1
PROPERTY RELATIONS
It shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any
stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the regime at any
other time, shall be VOID
Art. 74. Property relations is the only instance when the husband and wife can
stipulate as to the terms an conditions.
The marriage settlement governs the property relations of spouses provided such is
not contrary to law.
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the Family Code comes in. If the Family
Code in a rare instance is not applicable, then custom comes in.
Art. 75ACP is the regime of the spouses in the absence of a marriage settlement or
when the marriage settlement is void. This is so because ACP is more in keeping
with Filipino culture.
General Rule: All modifications to the marriage settlement must be made
before the marriage is celebrated.
Exceptions:
1Legal Separation (Article 63 (2))In such an instance, the property regime is
dissolved.
2.Revival of the former property regime upon reconciliation if the spouses agree
(Article 66 (2))
3A spouse may petition the court for:
-Receivership
-Judicial separation of property, or
-The authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership If the other
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family. (Article 128)
4.Judicial Dissolution (Articles 135 and 136)
Form: Marriage settlements and their modifications must be in writing
(private or public) for validity
To bind 3rd persons, the marriage settlement must be registered in:
-Local Civil Registry where the marriage contract is recorded.
-Proper Registries of Property
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute
his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons
designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the
agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
If the party has not yet reached the age of 21, parental consent is also required with
regard to the marriage settlement.
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon
whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to
any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a party thereto.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the
property relations of the spouses shall be governed By Philippine laws,
regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in
the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign
country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic
validity.
Art. 81.The MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT and the DONATIONS PROPTER
NUPTIAS are VOID If the marriage does not take place.
2022 notes: the civil code merely requires that property relations must be in writing
and that it does not require that it be in public instrument for purposes of its validity.
4BLUE95. In an ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY REGIME, the net profits shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time
of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
4BLUE95. In a CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS REGIME, the net
profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties
of the spouses and the products of their labor and industry
REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their
property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of
separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.
Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or
both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon
as separate shall pertain to the absolute community.
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or
her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each
spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry
and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage
from his or her separate property.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their
income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market
value of their separate properties.
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be
solidary.

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
General Rule:Community property shall consist of all the property owned by
the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
Exceptions:
1.Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, including the fruits and
the income.
Exception to the exception: The donor, testator, or grantor expressly provides
otherwise.
A’s father dies. A inherits from the father. A marries B. The property inherited by A
from his father is part of the community property.
B’s mother dies during B’s marriage to A. The property inherited by B from her
mother does not form part of the community property.
In ACP, the income from separate property of the spouses does not form part of the
community property.
In CPG, the income from separate property of the spouses forms part of the
community property.
2.Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse
Exception to the Exception: Jewelry forms part of the community property.
3.Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits and income of such property.
This is provided for so that the children from the 1st marriage will not be prejudiced.
Art. 93.
Presumption: Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
community.However it can be rebutted by proving such property acquired during
marriage is excluded.
LEASE: OWNERSHIP VESTED UPON FULL PAYMENT
(BAR) X &Y are married with 2 children. They entered into a contract with ABC for
a lease over a real property for 20 years with conditional sale. One of the conditions
is that ownership and title shall pass upon full payment of the rentals in the entire
period. On the 10th year, Y died. X married Z and they continued the payment until
fully paid. Ownership was acquired, X donated it to one of his children in the first
marriage. After X’s death, Z and her children went after the property and claiming
the same to be part of the properties of the second marriage, Rule.
HELD:In Jovellanos v CA, Z and her children are correct since full ownership was
vested only duri g the second marriage. Article 118 of the family code can be given
retroactive effect since no vested right by the first marriage was ever acquired.
PROPERTY BEFORE MARRIAGE WHO HAS LEGITIMATE
DESCENDANT IS EXCLUDED
(BAR) A and B are married. They have 2 children. During the marriage, they
acquired properties. A died ,hence , B got married to C. Do the properties of B which
were acquired in the previous marriage with A form part of the absolute community
of property in her marriage to C?
HELD: No, property acquired before marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits ,as well as the income, if any , of
such property is excluded from the absolute community of property, the reason is that
, the interest of the legitimate children in the first marriage are supposed to be
protected.
2005 notes: the rule above does not apply if the spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage had no legitimate children with the deceased spouse.
2005 notes: GRULE: absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for all antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they redound to the benefit of the
family.
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Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children
of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed
by the provisions of this Code on Support;
The ACP shall support the spouses’ common children and legitimate children of
either spouse
A common child of the spouse may not necessarily be legitimate. For example, A is
married to B. A has an affair with C. A and C have a child, D. B dies. A and C get
married. D cannot be legitimated since at the time of D’s conception, A and C had
no capacity to get married.
Illegitimate children are supported:
1.Primarily by their biological parent
2.Subsidiarily by the ACP (Article 94 (9)*)
(2)All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by
one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited;
The wordings under Articles 94 (2) and 94 (3) are different
Article 94 (2) contemplates 3 situations:
1.Obligations contracted by the designated administrator spouse for the purpose of
benefiting the community.
2.Under 94 (2) (a), purpose is enough. It is not required to show to what extent the
family benefited.
3.Obligations contracted by both spouses
4.Obligations contracted by 1 spouse with the consent of the other.
Article 94 (3) contemplates the situation wherein 1 spouse contracts an
obligation without the consent of the other.
The ACP is liable only to the extent that the family may have benefited.
Problem: What is the rule now regarding obligations contracted by the business of a
particular spouse?such debts would fall under Article 94 (2). According to Justice
Vitug, there is implied consent by the other spouse since the same did not object.
Otherwise, commercial transactions would slow down.
(4)All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon
the community property;
(5)All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the
separate property of either spouse used by the family;
Taxes and expenses for the preservation upon the exclusive property by 1 of the
spouses should be borne by the ACP. This is so because the family benefits.
(6)Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph
(7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in
case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse,
the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the
share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
Ante-nuptial debts not falling under Article 94 (7) will be borne by the ACP if the
separate property of the debtor-spouse is insufficient.
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except
those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties.

ADMINISTRATION AND ENJOYMENT OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
(not include selling and donating)
Art. 96, Administration of the community property belongs to both spouses
jointly.Both spouses must consent to the encumbrance or disposition of the
community property.
The other spouse may assume sole powers of administration when:
1The other spouse is incapacitated.
2The other spouse is unable to participate (i.e., abroad)
The power to administer does not include the power to dispose or encumber solely by
1 spouse. Court authority or the approval of the other spouse is required.
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the
community property.
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the
consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the
other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
General Rule: In order to donate any community property, the other
spouse must consent.
Exception: Moderate donations do not need the consent of the other spouse if for:
1. Charity
2. Occasions of family rejoicing or distress
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the
regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3)In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of
both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other
spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.
Separation de facto does not dissolve the ACP.
Art. 101If a spouse abandons the other spouse without just cause or fails to comply
with his or marital obligations, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for the
following:
-Receivership
-Judicial separation of property
-Authority to be the sole administrator.
Abandonment occurs when one leaves the conjugal dwelling without intention of
returning.
Presumption of Abandonment: When the spouse has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of 3 months without giving information as to his whereabouts.
(BAR) X &Y are married with 3 children. X abandoned the wife and children and
lived with Z. B, a friend of X entered into a contract whereby X became a guarantor.
B failed to pay the obligation, hence, B ,X and Y were sued. Judgment was rendered
,can the community of property of X and Y be held liable?
HELD: No. while the obligation was contracted during the marriage,yet the measure
of liability of the community property is the benefit it would bring to the family. A
guaranty agreement is without any consideration. This is especially so since X
abandoned the family.
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DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Article 134 to 138.
Dissolution of the ACP is not synonymous with the dissolution of the marriage. In
Articles 99 (2) and (4), the ACP is dissolved although the marriage is not. However,
the dissolution of the marriage automatically results in the dissolution of the ACP.
In Article 99 (3), when a marriage is declared as a nullity, there is no ACP to dissolve
since there was no property regime to begin with. The dissolution in such a case
would be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 99 is not a complete enumeration of the instances when the ACP terminates.
Another instance is when the marriage is terminated by the reappearance of the
absent spouse (Articles 42 and 43 (2)).
Article 102 enumerates the steps in liquidation:
1.Inventory
3 lists
-Inventory of community property
-Inventory of separate property of the wife
-Inventory of separate property of the husband.
2Payment of Community Debts
First, pay out of community assetsIf not enough, husband and wife are solidarily
liable with their separate property.
3.Delivery to each spouse his or her separate property if any.
4.Division of the net community assets
NOTE: There are special rules regarding the family home.
5.Delivery of presumptive legitimes if any to the children
The presumptive legitimes are given in the following instances:
1.Death of either spouse (Article 103)
2.Legal Separation (Articles 63 and 64)
3.Annulment (Articles 50 – 52)
4.Judicial Separation of Property (Articles 134 – 137)
5.Reappearance of the absent spouse which terminates the 2 nd marriage (Article 43)
(BAR) Upon termination of the marriage by death, what should the surviving
spouse do with the community property?
HELD: he should liquidate the same in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased (Article 103 FC).
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the same judicially or extrajudicially within 1 year from the death of the deceased
spouse (103).
any encumbrance or sale made on the property without having liquidated the same is
void.
should surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without the foregoing
requirements(liquidation), a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. Since the law seeks to
protect the children of the first marriage.—this rule applies also to the conjugal
partnership.
In case of doubt as to which community (marriage) the existing properties belong ,
the same shall be divided between or among the different communities in proportion
to the capital and duration of each.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
The regime of CPG applies:
-In case the future spouse agree on this regime in their marriage settlement, their property
relations will be governed by their agreement with the Family Code suppletorily applicable.
-Knowing the CPG is important. Under the Civil Code, this was the preponderant property
regime. Since a lot of marriages took place before the effectivity of the Family Code –
August 3, 1988 – many property regimes are CPG.
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, the husband and wife place in a common fund:
1.Income of their separate properties
2.Everything acquired by them through their efforts (whether singly or jointly)
3.Everything acquired by them through chance (the winnings from gambling, hidden
treasure, those acquired from hunting)
The spouses are not co-owners of the conjugal properties during the marriage and cannot
alienate the supposed ½ interest of each in the said properties. The interest of the spouses in
the conjugal properties is only inchoate or a mere expectancy and does not ripen into title
until it appears after the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership that there are net
assets (De Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila).
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal
partnership of gains.
Administration is same with absolute community. Contract without wife’s written
consent is void.
4blue 95 notes:The rules on partnership shall be applied PRIMARILY. (but in ACP,
rules in Family Code is applied primarily and partnership in suppletory
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with
designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her
own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike,
without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne
by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced
by the conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and
similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous
acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and
enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her
exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be
recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located.
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose
of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and
appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.
Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by
the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the
proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Presumption: All property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal (but
the contrary may be proved).
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EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSE (ART.109):
1.Property brought to the marriage as his or her own
Strictly speaking paraphernal property refers to the exclusive property of the wife while
capital is the exclusive property of the husband.
2.Property which each spouse acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title (by
succession or donation)
3.Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or exchange with
property belonging to only one of the spouses;
Article 109 (3) is illustrated as follows: The wife owns exclusively a piece of land. The wife
sells such land with the right to repurchase it. The wife redeems the money using conjugal
funds. Under Article 109 (3), the property is still paraphernal as the right of redemption
belongs to the wife. The fact that conjugal funds were used is irrelevant in that the wife
must liquidate such debt to the common fund upon the liquidation of the property regime.
Another illustration of Article 109 (3) is as follows: The wife owns exclusively a lot in BF
Homes in Q.C. The wife decides to sell the lot and gets money in exchange. The money is
paraphernal property.
4.Property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband
The rule is the same for ACP although there is no express provision.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES(ART 107) :
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
(3)The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
The problem arises when the fruits arise from the spouses’ separate properties. For
fruits arising from the separate properties of the spouses to be considered conjugal,
one must look at when the fruits are due and not when the fruits are received.For
example, A lends P 1,000,000 to B at 20% interest payable every quarter. B is
supposed to pay interest on March, June, Sept, and Dec. B did not pay the interest due
on March. A gets married to C. B finally pays the interests for the months of March
and June on June. The interest for March is exclusive property while the interest for
June is conjugal property. The interest for March is exclusive property because the
test is not when A and C receives the fruits. It is when the fruits are due. In this case,
the fruits were due on March before the marriage between A and C. That is why the
interest for June is conjugal property.
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the
finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5)Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number
of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting.
However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
Q: Maria, wife of Pedro, withdrew P 5 Million from their conjugal funds. With this
money, she constructed a building on a lot which she inherited from her father. Is the
building conjugal or paraphernal? Reasons. (2012 BAR)
A: It depends. If the value of the building is more than the value of the land, the
building is conjugal and the land becomes conjugal property under Art. 120 of the
FC. This is a case of reverse accession, where the building is considered as the
principal and the land, the accessory. If, on the other hand, the value of the land is
more than the value of the building, then the ordinary rule of accession applies where
the land is the principal and the building, the accessory. In such case, the land
remains paraphernal property and the building becomes paraphernal properly. (Note:
The rule on reverse accession is applicable only to the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains (CPG) in both the Family Code and the New Civil Code. The foregoing
answer assumes that CPG is the regime of the property relations of the spouses.)

Q: Bernard and Dorothy lived together as common-law spouses although they are
both capacitated to marry. After one year of cohabitation, Dorothy went abroad to
work in Dubai as a hair stylist and regularly sent money to Bernard. With the money,
Bernard bought a lot. For a good price, Bernard sold the lot. Dorothy came to know
about the acquisition and sale of the lot and filed a suit to nullify the sale because she
did not give her consent to the sale. 1. Will Dorothy's suit prosper? Decide with
reasons. 2. Suppose Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the
acquisition of the lot and her efforts consisted mainly in the care and maintenance of
the family and household, is her consent to the sale a prerequisite to its validity?
Explain. (2016 Bar)
A govern the ownership? Explain. b) Who would own the coconut land, and what
1.Yes, Dorothy’s suit will prosper, unless the buyer is a buyer in good faith and for
value. The rule of co-ownership governs the property relationship in a union without
marriage between a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other.
Article 147 of the Family Code is specifically applicable. Under this article, neither
party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consentof the other,
until after the termination of their cohabitation, thus, Bernard may not validly dispose
of the lot without the consent of Dorothy as the lot was acquired through their work
during their cohabitation.
2. Yes, if Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the
lot, her consent is still a prerequisite to the validity of the sale. Under the same
article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and the
household. In this case, although the money used to buy the lot was solely from
Bernard, Dorothy’s care and maintenance of the family and household are deemed
contributions in the acquisition of the lot. Article 147, 2nd paragraph is applicable, as
the lot is deemed owned in common by the common-law spouses in equal shares as
the same was acquired during their cohabitation, without prejudice to the rights of a
buyer in good faith and for value.
Q: Marco and Gina were married in 1989. Ten years later, or in 1999, Gina left
Marco and lived with another man, leaving their two children of school age with
Marco. When Marco needed money for their children's education, he sold a parcel of
land registered in his name, without Gina's consent, which he purchased before his
marriage. Is the sale by Marco valid, void or voidable? Explain with legal basis.
(2015Bar)
A: The sale made by Marco is considered void. The parties were married in 1989 and
no mention was made whether they executed a marriage settlement. In the absence of
a marriage settlement, the parties shall be governed by absolute community of
property whereby all the properties owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage as well as whatever they may acquire during the marriage
shall form part of the absolutecommunity.InACP, neither spouse can sell or
encumber property belonging to the ACP without the consent of the other. Any sale
or encumbrance made by one spouse without the consent of the other shall be void
although it is considered as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
upon authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. (Art. 96, FC)
Q: Jambrich, an Austrian, fell in-love and lived together with Descallar and bought
their houses and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision. In the Contracts to Sell, Jambrich
and Descallar were referred to as the buyers. When the Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, it was refused because
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
After Jambrich and Descallar separated, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from Borromeo. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to Borromeo. Borromeo discovered that titles
to the three (3) lots have been transferred in the name of Descallar. Who is the
rightful owner of the properties? Explain. (2012 Bar)
A: It depends. On the assumption that the Family Code is the applicable law, the
ownership of the properties depends on whether or not Jambrich and Descallar are
capacitated to marry each other during their cohabitation, and whether or not both
have contributed funds for the acquisition of the properties. If both of them were
capacitated to marry each other, Art. 147 will apply to their property relations and the
properties in question are owned by them in equal shares even though all the funds
used in acquiring the properties came only from the salaries or wages or the income
of Jambrich from his business or profession. In such a case, while Jambrich is
disqualified to own any part of the properties, his subsequent transfer of all his
interest therein to Borromeo, a Filipino, was valid as it removed the disqualification.
In such case, the properties are owned by Borromeo and Descallar in equal shares. If,
on the other hand, Jambrich and Descallar were not capacitated to marry each other,
Article 153 governs their property relations. Under this regime, Jambrich and
Descallar are owners of the properties but only if both of them contributed in their
acquisition. If all the funds used in acquiring the properties in question came from
Jambrich, the entire property is his even though he is disqualified from owning it. His
subsequent transfer to Borromeo, however, is valid as it removed the disqualification.
In such case, all of the properties are owned by Borromeo. If, on the other hand,
Descallar contributed to their acquisition, the properties are co-owned by Descallar
and Borromeo in proportion to the respective contributions of Descallar and
Jambrich. (Note: The facts of the problem are not exactly the same as in the case of
Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009, hence, the difference in
the resulting answer)
Q: May succession be conferred by contracts or acts inter vivos? (1991 Bar)
A: Under Art. 84 of the Family Code amending Art. 130 of the Civil Code,
contractual succession is no longer possible since the law now requires that donations
of future property be governed by the provisions on the testamentary succession and
formalities ofwills.
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Q: In 1989, Rico, then a widower, forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a
widow, thirty (30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their
combined earnings a parcel of rice land. After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived
together with Mabel, a maiden sixteen (16) years of age. While living together, Rico
was a salaried employee and Mabel kept house for Rico and did full-time household
chores for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel of coconut land was acquired by
Rico from his savings. After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel
separated. Rico then met and married Letty, a single woman twenty-six (26) years of
age. During the marriage of Rico and Letty, Letty bought a mango orchard out of her
own personal earnings. a) Who would own the rice land, and what property relations
property Relations governs the ownership? Explain. c) Who would own the mango
orchard, and what property relation governs the ownership? Explain. (1992, 1997,
2000 Bar)
A:
a) Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the rice land. The Relations is that of
coownership. (Art. 147 par. 1, FC) However, after Rico's marriage to Letty, the half
interest of Rico in the riceland will then become absolute community property of
Rico and Letty.
b) Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The Relations is a sole/single
proprietorship. (Art. 148 par. 1, FC, is applicable, and not Art. 147, FC) However,
after Rico's marriage to Letty, the coconut land of Rico will then become absolute
communitypropertyof RicoandLetty.
c) Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The relation is the Absolute Community of
Property.(Arts. 75, 90 and 9l, FC)
Q: On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-year old businessman, married Karla, a
winsome lass of 18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin
and Karla entered into an antenuptial contract the day before their marriage
stipulating that conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their marriage. At the time
of their marriage Kevin’s estatewas worth 50Million,while
Karla’swasvaluedat2Million. A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak
helicopter accident. He left no will, no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside
from Karla, are his only relatives: his brother Luis and first cousin Lilia. What
property regime governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla? Explain. (1995 Bar)
A: Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and without
the participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage
settlement is invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides that a minor who
according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements, but
they shall be valid only of the person who may give consent to the marriage are made
parties to the agreement. (Karla was still a minor at the time the marriage settlement
was executed in September 1988 because the law, RA 6809, reducing the age of
majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The marriage settlement
being void, the property regime governing the marriage is, therefore, absolute
community of property, under Art. 75 of theFC.
Q: Tim came into possession of an old map showing where a purported cache of
gold bullion was hidden. Without any authority from the government Tim conducted
a relentless search and finally found the treasure buried in a new river bed formerly
part of a parcel of land owned by spouses Tirso and Tessie. The old river which used
to cut through the land of Spouses Ursula and Urbito changed its course through
natural causes. Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without
executing any antenuptial agreement. One year after their marriage, Tirso while
supervising the clearing of Tessie’s inherited land on the latter’s request, accidentally
found the treasure not in the new river bed but on the property of Tessie. To whom
shall the treasure belong? (1995Bar)
A: Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the effectivity of the Family Code,
their property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of
the Civil Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or
proprietor belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. The one-half share pertaining
to Tessie as owner o the land, and the one-half share pertaining to Tirso as finder of
the treasure, belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
Q: Bar candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry each
other before the last day of the 1991 Bar Examinations. They agreed to execute a
Marriage Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her own handwriting.
They agreed on the following: (1) a conjugal partnership of gains; (2) each donates to
the other fifty (50) percent of his/her present property; (3) Rowena shall administer
the conjugal partnership property; and (4) neither may bring an action for the
annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both signed the agreement in
the presence of two witnesses. They did not, however, acknowledge it before a notary
public. a) As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in the
registry of property? If not, what steps must be taken to make itregistrable? b) Are
the stipulations valid? c) If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above
stipulations are likewise valid, does it now follow that said Marriage Settlement is
valid and enforceable? (1991Bar)
A:
a) Yes, it is valid as to form because it is in writing. However, it cannot be registered
in the registry of property because it is not a public document. To make it registrable,
it mustbe reformedandhas tobenotarized.
b) Stipulations 1 and 3 are valid because they are not contrary to law. Stipulation 4 is
void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation 2 is valid up to 1/5 of their respective
present properties by void as to the excess. (Art. 84, Family Code)
c) No, on September 15, 1991, the marriage settlement is not yet valid and
enforceable until the celebration of the marriage, to take place before the last day of
the 1991 Bar Examinations.

Q: Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10, 1990.
Prior thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in the
Register of Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired
a residential house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In 1995, they
decided to change their property relations to the regime of complete separation of
property. Mila consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative business. The
spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal partnership and
agreeing on a complete separation of property. Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion
in Baguio City, and a 5- hectare agricultural land in Oriental Mindoro, which he
registered exclusively in his name. In the year 2000, Mila's business venture failed,
and her creditors sued her for P10,000,000.00. After obtaining a favorable judgment,
the creditors sought to execute on the spouses' house and lot and condominium unit,
as well as Gabby's mansion and agriculturalland. a) Discuss the status of the first and
the amended marriage settlements. b) Discuss the effects of the said settlements on
the properties acquired by the spouses. c) What properties may be held answerable
for Mila's obligations? Explain. (2005Bar)
A:
a)
1) The first marriage settlement was valid because it was in writing, signed by the
parties and executed before the celebration of themarriage
2) The subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification of their
marriage settlement. To be valid, the modification must be executed before the
celebration of the marriage. The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and a separation of their properties because
it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement by the parties to dissolve
their conjugal partnership and to separate their properties during the marriage has to
be approved by the court.
b) Since the marriage settlement was binding between the parties, conjugal
partnership of gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, jointly or by either one of them, through their work or industry are
conjugal. Therefore, the residential house and lot, and the condominium unit are
conjugal having been jointly acquired by the couple during the marriage. Inasmuch
as the subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
separation of property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the
parties. Therefore, the mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having
been acquired by one of the spouses during themarriage.
c) The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the creditors,
because it was not registered with the local civil registrar where the marriage was
recorded. To bind third parties, the Family Code requires registration of the marriage
settlement not only with the proper registers of deeds but also with the local civil
registrar where the marriage was recorded. Hence, if the rules on conjugal
partnership will prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute community will be
applied instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without the
consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal partnership
and absolute community. The partnership or community is liable for debts contracted
by one spouse but only to the extent that it benefited the family. Therefore, if the
debts contracted by Mila redounded to the benefit of the family, all the conjugal
partnership properties are liable to pay them but only to the extentthe family was
benefited. The separate properties of Mila may be held answerable for Mila’s debts
and obligations that did not redound to the benefit ofthefamily.
Q: In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In
1975, Bob inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he
constructed a tworoom bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time,
the lot was worth P800, 000.00 while the house, when finished cost P600,000.00. In
1989 Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his mother, Sofia. Assuming that
the relative values of both assets remained at the same proportion: 1. State whether
Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but exclusive
property of her deceased son. 2. Will your answer be the same if Bob
diedbeforeAugust3,1988? (1998Bar)
A:
1. Since Bob and Sofia got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New
Civil Code, in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the
property of the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains. (Art. 119) By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and the wife place
in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry. (Art. 142) In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his
own separate property, he having acquired the same by lucrative title. (Art. 148,par.
2) However, the house constructed from his own savings in 1981 during the
subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property and not exclusive property
in accordance with the principle of "reverse accession" provided for in Art. 158 of the
Civil Code.
2. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their
marriage way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. (Art.119) It will not matter if
Bob died before or after August 3, 1988 (effectivity date of the Family Code), what
matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted
their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs them is still the
conjugal partnership of gains. (Art.158)
6
Q: Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive drinking of her husband,
Alberto. Paulita, out of her own endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she
was able to register under her name with the addendum ―widow.‖ She also acquired
stocks in a listed corporation registered in her name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to
Rafael, who first examined the original of the transfer certificate of title. 1) Has
Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock acquired by Paulita? 2) Can Alberto
recover the land from Rafael? (1994Bar)
A:
1)
a) Yes. The Family Code provides that all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the community property unless the contrary is proved.
b) Yes. The shares are presumed to be absolute community property having
been acquired during the marriage despite the fact that those shares were
registered only in her name. Alberto’s right to claim his share will only arise,
however,atdissolution.
c) The presumption is still that the shares of stock are owned in common.
Hence, they will form part of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership depending on what the property regimeis.
d) Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by onerous title during the
marriage, these are part of the conjugal or absolute community property, as the
case may be, or after the effectivity of the Family Code. Her physical separation
from her husband did not dissolve the community of property. Hence, the
husband has a right to share in the shares ofstock.
2)
a) Under a community of property,whether absolute or relative, the disposition
of property belonging to such community is void if done by just one spouse
without the consent of the other or authority of the proper court. However, the
land was registered in the name of Paulita as ―widow.‖ Hence, the buyer has the
right to rely upon what appears in the record of the Register of Deeds and
should, consequently, be protected. Alberto cannot recover the land from Rafael
but would have the right of recourse against hiswife.
b) The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired
during the marriage and through Paulita’s industry despite the registration being
only in the name of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to
Rafael without the consent of Alberto is void. However, since the land is
registered in the name of Paulita as widow, there is nothing in the title which
would raise a suspicion for Rafael to make inquiry. He, therefore, is an innocent
purchaser for value from whom the land may no longer be recovered.
c) The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired
during the marriage and through Paulita’s industry despite registration only in
the name of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael
without the consent of Alberto isvoid.
BAR MATTER 2024
Installment purchases (Art. 118)
Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds and party from
conjugal funds:
• Belongs to the buyer/s: If full ownership vested before the marriage
• Belongs to the conjugal partnership: If full ownership vested during the marriage
In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses
shall be reimbursed by the owner upon liquidation.
Credits in Installment (Art. 119)
Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the
spouses:
• Belongs to the spouse: Sums collected in partial payments or by installments during
the marriage
• Belongs to the conjugal partnership: Interests falling due during the marriage on the
principal

RULES IN CASES OF IMPROVEMENT OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
General Rule: The ownership of improvements made on the separate property
of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through efforts of both
spouses shall pertain to the partnership. (Art. 120)
Accession– if the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are
equal or less than the value of the entire property at the time of the improvement, the
entire property remains the exclusive property of the owner-spouse (subject to
reimbursement of improvement cost to the CPG)
Reverse Accession – if the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the entire property at the time of the improvement,
the property becomes conjugal (subject to reimbursement of the value of the property
of the owner-spouse)
CHARGES UPON CPG (ART. 121)
Same as that under ACP, except that under taxes and expenses for preservation
of separate property of either spouse during the marriage → property need not
be used by the family
NOTE: If the conjugal partnership is insufficient, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
The conjugal partnership property shall likewise be liable for the payment of the
personal debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the
family. (Art. 121)
Payment of criminal indemnities can be advanced by the conjugal partnership assets
even before these are liquidated. It may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities in Article 121 have been covered. No prior liquidation of
those assets is required. (Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 165201, 2012)
NOTE: If the community property is insufficient to cover all these liabilities (except
those falling under cases of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
A loan used for the family business is one which redounds to the benefit of the
family, even if the business fails (ROS v. Phil National Bank, GR No. 170166, 2011).
Under the Family Code, one spouse cannot sell property which is part of the
community properties without the written consent of the other spouse or the authority
of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. While the law
does not require a person dealing with registered land to inquire further than what the
Torrens Title on its face indicates, the rule is not absolute.
In order to be considered a buyer in good faith, the following must be shown: (a) the
diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the
diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other spouse. Mere reliance on the SPA given by the selling
spouse without further questioning despite knowing that the lots were conjugal
property is insufficient. (Spouses Aggabao v. Parulan, G.R. No. 165803, 2010)
4BLUE95. Although the mortgage is void as a spouse's consent is indispensable for
the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal properties, the principal obligation [loan
contracted during their marriage] remains valid
7
STEPS IN LIQUIDATION
1.Inventory of the CPG assets.
4blue 95: in the inventory ,there should be a separate listing of the conjugal and the
separate assets.
2.Restitution of advances made to each spouse (i.e., Article 122)
3.Payment of debts to each spouse (i.e., Article 120 )
4.Payment of obligations to 3rd parties
5.Delivery of exclusive properties
6.Payment of losses and deterioration of movables belonging to each spouse
4blue 95: even if due to fortuitous event, it shall be paid to said spouse from the
conjugal funds
7.Delivery of presumptive legitimes
8.Division
WHERE DISSOLUTION/LIQUIDATION IS MADE
Conjugal terminates(same ground to absolute):
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
a.CPG is dissolve in the testate/intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
b.or in Extra judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse,provided that there are no debts and provided all are of age or are
duly represented by their judicial guardians in case of minors.
c.in ordinary judicial partition
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation/annulment ;
Dissolve in said proceedings.
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Article 134 to 138.
Another instance is when the marriage is terminated by the reappearance of the
absent spouse (Articles 42 and 43 (2))
VAN DORN v ROMILLO: Alice (Fil) and Richard (American) married in HK.
They divorced in the US and Alice remarried to Theodore Richard filed a case in
RTC Pasay: Galleon Shop is their conjugal property and that Alice should render an
accounting and that he be declared a co-manager of the shop
HELD: pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
SILVERIO v RP : It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or
amend it.In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
HELD: It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

SEPARATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON PROPERTY BY ONE SPOUSE DURING
THE MARRIAGE CAN TAKE PLACE IN BOTH ACP AND CPG.
A PETITION MAY BE FILED FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACP OR
THE CPG BY:
1.Both spouses: voluntary dissolution (Articles 134 and 136)
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either
be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the
voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains,
as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and
notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the
creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest.
There are no need for causes in a voluntary dissolution.
2.One spouse: petition for sufficient cause (Article 135)
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5)That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the
final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the
grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
Causes are required for a petition for sufficient cause.
Article 135 (3) must be taken in relation with Articles 229 (4) and Articles 231 and
232.
The definition of abandonment in Article 135 (4) is found in Articles 101 and 128.
Under Article 135 (6), the spouse must wait for 1 year. After 1 year, the spouse can
file the petition for sufficient cause. Also reconciliation must be highly improbable.
The separation of the property of the spouses may not be done extrajudicially even if
the spouses agree. Court intervention is necessary.
After the decree of separation, the parties can revert back to their original regime by
filing a motion in court (Article 141).
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in
conformity with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses
and their children.
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.
Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment
granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and
registries of property.
Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously
acquired by creditors.
8
REVIVIAL OF PROPERTY REGIME:
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of
property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property
regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of
the following instances:
(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse
granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements will not again abuse that
power, authorizes the resumption of said
administration;
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home
without a decree of legal separation resumes
common life with the other;
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to
the spouse previously deprived thereof;
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at
least one year, reconcile and resume common life;
or
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership
has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition
of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the
former property regime. No voluntary separation
of property may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67.
If separation was by voluntary dissolution, the parties may agree to revert back to
their original property regime. However, if they do so, no voluntary separation of
property may be granted again.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALL CLASSES OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
OF EITHER SPOUSE MAY BE TRANSFERRED BY THE COURT TO THE
OTHER SPOUSE:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an
accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of
interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to
be the administrator.
This article enumerates the instances when the court may transfer the
administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse.
The following are the instances in when there can be a sole administrator of the
conjugal property:
1.If such is stipulated in the marriage settlement (Article 74)
2.If the other spouse is unable to participate (Articles 96, ¶2 and 124, ¶2 *)
3.The court may order such in case of abandonment (Articles 101 and
128)
4.If the spouses agree to such an arrangement during marriage. However,
in order to affect 3rd persons, such agreement must be registered.
 9

PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS W/O MARRIAGE

Requisites of Article 147:

Article 148 will apply if:
1. The man and the woman must have capacity to marry
each other.
1. The live-in partners do not have the capacity to marry each other; or
2. The man and the woman cohabit.
Example of this is that there is an impediment of relationship, crime or age.
3. The cohabitation is exclusive.
4. The man and the woman are not married to each other or
are married to each other but the marriage is void. 2. The cohabitation is not exclusive.

Under Article 147, the property regime between the man and the woman would be
special co-ownership. The special co-ownership only covers property acquired by both parties through their
The special co-ownership covers: actual joint contribution of money, property or industry. This is very similar to an
ordinary partnership.
1. Wages and salaries of either the man and the woman
If a live-in partner is legally married to someone else, the share of that live-in partner
2. Property acquired through the work or industry of either will accrue to the property regime of his or her existing valid marriage.
or both
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another his or her share
 If the partner did not acquire the property directly,
shall be forfeited to their common children or descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party
that partner's efforts must consist of the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household in
order for such party to own 1/2 of the acquired
property.


In Maxey vs. CA, the SC said that the co-
ownership arises even if the common-law wife
does not work is not gainfully employed. The
common-law wife is still a co-owner since she ran
the household and held the family purse even if
she did not contribute thereto.
The difference between this special co-ownership and the ordinary co-ownership is in
Article 147, ¶3. In this special co-ownership, the following cannot be done:
1. The co-ownership cannot be terminated until the
cohabitation is also terminated.
2. The co-owner may not dispose or encumber his share in
the property.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
Article 148 governs live-in partners who do not fall under Article 147or those
relationship under state of bigamy. That’s why law states that there should be ―actual
joint‖ contribution.
2022 notes: Administration is not ―actual‖ contribution. However, in Saguid v CA
(2005), since it came from the common fund and husband did not object thereto,then
each party is entitled to half of that fund.

2022 notes:Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
2022 notes:When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
2022 notes: it does not include their separate property, only the fruits. In Gonzales v
Gonzales(2005) it presumes that property is owned in common.
2022 notes:if case falls before the effectivity of family code, it is owned exclusively
by one party such property . but if its during the effectivity of family code, then it is
presumed to be owned both by parties.
The registration of a property in the name of the paramour who had no income
whatsoever at the time of the donation by another’s husband is tantamount to a
donation which is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The paramour then
holds the property under a constructive trust under Article 1456 in favor of the
conjugal partnership of the husband with the legitimate spouse (Joaquino v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 154645, 2004).
Under Article 148, there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in
partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their
contribution. Otherwise, there are no presumptions of co-ownership and equal
sharing. (Villanueva v. CA, G.R. No. 143286, 2004, reiterated in Ventura v. Sps.
Paulino, G.R. No. 202932, 2013)
No co-ownership exists between parties to an adulterous relationship. In such a
relationship, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. (Rivera v. Heirs
of Villanueva, G.R. No. 141501, 2006)
Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only the property acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal.
However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Petitioner failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the
condominium unit. (Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna G.R. No.
171914 2015)

Q: Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed.
Rizza is not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household. After living
together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary earnings
during that period the amout of P200,000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A house
and lot worth P500,000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the
property, P200,000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda
owned by Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In
fine, the sum of P500,000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P100,000.00, being used by
the common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by herparents. Luis
and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them
your legal advice on the following: a) How, under the law, should the bank deposit of
P200,000.00, the house and lot valued at P500,000.00 and the car worth P100,000.00
be allocated to them? b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis
and Rizza been living together all the time, i.e., since twenty years ago, under a valid
marriage? (1997 Bar)
A:
a) Art. 147 of the Family Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules ofco-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the familyand of thehousehold. Thus: 1. The
wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be divided equally
betweenLuis andRizza. 2. The house and lot valued at P500,000.00 having been
acquired by both of them through work or industry shall be divided between them in
proportion to their respective contribution in consonance with the rules on co-
ownership. Hence, Luis gets 2/5 while Rizza gets 3/5 of P500,000.00. 3. The car
worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been
donated to her by her parents.
b) The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been
celebrated 20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, under which the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts of by chance, and upon
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by
either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them.(Art. 142, CivilCode)
Thus: 1. The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200,000.00 and
the house and lot valued at P500,000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis
andRizza. 2. However, the car worth P100,000.00 donated to Rizza by her parents
shall be considered to her own paraphernal property, having been acquired by
lucrative title. (par. 2, Art. 148, Civil Code)
Q: Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Blas to construct a house on a lot
which he (Blas) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation
of the house, Adam hit a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old
Banco de las Islas Filipinas. Using a detonation device, Adam was able to open the
vault containing old notes and coins which were in circulation during the Spanish era.
While the notes and coins are no longer legal tender, they were valued at P100
million because of their historical value and the coins silver nickel content. The
following filed legal claims over the notes andcoins: i. Adam, as finder; ii. Blas, as
owner of the property where they were found; iii. Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault; and iv. The Philippine Government
because of their historical value. Assuming that either or both Adam and Blas are
adjudged as owners, will the notes and coins be deemed part of their absolute
community or conjugal partnership of gains with their respective spouses? (2008
Bar)
A: Yes. The hidden treasure will be part of the absolute community or conjugal
property of the respective marriages. (Arts 91, 93 and 106, Family Code)
Q: In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license,
went to the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was
not there, but the Mayor’s secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to
fill up and sign the required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to
wait, and went out to look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a
neighboring municipality. When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the
wedding reception, she showed him the marriage contract forms and told him that the
couple and their witnesses were waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all
the copies of the marriage contract, gave them to the secretary who returned to the
Mayor’s office. She then gave copies of the marriage contract to the parties, and told
Michael and Anna that they were already married. Thereafter, the couple lived
together as husband and wife, and had three sons. What governs the properties
acquired by the couple? Explain. (2009 Bar)
A: The marriage being void, the property relationship that governed their union is
special co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. This is on the
assumption that there was no impediment for them to validly marry each other.
10
Q: For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer,
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they
were capacitated to marry each other. Since Tony's salary was more than enough for
their needs, Susan stopped working and merely "kept house." During that period,
Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five
years, Tony and Susan decided to separate. a) Who will be entitled to the house and
lot? b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2000Bar)
A:
a) Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in equal shares.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and
wife, the property acquired during their cohabitation are presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or
her care and maintenance of the family and ofthe household.
b) Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the
parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment,
only those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the
family and household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of
the properties. Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot,
she has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from
Alice, the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before
his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or
partnership withAlice.
Q: G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which
bore no offspring, was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the couple possessed the following
properties: 1. A house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the
purchase price (representing downpayment) of which he paid; one third (1/3) was
paid by G on February 14, 1990 out of a cash gift given to her by her parents on her
graduation on April 6, 1989; and the balance was paid out of the spouses’ joint
income; and 2. an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987. a. Who
owns the foregoing properties? Explain. b. If G and B had married on July 3, 1987
and their marriage was dissolved in 2007, who owns the properties? Explain. (2010
Bar)
A:
a. Since the marriage was declared void ab initio in 2001, no absolute community or
conjugal partnership was ever established between B and G. Their property relation
is governed by a ―special co-ownership‖ under Article 147 of the Family Code
because they were capacitated to marry each other. Under Article 147, wages and
salaries of the ―former spouses‖ earned during their cohabitation shall be owned by
them in equal shares while properties acquired thru their work for industry shall be
owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. Care and maintenance
of the family is recognized as a valuable contribution. In the absence of proof as to
the value of their respective contributions,they shall share equally. If ownership of
the house and lot was acquired by B on August 3, 1988 at the time he bought it on
installment before he got married, he shall remain owner of the house and lot but he
must reimburse G for all the amounts she advanced to pay the purchase price and for
one-half share in the last payment from their joint income. In such case, the house
and lot were not acquired during their cohabitation,hence, are not co-owned by B and
G. But if the ownership of the house and lot was acquired during the cohabitation, the
house and lot will be owned as follows: i. 1/3 of the house and lot is owned by B. He
is an undivided co-owner to that extent for his contributions in its acquisition in the
form of the down payment he made before the celebration of the marriage. The
money he used to pay the down payment was not earned during the cohabitation,
hence, it is his exclusive property. ii. 1/3 of the house and lot is owned by G. She is
an undivided co-owner to the extent for her contribution in its acquisition when she
paid 1/3 of the purchase price using the gift from her parents. Although the gift was
acquired by G during her cohabitation with B, it is her exclusive property. It did not
consist of wage or salary or fruit of her work or industry. iii. 1/3 of the house is co-
owned by B and G because the payment came from their coowned funds, i.e., their
joint income during their cohabitation which is shared by them equally in the absence
of any proof to the contrary. After summing up their prospective shares, B and G are
undivided co-owners of the house and lot in equal shares. As to the apartment, it is
owned exclusive by B because he acquired it before their cohabitation. Even if he
acquired it during their cohabitation, it will still be his exclusive property because it
did not come from his wage or salary, or from his work or industry. It was acquired
gratuitously from his uncle.
b. The answer is the same as in letter A. Since the parties to the marriage which was
later declared void ab initio were capacitated to marry each other, the applicable law
under the New Civil Code was Article 144.This Article is substantially the same as
Article 147 of the FamilyCode. Hence, the determination of ownership will remain
the same as in question A. And even assuming that the two provisions are not the
same, Article 147 of the Family Code is still the law that will govern the property
relations of B and G because under Article 256, the Family Code has retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under the
new Civil Code or other laws. Applying Article 147 retroactively to the case of G and
B will not impair any vested right. Until the declaration of nullity of the marriage
under the Family Code, B and G have not yet acquired any vested right over the
properties acquired during their cohabitation.

DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS
Requisites of Donations Propter nuptias
1. Made before marriage
2. Made in consideration of the marriage (the motivation behind
the donation is the marriage)
3. In favor of one or both of the spouses
The donee must be 1 or both of the spouses
The donor can be anybody including 1 of the spouses
If the wedding gift is given before the wedding that is a donation propter nuptias.
If the wedding gift is given after the wedding, that is treated as an ordinary donation
Art. 83. FORM: Must comply with the form of donations in order to be valid (See Articles
748 and 749)
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community
of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than
one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void.
4blue95: If the donor is not one of the future spouses, the donor may give more than 1/5 of
his present property provided that the legitimes are not impaired.
4blue95: If the regime is ACP, there is no need to give a donation propter nuptias to your
spouse. It is useless since such donation shall become part of the community property. In
addition, donor’s tax must be paid.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary
succession and the formalities of wills.
This article applies only if the regime is NOT ACP. Otherwise, everything practically would
be community property.
If the donor is one of the future spouses and the regime is NOT ACP, the donor cannot
donate more than 1/5 of his PRESENT PROPERTY.
2022 notes: But if it is ACP, there is no limit.
The future spouse may donate future property to his fiancée for as long as it is not
inofficious (does not impair legitimes of the other compulsory heirs). This is so because the
donation of future property is really a testamentary disposition.
In the case of Mateo vs. Lagua, the Supreme Court said that donations propter nuptias may
be revoked for being inofficious.
2022 notes: In gercio v SunLife, the SC said that the rule against donation to one another
between the spouses does not include a spouse being a beneficiary of an insurance contract
over the life of the other.
2022 notes: donation to mistress are void, since it is made between persons guilty of
adultery at the time of the donation.
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the
following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except
donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as
required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions
of the Civil Code on donations in general.
In Article 86 (6), the act of ingratitude refers to Article 765.
(BAR) A and B set their wedding on June 12,1993. On May 31,1993, A donated a real
property to B, but prior to the donation, the property was mortgaged with the PNB for
P500T.Is the donation valid?
HELD: Donation valid. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to
encumbrances shall bevalid since A at time of the donation is still the owner of the property.
If the mortgage is foreclosed and it is sold for less than the obligation secured, the donee
shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of
said obligation, said donee shall be entitled to the excess.
2022 notes: If marriage does not push through, the donations can be revoke by the donor.
11
General Rule: During the marriage, the spouses may not donate to one another.
Exception: Spouses may give moderate gifts to each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.
4BLUE 95 NOTE: Article 87 is applicable to common-law spouses (Matabuena vs.
Cervantes)
This is to minimize improper or undue pressure as well as to prevent the spouses from
defrauding their creditors.
2024 notes: cohabitation is not anymore about sex,its all about public assumption.
Q: In 1997, B and G started living together without the benefit of marriage. The relationship
produced one offspring, Venus. The couple acquired a residential lot in Parañaque. After
four (4) years or in 2001, G having completed her 4-year college degree as a fulltime
student, she and B contracted marriage without a license. The marriage of B and G was, two
years later, declared null and void due to the absence of a marriage license. If you were the
judge who declared the nullity of the marriage, to whom would you award the lot? Explain
briefly. (2010 Bar)
A: Since the marriage was null and void, no Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership
was established between B and G. Their properties are governed by the ―special co-
ownership‖ provision of Article 147 of the Family Code because both B and G were
capacitated to marry each other. The said Article provides that when a man and a woman
who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or under a void marriage:
(1) their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares; and
(2) property acquired by bothofthem through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In co-ownership, the parties are co-owners if they contributed
something of value in the acquisition of the property. Their share is in proportion to their
respective contributions. In an ordinary coownership the care and maintenance of the family
is not recognized as a valuable contribution for the acquisition of a property. In the Article
147 ―special co-ownership‖, however, care and maintenance is recognized as a valuable
contribution which will entitle the contributor to half of the propertyacquired. Having been
acquired during their cohabitation, the residential lot is presumed acquired through their
joint work and industry under Art. 147, hence B and G are co-owners of the said property in
equalshares. Art. 147 also provides that when a party to the void marriage was in bad faith,
he forfeits his share in the co-ownership in favor of the common children or descendants. In
default of children or descendants, the forfeited share shall belong to the innocent party. In
the foregoing problem, there is no showing that one party was in bad faith. Hence, both shall
be presumed in good faith and no forfeiture shall take place.
Q: In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married Ophelia with
whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990, he married
Shirley and abandoned Ophelia. During their union, James and Ophelia acquired a
residential lot worth P300,000.00. Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his
marriage with Shirley be declared null and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since
his marriage to Ophelia was contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the
former is not binding upon him, the same being void ab initio; he further claims that his
marriage to Shirley is valid and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the time he
married her. What property regime governed the union of James and Ophelia? (1991 Bar)
A: The provisions of Art. 148 of the Family Code shall govern: Art. 148. In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit.
Q: In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975,
Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of rice land, with the title being placed jointly
in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which
was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died and Carol promptly filed
an action against Erlinda to recover both the Riceland and the house and lot, claiming them
to be conjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio
were co-owners of the Riceland; and with respect to the house and lot, she claims she is the
exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in
either purchase, how do you decide the case? A: Under Art. 148 of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, only the properties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Moreover, if one of the parties is validly married to another, his
share in the coownership shall accrue to the absolute community/conjugal partnership
existing in such validmarriage. Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used
her own money to buy the Riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the coowner
of the Riceland nor the exclusive owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricio’s.
And since his share accrues to the conjugal partnership with Carol, Carol can validly claim
such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda. (Art. 144, Civil Code) Q: Danny and Elsa were
married in 2002. In 2012, Elsa left the conjugal home and her two minor children with
Danny to live with her paramour. In 2015, Danny sold without Elsa’s consent a parcel of
land registered in his name that he had purchased prior to the marriage. Danny used the
proceeds of the sale to pay for his children’s tuition fees. Is the sale valid, void or voidable?
Explain your answer. (2012, 2017, Bar)
A: The sale of the parcel of land is void. There is no indication in the facts that Danny and
Elsa executed a marriage settlement prior to their marriage. As the marriage was celebrated
during the effectivity of the Family Code and absent a marriage settlement, the property
regime between the spouses is the Absolute Community of Property. [Article 75, FC] Under
the Absolute Community of Property regime, the parcel of land belongs to the community
property as the property he had brought into the marriage even if said property were
registered in the name of Danny. [Article 91, FC] In addition, said property do not fall under
any of the exceptions under Article 92. Therefore, the sale of the property is void, because it
was executed without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
[Article 96, 100,FC]