election is considered as an election
ELECTION LAW protest;
(Case Digest Compilation)
#2 BANAGA, JR. vs. COMELEC G.R. No.
134696, July 31, 2000
RULING:
FACTS:
 Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent
Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for
vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in
the May 1998 election. In said election,
respondent Bernabe Jr was proclaimed
as winner.
 Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner
filed with the COMELEC, a Petition to
Declare Failure of Elections and/or for
Annulment of Elections, alleging that
said election was replete with election
offenses, such as vote buying and flying
voters, as well as for altered, falsified or
fabricated election returns.
 There were people arrested who
admitted the said election offenses and
declared by the COMELEC failure of
election as sufficient proof.
 Petitioner Banaga, Jr. prayed that he
should be adjudged as the duly elected
Vice-Mayor but was denied by the
COMELEC. However, the election
tribunal concluded that based on the
allegations of the petitions, it is clear
that an election took place and that it did
not result in a failure to elect and
therefore, cannot be viewed as an
election protest.
 Petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari
that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion for dismissing his
petition motu propio without any basis
whatsoever and without giving him the
benefit of a hearing.
ISSUES:
1. WON petition to declare a failure of
elections and/or for annulment of
2. WON respondent COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners petition, in the light of
petitioners foregoing contentions.
1. The SC ruled that Mr. Banaga’s petition
before the COMELEC was a special
action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure. An election protest is an
ordinary governed by Rule 20 on
ordinary actions, while a petition to
declare failure of elections is covered by
Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner
also did not comply with the
requirements for filing an election
protest such as failing to pay filing fee
and cash deposits for an election
protest.
2. NO. The SC ruled that the petition to
declare a failure of election and/or to
annul election results must show on its
face that the conditions necessary to
declare a failure to elect are present.
There are three instances where a failure
of election may be declared, namely: (a)
the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes; (b) the
election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law
for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in
a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes. In the present
case, the instances being not present in
the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The
respondent COMELEC have no other
recourse but to dismiss the petition.

#15 AKBAYAN YOUTH v. COMELEC G.R.
No. 147066, 26 March 2001
FACTS:
 In the case at hand, Petitioners are
representing the youth sector seek to
direct the COMELEC to conduct a
special registration before the 14 May
2001 General Elections, of new voters
ages 18 to 21.
 Petitioners asserts that, around 4
million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the respondent COMELEC under
RA 8189.
 Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day
Additional Registration of New Voters
Only is submitted but was then denied
by the COMELEC under Resolution No.
3584 on February 8, 2001.
 However, aggrieved by the denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus Section 8 (System of
Continuing Registration of Voters) of
R.A. No. 8189 The Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996 provides: “The personal filing
of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of
the Election Officer during regular office
hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting
120 days before a regular election and
90 days before a special election.”
ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC
Resolution dated February 8, 2001.
2. WON the SC can compel respondent
COMELEC, through the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELEC’s imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the
May 14, 2001 general elections.
RULING:
1. NO. The SC ruled that, it is well-settled
that the law does not require that the
impossible be done. A two-day special
registration for new voters would give
rise to time constraints due to additional
pre-election matters. Accordingly,
COMELEC acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the
matter. In issuing the assailed
Resolution, respondent simply
performed its constitutional task to
enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election.
2. In this case, the Supreme Court cannot
control the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes
upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is
his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court. Hence, the remedy
of mandamus lies only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty, not
a discretionary one.
DIANGKA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 139545. January 28, 2000
FACTS:
 Ali M. Balindong, a mayoralty candidate
in the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del
Sur, filed a special action for
disqualification before the COMELEC
against his rival, Maimona Diangka, on
the ground that the latter and her
husband, then incumbent mayor of said
municipality, committed acts of
terrorism in order to accord Diangka an
undue advantage at the polls in violation
of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code. First, that they loaded the ballot
boxes into an ambulance then
 subsequently, through force and
threats, made the watchers of Balindong
go down from the vehicle. Second, that
Diangka’s husband went to the voting
areas and caused a commotion that
prevented voters from voting.
 In her Answer, Diangka made a general
denial and attacked the credibility of the
sworn statements attached to the
petition. The COMELEC en banc issued
an Omnibus Order declaring a partial
failure of election in nine (9) out of the
fifty-eight (58) precincts in Ganassi,
Lanao del Sur, and, accordingly
scheduled special elections in the nine
(9) precincts. Diangka emerged as the
winner. However, the COMELEC ordered
the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
cease and desist from proclaiming her.
Nevertheless, Diangka’s proclamation as
mayor of the municipality proceeded
since the said order was received late. In
the hearing for the disqualification, only
Balindong and lawyer appeared, hence
COMELEC disqualified Diangka.
Diangka now assails the decision via a
Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Diangka violated Sec. 68
of the Omnibus Election Code and
hence, be disqualified.
2. Whether or not Diangka was denied her
right to due process when she was
disqualified to run for the position.
RULING:
1. YES. The COMELEC found evidence of
her direct participation in the first act of
terrorism. She was on board the
ambulance used to transport the
election paraphernalia that commenced
the act. Diangka could not feign
ignorance as to what had transpired.
Neither could Diangka escape
responsibility on the ground that there
is no proof that she and her husband
conspired to commit the acts of
terrorism. The fact that Diangka was not
at the scene when the aforesaid event
happened does not necessarily exempt
her. She failed to disprove that she was
actually a lay figure or alter ego of her
husband and fielded by the latter to run,
as he was no longer qualified to run for
another term as mayor pursuant to the
Local Government Code which limits the
tenure of local elective officials to three
(3) consecutive terms.
2. NO. The court denied the petition and
upheld the factual findings, as well as
the conclusions reached by the
COMELEC. The Court finds that
Diangka was not denied due process.
Diangka was given all the opportunity to
prove that the evidence on her
disqualification based on the
commission of acts of terrorism was not
strong. She was able to file her Answer
to the petition to disqualify her. She
submitted her memorandum. The
COMELEC Second Division considered
the evidence of the parties and their
arguments and thereafter affirmed his
disqualification. The settled rule is that
due process does not mean prior hearing
but only an opportunity to be heard. The
COMELEC gave Diangka all the
opportunity to be heard. Furthermore,
when the COMELEC en banc reviews
and evaluates a party’s petition, or as in
the case at bar, a party’s answer and the
supporting papers attached thereto, the
same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of
his case.
Chavez v. Commission on Elections
G. R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004
FACTS:
 Petitioner Chavez, on various dates,
entered into formal agreements with
certain establishments to endorse their
products and pursuant to these
 agreements, three billboards were set up
along the Balintawak Interchange of the
North Expressway. "These last two
agreements were entered into on
October 14, 2OO3 and November 1O,
2OO3 respectively) On December 3O,
2OO3, petitioner filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Senator
under Alyansa ng Pag asa.
 Thereafter, respondent issued
Resolution No. 652 which contains Sec.
32 prohibiting all propaganda materials
showing the image or mentioning the
name of a person, who subsequent to the
placement thereof becomes a candidate
for public office. Petitioner was asked by
the respondent to comply with the rule
but petitioner asked that he be exempted
from said resolution considering that the
billboards mentioned therein are mere
product endorsement and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for
premature campaigning under the rules.
 Comelec ordered petitioner to remove or
cause the removal of the billboards, or to
cover them from public view pending the
approval of his request. Not agreeing
with the decision, petitioner Chavez asks
the Supreme Court that the Comelec be
enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision. Hence, the petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the billboard mentioned
therein are exempted from Sec. 32 of
Resolution no. 652O due to the reason
that it is purely product endorsement
and do not announce or solicit any
support for petitioner’s candidacy.
2. Whether or not Sec. 32 of Resolution
652O is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:
1. No, the Supreme Court held that the
billboard mentioned therein should not be
exempted from Sec. 32 of Resolution no.
652O.The Supreme Court held that under the
Omnibus Election Code, "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity" is defined as an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public
office! one of the activities included therein is
a "Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges
or support for or against a candidate."
2. Yes, the Supreme Court held that Sec.
32 of Resolution No. 652O is a valid exercise of
police power. The Supreme Court said that a
close examination of the assailed provision
reveals that its primary objectives are to
prohibit premature campaigning and to level
the playing field for candidates of public office,
to equalize the situation between popular or
rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser
known or poorer candidates, on the other, by
preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. This
is within the context of police power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, or safety,
and the general welfare of the people.
LEGARDA VS DE CASTRO
Facts:
 In a Resolution dated January 18, 2005,
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
confirmed the jurisdiction over the
protest of Loren B. Legarda and denied
the motion of protestee, Noli L. de Castro
for its outright dismissal. The Tribunal
further ordered concerned officials to
undertake measures for the protection
and preservation of the ballot boxes and
election documents subject of the
protest.
  On February 4, 2005, De Castro filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the
said resolution.
 De Castro argues that where the
correctness of the number of votes is the
issue, the best evidence are the ballots;
that the process of correcting the
manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns is a function
of the canvassing bodies; that once the
canvassing bodies had done their
functions, no alteration or correction of
manifest errors can be made; that since
the authority of the Tribunal involves an
exercise of judicial power to determine
the facts based on the evidence
presented and to apply the law based on
the established facts, it cannot perform
the ministerial function of canvassing
election returns.
 He also contends that the Tribunal
cannot correct the manifest errors on the
statements of votes (SOV) and
certificates of canvass (COC). But it is
not suggested by any of the parties that
questions on the validity, authenticity
and correctness of the SOVs and COCs
are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the Tribunal can re-canvass the
ballots and can correct the manifest errors in
the SOVs and COCs.
RULING:
Yes. The SC finds no reason why the
Tribunal cannot perform this function. SC
agrees that the ballots are the best and most
conclusive evidence in an election contest
where the correctness of the number of votes of
each candidate is involved. Legarda merely
seeks the correction of manifest errors, that is,
errors in the process of different levels of
transposition and addition of votes.
The constitutional function as well as
the power and the duty to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of the President and Vice-
President is expressly vested in the PET, in
Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to
correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.
There is no necessity, in the SC’s view, to
amend the PET Rules to perform this function
within the ambit of its constitutional function.
In the instant protest, Legarda
enumerated all the provinces, municipalities
and cities where she questions all the results in
all the precincts therein. The protest here is
sufficient in form and substantively, serious
enough on its face to pose a challenge to De
Castro’s title to his office.
Considering that the protest is sufficient
in form and substance, the SC again stress
that nothing as yet has been proved as to the
veracity of the allegations. The protest is only
sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give
the Legarda the opportunity to prove her case
pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although
said rule only pertains to revision of ballots,
nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from
allowing or including the correction of manifest
errors, pursuant to the Tribunal’s rule-making
power under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
#6 FERMIN VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
 Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both
cases, was a registered voter
of Barangay Payan,Kabuntalan.
 On December 13, 2006, claiming that he
had been a resident
of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6
months, petitioner applied with the
COMELEC for the transfer of his
registration record to the said barangay.
 In the meantime, the creation of North
Kabuntalan was ratified in aplebiscite on
December 30, 2006, formally making
Barangay Indatuan a component of
 Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, on
January 8, 2007, the COMELEC
approved petitioner's application for
thetransfer of his voting record and
registration as a voter
of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan.
 On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor
of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections.
Private respondent filed a have gravely abused its discretion when it
disqualification case against petitioner.
The petition alleged that the petitioner
did not possess the period of residency
required for candidacy and that he
perjured himself in his CoC and in his
application for transfer of voting record.
Elections were held without any decision
being rendered by the COMELEC in the
said case. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged
as the victor.
 Fermin subsequently filed an election
protest with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato City. On
June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd
Division, disqualified Fermin for not
being a resident of Northern
Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his
declaration that he is a resident
of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006
in his oath of office before Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been
a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at
least one year.
 Petitioner argues that he has been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan long
before the creation of Northern
Kabuntalan. This change of residence
prompted him to apply for the transfer of
his voter’s registration record from
Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan.
Moreover, the one-year residency
requirement under the law is not
applicable to candidates for elective
office in a newly created municipality,
because the length of residency of all its
inhabitants is reckoned from the
effective date of its creation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner
as not a resident of the locality for at least one
year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections?
RULING:
YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to
precipitately declared that Fermin was not a
resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least
one year prior to the said elections. COMELEC
relied on a single piece of evidence to support
its finding thatpetitioner was not a resident
of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan,
i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to
before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in
which petitioner indicated that he was a
resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of
April 27, 2006.
Quinto vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
FACTS:
 This Court resolves to grant the
respondent Commission on Elections’
(COMELEC) motion for reconsideration,
and the movants-intervenors’ motions
for reconsideration-in-intervention, of
this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision.
 The assailed Decision granted the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr. and declared as
unconstitutional the second proviso in
the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,
mainly on the ground that they violate
the equal protection clause of the
 Constitution and suffer from
overbreadth.
 The assailed Decision thus paved the
way for public appointive officials to
continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office
notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena
ISSUE: WON public appointive officials like the
elective officials can still continue discharging
the powers, prerogatives and functions of their
office notwithstanding their entry into the
political arena?
RULING:
No. The intent of both Congress and the
framers of our Constitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political activities is too
plain to be mistaken. But Section 2(4), Article
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the
implementing statutes apply only to civil
servants holding apolitical offices. Stated
differently, the constitutional ban does not
cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact
that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." This is because elected public
officials, by the very nature of their office,
engage in partisan political activities almost all
year round, even outside of the campaign
period. Political partisanship is the inevitable
essence of a political office, elective positions
included.
Additional notes:
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678
Compliant with Law
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a
faithful reflection of the present state of the law
and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under
Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section
66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person
holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or –controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. – Upon the
other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006
or the Fair Election Act,17 which repealed
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code18
and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A.
8436 insofar as it considered an elected official
as resigned only upon the start of the campaign
period corresponding to the positions for which
they are running,19 an elected official is not
deemed to have resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the
same or any other elected office or position. In
fine, an elected official may run for another
position without forfeiting his seat.
These laws and regulations implement
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service
officers and employees from engaging in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.
AGGABAO VS COMELEC
Facts:
 Petitioner Aggabao and respondent
Miranda were rival congressional
candidates for the 4 th District of Isabela
during the 2004 elections. During the
canvassing, Miranda moved for the
exclusion of the 1 st copy of the COCV
on grounds that it was tampered and
prepared under duress.
 The Provincial Board of Canvassers
(PBC) excluded the COCVs. Petitioner
appealed to the COMELEC and asserted
that the PBC acted without jurisdiction.
The COMELEC En Banc issued a
resolution directing the proclamation of
the remaining winning candidates.
Miranda was proclaimed as the
 Congressman for the 4 th District of
Isabela.
 Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari
assailing the Resolution and claimed
that the COMELEC En Banc acted
without jurisdiction when it ordered
Miranda’s proclamation considering that
the COMELEC has not yet resolved the
appeal. Miranda moved for the dismissal
of the petition contending that the issue
raised is best addressed to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
Issue: Whether or not a petition for review
under Certiorari was proper.
Ruling:
No. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is
undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office.
As such, petitioners recourse would have been
to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His
remedy is not a petition for certiorari.
Jalosjos, petitioner v. Cardino, respondent
[G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012]
FACTS:
 Dominador Jalosjos and Agapito
Cardino were candidates for Mayor of
Dapitan City in the May 2010 elections.
Jalosjos was running for his third term.
Cardino filed a petition under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos on
the ground that Jalosjos made a false
material representation in his certificate
of candidacy.
 Cardino claimed that long before
Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy,
Jalosjos had already been convicted by
final judgment for robbery and
sentenced to prisión mayor by the RTC
of Cebu City and asserted that Jalosjos
has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos
admitted his conviction but stated that
he had already been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos’ probation. Jalosjos refuted
Cardino and stated that the RTC issued
an Order declaring that Jalosjos had
duly complied with the order of
probation. Jalosjos further stated that
during the 2004 elections the COMELEC
denied a petition for disqualification filed
against him on the same grounds.
 The COMELEC 1st Division found that
Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of
probation was fraudulently issued; thus,
Jalosjos indeed committed material
misrepresentation in his CoC. On
August 11, 2010, the COMELEC En
Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for
reconsideration and ousted him from
office and ordered to cease and desist
from occupying and discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of
Dapitan City and that the provisions of
the Local Government Code on
succession shall apply. Both Jalosjos
and Cardino appealed to the Surpreme
Court. Cardino questioned the decision
of COMELEC En Banc in applying the
rules of succession.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in ousting
Jalosjos as Mayor of Dapitan City.
2. Whether or not the Local Government
Code on succession will apply.
candidacy void ab initio can operate to
defeat one or more valid certificates of
candidacy for the same position. Thus,
Cardino ran unopposed. There was only
one qualified candidate for Mayor in the
May 2010 elections – Cardino – who
received the highest number of votes.

RULING:
SALVADOR LACSON, JR., complainant, vs.
1. On the first issue, COMELEC did not RAMON POSADAS, Municipal Judge, of
commit grave abuse of discretion in Talisay, Negros Occidental, respondent.
ousting Jalosjos as Mayor of Dapitan City.
The COMELEC properly cancelled
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void Facts:
certificate of candidacy on the ground of
 Respondent Municipal Judge Ramon
ineligibility that existed at the time of the
Posadas, of Talisay Negros Occidental, is
filing of the certificate of candidacy can
charged in a verified complaint by
never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
Salvador Lacson, Jr. with (a) ignorance
much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’
of the law, (b) partiality, and (c) violation
certificate of candidacy was cancelled
of the Election Code of 1971. The
because he was ineligible from the start to
Executive Judge, to whom this case was
run for Mayor. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed
referred for investigation, found the
on the day he filed his certificate of
charges of ignorance of the law and
candidacy, and the cancellation of his
partiality to be without factual basis,
certificate of candidacy retroacted to the
however he found that respondent
day he filed it. The COMELEC is under a
Judge has failed to comply with the
legal duty to cancel the certificate of
requirements of Section 136 of the
candidacy of anyone suffering from the
Election Code of 1971.
accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by  Any person who has been refused
virtue of a final judgment of conviction. To registration or whose name has been
stricken out from the permanent list of
allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to
file a petition to cancel the certificate of voters may at any time except sixty (60)
candidacy of one suffering from perpetual days before a regular election or twenty-
five (25) days before a special election,
special disqualification will result in the
apply to the proper court for an order
anomaly that these cases so grotesquely
exemplify. directing the election registration board
or the board of inspectors as the case
may be, to include or reinstate his name
in the permanent list of voters, attaching
2. On the second issue, the rule on
to his application for inclusion the
succession will not apply. If the certificate
certificate of the Electron registration
of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally
board or the board of inspectors
the person who filed such void certificate
regarding his case and proof of service of
of candidacy was never a candidate in the
a copy of his application and of the
elections at any time. All votes for such
notice of hearing thereof upon a member
non-candidate are stray votes and should
of the said board.
not be counted. Otherwise, a certificate of
  Respondent disregarded the
requirement and none of the petitions
FACTS:
for inclusion based on lack of forms
contains the attached certificate of the  Petitioner and private respondents were
Chairman or any member of the Board candidates for mayor of the Municipality
of Inspectors of the precinct concerned of Sta.Monica, Surigao del Norte in
to the effect that petitioner or petitioners during the May 2007 elections. The
applied for registration on October 9, former filed her certificate of
1971 but were refused registration for candidacy on the day before the
lack of registration forms. prescribed campaign period. When
she went to the
Issue: WON Judge Posadas should be
COMELEC Office to file her
admonished for violating Sec 136 of the 1971
certificate of candidacy she
Election Code?
was accompanied by her
Ruling: partymates.
 Thereafter, they had a motorcade
Yes. In the light of the statutory purpose, which consisted of two trucks and
the seriousness of respondent's failure to
ten motorcycles running around the
comply with the requirements of Section 136 of municipality convincing the
the electoral law becomes evident. His good
residents to vote for her and her
faith or lack of malice is of no avail, considering party .Due to this, private
that in crimes which are mala prohibita the act
respondent filed a petition against
alone irrespective of its motives, constitutes the her alleging premature campaigning
offense. It appears, however, that on April 8,
as provided in the Omnibus Election
1974, the President of the Philippines Code Section 80 which says: “Election or
promulgated Presidential Decree No. 433,
partisan political activity outside
which grants general amnesty under certain campaign period.--- It shall be
conditions to public school teachers, other unlawful for any person, whether or
government officials and employees, members
not a voter or candidate, or for any party,
of the armed forces of the Philippines and other
or association of persons, to engage in
persons for violation of election laws and other an election campaign or partisan
related statutes in connection with the political activity except during the
elections of 1965, 1967, 1969, 1971, and the campaign period.” She argued that
election of delegates to the Constitutional
she is not guilty since she was not
Convention. There is no question that as a yet a candidate at that time and the
consequence of the general amnesty all persons campaign period has not yet started
who violated the election law on the dates and
when the motorcade was conducted.
occasions therein mentioned are relieved of
 While the petition was pending in
their criminal liability. 3 In the case at bar,
the COMELEC, she was voted as
respondent is relieved of any criminal liability
mayor and took her office
for his aforecited infraction; however, in the
thereafter. The COMELEC
public interest he should be admonished.
Second Division decided in
favor of the complainant and
found her guilty of premature
Penera, Rosalinda A. vs. COMELEC and campaigning. Likewise,
Edgar T. Andanar w h e n s h e appealed to the COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 En Banc, the previous decision was
affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with
 the Supreme Court which decided
against her.
 It was held that the conduct of the
motorcade is a form of election
campaign or partisan political
activity, falling under Section
79 (b) (2) of the Omnibus
Election Code which says:
“holding political caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campa
i g n o r propaganda for or against
a candidate.” Furthermore, it was held
that she should vacate the position.
Now, she filed for a motion for
reconsideration using the same
arguments.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is guilty of
premature campaigning?
RULING:
No, she is not. Any act is lawful
unless expressly declared unlawful by
law. It is enough that Congress stated
that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period.” So,
it is lawful if done before the start of the
campaign period. This plain language of the law
need not be construed further. Moreover, on
the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a
candidate for. As what was decided in the
case of Lanot which says that prior to the
campaign period, even if the candidate
has filed his/her certificate of candidacy,
he/she is not yet considered as a
candidate for purposes other than the
printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be
guilty of premature campaigning for in the
first place there is no candidate to talk about.
What she did was an exercise of her freedom of
expression.
RISOS-VIDAL V COMELEC
GR NO 206666 JANUARY 21, 2015
FACTS:
 On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
(SB) convicted former President Estrada
(Private Respondent) for the crime of
plunder. However, on October 25, 2007,
former President GMA extended executive
clemency by way of pardon to which
respondent accepted. Two (2) years later,
private respondent filed a Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Presidency which
earned three oppositions but were all denied
on the ground of being moot and academic
for respondent did not win said election.
 Private respondent once more filed a COC for
the 2010 mayoral elections in the City of
Manila to which Atty Alicia Risos-Vidal
(Petitioner) subsequently filed a Petition for
disqualification. Petitioner contended that
the pardon granted to herein private
respondent was conditional and was
breached when he for public office.Petitioner
further added that said pardon was
conditional for it lacked the express
declaration should be disqualified according
to Sec 40 of the Local Government Code and
Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
COMELEC, representing private respondent,
dismissed said petition for lack of merit.
Hence the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by former
President Arroyo.
RULING:
NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by former
President Arroyo.
The court is convinced that pardon extended
by PGMA was absolute and not conditional.
When such pardon worded “he (Estrada) is
hereby restored his civil and political rights’, the
Court ruled this to be an absolute and plenary
restoration which carried more weight than Risos-
Vidal’s contention that said pardon was conditional
by way of its third preambular clause and a need for
express declaration of what rights to restore or to
remit
JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION
G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995. 245 SCRA 759
Facts:
 On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C.
Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On
March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his
certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-
2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993
and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his
statement of contributions and
expenditures. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by
the COMELEC.
Issue: WON petitioner’s withdrawal of candidacy
extinguishes his liability for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures.
Ruling:
The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A.
No. 7166 states that “every candidate” has the
obligation to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in
the application of a law where none is indicated. In
the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction
or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every
candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a
candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to
one who withdrew his candidacy.
Romualdez v. RTC
G.R. NO. 104960
September 14, 1993
FACTS:
 Philip Romualdez is the nephew of Imelda
Marcos.
 In 1980, he established his legal residence at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
 When the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of
1986 came, he left the Philippines and
sought "asylum" in the United States.
 He received a letter from the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service
informing him that he should depart from
the U.S. at his expense.
 When he arrived in the Philippines on
December 1991, he registered himself anew
as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte for the May 1992 elections.
 Donato Advincula filed a petition with the
MTC praying that Romualdez be excluded
from the list of voters alleging that he did not
have the required one-year residence in the
Philippines and the six-month residence in
Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
 The MTC denied the petition.
 The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Romualdez voluntarily left
the country and abandoned his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
RULING:
 No. His sudden departure from the country
cannot be described as "voluntary", or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the
context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice".
  The Court is not convinced that Romualdez
abandoned his residence in the Philippines
and established his domicile elsewhere.
 The term "residence" as used in the election
law is synonymous with "domicile", which
imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return.
 Residence may be lost by adopting another
choice of domicile.
 In order to acquire a new domicile by choice,
there must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.
 In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi.
 The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice:
(1) must be for an indefinite period of
time;
(2) the change of residence must be
voluntary; and
(3) the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
PUÑGUTAN vs ABUBAKAR
GR No. L-33541, January 20, 1972
FACTS:
 Respondent Abubakar alleged that in the
towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no
elections were in effect held in view of
massive violence, terrorism and fraud.
 Commission concluded that no elections
were held in said municipalities as the voting
was done by persons other than the
registered voters while armed men went from
precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots
and dictated how the election returns were
to be prepared. It appears upon examination
that most of the thumbmarks and
signatures of those who voted compared with
the fingerprints of the registered voters
appearing in their registration record did not
match.
 Thus Comelec issued a resolution which
provides that the votes in the said towns are
spurious and/or manufactured returns or
no returns at all and as such should be
excluded from the canvass for the election of
delegates for the lone congressional district
of the province of Sulu.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC exceeded its
constitutional power by encroaching on terrain
properly judicial, the right to vote being involved?
RULING
No. Where no such election was in fact had
as was found by respondent Commission with
respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but
it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns
as clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore
bereft of any value.
The exercise of the right to vote is regulated
by the Election Code. It’s enforcement under the
Constitution is, vested in respondent Commission.
Such a power, however is purely executive or
administrative. As to whether or not an elect on has
been held is a question of a different type. It is
properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
respondent Commission. If, no such voting did take
place, considering the massive irregularities that
attended it in the four towns, then the exclusion of
the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity.
The denial of the right to vote should find
redress in the judiciary and is excluded from the
authority vested in the Commission on Elections,
however, it is not the case here. The exclusion of the
returns from the four towns in Sulu does not
involved a question as to denial of right to vote.
 DATU INOCENCIO C. SIAWAN vs. JUDGE
AQUILINO A. INOPIQUEZ, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056
May 21, 2001
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by the petitioner
against respondent Judge Inopiquez, Jr. of the
MCTC of Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law,
gross abuse of power, and misconduct in
connection with the latter's handling of two
election cases for inclusion of voters. Election
Case Nos. 333 was a petition for inclusion of a
voter in the voter's list while Election Case No.
292, on the other hand, the seven petitioners,
all surnamed Herbas, alleged that they were
refused registration by the BEI’s of Leyte; and
that they have not voted for two consecutive
elections.
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge, is guilty of
grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the
law for his failure to observe Section 143 of the
Omnibus Election Code?
RULING:
Yes. The failure of respondent to observe
the requirements of the Election Code is
inexcusable. As a judge of the MCTC vested
with the jurisdiction to hear and decide
petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters, he
is expected to be familiar with these
requirements because it can be assumed that
these election cases were not the first cases he
has decided.
The records show that neither of the petition in
Election Case No. 333 and Election Case No.
292 named the board of election inspectors a
party to the proceedings. Nor is there any
showing that the board of election inspectors
was ever notified of hearings to be conducted
on such inclusion proceedings either by
registered mail or by personal delivery, or by
notice posted in a conspicuous place in the city
hall or municipal building and in two other
conspicuous places within the city or
municipality at least 10 days prior to the day
set for the hearing.
ALVAREZ vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner was proclaimed duly elected
Punong Barangay of Dona Aurora, Quezon
City. He received 590 votes while his opponent,
private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained
585 votes. Private respondent filed an election
protest claiming irregularities, i.e.misreading
and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of
Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered
and theissues were joined, the Metropolitan
Trial Court ordered the reopening and
recounting of the ballots in ten contested
precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision
that private respondent won the election. She
garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550
votes after the recount.
On appeal, the Second Division of the
COMELEC ruled that private respondent won
over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile,
filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal
which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and private
respondent’s Motion for Execution pending
appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of
the Second Division. It granted the Motion for
Execution pending appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON preferential disposition applies to
cases before the COMELEC.
2. WON COMELEC prematurely acted on the
Motion for Execution pending appeal
3. WON decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on Elections contests
involving municipal and barangay officials
shall be final, executory and not
appealable.
RULING:
(1) No. Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused
its discretion when it failed to treat the case
preferentially. Petitioner misreads the
provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It will be noted that the
“preferential disposition” applies to cases
 before the courts and not those before the
COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the
section will readily show.
(2) No. When the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed, petitioner had a motion for
reconsideration before the Second Division.
This pending motion for reconsideration
suspended the execution of the resolution of
the Second Division. Appropriately then, the
division must act on the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, when the Second
Division resolved both petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration and private
respondent’s motion for execution pending
appeal, it did so in the exercise of its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The
requisites for the grant of execution pending
appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by
the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party; (b) there must be a good
reason for the execution pending appeal;
and (c) the good reason must be stated in a
special order. In our view, these three
requisites were present.
(3) No. Election cases pertaining to barangay
elections may be appealed by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. But this
recourse is available only when the
COMELEC’s factual determinations are
marred by grave abuse of discretion.
COQUILLA v. COMELEC G.R. No. 151914
Facts:
 Coquilla, a natural born Filipino citizen,
grew up and resided in Oras, Eastern Samar
until 1965, when he was subsequently
naturalized as a US citizen after joining the
US Navy. In 1998, he returned to the
Philippines and took out a residence
certificate although he continued making
several trips to the US.
 Subsequently, Coquilla applied for
repatriation under RA 8171 and took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines on
November 10, 2000. On November 21,
2000, Coquilla applied for registration as a
voter of Oras and on February 27, 2001, he
filed his certificate of candidacy stating
therein that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for 2 years.
 Incumbent Mayor Neil Alvarez, who was
running for reelection, sought the
cancellation on Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter had
resided in Oras for only 6 months since
November 10, 2000, when he took his oath
as a citizen.
 COMELEC was unable to render judgment
before the elections commenced and
Coquilla was proclaimed the winner.
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and
ordered the cancellation of Coquilla’s
certificate of candidacy.
Issue: WON COMELEC’s order of cancellation
of Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy proper
Ruling:
Yes. COMELEC retained jurisdiction
over his case notwithstanding his
proclamation. RA 6646 provides that the
proceedings for disqualification of candidates
or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of
candidacy, which have begun before election,
should continue even after such elections and
proclamation of the winners. Petitioner made a
false representation of a material fact in his
certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at
bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidate’s qualification for an
office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a
material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.