Chinese Political Science Review

https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00150-5

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Constructing an Analytical Framework for Explaining

Chinese Foreign Policy

Kevin G. Cai1

Received: 6 February 2020 / Accepted: 26 May 2020

© Fudan University 2020

Abstract
An analytical framework is constructed to explain Chinese foreign policy, adopt-
ing a symbiotic neorealist–constructivist approach. Chinese foreign policy is influ-
enced and shaped by a number of factors, which can be divided into two categories,
conditioning and determining. While China’s geographical and geopolitical environ-
ment, power (physical, economic and military), philosophical traditions, historical
experience, and communist ideology function as conditioning factors, its national
interests and the personality traits and leadership styles of individual communist
leaders serve as determining factors. While the conditioning factors provide physi-
cal conditions, power foundation and parameters, and the philosophical, historical
and ideological sources of Chinese foreign policy, it is the determining factor that
directly sets the direction and specific objectives of Chinese foreign policy and the
approaches to achieve the nation’s foreign policy objectives.

Keywords Analytical framework · Waltz’s theory · Neorealism · Constructivism ·

Chinese foreign policy

In his 1959 book, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Kenneth N. Waltz
developed a three-level analysis to explain the causes of war through what Waltz
called individual, state and international images (Waltz 1959). Thereafter, Waltz’s
theory became very influential and was widely used by scholars to explain interna-
tional relations. This paper is intended to transform Waltz’s three-level analysis into
an analytical framework that can be used to explain Chinese foreign policy.

* Kevin G. Cai
kcai@uwaterloo.ca
1
Renison University College, University of Waterloo, 240 Westmount Road North, Waterloo,
ON N2L 3G4, Canada

13
Vol.:(0123456789)
 Chinese Political Science Review

1 Constructing an Analytical Framework

An overall review of the major factors that have been influencing Chinese foreign
policy since 1949 shows that all these factors fit Waltz’s three levels or images.
Specifically, China’s geographical and geopolitical environment is a major factor
at the international (external) level that influences Chinese foreign policy; there
are multiple factors at the state level that impact China’s foreign policy in dif-
ferent ways, which include the country’s physical, economic and military power,
China’s rich philosophical traditions, long historical experience, communist ide-
ology of the Chinese state and the national interests/core interests as identified by
the Chinese communist leadership; and finally, the personality traits and leader-
ship styles of individual communist leaders can be seen as a factor at the indi-
vidual level that influences Chinese foreign policy.
All these factors apparently play different roles in influencing and shaping
Chinese foreign policy. Based on their different impacts on Chinese foreign pol-
icy, the factors identified above can be put into two categories, conditioning and
determining. While conditioning factors provide physical conditions, power foun-
dation and parameters, and the historical, philosophical and ideological sources
of Chinese foreign policy, determining factors directly set the direction and spe-
cific objectives of Chinese foreign policy and the ways in which the nation’s for-
eign policy objectives are to be achieved. According to these criteria of classifica-
tion, under the conditioning factors are the nation’s geographical and geopolitical
environment, the country’s power (physical, economic and military), China’s
philosophical traditions, long historical experience and communist ideology of
the state, while the determining factors include the national/core interests as iden-
tified by the Chinese communist state and the personality traits and leadership
styles of individual communist leaders.
Moreover, given their complexity, these factors that influence and shape Chi-
nese foreign policy can hardly be analyzed fully by a single theoretical approach.
Rather, all these factors as the concepts of study appropriately fall into two major
theoretical approaches, namely, neorealism and constructivism. Hence, this study
adopts a symbiotic neorealist–constructivist approach as illustrated in the analyti-
cal framework below (see Fig. 1).
In this analytical framework, factors 1–2 fall within the domain of neorealism,
because for neorealist analysts, in an international system of no supranational
authority, China as a nation-state is first of all inevitably compelled to defend
its security by overcoming the constraints imposed by the external environment
with all its power available and formulating its foreign policy accordingly. On
the other hand, factors 3–7 are subject to interpretation by constructivism, which
claims that a country’s foreign policy, China’s foreign policy in this case, is
socially, culturally and ideologically constructed and shaped.
It is important to note that the analytical framework as constructed in this
study is used to explain Chinese foreign policy in a broad sense, while the expla-
nation of Chinese foreign policy decision-making should undoubtedly be subject
to the influence of another set of important factors like government institutions,

13
Chinese Political Science Review

think-tanks, interest groups and public opinion to name a few, which apparently
requires a different analytical framework for explanation. However, an effec-
tive analysis of Chinese foreign policy decision-making should unavoidably be
unfolded within the general setting that is investigated in this study.
With the above analytical framework in mind, we can now examine the peculiar
characteristics of Chinese foreign policy and assess how each of these factors influ-
ences and shapes Chinese foreign policy in its own way.

2 Conditioning Factors

Of the five conditioning factors that influence Chinese foreign policy, China’s geo-
graphical/geopolitical environment and its physical/economic/military power are
two important topics under scrutiny by neorealism, while China’s philosophical tra-
ditions, historical experience, and communist ideology are subject to interpretation
by constructivism. Regardless, while providing physical conditions, power founda-
tion and parameters, or philosophical, historical and ideological sources of Chinese
foreign policy, the conditioning factors do not directly decide the specific course and
objectives of Chinese foreign policy, which are the prerogatives of the determining
factors. With this in mind, an analysis of the impacts of each of the five conditioning
factors on Chinese foreign policy is in order.

2.1 Geographical and Geopolitical Environment as a Top External Constraint

on Chinese Foreign Policy

Conventional wisdom is that a country’s foreign policy is first of all fundamentally

confined by the external environment (geographical and geopolitical) in which it is
located. This is particularly true of China.
China is widely seen as a major power in East Asia and the world. Compared with
other major powers in the world, however, China is confronted with a more complex
and challenging geographical and geopolitical environment. China is bordered by 14
countries on land and six others over the East and South China Seas plus Taiwan.
Consequently, China is in a strategically vulnerable position with perceived threats
from almost all directions and the possibility of being encircled by potential rivals.
This is especially so given the various present and historical territorial disputes
involving China, which have fostered animosity among some of its neighboring
countries. Added to this unfavorable geographical and geopolitical environment was
the historical juncture of the Cold War at which communist China came into exist-
ence. As a newly created communist state, the PRC could hardly escape the Cold
War politics of confrontation between the communist bloc and the Western bloc.
Such an unfavorable geographical and geopolitical environment combined with the
Cold War and its legacy in the post-Cold War era inevitably makes China’s foreign
policy more challenging and complicated than that of any other major power. Appar-
ently, Chinese foreign policy has been first of all defined and influenced by this basic
external condition of unfavorable geographical and geopolitical environment.

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

Conditioning Factors Determining Factors

1. China’s external environment (International level)

(geographical & geopolitical)
Neorealism 2. Chinese power (physical,
economic & military)
3. China’s national/core interests (State level) Waltz’s
4. China’s philosophical tradtions analysis
5. China’s historical experience
Constructivism 6. Communist ideology
7. Chinese communist leaders
(Individual level)
(personality traits & leadership
style)
_______________________ _______________________

Chinese Foreign Policy

Fig. 1  Analytical framework for explaining Chinese foreign policy—a neorealist–constructivist approach

2.2 Chinese Power as the Physical Foundation of Chinese Foreign Policy

For neorealism, power is most essential and crucial in foreign policy and interna-
tional politics. This is because the formation and implementation of a country’s for-
eign policy is decisively based on and defined by the level of power that country is
able to employ, which, in turn, is derived from specific sources of power available to
that nation. As a major regional and global power, China derives its power primarily
from the following four major sources:
First of all, Chinese power comes from the country’s sheer geographical size and
location. China possesses the largest geographical area in the East Asian region with
most of its neighboring countries only being of similar size to or even smaller than
a Chinese province. This huge geographical landmass undoubtedly provides China
with not only many physical advantages in the form of abundant resources and stra-
tegic scope and depth, but also psychological superiority over most of its smaller
neighboring countries. Added to China’s sheer geographical area is the country’s
geographical location, which places China very much in the center of the region
with its neighboring countries largely revolving around the huge “home base” of
China (Murphey 2010, 2), although such a geographical location could also bring
geopolitical and strategic vulnerability if China was confronted with external threats
from multiple directions as discussed above. The geographical advantages that
China enjoys constitute an important source of power for the nation in dealing with
not only its smaller neighboring countries but even global powers from outside the
region.
In a similar fashion, a second major source of Chinese power is the nation’s huge
population of 1.4 billion, which is the largest in the world as of today, accounting for

13
Chinese Political Science Review

over 18% of the global population.1 Such a huge population provides China with not
only an abundant labor force for economic development but also ample manpower in
the event of a war. Indeed, the sheer size of the Chinese population by itself serves
as a strategic deterrence against any existing and potential rivals. For example,
Mao’s famous strategic doctrine, “the people’s war” was precisely formulated on the
basis of China’s huge population, which was used as the nation’s security strategy of
deterrence against two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union during the Mao
era.
Like other major powers, China possesses a third source of power in its eco-
nomic capacity. Compared with that of the Mao era, China’s economic capacity of
today is the single most significant source of the nation’s power. This is because the
rise of Chinese power is primarily the result of its rising economic power follow-
ing the nation’s rapid economic growth, thanks to the post-Mao economic reforms.
Among the measures of China’s economic power are its stranding as the second
largest economy in the world,2 the largest trading nation3 (the largest exporter and
the second largest importer),4 the economy with the highest industrial outputs in the
world,5 the country with the largest foreign exchange reserves with a total amount
of $3.13 trillion (by August 2019),6 etc. The huge economic power provides China
with a large amount of resources that the nation can employ to pursue its foreign
policy objectives in multiple areas, not to mention the fundamental economic foun-
dation for the country’s rapidly modernized and expanded military power. With such
huge economic power, Beijing obviously possesses much more ability today to deal
with its foreign policy issues than that in the past. With its economic power continu-
ing to grow not only in terms of size but also in terms of quality (that is, growingly
more advanced economic structure), China will undoubtedly obtain more capacity
to pursue its major foreign policy objectives in the coming years.7
A fourth source of Chinese power is the country’s military capabilities. Largely
thanks to the nation’s rapid economic development over the past several decades,
China’s military has been substantially modernized and expanded since the early

1
The data based on the latest UN Population Division estimates, obtained from worldometer, “Countries
in the world by population,” available at https​://www.world​omete​rs.info/world​-popul​ation​/popul​ation​-by-
count​ry/ (accessed January 24, 2020).
2
“GDP (Nominal) Ranking 2019,” Statistics Times, available at http://stati​stics​times​.com/econo​my/
proje​cted-world​-gdp-ranki​ng.php (accessed October 16, 2019).
3
China surpassed the US as the largest trading nation in 2013 and has remained in this position ever
since.
4
Based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2018, International Monetary Fund, 2018, pp.
2–5.
5
World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data (mostly 2016), compiled in
“Industry, value added (current US$)—Country Ranking,” IndexMundi, available at https​://www.index​
mundi​.com/facts​/indic​ators​/NV.IND.TOTL.CD/ranki​ngs (accessed September 29, 2019).
6
“Foreign exchange reserves,” Knoema, available at https​://knoem​a.com/atlas​/topic​s/Econo​my/Short​
-term-indic​ators​/Forei​gn-excha​nge-reser​ves (accessed October 6, 2019).
7
While estimates are various on when China will surpass the US to become the largest economy in the
world, from 5 years to over 10 years, it seems that it is only a matter of time when China will finally sur-
pass the US as the largest economy.

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

1990s. Today, China, with a standing army of 2.2 million and a comprehensive array
of modern and state of the art weaponry, is ranked the 3rd out of 138 military pow-
ers in Global Firepower’s 2020 Military Strength Ranking.8 Rising military power,
together with growing economic power, is clearly behind the increasing confidence
of the Chinese leadership in dealing with challenging foreign policy issues and the
adjustment of China’s foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui
(low profile) approach toward a more assertive one under Xi Jingping’s leadership.

2.3 China’s Philosophical Traditions as the Ideological Sources of Chinese Foreign

Policy

With a recorded history of over 4000 years, China has rich philosophical traditions
represented by Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. Particularly, Confucianism
and Daoism, together with The Art of War by Sun Zi (the most sophisticated and
influential classical discourse on military strategy) and other classical literature,
have provided ideological sources and a clear world outlook for Chinese foreign
policy. This philosophical basis of China’s foreign policy can be well scrutinized by
constructivism.
Chinese foreign policy is most significantly influenced by the philosophical
concept of “harmony” (hexie, 和谐), a core concept that is emphasized by both
Confucianism and Daoism. Although Confucianism focuses on harmony in human
society and Daoism focuses on harmony in nature, both philosophies pursue
harmony as the ultimate objective of human behavior. As a philosophical concept,
harmony is understood as a balance of different forces or elements in nature and/or
in society. In human society, the concept of harmony, therefore, refers to a balance
of diversified interests among different parties under which different interests could
remain complementary and mutually supportive. As such, seeking harmony is meant
to achieve an optimal status in which diversified interests could be balanced in a way
that is mutually beneficial to all the parties involved, while preventing diversities
from evolving into conflicts and confrontation. So harmony implies peaceful and
cordial coexistence and co-prosperity between different parties, while at the same
time maintaining diversity. This is what Confucius teaches as “harmony in diversity”
(jun zi he er bu tong, 君子和而不同).”9 Such a Confucian idea of harmony is
clearly behind Chinese foreign policy, which is first of all designed to avoid
confrontation in external relations. An illustrative example is China’s insistence on
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in international relations, a core value of
Chinese foreign policy.10 Furthermore, China’s emphasis on sovereignty, equality,

8
Global Firepower, 2020 Military Strength Ranking, available at https​://www.globa​lfire​power​.com/
count​ries-listi​ng.asp (accessed April 26, 2020).
9
This quote, which comes from The analects of Confucius (论语), can also be translated into “a gentle-
man gets along with others, but does not necessarily agree with them.”.
10
The concept of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence includes (1) mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs;
(4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. It was first raised by Zhou Enlai in Decem-
ber 1953 and later promoted by Zhou in the 1954 Geneva Conference and 1955 Bandung Conference.

13
Chinese Political Science Review

mutual respect, non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs and win–win in

international relations can all be explained by referring to the Confucian concept of
harmony. Most recently, Beijing has been making great efforts to seek “harmony”
(that is, to maintain cooperative relationship) with the US for fear of the emergence
of a new cold war between the two most powerful countries in the world today.
Moreover, in line with harmony, Confucius emphasizes the importance of social
moral ethics in guiding human behavior and advises that “Do not do others what
you would not have them do to you” (ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren, 己所不欲, 勿施
于人).11 Influenced by these thoughts of Confucianism, Chinese foreign policy also
consistently emphasizes benevolence rather than coercion in international relations.
While harmony is emphasized in Chinese foreign policy, it does not mean com-
promising on principles and shying away from confrontation when China’s national
interests are infringed upon. Rather, if the fundamental national interests like sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, national independence, national security and so on are
threatened as a result of foreign intervention or foreign invasion, the preconditions
for harmony no longer exist and self-defence is, therefore, justified so as to defend
the national interests under the concept of harmony.
If harmony eventually fails to be achieved and confrontation becomes
unavoidable, Beijing’s foreign policy strategy is then most importantly guided by
Sun Zi’s teaching of “breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting as supreme
excellence” (bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing, shan zhi shan zhe ye, 不战而屈人之兵, 善
之善者也). This is because, according to Sun Zi, “the best policy is to outmaneuver
an enemy with astute strategy; the second best policy is to overpower an enemy
through diplomatic means; actual fighting is a policy that has to be adopted only after
the first two policy options fail; and the worst policy is to besiege a well-defended
enemy” (gu shan bing fa mou, qi ci fa jiao, qi ci fa bing, qi xia gong cheng, 故上兵
伐谋, 其次伐交, 其次伐兵, 其下攻城).12 If a war eventually breaks out, Sun Zi’s
idea of “a quick victory as the objective of war rather than lengthy campaigns” (gu
bing gui sheng, bu gui jiu, 故兵贵胜, 不贵久) would serve as the guiding principle
of Beijing’s strategy.13 These thoughts of Sun Zi largely explain why China has been
involved in a limited number of wars since 1949, and of the three wars (the Korean
War of 1950–1953, the China–India War of 1962 and the China–Vietnam War of
1979) in which China was involved, the China–India War and the China–Vietnam
War were very brief, each being only about 1 month long with the Chinese troops
penetrating into the land of India and Vietnam and then immediately withdrawing
after its political objective of “teaching the enemy a lesson” was achieved. Although
China’s involvement in the Korean War was almost 3 years long, truce negotiations
started as early as 9 months after China’s intervention in the war, which eventually

Footnote 10 (continued)
Since then, the concept of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has served as the official keystone
of Chinese foreign policy.
11
A quote from The analects of Confucius.
12
Both quoted from Sun Zi, The Art of War, “Section III Attack by Stratagem.”.
13
Quote from Sun Zi, The Art of War, “Section II Waging War.”.

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

ended with its major political and strategic objective of pushing US troops away
from the Chinese border and back into the southern part of the Korean peninsula
achieved.
Another important philosophical concept from China’s classical literature that
influences Chinese foreign policy is “lonely at the top” (gao chu bu sheng han, 高
处不胜寒).14 This concept implies that a great power that pursues supremacy and
overstretches its power will eventually exhaust its strength and decline. Influenced
by such thinking, an important mindset was later solidly formed in Chinese culture,
that is, “the shot hits the bird that pokes its head out” (qiang da chu tou niao, 枪打
出头鸟). With such philosophical influence and strong cultural mindset, China has
long been insisting that it will never be a hegemon and that it has neither intention to
replace the US as No. 1 in the world nor interest in sending troops around the world
and leading a web of international institutions.15 This said, however, it is important
to note that, as is discussed in the following section, China’s foreign policy is also
driven by a strong desire and determination to revive the nation’s historical glory
as a superior and respected global power, as most recently reflected in Xi Jinping’s
“China dream” drive. From a Chinese perspective, a revived global power of China
is not the same as a hegemon. According to Beijing, China, which is genetically
determined by its cultural tradition, will only be a benign global power.16
There are also other important philosophical concepts that influence Chinese
foreign policy, for example, “check a barbarian with another barbarian” or “play off
one power against another” (yi yi zhi yi, 以夷制夷), which is clearly behind China’s
implicit alliance with the US against the Soviet Union in the 1970s and China’s
implicit alliance with Russia against the US since the 2000s.

2.4 China’s Historical Experience and Its Impact on Chinese Foreign Policy

Having a recorded history of over 4000 years, China was first unified under the Qin
Dynasty in 221 bc. Thereafter, imperial China maintained active external relations
with other peoples and societies for over two millenniums. From a constructivist
perspective, such a long historical experience of external relations would inevitably
impact on the foreign policy of modern China.
In general, China’s foreign policy since 1949 reflects the coalescence of two
seemingly contradictory themes in the nation’s historical experience. On the one
hand, imperial China as the most powerful and civilized empire in the world for
many centuries until the early nineteenth century has brought China a strong sense

14
The idea of “lonely at the top” (gao chu bu sheng han, 高处不胜寒) is originally from a poem by a
famous ancient Chinese poet, Su Shi (苏轼, 1037–1101).
15
According The Book of Changes (yi jing, 易经), “The proud dragon repents (kang long you hui, 亢龙
有悔),” meaning that even a proud dragon will have to repent when it falls after flying too high into thin,
freezing air. Lao Tse also notes in Tao Te Ching (Dao De Jing, 道德经) that great strength can easily
deteriorate. This means that large countries should not pursue supremacy or become consumed by their
quest for power.
16
Despite Beijing’s repeatedly assuring the US of its benign intention, however, Washington seems
unconvinced. See Mastro (2019).

13
Chinese Political Science Review

of glorious past and a great-power mindset. On the other hand, over a century of
humiliation as a result of Western and Japanese encroachment and invasion in the
nineteenth century through the first half of the twentieth century has caused a huge
national trauma, which has ingrained a victim mentality in the Chinese nation.
While the great-power mindset and the victim mentality are obviously in contrast,
they are closely related to each other and are concurrently reflected in many impor-
tant foreign policy behaviors of China since the founding of the PRC.
In the first place, as a powerful empire, imperial China had long seen itself as the
middle kingdom and the Chinese people as civilized, while the peoples beyond the
Chinese empire were all treated as barbarians. It was within this historical context
that a tributary system emerged as early as the Han Dynasty (202 bc–220 ad) and
thereafter developed and expanded. By the late Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), over
40 Asian states had been incorporated into the extensive tributary system (Murphey
2010, 127). Evolving over time, this tributary system was basically a China-centered
system of international relations at the time, under which China’s political and cul-
tural superiority was willingly recognized by lesser neighboring states and accepted
as a model for their own societies, while the tributary states remained politically
independent. It is important to note that, according to Confucianism, imperial China
was superior not because of its military and economic power, but because of its
moral power. As a result of this two-millennium-long tributary system, the sense of
the superiority of imperial China as the middle kingdom was well entrenched. Such
a great-power mindset has had lasting impact on Chinese foreign policy since 1949.
While such a great-power mindset does not necessarily mean that China wants to
reestablish a new China-centered tributary system, it does imply China’s intention to
revive its great-power status in the postwar context. This is most recently exempli-
fied in Xi Jinping’s concept of China dream, which explicitly calls for a rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation, a concept that is clearly a direct historical legacy of China’s
glorious past.
Starting in the early nineteenth century, China experienced over a century
of decline, during which not only the tributary system collapsed in the course of
the nineteenth century, but also the nation itself was repeatedly encroached upon
and invaded by Western and Japanese imperialist powers from the Opium War of
1839–1842 to Japanese occupation of a large part of the country up to 1945. As
a result, China was forced to sign a number of unequal treaties with Western and
Japanese imperialist powers.17 Consequently, a once most powerful Chinese empire
fell to the status of semi-colony at the mercy of Western and Japanese imperialist
powers by the end of the nineteenth century. Hence, the dramatic fall of the status
from the middle kingdom as the center of the tributary system of 2000 years long
to a semi-colony led to a victim mentality ingrained in the Chinese nation, which
has inevitably impacted Chinese foreign policy since 1949 when communist China

17
For the explanation of the term “unequal treaties,” see Elleman and Paine (2019, 147).

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

regained the nation’s true independence. Many of China’s foreign policy behaviors
(for example, China’s insistence on its territorial integrity, national unification with
Taiwan, etc.) can be well explained by this victim mentality.18
China’s great-power mindset and victim mentality are closely linked to each
other in the sense that the victim mentality could hardly be truly overcome without
China’s great-power status being fully revived. As such, the revival of the Chinese
nation as a great power and the overcoming of the nation’s victim mentality will
inevitably happen hand in hand as reflected in China’s foreign policy and external
behavior (Yan 2001 33–34).

2.5 Communism as an Ideological Source of Chinese Foreign Policy

As constructivism would claim, Chinese foreign policy is also influenced by com-

munist ideology, given the fact that the PRC was established as a communist state.
This is particularly true of Chinese foreign policy during the Mao era. As a new
communist state created at a time when the world was split into two hostile Cold
War blocs, it made ideological as well as geopolitical sense for communist China to
be allied with the communist bloc led by Moscow as opposed to the Western bloc
led by Washington. Not long thereafter, China’s intervention in the Korean War in
late 1950 could also be seen as a foreign policy decision made along the ideologi-
cal lines in support of the survival of its communist neighbor of North Korea. In the
1950s through the early 1970s, Beijing’s support of communist Vietnam first against
French colonial forces and then against US forces after the collapse of French colo-
nial rule in Vietnam in 1954 could likewise be seen as a foreign policy that was
made in line with communist ideology. During the Mao era, Beijing’s support of
communist insurgencies worldwide, which were seen as part of global class strug-
gle, further illustrates how Chinese foreign policy was significantly influenced by
communist ideology. It was only after Deng Xiaoping came to power and started
to pursue pragmatic foreign policy in support of his economic reforms and opening
policy in the late 1970s that the influence of communist ideology in Chinese foreign
policy became minimized, although not totally extinct. Today, communist ideology
is only symbolically relevant to China’s relations with a handful of remaining com-
munist states, including North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cuba.
It is important to note that communist ideology was not only behind China’s rela-
tions with other communist states and its support of global communist movements, but

18
Many in the West are critical of China’s victim mentality, see, for example, Medeiros (2009, 10–11);
Andrew Browne, “The Danger of China’s Victim Mentality: Expect Beijing to lash out if a ruling on
South China Sea claims goes against it,” The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2016, available at https​://
www.wsj.com/artic​les/the-dange​r-of-china​s-victi​m-menta​lity-14658​80577​ (accessed December 16,
2019). Others, however, argue otherwise. For example, Brantly Womack argues that “a ‘victim mental-
ity’ has its roots in the reality of being a victim, and it is no more pathological than its opposite, the
‘victor mentality’, with its rosy memories of past glory and callousness in presuming that might is right.”
See Brantly Womack, “China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor,” CEPS Working Document No. 282/
January 2008, available at https​://paper​s.ssrn.com/sol3/paper​s.cfm?abstr​act_id = 13376​18 (accessed
December 16, 2019).

13
Chinese Political Science Review

also related to Beijing’s policy toward the third world or developing countries during
the Mao era. This is because, in Mao’s view, Marxist theory of class struggle between
the oppressed working class and the oppressing capitalist class within a capitalist state
could be well used to explain a global class struggle that was going on between the
newly independent third world/developing countries (which had been former colonies)
as the oppressed and the developed countries (which had been former colonial pow-
ers) as the oppressing. Mao’s China, seeing itself as a third world country, therefore,
supported the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and other initiatives
of third world/developing countries during the Cold War era. Although the Marxist
terminology of global class struggle is no longer used today, China continues to pay
great attention to developing countries in its foreign policy, continuing to see itself as a
developing country for both political and economic considerations.
In any analysis of the influence of communist ideology in China’s foreign policy,
it is particularly important to point out that although China is a communist state, its
foreign policy is fundamentally driven by its national interests (which will be fully dis-
cussed in the following section), as is the case with all the other communist states. As
such, in the event that a conflict between national interests and communist ideology
occurs, it is always national interests that have prevailed, although the Chinese commu-
nist leadership never explicitly acknowledges it. It is in this sense that communist ideol-
ogy, when applied in the foreign policy context, is basically used to support the national
interest-based foreign policy objectives rather than the other way round. Along this line
of thinking, it is not difficult to find that China’s alliance with the Soviet Union soon
after the founding of the PRC, its intervention in the Korean War and its support of
communist Vietnam against first French forces and then US forces can all be explained
by China’s crucial interests of defending its national security in a hostile world of the
Cold War politics. China’s support of global communist movements can also be seen
as an approach used by China to enhance its leading status in the communist world.
Although Mao’s third world foreign policy was pursued by referring to the Marxist
terminology of a global class struggle between the oppressed developing nations and
the oppressing capitalist powers, this policy was apparently designed to overcome its
strategic inferiority by forming an alliance with a large number of third world coun-
tries in face of the threats from superpowers, from the US in the 1950s, from both the
US and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and from the Soviet Union in the 1970s-early
1980s. National interests over communist ideology as the most important driving force
behind Chinese foreign policy can also be further explained by the breakup of the alli-
ance between China and the Soviet Union as two communist giants in the course of the
1960s and the brief war between communist China and communist Vietnam in early
1979. Most recently, shared communist ideology has failed to prevent China and Viet-
nam from their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Indeed, when national inter-
ests are involved, communist ideology instantly becomes irrelevant!

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

3 Determining Factors

While the conditioning factors provide the physical conditions, power foundation
and parameters as well as historical, philosophical and ideological sources for
Chinese foreign policy, it is the determining factors that set the specific direction
and objectives of Chinese foreign policy and lead to the specific approaches used
to achieve these foreign policy objectives. There are two determining factors in
Chinese foreign policy, one being the national interests/core interests and the other
the personality traits and leadership style of individual Chinese communist leaders,
both of which are subject to interpretation by constructivism.

3.1 China’s National Interests as the Driving Force of Chinese Foreign Policy

China’s foreign policy, like that of other powers, is clearly formulated to pursue the
country’s national interests as identified by the Chinese communist state. Hence,
from a constructivist perspective, it is the nation’s ruling elites who have defined
what China’s national interests are, which then function as the fundamental driving
force of Chinese foreign policy.
While national interests are unequivocally the driving force of Chinese foreign
policy today, it was not so explicit during the Mao era when the nation’s foreign
policy was presumably driven by communist ideology. Even though not openly
claimed, however, national interests were still clearly behind Mao’s foreign policy,
concealed in the rhetoric of “building a socialist state” (Gupta 2012, 807). It was
in the post-Mao era that Deng Xiaoping for the first time explicitly picked up the
concept of “national interests,” which he claimed should be the basis of the govern-
ment’s both domestic and foreign policies (Gupta 2012, 808). Thereafter, the con-
cept of national interests as related to China’s foreign policy became more and more
frequently employed and explored (Yong 1998, 308–309). This led to the publica-
tion of a book by an influential Chinese scholar, Yan Xuetong in 1997, Analysis of
China’s National Interests (Yan 1997). The first systematic study of national inter-
ests in China, Yan’s work provided a theoretical foundation for the switch from ide-
ology to national interests as a driving force of Chinese foreign policy.
Around 2004, a new concept of “core (national) interests” in relation to China’s
foreign policy emerged and was thereafter more frequently used in Chinese media
as well as in speeches by Chinese officials and in China’s official statements. By
the end of the 2000s, the concept of “core interests” had become clearly specified.
A most important feature of the notion of “core interests,” as compared with the
concept of “national interests,” is its explicit emphasis that “core interests” cannot
be compromised. Today, “core interests” is one of the most frequently used terms
in the lexicon of Chinese foreign policy and a repeatedly emphasized principle in
China’s diplomacy.19

19
On how the term “core interests” first emerged and later became frequently used and how it is defined,
see Swaine (2011) and Gupta (2012).

13
Chinese Political Science Review

In theory, national interests refer to the interests of the nation as whole. In the case
of China, however, the country’s national interests or core interests are exclusively
defined by the ruling elites (that is, Chinese communist leaders) in a way that first of
all reflects the interests of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and then the interests
of the Chinese nation as such. Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has been precisely
designed to pursue such Chinese “national interests,” now more frequently referred
to as “core interests,” as defined by the Chinese communist state.
It was within this context that during the US–China Strategic Economic Dialogue
in July 2009, the then Chinese State Councillor Dai Binguo explicitly defined what
China’s core interests comprised. According to Dai, “China’s number one core inter-
est is to maintain its basic (political) system and national security; the second is state
sovereignty and territorial integrity; and the third is the continued stable develop-
ment of economy and society.”20 China’s definition of core interests was later fur-
ther officially specified in a white paper, entitled “China’s Peaceful Development,”
published by the Information Office of the State Council of the PRC on Septem-
ber 6, 2011. According to this white paper, China has six core interests: (1) state
sovereignty; (2) national security; (3) territorial integrity; (4) national unification;
(5) China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stabil-
ity; and (6) basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social develop-
ment.21 China’s foreign policy objectives are precisely set in pursuit of these national
interests/core interests.
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese communist leadership has
set and developed seven major foreign policy objectives to consistently pursue its
national interests/core interests. These foreign policy objectives, while closely related
to each other, are clearly ranked on the basis of the Chinese communist leadership’s
prioritization of the country’s national interests/core interests. Although the sequence
of importance and specific elements of each of these objectives have changed over
time, the fundamental substance of all these foreign policy objectives remains.
Beijing’s top foreign policy objective is to maintain China’s existing political system,
which implies the maintenance of the CCP’s monopoly over the nation’s political
power. Although maintaining China’s existing political system was explicitly claimed
by Dai Binguo as the nation’s No.1 core interest in China’s foreign policy for the first
time in 2009, it has been clearly embodied in the spirit of China’s constitution and it has
undoubtedly remained as the PRC’s most important objective in pursuing its foreign
policy since 1949. Maintaining the current political system as China’s most important
foreign policy objective is also “logically” based on the communist leadership’s
persistent claim that only the CCP can save China and promote the national interests
of the country. Beijing’s insistence on the state sovereignty principle and persistent

20
Zhongxinwang (http://www.china​news.com), “shou lun zhong mei jing ji dui hua: chu shang yue qiu
wai zhu yao wenti jun yi tan ji” (The first round of China–US talks: all of the issues are discussed except
going to moon), July 29, 2009, available at http://www.china​news.com/gn/news/2009/07-29/17949​
84.shtml​(accessed October 21, 2019).
21
The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Peace-
ful Development, September 6, 2011, available at http://www.gov.cn/engli​sh/offic​ial/2011-09/06/conte​
nt_19413​54.htm (accessed October 21, 2019).

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

resistance to external pressures on such issues as human rights, individual freedoms,

etc. can all be well explained by this foreign policy objective of China.
Maintaining state sovereignty is China’s second foreign policy objective. This
is a highly important foreign policy objective for the Chinese leadership, because
it directly serves its top foreign policy objective of keeping the nation’s existing
political system intact. For example, China’s resistance to the pressure from the West
on such issues as human rights and individual freedoms is more often than not based
on the principle of state sovereignty, as Beijing insists that these are internal affairs
of China as a sovereign state, in which foreign countries have no right to interfere.
Moreover, state sovereignty is also closely related to the crucial issue of the nation’s
political independence. In this respect, China’s insistence on state sovereignty
is derived from the nation’s over a century of bitter experience as a semi-colony.
Hence, maintaining state sovereignty is seen as fundamental for maintaining China
as an independent nation-state.
China’s third foreign policy objective is to ensure the country’s national security.
This is particularly compelling in that the PRC was established as a communist state
within the unique historical setting of the Cold War. Since then, the communist state,
which had remained in an absolute inferior position vis-à-vis two superpowers, was
under the constant threat first from the US in the 1950s, then from both the US and
the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and thereafter from the Soviet Union from the 1970s
to the early 1980s. Although its security environment greatly improved following
the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, Beijing continues
to be concerned about its geopolitical vulnerability and its military inferiority vis-à-
vis the sole superpower, the US, which has long been confining communist China
geopolitically to its immediate coastal waters and has been continuously critical of
its political system. Hence, improving its national security has been identified by the
Chinese government as a core national interest and has remained high on its foreign
policy agenda as a very important foreign policy objective of the nation.
Preserving the nation’s territorial integrity is China’s fourth foreign policy
objective. Territorial integrity is ranked high by the Chinese leadership on its for-
eign policy agenda, because territorial integrity, which is clearly a core interest of
national consensus, directly affects the legitimacy of the communist government. As
such, Beijing always tries to avoid being seen as weak by the Chinese people when
it comes to territorial disputes with its neighboring counties. Instead, maintaining
territorial integrity is generally used by the Chinese leadership as a way to help
enhance the legitimacy of the communist state. China’s policy regarding territorial
disputes with its neighboring states can be well understood in this context.
China’s fifth foreign policy objective is to achieve national unification with
Taiwan. Before the 1990s, Beijing’s foreign policy of national unification focused
on competing with Taiwan for global recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate
government of all China. Since the 1990s, however, as Taiwan was gradually moving
away from the “one China” policy, Beijing’s policy has switched to prevent Taiwan
from moving toward independence. As a result, Beijing stays firm on the issue of
Taiwan and tries to prevent any move that implies the island’s statehood status.
Moreover, the policy objective of national unification also involves maintaining
Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet as integral parts of China.

13
Chinese Political Science Review

The sixth objective of China’s foreign policy is to ensure the nation’s sustained
economic development and modernization. Especially since economic reforms were
initiated in the late 1970s, it has been one of Beijing’s most important foreign pol-
icy objectives to maintain a peaceful and favorable external environment, so that
the country could concentrate on economic and social development and pursue the
nation’s modernization. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of tao guang yang hui, Hu Jintao’s
notions of “peaceful development” and “harmonious world” and Xi Jinping’s con-
cept of “human community of common destiny” have all been intended to pursue
this foreign policy objective.
Finally, it is also China’s foreign policy objective to enhance the nation’s inter-
national position and restore its great-power status. This foreign policy objective,
which is clearly supported by the Chinese people,22 is seen as particularly significant
by the Chinese leadership in the context of over a century of the nation’s humiliation
imposed by Western and Japanese imperialist powers. This foreign policy objective
was first reflected in the famous slogan at the founding of the PRC on October 1,
1949 that “the Chinese people have stood up.” It has been most recently reflected
in the concept of “China dream” that Xi Jinping put forward after he took office in
2012. The China dream concept clearly refers to a vision of making China a global
power in the process of peaceful development and global cooperation.
Apparently, while the top foreign policy objective of maintaining the existing
political system dominated by the CCP takes precedence over all the other foreign
policy objectives, the effective implementation of those other foreign policy objec-
tives would undoubtedly help promote this top foreign policy objective as identified
by the Chinese communist leadership. As such, the CCP has tried hard to promote
the other foreign policy objective so as to enhance the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule
and to secure its one-party dominant political system in China. It is in this sense that
to some extent the interests of the CCP and the interests of the Chinese nation are
overlapped.

3.2 The Impacts of the Personality Traits and Leadership Styles of Chinese

Leaders on Chinese Foreign Policy

While Chinese foreign policy is fundamentally driven by the country’s national

interests as identified by the Chinese communist leadership, the specific approaches
adopted to pursue the national interests through foreign policy are clearly different
from one communist leader to the other, largely depending on the personality traits
and leadership style of individual Chinese communist leaders as well as the level
of authority they each enjoy in decision-making within the party-state system, The
investigation of this aspect of Chinese foreign policy falls well within the domain of
constructivism.
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, there have been three communist leaders,
among others, who are seen as the most prominent in enjoying predominant authority

22
To use Yan Xuetong’s words, “They (the Chinese) never concern themselves with the question of why
China should be more advanced than other nations, but rather frequently ask themselves the question of
why China is not the number one nation in the world” (Yan 2001, 34).

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

in policy making in general and foreign policy making in particular, namely, Mao
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping. Consequently, these three leaders have left
the most significant imprints on Chinese foreign policy, substantially setting the
direction of Chinese foreign policy. Some scholars even see these three communist
leaders as representing three phases of Chinese foreign policy/diplomacy, that is,
Mao’s “Chinese Diplomacy 1.0” (1949–1979), Deng’s “Chinese Diplomacy 2.0”
(1979–2009), and Xi’s “Chinese Diplomacy 3.0” of today (Hu 2019, 1).
As the leader who brought the Chinese communist revolution to success, Mao
Zedong undoubtedly enjoyed unchallenged power and authority within the CCP.
Although a communist, however, Mao was more nationalistic-oriented, seeing him-
self more as a Chinese absolute monarch and behaving accordingly. Consequently,
during the Mao era all the major policies of the nation, foreign policies in particular,
were basically set by Mao in person.
As a Chinese communist leader, Mao was highly empirical with many of his poli-
cies (including foreign policy) for the nation primarily based on the Chinese com-
munist revolutionary experience before 1949. Possessing unchallenged and over-
whelming power and authority, Mao was extremely self-confident and determined
in pursuing the objectives he had set for the nation. On the other hand, Mao was
also quite idealistic and utopian in setting his objectives and policies. As a result,
Chinese foreign policy during the Mao era was substantially influenced by Mao’s
complex personality and leadership style. For example, Mao’s third world foreign
policy, which was intended to form a global united front against the US and the
Soviet Union, was empirically based on the CCP’s experience of the united front
strategy during the years of the communist revolution to unite with all the forces
that could be united against the chief enemy; Mao’s self-reliance policy was partly
derived from the revolutionary experience of the Yan’an period (1935–1948) and
partly derived from his idealistic belief in the inexhaustible power of the people who
could create everything; Mao’s support of global communist movements was related
to his utopian belief in the eventual success of the global communist revolution and
the creation of a global communist society; and Mao’s famous claim that nuclear
weapons are paper tigers was based on his idealistic idea of man over weapons.
Like Mao, Deng Xiaoping obtained his prestige as a strong communist leader
from his revolutionary experience. However, unlike Mao who was the supreme
leader of the Chinese communist revolution, Deng was only one of the veteran com-
munist leaders from the revolutionary years. Moreover, Deng did not seem to care
about the official titles of party and/or state/government positions and therefore
never assumed the formal positions of the party chief or the head of the state or gov-
ernment. Consequently, Deng’s authority within the CCP never reached the level of
Mao’s. Despite that, however, Deng apparently held dominant power and authority
as the first among equals within the Chinese communist leadership and his authority
allowed him to get his agenda set and his policies implemented.
Like Mao, Deng was self-confident and determined in doing what he wanted.
However, unlike Mao, who was empirical, idealistic and utopian, Deng was highly
pragmatic and flexible, primarily caring about the end through whatever means. Hence,
in order to achieve the objective that he set for the Chinese nation, Deng, although a
communist, could adopt the policies that were far from conventional for a communist

13
Chinese Political Science Review

state. This is well illustrated in Deng’s frequently cited famous “cat theory”—“It
doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.” For Deng, the
most important objective of the Chinese nation was to achieve modernization and
regain global power status. As such, starting in the late 1970s, Deng engineered a
fundamental transformation of the communist state’s policy in general and its foreign
policy in particular. The most significant policy that Deng introduced was economic
reforms and opening of the country to the capitalist world. Deng’s foreign policy,
moving away from the major tenet of Mao’s foreign policy, was precisely designed to
support his reforms and opening policy and to maintain amicable relations with other
countries so as to bring a favorable external environment for China to concentrate on
economic development. Chinese foreign policy from the late 1970s through the 2000s
was basically set along this line of Deng’s thinking.
Xi Jinping is the first Chinese communist leader who was born after the
founding of the PRC. As such, unlike Mao and Deng who obtained their status
as unquestioned communist leaders from their long experience of a successful
communist revolution and from their status as the founders of communist China,
Xi has a much weaker standing as a new communist leader when he first came to
power as the party chief in late 2012, whose appointment was primarily a result
of compromise between major factions within the CCP’s leadership. Moreover,
the Chinese leadership became generally collective in nature in the post-Mao era,
particularly after the mid-1990s, and the party chief was largely seen as the first
among equals. Despite this, however, Xi has managed to turn himself into another
strong communist leader since he took office in 2012. Some analysts even see Xi as
the most powerful Chinese communist leader since Mao.
Xi’s establishment of his dominant position within the CCP as the new commu-
nist leader not only reflects his high political skills in manipulating power politics in
the Chinese political setting, but also reveals his ambition and determination to set a
new course for the Chinese nation. Although undaunted, Xi, compared with Deng,
seems quite conservative and far from prudent and farsighted. Beijing’s dramatic
foreign policy adjustment under Xi is clearly influenced by his personality traits and
leadership style. Particularly, through his highly publicized China dream concept, Xi
has abruptly dropped Deng’s tao guang yang hui foreign policy and replaced it with
a more assertive foreign policy to pursue Chinese national interests. In doing so, Xi
has ushered in the so-called “major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”
and proposed “a new model of great-power relations” between China and the US,
clearly showing his intention to acquire more voice and influence in international
affairs commensurate with the nation’s rising power.23 As part of his great-power

23
See the State Council Information Office of the PRC, “Xi urges breaking new ground in major coun-
try diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” Xinhua, June 24, 2018, available at http://www.xinhu​anet.
com/engli​sh/2018-06/24/c_13727​6269.htm (accessed December 26, 2019). For a discussion of “major
country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” see Hu (2019, 1–14). For a discussion of “a new pat-
tern of great-power relations” between China and the U.S, see “zong shu: xi jinping de ‘xin xing da guo
guan xi’ zhan lue zhe yang lian chen de” (The formation of Xi Jinping’s strategy of ‘a new model of
great power relations”: a summary), people.cn, February 13, 2016, available at http://world​.peopl​e.com.
cn/n1/2016/0213/c1002​-28120​530.html (accessed December 26, 2019).

13
 Chinese Political Science Review

diplomacy, Xi has also launched such high-profile initiatives as the One Belt One
Road (OBOR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Cai 2018).
Equally significant for Xi’s great-power ambition is China’s rapid expansion and
modernization of its military capabilities, which is most illustratively reflected in
the expansion of the Chinese navy, which is well on the way to become blue-water
naval forces.24 In the meantime, Xi has also adopted a number of other assertive for-
eign policy measures to promote China’s national/core interests, including the estab-
lishment and consolidation of China’s presence in the disputed South China Sea by
swiftly transforming multiple reefs under Chinese control into artificial islands and
building military and other installations thereon.
Xi’s such a high profile and assertive foreign policy seems to be based on his
assessment of China’s changed global position today, which is explicitly stated in
his report to the 19th party congress. According to Xi, China has experienced three
stages of development since 1949, that is, the first stage of “China has stood up”
under Mao, the second stage of “China has grown rich” under Deng, and the third
stage of “China is becoming strong” of today, which in Xi’s eyes, is a historical
juncture in China’s development.25 It is precisely based on this assessment of Chi-
nese power that Xi has decisively switched from Deng’s tao guang yang hui foreign
policy into a more assertive foreign policy, so as to make China become a great
power by the mid-twenty-first century (Hu 2019, 1).

4 Conclusion

Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has been influenced and shaped by a number
of major factors. Starting with Waltz’s theory of three images, this article has
developed a neorealist–constructivist approach to explain how each of these factors
influences and shapes Chinese foreign policy in its own way. Depending on their
different impacts on Chinese foreign policy, these factors are divided into two
categories, conditioning and determining. While the nation’s geographical and
geopolitical environment, the country’s power (physical, economic and military),
China’s philosophical traditions and historical experience, and the communist
ideology of the state function as conditioning factors, national/core interests as
identified by the Chinese communist state and the personality traits and leadership
styles of individual communist leaders serve as determining factors. While the
conditioning factors provide physical conditions, power foundation and parameters,
and the philosophical, historical and ideological sources of Chinese foreign policy,
it is the determining factors that directly set the direction and specific objectives

24
See Mark Episkopos, “China’s Navy is Going Blue Water (Starting With 6 Aircraft Carriers),” The
National Interest, July 4, 2019, available at https​://natio​nalin​teres​t.org/blog/buzz/china​s-navy-going​
-blue-water​-start​ing-6-aircr​aft-carri​ers-65546​ (accessed December 24, 2019).
25
“Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress,” delivered on October 18, 2017,
China Daily, November 3, 2017, available at https​://www.china​daily​.com.cn/china​/19thc​pcnat​ional​congr​
ess/2017-11/04/conte​nt_34115​212.htm (accessed December 26, 2019).

13
Chinese Political Science Review

of Chinese foreign policy and the approaches to achieve the nation’s foreign policy
objectives.
The analytical framework constructed in this article should be able to help better
understand China’s foreign policy and external behavior.

Acknowledgements The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for his/her very insightful com-
ments on the original version of this article. Thanks are also given to Thomas W. Burkman for his helpful
proof-reading of the manuscript.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest There is no conflict of interest.

References
Cai, Kevin G. 2018. One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Beijing’s New
Strategy of Geoeconomics and Geopolitics. The Journal of Contemporary China 27 (114): 831–847.
Elleman, Bruce A., and S.C.M. Paine. 2019. Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644 to the Present,
2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Gupta, Rukmani. 2012. China’s National Interests: Exploring the Domestic Discourse. Strategic Analysis
36 (5): 804–818.
Hu, Weixing. 2019. Xi Jinping’s ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: The Role of Leadership in Foreign Policy
Transformation. The Journal of Contemporary China 29 (115): 1–14.
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. 2019. “The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions.” Foreign
Affairs.
Medeiros, Evan S. 2009. China’s International Behavior Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Murphey, Rhoads. 2010. East Asia: A New History, 5th ed. New York: Longman.
Swaine, Michael D. 2011. “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On ‘Core Interests.’” Hoover Institu-
tion, China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, Winter.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
Yan, Xuetong. 1997. Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (Analysis of China’s National Interests). Tianjin: Tianjin
People’s Press.
Yan, Xuetong. 2001. The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes. The Journal of Contemporary China 10 (26):
33–39.
Yong, Deng. 1998. The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations. The China
Quarterly 154: 308–329.

Kevin G. Cai is an associate professor at Renison University College of University of Waterloo in Canada.
His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, the political economy
of East Asia and regional integration and institution-building in East Asia. Dr. Cai is the author of three
books and the editor of one volume. Besides, he has published a number of refereed journal articles, book
chapters and other pieces. Dr. Cai is co-editor of Palgrave Macmillan’s book series, Politics and Develop-
ment of Contemporary China. http://www.palgr​ave.com/gp/serie​s/14541​.

13