Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PAAR V. BORROMEO, 79 PHIL 344, G.R. NO. L-1582, OCTOBER 10, 1947
Teofilo Paar is charged in Manila with treason before the People's Court, and prayed that
he be assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a member of the bar. The
People's Court denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 are as follows:
"SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have attorney. If the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to
have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney.
If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
"SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney 'de oficio.' The attorney so employed or
assigned must be a duly authorized member of the Bar. But in provinces where duly
authorized members of the bar are not available, the court may, in its discretion, admit or
assign a person, resident in the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to aid
the defendant in his defense, although the person so admitted or assigned be not a duly
authorized member of the Bar."
"SEC. 29. Attorneys for destitute litigants. 'A superior court may assign an attorney to
render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it
appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services
of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party.
It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is
excused there from by the court for sufficient cause shown.'
"SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar."
It is clear from these provisions that in Manila where there are many members of the bar,
defendants in the People's Court may be assisted only by members of the bar.
No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting
union: Provided, However, that attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an amount
to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1691, May 1, 1980)
SUMMARY:
Maldigan and Sabsalon were taxi drivers for Five J Taxi. Five J Taxi had in place a
boundary system where the driver had to pay not only the boundary fee to take out the taxi for
the day, but also a P20 car wash fee and a P15 deposit. Years later, after Maldigan and Sabsalon
had left the company, they sought to get the accumulated deposits – only to be told that, as per
company practice, the accumulated fees were to answer for the repair expenses of the taxi cabs
handled by the drivers. Maldigan and Sabsalon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA
dismissed the complaint, which decision was concurred in by the NLRC. HOWEVER, the
NLRC modified the decision of the LA by granting the refund of the deposit and the car wash
fee. On the question of the propriety of those awards, Five J Taxi elevated the case to the SC. The
SC affirmed the NLRC’s award of the deposit, but reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s holding that the
car wash fee was an industry practice, thus was not an illegal deduction in the contemplation of
the law.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Was the NLRC correct in holding that the deposit was covered by the general prohibition
in Art. 114 (LC) against requiring employees to make deposits?
2. Were the drivers entitled to the refund of the car wash fee?
RULING:
1. YES. Note that there was no showing that the SOLE had recognized the deposit as a
“practice” in the taxi industry.
This does not apply to boundary deficiencies – the rule only covers deposits for loss or
damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer.
ALSO, when Maldrigan and Sabsalon stopped working for Five J Taxi, the alleged
purpose for which the deposits were required no longer existed.
IN ANY EVENT, any balance due must be returned, with legal interest.
o For Sabsalon: That being said, no balance remains from the deposits given by
Sabsalon – although he was able to accumulate P3,579 between 1987 to 1991, he
had shortages totaling P4,327, AND he owed Five J Taxi P2,700 for “vales”.
(Bumale?)
o For Maldigan: Nothing similar was mentioned – SC agreed with the SolGen that
he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits.
2. NO. SC upheld the finding of the Labor Arbiter that in the taxi industry, it is a matter of
practice that it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit to the same clean condition
as when he had taken it out.
The fee was paid directly to the person who washed the unit.
SC quoted the SolGen’s observation that to save money, the drivers could wash the car
themselves.
DOCTRINE:
Art. 114 of the Labor Code provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools,
materials or equipment supplied by the employer. The exceptional case where an employer may
require his worker to make deposits to answer for loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment – when the employer is engaged in a trade, etc. where such is a recognized practice,
or is by the determination of the SOLE in appropriate rules and regulations necessary or
desirable – does NOT apply to deposits meant to answer for deficiencies in the boundary fees.
SECTION 9. Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands, whether named in the
notice or not, shall appear before the Court by himself, or by some person in his behalf and shall
file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the
Court. The answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant or by some person in his behalf,
and shall state whether the claimant is married or unmarried, and, if married, the name of the
husband or wife and the date of the marriage, and shall also contain: