion in the colonies also sug-
gests a rationale for the remedy against foreign imposters attested
by Craterus in his collection of decrees:

"But if anyone born of two xenoi acts as a phrater, any Athenian who
wishes may prosecute, of those eligible to do so, and bring charges to
the nautodikai on the last day of the month." Aristophanes in Banqueters:
"I want to row to the nautodikai and straightaway <denounce someone>
as an alien."32

The reference in Aristophanes' Banqueters shows that this remedy

was already in place by 427. Jacoby dated the measure to the late
430s, and there is no compelling reason to dispute that.33 The evi-
dence is nonetheless consistent with a slightly later enactment,

30 The construction "unequal partnership" is Patterson's (esp. 1990), and it

seems to me more useful to think in these terms. Sealey (1984) and (1990) 29-36,
from another perspective argued strongly against the notion of "legitimacy" as
established by the particular formality of enguesis: not all children born outside
enguetic marriage were necessarily classed as nothoi (after all, Athenian law is
short on prescriptive definitions), and the ordinary implication of nothos (nowhere
defined) was that the mother was not an Athenian aste.
31' Figueira (1991) 217-20, counts seven colonies (or extensions) in the period
453-445 BC, and five cleruchies in 453-448 BC, indicating several thousand Atheni-
ans maintaining households abroad.
32 Craterus FGrHIBNJ 342 F 4a = Harp. N 5 s.v. vau-robiKaI, "sailor judges":
...KpaTEp6S yo0v Ev T( ) TCOy -r1YptolPaTcv prlov-0 <<Jt v U TI& i E6(poIv EivoIv
yEyovCis ippaTpigr, 8tCKEIV ElvaI TC o POuAoplvcp 'AOlvaicov, o1s 8iKaI EiOi.* aYXaVEIV
bi Tf iEVr K I Vt Trpbs TOUS vauTo8iKaS>>. 'AptoroodavnIS AalTaXhEGOlV <<OiE o 36pAPao
-rrpS vau-robiKa5 E vov i aiqvrT <lTOcpfivat>>>. Cf. Carawan (2007) ad loc.
33 Andrewes (1961) supposed that the law cited by Craterus belongs to the
430s, as it seems to be reflected in Cratinus' Cheirones (fr. 233). But we know that
the nautodikai had some jurisdiction (in property disputes ) involving non-citizens
going back to 446 /5 (IG I3 41), so the joke in Cheirones (distraining centaurs as live-
stock ) may have nothing to do with citizenship. Patterson (1981) 109-13 supposes
a separate remedy for half-astoi, and dates the measure to the 440s. Ogden (1996)
50 insists that the measure must be pre-Periclean.

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 392 EDWIN CARAWAN

and it is tempting to suppose th

posters only emerged when the P
be astoi," was invalid.34 But let u
The 8E at the beginning of thi
joined to another regarding cit
but what direction that rule took is unclear. It is conceivable that
the missing provision introduced a new remedy against those
who claimed citizenship with only one citizen-parent, perhaps the
graphe xenias. But before 404 there is no evidence of any barrier
against that group other than traditional scrutiny in the phratry
or deme.35 It is equally possible (as Figueira supposes) that the
missing clause simply recognized the rights of all those who
could claim even one citizen-parent; if so, it would indicate that
Pericles' law was fully rescinded. But I think it more likely that
the first clause acknowledged some traditional rule of phratry
self-governance; when altering old law, it is crucial to be clear
about what does not change. The effect may have been to confirm
the status of members enrolled before 451. In any given phratry
there might be some-perhaps many-members of long standing,
whose fathers were well known but who could not easily prove
that both parents were astoi; their status and the enrollment of
their offspring remain within the phratry's control. But if anyone
posed as a phratir without even a citizen-father, he became subject
to a remedy with a very long reach.
The jurisdiction of the nautodikai suggests that this measure
addressed a particular sort of imposter, not the metropolitan xenos
who had usurped his citizenship in the era after Salamis, but an
infiltrator who might have to be denounced to circuit judges in
the outposts of the empire. This would be a non-Athenian who
claimed to be a phratryman in order to take advantage of that
qualification in his dealings with cleruchs or colonists.36 At Ath-
ens such individuals would have the odds stacked against them
in the face-to-face meetings of phratries and demes. But in the
colonies the imposter might have great success; for instance, he
might marry a cleruch's daughter or marry off his own daughter

34 Figueira (1991) 236.

3 The only instance in the 5th century where xenia appears to be the charge ac-
tually involves a decree under the Thirty: Lys. 13.59-60. In the 4th century the few
known cases involve charges of cohabiting or "living in marriage" with a xene
(which was not in itself illegal under Pericles' law): the case against Neaera (and
Stephanus) in [D.] 59; the abortive parallel mentioned in [D.] 59.52; and Is. 3.37.
Hypothetical references suggest that one might prosecute the son of a mixed mar-
riage, but the specific grounds are unclear (D. 39.18; 40.41; 49.66).
36 It is not unlikely that in many cleruchies and colonies local organization
was based on tribe and phratry-there might even have been "local chapters" for
the better-represented phratries. But there is no direct evidence to support this
conjecture, and the argument here does not depend upon it.

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 393

to an Athenian colonist. And in business dealings h

much to gain by passing as an Athenian; at least in so
it appears that cleruchs could not sell or otherwise
allotments to non-Athenians.37 Craterus F 4a thus desc
sure that seems inspired by the aftermath of the col
sion: it was primarily aimed at punishing frauds in
not at expelling false citizens at Athens.
Whatever we make of Craterus' testimony, Peri
its adaptations-addressed a complicated problem, n
elite phenomenon.38 By singling out the children of
riages for special scrutiny, it posed a new complicatio
across the social and economic spectrum, especial
maintained a household outside Attica or on its bor
of those who found themselves in this situation would have bene-
fited by an amendment such as I have suggested, allowing a
phratryman to adopt his nothos as his heir if he had no other, and
thus to enroll a son-and-successor when he could not easily prove
that the child's mother was an aste.

II. On the other side of the debate we find considerable evidence

that the strict rule requiring that both parents be astoi was invali-
dated or unenforceable at least in the later stages of the Pelopon-
nesian War.40 Indeed, it has been argued and often assumed that
Pericles' law was suspended soon after the Sicilian disaster,
perhaps in 411-403. This was Milller's view (1899), but it is open
to various objections.41 In particular, the narrow time frame is
based upon what seems to me a tendentious reading of the evi-
37 Cf. Figueira (1991) 146; Cargill (1995) 192-5, with references at 192 n. 1.
38 Other circumstances contributed. Boegehold (1994) suggests quite plausibly
that the legislation followed the lead of the courts: in inheritance cases, juries or
magistrates would have established the popular standard, that the full-blood heir,
born to two Athenians in traditional marriage, was the privileged successor to
property and legal rights. Ruschenbusch (1979) 83-7 suggested that the legislation
reacted against the weddings of Athenian astai to metics after the Egyptian disaster.
de Ste. Croix (2004) 248-50 argues that the law was aimed against "extra-marital
unions," which would usually involve non-astai.
39 Connor (1994) 36-9, emphasized the "centrifugal forces" at work in large
outlying demes, where shepherds and other highly mobile constituents would
inevitably form alliances with neighboring folk, take in runaways and otherwise
taint their Attic bloodlines. Cf. Figueira (1991) 142-60, on "Regional Expansion."
40 D. 57.30; Eumelus FGrH/ BNJ 77 F 2 = I Aeschin. 1.39; notable examples dis-
cussed below. The implication is recognized e.g. by Stroud (1971) 299. Ath. Pol.
42.1 acknowledges the restatement; the author says nothing of changes before 403
but, within the scope of his summary, we could hardly expect him to comment
further on nothoi and other persons of marginal status. Cf. Rhodes (1981) 496-7.
41 Muller's construction was countered in detail by Ledl (1907-08) and is often
ignored in later studies; see esp. Ledl (1908) 173-87 on the rights and status of
nothoi. Ogden (1996) 76-7, however, arrives at roughly the same time-frame.

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394 EDWIN CARAWAN

dence: we are to suppose that the

against foreign alliances of the
scinded the law when they took p
model, the evidence suggests that
stages: a narrow exception was
devastated by the plague; then a
were more widely admitted. For
the one sure terminus, the end of
(1) The revival of the Periclean
be astoi, is well attested for 403
exception: those born before Eu
subject to the Periclean rule.42 Th
ing the war many children of mi
in their phratries (and some had
fore the law allowed no challen
qualified before then.43 It is som
restatement was simply required
unwritten law" and "to apply the
reads too much into And. 1.83-7. Andocides does not mean that
all old laws had to be reenacted, only that laws targeting atimoi
were listed under the time-limit "from Euclides." The Law of Dio-
cles (D. 24.42-3) confirms that old laws remained in force and that
some laws were simply given a new "starting date." Therefore, if
the law barring nothoi had not been undone or amended, there
would be no need to reenact it.
The Periclean amendment, allowing a father to adopt his
nothos if he had no surviving gnesioi, appears to have been hon-
ored in at least two parallel cases. These are metroxenoi who were
admitted to their phratries before 403 and who famously exer-
cised citizenship thereafter. Athenaeus 13.577a reports that Timo-
theus the son of Conon (PA 13700) was born to a Thracian hetaira,
probably in 420/19 or before. The only other son of Conon known
to us was born to a Cyprian wife (Lys. 19.36), so Timotheus may
have been adopted under the amendment Pericles devised allow-
ing the father to enroll his nothos as sole successor. Similarly Anti-
sthenes the Cynic (PA 1188) was said to be the son of a Thracian
mother (D.L. 6.1; Suda a 2723) and we have no good reason to dis-
count the testimony.45 After all, Antisthenes, the son of Antisthe-

42 I Aeschin. 1.39: lpru8va TC)v IET' 'EUKXEigl i&PXOVTa IETEXEIV TI Tr6XECOS av

Pl apcpA) TOUS y6VEas acOTOOs rrt6EilTTat, TOJS 6B "Tp6 'EUKXEiBO V VE ETa TCW~
raqETioal (proposed by Nikomenes); cf. Ath. 13.577b-c (Aristophon).
43 Cf. Verilhac and Vial (1968) 56-7 with n. 48.
4 Thus Walters (1983) 324-7; similarly Thompson (1968) 65-6. For the legal ef-
fect of lV VqrlotKaKETV and the limitation "from Euclides," see Carawan (2002) 5-15.
45 Nails (2002) 36 rejects the testimony, but largely on the presumption that if
his mother were Thracian, he must have been excluded by Pericles' law. Hum-

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 395

nes, was roughly contemporary with Pericles the son

and we can best account for the evidence by supp
benefited from the same change in the law on nothoi.
When Pericles enrolled his nothos in the phratry,
boy his own name," he was "adopting" his son as
in the oikos (odd as it may seem to speak of a father
own son). The defining act of any adoption was induc
phratry; acceptance by the phrateres entitles the a
assert his hereditary rights to his property and hi
polis.46 The boy was sometimes given the father's
paternal grandfather's name on the occasion of his en
a sign of this change in status from outsider to heir;
be its significance here.47 Any arrangement of th
course likely to provoke a legal dispute, since clo
might try to disqualify the adoptee in order to advan
claims. Family disputes involving adoption and th
interests of potential heirs were common enough to
edy.48 Nothoi figure in these disputes even in the 4th
the nothos was disqualified without exception.49
We can see how the eligibility of a nothos could
matters in Aristophanes' parody of litigious wrang

phreys (1974) 93 accepts the testimony and its implication, that A

nothos. Particularly suggestive is the comment attributed to Socra
thenes proved himself at the battle of Tanagra (426 BC): oiJK &V K
oTrCw yEY6VOt yEVvaios.
4 Rubinstein (1993) showed that induction into the phratry
step in adoption.
47 This does not necessarily mean that the boy was not called
ously; it might simply be that the name was given formal recogn
enrolled as Pericles' heir. But it is possible that the name was chan
named for Aspasia's father, he would have been another Axioch
family connections, see Henry (1995) 10-11). Ogden (1996) 93 fi
probable" that 1-rli T-r &u-roO 6v6'raT means that the son was now
nymic, citing the same expression in Is. 6.21. But Isaeus also se
the father enrolled the boy as his namesake (otherwise unnamed).
case of Boeotus/Mantitheus (D. 39-40), where a dubious son w
nized as an heir, we find a new name reflecting that status and
he was previously denied the patronymic. Cf. Humphreys (1974) 9
nothos Hermogenes "politely addressed as 'son of Hipponikos"' in
48 Cf. Ar. V. 583-6, with Scafuro (1997) 285 and 294-8, on Men.
49 MUiller (1899) concluded that nothoi enfranchised before
their citizenship but lose their inheritance (806, citing the case of
ter of Pyrrhos, Is. 3.37-53). Harrison (1968) 69-70 insisted that leg
by adoption was simply illegal; in the most flagrant cases (incl
Euctemon's) "we have factual legitimation procured by an op
law." Cf. Rhodes (1978); Patterson (1981) 31 n. 20.

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 396 EDWIN CARAWAN

claims of the nothos and the epi

and Heracles have come to negot
cles, seeing how much the birds
onciled (1640), to which Poseido
his legacy, "if Zeus dies having s
Peisetairos replies in kind to t
TTEpt1oocpitETaL): "your uncle's
laws, you don't have slightest sh
you're nothos and not gnesios"
vokes, of course, are the laws of
Athena's claim prevails; as he exp
ess" (epikleros is one of her epith
were any right-born brothers.
my father gives me the propert
That is, even if the estate is ent
(or some portion) might be given
But as Peisetairos insists, "The la
don would be the first to contes
since he, as a right-born brother
self. That is, the uncle would clai
At this point Peisetairos int
making sense of what Aristoph
important to bear in mind the
the previous exchange; the mat
be a nothos and bars him from a
standing as "the Heiress." Again
that, even with the estate enta
him property by will, which is t
that option, Peisetairos sets fort
'Epc 8 i Kal TOV 06Acv65 0oo v
"N6ocp 8~ Pl )EIvat dayXIOTEiaV TTl
Exv BE "TraiES P i)] Col yvtlotol, T
T C)V XPTriPTC)wV."

Indeed, I'll even tell you Solon

[1] "A nothos shall have no s
there are legitimate childr
but [2] if there are no legitima
shall share the property."

5o Dunbar's commentary (1995) 729-3

For Peisetairos' motivation and the link between Athena and the Basileia of his
desires, see now Anderson and Dix (2007).
51 As Dunbar (1995) 731 observes, Athena's epithet epikleros probably derives
from her triumph over Poseidon, as the receiver of Athens itself, or from her role
as protectress of epikleroi (or both).
52 Thus Ledl (1908) 175, followed by Harrison (1968) 66; similarly Dunbar
(1995) 732.

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 397

The gist of this exchange is that even the father's ri

of his property by will is limited by Heracles' status
That much is true. But the "law" Peisetairos cites app
flate the rules for two different situations. The f
applies "if there are legitimate offspring," and clearly
if there are none, nothoi may indeed inherit.53 The se
just the opposite: if there are no gnesioi, the nothos is
inheriting. Scholars have tried to save the sense by
phrase Traibcov oVTCAr yvrloitov as an intrusion: it is
phanes' invention (Humphreys) or a later interpola
But several considerations confirm its authenticity. P
no motivation to invent the condition if there were none-he is
trying to discourage Heracles, not to raise his expectations. And
to suppose that this one troublesome phrase is a later interpola-
tion seems a strategy of desperation (as Wolff regarded it). But
most compelling is the direction of the comic dialogue. The first
rule, complete with the condition TraiBcov OVTCro yvrloiwOV, carries
the same implication as the argument that led up it: if not for the
legitimate daughter, Heracles the nothos might hope to inherit. If
the nothos were barred unconditionally, there would be no point
in insisting upon the rights of the heiress.
This may seem an abstruse point to us, but this kind of issue
must have been painfully familiar to the ancient audience.54 The
essential features of the operative law would also be well-known,
for Solon famously introduced the basic law allowing the father
"to dispose of his estate as he wishes, if he would leave no legiti-
mate sons."55 By will a father could assign his estate to an heir
outside the circle of his nearest agnates, but it was an inviolable
condition that the will provide for any legitimate daughter.56
Peisetairos' argument suggests that the rule against nothoi was
commonly seen as one of the guarantees for epikleroi.

53 Wolff (1944) 88-9, saw the implication: "'if there be lawful sons' logically
demands a provision giving v660o preference to collaterals if there are no yvrioto."
Cf. Humphreys (1974) 89 n. 5, recognizing that the two laws are not logically con-
nected. Patterson (1990) 51-2, 57 cautiously allows for the exception.
54 Compare the case of Euctemon's estate, Is. 6.46-51: the defendant Androcles
asserted that two boys are legitimate sons of Euctemon and enrolled them by
"posthumous adoption" as sons of Philoctemon and Ergamenes (the childless
elder sons of Euctemon). But Androcles had made an earlier bid for the property,
claiming that Euctemon left a legitimate daughter and that it was his right (as
nearest agnate) to marry her. So the plaintiff protests: if the girl was an epikleros,
the boys cannot be gnesioi. Thus, as nothoi, they are barred by the law, v66co aB BarlB
v6r0l dYXIOTEiav pCjO' iEpc~v pCj' 6oicov, &Tr' E OAKTEiBOU &PXOVTOS.
5 Is. 3.68; cf. Manville (1990) 127, 149 with references, n. 65.
56 The father might designate a husband in the will, or he might adopt an heir
by will, with the stipulation that he marry (or marry off) the epikleros. See Rubin-
stein (1993) 96-7, followed (in the main) by Scafuro (1997) 282-3.

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 398 EDWIN CARAWAN

But there is a disconnect betw

eral provision barring a nothos
ily, if there are gnesioi. It appli
death and especially affects a
before his death cannot adopt a
bequeath the estate to him by
tion.57 By contrast, the second
succession. It only applies aft
legitimate sons surviving and h
In sum, the two provisions
authentic, but Peisetairos' comb
invention. The first clause bars
under a will, unless there are
begins as though it would dea
duces a rule for intestate succession-that is, a rule that cannot
apply in the same case where the first clause applies. Attempts
have been made to cut out the first condition (Trai&ov aOVTCO
yvroiov) or to disregard it, but the dialogue depends upon it.
Athena's claim as the "heiress" who would pass on rights to her
son has no relevance except to close that loophole, however
absurdly. Heracles cannot be his father's heir, since he would
supplant the offspring of Athena (inconceivable as that is). In my
view, therefore, this passage plays upon a familiar exception, the
same loophole Pericles invoked in 430/29: in the absence of
gnesioi--and only in that case-a father may adopt a nothos. This
would be readily seen as "Solon's law" or an adaptation of it, as
the rule barring the nothos was part of the law on wills, including
testamentary adoption, and was closely linked to the guarantees
for the epikl2ros. The exception for the nothos as sole survivor was
one last recourse to preserve the oikos, to fall back upon if there
were no epikleros.
(2) In the period 411-403, a broader dispensation appears to
have been in effect, much as Miiller argued: nothoi held citizen-
ship and (limited) inheritance rights alongside their legitimate
siblings rather than as surrogates. Whether this was the result of
a positive change in the law or simply an erosion of its authority
is debated. Ledl exposed a number of weaknesses in Miiller's
argument (noted below), but the main thesis has merit. The most
troublesome premise is that the oligarchic regime of 411 rescinded
the law of 451, partly to rehabilitate the metroxenoi of their class,

7 Disposing of one's estate by will was, in origin and effect, a sort of adop-
tion: see esp. Gernet (1955) 121-49.
58 Cf. D. 43.51: the statute begins by confirming the rule that property is en-
tailed with the legitimate daughters, if there are any; but if not, priority is given to
brothers of the deceased by the same father, or to their sons (and so on). The text
as we have it concludes with the rule barring nothoi (above, n. 54).

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 399

but also to meet the exigencies of the Decelean W

convergence of motives there was no reason to chan
In order to show that a change in 411 accounts fo
dence, Miiller had to insist that the testimony in Bi
later interpolation. But if we follow the model ou
we can fit the evidence together without procrustea
before 413 there was a much narrower dispensation,
cles passed in 430/29 allowing a father to adopt h
gnesioi survived. If the broader liberalization were al
fect in 414, there would be nothing to bar a nothos
from his father's phratry.60
In 410 there is perhaps an indication that nothoi
citizen-rights, in the decree against Antiphon and A
(Craterus FGrH 342 F 5b = [Plu.] Mor. 833d-4b): th
traitors, both nothoi and gnesioi, are to be atimoi (withou
or recourse), and anyone who adopts a traitor's son i
This suggests that other nothoi, not subject to this de
zen rights.6' It may be a mistake to parse the law so
and gnesioi may be simply the sort of polar expressi
all distinctions. Likewise it may be only the tersenes
guage that suggests that a nothos could be adopted
family, and the original audience would underst
clause applies only to gnesioi. But at least on the face
plication is that nothoi could be citizens and heirs.
There are in fact many indications that nothoi
enfranchised in the decade or so before 403. In D. 57
stance, Euxitheus tells how his father served in the
his kinsmen testify that the father was a citizen
although as Euxitheus insists, this is more than the
as his father was born long before the year of Eucli
when even an astos-on-one-side held citizenship.

59 Referring to the law attested by Diogenes Laertius (belo

reasoned (797-8), "451-13 ist ffir ein solches Notgesetz ... kein R
Gesetz der Not, der bittersten Kriegsnot."
60 At Av. 1668-70, Peisetairos asks, "Tell me--has your fathe
you among the phrateres " To which Heracles replies, "Not at a
wondered why." Heracles is a nothos on either criterion: his m
(not an Olympian) and not married with any contractual formalit
61 Thus MacDowell (1976) and (1978) 68. Rhodes (1978) objects
involves atimia in the archaic sense of outlawry; similarly Led
Sealey (1984) 127 is right to fault the distinction. "Outlawry," aft
ply that the condemned man has no rights or recourse against vi
atimos absolutely).
62 D. 57.54 reports the 4'h-century oath, not naming the moth
her qualification: 6p6aaS TO-b v61pi1ov TOiTS qppdTEpoyv opKov Eioa
aYTr~i yyurTTfiS airrT yEyEvriJLPVOV Ei&cs. Cf. IG II2 1237 (De
(oath of witnesses): yviltov iy yacETTxr ; elsewhere identified by

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400 EDWIN CARAWAN

father was born no later than the

well before 404, and Euxitheus
that era belonged to half-astoi as
of the law. This is a hypothetical
may be a product of hindsight,
lenging citizens who qualified bef
on the face of it, the testimony s
fully counted as citizens before th
A real case is indicated in Ly
the deme Cholleidai offered suret
his escape (to no avail), despite t
faced as a person of mixed pare
even cites the decree calling for t
phanes "as being not properly a
phanes is given a demotic and o
citizen with legal rights.
One might nonetheless argue
merely prove that the law was
changed.64 But I find it unlikely
disregarded without provoking
can think of no comparable nullif
rule of such consequence was simp
the law remained formally valid
provide partisan and personal e
action on a range of issues-pro
office, and so on-of which we h
timony to a change in the law ben
partnerships.
Diogenes Laertius, in his brief a
Satyrus and Hieronymus of Rhod
wanted to increase their plethos,
so) decreed (that a man) could mar
children also from another."65 D
... another"-suggests that both
Athenians. But there is good reaso
the letter nor the intent of the l
lored to the example of Socrates, d

and his deme. The oath did not always tak

63 The sense is clear enough. The manu
OVTa, but Taylor's KaOap,&s is attractive
151 translates, "on the grounds that he w
64 Ledl (1908) 187; cf. Thompson (1968) 6
the crush of urbanization during the war.
65 D.L. 2.26: (paot yhip pouVXrlYVTras AM
TOb TrXij60, 'rl)tioaooai yoaQEIv PIv d OTlv [iay
66 The story is not impossible; cf. MacD
have been inspired by odd details regard

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 401

Aristotle reported that Socrates had two wives, firs

and then Myrto, though the timing is problematic.67
Hieronymus evidently explained that Socrates took
a specific law to have two partners at once. Porphyry
accepted the implication: the better-known wife, Xan
in fact the concubine.68 This chain of inference is dou
premise is credible enough: in the course of the war
altered the law, to allow a father to acknowledge chil
second partnership.
The implication that this second partner was requi
aste merely fits the dubious case: Diogenes adapted
tice from the testimony on Socrates' two wives.
shorthand version, the disparity between the partner
enough: proper marriage is reserved for the one
yaIETi Piv aoTlJV plcav. The other arrangement is vag
as "[to] get [legitimate] children" also from anoth
-rrotIEciat8 Kal E 'TipaS. But the sense must surel
father is now allowed to legitimize the children h
from his concubine or other unequal partner-and
usual assumption was that these were not astai.69
measure, few Athenian families would engage their
concubines, and it seems doubtful that the law wa
initiate a round of legitimized concubinage, requir
now to engage an astj in this role. The aim was instea
the citizen-ranks immediately, rather than waiting 1
new cohort to come of age.70 As we saw, the testimo

Lamprocles as the eldest (Mem. 2.1.34; elsewhere called meirakio

identifies him as the son of Xanthippe (named for her father; s
Nails (2002) 263). Sophroniscus, named for Socrates' father, was
so (supposedly) he was born to a second wife, Myrto. Plato pictu
the Phaedo as sitting apart with Socrates and holding his paid
joined by the other sons and the oikeiai gunaikes.
67 Cf. Plu. Arist. 27.1 with Ath. 13.555d = Arist. fr. 71 Gigo
Hieronymus of Rhodes frr. 43-5 Wehrli; Satyrus fr. 17a Schorn. Th
tified as the daughter of Aristides the Just. But if there is any basis
is more likely his granddaughter (as Fitton (1970) 66 suggests), or
his grandson and namesake. On the tradition confusing Aristide
son, cf. Carawan (2007) on Craterus F 12.
68 Porphyry FGrH 260 F 11c (= Theodoretus Graec. aft. cur. X
(1970) 61, would emend 1TpoTrrXaKE!Oav to Trpo -rraAhaKEiav.
69 Either the law applied retroactively or TratborroteoGatL sta
1TOETOOtat, "adopt a child" (as in Plu. Mor. 1000d). On the ideo
tween citizen-wives and other partners, see Hartmann (2000).
70 Lysistrata (early 411) suggests that there was yet no repri
riageable women. But that could be a benefit of the law Diogenes t
latter was a measure to enroll nothoi, including "sons of the pr
calls for the inclusion of "all cities that are colonies of this land
greatly increase the stock of available husbands. Cf. Miiller (1899)

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 402 EDWIN CARAWAN

tial that half-astoi exercised citiz

reject both traditions, therefore,
one in light of the other: the Ath
now enroll in his phratry any no
a second partner (aste or not).
A likely example of this rule, r
partnership, is the case of Callias
alized by Andocides (1.124-7). The
to engage an epikleros was in fac
wife's mother, Chrysilla. When h
the child at the Apatouria, under
fused to acknowledge the boy, sw
Hipponicus." Later he made up
their son under oath before his
plains that the Kerykes have a la
that the boy is his in order to
boy was enrolled in the genos, h
phratry, as Philochorus attests (F
accept the orgeones and the homo
This clause was probably part of
what remains is sufficient to s
his phratry a son he had disavow
Andocides does all he can to
who flaunted his position as pr
carrying on with his wife's mo
there is anything illegal in keepi
one's wife, and recognizing the o
the worst he can do is to brand
for first disavowing and then
the incidental details reveal a
Callias disavowed the boy, he sw
was not his, but that he had "
Apparently he refused to adopt h
to swear "I have no other son but this" (under Pericles' amend-

71 On the implications of this case, cf. Sealey (1990) 29-36. And. 1.127 summa-
rizes the law of the Kerykes as simply requiring that the father swear li niv ui6v
OvTa fauTro EioGyEIv. He then describes the oath by Callias, ClaOOEV Pl#v T6v
Traiba auroU ETvat yvOltov. But the word gnesion is probably Andocides' own,
perhaps borrowed from language that later became standard, intended to amplify
the irregularity. Cf. Patterson (1990) 61 n. 81, citing Metag. fr. 14: "Who is a citizen
if not ... the nothos of Callias "
72 Andrewes (1961) argued persuasively that this rule belongs to the 430s
(within the range of Philochorus Book 4, to which it is assigned). Ogden (1996) 47-
53 argues that it goes back to Peisistratus. In any case, it probably recognizes what
was customary. On orgeones and related groups, see Arnaoutoglou (2003) 31-70,
esp. 37-43, suggesting that the statute may be as late as the 4th century.

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 PERICLES II AND THE CITIZENSHIP LAW 403

ment). When Callias at last acknowledged the boy

mitted to enroll him alongside Hipponicus (probably
The coming of this wider access may be foresha
110 of Eupolis Demes, perhaps as late as 411: the gho
asks after his nothos (6 v60o ~ poot i;), only to le
barred by his mother's notoriety from pursuing a p
If he tried to "be an aner"-taking his place in the
ers-he would undoubtedly face challenges in scrut
cles II took office as Hellenotamias in 410/9 (IG 13
was elected general in 406. If the rights of nothoi we
tended c. 411, this later measure may have specifical
their eligibility for full "sharing in the polis," and
Pericles II embark upon his fateful career.

III. The main thesis of this essay is a simple one, but

complicated sequence of events. Therefore it may
summarize the changes in the law regarding noth
430-403 / 2 as reconstructed above.
(1) The measure of 430/29 was not a decree -rr' dv
ing citizenship to the younger Pericles alone, but
to the law of 451/0, affecting all families that found
the same predicament: a father who had no survivin
allowed to adopt a nothos and thus sustain his house
(2) As late as 414 the amendment of 430/29 was st
loophole, as Birds 1649-70 suggests. The law quote
implies that a nothos might be adopted if there wer
but if a father had rightly born offspring-even
epikleros as Athena-he lacked that option.
(3) For the period 411-403, nothoi enjoyed wider a
phratry: the father might enroll his nothoi alongsid
born siblings. Probably this was a positive change in
confused tradition cited by D.L. 2.26 suggests legi
effect, and it was perhaps a corollary to this more g
chise that opened the door to political office for suc
nothoi as Pericles II.
This is not a complete solution, but it reconciles the crucial
evidence more readily than others. It has the advantage of ex-
plaining some otherwise puzzling testimony at the margins, such
as the tale of Callias' nothos, whom he first disavowed but later
enrolled. And if we recognize the sequence of changes in 430-403,
it may help us sort out the status of nothoi in other periods.
To illustrate these implications, let us consider one last text.
Lysias' speech for a graphe paranomon against Theozotides (c.
402/1) reveals a special regard for nothoi and the rights they had

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 404 EDWIN CARAWAN

recently held.73 Theozotides' bill l

phans of the democratic resistanc
back from Phyle), by excluding n
Among the fragments we find th
is cruel to nothoi because they wi
128 Carey, 10-13): under the law
have no share in their fathers' esta
We do not have the section where
to poietoi, but it is not hard to i
the adoptee is the sole successor
unfair to give him no recogniti
A certain emphasis is also indica
insistently treats the two grou
TrotrlTOUs-together in opposition
are commonly opposed to gnesioi
century, but they are not usually
son was ordinarily a kinsman's gn
heir would adopt a son from amon
near relatives. It would hardly se
nary adoptees were not honored a
fact, Lysias speaks as though the
adopted gnesioi. Instead, the link
gests that they belong to the sam
dividuals Lysias defends simply
fathers had enrolled them in thei
born siblings under the broader
poietoi, whom Lysias champions
clude those nothoi adopted by
amendment from 430/29; they esp
port, as they were not only the so
the heroes' own sons.74

EDWIN CARAWAN
Missouri State University

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