The Luminary Answer

ْ
‫َ َ ُ ُض‬ ْ
‫لاج واب الم ِ ي ء‬

By: al-Sayyid al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥusayn b. Yaḥyā al-Muṭahar

Translated by: Muḥammad al-Sharīfī

In the name of Allāh, the Most Gracious, Most Merciful

Praise be to Allāh Lord of the Worlds, and may His peace, and blessings be upon our master
Muḥammad, and his pure, blessed household.

The Mannerisms of Debate

Know O Seeker of noble knowledge: It is obligatory upon the seeker of noble knowledge to have
humility, be drawn towards truth, research, and not be deceived by his ego. He must know that
discourse, and argumentation isn’t for the sake of winning, and competing. Rather, it is for the
sake of understanding. It is incumbent upon both interlocutors to seek truth, and what is accurate.
He who is able to achieve that from them, and his proof is overwhelming, the interlocutor must
not be arrogant in not conceding. This is because the end that is sought is perceiving the truth as
it is.

Proof is Necessary for Every Claim

If you have come to know this, then you have known that proof is necessary, every claim without
proof is null. For, Allāh, the Glorious, the Exalted, did not claim Lordship without proof. Rather,
He guided us towards reflection, and informed us how to in many of the verses of the Noble
Qurʾān. He, the Exalted, said: {Let people then consider their food: [24] how We pour down
rain in abundance [25] and meticulously split the earth open ˹for sprouts˺ [26] causing
grain to grow in it [27] as well as grapes and greens [28] and olives and palm trees [29] and
dense orchards [30] and fruit and fodder— [31] all as ˹a means of˺ sustenance for you and
your animals} [80:24-32].

And He, the Exalted, said: {Do they not see that We single handedly created for them, among
other things, cattle which are under their control? [71] And We have subjected these
˹animals˺ to them, so they may ride some and eat others [72] And they derive from them
other benefits and drinks. Will they not then give thanks?} [36:71-73].

And He, the Exalted, said: {Do people not see that We have created them from a sperm-drop,
then—behold!—they openly challenge ˹Us˺? [77] And they argue with Us—forgetting they
were created—saying, “Who will give life to decayed bones?” [78] Say, ˹O Prophet,˺ “They
will be revived by the One Who produced them the first time, for He has ˹perfect˺
knowledge of every created being [79] ˹He is the One˺ Who gives you fire from green trees,
and—behold!—you kindle ˹fire˺ from them} [36:77-80].
And He, the Exalted, said: {And of His signs are the night and day and the sun and moon. Do
not prostrate to the sun or to the moon, but prostrate to Allāh, who created them, if it
should be Him that you worship} [41:37].

And He, the Exalted, said: {And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and
the diversity of your languages and your colors. Indeed in that are signs for those of
knowledge} [30:22].

And He, the Exalted, said: {Do they not ever reflect on camels—how they were ˹masterfully˺
created [17] and the sky—how it was raised ˹high˺ [18] and the mountains—how they were
firmly set up [19] and the earth—how it was leveled out?} [88:17-20].

And He, the Exalted, said: {Do you not see that Allah sends down rain from the sky with
which We bring forth fruits of different colors? And in the mountains are streaks of
varying shades of white, red, and raven black} [35:27].
Change is Evidence for Contingency

Our Imāms (upon them be peace), and companions (may Allāh be pleased with them) dispute
with the form of change that the Qurʾān disputed with. The point is not that any difference
whatsoever indicates a matter to be contingent, rather it is [the form] of change which
necessitates a matter to be contingent.

In Clarification of that:

If a mountain was high, and it was possible for it to be low, or middle-sized, and upright. Or, it
was possible for it to be flat, and in a certain place, while it was possible for it to be in another
place and rough. Or, it was possible for it to be smooth, and thin while it was possible for it to be
solid, and thick. Or, it was possible for it to be powdery, and white, while it was possible for it to
be black, red, or yellow. Or, it was possible for it to be elevated, or low.

Then, it is impossible for it to be upon any state, or description while having the possibility to be
contrary except through [external] influence. This is because [such influence] would entail being
governed. Therefore, it necessitates that for it there is an originator who chose for it to be this
way.

To Elaborate Further, we say:

If the height of the mountain was a thousand arm spans, while it was possible for it to be five
hundred, three hundred, one hundred, or fifty arm spans, etc. Then, it is not possible for it to be
upon such a chosen state [of one thousand arm spans] except through the influence of someone
[or something] that made it this way.

Likewise, the change in ajsām (material entities), mountains, earth, and the heavens by their
proportions, colors, solidity, looseness, coarseness, softness, and position. For, if it is possible for
every jism to be in a position that is other than it’s [current] position. It is possible for it to be
elevated, low, or contrary [to what it is]. It is possible for it to be tall, short, or contrary [to what
it is,] and likewise is the case with all the Ṣifāt (attributes) which we have mentioned, and
otherwise.

Therefore, anything that is upon a Ṣifa (attribute), while it was possible for it to be otherwise, or
possesses varying aʿrāḍ (accidents) within it - and they are many - and it is possible for any
entity to be different to what it is presently upon. Such as, something that is sour, and [can be]
otherwise, or white, black, red, etc.
This is the form of change which our Imāms have mentioned to be evidence for contingency.
Also, do not forget that a jism is a quiddity under which there are classified types, and forms.
The ʿarḍ is likewise, and the jism is a composition of things, and many entities, and so is the
ʿarḍ. As for the ḍāt (essence) of al-Bārī (the Maker), it is not a quiddity. Rather, it is one existent
which there is nothing like unto it. Therefore, the saying of some of you: It is necessary that there
is nothing like unto the “jism” is incorrect.

However, if you intend that it [the jism] is unlike al-Bārī, then yes, but [if you intend] nothing
being like unto it [the jism]. Then, no.

This is because a jism is a whole, and every particular from the animals is a whole, and every
particular from the inanimate things is also a whole. Every jism, like the rest of the ajsām, it
serves as a receptacle. Considering that it is a possible existent, in a fixed state, contingent, and
conditioned. Likewise the ʿarḍ, it is an entirety which rests upon molecules, it is concordant with
the jism in what we have mentioned, except for it being a receptacle.

Not every difference is evidence for contingency, for the difference between al-Bārī, the Exalted,
and the jism, or ʿarḍ does not indicate contingency, nor is it stipulated from this. Do you not see
that it is impossible for the jism to be a God, for the God to be a jism, nor the ʿarḍ. For, the ʿarḍ
cannot be a jism, nor can the jism become a ʿarḍ. This is because it is a shift between realities, it
is like saying truthfulness is a lie, and vice versa.

It is necessary for a jism to either be in motion, or stationary. In certain instances it is in motion,

and in other instances it is stationary. Motion occurs after being stationary, and being stationary
comes after being in motion. Everything that is after a prior state is contingent, therefore, it is
established that movement, and stillness are contingent.

The jism cannot be indivisible from them, therefore, it necessitates that it is contingent, and by
that every jism is contingent.

As for the aʿrāḍ they are descriptions of the jism, because motion, and stillness is among the
description of the ajsām; so is lust, repulsion, joy, grief, desire, pain, love, color, hardness,
softness, fragility, smoothness, wetness, dryness, sweetness, bitterness, salinity, and acidity. All
of these must necessarily be present within a jism, as well as the remainder of the aʿrāḍ.

By this you will know that the quiddity of the jism, and aʿrḍ undergo change, and by that change
they are necessarily contingent.

al-Bārī is not so, rather He is a single ḍāt, not a quiddity which possesses variances that [He] is
dependent upon, so as to be [rendered] contingent by necessity.
Since the ajsām are contingent, it necessitates that the aʿrāḍ which are present to also be
contingent. Likewise, the jawhar (substance), due to it being a part of the jism. So, if it being
contingent is established, then all of its parts are contingent.

Moreover, the majority of the aʿrāḍ exist after being non-existent, and return to non-existence
after existing. If the contingency of the ajsām, and the aʿrāḍ is established, then it is necessary
that for them there is a originator.

As for the originator [of contingent things]: It is either eternal [and necessary], or contingent. It
cannot be contingent, because it would mean that it relies upon something else that is contingent
which would result in an infinite causal series, or [brute contingency] and both are errant.

As for brute contingency: It requires that we halt at a point without reason, while it is possible to
halt at a different point.

In clarification of that: We stop at the fifth point, and choose it while it is possible to stop at a
point which is less, or more. We cannot stop at a point while it is possible for a different point
without a reason, and this is the meaning of brute contingency.

As for an infinite causal series: It is that we do not stop at a point, and the existence of ajsām,
and aʿrāḍ is fixed upon an end. This would result in its ending - due to the presence of
contingency within it - and not ending - due to the infinite series - and this is a contradiction
which is impossible.

Therefore, if you concede to this, then it is necessary for Him to be eternal. Considering that
there is no evidence for another creator, who is other than this creator. Otherwise, His Books, and
Messengers would have reached us.

Expounding on Allāh, the Exalted, being Capable, Knowledgeable, and Wise

If the creator (necessary being), and His eternality is established, it therefore follows that He is
necessarily capable, this is because the incapable is unable to create. He is also knowledgeable
because the creation beholds mastery, and law, and this is without a doubt.

For, one would not be able to follow the rules of carpentry, sewing, architecture, and calligraphy
except through knowledge of them. We will provide two examples for you, so that you may
deduce from them.
The First: Know that when Allāh, the Exalted, sends forth rain, He does not send it
unexpectedly, or randomly. Rather, He causes the clouds to come together, and form. Then, He
alerts us through thunder, and lightning, so that we may shelter ourselves, our belongings, and
animals. He then sends them as drops which overtake the prairie, and pastures, and then the
torrents flow throughout the valleys. If He were to send it as a torrent from the sky, then it would
be destructive, harmful, and it would not be encompassing.

The Second: The difference between our tongues, and colors in a smaller analogy, and without
numbers. If our images were the same, then great corruption would result. For, the man would
not be able to identify his wife, nor could the woman identify her husband. The son would not be
able to identify his father, nor the father will be able to identify his son. If our tongues were the
same, then the sound of the male, and the female would not differ, and we would not be able to
discern between the voices of men amongst themselves, and women. From there, deduce the
remainder.

All the created things are upon mastery, and wisdom, even if we did not know the wisdom
behind certain particulars. The least case is that when we see the created things, and we see their
vast variety, we then know that it is necessary that for them there is a creator with a will whose
ability, and power reached the highest of extents. For, there must be a being that is differentiated
from them.

The Meaning of Knowledgeable of All Things

As for your saying: What is the evidence for Allāh being knowledgeable of all things?

We say: His saying, the Exalted: {With Him are the keys of the unseen—no one knows them
except Him. And He knows what is in the land and sea. Not even a leaf falls without His
knowledge, nor a grain in the darkness of the earth or anything—green or dry—but is
˹written˺ in a perfect Record} [6:59]. This is the evidence from revelation.

As for the evidence from the intellect:

Allāh is not knowledgeable through knowledge which was bestowed upon Him by other than
Him, so as to be specified with what was given to Him, like our knowledge. It is impossible to
deny the knowledge of Allah, or the remainder of the attributes of the Essence. This is because
His wise acts have indicated them, so they necessitated that He possesses them by His Essence.

Meaning: It is of Him, and from His reality, in the same manner that the reality of truthfulness is
its concordance to reality, and the reality of lying is its in-concordance to reality; they do not
differ with their reality.
So, if knowledge is of Him, and from His reality, then it is impossible for it to not be of Him. If
He were to be unaware of even one single thing, then the attribute of knowledge would differ
with Him.

For, if He were knowledgeable of a matter, and not another would entail being controlled [by a
matter], and specification without a specifier. Therefore, it is necessary that He is either
knowledgeable of all matters, or unaware of all matters.

This is because His knowledge is not an instrument specified by a creator for limited things, and
likewise is the case with the remainder of the attributes.

Existence, hearing, sight, perception of food, smells, tangibles, power, will, wisdom, and life are
all eternal.

The intent is not that He has tools, or that His essence is a tool. Nor is it meant that perception
occurs to Him, this is because it necessarily entails that He was not aware before. Rather, what is
intended is that: The matters of perception from those which are heard, seen, tasted, smelled, and
touched are never hidden from Him, and He is an eternal being that is compelled by nothing.

This is the meaning of the saying of our Imāms (upon them be peace): His attributes are His
essence.

So, by being eternal nothing is missed by Him, for He is aware of all that is heard, seen, tasted,
smelled, and touched through eternity while they were non-existing. A truth cannot be while it is
non-existent, and this is what is perceived through the five senses.

So, all that remains is the meaning of knowing, and it follows that it is [to be understood]
allegorically, and likewise are the attributes of the essence; other than knowledgeable, and
powerful. However, it is through a different instrument, because it is not necessary with Him for
those which are known, and capable to exist. As for all-Hearing, and to it’s like, it is necessary
for all that is audible to be existing. Otherwise, the matter is allegorical, and so are the remainder.

Benefit: All the attributes of Allāh cannot be negated, and likewise is the case with power, life,
and existence. It is impossible for them to be negated from Him.

For, it is impossible for Him to cease to exist, to be unable to do what is [logically] possible, to
die, to be non-existent. All His attributes are contrary to their negatives, meaning: They are the
opposites of them, because it cannot be established that there are other eternals with Allāh.
For, it would necessitate that what is established for Him is established for them, due to the
absence of a specifier. Therefore, it would necessitate that they also be gods, and this is the
meaning behind the saying of our Imāms: His attributes are His essence, meaning: There is only
the essence.

The meaning of the attributes: All-Hearing, and All-Seeing in respect to Allah, the Exalted

If it is said: We differ between what we hear, see, and our knowledge of them

It is said to him: The knowledge of Allāh is not like our knowledge, do you not see that Allāh
knows what is tasted, and what is smelled without tasting, or smelling? Likewise, the case with
what is heard, and seen, because they are all apprehended with the five senses.

If it is said: One of us is described with hearing and sight even when what is heard, and seen is
not present. Such as the case of someone being present in darkness.

It is said to him: What is meant regarding us is that we have instruments of hearing, and seeing
which are sound, and we are able to listen through them. We are able to perceive whenever an
audible, or visual matter presents itself.

For Allāh there isn’t an instrument which He uses to hear, or see, nor is it possible [to postulate]
that an instance of realization occurs to him. This is because it is an ʿarḍ, and it cannot occur
within Him, for a matter cannot be changed within Him. For, it is a part of His reality, and
existence. There can be no difference with Him, rather He is eternal. So, His description of it,
with its lack of presence, or with its presence is the same.

Allāh, the Exalted, is not susceptible to Aʿrāḍ

If you acknowledge this, then know: For Allāh, the Exalted, Aʿrāḍ cannot be a part of Him. For,
they are from the attributes of bodies, and if they were a part of Him, then He would become a
vessel for them. If the matter was such, then He would be limited, and fixated. If [He is such],
then He would need a fixer to [explain] the limitation placed. As it has already been mentioned,
every fixated thing requires a matter that explains its fixation.

Lust, irregularity, desire, pain, sadness, joy, chagrin, rest, and harm cannot be a part of Him. So,
it necessitates, and is established that He is not needy. This is because neediness is confined to
either garnering a benefit, or avoiding a harmful thing.
The Acts of Allāh, the Exalted

Therefore, He does not do anything, save what is wise, and of benefit. This is because the one
who acts with knowledge does not act unless there is a reason that calls for action, as for the
reason of need it is not applicable to Him. So, what remains is the reason of wisdom, and benefit.
For, He does not do what is purposeless, and all shortcomings, and injustices are abstained from
Him. This is because He is knowledgeable of their injustice, and does not need to act upon them,
while they also waiver His completeness, exaltedness, and might.

On the Will

Know that the ʿAdlīyya maintain that the attributes of the essence are all metaphorical, except for
All-Knowledgeable, and All-Powerful. However, without an instrument. Those who have went
on to say that the will is an ʿarḍ which is not confined to an area, then they are not held to
Tashbīh (anthropomorphism), rather they are held to [claiming] what is impossible.

What is outstanding is their saying: If the will was an attribute of the essence, then it would
necessitate that it would include all that is willed, so it would include all injustices.

Are not injustices detestable, and what is detestable is against the will? Allāh, the Exalted, said:
{All that - its evil is ever, in the sight of your Lord, detested} [17:38]. With what evidence
does one say that Allāh created the will without a place, and there cannot be a description of it
unless it was established within Him. For, any attribute cannot be maintained for anyone if they
were not of Him.

And what is outstanding is their saying: Allāh created for Himself wills that are equal to the
number of the creation, to every act there is a will, and it is not wanted! Isn’t it more plausible to
say that He created the creation themselves without a will? The difference is determinism.

The Difference between Taqlīd, and following the Ahl al-Bayt

If you acknowledge that He, the Exalted, cannot send a lying Messenger, then Allāh, the Exalted,
has sent our Prophet Muḥammad (upon him and his Ahl al-Bayt be peace). Towards his Ahl
al-Bayt one is not a Muqallid (blind follower), rather one is acting upon what Allāh, and His
Messenger ordered. He, the Exalted, said: {Allah only wishes to remove uncleanness from
you, O members of the (Prophet's) household, and to purify you completely} [33:33]. The
intent isn’t that the uncleanliness of physical impurities is removed from them, such as urine,
excrement, blood, commit, etc. For, they and others [from the humans] are equal.

Therefore, understand the difference between Taqlīd, and between following the evidence.
For, Taqlīd is: Following the saying of other than oneself without proof, whereas following the
Prophet (upon him and his Ahl al-Bayt be peace) and his Ahl al-Bayt is established by proof, and
is not Taqlīd because it is by the order of Allāh. He, the Exalted, said: {Whoever obeys the
Messenger has truly obeyed Allah. But whoever turns away, then ˹know that˺ We have not
sent you ˹O Prophet˺ as a keeper over them} [4:80].

And His saying, the Blessed, the Exalted: {And whatever the Messenger has given you - take;
and what he has forbidden you - refrain from. And fear Allāh; indeed, Allāh is severe in
retribution} [59:7]. And His saying, the Exalted: {And whoever defies the Messenger after
guidance has become clear to them and follows a path other than that of the believers, We
will let them pursue what they have chosen, then burn them in Hell—what an evil end!}
[4:115].

So, He who takes his religion from other than the Ahl al-Bayt, even if he was from the Ahl
al-Bayt, then it is not from their Maẓhab if they did not profess it. For, not every man from
among them is an authority, let alone if he forsakes the position of his forefathers, and Salaf;
unless it was a matter of semantics, or a linguistic understanding that does not entail
anthropomorphism, determinism, [or injustice] then there is no problem.

A Refutation of the one who holds to the particular attribute

As for the one who says that for Allāh there is an attribute which maintains His four attributes,
we don’t deny that Allāh is specified with being eternal, rather all the ʿAdlīyya maintain this.

However, their saying: The Qadrīyya, ʿAlamīyya, Ḥayyīya, and the Wujūdīyya necessitated that
matter for Him. If by that they intend eternality, which is never ending existence, then how does
a thing require its own existence?

It is as if they want from this special [and distinct] attribute a fifth attribute, they don’t know
what it is, nor do they have evidence for it.

As for us we say: The attributes of Allāh are the attributes of the essence, He only possesses
them, and nothing shares them with Him save through terminology.

Know that: Some of the Muʿtazilah, and those who share their saying say: What pertains to will,
knowledge, and life indicate for their companion certain attributes, and they are: That he has
power, and so one. At times they describe it as al-ʿAlamīyya (knowledgeability), al-Qādirīyya
(ability), and so on, and that these attributes are not of an act.
Meaning: They are not a result of an act, but by a cause, and that cause is knowledge, ability, and
so on. They argue for this saying that if it were from an act, then it would be possible to negate
them with the cause remaining. So, the ability would be negated, while what was caused from
the ability would remain. For, if what is necessary is negated, then so is its necessity.

The answer is: To negate it is to negate the cause, so the negation of ability is negation of power.
This is because ability is that which occurs, is established, or present. To negate this attribute is
to negate it.

What appears from the words of al-Amīr al-Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn (upon him be peace) in
al-Yanābīʿ, is that the one who uses the description of: Powerful, and knowledgeable is not the
one who has given themselves these attributes, and this is agreed upon. For, the one who is
already powerful cannot give to themselves this attribute of being powerful. This is because the
one who is unable cannot give to themselves what they are unable of ascertaining, if one is
powerful then it is not possible to earn what is already present, because seeking to have what one
already has is impossible, and it results in an infinite regression.

This is because he cannot give to himself ability unless he was already able, and he cannot be
able unless he gives to himself this attribute which is being able. However, it is not necessary to
be one who is [ontologically] unless it is Allāh, the Glorious, the Exalted, and Allāh has said:
{We therefore endowed him with hearing and sight} [76:2].

This Naṣṣ is open to dispute, because hearing to them is not the same as listening, and likewise
perceiving, and that seeing is what affects perception. The linking between both do not
necessitate [juxtaposition]: Such possessing ability - for the sake of argument - and ability; when
it ceases to have ability it does not mean that ability affected it, and that it is reason for such, in
the same manner that the [causal] relationship between fatherhood, and sonship does not
necessitate [dependency].

Whenever one of them halts in face of the other, it does not follow that each one had an effect on
one another. Nor is it such when it comes to movement, or inertia, and the contingency from
what is described of them. It does not follow that they are the reason for contingency, so [causal]
relation is an indication, not an explanation [for contingency].

Considering that fatherhood is other than sonship is that which there is no doubt of, in spite of
ability, and capacity. It is not sound to say that sonship affects fatherhood, or vice versa. This is
because it necessitates that each is preliminary to the other, even if it was in terms of hierarchy as
they claim, and I don’t think that anyone claims such, considering that causality is not related to
negating fatherhood, or sonshop after their occurrence, and [instead] relates to negating ability,
and capacity.
If you reflect upon their speech, you will know the meaning of ability, and what relates to it. And
it is that its beholder has power, meaning: Capability is established for him, or the gaining of it.
If you have reflected upon this matter, then you will have concluded that their speech is of great
errancy. Is one to postulate that ability itself is what established itself to he who is described by
it? That it established itself for him, and brought itself out of existence for him?

We do not accept that there is an attribute other than what is tied to knowledge, and power. This
is because they are what their beholder is grounded, and from it receives praise, and exaltation,
or vilification, and humiliation. That which describes is referred to as the predicate, and it is
referred to as the predicate because it maintains for what is being described what we have
mentioned. Likewise, the case with predication, because it is a decree upon its companion, and a
means of establishing the attribute for what it describes.

What is astounding is the saying of one of you: For the jism there is a particular attribute which
affects its ability in being a receptacle, and the particular attribute is a receptacle. How can it,
therefore, affect itself? It is like the saying of the Muʿtazilah: Ability has an effect on ability, and
ability establishes the ability to He who is able, does the ability affirm itself?

Likewise their saying: For Allāh there is a particular attribute which grounds the four attributes
of ability, knowledge, liveliness, and existence. This particular attribute is eternality, which is
neverending existence. He was not associated with this matter by anything, so how can existence
establish existence?

If they intend another attribute they don’t have evidence for it, or for its necessity. We do not
accept the proposition that He has an attribute which has attributes, and we don’t intend for
eternality to hold any [particular] attribute.

Benefit: Know that the attribute of the essence is what does not contradict what it is predicated
upon, nor does that which is predicated leave. So, if the predicate is eternal, it is eternal.
Otherwise, it would follow that it contradicts it. If the predicate was contingent it is contingent, if
it necessitated an explanation, then it too necessitates an explanation. This is because
contingency requires an explanation, due to there being no demarcation between a contingent
thing, and another contingent thing.

And it can be said: Did Allāh create the jism without the attribute of being a receptacle, or did He
create it with that attribute?
If one chooses the first, then being receptacle ceases to be a description of the essence, because it
has differed with its predicate. So, what you claim for it cannot be established. If you choose the
latter, then you concede to us that Allāh is He who originated it.

Conclusion:

It is notable to mention that your concern with proof has become so great that it has become
peculiar, to the extent that it has caused you to accuse others of having blind faith in the creator.
Whereas, the evidence may be known with the slightest reflection. To the extent that it is not far
to say that it has becomes a necessary fact [of reality,] reflect over the argument of Ibrahim (upon
him be the blessings of Allāh) when he states: {‘It is my Lord who gives life and death,’ he
said, ‘I too give life and death.’ So Abraham said, ‘God brings the sun from the east; so
bring it from the west.’ The disbeliever was dumbfounded} [2:258]. For, in the rising, and
setting of the sun therein is a lamp for the entire world which does not err a single day. It is what
indicates a creator, who does not need anything other than it.

Let alone what we see from the creation of the animals, trees, various fruits, and seasons. Reflect
over these matters which are certain for the human in the least exertion of reflection, rather
alongside them we are compelled to believe in a creator. And what we advise you with is that the
Muslims have believed in Allah as a Lord, and Muḥammad His Prophet; that he does not speak
on his own accord. What he has come with is from Allah, and he has informed us that the Ahl
al-Bayt are with the truth, and the Qurʾān, like the ark of Noah.

So, reflect over what those who preceded reached a consensus on, for if you were to know their
evidence, and were knowledgeable of them then you have succeeded. Otherwise, know that you
are errant, and they are accurate, as per the decree of the Messenger of Allāh (upon him and his
Ahl al-Bayt be peace), and he did not guide us to other than them. Therefore, their saying is a
proof which one is obligated to follow, in the same manner that the Qurʾān is a proof which one
is obligated to follow, not by blind faith, but rather through expanding upon the logical proofs
that negate opposition, and nullify what the philosophers, naturalists, atheists, and other variant
groups have held to.

As for ourselves, only their statements are sufficient, because it is the religion of Allāh, so if we
oppose them, then we will accuse ourselves of errancy.

Reflect on the Qurʾānic evidence, and what is within it, and it is His saying, the Exalted:
{Indeed, Allah is the One Who causes seeds and fruit stones to sprout} [6:95]. Until His
saying: {Indeed, in these are signs for people who believe} [6:99].
The verses from Ṣūrah al-Anʿām have guided us towards reflection, and Allāh has guided us
towards the Ahl al-Bayt, He did not guide us towards the Muʿtazilah. We agree with the
Muʿtazilah with what they have agreed with us, only. They have generally agreed with us
regarding ʿAdl, and Tawḥīd, not in every nuance.

As for those who follow them from the Ahl al-Bayt, they are not an authority, because what is
binding is their consensus. We have clarified that matter sufficiently in our book al-Qawl
al-Sadīd. We ask that you reflect over all that we have said.

For, benefit arrives after repeated reflection. This is what we have been able to provide, due to
the extensiveness of work, and the problems which muddle the mind, and occupy the thoughts.
We ask Allāh that is beneficial for my believing brothers, exclusive to His Noble Visage, a
means of munition for the day of recompense.

There is no power, nor strength, save through Allah. The Elevated, the Exalted. May the peace,
and blessings of Allāh be upon our master Muḥammad, and his purified household. Praise be to
Allāh Lord of the Worlds.