REPUBLIC V. CA 135 SCRA 156 (1985)
ALECHA 135 SCRA 427 (1985)
FACTS: In 1961, CFI Quezon upheld the registration of a parcel of
land in the names of Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Moreles.
1. Subsequently, OCT was issued covering the same. In 1969,
the Republic filed a petition to annul said decision citing that
the land in question are part of unclassified public forest and
the possessory information title relied upon the Maxino
spouses covered only 29 hectares and not 885 hectares.
2. CA dismissed the petition on the account that the decision
had become final and unappealable.
ISSUE: WON the certificate of title issued to spouses Maxino is valid
HELD: It is incontestable that the subject property registered by the
Maxinos, is within the public forest and as such, not alienable and
disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in
the public forest was certified by the Director of Forestry in July 1940.
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos that is a Spanish title is
untenable. First, the composition title is spurious based on the facts
alone as it appears the alleged deed of absolute sale is but a quit-
claim. Also, it is axiomatic that public forestral lands is not subject to
registration. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during
the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. As
such, possession of public foresrtal lands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership.
UMBAY V.
FACTS: Natalio Enanoria owned a parcel of land (Lot no. 5280) with
OCT 10933 issued in 1922.
1. He died in 1924. In 1963, the heirs of Enanoria asked a
surveyor to relocate the lot; they discovered that the said
property was occupied by Placido Alecha, the owner of the
adjoining lot. Despite demands to vacate the subject
property, spouses Alecha refused to do so.
2. As a result, the heirs of Enanoria filed a complaint against
Alecha, alleging that the latter had usurped their property.
3. The trial court held in favor of the Enannorias however upon
appeal, CA reversed the decision and dismission the
complaint of the Enanoria heirs.
ISSUE: Is the complaint of the heirs of Enanoria barred by
prescription ?
HELD: The SC held that Enanoria’s complaint does not prescribe nor
is it barred by laches. Sec 46 of the Land Registration Law (now Sec
47 of the Property Registration Decree PD 1529 effective June 11,
1978) provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but
also his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the
shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to
stop forever any question as to its legality. “Once a title is registered,
the owner may rest secure, and avoid the possibility of losing his
land.”
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Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a
Torrens title has been issued for it. The right to recover possession of
registered lands is imprescriptible because possession is merely a
consequence of ownership.
In the present case, the petitioners’ action to recover the subject
property cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or
delay because they became aware of the encroachment only
after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true boundaries
of the subject property.
PNB V. CA 153 SCRA 435 (1987)
FACTS: During his lifetime, Clodualdo Vitug married twice: Gervacia
Flores with whom he had 3 children: Victor, Lucina and Julio. Victor
is survived by 5 children: Leonardo, Juan, Candida Francisco and
Donaciano.
1. Juan is survived by his only daughter Florencia. Donata
Montemayor was the 2nd wife with whom he had 8 children:
Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencia,
Anunciacion, Enrique and Francisco. Francisco is survived by
11 children.
2. Clodualdo died intestate in May 1929 and a special
proceeding named Donata Montemayor as the
administratrix.
3. In November 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son,
Salvador Vitug, mortgaged several parcels of land covered
by TCT 2289 in favor of PNB to guarantee a loan granted by
the bank to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the
amount of P40,900.
4. Donata also mortgaged other properties (TCT 2887-88) in
favor of the same bank to guarantee the payment of a loan
her son made in the amount of P35,200. All TCTs of the
subject properties were in the name of Donata
Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow and a resident of
Lubao Pampanga and were free from all liens and
encumbrances.
5. Salvador Vitug failed to pay his loan so the bank foreclosed
the mortgaged properties and were sold at a public auction
in May 1968 to PNB who was the highest bidder. The titles
thereto were consolidated in the name of PNB. Likewise,
Jaramilla and Bacani failed to settle their loans with the
bank so the latter foreclosed the mortgaged properties
which were sold at a public action. PNB was the highest
bidder. In August 1968, a new title was issued in PNB’s name.
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 6. In 1969, PNB sold the properties (TCT 2887-88) to Jesus Vitug,
Anunciacion de Guzman, Prudencia Fajardo, Salvador Vitug
and Aurora Guttierez.
7. In May 1970, Pragmacio and Maximo file an action for
partition and reconveyance before CFI Pampanga against
Marcelo Mendiola as the special administrator of the
intestate estate of Donata, their siblings, the heirs of
Francisco, and PNB. Both claim that the subject properties
were conjugal properties of spouses Donata and Clodualdo
of which they claim a share of 2/11 of ½ thereof. They
assailed the mortgage to PNB and public auction of said
properties were null and void. Lower court dismissed the
complaint. CA reversed the lower court’s decision and held
in favor of brothers Pragmacio and Maximo.
ISSUE: Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired
by the spouses during coverture provided for in art 160 NCC apply
to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of
the widow?
HELD: In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor,
the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of
title and no more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata
Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor
question the status of said registered owner and her ownership
thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the
same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
make such inquiry.
A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land
covered by a final degree of registration. Once the title is registered
the owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into
the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid
the possibility of losing his land.
The presumption stipulated in Art. 160 does not apply in this case
because it appears on the face of the title that the properties were
acquired by Donata when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this
is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title
of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a
mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgages covering
said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw
of the title of the mortgagor. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the
conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the
mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata
Montemayor without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or
co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at
public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith.
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BORNALES V. IAC 166 SCRA 519 (1988)
Also, Bornales had been a tenant of the Dumulong’s. He is aware
FACTS: In 1927, Sixto Dumulong and his legal wife Isabel Marquez- that Placida was not Sixto’s legal spouse and that it was Isabel who
Dumulong were awarded a parcel of land in Capiz (OCT 6161). has a rightful claim over the land. He should have not bought the
Sixto and Isabel had no children and lived separately since 1920. land from Placida, considering his knowledge of the fact that
1. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited with Placida, who even used Placida could not have own any portion of the land since she was
Sixto’s surname, and had several children. not a legal wife.
2. In March 1978, Placida and her children executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property involving
the subject property. Said property was sold in favor of
spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong.
3. They were able to acquire the supposed thumbmark of
Isabel. But apparently, Isabel never affixed her thumbmark
and that the same was not within her knowledge.
4. In November 1978, Placida registered the Deed and a
Torrens title was issued in their name. Three months
thereafter, Placida and her children sold the land to
Bornales. Isabel assailed the sale.
5. Isabel argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by
Placida et al was through fraud. Bornales countered he was
not aware of the fraudulent nature of the prior transactions,
but since a Torrens was issued he should be considered as a
buyer in good faith, hence entitled to some right.

ISSUE: May Bornales invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title?

HELD: No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens
system from Placida who procured title thereto by means of fraud,
Bornales cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title
against Isabel to the extent of her interest therein. Torrens system of
land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property. Registration, to be
effective, must be made in good faith. It is a settled rule that the
defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a
transferee (Bornales) who takes it with notice of the flaws in his
transferor's (Placida’s) title.

Page | 4
PNB V. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, 199 SCRA 508 (1991) original registration of title to lands, including improvements and
interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original registration
FACTS: Petitioner PNB filed with RTC Alaminos, Pangasinan a petition of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance such applications or petitions.
annotated upon its 16 TCTS
1. Petitioner alleged that spouses Balingit executed a real Sec 2 of PD 1529 removed the distinction between the general
estate mortgage in favor of PNB to secure a loan the jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
spouses obtained from PNB jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law (Act 496) when
2. Annotated subsequent to the memoranda of the mortgage acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of
lien of PNB is a “notice of levy re Civil Case Continental Bank suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings for “original
v. Spouses Balingit) for a total sum of P96,636.1 at the back registration” but also “over all petitioners filed after original
of the TCTs registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
3. Since the spouses defaulted on their loan with PNB, the bank arising upon such applications or petitions. Clearly, therefore, that
extra-judicially foreclosed the 16 parcels of land. The sheriff’s the lower court had ample jurisdiction to decide the instant case
certificate of sale was registered on April 3, 1972 filed by PNB.
4. Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption
period, PNB consolidated in its name the ownership of the
subject properties and a new TCT was issued in its name.
however, the notice of levy in favor of Continental Bank
(now ICB) was carried over and now appears as the sole
encumbrance in the new titles of PNB
5. Subsequently, ICB, as successor in interest of Continental
Bank, filed an opposition alleging that since it was not
aware of the extrajudicial foreclosure, the new and
consolidated titles in favor of PNB are null and void
6. RTC Alaminos denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction
7. Petitioner appealed to CA averring that RTC erred in ruling
(1) there is an adverse claim or serious objection on the part
of the oppositor render the case controversial and as such,
should be threshed out in an ordinary case; and (2) it has no
jurisdiction over the case

ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over petitions filed under Sec 108 of
Property Registration Act
HELD: Yes. Under Sec 2 PD 1529, RTCs acting as land registration
courts now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over applications for

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VIAJAR V. CA 168 SCRA 405 (1988)
FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of
Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay
Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sqm., TCT T-21940 of the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the
registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot
7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.
1. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his
wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for
P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in Viajar’s name.
2. Later, Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out
that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused.
The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay
Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089
sqm.; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot
7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that
the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in
the possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms.,
which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per
cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of
Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual
physical possession of Lot 7340.
3. On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a
civil action for recovery of possession and damages against
Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo.
Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer with a
counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer.
4. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead
Rosendo Te as another defendant. The Viajars sought the
annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the
purchase price with interest in the event the possession of
defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to the
amended complaint and he counterclaimed for damages.
The Viajars answered the counterclaim.
5. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights
over Lot 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F.
Viajar. For this reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the
sole registered owner of the lot.
6. On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was substituted in
the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children,
namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and
Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants.
7. After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint
which included damages was admitted. On 10 December
1981, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido,
dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with
costs against them, declaring Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes
Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido
as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in
the sketch plan situated in barangays Cawayan and
Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of
25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as owners of the land,
the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof.
ISSUE: WON the change in the Suague river was gradual
HELD: The presumption is that the change in the course of the river
was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Cañas
vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason,
53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the present
case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced
by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the Suague
River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear
and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for
many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of
Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so
that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares),
more or less, had been added to Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot
Page | 6
B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The
established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot 7511
was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of
more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant
gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of
the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to
alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose
tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The
quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years.
The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of
any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the
banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil
Code which took effect on 30 August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94
Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots
A and B belong to the Ladridos.
Section 45 of Act 496 provides that “the obtaining of a decree of
registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded
as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the
applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and
always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this
Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act
provides that “No title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession."
owners of the estates bordering thereon.” Accretions of that
character are natural incidents to land bordering on running
streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that
registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of
the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream. Similarly in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it
was ruled that if the land in question has become part of one’s
estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs
to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to
another's estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title,
cannot preclude the former from being the owner thereof.
Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code;
Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land
bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in
that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.

The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect
the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his
registered land through gradual changes in the course of an
adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co.
vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that Article 366 of the Civil Code
provides that “any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the

Page | 7
CORONEL V. CA,173 SCRA 26 (1987) The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
FACTS: Petitioner Coronel filed a complaint for recover of possession certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further.
of a parcel of land registered in his name. The complaint was filed There is, however, a countervailing doctrine, that mitigates the iron-
against private respondents Merlan et al clad application of the principle attaching full faith and credit to a
1. Coronel alleged that when he purchased the subject Torrens title. It is inspired by the highest concept of what is fair and
property, private respondents were already occupying a what is equitable.
portion thereof as “tenants at all” and the latter refused the
vacate the premises despite demands The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens
2. Private respondents, on the other hand, averred that the system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all
portion they occupied formed 1/3 undivided share which the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the
they had inherited and that they never sold their 1/3 share Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight, land which
3. Third-party defendants Novelo et al, denied that they had cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by
sold the entire property, they claimed that they only sold virtue of said certificate aloe, become the owner of the lands
their 2/3 undivided share in the property included.
4. It appears that the subject property was part of a bigger
estate which was inherited by Lontoc. When Lontoc died, The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private
the property was inherited by: children of Enrique Merlan respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not
(Bernardino Merlan), children of Gabriel Merlan (Jose inscribed in the Torrens title of the subject property.
Merlan) and the children of Francisca Merlan (Anuat)
5. In 1950, Bernardino and the Anuats sold their 2/3 undivided
share to spouses Manalo
6. Spouses Manalo, in turn, sold their share to Mariano Manalo.
A new TCT was then issued in the name of Mariano. The TCT
covered the whole property without any mention of the 1/3
share of the private respondents which was not sold to them
7. Relying on the TCT of Mariano Manalo, petitioner Coronel
purchased the subject property for P27,000 and a new TCT
was issued in his name

ISSUE: WON Coronel is the owner of the subject property

HELD: No. Coronel’s ownership only pertains to the 2/3 undivided

share which he purchased from Mariano Manalo.

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GOLLOY V. CA 173 SCRA 26 (1989)
FACTS: Petitioner Golloy has been, for more than 20 years, the
registered owner and in possession of a parcel of land covered by
TCT 45764. The southwest boundary is owned by private respondents
covered by certificate of title 8565. Sometime in 1966, private
respondents subdivided their land among themselves and in the
course of doing so, private respondents had placed 2 monuments
in the southwest portion of the petitioner’s land. As a result,
petitioner Golloy filed an action to quiet title (claim ownership over
a real property) before the CFI Tarlac.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss with counterclaim,
denying Golloy’s allegation and maintained that they merely
subdivided their own property and as such, Golloy had no cause of
action.
During the pre-trial both parties agreed that the question of the
boundaries of their respective properties could be resolved by
appointing a surveyor to relocate the disputed area.
In May 1968, Jovino Dauz, the surveyor of the Bureau of Lands,
reported the following:
1. Petitioner’s land is Lot A of the subdivision plan, Psd-1413,
being a portion of the land described in OCT 126 in the
name of Augustin Golloy. The land under OCT 126 was
surveyed on Mar 1918 and subsequently titled in 1919
2. Private respondents’ land is Lot no. 1, 11-8218 in the name of
Domingo Balanga, which was surveyed on Mar 1913 and
originally titled and registered on Mar 1918
3. There is overlapping on the boundaries which was due to
the defect in the survey on petitioner’s since it did not duly
conform with the previously approved of survey of Lot 1, 11-
3218 under OCT 8565
4. Private respondents’ land, TCT 8565, prevails over petitioner’s
land since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
Trial court held in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed the
same.
ISSUE: Between the two title holders, who is entitled to the land in
question?
HELD: Petitioner Golloy is entitled to the disputed portion of land. It is
undisputed that that Balanga’s property was surveyed and titled
earlier than Golloy’s. Having been surveyed and thereafter
registered, monuments were placed therein to indicate their
respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive that the private
respondents’ predecessor Balanga, believing that she has a rightful
claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move to
question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily
objected to the placement and point out that the placements of
the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her
property. However, no such objections were made. As such, it may
be construed that Balanga never believed that she has a right and
legal claim to the overlapped portion.
Considering that the petitioner and his predecessors have in
continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost 50
years (from 1919 when it was registered to 1966 when the dispute
ensued), the private respondents are guilty of laches.
Mere possession of certificate of title under Torrens System is not
conclusive as to the holder’s true ownership of all the property
described therein for he does by virtue of said c certificate alone
become the owner of the land illegally included.
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REPUBLIC V. CA, 83 SCRA 453 (1978)
FACTS: Both Republic and respondents de Ocampo and Anglo
claim ownership of the subject parcel of land.
1. Republic claims that said properties were bequeathed to
the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) by
the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. Said properties
were already registered under the Torrens system in the
name of Meerkamp & Co prior to being acquired by
Jalandoni
2. Respondent de Ocampo based his claim on an application
for registration of the same. He claimed the lots were
unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by
virtue of a donation from one Luis Mosquera
3. Respondent Anglo allegedly purchased the same from De
Ocampo in 1966
carries no persuasive force, and may be completely disregarded if
the trial court acted without jurisdiction.
As held in Reyes v. Borbon: When the attention of the court of land
registration is called to the fact that the same land has been
registered in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of the
said court to order and investigation of that fact and should be
done even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud has
been committed during the double registration. When it is
established that the same has been registered in the name of two
different persons, the title should remain in the name of the person
securing the first registration. The very purpose of the Torrens system
would be destroyed fi the same land may be subsequently brought
under a second action for registration.

ISSUE: WON the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the

application for land registration of De Ocampo on the ground that
said properties were already registered under the Torrens system
before 1919

HELD: No. Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court

is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already registered in an earlier registration case, and that the
second decree entered for the same land is null and void. If there is
no valid and final judgment by the land registration to speak of,
then the filing of an admittedly late appear from the decision
denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no
moment insofar as these proceedings are concerned in view of the
congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision
decreeing for the second time, the registration of the same lots in
favor of De Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of
Meerkamp & Co. Jurisprudence holds that that the appellant’s
failure to perfect an appeal on time, although ordinarily decisive,

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