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2. ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO, et. al.

G.R. No. 156358


August 17, 2011
CASE DIGEST by: TALAGA, Regina Carla T.

FACTS:

 On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila initiated an ejectment action in the MTCC in Bacolod
City against multiple defendants, including the respondents, to evict them from his
properties.
 Domingo Pahila passed away during the proceedings, and his surviving spouse, Angelina
Pahila-Garrido, was substituted as the petitioner.
 Two groups of defendants emerged with different defenses: one group claimed to be
agricultural tenants on the land, while the second group argued that the plaintiff's title was
invalid as their portions were on foreshore land.
 MTCC rendered a decision on March 17, 1999, in favor of the petitioner, ordering the
defendants to vacate the properties. The RTC affirmed the decision on September 22, 1999.
 Only the second group appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was
foreshore land. The CA dismissed their appeal on December 6, 1999.
 Respondents appealed to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458),
but the Court rejected their recourse on July 19, 2000.

Post-Appeal Events:

 On February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in
property descriptions.
 Writ of execution was issued on April 5, 2000, and duly served on August 24, 2000, to all
defendants, including the respondents.
 On April 20, 2001, respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, citing a
supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ was foreshore land belonging to the
State.
 MTCC denied the motion on May 4, 2001, and rejected the motion for reconsideration on
June 8, 2001.

RTC Proceedings:

 On October 1, 2001, more than a year after the writ of execution, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari in the RTC, seeking to reverse and annul the MTCC's orders.
 On October 11, 2001, the RTC granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the
execution of the writ pending trial.
 On November 12, 2002, the RTC issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction, enjoining
further implementation of the writ of execution until final determination of the case.

Petitioner's Contentions:

The petitioner (Angelina Pahila-Garrido) filed a petition for review on certiorari directly with the
Supreme Court to annul the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC.
Contention: The RTC improperly issued the injunction against the execution of a final and
executory judgment, and the respondents had no existing right to be protected by injunction.
ISSUE:

a. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002 order of
the RTC; and
b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory March 17, 1999
decision of the MTCC.

RULING:

The SC gives due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari.

The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO and the writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the final and executory decision
of the MTCC.

I.

The order dated November 12, 2002, granting the application for the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters, and the trial on the merits is yet to be held. The test to determine if an order is
interlocutory is whether it leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case. Since the order in question did not completely dispose of the case but left something
else to be decided upon, it was interlocutory.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject to appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

II.

The Court treats the present recourse as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Certiorari is a remedy against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, which has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following elements must concur: 1) the respondent
exercised judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) the respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC does not preclude treating
the petition as a petition for certiorari. Exceptions to the requirement of exhaustion of remedies
exist, such as when there is a need to prevent irreparable damages, when the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised judgment, or when there may be danger of a failure of
justice.

The petition was timely filed within the 60-day period allowed by Rule 65. The rules of procedure
should be liberally construed to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
III.

The March 17, 1999 Decision of the MTCC, being already final and executory, could not be
assailed; nor could its execution be restrained.

The respondents' attempt to challenge the final and executory decision of the MTCC through a
petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was improper. The decision had already become final and
executory, and the respondents were precluded from further delaying its execution through dilatory
schemes.

The principle of immutability of final judgments must be applied against the respondents. They
could not be permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through the
interposition of new petitions or pleadings.

Equitable remedies, such as a petition to annul the judgment based on extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment, are no longer available to the
respondents since the time for such remedies has passed.

IV.

The RTC Judge's issuance of the TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted
manifestly grave abuse of discretion.

A. Respondents had no existing right violated by the implementation of the writ of execution

Injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted to protect actual and existing substantial rights. The
respondents failed to establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by injunction. They
did not hold any enforceable claim in the property subject to the MTCC decision and the writ of
execution. The classification of the property as foreshore land by the DENR conferred no interest
or right upon the respondents. The issuance of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was
arbitrary and whimsical, as injunction protects only an existing right or actual interest in property.

B. TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction were wrongfully issued for an indefinite
period

The RTC Judge violated procedural rules by making the TRO effective until further orders from
him. This contravened Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly stated that the life
span of a TRO was only 20 days from service on the party or person to be enjoined. The RTC
Judge's disregard for this basic rule amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure. The
issuance of the TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction for an indefinite period was a
wrongful exercise of power and showed a lack of restraint, as injunction should be granted
sparingly and only where the reason and necessity for such relief are clearly established.

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