Chaos Theory in Politics

Understanding Complex Systems
Santo Banerjee
Şefika Şule Erçetin
Ali Tekin Editors
Chaos
Theory in
Politics
Springer Complexity
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Understanding Complex Systems
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Santo Banerjee • Şefika Şule Erçetin • Ali Tekin
Editors
Chaos Theory in Politics
123
Editors
Santo Banerjee Şefika Şule Erçetin
Institute for Mathematical Research Hacettepe University and International
University Putra Malaysia Science Association
Serdang, Malaysia Ankara, Turkey
Ali Tekin
Yaşar University
İzmir, Turkey
ISSN 1860-0832 ISSN 1860-0840 (electronic)

ISBN 978-94-017-8690-4 ISBN 978-94-017-8691-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8691-1
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SB: To Chaitali (Rupa) and Sudip, wish you a
less Politics and no Chaos in life!
SSE: To my dearest Nihan Potas and Şuay
Nilhan Aç{kal{n
AT: I dedicate my contribution to this book to
many students that I have encountered over
the years as a professor. Their support,
challenges, and comments have been
extremely valuable for my professional
growth.
Preface
World history has always been full of catastrophic social and political events. From
the industrial revolution to the First World War and the more recent Arab Spring,
these events will be remembered as cornerstones of modern world history. Although
the twenty-first century has not witnessed a world war, we have experienced new
challenges, including ethnic conflicts and global warming. To meet these and other
new challenges, humanity must learn new concepts and develop new approaches.
The last 50 years have witnessed a scientific revolution and critical accumulation
of knowledge that have triggered a more multi-disciplinary approach towards
research in order to address these new challenges. Often this multi-disciplinary
approach is given the label of Chaos Theory, a term that first gained popularity
in the disciplines of Mathematics and Physics. In fact, this could perhaps better be
seen as a new term to define a very old concept. Our daily lives can be seen as
being directly linked with the events in sociology, political science and the natural
sciences. What was at first branded as a primarily numerical concept has in recent
years been shown to part of the fabric of our social reality. Today, we recognize
that our lives are affected on a daily basis by unexpected human behaviour. In such
a world, there are always alternative ways to understand the social and political
dynamics of our history.
This book attempts to frame chaos and its application within different subcate-
gories of world politics. The reader will gain insights from Arab Spring to gender
issues through the eyes of chaos theory. It is my hope that this book will inspire
researchers, both present and future, to work in the dynamic field of chaos and
politics.
I wish to thank the editors who invited me to write the preface for a book on our
unique field of “chaos.”
Ankara Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın

November-2013
vii
Contents
Part I Politics, Uncertainty and Peace Intelligence
1 Organized and Disorganized Chaos a New Dynamics

in Peace Intelligence .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Şefika Şule Erçetin, Ali Tekin, and Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın
2 Uncertainty and Fuzzy Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
İbrahim Özkan and I. Burhan Türkşen
3 Understanding of Arab Spring with Chaos Theory –
Uprising or Revolution .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek
Part II Politics, Complex Systems, Basin of Attractions
4 Economic Decision Making: Application of the Theory

of Complex Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Robert Kitt
5 Basins of Attraction for Generative Justice.. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Ron Eglash and Colin Garvey
6 Chaos in World Politics: A Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Manuel Alberto Martins Ferreira,
José António Candeias Bonito Filipe, Manuel F.P. Coelho,
and Isabel C. Pedro
7 Large Spatial and Temporal Separations of Cause
and Effect in Policy Making – Dealing with Non-linear Effects .. . . . . . 105
John McCaskill
ix
x Contents
Part III Leadership, Political Science, Chaos and National

Security
8 Chaos and Political Science: How Floods and Butterflies

Have Proved to Be Relevant to Move Tables Closer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Joan Pere Plaza i Font
9 Working Towards Führer: A Chaotic View . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Ulas Cakar
10 New Communitarianism Movements and Complex Utopia . . . . . . . . . . . 163
K. Gediz Akdeniz
11 Counter-Intelligence as a Chaotic Phenomenon and Its
Importance in National Security .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Gökhan Kuloğlu, Zakir Gül, and Şefika Şule Erçetin
Part IV Sex Complexity and Politics in Literature
12 Sex Complexity and Politics in Black Dogs by Ian McEwan. . . . . . . . . . . 191

Mina Abbasiyannejad and Rosli Talif
Part I
Politics, Uncertainty and Peace Intelligence
Chapter 1
Organized and Disorganized Chaos a New
Dynamics in Peace Intelligence
Şefika Şule Erçetin, Ali Tekin, and Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın
To the faith of humanity’s common future : : :
Abstract “How to prevent wars” can be considered as reason behind the foundation
of field international relations. In other words, after two devastating war humanity
realized that we should learn peaceful coexistence. That’s why last 50 years were
dedicated to peace which have been the most controversial and gripping notion
in all disciplines. Within this context, the notion of sustainable peace becomes
more important in last years. On the other hand, chaos and its application in social
life- actually our real universe gave insight people to understand social facts with
dynamic systems and chaos theory. So, this chapter will be a new and fresh to
have sustainable peace with peace intelligence. Peace intelligence is completely new
phenomena which coined by Şefika Şule Erçetin.
Keywords Security threats • Intelligence • Peace • Peace intelligence
Ş.Ş. Erçetin ()

Hacettepe University and International Science Association, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: sefikasule@gmail.com
A. Tekin
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences,
Yaşar University, İzmir 35100, Turkey
e-mail: tekin04@gmail.com
Ş.N. Açıkalın ()
Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: suaynilhan@gmail.com
S. Banerjee et al. (eds.), Chaos Theory in Politics, Understanding 3

Complex Systems, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8691-1__1,
© Springer ScienceCBusiness Media Dordrecht 2014
4 Ş.Ş. Erçetin et al.
1.1 Introduction
Peace can be considered as a metaphor of love, life and maintaining such strong
feeling requires a strong spirit and endeavor. Any person who believes in himself
has the power and potential of peace making and maintains peace as the power and
responsibility given by love.
The ones who choose to stay in the dark mazes of fear cannot write happy ending
stories. Because of this, bringing and maintaining peace requires such spirit and
good will. The ones who can’t show this are left back in the dusty pages of history.
Security studies have been always popular in international relations and all
academics field. Dealing with the security study history, threats have been always
key issues of security studies. Throughout the history, there were remarkable
times to change field in terms of both practical and theoretical. The Cold war
can be considered to be a turning point for international system especially for
security studies. The cold war has changed the perception of security threats and
its solutions. After end of the cold war, 9/11 came to the scene as a major role in
security studies and of course it also caused shifting in theoretical approach. Not
only historical events but also technological development and globalization have
affected security studies and peace studies. It obviously shows that new perception
of security challenges desperately needs new peace solutions. When it comes to
take a step for peace, leaders become more important than they used to be because
leaders have ability to transform the peace process. Depend on this truth “Peace
intelligence” suggests a new theory solution for keeping peace in individual level
that not only limited by countries leaders. Peace intelligence was proposed by
Ercetin in 2007 ICANAS Conference. Peace intelligence is qualitative research and
before Erçetin, peace was never considered as a type of intelligence. This study
will first show peace in international relations and chaos theory literature then there
will be theory of peace intelligence as a new phenomenon. Undoubtly, Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk and his wisdom give inspiration to our research. In other words, this
new way to peace can only be seen in light of “peace at home, peace at world” by
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk [7, 15, 16, 19, 22, 28, 29, 46].
1.2 Peace
Peace is a notion which is discussed in different aspects and matters. For example,
in political science it is stated as a universal value, a thought of re-cycling situations,
motions, understanding to make things better in the changing living conditions and
culture. In experimental psychology, it is mentioned as needs, self-control, and a
step of mental and moral progress or justice. In social psychology it is stated as
human rights, group identity and conflict, identity in personality based researches,
1 Organized and Disorganized Chaos a New Dynamics in Peace Intelligence 5
offenseless personality, and integrative power. In Cultural studies it is discussed

as multidimensional alienation, psychological trauma in clinical researches, ability
to forgive, anger management. The facts below are commonly discussed in these
researches;
1. Acceptance of varieties to be valuable,
2. Social reorganizations and directorial applications upon the belief of equal
sharing of all resources of the world,
3. Personal or social constant self discipline,
4. Forgiveness, tenderness, fairness, control of destructive feelings, a positive
philosophy and motion upon ideal values,
5. Mental maturity, problem solving, conflict management, seek for a solution of
inequity, power imbalance,
6. The celebration of difference in the hope of unforeseen change ([48], p. 126; [5],
p. 1; [30], pp. 205–207; [13, 35, 40], pp. 599–601; [2, 3, 14]).
1.3 Peace in International Relations Theories
As an interdisciplinary field of international relations, discussed theories are

taken into consideration via different assessments, and classifications. Upon these
theories, we tried to give a short and concised information about realism, liberal-
ism/neoliberalism, idealism, critical theory and Marxist theory.
Realism: According to the realism international system is anarchic because of
these actors main goal is survival. This struggle of power cause conflict is inevitable
in anarchic environment. Through eyes of realism, peace can be considered as a
space between wars. In other words, the peace is the absence of war.
Liberalism/Neoliberalism: Opposite to realism, Liberalists claim that conflict
is an exception which occur only lack of cooperation or because of a
misunderstanding. For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. In Kant’s word,
peace can be perpetual. They believe that war can be preventive; states have capacity
to prevent war. Peace can be only achieved from international agreements and
institutions by establishing cooperation of states. Under liberalist theory, democratic
peace theory suggest that democratic states don’t have any tendency to democratic
states but it does not mean that democratic regimes cannot have conflict with
non-democratic regimes. In other words, democratic peace theory bring domestic
characteristic of state as factor in foreign policy.
Idealism: Idealist theory argue that there is an ideal form of peace with incorpora-
tion of social, political harmony which can be achieved by government or federation,
however, idealists claim that peace has an ideal form but it has not been achieved
yet [37].
Critical Theory: In critical theory, emancipation is the starting point. They claim
that you can limit the state power and establish a new system based on equality of a
state. They suggest the Notion of universal ethics in accordance with their universal
ethic ideal they claim that universal peace can be achievable.
Marxist Theory: Peace can only exist where social justice and equality occur.
Class struggle is dominant form of conflict for Marxists. In relation to this,
revolution of proletariat class is the way to achieve peace. Not only domestic
revolution, but they also emphasize universal upheaval and revolution of proletariat
class.
In Richmond’s poststructuralism peace theories are discussed and examined
in a detailed way. Richmond also discussed peace in interdisciplinary studies to
understand peace, enriched by studies of the disclosure. To him knowing the
dynamics of pluralism and peace in daily practices and understandings in different
contexts, thus these can be seen as an important step to ensure the development of
clearly evaluated.
At this stage, none of the studies have been contacted it must be emphasized that
peace, have never been defined as the product of an intelligence.
However, when these studies are taken into consideration all aspects come in
individual, organizational and societal sense, containing biopsychosocial potential,
ability, competence. Such potential, is evaluated by Erçetin for the first time [17]
and defined as peace intelligence, which is sought to be developed in further
studies [18–21]. Peace intelligence addressed in this study have never analyzed
and discussed intertwined with chaos before. Chaotic dimensions of peace have
been superimposed with intelligence analysis which form a new approach to the
study. Area of intelligence in terms of sustainable peace. Peace brought a different
perspective can be considered as a huge step to change the perception of conflict
and peace in recent times.
1.4 Peace in the Literature of Chaos
As we have mentioned in advance peace has been defined in different ways in the
literature, and definitions are created through the joint projections. Peace, in recent
years, started to be implemented to social sciences of chaos theory as a result of
which it was moved to a different dimension. Assumptions are made on the basis of
wars being a disorder, in the light of these, by a small number of academics “peace”
is handled with chaos theory.
Chaos is the starting point of the best-known definition of dependency, and this is
explained by the famous “butterfly effect” Before we starting to move forward with
the definition of peace via chaos theory, we need to answer question such as “How
does peace occur? What is needed to have peace? etc..”
“Chaoplexity” described by Hogan and Bousquet is used to define accuracy of the
initial state of chaos and its self -emergence. According to their explanation Chao-
plexity has three specialities. First, as we have discussed before is the sensibility of
chaos to initial points of the system by limiting the anticipation level. Also, in order
to make more accurate Quantitative analysis, there is need to identify the identity of
system with qualitative analysis. The second, distributed, local network relationship
and positive feedback would led to evolution of systems. Thirdly, edge of chaos is
the most creative and flexible point in the systemic structure. In other words, edge
of chaos can response unpredictability in best way because critical networks show
dynamic behaviours in the edge of chaos [32, 33].
In this perspective it is possible to reach different analysis when we talk about
“Peace” Peace such as chaotic systems emerges depending on many different
variables. These variables we prefer to call an “actor” can be exemplified from the
foreign policy behavior of countries in the region to the climate characteristics of
each influencer. This variable case depending on the nature of the peace can be
described as chaos. In this context Bousquet [6] claims that war can be considered
as a “chaoplexic”. In this paper, we take “peace” as a chaoplexic. On the other hand,
Chernus [12] claims that maintaining “order” is costly and it is paradoxical which
means states generally prefer to use military option to maintain order and peace.
Galtung [23] actually summarize the chaos and peace relationship, he suggests that
where interactions between actors are so intense, there is high probability to have
peace.
Due to its dependence on the initial state of chaos, the first feature of chaoplexity
limitations of estimates of future patterns of ways to reveal the qualitative to
quantitative results. When we look at a peaceful environment as required by the state
of peace because of the sensitivity of different variables, how long it will last would
be impossible to define. To make a much more realistic and numerical commentary
on the continuity of peace, there has to be qualitative perspectives on patterns and
types of the peace.
The second feature is network relationships enabling the evolution of the
distributed and decentralized systems. The relationship between networks of dis-
persed variables does not exist in the center of peace; furthermore geographical
conditions and even cultural differences make it evolve into the formation process
of perception. The most concrete example of this is, the different understanding of
peace throughout the history. For instance, today we can agree that there has not
been any literally war since 1945 WWII; however ethnic, regional problems make
us question “Do we really have peace?” This showed that the relations of peace,
a decentralized network patterned scattered and independent and always open to
change and transformation.
The third and final feature of chaoplexity is related to the banks of chaos.
According to the theory of chaos and uncertainty it can be defined as the most perfect
reaction to the uncertainty. As we mentioned in previous part how it is fragile and
variable. War and peace, in this context are variables of change and transition to a
new top-order to the chaos coast of actors.
Mesjaz [36] analysis of chaos and peace comes into play at this point. Peace
emerges out of high entropy of the states. In a sense, the increasing disorder, dis-
organization, randomness and unpredictability, everything we perceive as negative,
creates more peaceful environment than predictability does.
When we look at the history of Earth, perhaps the highest probabilities born
out of uncertainty and it characterized as the period of the Cold War. However
in another sense, perhaps the extant long-term look at the Cold War was a time
of Peace. Uncertainty in the heart of battle, and the pre-order options and a high
probability of having of peace more than can be said in that state.
Maybe you do for peace in this context, the following analysis may be correct,
the universe we live in and the layout behavior of unpredictable consists of random
variables. That is why nature and society can be considered peaceful by nature.
Nature has diversity it is a harmony of coexistence because of the peace of society
and human relations as a model, but the ratio of the number of variables and the
uncertainty are the biggest advantages and disadvantages of persistency of the peace.
All this analysis is based on the quest for peace studies as new peace “intelligence”
as a new light enlighten us.
The following resonances are clarifying that we live in peace, intelligence in a
miraculous world that we can use the uncertainty and diversity in order to find out
how to achieve peace. Perhaps our question should be, “If our universe has an inborn
model for peace, why societies should not have it?”
The conversion from war to peace may be experienced in different levels but the
most important thing is to have peace among societies and people. It will transform
the advantage of both uncertainty and provide a variety of individuals on the basis
of the peace by creating an intelligence model within the framework of chaos. To
achieve peace, each variable should respond to chaos in the best way by requiring
exertation of dynamic behavior. Thus, such models should be developed individually
based unlike other holistic solutions which should focus on holistic ways of solution,
rather than by the individual that aims to go to the whole.
1.5 Peace Intelligence
It seems hard to understand or explain or define the intelligence. If it is not,

alternative metaphors and distinct classification related to intelligence would not be
possible. Among these, we make use of Sternberg’s ([45], p. 4) geographical, cogni-
tive, biological, epistemological, anthropological, sociological: system metaphor.
System metaphor, is a multi-dimensional intelligence of an individual trying
to explain the relationship between inner and outer world at the crossroads of
all the metaphors it can also be considered as a product of efforts to under-
stand intelligence. System metaphor, in terms of theories that are included in
peace, tries to explain and discuss intelligence provides the appropriate theoretical
foundations and practical results. System metaphor includes Gardner’s “multiple”
[26, 27], Sternberg’s [42–44] “Triarchic”, Ceci’s [8–11] “bio-ecological” theories
of intelligence.
Gardner [24], in his work entitled “Frames of Mind’s” tries to explain the theory
of multiple intelligence, such as how to determine intelligence being created a series
of measures announced at the same time, this set of criteria is to be used instead of
any intelligence in choosing the candidate list. Following criterias can be used to
simplify to understand whether a candidate facilitates intelligence or not.
Brain’s isolation because of a damage received: Due to the damage to brain, it
carries the possibility of being isolated.
Idiot savants, geniuses, and the presence of other exceptional individuals:
Skills for defects or individuals which have a rather unusual to have an image with
a relatively even can be considered in an isolated manner.
A key operation or a defined sequence of operations: Stroke of intelligence
information is either presented inside or outside genetically programmed or
triggered just as the functioning of a computer system.
The story of the development and performance of an expert described a
different: Which is valid for normal development, as well as a history of brilliant
individuals.
Evolutionary history and the evolution of the mind: Have an evolutionary
history, although other species show being alone with a combination of skills that
include humans.
The contribution of experimental psychology: Experimental psychology can
work comfortably with specific skills or contains an area of the waist.
Sensitivity of symbol coding system: A symbol has a natural tendency to perform
within the system it is formed.
The contribution of the psychometric findings: Support psychometric results to
interpret the meaning of the psychometric findings are also straight.
A new series of intelligence of some of these criteria were defined as a type of
intelligence peace.
Peace intelligence is based on adaptation: It emerges as the capacity to regulate
interpersonal relations and environment this cannot be limited in the definition of
social intelligence. Mental strength represents stability and strength of behavioral
represents. It is a capacity to understand and be able to recognize himself and
opponent who wields this power. Perhaps the peace intelligence is the most basic
unit of intelligence success. The success of the society the individual and system-
based. The functioning of the system depends upon the cohesion and interpersonal
relations of the product of an intelligence. This adaptation can be regarded as
property, perhaps the most important factor because it is so fragmented that such
system creates the foundation of “tolerance”.
Constituting the essence of chaos, dynamic, nonlinear and each individual who
is variable according to this situation contains variability potential. As mentioned
above, the success of the society is individualistic and system-based. Having
intelligence of the variables on the success of the peace, putting into the practice
for peace, should be a social priority.
Reflections of peace to the chaos can be defined by another perspective:

In its chaotic form, its structure of the system by evolving to change, in a sense
the adaptation to the environment has the historical framework.
Peace intelligence is fluent: as one of the specialities of peace intelligence, fluency
finds its own place in peace. Fluency basis of a stable personality structure adjust-
ment and interpersonal relations gradually emerges as a feature of intelligence.
Fluency with the ability to adapt to a stable structure and it can be familiarized with
mercury in terms of this speciality. Turkish in the “mercury” as the phrase is used
to express the vitality and stability of an object or person. Contamination around
undistorted pollute is a success-based structural feature of its structure. Substance,
in its chemical stability, open to change the molecular state of intact stability, water
to freezing cold, in average temperature it becomes a liquid fluid, the conversion
of heat into the gas, all these can be adapted to the individual. In this sense, the
different media and in different notwithstanding the weakness of personality and
identity in interpersonal relations, peace on all media to reveal the existence of the
main motifs of intelligence evolving.
This feature of chaoplexity is best known feature of chaotic systems, zero
deterioration of the mercury itself showing parallelism to our metaphor. On the
other hand, to show the sensitivity of the initial specifications and adaptating to
the starting point of each formation is proves that chaotic systems are fluid.
Peace intelligence. – is a super combination of creativity. When differences turn
into conflicts, it produces a multidimensional solution strategy and policy in terms
of instance, reciprocity, and positivity. In this sense peace intelligence functions as
a super set of creativity and intelligence discussed by Sternberg and O’Hara [47].
We can say that peace intelligence is mutual reflection of a non-linear and
dynamic structure. This dynamic structure, the size of the peace instant chaos,
unlikelihood variability, and in case of a natural part of the system contains all
accessories. In other words, it ensures sustainable peace in the chaotic sense of
creativity and positive use of multi-faceted intelligence. If we consider chaos, war,
peace studies, as a state of irregularity, create a lot of conflict and war opposition
as a whole. As a result it forms a new order during the process which is called the
threshold of chaos by most. Actors’ being able to answer such uncertainty proves
the framework of peace, intelligence, creativity, being a super-set of features.
Peace intelligence is a sort of transformation process of humans’ biopsycholoso-
cialcosmic potentials from peace related fortes to consistent and positive life-style
by functioning those skills. Peace intelligence does not necessarily mean peace
loaded only different meanings, values and beliefs. As human beings their potential
and other assets owned by biopyscholosocialcosmic skills working to convert a life-
standards. In this field, again the active figure can be seen as a type of intelligence.
This feature is probably the most operative aspect of intelligence which is a
cornerstone of the peace, chaos. In its natural state within the framework of the
system and to accept peace, that all the variables in the system (individuals) means
that the activation under the scope is accepted. What is important here, the following
recalled, the emergence of a new formation as a process which we call the coast of
chaos variables and responsiveness.
It is likely that the origin of peace intelligence can be traced back to Talamus and
frontal cortex which is a part of our brain.
Donald Hebb in 1949 [1], the concept of the flexibility of the brain (Brain
Plasticity) has been developed. Hebb, is likely to modify our brains by learning
new things, this is due to the realization of the change suggests that the level of the
nerve cell. The concept emphasizes the dynamic nature of the brain. There are two
key elements of the concept of elasticity of the brain, critical period, and depending
on the action learning. The idea of a critical period of brain development describes
someone aspects of the environmental importance of the timing. If stimulus does not
reveal itself in the right time, extremely important talents will not be fully revealed
or will be developed with lesser skills. The same thing is possible for high quality
functions such as language. Probably the same things are valid for peace intelligence
as well. Peace intelligence needed the most critical moments of mental faculties.
Generally fully realizes its cycle after receiving negative feedback as it happens in
most conflicts, like war.
It is most likely that the points of the brain for the peace intelligence are the
Talamus which works as a filter of external stimulus facts and Frontal Cortex, which
is the center of executional functions and which controls the reactions after straining
the facts.
In the meantime we should remind of the adrenal cortex and locus ceruleus with
their roles on countless war and reactions. Future researches on Peace intelligence
may be looked up for some answers upon this subject.
However, it must be considered that there still are intelligence types with
cognitive components, neuronal centers or determined neural progress which hasn’t
been revealed yet [39]. An example can be given upon artistic intelligence for its
specifical cognition, application and talent and on the other hand for its resistance
against aetiological studies upon brain damage [52].
Peace intelligence goes through several complex compositional, empirical,
contextual processes to consider when and how to react with which method against
which situation and to know to forgive.
Peace intelligence doesn’t only contain permanent peace a consensus to obtain
such thing. A situation like this may not be a matter in every moment and every event
of life, in a matter like this, a solutional decision might not be correct, in other words
it may not be a bringer of peace. In this matter, peace intelligence represents which
conflict and war condition need to be avoid or not, on-time and correct judgment,
these abilities are critical and instant decision process.
Maybe this can be accepted as peace intelligence’s most important and striking
features. It shows that when one says peace, as a sense first thing comes to one’s
mind like terminate the conflict in any case, is no longer exist in this world
order. Thus, this view can be accepted in realist theory in international relations.
However, peace intelligence’s feature, as an innovation, represents very distinctive
perspective. Along with chaos between peace and war, which as we indicated before,
this process is a time that new creations occur, in this point, as we emphasize before
at adaptation and creativity that actors’ question to choose peace or war at the most
vague and irregular amount of time, is the best answerable times of them. In this
point, for a sustainable peace, existence of peace intelligence on leaders, will be
chaos’ margin and consisted new order afterwards.
With this feature peace intelligence actually emphasizes, with suitability of
conditions and cases, war and conflict that sometimes regarded chaos, it can be
provider of peace. If one looks Mesjaz’s analysis again, our perception of destructive
war (irregularity and vagueness) could bring much more peace environment than
foreseeability and order perception.
Peace Intelligence has an evolutional history. – Like human intelligence, animal
intelligence assumed multidimensional [31]. Features like conflict, dispute resolu-
tion and making peace, interest to others and noticing others’ perception to him/her,
awareness of group’s social rules, altruism, decision making in human beings,
especially human like apes, apes, dolphins and the other mammals including whales,
are common in scientific literature [4, 38]. As Shermer [41] indicates in terms of
species these feature’s presenting form and level differ. Human present most of these
features much more higher and in a complicated level according to other species.
And this shows that peace intelligence has an evolutionary history, despite make
presence along in other species, and it has some abilities that common in humans.
Intelligence is a part of ours that can evolve by itself. Interesting thing in
this study, peace and intelligence can evolve autonomously on their own. When
intelligence personally evolve with its variability and improvability. It’s possible to
say that peace notion evolves in time, geographics and cultural differences. I assume
today, no one can claim peace perception of today is the same with 1800s, moreover,
it can be said that this perception is shaped by international institutions time to
time and its biggest example can be accepted as NATO and UN. After all of these
analyses one should say that peace intelligence with many sub-systems like dispute
resolution, conflict and solution seeking system shows that peace intelligence can
evolve.
Peace intelligence follows a development course for a normal individual as
well as individuals who can be qualified as the most sparkling. Potential peace
intelligence follows a development course through first in the environment of
an individual in which that individual can’t have a choice and second through
experience that can be controlled and can’t be controlled via conscious choices. This
situation brings about the possibility of an individual’s peace intelligence to stay
only as a potential or deteriorate. It also means that it can be educated and matured
with a steady and systematic effort. As it was mentioned above, peace intelligence
can be improved or deteriorated. Excluding from the individual’s environment,
peace intelligence is open to improvement with all figures and methods. Peace
intelligence can show improvement in chaos and chaotic systems. In fact, chaotic
systems constantly repeat themselves, show improvement, and sometimes degrowth.
However, it keeps the identical version of itself in every case. In fact, this feature,
which is connected to prior evolvability feature makes us think through a peaceful
perspective that the concept of “peace” can be assumed to follow an improvement
on its own.
As a matter of fact, Lubkemann ([34]: 14) emphasizes that war should be

researched within the scope of the emergence, transformation of social relations and
cultural practices of conflict rather than as an aggressive form of political conflicts.
According to Lubkemann, chaotic imagery and metaphors are particularly found
in descriptions of conflicts such as those in Mozambique. In addition to this,
Lubkemann claim that the “master narrative” and its protagonists played only
one role in the organization of Mozambican war-time violence should notlead to
the conclusion that therefore war-time violence was disorganized, meaningless, or
completely chaotic. Alternatively, in order to understand the dynamics and logic of
war-time violence Lubkemann suggests the term of multivocality. Multi vocality
can be considered important characteristic of all war-time violence. Violence in
such contexts is not “fragmented” by the social problematics and cultural terms
of expression of the various social formations [34] Lubkemann continues like that
“What such fragmented wars require are parallel points of ethnographic entry:
without neglecting the social production of master political narratives and their
shaping of violence, analysis should also work its way back from the understandings
of those who experience war-time violence in order to determine the causes and
shaping forces of violence. In launching from these simultaneous points of departure
ethnography has the potential to reveal” [34].
1.6 Conclusion
What all you read in before pages, we try to find a new way to achieve sustainable
peace. We started our research with vital question “if we live in universe which
has an inborn model for peace, why societies should not have it?” In other words,
through the eyes of chaos theory, we live in a world consisted with unpredictable
events and we cannot control these unpredictable events and human behaviour.
That’s why we notice that sustainable peace can be achievable through peace
intelligence. The notion of peace intelligence was first used by Şefika Şule Erçetin.
It has different dimensions in itself. First, peace intelligence is based on adaptation.
It implies that capacity to adapt themselves into social environment. Actually it is
one of basic features of peace intelligence because the notion of adaptation reflects
tolerance in the society. Tolerance can be only achieved by high capacity of people’s
adaptation with common values in society. In the context chaos, tolerance and
adaptation is also important because in evolving environment, adaptation will be
the most important.
Second dimension of peace intelligence is fluent. It has more complicated
connection with chaos theory. As we mentioned in the beginning, all changing and
evolving in the chaotic systems, transmitted fluently. Also, it point out that fluent
and adaptation are related with mercury. Last but the most complicated dimension
of peace intelligence is it is combination of super creativity. In this dimension, we
try to show decision making of individual in the context of chaotic environment
when all possibilities turn to conflict. In other words, strategic thinking and decide
to have peace and war as a response to situation. We can say that it is the most
bra, in-function based dimension of peace intelligence. There are two important
elements of the concept of elasticity of the brain, critical period, and depending
on the action and then learning. In that point, timing is so vital. If stimulus does
not activated itself in the right time, extremely important talents will not be fully
worked or will be developed with lesser skills. It is same for peace intelligence
as well. Peace intelligence demand the most critical moments of mental activities.
Generally fully realizes its cycle after receiving negative feedback as it happens in
most conflicts, like war.
To sum up, with all dimension of peace intelligence will highlight two new
important element into sustainable peace through peace intelligence which are
organized and disorganized chaos. It should be noted peace intelligence is not
always to prefer to avoid conflict on the contrary peace intelligence suggest that
individual should decide to have conflict or peace in true time!
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Chapter 2
Uncertainty and Fuzzy Decisions
İbrahim Özkan and I. Burhan Türkşen
Abstract Uncertainty is the main reason that makes human free to choose. Many
actions, strategies are designed to handle or reduce the uncertainty to make decision
makers life easier. But there is no common accepted theory in the academia.
Researchers still struggling to create a common understanding. There are theories
that we may follow to make decisions under uncertainty. Among them, probability
theory, fuzzy theory and evidence theory can be given. Decision problem is
constructed in with the help of these theories. Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy theory may
be considered as the recent advancement and has been applied in many fields for
different type of decision problems.
Keywords Uncertainty • Taxonomy • Chaos and complexity • Fuzzy sets and

logic • Computing with words • Meta-Linguistic expressions
2.1 Introduction
There is no uncertainty theory that is commonly accepted in academia. A Google

search with keywords “uncertainty theory” yields tens of thousands of results. Since
the knowledge is limited and measurements are imprecise, future events can only be
İ. Özkan ()

Department of Economics, Hacettepe University, Beytepe, Ankara, Turkey
Knowledge/Intelligence System Lab, Department of Mechanical and Industrial
Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
e-mail: iozkan@hacettepe.edu.tr
I.B. Türkşen
Department of Industrial Engineering, TOBB-Economics and Technology
University, Ankara, Turkey
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

18 İ. Özkan and I.B. Türkşen
predicted with some confidence under strong assumptions. Naturally decisions have
to be made in uncertain environments in the real world.
Like everyone else, leaders must make decisions under uncertainty and, in many
cases, uncertainty itself becomes the real problem for leaders. As Simon [38] put
forward, decisions are made with criteria that satisfy our needs. We make decisions
even though there may not be an optimal action that can be found with an application
of scientific methodologies or there may not be any action that satisfies our needs.
Although it is a subject of several research fields, there are some attempts
to construct theories of uncertainty in mathematics [see for example, [30, 31]].
Uncertainty theory might be a subject of a specific branch of mathematics that deals
with human uncertainty that is usually not sufficient. It is generally a subject of
several theories such as fuzzy logic (FL), probability theory (PT), complexity theory
and philosophy, etc. There are different views and thoughts about uncertainty. These
views and thoughts are all related with the nature of problems in different fields.
According to Weber [55, 56] these views are epistemologically biased. He states;
[ : : : ] the concept of uncertainty is epistemologically biased, in that uncertainty is viewed
as an attribute of how we know what we know. This epistemological bias has led to the
development of four branches of uncertainty literature based on an actor’s (individual,
group, or organization): (1) ability to gather and process information; (2) ability to predict
consequences of actions; (3) use of intuition; or (4) perception of the environment. (Weber
[55]: 455)
Since, humans are the creators of the concept of uncertainty, it all makes sense
that, our abilities, capabilities, intuitions and perceptions are the real ingredient
in this subject. As it is put forward by Zadeh [63, 64], Fuzzy logic is create an
approximate reasoning mechanism to handle the uncertainty associated with human
perception.
The emphasis of this chapter is mainly on uncertainty and fuzzy decision making
under uncertainty. After the brief introduction of both uncertainty and Fuzzy Logic,
the concept of fuzzy decision making and as a particular extension, perception based
decision making is introduced.
2.2 Uncertainty
Uncertainty has been studied in many fields during the last few centuries. Discus-
sions on uncertainty are frequently encountered in the following fields, but not
limited to them; decision sciences, artificial Intelligence, legal fact-finding, eco-
nomics, medical science, organizational open system theory, psychology, physics,
etc. In this section we would like to summarize some important facts and studies
that attempt to discuss uncertainty.
More often authors start with dictionary definition of uncertainty. We all use
this term in our day to day real life. In order to keep our explanation compact, we
avoid giving these definitions. However, some words that are related to uncertainty,
such as, not precise, fuzzy, vague, etc., are important for this chapter. Frequently
2 Uncertainty and Fuzzy Decisions 19
information is usually presented with some words that have no precise definitions.
“About”, “low”, “high”, “big”, “fast”, “slow” are some examples that are used for
approximate reasoning in human decision making. Humans do understand them and
communicate effectively using them. These words are central research focus for a
specific research field, Computing With Words, CWW, [61]. Their imprecise meaning
is also seen as the starting point of Fuzzy Logic. They help us to communicate and
decide even though they are imprecise.
Researchers have tried to identify the different types and dimensions of uncer-
tainty. Among them, Smithson [41], Smets [40], Bosc and Prade [7], Klir and Yuan
[24], Walker [54] and Parsons [36] can be mentioned.
In Smithson’s [41] taxonomy, uncertainty is a part of Incompleteness which is
product of Errors. For him, Fuzziness can be seen as a specific type of Vagueness.
Smets [40] sees uncertainty as the basic part of ignorance. His taxonomy puts
the concept of fuzzy under the data without error part of uncertainty. Dubois and
Prade [10] distinguish the concept of imprecision and uncertainty in a way that,
imprecision relates to the content of value of information. According to them,
the concept of fuzzy is a qualifier for items of information. Uncertainty relates
to the truth or the confidence of information. Bosc and Prade [7] suggest that
uncertainty arises from a “lack of information” closely related to the probability
theory proponents which assess the probability as lack of knowledge. Klir and Yuan
[24] identifies three basic types of uncertainty. These are, nonspecificity, strife and
fuzziness. According to Walker [54] theory of uncertainty has three dimensions
in legal fact-finding. These are, linguistic, logical and causal dimensions. Walker
classified the uncertainties into six types for scientific evidence about generic
causation. These are; concept uncertainty, measurement uncertainty, calculation
uncertainty, sampling uncertainty, mathematical modeling uncertainty and causal
uncertainty.
Uncertainty is a cognitive process. It is appropriate to give some other per-
spectives from selected fields. For example, Knight [25] and Keynes [23] viewed
uncertainty as something “simply we do not know”. Uncertainty is viewed as “lack
of knowledge”, “bias” and “psychological perception1” in at least some of many
disciplines [3, 14, 17, 27, 28, 34, 39] as in agreement with both Keynes and Knight.
Uncertainty is seen in psychology as; (i) the psychological perception that creates
fear and (ii) the motivation of communication [5, 11, 26].
Every decision we make is also part of the source of uncertainty even though it is
the result of a series of negotiations in which we try to reduce uncertainty. This is the
main ingredient of Game Theory. The discussions on game of chance lead to the idea
of expected utility. Von Neumann-Morgenstern [53].2 Based on Expected Utility
Theory (EUT), the “rational” way to make decision is to maximize the expected
utility. To understand more about the real life problems, these discussions were held
1
Uncertainty is thought to be then converted to fear that motivates to take some action. In this view
it is a cognitive process.
2
Due to the war-time difficulties, it was first published in 1953.
in toy domain. However imperfect knowledge makes life difficult for the proponents
of EUT. Friedman and Savage [13] proposed the axioms of subjective expected
utility theory. To show the systematic deviation from the EUT, Allais [1] published
“Allais Paradox”. Thus, Non-Expected Utility Theory (NEUT) came into existence.
In late 1960s decision under ignorance revived. Instead of normative theories,
researchers started to look for more descriptive theories of decision. Several seminal
contributions have been made for decision under uncertainty (sometimes called as
under “ignorance”, “risk”). Among the contributors, Kahneman and Tversky [20],
Tversky and Kahneman [51], Machina [32, 33], Fishburn [12], Kahneman et al.
[21], Lichtenstein and Slovic [29] can be given.
Information and knowledge have a complex nature in real world. Quantitative
measures such as probability may be found to be insufficient and/or misleading
for many cases. It appears that humans try to overcome this difficulty with using
heuristics as the first tool for reasoning under uncertainty. It is unaided and it is a
quick and dirty way of handling uncertainty [36]. There is a need for a formal system
to handle uncertainty to ensure that the information is effectively used. For this
purpose, one can find three widely studied systems that are probability, possibility
and evidence theories in literature. In this chapter, we focus on Zadeh’s Fuzzy Logic
and Fuzzy System Theory. Both probability and evidence theories will be untouched
since they are out of the scope of this chapter.3
2.3 Fuzzy Theory
After Zadeh’s [59] introduction of Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Sets, a vast volume
of literature appeared about fuzzy logic and fuzzy system modeling (FSM) in
particular. Zadeh’s intention was to create a methodology to mimic the human
reasoning to handle the real world uncertainty more efficiently.
Briefly in fuzzy theory, every element belongs to a concept class, say A, to
a partial degree, i.e., A : X ! [0,1], A (x) D a2[0,1], x2X, where A (x) is the
membership assignment of an element ‘x’ to a concept class A in a proposition.
The above representation is generally accepted as Type-1 fuzzy sets which assumes
the membership values are certain. Unfortunately most of all concepts in fuzzy
theory are assumed to be definable to be true to a degree.
Zadeh [60] introduced Type-2 fuzzy sets as an extension of Type-1 fuzzy set.
Zadeh’s Type-2 fuzzy sets are the fuzzy sets, whose membership functions are
classified as Type-1 fuzzy sets. Hence the value of membership function becomes
fuzzy or these values are true to a degree. In most of the situations, the uncertainty
may not be captures by Type-1 fuzzy sets. Karnik and Mendel [22] have proposed
to add at least one higher degree to Type-1 fuzzy sets may provide a measure of
3
We would like to encourage interested readers to examine both theories and their role in reasoning
under uncertainty.
dispersion for totally precise membership values of Type-1. Hence, Type-2 fuzzy
sets capture the extensions of the Type-1 fuzzy sets to a higher degree. Type-2 fuzzy
sets have grades of membership that are themselves defined by Type-1 membership
functions, which are called secondary membership functions.
Another particular example of type-2 fuzzy set is interval valued fuzzy set
where one of the author of this chapter contributes the related literature with
several seminal papers. Turksen’s [46–49] approach is a pioneering representation
of interval valued type-2 fuzzy sets. In his pioneering works, he has shown that
Disjunctive and Conjunctive Normal Forms (DNF and CNF) are equal in classical
set theory but DNF and CNF are not equal in fuzzy set theory. He then showed
that, Fuzzy Disjunctive Normal Forms (FDNF) is not equal to Fuzzy Conjunctive
Normal Forms (FCNF) in fuzzy set theory which define the interval valued Type-2
fuzzy sets. His recent research [50] opens a new path to assess objective Full Type-2,
to Full Type-n fuzzy system research.
Fuzzy system models (FSM) based of Fuzzy Logic define relationships between
input and output variables of a system by using linguistic labels in a collection of
IF-THEN rules. Zadeh [59] and Takagi-Sugeno [42] are the most commonly used
rule based approaches. If we define k-th information vector Xk D fx1k , x2k , : : : ,xnk g
where n is the number of attributes of information, and the reasoning for this
information vector is a rule in general which can be written as:
IF x1 çXk isr A1j AND x2 çXk isr A2j AND : : : AND xn çXk isr Anj THEN yçYk isr Bj
where, Aij and Bj are linguistic assignments for input and output information
objects, respectively, for the j-th rule of the whole number of rules in fuzzy rule base.
‘isr’ (is in relation to) is introduced by Zadeh and it represents that the definitions
or assignments are not crisp, they are fuzzy.
There are at least two advantages of FSM that attracts researchers: (i) its power
of linguistic explanation with resulting ease of understanding, and (ii) its tolerance
to imprecise data which provides flexibility and stability for prediction. But, very
few studies, if any, have been devoted to the study of the “Philosophical Grounding
of Fuzzy Theory” since then. For a detailed philosophical grounding readers are
referred to Turksen’s book [49].
2.4 Fuzzy Decisions
In modeling human decision process, one may distinguish the descriptive and
prescriptive type approaches. In these approaches, descriptive modeling attempts
to identify system structure that capture the behavior characteristics as best as it
can, whereas the prescriptive modeling attempts to determine the best approximate
reasoning schemas that produce the best prediction of system behavior for a given
descriptive model.4 Human decision processes depend on the perceived world and
decision maker faces uncertainties at any stage of a decision process.
According to mainstream theoretical studies, rational individuals use all avail-
able information during the expectation formation process and they optimize the
expected value of a well-defined objective function under the assumptions of
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. The assumptions of von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory may not be fulfilled since most real world
probabilities are imprecise or immeasurable. Even if it is a measurable case, when
there is a tolerance for imprecision which can be exploited through granulation to
achieve tractability, interpretability, robustness and economy of communication.
There is generally a rationale which underlie granulation of attributes and use
of linguistic variables [62, 64]. Furthermore, as briefly discussed in the above
section, uncertainty may appear in different forms such as ambiguity, vagueness,
discord, imprecision and fuzziness [24]. It is an attribute of information. Zadeh
[64] suggests that information is a generalized constraint on the values which a
variable is allowed to take. It becomes necessary to use uncertainty as an additional
source of information that may be helpful to reasoning. As Zadeh [62] pointed out,
information can be analyzed by perception based theory of approximate reasoning
which is a generalization of classical reasoning that contains the capability to
operate with perception based information. Fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets lay the
ground for this kind of information processing and decision making.
Modelling of decision problem in formal theory requires; (i) courses of action
(acts), (ii) states of nature (events), (iii) payoff associated with each actions-states,
(iv) the degree of knowledge about states of nature and (v) decision criterion that
helps select the course of action. This is often presented as a decision matrix (payoff
matrix) for the sake of simplicity as given below.
Event ‘1’ Event ‘2’ ::: Event ‘h’

Acts ‘1’ Payoff (1, 1) Payoff (1, 2) ::: Payoff (1, h)
Acts ‘2’ Payoff (2, 1) Payoff (2, 2) ::: Payoff (2, h)
::: ::: ::: ::: :::
Acts ‘k’ Payoff (k, 1) Payoff (k, 2) ::: Payoff (k, h)
In general every event has associated probabilities that is assigned. These

probabilities are assumed to represent the degree of knowledge (or of course
lack of knowledge) about states of natures. Time to time, payoffs are shown as
utilities instead of some values such as returns, gains, etc. Every Act then has
a value that represent expected utilities (or expected returns/gains) for decision
makers. The rational decisions are supposed to be the ones that maximize expected
utilities. In contrast to this representation, Acts, Events, payoffs and the degree of
4
See Baron [4] ch. 5 and 6., for a clear exposition of descriptive and prescriptive modeling in
decision making.
knowledge are often known approximately in real world. Their values are imprecise,
or perhaps best approximated with different representations. Hence, following
Zadeh’s [59] seminal paper on Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Decision Analysis [6], during
1970s and 1980s the principles of fuzzy theory were applied to classical statistical
decision theory. These contributions include “fuzzy acts” [2, 43–45], “fuzzy events”
[2, 43–45]„ “fuzzy probabilities” [9, 57], “fuzzy utilities” [19, 37, 57, 58], and
“fuzzy information” [2, 43–45], “fuzzy linguistic modeling” [8, 15, 16]. With
these contributions classical statistical decision theory is transformed into fuzzy
decision theory. The importance of formulations of perceptions in fuzzy decision
theory and formulations of perception based probabilistic reasoning with imprecise
probabilities are articulated by Zadeh [62].
Human perception process is a flexible function of experiences. Studies have
shown that attention can be directed to objects that are defined on the basis of generic
grouping principles based on previous experiences [65]. Previous experiences
determine the familiarity of the objects. In most experiments, it is demonstrated
that object-based attention are stronger for highly familiar objects than for unfa-
miliar ones [52]. For instance, gestalt perceptual grouping principles which have
proximity, similarity, continuity, common movement, and common fate properties
are sufficient to define the objects.
Often objective function based approaches uses clustering algorithm which
assigns a membership value for each observation. This value represents the degree
of belongingness to each clusters. Membership functions that calculate membership
values can often be assigned linguistic labels such as “low”, “medium” or “high”.
Such labeling provides linguistic meaning representation for understanding.5
Ozkan and Turksen [35] employ perception based inference method where fuzzy
clusters are treated as dictionary catalogs that serve for the basis of objects to
analyze currency crisis. They successfully show that one may use Fuzzy Decision
approach to understand the very important and rare event of currency crisis.
According to their approach, any object can be defined as a pattern that is generated
by experience. Clustering the similar patterns provide the definition of translation
catalogs that are used in approximate reasoning. This approach is a process which
has four properties that are; (i) clustering, (ii) similarity, (iii) flexibility, and (iv)
resolution of uncertainty. In this manner, they embed gestalt perceptual prototypes
by their properties of similarity, grouping, proximity and continuity in their model.
This model starts with definition of decision problems given as:
[ : : : ] Assume that d is the decision problem, s, is the state of nature, f is the inference
function, p is payoff, X D .x1 ; x2 ; : : : ; xn / is an information vector (input vector),
T
vx D vx;1 ; vx;2 ; : : : ; vx;c is the cluster center matrix and vx;j D v1;j ; v2;j ; : : : ; xn;j
is the j-th cluster center projected
˚ to input
space. The decision problem, d, can be
presented as: d D X; s; p D f X; vx , and inference function, p, can be written
5
See Hoppner et al. [18], chapter 8., Rule Generation with Clustering.
0 1
B C
X
c
B
B j X; vx C
C
as, f X; vx D gj X B C where gj is jth cluster’s fuzzy regression
BXc
C
j D1 @ A
i X; vx
iD1
function and j is membership values cluster for information vector X and the
to jth
normalization term is equal to one. f X; vx is simply a smooth interpolation (where this
is the local regression models in their exposition) of models and the weights on each local
model is the value of the membership function. (Ozkan and Turksen [35])
2.5 Conclusion
Leaders, policy makers, authorities and all parties in society are making decisions
everyday under uncertainty, possibly, with some complexities. With complexities,
we mean that the knowledge about both the environment and the consequences of
decisions is not perfect. There all ill-defined concepts that may be changing with
unpredictable patterns. It is helpful to understand the uncertainty and the tools that
help us to make decision under uncertainty. In order to do so, a brief summary about
uncertainty is given. Then fuzzy logic is introduced and fuzzy decisions is given as
a tool to make decision under uncertainty.
Uncertainty is a phenomena that has a deep root in daily life. It makes us free to
choose. Our brain converts uncertainty into fear in order to create a motivation to do
something. But, as Keynes noted, still we do not know much about uncertainty. One
may find that several research field has been spending good efforts to understand and
if possible to handle the uncertainty. We do understand that it has several dimensions
and types. It has characteristics that may be modelled with classical probability
theory, evidence theory or fuzzy logic. Starting from heuristics to the modern tools
of handling uncertainty is a vast area of research. Fuzzy logic is an approach that
has been used effectively to decide under uncertainty.
After Zadeh’s [59] seminal paper about fuzzy logic, researchers were attracted to
apply the tools created with fuzzy logic for complex problems in almost every fields.
The body of research has been increasing very fast. Generally first discussions are
about Type 1 fuzzy logic where the degree of memberships are assumed precise.
The new discussions where the degree of membership become fuzzy took place
after realizing the certain degree of membership may not be the founding ground for
fuzzy approaches. This new approach is called as Type 2 (and of course higher order
up to Type n introduced) fuzzy systems. Fuzzy logic and fuzzy system modeling is
proved to be a close to approximation of human decision making and perception
processes. Therefore as the application of fuzzy system modeling, the advances in
fuzzy decisions and as a particular case, perception based decision are introduced in
the last section of this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Understanding of Arab Spring with Chaos
Theory – Uprising or Revolution
Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek
For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;

For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost!
[3]
Abstract ‘Arab Spring’ can be considered as one of the most remarkable events
in the history of world politics. On December 18, 2010, a Tunisian young protestor
burned himself in a public square of the city. This event triggered probably one
of the most chaotic and long term uprisings in the Middle East. From the day of
its initiation until the present, ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East created unstable
political situation and several uprisings. In this chapter, we will first give general
information about chaos theory, and then we will examine the ‘butterfly effect’
created by the Tunisian young protestor and process of Arab Spring in the Middle
East regarding its extend and form in those countries within the framework of
chaos theory. For the first part of this chapter, the spark created by the Tunisian
young protestor and its effects can be analyzed under ‘butterfly effect’ perspective
within chaos theory, arguing whether the events followed each other consecutively
or randomly. The question is whether the incidents following each other have
reasonable links of causality to one another, or the events defining the phenomena
known as ‘Arab Spring’ have no predictable reasons and outcomes regardless of
Ş.N. Açıkalın ()

Department of the International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: suaynilhan@gmail.com
C.A. Bölücek
Department of History, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: cemalb@bilkent.edu.tr

30 Ş.N. Açıkalın and C.A. Bölücek
the regional, social and political differences. The events caused the collapse of the
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya; they had very serious outcomes.
However, current approaches generally fail in defining the panorama clearly,
which does not help in finding a way out. The change started with young protestors
rushing the streets and resulted in a completely new order, which resulted in
somewhat greater turmoil in these countries, which was somewhat unpredictable
through chain of causality. From the beginning to the end of the ‘butterfly effect,’
an analysis of present day situation raised the unpredictability to a new level. With
the help of chaos theory, which has lately but very usefully revealed itself in social
studies, phenomena of ‘Arab Spring’ is observed for discovering whether it is a new
beginning for Middle Eastern countries with consecutive and predictable outcomes,
or is a path to a much more devastating ‘Arab Winter’ just knocking the door.
Keywords Arab spring • Chaos theory • Egypt • Syria • International relations

theory • Social media • Interdependency
3.1 Introduction
Twenty-first century will always be remarkable for the international events within.
Although humanity did not experience a third world war, conflict and war became
much more apparent in daily life within different forms. Emerging security threats
are not unknown to human experience, but particularly the events in Tunisia, Egypt
and other countries are completely new for us. Some journalist and scholars claim
that events in those countries are not unique. It is more or less a simple fight for
freedom; however it happened at an unexpected time and place. Then “Arab Spring”
as a new concept entered our life. The term “Arab Spring” has a framework both
have positive connotations and at the same time certain shortcomings for defining
the panorama in the Middle East recently. Surely triggered by a number of motives,
countries, governments and people were under intense pressure created by the social
and political events of this framework. Ordinary newspaper readers or those who
follow TV broadcast or social media became properly informed that the term “Arab
Spring” suggests certain social and political events such as uprisings and rebellious
attempts to overthrow existing governments, following a path to liberal democratic
values and virtues that hardly have existed in the Middle East for decades.
In as much as change became eminent, perceptions of the old-established regimes
in the Middle East seemed dramatically changed, or to be more accurate, people
realized they can change the fate of their country. This was a general perception and
from bottom to top demonstrations determined the demise of the Middle Eastern
dictatorial governments. This was a civil leap from the traditional international
desire of stability to a new desire of democratic change. In other words, what was
called ‘stability’ in the Middle East no more found an echo in the international
society and lost receiving of international support. The lead of the international
decision taking was the U.S. interests which no longer could tolerate the dictatorial
regimes in the Middle East. The U.S. President Barack Obama is seen as a supporter
of this change, who changed the fate of social uprisings unexpectedly high.
3 Understanding of Arab Spring with Chaos Theory – Uprising or Revolution 31
The term “Arab Spring” cannot perfectly summarize this unexpected chain
of events in the Middle East, since the territories realizing the change were not
populated by uniform motivated and locked on Arab people only. Foreign Policy
writer Marc Lynch coined the term probably because he was inspired by the
terminology used to define and describe regenerations such as Prague Spring
of 1968 and the Revolutions of 1989, probably the word ‘spring’, instead of
another seasonal nomination, is chosen to create positive indication and a sense
of rejuvenation at the social and political levels. The leaders of the demonstrations
have many state and non-state rivals and opposing counterparts. This explanation
may seem naive, but indeed, regarding the various political and social motives
in the realm of turmoil, the situation represented a lesser of the two evils case. Once
the uprisings started and spread through Northern Africa, Arabian Peninsula and
the Gulf, various and countless opposing groups, political parties, armed guerrilla,
social organizations, states’ armed forces, etc. either divided apart from each other
or united as different fronts in order to obtain strength and political power in a
cloudy and misty social environment.
The Tunisian protests were the ignition. In first sense, burning himself of
Muhammed Bauzazi named ordinary uprising in Tunisia however it was more
than that. It is only kind of trigger of coming events. Protests were getting bigger
and violently day by day. Not so long time, in January 2011 President Zine El
Abidine Ben Ali had to resign his office after 13 years of dictatorship. There was
no expectation protesting and even Zine El Abidine’s resignation would spread to
other Arab countries. Egypt, Libya and Yemen followed Tunisian protests, almost
imitating the nature of that original demonstration. Once more, events surprised
whole world. By inspiration from Tunisia, the first month of 2011 was the scene
of unforgettable uprising through whole Arab country. Tahrir Square of Egypt and
city of Tripoli of Libya showed that Arab people have an intense desire for their
freedom. Arab Spring can be considered, still arguably, as a Big Bang of long years
reasons of corruption, poverty, inequality and oppression of authoritarian regimes.
The reasons behind Arab Spring are diverse and in a sense unique to each country;
however, the outcomes are similar to each other. “Essentially, there was agreement
that the elements of vulnerability include a lethal combination of poverty, lack of
economic opportunity, and a repressive and disliked regime” [5].
Not only domestic factors which encouraged Arab Spring but also various
perspectives of global stability in explanation of Arab Spring. In August 2010,
the Obama administration made a foreign policy shift towards the Middle East,
quitted supporting dictatorial stability, encouraged democracy and establishment of
democratic governments in the Arab world. Short term stability was creating a big
obstacle in front of long term stability which can only be achieved through liberal
democracy, fair elections, overthrowing the existing dictatorial regimes and replac-
ing them with more tolerable and negotiable governments which represents their
peoples and acting in accordance with the needs and wishes of their societies. This
plan would create (and so created) a suitable atmosphere and a safe realm for ulti-
mate and long term U.S. interests in the region. Political openness and democratic
governance meant integration to the democratic league of states, which was led
by the U.S. Thus, from the stability perspective, Obama administration decided to
support change and transition rather than mere stability in order to achieve long-term
stronger stability for serving its interests in the Middle East. Dictatorial stability,
however, aimed to restrain any change at the expense of interest of their wealth,
government comprehension, military pressure on the society and untouchability.
So, as the diversity of reasons indicates, here we are talking about nineteen
different Arab countries where protest and uprising happened regardless of their
size and effectiveness. Among these countries, effect of Arab Spring has been felt
in different levels. As we mentioned in first paragraph some of countries regimes
were overthrown by protestors especially these were the biggest ones. On the other
hand, some countries protesting were eliminated with changing government or
partial reforms such as UAE and Algeria. Some countries like Bahrain still suffered
from on-going protest and uprising. Unfortunately, Syria is the worst case because
the uprisings turned into civil war and number of casualties has increased day by
day. We can argue that Egypt has a special position within these countries because
although there is transition government, there are still huge protest against Mursi
who is the new president of Egypt.
There are many studies carried out and works been done about the nature and
progress of Arab Spring; however, this paper is intending to analyze Arab Spring
and its complex nature within the frame of chaos theory.
3.2 Order, Anarchy, Disorder and Chaos
This first part is devoted to provide an overview of discussion on order, anarchy,

disorder and chaos. We will try to draw main differences of theories how they
perceive these notion and of course last part will deal with how chaos is different
than others and how we annotate chaos theory in IR discipline. Firstly, the notion of
“order” is always debatable for theorists in the IR. The notion of order can be found
in term of “international order” which is also highly controversial in the context of
order and anarchy. We would not go deep into different views on order and anarchy,
just some blueprints of how different theories perceive order in IR. The oldest and
main theories realism and liberalism had completely different and basic arguments
on “order”. According to realist school, basically international system is anarchic,
it is impossible to talk about order which inspired by Hobbes. Donnelly state that
“I use “anarchy” as it is ordinarily used in international relations literature, that is
literal sense of absence of rule, lack of government. Anarchy does not imply chaos,
absence of order; it is simply absence of “hierarchical” political order based on
formal subordination and authority” [1]. Actually it is very controversial argument
Donnelly because he implied that anarchy never meant that chaos. At the same time,
it implies that disorder is not always mean chaos. The anarchy argument of realism
has been shared by many other theories however English school mostly focus on
“order”.
English school discuss mainly “order versus justice” problem in IR. According
to Bull, there is a distinction between international system and international society.
International society is more complex than international system which imply a
group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values and he
argued that “the goal of preserving the sovereignty of each state has often clashed
with the common interest in preserving the balance of power” [8]. Bull continued
with that time to in order to maintain order, justice was sacrificed. He gave example
as a sacrificing of Polish independence and attitude of LON in Abyssinia case. Also,
Bull claim that “ideas on justice” can be differentiated by each state but they all can
agree to maintain order. “ : : : purpose of international society is to promote order in
human society as a whole” [8].
Constructivism also accepts realism argument of anarchical structure of interna-
tional system with one exception. In famous words, “anarchy what state makes of
it”. In other words, constructivists’ claim that this anarchical system has been made
by actors and primarily states. On the other hand, Marxism suggests emancipation
from international order as a only way to survive. Mainly, as all we know
existed international order is the source of conflict that’s why transforming the
international order is necessary. So, Marxism focuses on not only order itself but
also transforming order too.
So, “order” was sometimes used by opposite of anarchy, sometimes it was used
as indispensable element of international relations in different theories. “Order” as
a notion and its forms have been used in various different theories however, we just
want to draw a kind of frame which shows hoe field of IR discussed “order”. It is
obvious that conventional theories of IR are so limited to explain complexity and
dynamic structure of international system with terms of order, anarchy and disorder
and most of the time some of terms are used interchangeably but with different
meanings and implications. However, today international relations and its actors
have much more interdependence than they used to have. Also, globalization is the
most influenced on system, today individuals become separate actors and social
media is another stronger actor in the system or order what you call. In other words,
today we can talk about millions of actor and supranational power-social media
which mean international system has now tight network with many independent
and dependent variable. The fuel of globalization reshaped the structure and terms
naturally. It is obvious that international system should be analyzed more deep
and complex way that’s why the next section of this chapter will provide general
framework of chaos theory and its possible application on international relations.
3.3 Chaos Theory – An Alternative Way
The word of chaos literally means disorder and existence of turbulence [9]. Chaos
is hard to totally capture in nature. Related to its definition, it can occur in nonlinear
and dynamic systems. Because of its dynamic structure it has its own to power
generate a change. Chaos theory is subfield of mathematics normally but it has
different application to physics, engineering, economics and social sciences. It
was first proposed by Poincare in 1880s. Then it was developed by different
mathematicians and physicists. However, the main development of chaos theory
was fostered after invention of computers because they made easier to calculate
formulates. Early formulation of chaos was done by Lorenz. Interestingly, he found
chaos theory when he was trying to make weather prediction in 1961. Through
his analysis attempt, he noticed that even the minor differences in initial conditions
give completely different results. For example, he started to calculate with 0.506 and
then he changed as 0,506921 as an initial condition. It would be completely different
result in weather prediction. In other words, Lorenz noticed that this small amount
of changing and its effect will be huge in the system. So, chaos is very dependent on
its initial conditions it famously called “butterfly effect” which suggest that flutter
of butterfly’s wing in Beijing can be responsible for producing hurricane in South
America [12]. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions shows how a small
change at one place or moment in a nonlinear system can led to large differences to
a later state in the system.
This sensitiveness would lead two important features of chaotic systems which
are variety and unpredictability [7]. So, primary units-individuals can have wide
range effect on the system. On the contrary, we cannot say every primary unit will
have wide range effect on the systems. Although millions of primary units interact
each other at the same time, it would turn into storm.
In the case of international relations and chaos theory is not completely new
there are only few peoples to interest in. Most of workings are about analyzing
of international system as a chaotic environment. Diana Richards is the first who
suggested chaotic dynamics in international system in her “A Chaotic Model of
Power Concentration in the international system”. Richards make analyze with
Modelski’s cycle theory and sea power and conclude that “evolution of power is
chaotic process” [9, 10]. Furthermore, Kissane described elements of chaotic inter-
national system and chaos as an alternative theory to explain nature of international
system. Kissane describe three elements of chaotic international system which are
nature of international system is chaotic, security seeking and interaction between
actors. According to Kissane, it is surely impossible to account for the actions of
every human on the planet and the implications of all of their actions on the wider
system, yet a chaotic system, by definition, is one in which such small permutations
at the individual level can affect the entire system and all other actors within it [6]
: : : the theorist has to make a choice as to which actors or level of inter-dependence
they will restrict their analysis to : : : [However] while it is necessary for the sake of
a comprehensible theory that the number and nature of the actors assessed is limited,
it is also antithetical to the chaotic approach to exclude actors, which may have a
significant effect on events in the system, so arbitrarily [7].
3.4 Chaos Theory and Arab Spring
It is impossible to make a total analysis of Arab Spring, since neither it is a

completed progress nor a template used to change regimes. Rather, it should be
considered as an uncompleted, unprecedented and unpredictable series of events.
Decision takers or manipulators behind the scene, either they are forerunners of
demonstrations and their ideologues or state and non-state actors and secret services,
can hardly be sure of the outcomes of their actions. The panorama of the events and
their outcomes are not orderly and predictable. This, however, is an observable and
understandable series of events only if one admits that it is at a level of controlled
chaos and intermingled complexity. The complex nature at the very beginning is
seen and easily observed: the butterfly effect created by a 26 year-old Tunisian
man, Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed graduate, who was selling vegetables for
earning his life, set him on fire in the middle of a crowd because local police seized
his cart. The reason of the seizure was that he had no permit to sell vegetables. His
reaction to this confiscation is understood today is the trigger of whatever happened
through the timeline of Arab Spring demonstrations. Tunisian people protested
against the government, crying off their anger so long they kept inside. This scene
is at the first glance as depicted above.
Nonetheless, there is a part to be analyzed a little deeper, and by refraining
from making superficial first-impression analysis. Tunisia, for a long time through
its history, is known as an undemocratic country, whose predominantly Muslim
population was under severe pressure by the government, however much pressure
can be observed at every aspect of social and religious life; such times were sadly
realized, people neither could practice their sacred duties and nor could use religious
wearing such as headscarf publicly, and public communities and meetings were
intensely followed by the angry eye of the state. Economic and social life was not at
a desired level of wealth and stability in Tunisia. Therefore, the daily life has long
witnessed such incidents like confiscations of carts and beating, violence, unem-
ployment, random arrests, cruel activities of police officers, torture etc., and were
commonplace in Tunisia. As Bouazizi’s self-immolation happened as a result of one
of these usual everyday happenings, the reason behind the scene should be examined
thoroughly. Bouazizi’s quite noteworthy protest appeared on the news both local
and international, for sure. The self immolation protest happened on 17 December
2010 and Tunisian government has been overthrown on 16 January 2011, Tunisian
president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia by way of Malta. Everything
happened in a month’s time. Sure it is a quite short time for a regime change.
If the scene is understood as appeared on the news bulletins, a man burning
himself can cause a regime change. In a thorough analysis, one can find out that the
plot is set for this quick and easy path to overthrow a government which had been
untouchable for decades. One explanation is the background preparation of public
opinion towards such a change: in Assange’s Wikileaks documents, Tunisia in the
eyes of the U.S. was full of negative indications. These were leaked accidentally as
the official story told us. Apart from the accidental nature of the documents, they
indicated that either the U.S. support or distant stance meant much for international
and domestic public opinions. Tunisian youth and any person who had access to
news, social media and internet services became sure of that their government
lacked enough international, and more importantly the U.S., support for applying
such a pressure on the society. The invulnerability of Tunisian dictatorship collapsed
in the social psychological level.
Not only Tunisia but also Egypt, Libya and other Arab Spring countries has their
own timeline and story. Maybe today, we can say that Egypt and Syria become the
unique. Egypt experienced coup d’etat in 2013 summer and Syria has still suffered
from civil war for almost 2 years. Unfortunately, these two countries and other
countries did not give any hope for democratic transition or democratic country
in the future.
Classical theories of international relations seems not enough to describe what
happened and what will be happened in those countries. Also, nature and evolution
of uprisings – revolution? did not same with old experience of countries. World
never experienced such a complicated, chaotic and interdependent protests. Also,
no one really can predict or guide future of those countries. That’s why, in this
paper we would analyze Arab Spring with chaos theory in four main assumptions
of chaos theory (1) international system as a Chaotic system (2) butterfly effect in
Arab Spring (3) Interdependence in Arab Spring (4) Edge of the chaos – generate
better and new system or not.
3.4.1 International System as a Chaotic
In order to understand, effectiveness of Arab Spring and its nature, we should start
our analysis with assumption of international system as a non linear system. As
we mentioned in the part of discussion on order, anarchy and disorder within the
field of international relations today can not explain naturally complex and chaotic
relationship network of international system.
Regarding Arab Spring, in order to understand its depth and long term conse-
quences can be understood within chaotic international system. According Kissane,
there are three elements of chaotic international system. He suggests that system
is chaotic which is completely different from any interdependent system. Secondly,
Kissane claims that every actor seek security in chaotic international system. He
made distinction between realists assumption of seeking survival. “A state seeking
security may well trade off sovereignty to another state or institution if it believes
it to be in the best interests of the state sovereignty” (Kissane 93). So, Kissane say
that each actor may define its security and, in parallel, make it more complicated
and unpredictable. Third assumption of Kissane is actors who while seeking security
also interact with each other. “Security cannot be pursued independently : : : security
can only be sought and attained by interacting with other units in the system.
These interactions drive the security balance and also the chaotic nature of the
wider system” [7]. He exemplified EU membership progress, since countries are
bestowing their sovereignty, though partially, and it is not easy to explain with
conventional ways.
Chaotic international system would much more focus on depth of interdepen-
dency, velocity of networks with the seeking of security. Actors in the system
become more varied, independent and interdependent through the years. We should
consider Arab Spring in the light of map of chaotic international system which
generally described Dylan Kissane. It will be helpful to understand uniqueness of
Arab Spring for region and world. So, the first step of analyzing is Arab Spring
occurred still continue in the chaotic international system which suggests actors are
more interdependent and interact each other, while seeking security.
3.4.2 Butterfly Effect in Arab Spring
Maybe the most popular phenomenon of Arab Spring has been “butterfly effect”.
From scholars to journals everyone described the situation with the word of butterfly
effect because as we mentioned in the beginning protests started in Tunisia and
split into whole Egypt, Libya, Syria and other countries. In first sight, we can talk
about butterfly effect started with Tunisian guy and it resulted in leader change in
countries. However we can talk about much deeper butterfly effect in Arab Spring.
First question is why a young Tunisian set himself on fire and what are the
reasons behind the mass protests across the region. We can find many answers
to those questions, if we want to summarize the general reasons, we will reach
the first chains of butterfly effect. We would like to remind that each country has
unique historical and political background however Arab people have common bad
memories and hopeful future dreams.
Political sphere in the Arab countries before Arab Spring was completely
undemocratic. Gelvin in his book “Arab Uprising: What everybody needs to know”
put the most common questions of public about Arab Spring. According to Regional
Bureau for Arab States of the United Nations Development Programme prepared the
report which manifested characteristics of political system in the region.
When it come to civil liberties, political rights and independence of media, only Jordan
ranked above the international mean [2]
When it came to public perceptions of corruption (graft, bribery, cronyism), ten out of the
seventeen Arab states surveyed ranked above the international mean [2]
Seventeen of the nineteen Arab States surveyed required newspapers to be licensed, there
was pre-censorship in eleven states. [2]
In its 2008 report, the Arab Organization for Human Rights cited seven states- Iraq,
Syria, Egypti Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait-and the governing authorities in the
West Bank and Gaza for regularly torturing interned prisoners; the United Nations High
Commission for Human Rights also threw in Algeria, Bahrein, Morocco and Tunisia, for
good measure [2]
As report mentioned, political sphere in Arab region became one of the main reason
behind uprisings. Most of the Arab countries have lived under the situation of
“state of emergency” which makes much more strong government authorities. So,
suffering from political authorities become first and one of the main reasons behind
uprisings.
Second reason is the economic conditions in the Arab region. We can say that
oil exporters’ countries have better conditions. There have been different economic
patterns in the region. It is hard to generalize economic conditions, for example,
Algeria is rich in oil and gas but the first protesters shouted “We want sugars!” [2].
Furthermore, IMF’s report on economies in the Middle East and North Africa draw
pessimistic frame, some of points were given in the below;
Over the course of the previous three decades, the growth of GDP in the region aver-
aged only 3 percent, while the GDP in the rest of developing world grew at 0f 4–5
percent : : : (2012)
The number of jobs grew 2 percent annually between 2000 and 2007. Overall, unemploy-
ment in countries for which data are available- Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia
hovered between 10 and 12 percent. (2012)
Not only political atmosphere in the region but also economic situation show how
Arab people have lived poor conditions. Unemployment rate has been increasing
while growth rate of GDP per capita are decreasing. Also, it should be remembered
that Tunisia was the worst countries which affected from 2008 economic crisis.
Third reason is directly related with other two reasons which is food crisis. As
we mentioned in the economic conditions, food crisis became so obvious and even
it reached to level of scarcity. Gelvin pointed out that Japanese investment bank
Nomura prepared list of 25 countries that would be “crushed” in a food crisis, of
course the Arab world dominated the list. Tunisia was in the number 18, Libya at
16, Sudan at eight, Egypt at six, Lebanon at five, Algeria at three and Morocco at two
[2]. We can say that unexpected climate change – drought in Syria and unbalanced
and wrong economic policies in the country. “In 2007, for example, when prices
began to climb, bread riots spread throughout the region, from Morocco and Algeria
to Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria” [2].
Authoritarian political atmosphere, poverty, unemployment, poor life standards,
non humanitarian treatment towards people characterized protesters life in the Arab
region. We can say that, in some countries such as Libya and Egypt this type of
life unfortunately continued even 50 years and more. So, reasons behind uprisings
did go back at least 50 years ago. We can say that long term negative aggregation
of Arab people resulted in massive and unexpected (still questionable for whom?)
protests and then regime change.
Regarding butterfly effect and chaos theory, compare to other analysis for Arab
Spring we pointed out deep reasons which were long term unemployment, poverty
and food crisis were the initial points of the protest. Now we can say that Arab
Spring cannot be demoted to Bouzazi’s burned himself. He was just a symbol
of initial conditions and will be sparkle for Arab peoples how they image their
future. Most importantly, how and why Arab people’s demands changed from their
initial conditions until today. In other words, Arab people started protests because
of poverty and food crisis but their demands shifted towards political demands of
democracy and human rights. Third part of our analyzing will show off how their
demands shifted to political ones with the interdependence in chaos theory.
3.4.3 Interdependency in Arab Spring – New Journalists

of Twenty-First Century
Third related issue with chaos theory is interdependence in Arab Spring. As we

mentioned in the butterfly effect part, interdependence and butterfly effect are inter-
related each other. Interdependence has been discussing by many scholars, we would
not get into deep. However the term of complex interdependence can be considered
as a new in IR, it is brought by Joseph Nye and Keohane. Simply, it means that
the various and complex transnational connections and interdependencies between
states and societies were increasing at the same time, balance of power by use of
force is decreasing. We can say that Furthermore, complex interdependence of Arab
Spring consisted of various actors. Interdependence is natural part of chaos because
any individual action can affect and change the system as whole but at the same time,
it make impossible to analyze. That’s why we limit our analyze with role of social
media and individuals to show interdependency realized with youth population and
social media.
Firstly, it is better to start with youth population and their role in Arab Spring.
Despite the old-type of regime supporters, Tahrir Square and Arab countries
experienced a unique revolution attempt by young Arabs who mainly suffered from
long term low wages, unemployment and poverty which we discussed in butterfly
effect part. Stephanie Schwartz work on critical role of youth in Arab Spring.
For years scholars have been warning about the youth bulge – that the disproportionately
large population of young men in the Arab world is a ticking time bomb. This logic
focused on young people’s violent potential: young men with little access to jobs and whose
grievances aren’t addressed by good governance are more likely to join rebel movements.
In part we are seeing this come to fruition, but not in the ways originally predicted. [11]
Role of youth population has kind of main position of interdependency analysis

because youth population means that high number of using social media and show
more mobilization. Schwartz [11] also emphasize that youth put a new elements
to protests like Social media, hip hop, the arts and comedy have all played a
role in anti-regime advocacy. She believes that “this was an important lesson for
traditional political and diplomatic institutions across the world, which in the past
might have : : : sustainable change”. So we can say that young population showed off
high mobilization and use of social media during protests which triggered massive
ones even revolution in not only one country it becomes whole region.
Secondly, social media is another source of intuition for the desires of indepen-
dent minds that became more eager for Arab Spring. Maybe for the first time, people
realize that how social media and its network were so effective in political events.
Arab Spring may be metaphorically regarded as a Vietnam of social media with
those who participated into it and who did not; this should be remembered when
people can still recall the “CNN effect” got into our life immediately after the first
Gulf War. There is no doubt that the news agencies such as the Al-Jazeera network
had significant role in monitoring events in the Arab Spring. However, this time
news, videos and most importantly groups organized through social media. Two
elements of interdependence is highly relevant to each other, because of mainly

young groups who make good use of social media in their daily life quite often,
manipulated events in the countries.
Social media is broad and limitless but can be represented mainly by Facebook,
Twitter and Youtube. They give chance to their users to post unmonitored and
immediate information, photo and videos; also it is more available and fast for
people to reach these postings. According to study from Washington University
which was about use of social media in Arab Spring with the words of Philip
Howard who is the leader and associate professor in Washington University
“Our evidence suggests that social media carried a cascade of messages about
freedom and democracy across North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise
expectations for the success of political uprising” [4]. Also, they used numbers
of tweets how change during high-tension times. For example, during the week
before Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, the total rate of tweets from
Egypt – and around the world – about political change in that country increased from
2,300 a day to 230,000 a day. Videos featuring protest and political commentary
went viral – the top 23 videos received nearly 5.5 million views [4].
The significantly important function of social media through the Arab Spring is
not just a simple role to inform the world what was going on then in their countries,
but also and more crucially, people became organized in groupings through social
media. Project on Information Technology & Political Islam point out this situation
“They found solidarity through social media, and then used their mobile phones to
call their social networks into the street. In a surprise to both government analysts
and outsiders, a large network of relatively liberal, middle class, peaceful citizens
quickly mobilize against Mubarak”(2011). Even Mubarak attempted to shut down
telecommunication system and received immediate criticism from public.
For example, regarding this organizing dimension of use of social media; Wolfs-
feld and others explain the role of social media in Arab Spring with two different
theoretical considerations. “This dynamic is likely to be especially prevalent in non-
democratic states, where citizens have less faith to their domestic media” [13].
There are two different approaches to role of social media during protests. First
one claims that political environment would change paralleling to increase number
of social media, on the other hand cyber-skeptics claim that protests already reached
peak point. They supported their claims with the following argument: only 20 % of
Egyptian has proper internet access. [2]. In other words, they try to understand how
social media affect and political environment change in a cycle.
Regarding chaos theory, two variables which are youth and social media can
be considered as a backbone of interdependency. Young population too often
uses social media tools to inform all over the world and organize their protests.
Furthermore, use of social network went beyond the expectation and reach almost
all over the world. Even we can say that the first days of protests followed from
Twitter and Youtube. In other words, use of social media and its deep network
triggered massive protests and global effect. Furthermore, social media also create
its interdependence network, millions of insider and outsider users brought Arab
Spring events to their network. This interdependency and its chain effect is found
in chaos itself. It repeated itself millions time and affect systems, in our case using
of social media by youth protestors create its own new network and it is a repeated
procedure for too many times by too many users. So, it led to a high interdependency
between actors even it push states as a main actor to take action.
3.4.4 Edge of Chaos – The New Systems
The main concern about the protests was when it would be ended? However, ending
protests seemed not to ended in soon even protesters spread to other countries. One
year later, February 2011, Mubarak was thrown out and in September 2011 Kaddafi
the Libyan dictator was lynched in the streets. World was shocked because small
spark turned to mass protests and then obviously uprising and in the finally resulted
in not government even system change in these countries. So, finally dimension of
this paper would consider Arab Spring countries on the edge of chaos which means
would Arab Spring led into new system or not.
The term of edge of chaos derived from coined by mathematician Doyne
Farmer to describe the transition phenomenon discovered by computer scientist
Christopher Langton. In general terms, edge of the chaos directly related with
self-organized criticality (where systems spontaneously reorganize themselves to
operate at a critical point between order and randomness), can emerge from complex
interactions in many different physical systems, including avalanches, forest fires,
earthquakes, and heartbeat rhythms. In detailed, Chris Langton discovered a regime
at particular threshold value, where there is a transition between where the state of
the automata eventually repeats itself and state where there is completely random
generated states that never repeat. Coined by Doyne Farmer as the “edge of chaos”
this regime is between the chaotic regime and the order regime. Jim Crutchfield has
mathematically analyzed this transition and determined that there is a peak at the
“edge of chaos” where there is a maximum of information.
Can we say Arab Spring can be considered as an edge of chaos in itself? In other
words, can the Arab Spring be the starting point for a new system in the countries
of the Arab world? This analysis should be carried out for each country separately,
because so far it has been 3 years since the protests started. Unfortunately, it is not
easy to generalize political and economic atmosphere of Arab countries. That’s why
it is more practical to focus on the most controversial ones: Egypt, Tunisia and Syria.
3.5 Egypt – Would Revolution Ended in Coup d’etat?
Egypt can be realized as a biggest and effective country in the Arab region in terms
of politically and economically. Even some of people believe that Cairo has been
the hearth of Muslim world. We would not go to detailed political history of Egypt
however as everybody know 30 years Mubarak’s period, Egypt experienced partially
liberal economic policies while there has been limited political reforms even it was
getting authoritarian day by day. Since 1967 except assassination of Anwar Sadat,
Egypt lived under Emergency Law Rule which led to seize of police and army
power and censorship on press become legalized, there was no word for human
rights. Also, during his 30 years of rule, opposition groups members such as Muslim
Brotherhood have been pressurized and prisoned. Of course in such a regime, riots
and unrest was not new, during his regime many times Egyptians made huge protests
because of economic reasons.
His overthrown just after 18 days later protests began. However it was not end bad
days of Egypt. For chaos theory, the peak point of protests in Egypt was completely
considered as edge of chaos. As same as system in the physics, in the edge of the
chaos system will be ready for new system. Protests turned into revolution towards
more democratic and open society. In other words, Egypt was ready to have better
and new political system. Muslim Brotherhood founded a political party called
“freedom and justice party” and in 2012 election Mursi who is the leader of Muslim
Brotherhood became president of Egypt. Unfortunately, 3 July 2013 coup d’etat
ended the term of Mursi’s presidency – the first democratic election of Egypt. It
made Egypt is one of the unique country because as we expected paralleling to “edge
of chaos” first Egypt have fair and democratic elections as Egyptians expected, then
again coup d’etat which is completely chaotic situation for Egypt. Today, Egypt has
suffered from mass protests and different than society was divided into two groups –
supporters of Mursi and anti ones. In other words, Egypt is more worse situation
during Arab Spring. Thus, Egypt seems again put itself in new edge chaos, we will
see how the new system will be shaped.
3.6 Tunisia – A Struggling One
Tunisia was one of the most controversial countries during protests because within
Arab countries Tunisia was relatively rich and prosperous country. As same as
Egypt, Tunisia had relatively neoliberal economic policies with autocratic political
systems. Despite the richness of Tunisian people, major group of Tunisian people
has suffered from poverty which expected as a result of neoliberal economic
policies. Like Mubarak, protests ended Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
regime and he and his family flew to Saudi Arabia but it was not end like other Arab
Spring countries, it was just beginning for them. After his flee, state of emergency
was declared protests continued for a long time against RDC (Constitutional
Democratic Rally) which was Ben Ali’s party. Because of long term protest, party
was banned. New president announced elections of Constituent Assembly and
Islamist Ennahda Party wining plurality.
Compare to Egypt and especially Syria, Tunisia seems in much more stabile
situation or we can say that protesters got what they want from old regime.
Thousands of people gathered to protest against Islamist government, protests rised

political tension since July and even Tunisian parliament activities were freezed
until political groups have consensus. However, it seems protests would turn into
massive points. Later than Egypt, Tunisia is again in the chaotic situation. The events
chain is the same with Egypt, even both elections resulted in favor of Islamists while
anti groups’ protests rised. So, we can say that Tunisia has also don’t have stable and
prosperous political life after Arab Spring, edge of chaos is still valid for Tunisia too.
3.7 Syria – Civil War
Syria – maybe the most bloodiest country in Arab Spring. In the beginning as Gelvin
said that uprising in the Syria was almost surprisingly for everyone. Actually, after
1 year the first protest in Tunisia and Egypt, Bashar El Asad believed that his country
is different and never happened such revolution. Also, Gelvin pointed out different
reasons why it was surprising. First Bashar Al Asad was known as a reformer
after his dad, even Syrians celebrate his coming. Secondly and more importantly
Syria is composed from different religious group and they give support to religious
minorities. Even Asad family themselves are belonged to Alawite sect while 75 %
of Syrians are Sunni (2012). Protests first started in small cities of Syria and it
was triggered by arrest of schoolchildren because of taking a slogan from Egyptian
revolution.
Unfortunately, Syrian people never had chance to transform democratic system
and election like Egypt and Tunisia. Characteristics of opposition groups, Asad
regime and role of international actors played role to have civil war in Syria.
Opposition groups in Syria have different elements. Peaceful protesters is one of
them however there are pro-democracy groups, “Local Coordination Committees”
and of course well know opposition Kurdish and tribal groups. On the other hand,
Syrian government structure is very different than Mubarak’s and Tunisian. Both
Father Asad and Bashar Asad appointed their relatives or familiar people from
Alawite sect to crucial positions in military and government. It is not easy to forced
to be resigned Asad. So, after almost 2 years since protests began there is unnamed
civil war in Syria. Day by day, role of international actors become more eminent and
effective. Also, control of different territories of Syria are taken by different groups
and violence continued.
Regarding chaos theory and being edge of the chaos, Syria might be considered
the most suitable case. They are still live in the edge of chaos, still hope to have
better system at the same time possible to have new system with Asad. Time, actors
and Asad regime are the vital player to continue these chaotic times for Syria. It
appears that Syria won’t generate a new system in soon. Chaos will be in Syria for
a long time too.
3.8 Epilogue: Chaos as a Matter of Fact in the Middle East
Chaos, as explained, does not necessarily mean arbitrariness or disorder, with regard
to international relations. Chronological explanations generally refer to acts of
governments, which are taken by certain decision taking processes, challenging
any disorder in their realms. As many other authoritative bodies, the government
in Syria, for example, has a priority of controlling its surrounding environment,
primarily its bureaucracy, intelligence and particular interest groups. By controlling
the nearby environment, they can simply impose their power upon their realms. This
is simply practical and as expected. Surprising is the fact that Asad developed some
kind of ‘siege mentality’ [2]. With this mentality, which is quite dangerous though,
Asad deliberately creates a chaotic environment nearby. This fits into our scheme
that leaders sometimes let happening of unrest and disorder, and see them as a
chance to reconstruct their authority and power. As the ultimate example to this, one
can see the latest dispute on chemical weapons and their arbitrary usage on civilian
society of Syria. This act, with no doubt, was a unrestrained act which has already
been titled as a war crime within international laws and regulations. However,
Asad’s chemical maneuver, which was expected to stir the already difficult situation
further, still very surprisingly though, ended in the cancellation of the plans of
international military intervention led by the U.S. This is also the consequence
of Asad’s final move, either planned or not, of quitting being reasonable both for
extending power and fear among bureaucracy and nearby people and also for giving
a message to the world that any relentless intervention into his business will turn out
to a turmoil.
How did using internationally banned chemical weapons ended up at the advan-
tage of Asad? It might still be his bare luck, or an evil-but-successful management of
chaos. Stressing the latter, we may say Asad, and as a devote counterpart Putin were
successful in managing the breaking point, indeed by creating a new one himself.
Metaphorically, by creating a big explosion on a river basin one can change the
direction of stream easily. Using a chemical bomb and killing thousands at once was
far from brutal; however, as evaluated as a bifurcation point in the linear worsening
of Syrian problem, that bomb is planned to be no risk to Asad, who is already going
downwards by all means. The bomb was seen as the bottom line of the bill that
Asad should pay, but it did not end up like that. This is one way or another related
to escalating the chaotic image and using its energy in a way vice versa.
The situation in the Middle East was no better for him to be harsh on civilians
and opposition parties. Iranian support, for example, which has always been quite
understandable through sectarian reasons between the governments of Syria and
Iran, seem like flowing in the same course it did for years. The Shiite collaboration
is, however, only one side of the explanation, and even a superficial side. Hassan
Rouhani as a newly elected president did refrain from appearing too internationally
obliged like his predecessor Ahmadinejad in terms of Shiite cooperation. Besides,
Iran has no real intention to immediately get at odds with the West, namely the U.S,
Britain and Europe. Additionally, Rouhani could not rest on the comfort that Russia
will always support Asad, and remain as a great bulwark in front of the West when
the willingness of the West to get rid of Asad immediately reached at its climax.
Russia is not willingly dividing the world into two in a Cold War fashion over
the Syrian dispute. Rouhani and those who think like him are desperately right.
Since Putin managed two international political movements amazingly successfully.
One is using the weak hand of Obama administration, which was an overall
unwillingness to deal with Syria in terms of military intervention (that is obvious in
the atmosphere of the Congress which could not give support to Obama that made
the situation uneasy for him to take the responsibility on himself of the military
intervention). Secondly, Putin not only appeared as the savior of Obama in offering a
peaceful non-intervention solution, but also firmly and clearly denounced the use of
chemical weapons and made Asad to come by him on that matter. How the latter did
happened? Simply, Asad was expected to welcome the international law at home and
freed from execution. The U.N seen as the body of international law and regulations
was set free on whatever they might observe in Syria. This shows that Putin was one
who understood the possible advantage of the braking of the parallel and linear flow
right within the correct time, which can be taken into account as a true bifurcation
point in the chaotic universe.
Turkey, from the very beginning of the problem, appeared on the humanitarian
side of the issue. However, supporting both the opposition openly and directly and
the refugees running away from the war in their hometowns, Turkey was a side from
the initial days of the conflict and did not seek for any ultimate political goal in the
environment after Asad. The issue of Turkey’s search for a role in the reconstruction
of Syria in the possible post-Asad period is not a crucial matter for its international
strategy. Both prime minister Erdogan and President Gul declared the aim of Turkey
as bringing an end to murder. However, Turkey did not apply to the changes
soon afterwards, which was a chaotic crisis management and a realm of political
movements. The case of Egypt was another failure of Turkish political adaptation
to immediate events. Turkey supported the Muslim Brotherhood and Mursi from
the very beginning. After 1 year of administration, Mursi failed in dealing with the
deeply and strongly established regime and particularly its military branch. A coup
d’etat finalized the Mursi administration. In Egypt, as a matter of fact, the army
controlled almost everything even the economy through its enterprises. An annual
U.S financial support and the military technology transfer were regular advantages
of the army. Besides, a long lasting Israeli support to the Armed forces of Egypt
is a debated issue. With all the given parameters, as long as Mursi’s efforts in
establishing democracy in Egypt were peaceful and a part of a long-term political
agenda, it was destined to fail eventually. In comparison to whatever we see from
Asad, instant, sudden and unrestrained political actions seem to be more successful
than waiting for peaceful evolution. Back to Turkey’s stance, the policy was doomed
to fail to expect from a very fresh democracy to change the old established regime,
ruled and protected by Mubarak for decades, once and automatically. This did not
work, so did not the support for the West including Turkey for newly established
Egyptian democracy.
Chaos theory with specific logical sequences and certain peculiar equations can
explain social and political phenomena as far as modeling them within structuralist
explanations. Therefore, Arab Spring, aftermath, turmoil and ongoing civil wars
can be fit into various schemes quite well. If we take into account the explanations
of chain reactions within already established schemes and put the bifurcation
points wherever necessary, we might not somehow manage to put forward sensible
explanations to actual events. However, as obviously seen in the irresponsible
use of chemical bombs, irrational and unreasonable acts might somehow end up
into advantageous positions for those who merely desired to create more terror.
There is not enough evidence to prove that decision takers like Asad intentionally
used the chemical bomb to change the flow at his advantage. This looked like a
desperate act of an already uncredited leader in the international arena. Surprisingly
enough, the recent situation reveals the fact that Asad indeed released from US
intervention by using that bomb. This rather unusual leap from a desperately
disadvantageous position to an advantageous relief is better to be explained by a
global power transition: an equation which is constituted by two main variables
we all are acquainted with throughout the Cold War period, namely the U.S. and
Russia. Arab spring, therefore, is in a way not a regional phenomenon, indeed,
a systematical scheme for global powers, a quite applicable one to any pattern
related to power transition. For Mursi, what was wrong is expecting an idealistic
betterment of his country, but forgetting the fact that the change initiated in Tahrir
Square resembled disorder and chaos. Change for Egypt, Tunisia and the rest was
not initiated by orderly manner. What is missing at the understanding of the idealist
leaders like Mursi is found in chaos theory and its application into international
politics. Although unintentionally, the events that seem to happen all of a sudden
in a particular time may either lead to desired or undesired situations. For resetting
the political (or economical, social) universe, destructing the motives or parameters
that continue their existence according to physical the law of inertia should be
interrupted for changing the flow of events. Thus happened in Syria. International
political decision takers, as long as they seek for a sustainable peace in every
disputed part of the world, may somehow act as their policies become divergent,
including the options that may appear provoking. Chaos management has a negative
side which appears as an image of problem solution by creating a bigger problem.
References
1. Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.
2. Gelvin, L. J. (2012). Arab uprisings: What everyone needs to know. New York: Oxford
University Press.
3. Gleick, J. (1987). Chaos: Making new science. New York: Viking Penguin.
4. Howard, P, et al. (2011) Opening closed regimes: What was the role of social media during the
Arab spring? (Working Paper.). University of Washington’s Department of Communication,
USA: Project on Technology & Political Islam.
5. Jones, P. (2012). The Arab spring: Opportunities and implications. International Journal
(Vol. 67, p. 447). Spring.
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revolution in international politics. Revistă de ştiinţe politice editată, 2, 85–103.
7. Kissane, D. (2010). Mapping international chaos. Contemporary Issues, 2(1), 17–27.
8. Linklater, A. (Ed.). (2000). International relations: Critical concepts in political science.
London: Routledge.
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science. Fukuoka: IPSA Congress Paper, First Draft.
10. Richards, D. (1993). A chaotic model of power concentration in the international system.
International Studies Quarterly, 37(1), 55–72.
11. Schwartz, S. (2011, April 28). Youth and the Arab spring. United States Institute of Peace.
Available at: http://www.usip.org/publications/youth-and-the-arab-spring
12. Thietart, R. A., & Forgues, B. (1995). Chaos theory and organization. Organization Science,
6(1), 19–31.
13. Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E., & Sheafer, T. (2012). Social media and the Arab spring: Politics come
first (Vol. 18, pp. 115–137). The International Journal of Press/Politics 2013, APSA annual
meeting paper.
Part II
Politics, Complex Systems,
Basin of Attractions
Chapter 4
Economic Decision Making: Application
of the Theory of Complex Systems
Robert Kitt
Abstract In this chapter the complex systems are discussed in the context of
economic and business policy and decision making. It will be showed and moti-
vated that social systems are typically chaotic, non-linear and/or non-equilibrium
and therefore complex systems. It is discussed that the rapid change in global
consumer behaviour is underway, that further increases the complexity in business
and management. For policy making under complexity, following principles are
offered: openness and international competition, tolerance and variety of ideas,
self-reliability and low dependence on external help. The chapter contains four
applications that build on the theoretical motivation of complexity in social systems.
The first application demonstrates that small economies have good prospects to
gain from the global processes underway, if they can demonstrate production
flexibility, reliable business ethics and good risk management. The second appli-
cation elaborates on and discusses the opportunities and challenges in decision
making under complexity from macro and micro economic perspective. In this
environment, the challenges for corporate management are being also permanently
changed: the balance between short term noise and long term chaos whose attractor
includes customers, shareholders and employees must be found. The emergence of
chaos in economic relationships is demonstrated by a simple system of differential
equations that relate the stakeholders described above. The chapter concludes with
two financial applications: about debt and risk management. The non-equilibrium
economic establishment leads to additional problems by using excessive borrow-
ing; unexpected downturns in economy can more easily kill companies. Finally,
the demand for quantitative improvements in risk management is postulated.
R. Kitt ()
Department of Mechanics and Applied Mathematics, Institute of Cybernetics,
Tallinn University of Technology, Akadeemia tee 21, 12618, Tallinn, Estonia
Swedbank AS, Liivalaia 8, 15040, Tallinn, Estonia
e-mail: kitt@ioc.ee; robert.kitt@swedbank.ee

52 R. Kitt
Development of the financial markets has triggered non-linearity to spike in prices

of various production articles such as agricultural and other commodities that has
added market risk management to the business model of many companies.
Keywords Decision making • Complexity of social systems • Risk management
4.1 Introduction
The study of complex systems has long been applied to the social sciences (cf.
[16, 17]). Financial markets and financial time series have been of special interest
among scientists as there is a well-accessible supply of data in time resolutions
ranging from seconds to years. Therefore, many scientists like physicists, math-
ematicians, engineers and others have been attracted by research of the financial
markets. Moreover, for about two decades for now, a branch of statistical mechanics,
econophysics, has dealt with the financial time series analysis (cf. [10, 15]) by using
models first developed in statistical mechanics (cf. [28] and references therein).
It is not surprising, that the academic literature has been populated with numerous
applications that confirm the non-linearity and/or complexity in social phenomena.
Interestingly, the first two noteworthy applications came from scholars (as opposed
to scientists) in the first half of twentieth century: the works of Vilfredo Pareto of
wealth distribution (cf. [19]) and George K. Zipf (cf. [32]) of frequency distribution
of words in English language. But it was only in 1963, when Benoit Mandelbrot
suggested (cf. [11]) to use Levy stable distribution function as characteristics
of financial market fluctuations; and in 1965 (cf. [12]) when he recommended
processes with long-term memory. In addition to stochastic phenomena, the deter-
ministic chaos also describes complexity. One of the first applications of chaos
in economics were reported by Tõnu Puu in 1989 (cf. [25]). The applications of
econophysics are mostly descriptive: typically the dynamical stochastic models
are derived from data analysis. By today, it is widely accepted, that majority of
social phenomena obeys non-linear properties or complexity. However, the research
about the origin of complexity in social sciences (including economics and financial
markets) has somewhat been unclear.
The aim of this chapter is to show that economic policy and decision making is
an application of the theory of complex systems. Hence, the economic systems can
very seldom be reduced to the linear, forecastable systems, which is the essence of
many economics and business textbooks. It seems that mankind has always searched
for some clarity or order in its arrangements. There has always been a drift towards
some hierarchy, or structure. Only in very recent past, perhaps due to the progress
of the so-called third industrial revolution (cf. Sect. 4.2.2), there has been some
admittance that natural state of human society is better described by complexity;
non-Gaussian stochasticity or chaos. Or, to put it in another words, the equilibrium
economics has started to leave its space to non-equilibrium economics.
This chapter is organized as follows: first the complex or non-equilibrium phe-
nomena is discussed in an economic arrangements from theoretical point of view.
The rise of power-laws is theoretically motivated. The change in the behaviour of
4 Economic Decision Making: Application of the Theory of Complex Systems 53
consumers is discussed and the examples of power-laws are given. To conclude, the
guidelines are given for successful management of complex phenomena in business
and economics. Further, four applications based on non-equilibrium phenomena are
discussed. The first application discusses the opportunities for small economies in
changing market environment. The challenges of business managers is elaborated
and the chapter concludes with the two financial applications. The first of them
discusses threats arising from excessive usage of debt and the second highlights the
importance of risk management in the future.
4.2 Complex Social Systems
The population has rapidly grown in past centuries. So have the social relationships
between humans beings. They form increasingly complex networks that have been
studied by many fields of science (e.g. complexity, network, chaos science). As
it emerges, many, if not all, human networks are scale free, i.e. they cannot be
characterized by some average or variance. For example: the question about average
company does not make sense, as in every industry there are giants and pygmies
side by side. Or perhaps the better example is the distribution of wealth: already
according to Pareto (cf. [19]), the 80 % of the land is owned by 20 % of the
people. The spreading of such systems is striking: internet routers, airport densities,
book sales, brand awareness are just few examples that obey so-called power-
law, i.e. system members obeying property x decreases with x in power of ˛.
Mathematically the power-law can be written:
P .x/ / x ˛ (4.1)
where P .x/ denotes cumulative probability distribution of variable x. The power-

law leads to the scale invariance that can be explained as the system without
characteristic scale to measure it.
It is important to note that the complexity can be driven from ordinary func-
tional dynamic equations that just contain the non-linear element. Therefore the
researcher, economist or businessman needs to be very careful when building his/her
theory or business plan on some equilibrium in the system. Non-linear dynamics
typically leads to non-equilibrium systems; or to the equilibriums that are not stable.
The important question is to ask why? Why social systems lead to the power-laws,
scale invariance and chaos? In the following sections the complexity is theoretically
motivated and the applications are offered for economic decision and policy making.
4.2.1 Motivation of Complexity in Social Sciences
It has been said that a biological system is in equilibrium only when the cell is dead.
The question arises, what determines, if an economic system is under equilibrium
54 R. Kitt
Table 4.1 Sources of non-equilibrium in socio-economic processes

Complexity resulting from
Equilibrium Non-equilibrium non-equilibrium
Deterministic linear dynamic Deterministic non-linear Deterministic chaos
equations dynamic equations
Converging variance of Diverging variance of random Power-law distribution
random process process
Independent random variables Time-related random Fractality and long-term
variables correlations
or not? In the Table 4.1, the conditions for certain equilibrium are compared with
equivalents of non-equilibrium.
The complexity can be easily increased by combining any of the factors above.
For example, a stochastic process with power-law distribution and long-range
memory is called multi-fractal process (cf. [13, 14]). As noted above, there is a
number of reports about economic systems obeying complex dynamics. However in
economics, one should always ask why the system is having non-linear properties?
The key difference between social and natural sciences is that the latter has super-
universal properties (laws of nature) that are present at any time in any place. The
social systems, according to the best available knowledge do not obey such universal
properties. Even if such universal law exists, then it is so vaguely defined, that the
dynamical equations cannot be derived. For example, the utility theory suggests
that all economic agents are striving for maximum utility. The utility, however,
is not universally defined. Some consider money as a proxy for utility, some add
soft factors such as happiness. Poincaré has suggested that if the assumptions of
mathematical models are not valid, the models do not work. The same applies to
applications in economy and social science. Barabási and Albert have shown (cf.
below), that power-laws are arising from growth and preferential attachment of the
system. Therefore, we can conclude, that the power-laws are justified in the studies
of current economic conditions. But due to the lack of super-universal social laws,
one should always be critical of applying the model for future forecasting purposes.
Additionally, on has to evaluate the assumptions behind each model. If a socio-
economic model is empirically verified from past data; and it is claimed that this
model is universal (i.e. applies also to the future or is good for making predictions)
then it can be classified as historicism as elaborated by Karl Popper (cf. [23]).
To motivate existence of power-laws in social sciences one has to go back into
1950s when Hungarian mathematicians Paul Erdös and Alfred Renyi studied first
the random graphs (cf. [7]). Their work has guided studies of complex networks for
decades until increased research in the field started to question whether it is right
to assume complete randomness in real networks (such as internet) or expect some
organization of the system. If the network was random then the distribution of the
number of connections from arbitrary point in the network (denoted as degree dis-
tribution) would follow Poisson distribution. In 1999 Barabási and Albert reported
(cf. [3] and references in [1]) that (degree distribution of) real networks deviated
significantly from expected Poisson distribution and obeyed a power law instead.
They also showed that the system must have growth and preferential attachment
properties to result power-law behaviour. Preferential attachment denotes that the
relationships between system members do not appear randomly, but new links prefer
to attach to connected members.
The complexity arises from non-linear components in the system. The sources
of non-linearity (but still deterministic and non-stochastic behaviour) are countless:
from micro-economics the supply and demand functions can be non-linear (cf. [4]);
production cost does not have to be linear function of volumes (economists are call-
ing this scale-effect or scale-efficiency); and relationship between unemployment
and inflation (so-called Phillips curve) might be non-linear to mention just the few.
The power-law behaviour is the signature of underlying complexity of the system.
It is the key warning signal, that the system under consideration might have some
intrinsic non-equilibrium properties.
The discussion above has shown, that socio-economic system can easily become
complex system. The presence of power-laws, memory and deterministic chaos
in economic process has been motivated and empirically confirmed by many
authors. Next it is discussed whether the global economy has recently increased
its complexity and therefore the scientists and economists and businessmen have to
change their paradigms in interaction with surrounding economic problems.
4.2.2 Trends in Consumer Behaviour
The special editorial report devoted to the third industrial revolution was published
in the April 21st, 2012 issue of the British weekly the Economist (cf. [31]). The
Economist claimed, that current changes in global economic development have
exceeded the usual evolutionary process and the global economy might be in the
verge of the revolutionary changes. This is, of course, a revolution in production
methods, not a political revolt against ruling classes.
The first so-called industrial revolution took place about 200 years ago, in the
late eighteenth century in Britain with mechanisation of textile industry. In the
following decades the idea of letting machines do the work (instead of physical
work by people) spread around to the other industries and countries. The second
industrial revolution started at the beginning of the twentieth century in America
and was characterized by mass production. The iconic industrialist Henry Ford has
said that any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long
as it is black (cf. [8]). In other words, the production processes were improved
and tremendous efficiency gains were achieved over the twentieth century. More
people than ever before could allow themselves a car, computer, washing machine
or any other industrial product. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution,
the improvements in quality of life for ordinary people are incomparable with the
developments known since the beginning of the civil society.
56 R. Kitt
By the beginning of the twenty-first century the global economy has reached
the point where production is no longer an issue. The unit cost of production (in
terms of raw material, time or labour) is lower than ever before. But the problem
has turned and the production issues have been replaced with marketing issues. The
supply of goods is saturated and the consumers are more selective than ever before.
Consumers want to have individual solutions for the price of mass production and
all this should be available instantly. Auto-mobile industry, the flagship of the
second industrial revolution, does not produce for the retail consumers identical cars
any more. The keywords for the third industrial revolution are: customer centric,
flexibility, speed, preciseness. The consumers are now literally dictating the market.
The importance of intermediaries and whole-sellers (who depict the choice for
consumers) is decreasing in time. Thanks to the possibilities of e-commerce, even
the physical constraints do not matter any more. Everyone can shop online.
These trends have major (or revolutionary) effect to the production. The efficient
manufacturing of big quantities is not suitable for changed consumer behaviour.
Not only the production quantities, but the logistics should match the changed
environment. The Economist (cf. [31]) makes case that the productions is therefore
returning to the proximity of consumers. Consumer preferences are subject to com-
plex decision-making. Therefore, the demand side of the economic supply/demand
relationship is expected to create clustering (i.e. power-laws). In addition, the
consumer choices are very sensitive to the small details. In physics, it denotes the
sensitivity to the initial conditions, that leads to the chaotic behaviour of the system.
4.2.3 Rise of Power Laws in the World Economics and Trade
Further it is analysed how recent societal trends have increased the complexity.
The model of Barabási-Albert (cf. [3]) is used. To recall, the model claims that
the system must have properties of growth and preferential attachment to result the
power-law behaviour. It will be showed that many social and economic systems
obey those two properties and therefore the power-law behaviour is theoretically
motivated.
First the growth component is discussed. In order to motivate the complexity,
the system must have the change in its size. To put it in other words, the number
of social agents must vary in order to have power-law in social system. It will be
quite easy to show that this is the case in many of the social systems. The first and
foremost, the population of the Globe has reached seven billion by 2012; and the
rate of increase as been also increasing. From a pessimistic note from economic
perspective, the increase has not been in the most developed parts of the Globe
and therefore it might not contribute to the increased complexity. This note can be
ignored because of the decreased barriers in the global trade. The World is becoming
increasingly global in its trading affairs. The local differences are fading away and
therefore the increase in population is reaching to the global markets. Therefore, the
increased trading relations also increase the number of potential customer for each
company regardless of its physical location. As it will be shown later, this brings
unique opportunities for the smaller countries.
The second requirement from Barabási-Albert model for arising the power-laws
is preferential attachments. This phenomenon denotes the behaviour, where social
agents prefer to connect with the agents that have more connections at first place.
When intuitively true, it can be proved by ruling out the opposite. Let us consider
an arbitrary social system, that is related to the human behaviour. Preferential
attachment does not exist, when the decision making over the population is
completely random. Whereas there is definitely an element of randomness involved,
any of the product or service for the sale contains an unique value proposition that
influences decision making. The examples of those are: historical habits, expensive
marketing campaign, cheap price of the product, well-known (and prestigious)
brand, lack of alternatives and others. With the growth and preferential attachment
components in place, the Barabási-Albert model has its pre-conditions in place and
the systems under observation obey power-law. This is a matter of fundamental
importance in social and economic affairs: with the rise of power-law the systems
become scale invariant, i.e. they loose the meaning of properties of average and
standard deviation.
The power-law in stock price fluctuation is caused because investors have their
preferences to buy stocks by definition (hopefully nobody picks stocks randomly)
and the number of investors in given company is continuously changing (growing
or decreasing). The number of internet websites and academic papers grows; and is
likely that more popular websites or papers are getting more and more connections
to them. Number of words in any language is growing; people prefer to use only
limited amount of them and therefore the distribution of word usage follows power-
law (i.e. Zipf’s law). The wealth of the individuals grow; but more money in absolute
terms is earned by the ones with higher initial capital (although the percentage of
the return might be higher with those of low initial capital). The list can easily be
prolonged and the power-law is observed in very many social systems. But before
the usage of its applications, it would be still wise to consider, if the system has the
intrinsic properties to yield power-law behaviour.
As a final note, the preferential attachment refers to the free will of the agent.
This is of course the cornerstone of free will (in political terms) or free capitalism
(in economic terms). The changes in political regimes in the past decades have
positively contributed to share of people who are currently part of global capitalist
system. Those people have started to express their free political and economic
will. And the latter has significantly contributed to the rise of the demands from
consumer side. Coupled with the technological advancements, inter-connectivity
due to the internet, the global preferential attachments have most likely gone through
qualitative change that gives the rise of complexity and power-laws in countless
social applications.
58 R. Kitt
4.2.4 About Social Predictions and Economic Forecasts
Forecasting and socio-economic determinism has been a desire for the mankind
since Plato. Karl Popper, in his seminal book of The Open Society and Its Enemies
(cf. [22]), analyses brilliantly the problems arising from uncertainty and openness
of the society. According to the Popper, Plato saw and understood very well the
changes in the society that have started to transform from tribalism to the democracy.
Plato’s response was to freeze all of the changes and return to the old, closed
society. The key difference between open and closed society is that in the former
the individual decisions of the people almost did not exist; all of their choices were
pre-determined by customs of the tribe or society. But this was also mental relief,
as people did not bear any responsibility for such decisions. In open society, on
contrary, people have to decide by their selves about their actions, but they are also
responsible for their actions. During the course of past two millennia, the problem of
Plato has re-occurred a number of times (cf. numerous references in Popper’s The
Open Society and Its Enemies [22]) with the issues circling around (i) individual
freedom and responsibility of the person and/or (ii) collective welfare of the nation
and the means to achieve this.
It can be discussed, whether the tribalism was truly closed society or not (at
the end of the day, the laws of nature still applied to the society), but it has no
relevance in the current context. The one and truly relevant point is that the society
is a complex system with countless interconnections and non-linear relationships. It
cannot be reduced to the linear system for the forecasting purposes. The power-laws
and scale invariance (i.e. lack of characteristic measures such as averages or standard
deviations) simply cannot allow to ignore one-off, big time changes. Critical Mass,
a book by Philip Ball (cf. [2]), describes wide variety of such phenomena. Fooled
by Randomness and Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb (cf. [29, 30]) adds the
flavour of the financial markets.
4.2.4.1 The Problem of the Analyst
Many fields of human activities celebrate calendar year by nominating and choosing
the best performer of the year. Among others, the best athletes, artists and architects
get selected. From another perspective, various magicians are continuously provid-
ing the forecasts for the coming periods. Regardless of the used methods (tarot
cards, celestial bodies or other tools), one can be very sceptical about the social
forecasts, as once again, there are no super-universal laws that describe the social
systems. However, all kinds of forecasts are very popular, as they provide a sort
of security that people would like to have in their lives. This is especially true for
the stock markets, but also for various aspects of people’s personal lives. A very
interesting book about forecasting (cf. [27]) was written by Ian Rowland, a British
magician, who has debunked various aspects of paranormal phenomena.
What is the role of forecasting in economic decision making? Certainly the stock
exchange prices are driven by various forecasts: the ones drawn by the companies
themselves and the others offered by analysts in investment banks. In addition, the
micro economic (or company level) forecasts are dependant on the general macro
economic situation; and further the predictions of economists influence the forecasts
of the stock analysts. Note, that the current passage is by no means restricted to
the stock exchange, but the logic offered can be easily applied to the other fields
of finance (e.g. agriculture as discussed in Sect. 4.6). But are such predictions
contributing to the economic decision making, or perhaps vice versa, make things
worse?
As discussed in Sect. 4.2.1, the mathematical models should be dropped, if the
assumptions are no longer valid. Further, the only super-universal law in economics
can be formulated as follows:
Revenues Costs D Profits (4.2)
Therefore, the only reasonable economic forecast relies in simple modelling, where
revenues and costs are depicted. If the model works on paper, it may also work in
real life. If the model does not work on paper, then there are very little chances that
the business will work in real life. However, typically economic models contain non-
linear inputs because of stochasticity (variability of input and/or output quantities),
non-linearity (clustering of purchases or sales of the company) or other reasons,
that make the forecasting pointless. For example, in order to forecast stock price
the analysts must account not only for the company-specific reasons, but as well as
behaviour of other investors in the market. This equals of forecasting the social (i.e.
complex) systems.
The problem of the analysis broadcasted in popular media includes the following
shortcomings: (i) missing error estimates, (ii) missing back-tests of the achieved
results; and (iii) missing personal responsibilities. In physics, all experiments are
conducted with mandatory error estimates. In economics and financial markets, the
error estimates are never given that would leave the user of such forecast with no
idea of the accuracy of the forecast. Further, even if the forecast proved to be right,
there is never no information given about the method itself, or the reliability of
the forecast in slightly different initial conditions. From Sect. 4.2.1, the complex
systems are very sensitive to the initial conditions. Therefore, if no additional
information is given, there result is not qualitatively different from the random luck.
Thirdly, no analyst is responsible for their results, that are used in media. So, even
if the results are not correct, the analyst typically bears no responsibility for the
advice. Why should anyone take such forecasts seriously?
The critique above was not intended to dismiss all aspects of economic analysis.
As noted previously, the models that build on the pre-determined rules can be
verified and falsified (as defined by Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery
[21]). However, the critique is addressed to the blind belief of any of the forecasts
of complex social systems.
60 R. Kitt
4.2.5 Possibilities of Handling the Complexity
The power-laws and chaotic processes have already put many companies out of
business and most probably will do also in the future. In this section some stylized
approaches are suggested in order to manage the changed economic environment.
4.2.5.1 Openness and International Competition
The most fascinating thing about the globalization and international integration is
the international competition. The competition, by definitions means threats and
opportunities. The competition forces producers to continuous improvements in
order to appeal the consumers. The definition of the consumer and the market
has changed in the past decade; so has the demand of the consumers. About
20 years ago, the consumer potential of any product was determined by population
living in certain area and having relevant income level. Due to the advances of
internet, the geographic borders have vanished. The physical stores are there to
remain for food and other daily products (and perhaps daily services such as hair-
dressers, car washes etc.). On the same time, the dealerships for consumer staples
have to reconsider their business plan. The market for all products and services
has become more competitive and therefore the following can be generalized: the
producers must aim to produce globally best product since the consumers want to
buy globally best products. Obviously, the definition of the product can include
various components; as described by value proposition in (cf. [6]). If the local
language is the part of the value proposition (for example for a video game), then
the producer can claim, that he/she is doing the best product in local language; that
sells with higher price than the English language equivalents. This might be true,
and the producer might be successful, but in conventional market conditions, the
producer always bears the risk that the consumer’s preferences change and s/he is
out of business. Therefore, given the rise of competition and higher demands from
consumers, the producers must always be open to the innovation and assume the
global competition; even if they are servicing only local consumers.
4.2.5.2 Tolerance and Variety of Ideas
Hayek has said (cf. [9]) that the society cannot be measured in a single scale of
more and less. The number of opinions might be as large as the number of people.
The democratic society respects all opinions that are not dangerous to others. The
dominance of the single opinion is also dangerous as it can be wrong. In the context
of economic management, due to the complexity, the direct and indirect outcomes
of decisions are never clear. Therefore it is important to consider and tolerate within
society or company, but also in department or family level the variety of opinions in
decision-making. The next question arises from the implementation of the decision.
Should it be done with one big bang or slowly, step by step. As it was discussed
above, the complex systems tend to be non-equilibrium. So, every big step may
drive the unit under discussion quickly out of equilibrium. Therefore it is important
to manage step by step. In popular reading, it is also known as method of trial-and-
error. Should the idea or decision prove to be wrong; one can easily reverse the
situation and try other solutions.
The pessimist in complexity phenomena might argue that the piecemeal imple-
mentation of any plan never allows to achieve extraordinary results. A wise person
never puts all eggs into one basket. Whether the company is an established one or
a start-up, the owners very seldom take single risks with all of their capital. If the
new business venture is still pursued, with all the capital under risk; the successful
outcome cannot still be classified as wise, but rather lucky.
As the final note, the variety of ideas very seldom rises from single source of
knowledge. Therefore, along with continuous innovation, the variety of ideas should
be always searched for. One original sources of the ideas is to look at the intersec-
tions of various disciplines. People with different background are more likely to
produce truly innovative ideas as opposed to similar people. Interdisciplinary fields
of science, business or social life are more likely to yield new ideas that expand
mankind’s knowledge and welfare.
4.2.5.3 Low Dependence on External Help
External interference into any physical system disturbs the system. As discussed
previously, the small disturbances can yield the qualitatively different outcome of
the system under chaos. But what if the disturbances are permanent and/or large?
Then the system has to be redesigned and all of the dynamic equations should
be rewritten. The social systems behave analogically. The small disturbances are
perhaps new competitors; or small new technological innovations. The technolog-
ical innovations can lead also to the new industries and big changes, but this is
also part of the usual market behaviour. However, the government interference into
economic system is big disturbance that reshapes the whole economy in general or
any industry in particular. The government interference creates market distortions
that companies should comply with. This can be advantageous (in case of subsidies)
or disadvantageous (rules and regulations). Important is to note that companies
under global competition may respectively have opportunity or threat to survive.
The government interference is very powerful tool that influences the system. Under
complexity, it can therefore with the fraction of the second, reshape the destinies of
many companies and workers in those companies. The same is true also for the
demand side of economy. With the increased regulations the consumers might pay
higher prices.
To summarize, the companies should be aware of the distorted market models,
since they are competing internationally. This is also the case, if the distortion
is beneficial in short term, and is creating the advantages. The threat is that the
managers might be deluded from observing international competition; and if the
public support disappears, they may find themselves in trouble.
62 R. Kitt
4.2.5.4 Qualitative Improvements in Risk Management
The increased complexity demands the qualitative improvements in risk manage-

ment. There are various sources where the company or private individual can be
exposed to the complexity. It is utmost critical that the company will be aware of
such phenomena. It has to understand the sensitivity of its cash-flows of the variables
it is exposed. Further, the risk mitigation plan should be devised. It is important
to stress, that not all risks can be or should be hedged. After all, the companies
typically earn money for risk taking. Hence, the good risk management is not risk
minimisation, but risk optimisation. But one can optimise only after the risks are
identified and quantified. This requires dedicated attention from to top management
or owners of the company; after all, it is their interest that the company would not
suffer against unforeseen risks. And all of the risks arising from complexity are not
seen without proper attention. The risk management issues are also discussed in
Sect. 4.6 of this chapter.
4.3 Application: Opportunities for Small Economies
Countries, like companies are obeying power-law, if their size (in terms of popula-
tion or economic output) is observed. It is tempting to ask that who will win from
the third industrial revolution (cf. Sect. 4.2.2) or from complexity or combination
of both. Instead it is asked, what are the opportunities for small economies to
benefit from the underlying changes in the global economy. Note, that the definitions
of economy and small are not given in this context. It can apply for the nation,
company, or family.
The value proposition of the production company in the new environment can
be elaborated as follows: first and foremost, the changes in consumer behaviour
call for individual solutions. In every industry the consumers are expecting the
tailor-made solutions that are different (or at least look different) than the others.
This calls also for decreased production quantities which, in turn, affect production
processes. Therefore, the flexibility of production is playing increasing role in global
competition. The producer or service provider has to be quickly able to adjust to the
new orders; the delays in production drive up production costs. The flexibility has
also other meanings: it is ability to quickly introduce new products or variations of
existing ones; it implies quick and reliable delivery of the goods; it raises a question
of whether the company should enter or exit new elements in product value chain.
This means that the company may decide to start to produce more value-adding
components to existing products; or to increase the production cycle (i.e. start
producing also goods that it was previously buying in). Excelling in production does
not necessarily make the company successful as the products also need to be sold.
But selling has not that much changed due to the complexity. There is just another
dimension; that is to provide the value proposition above: flexibility, individual

solutions, small quantities, efficient production and quick delivery. However, since
the competition in production side is also growing the reliability and business
ethics of each company as well as nation starts to play increasingly large role. The
successful companies cannot allow themselves to break their promises or violate
oral or written agreements.
The concept of flexibility has so far only limited reach in academic literature.
Only very recently, a group lead by prof. Luciano Pietronero has devised a new
method to rank the countries. It opposes two-hundred-year old concept (cf. for
example [26]) of economic specialization (and of static equilibrium) and ranks the
countries by complexity of their products (cf. [5]). The suggestion of their method is
to study the complexity (and variety) of the exported products that serves the proxy
to the future well-being of that country (as measured by GDP).
The small economies can use this change in economic landscape for their benefit.
It is clear advantage as compared to the big economies, that are used to make huge
quantities of similar products. Obviously, bigger economies adjust as well; but their
production efficiency advantage is disappearing. The small economies have to be
agile in finding new opportunities. They have to strive for the best product in the
world and not for a less. Continuous innovation and rethinking of the business model
is of benefit. They must continuously try new things; if one does not try, one cannot
also succeed. But the risks have to be carefully measured. It is dangerous to get
stuck with single buyer of the production: not only this makes negative impact to
the agility, but also the buyer might start to push down the margins of the producer.
Finally, the small economies should be counting only to themselves. It applies to
the national level, but also to the company level. No government subsidy will make
any of the companies to produce or sell better. From public point of view it has to
be assured, that none of the productions is discriminated by other countries; and the
government might want to help with investments. But the companies have to find
the customers by them selves. No government support (by small country) will help
to reshape the global consumer behaviour.
To conclude, the increased complexity (due to globalization, usage of internet
and liberalized markets) opens the opportunities for the small economies. With
flexible production, reliable business ethics and managed risks, they have all chances
to succeed.
4.4 Application: Changes in Business Management
The fact that the world becomes more and more complex was already discussed
above. It is reasonable to assume that business environment also changes and
becomes more and more complex.
64 R. Kitt
4.4.1 Problem of Trustful Sources: Success-Driven Business

Literature Ignores the Failures
There is a myriad of books written about business and management, that typically
state or study trivialities: buy cheap and sell expensive; in order to succeed the
unique value proposition needs to be developed and exploited. There are plenty
of tools to determine the strategy. For example, one only needs to draw Porter’s
five forces (cf. [24]). In the course from determinism to chaos more individual
approaches start to prosper. Blue Ocean Strategy (cf. [6]) is the method where
value proposition of individual product/service is modified; similarly the methods
depicted by Moskowitz and Gofman (cf. [18]) about segmentation. However,
what seems to be very common for the conventional business books is absolute
ignorance towards survivorship bias: namely all of the examples brought forward
are positive. At least in theory (and much in practice) there are failing business
strategies. However, those seem to be missing from popular literature: almost
always the theories are backed with the success-stories. To summarize, all of
the (successful) books write about successful strategies, leaving unanswered the
empiricist’s question: what made a strategy fail? It would be interesting to speculate,
how many product launches, business ventures, restructurings and similar has to fail
in order to produce single successful one.
4.4.2 Unsuccessful Response to the Complexity
In late 1990s, before the burst of so-called high-tech bubble, the popular buzz-
word was New Economy. This term was coined mostly to describe the technological
advancement. But not only. It was also symbol of boundary-less activity, agility,
in some cases loose financial management. For some time there existed a claim
that the company of the New Economy does not have to be profitable; and the
right assessment of the value of the company (i.e. share price) was not done by
money earned to shareholders, but clicks received by company’s web-site (there
was even price-to-click ratio introduced to be a better proxy than price-to earnings
ratio). By today such party is clearly over; performance management is back in
stage and companies are counting money more than ever before. As an aftermath of
recent economic and financial crisis, the regulations and standards in many sectors
(including financial, industrial and services) are about to increase. The companies
have to strive for order in management and market relationship in order to survive.
Yet, the twenty-first century has not made the shareholders rich. The performance
of the biggest stock indices in US and Europe has been modest, if not negative,
in the past decade. If not nominally, then volatility-adjusted performance for sure.
(Note that the aim of this chapter is not to discuss the statistical properties of
stock indexes; there are most definitely market segments that have posted life-high
returns). At the same time companies around the globe have succeeded in many
paradigm-changing innovations: the usage of Facebook, smart-phones, hybrid cars

or renewable energy has increased by order of magnitude. It would be probably hard
to find a single corporate executive who can claim that their efficiency has not risen.
Additionally, the financial management of companies (and public sector) is better
than ever before. The market has done its job perfectly: companies are fitter than
ever before. But as discussed above, the consumers are also demanding more than
ever before. The complexity has risen, but the response has not yet been successful.
4.4.3 Through Chaos to Determinism
To summarize at this point: corporate executives (as well as public administrators)

have to respond to both: (i) increased consumer demands for value innovation
(that drives up costs); and (ii) increased demands from regulatory and financial
institutions. And, as companies become more and more competitive, there is the
third dimension: ongoing competition for the labour force. What is the right
management approach in this context? Tom Peters describes in his classic book
In Search for Excellence (cf. [20]) various management styles that make companies
successful. However, it seems that all of his advice is bound to linear evolution –
that should be amended in the context of non-linear or non-equilibrium economics.
4.4.4 An Illustrative Model of Chaos in Economics
In this section an illustrative model is constructed in order to demonstrate the

emergence of chaos from simple micro economic relationship.
Consider an arbitrary company that sells an arbitrary good. It is simplified that
the company is selling the unit labour hours; and the quantity available for sales (i.e.
supply) at time t is denoted as qS . In this model, the quantity for sales can be also
interpreted as the satisfaction of the employees – the bigger the number of employ-
ees the higher is the satisfaction of the employees. The customers are purchasing
the same unit labour hours and their demand (at time t) is denoted as qD . It can also
be interpreted as the satisfaction of the consumers – the more they are buying the
higher the satisfaction. At time t the transactions are concluded at the price p; the
wealth of the shareholders is W ; and the employees are compensated at the unit rate
of C . Therefore, the full cost of production is qS C ; the revenues of the company are
qD p. From these simple definitions the following equations are derived.
The satisfaction of the employees is positively related to the compensation. The
compensation (i.e. salary) has to be higher than critical value C0 ; otherwise the
employees are leaving.
dqS
D .C C0 / (4.3)
dt
66 R. Kitt
The satisfaction of the consumers is negatively related to the price. If the price is
higher than critical value of p0 the consumers will not conduct any transactions.
dqD
D ı.p0 p/ (4.4)
dt
The relationship between shareholders and employees is also positive: if the
shareholders are doing well, they tend to raise the salaries of the employees.
dC
D ˇW (4.5)
dt
If the supply is larger than the demand, the price has to be lowered. It is assumed
that the price is not related to the wealth of shareholders.
dp
D ˛.qS qD / (4.6)
dt
Finally, the change in shareholders’ wealth equals to revenues less costs.
dW
D pqD C qS (4.7)
dt
Merging Eqs. (4.7) and (4.5) yield following:
d 2C
D ˇ.pqD C qS / (4.8)
dt 2
To summarise, the micro economics of simple company can be presented in a
form of system of ordinary differential equations.
8
ˆ dqS
ˆ
ˆ dt D .C C0 /
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ dqD
ˆ
< D ı.p0 p/
dt
(4.9)
ˆ
ˆ d 2C
ˆ
ˆ D ˇ.pqD C qS /
ˆ
ˆ 2
ˆ dt
ˆ
ˆ dp
:̂ D ˛.qS qD /
dt
Due to the non-linearity, the emergence of chaos can be predicted. It is not
attempted to solve these equations analytically. However, it is easy to demonstrate
that the numerical solutions inevitably lead to the chaos. In Fig. 4.1 the happiness of
the consumers (variable qD ) is plotted against salaries C . From economic point of
view the vertical axis demonstrate the quantities demanded by the customers (qD ).
In both plots the quantities in demand drop to the low territories, but recover later. In
chart .b/ the value of qD is even negative at some point. In real economic situations,
this represents very bad business conditions and perhaps even the bankruptcy of the
company.
a b
10 12
9 10
8
8
7
6 6
5
4
4
3 2
2 0
1 99 99,5 100 100,5 101 101,5
99 99,5 100 100,5 101 -2 Salary fund
Fig. 4.1 C -qD plot with the parameters. (a) ˛ D 0:6; ı D 0:2; D 0:3; ˇ D 0:005; C0 D 100;
p0 D 100. Initial conditions of the system: qS .0/ D 10; C.0/ D 101; dC.0/=dt D 0:2 and
p.0/ D 101. (b) ˛ D 0:525; ı D 0:2; D 0:3; ˇ D 0:005; C0 D 100; p0 D 100. Initial
conditions of the system: qS .0/ D 10; C.0/ D 101; dC.0/=dt D 0:2 and p.0/ D 101
Although very primitive, the illustrations carried out in this section demonstrate
very well the chaotic and complex nature of the business conditions. With smallest
change of the parameter ˛ the qualitative difference between those two situations
becomes apparent. Therefore the policy makers in social systems (including busi-
ness and economics) have to be very careful with their decision-making. Only
smallest change in any of the parameters can lead to the qualitatively different
outcomes.
4.4.5 Chaotic Management Approach
It is proposed to implement a chaotic management approach in order to succeed

in the twenty-first century. Chaos, as defined in physics, refers to the dynamical
process that oscillates randomly around some attractor (or basin). Chaos is not
randomness. It is random only by observing from short distance (e.g. short time). By
borrowing the phraseology from Graph theory (cf. [1]), the successful company is
consisting of graph of three nodes: clients (i.e. public), shareholders and employees
and three edges. This Corporate Graph serves as the basin for attractor of chaotic
dynamical process as the company evolves during the time. The process gets very
complicated as there is a high degree of noise (news-flow, competitor and customer
behaviour) and high degree of conflict of interests across the edges. As one can
see, the determinism in the contemporary management is unstable. Therefore the
conventional tools of performance management have to be adjusted. The goals and
targets might change overnight and the management culture has to account for
this. The management under chaotic conditions is much more complicated than the
management under deterministic or linear conditions. However, this is most likely
irreversible trend and the management in the future is most likely even harder than
the one of today.
68 R. Kitt
To conclude, the modern management is like deterministic chaos. Whereas

underlying structure of the stakeholders interest is determined (by the Corporate
Graph above) the daily management is full of randomness. Successful leader has to
keep its graph together with sound balance between short and long time horizon.
4.5 Application: Threats from Debt Accumulation
The essence of debt is to gear up the shareholder’s capital. The motivation and
extent of debt usage may vary. Business textbooks recommend to use it for capital
optimization purposes, but debt may also be required due to insufficient amount
of equity in the company. The sources of debt financing consist largely of two
groups: banks (typical for continental Europe) and debt capital markets (Anglo-
Saxon model). The same principles apply to the private individuals; only the main
reason for them is to engage into larger investments than their cash accounts allows.
Usage of debt is largely justified in daily business processes and offering debt
financing is major source of revenues for commercial banks. Mismanagement of
the debt leads to the bankruptcy of private entity and/or credit losses for commercial
banks. Therefore, the debt issuing and management is of interest to both: borrower
and lender.
In addition to private individuals and companies the States (via respective
governments) are issuing debt to manage public finances. Whereas there are
differences between the countries, the public debt tends to be larger than the private
aggregated debt. Again, in general the usage of public debt is justified with the
reasons being similar to the private purposes. And similarly, mismanagement of
public debt can become a threat to the national solvency.
From the textbooks, the main risks associated with debt are: credit risk (i.e.
borrower’s financial inability or institutional unwillingness to serve the debt),
interest rate risk (i.e. difference between market value and notional amount) and
currency risk (i.e. difference arising from currency fluctuations).
4.5.1 Implications of Complexity to Debt Management
In must be noted, that by introducing complexity, there are no changes in any of the
matters above. Conventional private, corporate or public finance has no alterations
due to the complexity. What complexity does, is making financial system more
fragile. Namely, the usage of debt in the balance sheet implies certain level of
confidence that borrower is able to serve its obligations. Under stable conditions,
the borrowers can estimate their cash flows and then derive their debt service ability.
Usually the cash flows of households consist of salaries; the free cash flow of
companies is revenues minus costs; and the public sector cash flows is essentially
collected taxes plus one-off items, such as privatization.
Complexity and power-laws add additional element of uncertainty into cash

flows. The economic system is never in equilibrium and therefore the borrowers
must qualitatively re-estimate their ability to service the debt. All economic agents
must ask the following questions: what if the salary/revenues disappear from one
day? What if there is unforeseen economic depression? What if the assumptions of
balance sheet optimization task are no longer valid? The debt needs to be serviced at
all given times. The borrower faces problems, if it fails even in short term despite the
fact that the balance sheet and all other conventional measures are still satisfactory.
Complexity makes borrowing fragile since the short-term problems can kill the
borrower. As we have recently seen (cf. international help to Greece, Ireland and
other countries in Europe) the sovereign States are not that different from private
entities. It can be speculated that the increased amount of money has increased the
complexity and that, in turn, has triggered the problems for over-borrowed countries.
To conclude, the usage of debt is very common and it helps to increase the
opportunity set for private and public institutions. However, the extent of debt usage
should be considered carefully; the optimization techniques for certain aim (e.g.
return of equity) are subject to equilibrium that does not hold in real, complex
economic systems.
4.6 Application: Negative Impacts of Market-Driven

Complexity
So far the discussion has mainly been focused on positive aspects of complexity.
This has opened many new alternatives and created new possibilities for people.
However, there is a clearly negative application due to the market liberalization and
the rise of complexity. This is the application of long-term investments.
The long-term investments such as manufacturing plants and infrastructure
have faced clear set-back from the liberalization of the markets. Let us consider
the simplified example of electrical plants. The life-span of the plant and therefore
the business plan is drawn for decades. The feasibility analysis of the construction
of the new plant goes like follows: revenue minus cost minus debt service costs
yields the shareholder’s profit. The output of the electrical plant is by definition
the electricity and hence the revenues of the plant is generated from the sales of
electricity. The cost of building an electrical plant is huge; this can be done only
by borrowing. From the previous, borrowing makes the system fragile and the
debt servicing flows have to be carefully planned with buffers and cushions for
the extraordinary events. However, with the good investment plan it is not unusual
to draw the feasible business plan for electrical plant. The problematic aspect
is added by increased uncertainty in revenues. Note, that the complexity arising
from the market fluctuations of input commodity (e.g. coil, gas) is ignored here
because of simplicity. By market liberalization, the electricity is freely traded in
the market. What trades in the market tends to fluctuate. And this adds uncertainty
70 R. Kitt
and complexity by the order of magnitude. Since the amount of equity in the
balance sheet is limited; the drop in revenues can influence the debt servicing
ability. One should not be confused between market revenues and revenues from
public subsidies. Public subsidies exist to eliminate some market inefficiencies; or
to execute a political goal. In the context of electricity such goal is to facilitate
the renewable energy sources. Hence, there is stable stream of cash-flows coming
from government that is typically reliable source of revenues in business plan.
To conclude, there is probably a relationship between market liberalization and
willingness for private entrepreneurs to set up new electrical plants.
The example of electrical plants can be easily generalized to any of the
production facility. The business plan faces additional stochasticity from almost
all of the inputs as well as outputs. To elaborate: one of the largest cost items is
electricity, also various commodities including metals and food. Note that the cost
of labour is not accounted here – the labour market has not essentially changed in
the context of recent jump to the higher level complexity. Similarly to the costs, the
revenue side (i.e. the sales of the company) fluctuates in the market; and it should be
as the output of one company is input to other companies or individuals. Whereas the
input prices can be passed through to the output prices is the function of company
management skills and market practices.
An interesting trend of increased market-based trading takes place in agriculture.
Recently, the number of agricultural products that are traded in the financial market
has increased. This has lead to new market participants in the form of financial
investors (growth in map). From consumer demand, there is also the preferential
attachment. Recall from Sect. 4.2.3 that growth and preferential attachment are the
two pre-conditions for the rise of power-laws from Barabási-Albert model. There-
fore, the rise of power-law has gained its legitimacy and, indeed, the prices of agri-
cultural commodities have started to fluctuate in more unpredictable way. Note, that
the prices used to be predictable as the market participants included only producers
on supply side and consumers on demand side of the economic equation. Therefore,
the complexity of agricultural business model has exceeded the production-specific
aspects and includes now also the complexity of the financial markets.
What would be the tools for businesses to overcome the complexity of markets?
The first and foremost, the business managers have to accept the complexity and
to admit the higher degree of unpredictability in their business plans. The second
line of defence is to explicitly state the quantities under risk and then to find
the risk mitigating solutions. For example, the electrical plant managers should
think about their cash-flow sensitivity towards the price of gas or coal (inputs) and
electricity (output). The risk mitigation can be done through financial contracts as
OTC forwards, futures; options or other similar instruments; or by passing through
the input fluctuation to the output. The problem with this approach is that the length
of such contracts is typically short and cannot be used for the whole lifetime of
the business plan. Despite of that, the increased complexity calls for the qualitative
increase in risk management of the corporate and/or public management. Another
solution to the problem is financial innovation. Namely, the loans of the banks might
depend on the price of some commodity, but it is only partial solution as then
the banks would be taking the price risk. The full solution is that the banks can
also finance themselves based on some commodity index; that in turn calls for the
financial market to create such instruments. And, as we have seen, this might trigger
in turn an additional level of complexity.
4.7 Conclusion
Non-equilibrium economy via its applications of chaotic dynamic and non-linear

stochasticity is in the rise. The rise of power-laws in many social systems are
discussed and it is shown that the systems with growth and preferential attachments
are characterised by power-laws. These conditions are satisfied in increasing number
of fields in socio-economic landscape and therefore the non-linear or complex
phenomena is increasingly dominant in social systems. In addition, the changes are
also under-way in global consumption patterns that together with inter-connectivity
through the internet make business and economic environment more and more
complex. For successful management under complexity, a following principles are
offered: openness and international competition, tolerance and variety of ideas, self-
reliability and low dependence on external help.
Despite of increasing complexity, it seems that small economies have good
prospects to gain from the global processes underway. The key to success is flexible
production, reliable business ethics and good risk management. Management itself
is also changing. The static approaches and tools have to be complemented with
dynamic and more agile approaches. Corporate executives do not have the luxury
of not to react to the market information promptly. The managers have to find
good balance between main stakeholders (customers, shareholders and employees)
as well as market reactions. From financial aspects the excessive usage of debt is
questioned. The debt makes companies fragile as short-term temporary downturns
can under unfavourable circumstances kill the company. The increasing non-
linearity in the economic surroundings has influenced many industries. As it is
shown, the business models start including also the financial risk management as
an integral part of company’s operations.
Acknowledgements This contribution was written in the 2nd Ph.D. School of “Mathematical
modelling of complex systems” in Pescara, Italy in July 2012. Author would like to thank all
of the attending students and professors for fruitful discussion; and especially Professors. G.I.
Bischi and T. Bountis. Author would also like to thank Prof. J. Engelbrecht and Dr J. Kalda from
Institute of Cybernetics at Tallinn University of Technology for fruitful discussions. The support
of Estonian Science Foundation (Grant ETF7909) supported by the EU through the European
Regional Development Fund is highly appreciated.
72 R. Kitt
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Chapter 5
Basins of Attraction for Generative Justice
Ron Eglash and Colin Garvey
Abstract It has long been known that dynamic systems typically tend towards
some state – an “attractor” – into which they finally settle. The introduction of
chaos theory has modified our understanding of these attractors: we no longer
think of the final “resting state” as necessarily being at rest. In this essay we
consider the attractors of social ecologies: the networks of people, technologies
and natural resources that makeup our built environments. Following the work of
“communitarians” we posit that basins of attraction could be created for social
ecologies that foster both environmental sustainability and social justice. We refer to
this confluence as “generative justice”; a phrase which references both the “bottom-
up”, self-generating source of its adaptive meta stability, as well as its grounding in
the ethics of egalitarian political theory.
Keywords Chaos theory • Attractor • Generative justice • Industrial ecology •

Open source
It has long been known that dynamic systems typically tend towards some state – an
“attractor” – into which they finally settle: a driven pendulum like a metronome will
settle into a repetitive cycle; a racing heart will return to its normal rate after a sprint;
an ecosystem will eventually find a stable re-configuration given a newly introduced
species. The introduction of chaos theory has modified our understanding of these
attractors. We no longer think of the final “resting state” as necessarily being at rest.
We now know that a driven double pendulum can settle into a chaotic attractor that
never repeats its motion [7]. The beating heart, which seems to be a simple cycle,
is actually a subtle chaotic attractor whose variation is key to cardiac health [13].
R. Eglash () • C. Garvey

Department of Science and Technology Studies, Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute (RPI), Troy, NY, USA
e-mail: eglash@rpi.edu; garvec@rpi.edu

76 R. Eglash and C. Garvey
And ecosystems which were once seen to settle into a static climax community
are now regarded as the ever-changing results of chaotic attractors [22]; what
is sometimes referred to as the “metastability” of complex adaptive systems. In
this essay we consider the attractors of social ecologies: the networks of people,
technologies and natural resources that make up our built environments. Following
the work of “communitarians” such as Kropotkin [16], Ostrom [23], Benkler [2]
and others, we posit that basins of attraction could be created for social ecologies
that foster both environmental sustainability and social justice. We refer to this
confluence as “generative justice” [9, 10]; a phrase which references both the
“bottom-up”, self-generating source of its adaptive metastability, as well as its
grounding in the ethics of egalitarian political theory.
5.1 Generative Justice: Bottom-Up Flows of Value

in Social Ecologies
The theory of generative justice posits that both environmental sustainability and
social justice can be improved by self-organized flows of value through social
ecologies. Adam Smith noted that a commodity such a precious gem may have
“exchange value” – you can trade it for other goods or currency – without having
“use-value.” Marx made use of this distinction in defining exploitation: by paying
only a small wage to the laborers in a factory or farm, the owners of that “means
of production” can essentially extract much of the value they produce. In the early
1990s, a new “ecological Marxism” brought this conception of value to bear on the
ways that the means of production extracted value from Nature (e.g. [25]). Just as
value is extracted from labor, it is also extracted from nature: in the form of either
a source for materials, a sink for pollution, or even the useful work performed by a
dammed river.
At the same time that Marxist theory was finding more success in ecological
views, Marxist practice was finding defeat in the dissolution of the USSR. If it was
not obvious before, it became increasingly clear that the extraction of value from
labor and nature in the former USSR was at least as exploitative, destructive and
unjust under Russian communism than it was under American capitalism [1]. But
why?
Both labor and nature are “generators” of value, and they can regenerate if
allowed the resources to do so. But externalizing those costs – making workers
pay for their own health insurance, or making nature plant trees for reforestation –
will increase profits. Figure 5.1 shows the system of value flows under capitalist
or communist governance. Note that some small flows loop from labor back to
labor: workers continue to take care of their health and households as best they can.
Similarly, nature regenerates from its exploitation to the extent it is able. But most
of the value is extracted. Under liberal capitalism some of this value is returned
because of taxes: as social services to labor or environmental services to nature.
5 Basins of Attraction for Generative Justice 77
Fig. 5.1 The flow of value under capitalism or state communism
Fig. 5.2 The border between Russia and Mongolia, 1992
Under communism, state ownership takes on a similar role as taxes. But neither
governance mechanism does a good job of returning that extracted value to the
entities that generated it.
Figure 5.2 shows the border between Russia and Mongolia. Years of centralized
government control under the USSR created environmental devastation due to
overgrazing of livestock. The same environmental terrain just across the border in
Mongolia was governed under traditional indigenous practices [26]. Contrary to
the assertions of Malthusians such as Garrett Hardin, strong centralized authority
Fig. 5.3 Flow of value in the Arduino open source community
created a “tragedy of the commons,” and voluntary community associations pre-

vented one. Most indigenous economic traditions do not depend on an “alienated”
route for returning value to the value-generators. Rather than extracting value
through socialist national ownership or capitalist state taxes which might, some day,
be eventually returned via some government payment or service, the indigenous
tradition allows labor’s herders to integrate local social networks directly with the
value produced by their herds. Rather than deplete soil by monocropping and use
the income to purchase commercial chemical amendments that might eventually
ameliorate the imbalance, the indigenous agroecology allows the soil ecosystem to
directly integrate its networks with the fertilization of the animals they support.
One critique of such portraits is that they can only work for people who live
“simple,” pre-industrial lives. This is wrong on two counts. First, the model of
“generative justice” also fits communities based on Open Source sharing. Arduino,
for example, is an Open Source microprocessor that has spawned a surprisingly
large community of lay and professional users across the world. Figure 5.3
visualizes some of the flows of value. Unlike the case of proprietary hardware
in which users merely carry out consumption, delivering profits to a corporation,
the “public commons” in which the Arduino circuits, code and applications are
legally owned is both consumer and producer, and thus supplies profits to keep the
enterprise financially solvent and yet significant value returns to the source of value
generation: the DIY “maker” community.
The second reason that this critique of “simple lives” is incorrect is that even in
the case of indigenous traditions, the fact that value is returned in less alienated
forms does not mean the paths of flow are simple. Phrases such as “directly
integrate” are just shorthand for what are actually highly intricate networks. Lansing
and Kremer [17] for example describe how Balinese rice farmers combine spiritual
beliefs, ecological knowledge, and representational forms such as the wooden “tika”
calendar to collaboratively schedule interlocking irrigation patterns. Despite the
potential for conflict over water, this adaptive synthesis of virtual and material
aspects allows them to do so without any centralized authority.
We will shortly compare these two cases of generative justice – indigenous

irrigation and open source information technology – and show that both can be
described using the framework of basins of attraction from nonlinear dynamics. We
first offer an introduction to the concept of basins of attraction for those unfamiliar
with this model.
5.2 Basics of Basins of Attraction
One of the best ways of obtaining an intuitive understanding for a basin of attraction
is to consider a simple pendulum. We know that a pendulum with friction will
swing in smaller and smaller angles, eventually coming to a halt. Figure 5.4 shows
how plotting the angle and velocity of the pendulum will form a spiral, because
these quantities are 180ı out of phase. Hence the term “phase space”. The point
at the center is a “point attractor.” In Fig. 5.5 we try this same plot for many
different starting points. No matter what the starting positions, we end up in the
same point attractor. Thus we are always in its “basin of attraction.” One way to
gain better intuition about basins of attraction is to add a third dimension such as
potential energy. This helps us see that a basin of attraction is similar to the role that
gravitational attraction would play in a physical 3D surface, as shown on the right.
Figure 5.6 shows the phase space plot for an inverted pendulum, such as a flexible
rod with a weight on the end. Here there are two basins of attraction. Unlike the case
of the single pendulum, in which all initial conditions land us in the same attractor,
the initial conditions matter greatly. Keeping a system within the basin of attraction
characterized by generative justice is the primary goal for our analytic framework.
Finally, Fig. 5.7 shows a phase space plot for a driven pendulum, in which there
is a vertical motion in addition to the horizontal swing. Unlike the repetitive cycles
of the simple pendulum, the driven pendulum has a chaotic attractor: the behavior
will remain bounded but never precisely repeat the same values. As noted in the
Fig. 5.4 Phase space plot of angle and velocity for a pendulum
Fig. 5.5 (a) Phase space plot for many different starting positions, showing the basin of attraction.
(b) The same basin of attraction as in (a), with a 3rd dimension showing potential energy
Fig. 5.6 Basins of attraction in 2D and 3D for the inverted pendulum
introduction, research now supports the idea that such mechanisms for internal
variation in biological systems – even in something as seemingly repetitive as a
heart beat – are an important means by which complex adaptive systems are able
to maintain both flexibility in the face of external perturbations and resilience that
prevents the system from moving to the “wrong” basin (in our case, that of social
injustice and environmental instability).
3
Attachment
moves vertically
2
theta 1
q
Omega
0
-1
-2
negative positive
velocity velocity -3
-4 -2 0 2 4
Theta
Fig. 5.7 Chaotic attractor of the driven pendulum
5.3 Basins of Attraction in Generative Justice: Comparing

Balinese Rice Irrigation and Open Source Software
Production
As noted previously, Lansing’s analysis of rice irrigation in Bali offers a well-

studied model for how a social ecology can form a basin of attraction around the
immediate return of value to its generative sources in labor and nature. Rice farmers
on the island of Bali create terraces on its volcanic slope that require an extensive
network of irrigation canals, governed by “water temples” which divert and regulate
flow. Because water is a precious and well-regulated resource in this context,
previous scholars assumed that there must be a hierarchy in which higher social
power resides higher up the gravitational aquifer. But Lansing’s careful analysis
showed that in fact the schedules for water irrigation are created in an egalitarian,
self-organized consensus process. One explanation he provides for this cooperative
basin of attraction – an excellent illustration of generative justice – is that pest
populations are kept to a minimum by simultaneously flooding or draining near-
by fields. If they are not synchronized in their irrigation patterns, pest explosions
result, because the pests fleeing a newly flooded field can just hop over to a dry
patch next door (and the converse for pests that require an all-wet environment).
The results of Lansing’s survey matches the prediction of his model: farmers at the
level of a water temple say they fear pests the most, and farmers downhill from the
water temple say they fear droughts the most.
Lansing and Miller [18] formalize these observations using game theory, first
with a simple model using 2 farmers, upstream (u) and downstream (d), and two
dates for irrigation, A and B. If both farmers plant on date A (represented by
“Au” and “Ad”) then the upstream farmer has a normal, unencumbered harvest
(normalized as Au D 1), and the downstream farmer has his harvest reduced by some
factor “w” (normalized to the range 0 < w < 1) due to lack of water (Ad D 1 w).
If they irrigate on different days, then both will suffer a loss from the increased
pest populations (for example Au D 1 p and Bd D 1 p). Summarizing this in the
payoff matrix typically used for such game theory analysis, we have
Ad Bd
Au 1, 1 w 1 p, 1 p
Bu 1 p, 1 p 1, 1 w
As long as p > w/2, the aggregate yield will be greater for coordinated irrigation
than uncoordinated.
Readers will likely be familiar with the Prisoner’s Dilemma form of such
cooperative games, and indeed if the harvest decrease due to pests were made
artificially low, the “rational” choice would be a lower aggregate yield, since the
upstream farmers would no longer have a logical incentive to cooperate [15].
However Lansing points out that in reality the water damage due to droughts is not
a binary choice: upstream farmers can allow a partial release of water that slightly
decreases their yield and still provides positive feedback for synchronization from
downstream farmers, and he shows that the resulting basin of attraction is towards
egalitarian sharing of water. As noted above, Lansing does not attribute the existence
of this cooperative basin of attraction purely to such rational calculation – he notes
that there is a wealth of very long-term interactions networking religion, marriage,
harvest rituals, gossip, comradare, and other social and economic realms. At the
same time, the game theoretic model shows that even the logic of pure self-interest
can move us toward this attractor.
Basins of attraction for such collective prisoner’s dilemmas and related game
scenarios investigated by other researchers show that chaotic attractors may play an
important role in the metastability of cooperative solutions [20, 21, 27]. In general,
chaotic dynamics are the result of combining negative and positive feedback: the
positive feedback moves the system towards the boundary of the basin of attraction,
but negative feedback is always simultaneously at work, and recovers it, so to speak,
before it can escape to another basin ([8]: p.168). Because this recovery never lands
back on the exact values of a previous trajectory, deterministic chaos results. But
whether chaotic or periodic, the social ecology of Balinese rice irrigation clearly
makes cooperative behavior a basin of attraction by this kind of balance between
“upstream” and “downstream” feedback.
A similar model can be used to understand the cooperative basin of Open
Source software production, in which a generative capacity is similarly maintained
by a balance of upstream/downstream interests. The founders of an Open Source
project are typically in a position to accept or reject code contributions (“pull
requests” in the language of Github, the most popular open source repository). Like
the upstream farmers, they control access to a critical resource. But contributing
software developers can create the equivalent of the downstream rice farmer’s pest
problem: a contributor who is disappointed by the lack of code adoption can “fork”1
the code into another version of the same project, splitting the community and
dissipating its human resources.
Establishing an entirely new project would be an extreme option, but it does
not actually have to be exercised any more than an actual pest explosion needs to
be deployed; merely knowing that the possibility of splitting the community exists
could be enough to exert a counter-force. And there are less extreme measures than
project forking: for example exercising “soft power” in the form of jokes: “those
vested with authority on [Open Source] software projects, because of their success,
are usually met with some degree of suspicion, and thus jokes and sometimes
accusations of cabals run rampant among hackers” ([6]: p. 122). Stronger forms that
still avoid the “nuclear option” of forking the entire project include behaviors such
as “going dark,” in which coders suddenly go incommunicado for extended periods
of time (http://www.codinghorror.com/blog/2008/06/dont-go-dark.html). These can
also give be the software equivalent of “downstream pests.”
Our description here, even in the soft power case, models the relationship in
antagonistic terms that are perhaps more the result of game theory frameworks than
actual lived experience of either rice farmers or OS coders. The option of creating
a new version of the same project does not have to be interpreted as a threat; it
can simply be seen as a legitimate and reasonable possibility, and thus a good
reason for respecting the voice of contributors in pull requests. Lansing makes a
similar distinction between the “calculus of self-interest” in game theory and the
pragmatic experience of living in a culture that values a deeply cultural commitment
to cooperative perspectives and articulations.
Thus the concept of a basin of attraction for generative justice is not merely a
utopian dream: it is an empirically testable model for both tradition social ecologies
and what we might call the “techno-social” ecosystem for Open Source specifically
and Benkler’s “Commons Based Peer Production” more generally. Indigenous
communities and online peer production may seem like exotic exceptions to the
mainstream global workforce, but in the next section we examine the analytic utility
of basins of attraction in the case of environmental sustainability in the mainstream
industrial sector.
5.4 Basins of Attraction as a Model for Industrial Symbiosis
Industrial Ecology (IE) is a discipline that takes evolutionary and ecological

solutions as inspiration for industrial development. The idea is simple: in biological
ecosystems, there is no “waste” per se, only material exchange between entities.
1
There is some confusion over the term “fork”. Originally this referred to a new version of the
project, but the source code repository Github now uses the term for any pull request, including
those adopted.
Fig. 5.8 Flow of materials and energy in an EIP, based on the industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg,
Denmark
In an industrial ecosystem, waste would not be externalized through disposal into

environment but instead “serve as the raw material for another process” and so
on, until the “loop is closed” on that particular material flow [12]. As the applied
branch of IE, Industrial Symbiosis (IS) focuses on the creation of such industrial
ecosystems through the implementation of the eco-industrial park (EIP) model
[4]. An EIP is an interdependent network of co-located firms wherein one firm’s
wastes are the feedstock of another, transforming what would otherwise be a
disposal cost into a profitable byproduct exchange. Therefore, just as the material
exchanges between organisms within a biological ecosystem result in optimal
resource utilization at the level of the whole system, the EIP model offers the
possibility of profitably achieving “zero emissions” at the system level without
requiring individual firms to reduce waste. Yet despite its advantages, widespread
adoption in the West, especially the US, remains elusive. In the current sociopolitical
climate, EIPs are not yet basins of attraction. Why not? (Fig. 5.8).
One reason is the choice of evolutionary/economic analogy. Much of IE currently
draws on increasingly obsolete evolutionary theory in which natural selection is
conceived exclusively in terms of competition between self-interested individuals.
Groups and alliances play little if any role. This is a poor model for sustainable
development because IS requires interdependence and coordination between firms,
not merely competition. In other words, a solution for building successful EIPs
in the US (and perhaps elsewhere) can be approached by asking, “Under what
conditions does cooperative industrial ecology become a basin of attraction”? Such

a model could help governments implement “top-down” regulations that, rather than
restricting the activities of individual firms, set the conditions for “bottom-up” EIP
growth as an adaptive strategy.
Such innovative “win-win-win” solutions to the dilemma posed by sustainable
industrial development are not too good to be true: several flexible, stable, and
profitable EIPs have been documented around the world [5], though first and most
prominently in Kalundborg, Denmark [11]. However, the EIP model has so far failed
to catch on in the West for at least two reasons. First, the success of a few examples
narrowed the field’s vision, with the result that driving question mutated from
“How to facilitate EIP growth?” to “How to replicate Kalundborg?” Second, case
studies consistently emphasize the bottom-up, unplanned quality of EIP emergence
[14]. This insistence has led to a systematic position in the literature that in order
to be successful, EIPs must evolve “spontaneously.” In describing the movements
of flocks of birds and other natural phenomena, such language is apropos. But in
the creation of an artificial ecosystem – whether in a petri dish, aquarium, or even
a simulation – it is carefully planned conditions that allow self-organization to take
place. Similarly, the coherence of multiple micro-decisions behind the creation of
symbiotic linkages between firms is not a matter of waiting for a lucky convergence,
but carefully planning the technosocial conditions that allow an EIP to stabilize
and thrive. The insistence on spontaneity implies EIP simply cannot be deliberately
developed.
This contradiction has not only undermined efforts to replicate the success of
extant EIPs such as Kalundborg, it also confounds EIP development in Asia, where
several countries have adopted IS as national policy. China is implementing IS
concepts on a massive scale through the Circular Economy Initiative, made law in
2008 [19]. South Korea has instituted a 3-phase, 15 year project transitioning some
of the country’s largest industrial parks into EIPs [24]. Japan has incorporated IE
principles into official policy since the 1960s, most recently as part of the 1997 Eco-
Town Program, designed to foster symbiotic linkages in 26 major urban areas [28].
Despite the fact that these projects have produced empirically verified, successful
EIPs and other symbiotic exchanges, because they have been ostensibly planned
from the top-down rather than having emerged spontaneously, these examples are
perceived as outliers. Clearly a more robust framework for EIP development is
needed.
Thus our current research examines the possibilities for applying agent-based
modeling to simulate EIPs, with the aim of defining the properties that would make
the EIP a basin of attraction. Recent work on “Organizing Self-Organizing Systems”
[5] suggests the field of IS is moving in a similar direction. One challenge is that the
constant turn-over from manufacturing innovation will change the material flows
in ways that destabilize this exchange. However the symbiosis at Kalundborg has
proven resilient despite significant changes within and between member firms [3],
and there is no reason to think it must remain the exception. As noted above, the
metastability offered by chaotic attractors may be an important mechanism by which
cooperative basins of attraction achieve resilience in the face of such perturbations.
Another challenge is that unlike idealized agents of simple game theoretic models,
real humans live in a rich cultural milieu. It may be that the success of EIPs
such as Kalundborg owe as much to the influence of Danish culture as they do to
insightful industrial planning or government regulation. Nevertheless, as we note in
the comparison of Balinese rice irrigation and Open Source software production,
contemporary techno-social ecologies can achieve similar cooperative basins of
attraction in the absence of ancient cultural traditions, simply by creating conditions
in which “upstream” and “downstream” forces are in balance.
5.5 Conclusion
The concept of “basin of attraction” offers a helpful means for bringing together the
disparate scholarly disciplines that can contribute to a future animated by generative
justice. Even in the case of industrial systems which are far from egalitarian, better
arrangements of generative capacity through industrial symbiosis would at the very
least mitigate the environmental devastation that will otherwise continue to grow
at an accelerating pace. It is our hope that analyzing the question of IS in terms
of basins of attraction – in particular their ability to remain in a closed-loop,
byproduct-to-feedstock ecosystem and yet adapt to technological innovation and
other perturbations – will offer better chances for creating the regulatory changes
and other conditions by which EIPs could have a future in the US. Furthermore, it
is our belief that still more significant, far-reaching changes could be broached by
considering arrangements for these eco-industrial basins of attraction not simply in
terms of industrial loop-closing, but by fully embracing the model of generative
justice as a goal. There is no reason why the bottom-up return of value to its
generative sources in both Nature and labor cannot be elevated as a national priority.
In Spain, for example, the worker-owned cooperative system Mondragon, which
primarily manufactures large-scale light industry products such as cooking stoves,
utilizes a system of wage ratios which limit the distance between executive work and
field or factory work to an average of 5:1. It may be that such simple mechanisms can
move us towards the “upstream/downstream” balance that is crucial to establishing
generative justice as a basin of attraction.
References
1. Agyeman, J., & Ogneva-Himmelberger, Y. (2009). Environmental justice and sustainability in

the former Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
2. Benkler, Y. (2011). Penguin and the Leviathan: How cooperation triumphs over self interest.
New York: Crown Business.
3. Chertow, M. R. (2004). Industrial symbiosis. Encyclopedia of Energy, 3, 407–415.
4. Chertow, M. R. (2007). ‘Uncovering’ industrial symbiosis. Journal of Industrial Ecology,
11(1), 11–30.
5. Chertow, M. R., & Ehrenfeld, J. (2012). Organizing self-organizing systems: Toward a theory
of industrial symbiosis. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 16(1), 13–27.
6. Coleman, E. G. (2012). Coding freedom: The ethics and aesthetics of hacking. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
7. DeSerio, R. (2003). Chaotic pendulum: The complete attractor. American Journal of Physics,
71(3), 250–257.
8. Eglash, R. (1999). African fractals. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
9. Eglash, R. (2013, August). Generative justice versus distributive justice. Paper delivered at the
9th annual engineering, social justice, and peace conference, Rensselaer NY. Online at http://
www.ccd.rpi.edu/eglash/papers/generative%20justice2.ppt
10. Eglash, R. (2014, April). Generative justice: The revolution will be self-organized. Tikkun.
11. Ehrenfeld, J., & Gertler, N. (1997). Industrial ecology in practice: The evolution of interdepen-
dence at Kalundborg. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 1(1), 67–79.
12. Frosch, R., & Gallopoulos, N. (1989). Strategies for manufacturing. Scientific American,
261(3), 144–152.
13. Goldberger, A. L. (1991). Is the normal heartbeat chaotic or homeostatic? News in Physiologi-
cal Sciences, 6, 87–91.
14. Jacobsen, N. (2006). Industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark. Journal of Industrial
Ecology, 10(1–2), 239–255.
15. Janssen, M. A. (2007). Coordination in irrigation systems: An analysis of the Lansing-Kremer
model of Bali. Agricultural Systems, 93(1–3), 170–190.
16. Kropotkin, P. (1902). Mutual aid: A factor of evolution. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co.
17. Lansing, J. S., & Kremer, J. N. (1993). Emergent properties of Balinese water temples.
American Anthropologist, 95(1), 97–114.
18. Lansing, J. S., & Miller, J. H. (2005). Cooperation games and ecological feedback: Some
insights from Bali. Current Anthropology, 46(2), 328–334.
19. Matthews, J., & Tan, H. (2011). Progress toward a circular economy in China. Journal of
Industrial Ecology, 15(3), 435–457.
20. Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993). Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 90, 5091–5094.
21. Ochea, M. (2013). Evolution of repeated prisoner’s dilemma play under logit dynamics.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(12), 2483–2499.
22. Odenbaugh, J. (2011). Complex ecological systems. In H. Cliff (Ed.), Philosophy of complex
systems (Handbook of the philosophy of science, Vol. 11). Oxford: North Holland (North
Holland is an imprint of Elsevier).
23. Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological
systems. Science, 325(5939), 419–422.
24. Park, H. S., et al. (2008). Strategies for sustainable development of industrial park in Ulsan,
South Korea – From spontaneous evolution to systematic expansion of industrial symbiosis.
Journal of Environmental Management, 87(1), 1–13.
25. Salleh, A. (1991). Eco-socialism/ecofeminism. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 2(1), 129–134.
26. Sneath, D. (1998). State policy and pasture degradation in inner Asia. Science, 281(5380),
1147–1148.
27. Suzuki, S., & Akiyama, E. (2008). Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity
in n-person games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 252(4), 686–693.
28. van Berkel, R., et al. (2009). Industrial and urban symbiosis in Japan. Journal of Environmental
Management, 90(3), 1544–1556.
Dr. Ron Eglash, Professor, Department of Science and Technology Studies. Rensselaer, Sage
Labs 5502,110 8th St, Troy, NY 12180–3590 www.rpi.edu/~eglash/eglash.htm cell: 518-421-
9841, fax#: 518-276-2659, work#: 518-276-2048
Dr. Ron Eglash (eglash@rpi.edu) is a Professor of Science and Technology Studies at
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, with a secondary appointment in Computer Science. He
received his B.S. in Cybernetics, his M.S. in Systems Engineering, and his PhD in History
of Consciousness, all from the University of California. A Fulbright postdoctoral fellowship

enabled his field research on African ethnomathematics, which was published by Rutgers
University Press as African Fractals: modern computing and indigenous design, and recently
appeared as his TED talk. His courses range from a hands-on studio for design of educational
technologies to graduate seminars in social studies of science. His “Culturally Situated Design
Tools” software, offering math and computing education from indigenous and vernacular arts,
is available for free at www.csdt.rpi.edu. Recently funded work includes his NSF “Triple
Helix” project, which brings together graduate fellows in science and engineering with local
community activists and K-12 educators to seek new approaches to putting science and
innovation in the service of under-served populations.
Colin Garvey (garvec@rpi.edu) received his BA in both Japanese and Media Studies from
Vassar College, followed by several years of training in Japan at a Zen Buddhist monastery.
He began his PhD in the STS program at Rensselaer under the Triple Helix program.
His doctoral dissertation uses evolutionary frameworks to examine symbiotic behavior at
community-based and industrial scales, while at the same time reflexively analyzing the use
and application of ecological and evolutionary analogies, the power of evolution as a unifying
narrative, and the pernicious myth of genetic determinism.
Chapter 6
Chaos in World Politics: A Reflection
The “Drop of Honey Effect”
Manuel Alberto Martins Ferreira, José António Candeias Bonito Filipe,

Manuel F.P. Coelho, and Isabel C. Pedro
Abstract Chaos theory results from natural scientists’ findings in the area of non-
linear dynamics. The importance of related models has increased in the last decades,
by studying the temporal evolution of non-linear systems. In consequence, chaos
is one of the concepts that most rapidly have been expanded in what research
topics respects. Considering that relationships in non-linear systems are unstable,
chaos theory aims to understand and to explain this kind of unpredictable aspects of
nature, social life, the uncertainties, the nonlinearities, the disorders and confusion,
scientifically it represents a disarray connection, but basically it involves much more
than that. The existing close relationship between change and time seems essential
to understand what happens in the basics of chaos theory. In fact, this theory got a
crucial role in the explanation of many phenomena. The relevance of this kind of
theories has been well recognized to explain social phenomena and has permitted
new advances in the study of social systems. Chaos theory has also been applied,
particularly in the context of politics, in this area. The goal of this chapter is to
make a reflection on chaos theory – and dynamical systems such as the theories of
complexity – in terms of the interpretation of political issues, considering some kind
of events in the political context and also considering the macro-strategic ideas of
states positioning in the international stage.
M.A.M. Ferreira () • J.A.C.B. Filipe

Departamento de Matemática, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), BRU-UNIDE,
Lisboa, Portugal
e-mail: manuel.ferreira@iscte.pt; jose.filipe@iscte.pt
M.F.P. Coelho
Departamento de Economia, SOCIUS/ISEG-UTL, Lisboa, Portugal
e-mail: coelho@iseg.utl.pt
I.C. Pedro
Departamento de Engenharia e Gestão, Instituto Superior Técnico (CEGIST/IST),
Lisboa, Portugal
e-mail: ipedro@ist.utl.pt

90 M.A.M. Ferreira et al.
Keywords Chaos • World politics • Economics • Drop of honey effect
6.1 Introduction
The Newtonian ideas and the influence of scientists like Leibniz, Euler, Lagrange
or even Descartes and Comte, allowed that the classical positivist model – and
its deterministic features – got a great importance since the eighteenth century. It
got a determinant influence in the modern scientific knowledge and has strongly
supported, as Geyer [26] stated, the idea of the existence of an order. The
principles of order, reductionism, predictability and determinism, see for instance
Galtung [25], Kauffmann [31] and Prigogine and Stenglers [43], have become the
basis for explaining and understanding the behavior of nature and social systems.
There was a mechanistic world defined by differential equations, in which causes
and effects were always determined by proportional laws of behavior. There was a
point of view of linear relationship between causes and effects.
A new advance, in which exists an uncertainty world, nonlinear and unpre-
dictable, would come, presenting a non-proportional relationship between causes
and consequences. In fact, small causes can give rise to huge consequences.
Poincaré, cited in [30], has showed that complex behaviors could also be an output
from a set of linear interacting equations.
New discoveries appeared and new theories would present, in mathematics and
physics, the quantum physics and the relativity theory to give a new course to the
non-linear dynamic systems ([8], cited in [30]). In essence, it is interesting to note
for example that the new discoveries did not refute Newton at all, just revealed that
many phenomena were not orderly, reducible, predictable and/or determined.
In short statements, let’s make a small mention to deterministic chaos, quantum
chaos and relativistic chaos, just for a brief reference.
Chaos is based on the fact that small differences in initial conditions (such as
those due to rounding errors in numerical computation) yield widely diverging
outcomes for chaotic systems, rendering long-term prediction impossible in general.
This happens even though these systems are deterministic, meaning that their future
behavior is fully determined by their initial conditions, with no random elements
involved. The deterministic nature of these systems does not make them predictable.
This behavior is known as deterministic chaos, or simply chaos.
Quantum chaos theory studies how the correspondence between quantum
mechanics and classical mechanics – which is based on the solution of ordinary
differential equations – works in the context of chaotic systems. It studies chaotic
classical dynamic systems in terms of quantum theory, intending to study the
relationship between quantum mechanics and the classical chaos.
In another approach, relativistic chaos describes chaotic systems under general
relativity.
6 Chaos in World Politics: A Reflection 91
6.2 In the Search for Explaining the Existence of Chaos
Although the importance gained by chaos theory in the explanation of non-linear

systems, the truth is that “chaos” is far away from being completely understood
or determined. Many mathematical computation and laboratory research allows to
analyse and to find chaos in problems to be solved but due to the very complex
structures this kind of problems remain without a definitive solution. With the
introduction of the idea of nonlinearity1 into theoretical models, chaos would
emerge in the analysis and a real very complex composition would come to be
observed in the field data.
The chaos theory and complexity theory themselves, see [41, 42], expose the
idea that many activities reflect dynamic forms of analysis and a very complex and
widespread reality, specific of complex systems, which dynamics are very hard to
model and understand. These realities fall within a range of situations integrated in
a broader context, which is intended to be reproduced in the theory itself but also to
be integrated in the complex environment of their own dynamic, with complex and
often chaotic features in their essence.
However, with the technologic development, it is now possible, with the help of
computers, to make extremely complex calculations and to understand better the
occurrence of chaos.
6.3 Some Concepts in Chaos Theory
In this chapter it is intended to study situations of chaos in politics. In order to reflect

on this analysis the concepts generally accepted in chaos theory, some of them are
now introduced. So, we can begin by saying that “the hidden orderly patterns in
chaotic behaviour can be presented in the so-called phase space”, which are abstract
mathematical spaces. They are a set of structured points, normally with a high
number of coordinates – each particular variable taken into account by the model
is associated to a different coordinate – so that each point in this abstract space
represents a complete and detailed state which the analyzed system could eventually
reach. Thus, the larger the dimension – number of coordinates – of the phase space,
the better will be the description of a particular state reached by the system [30].
A trajectory is the evolution of any particular system, which can be described
by a chain of consecutive points in its phase space. The existence of a trajectory
assumes the idea of existence of an attractor, because any trajectory of a system
running on the long-term is somehow “attracted” by some points or some closed
1
Nonlinear means that output is not directly proportional to input, or that a change in one variable
does not produce a proportional change or reaction in the related variable(s). See [27, 28] for an
interesting exploitation of this concept in management.
regions within the phase space describing the system in question. There are several
kinds of attractors:
• Punctual attractor
One single point; the trajectory tends to a stable equilibrium;
• Periodical attractor
Two or more “basins of attraction” consecutively visited by the trajectory of the
system; there is a periodical oscillatory system;
• Strange attractor
There is no pre-defined shape; it implies a chaotic behavior.
Considering that a chaotic behavior is characterized by its extreme sensitivity
to the initial conditions, this sensitivity represents the idea that a very small
perturbation of the system in an initial condition may lead it to an exponentially
divergent final state. The trajectories of neighboring points may behave in a very
different way, approaching and moving away one from the other in a really
unpredictable way: consider for illustration the Lorenz’ metaphor of the “butterfly
effect” or the “drop of honey effect” illustrated in this work.
We can also mention the critical moments, i.e., the bifurcation points – which
constantly challenge the trajectory of the system – that are positioned where the
sensitivity of the system to the initial conditions is stronger. There, the chaotic nature
of the system reveals itself in a more radical way, conducting the system to the so-
called “limit of chaos”. Up to this kind of moments, the trajectory of the system
might behave in a quite predictable pattern, but once reached this bifurcation point,
the prior order breaks out and the system is driven by patterns of behavior less
predictable than ever before. In other words, with nonlinear dynamic systems, the
bifurcation implies a change in the system’s behavior when it is changing from one
attractor to a new one (see [30]).
6.4 Thinking Chaos in Mathematical Terms
As Williams [49] says, phenomena happen over time as at discrete, separate or

distinct, intervals2 or as continuously.3 Discrete intervals can be spaced evenly in
time or irregularly in time. Continuous phenomena might be measured continuously.
However, we can measure them at discrete intervals.4 Special types of equations
apply to each of those two ways in which phenomena happen over time. Equations
for discrete time changes are difference equations and are solved by iteration, the
2
Examples are the occurrence of earthquakes, rainstorms or volcanic eruptions.
3
Examples are air temperature and humidity or the flow of water in perennial rivers.
4
For example, we may measure air temperature only once per hour, over many days or years.
most of the times, or analytically. In contrast, equations based on a continuous

change (continuous measurements) are differential equations. The term “flow” often
is associated to differential equations.5
Differential equations are often the most accurate mathematical way to describe
a smooth continuous evolution. However, some of these equations are difficult
or impossible to solve. In contrast, difference equations usually can be solved
right away. Furthermore, they are often acceptable approximations of differential
equations. Olsen and Degn [39] say that difference equations are the most powerful
vehicle to the understanding of chaos.
It follows a mathematical model that works the concepts of chaos theory and
contributes to explain the possible presence of some effects based on the idea of
chaos.
So, in Berliner [4] it is referred that non-invertibility is required to observe chaos
for one-dimensional dynamic systems. Additionally it is said “everywhere invertible
maps in two or more dimensions can exhibit chaotic behavior”. The study of strange
attractors shows that in the long term, as time proceeds, the trajectories of systems
may become trapped in certain bounded regions of the state space of the system.
The model presented in Berliner [4] is an example in two dimensions of the
Hénon map, displaying the property of having a strange attractor.
The Hénon map appears represented by the equations:
xt C1 D 1 C yt axt2 (6.1)
and
yt C1 D bxt ; (6.2)
for fixed values of a and b with t D 0,1, : : :

This invertible map possesses strange attractors and simultaneously has strong
sensitivity to initial conditions.
The Hénon map representing a transformation from R2 to R2 has Jacobian equal
to –b.
If 0 < b < 1, the Hénon map contracts the domains to which it is applied. These
maps are said to be dissipative. On the contrary, maps that maintain the application
domain are said to be conservative.
5
For some authors (see [3]), a flow is a system of differential equations. For others (see [45]), a flow
is the solution of differential equations. Note that for the Navier–Stokes equations, that describe the
motion of fluid substances, surprisingly, given their wide range of practical uses, mathematicians
have not yet proven that in three dimensions solutions always exist, or that if they do exist, then
they do not contain any singularity.
6.5 Chaos in Politics: A General View
6.5.1 Chaos: Some General Considerations
In the twentieth century, chaos theory got rapidly a developing field, being much
of the progress in this area revealed just since the 1970s. Chaos, in the sense it is
studied, is consequently yet a not well-known field and it is now distant from being
completely understood or determined. In reality, chaos is extremely complex and
difficult to be identified in the real world, using the workable information. But, up to
a certain point, it is possible to find specific mathematical relationships for problems
to be solved either in computers or with laboratory research. As said before, as soon
as the idea of nonlinearity6 was introduced into theoretical models, the existence of
chaos analysed through the models was made possible. A very complex structure
is observed in field data and just simple patterns can be found and approximated
theoretically; complex patterns to be got through models are much more difficult
to find. In any event, we cannot just grab a nice little set of data, apply a simple
test or two, and declare “chaos” or “no chaos” [49]. Chaos occurs in deterministic,
nonlinear, dynamical systems.
The word “chaos” presumes the existence of turbulence and disorder. The
predisposition to a profound change in the direction of a phenomenon generates an
own force, understood as a deep change that results from small changes in the initial
conditions. The chaos is – from this point of view – something extremely sensitive
to the initial conditions. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions shows how
a small change at one place or moment in a nonlinear system can result in large
differences to a later state in the system.
The deterministic chaos present in many nonlinear systems can impose funda-
mental limitations on the human ability for predicting behaviors. Additionally, the
exploration of a big number of conditions by a single deterministic result may create
the possibility to have a prospective outcome in terms of adaptation and evolution.
In the context of artificial life models this has led to the notion of “life at the edge of
chaos” expressing the principle that a delicate balance of chaos and order is optimal
for successful evolution [7]. Nevertheless, the essence of life may conduct to specific
situations that sometimes bring new ones creating a new order even considering
extremely difficult situations.
6.5.2 Chaos in Social and Political Systems
The understanding of inherently nonlinear phenomena present in politics shows that

it is possible to use mathematical models in the analysis of the political environment
6
Nonlinear means that output is not directly proportional to input, or that a change in one variable
does not produce a proportional change or reaction in the related variable(s).
and socio-political issues. Moreover, when this does not happen, some kind of
qualitative analysis is yet possible to perform by following the ideas of chaos theory.
In the study of social or political phenomena, the scientific object is by definition
far different from the one in natural sciences. As I Font and Régis [30] say, citing
Prigogine and Nicolis [42], social and political scientists find out that “a high
degree of unpredictability of the future is the essence of the human adventure”.
Some studies and research projects have assumed, in the two last decennia, that
chaos theory concepts and tools are inherently part of the properties of the political
science. Many studies deal with this subject by analysing situations of sensitivity
to initial conditions, considering bifurcations, or entropy, see [25], for example, and
use the chaos’ vocabulary to describe political behaviours and phenomena like wars,
revolutions, electoral instability, or simply political problems that, on the first sight,
look complex (see [30]).
It is interesting to see that often, after strategic political decisions are taken, it
is very difficult to get them back and to make the decisions to be reversible. After
these strategic measures are announced, the complete irreversibility of the assumed
political decisions, in general, is not possible anymore and if that happens for any
reason the political power of that government falls drastically and, since then, its
fragility increases exponentially. In fact, after some courses of action are introduced
it is almost impossible to reverse them. In general, future political developments
result from the existence of critical moments with significant consequences in social
life of people. See, for example, the case of Greece in the recent first round elections
for Greek Parliament or the announcement in September and October 2012 of severe
political measures in Portugal with dramatic foreseen consequences for Portuguese
people.
6.6 Chaos in Politics: Some Examples of Application Areas
In addition to the consideration of a set of interesting situations involving chaos in

politics, it is possible to typify two specific situations often seen in this area. These
two evident situations can in fact result from chaos theory, in a general way, when
scheming chaos systems and relating them to political science. As can be seen in
I Font and Régis [30], referring to Peled [40], the first type encompasses systems
that converge to equilibrium or a steady state, like national sentiments that often
converge to a steady equilibrium. The second type concerns systems that display a
stable oscillating behaviour according to a repeated pattern, like elections’ cycles.
The chaotic system displays an irregular oscillatory process like, for example, in
countries that irregularly oscillate between anarchy, civil war and democracy.
When political phenomena are considered, it may be said that, like for the general
condition in social systems, there is a high degree of unpredictability associated to
the human behaviour, because in its essence, human species has a large range for
unexpected actions.
In this sense, in political area, chaos theory may be applied to:

• Public organizations, as complex systems, by analysing their services and
activities, by studying their equilibrium and dynamic stability, by studying the
behaviour and structure of the work system. It is interesting to note particularly
that, as a consequence of the utilization of chaos theory, it is possible to
verify that organizations are capable of producing within themselves forces of
dissipative structures most of which have self-organizing capacities that lead to
new organizational entities and order. For instance, some governments’ types and
democracy may be considered chaotic (see [30]). This reality brings a capacity
to understand how large is the possibility to build new situations, some of them
with very severe consequences.
• Additionally when studying international relations, chaos theory can be used
for example in the study of peace scenarios. In I Font and Régis [30] the
importance of chaos theory is shown in this area as much as the importance of the
relation between order and disorder in the emergence of peace. Many and many
examples involving chaos theory in international relations area can be presented.
For illustration: the Iranian revolution of 1978–19797 [10]; the predictions made
on the post-Castro environment in Cuba8 [44]; Adolf Hitler in Germany9 [40];
September 2001 in the USA10 ; Alexander in the Persian Empire11; the arrival of
Attila to Europe12; the arrival of gunpowder in Europe,13 for example.
• In terms of political parties and elections, a small event during an electoral
campaign can be responsible for a complete change in the final outcome. For
illustration, in Portugal in 1986, in an electoral campaign in Marinha Grande
(a small town), the candidate to the Presidency of the Portuguese Republic,
7
The spontaneous and mass revolution in Iran is considered a massive rupture of chaotic
uncertainties and bifurcations into unpredictable dynamical changes in a political system.
8
The scenarios for the future could be based on chaotic uncertainties and bifurcations resulting into
unpredictable dynamic changes in the political system.
9
A single man was considered the “butterfly wing” that could cause the German system to bifurcate
from democracy to totalitarianism.
10
The tragic event of 11st September in New York brought a chaotic uncertainty to the international
political and military arena.
11
The Macedonian Alexander, endowed with great political vision, has created one of the largest
empires of the ancient world, unifying the Greek state-cities and mastering the whole Eastern
Antique World, with huge consequences for Humanity.
12
A military victory of the Chinese dynasty Han around the year 100 over a Mongolian tribe of the
North (Xiongnu tribe) can be considered as the beating of the “butterfly wings” for the tragedies
that would occur in medieval Europe. Indeed, the arrival of Attila and his Hunnish Army to the
north of the Black Sea in the fourth century may well have been the consequence of that victory
in China. This arrival would promote events with long lasting destructive effects in Europe in
the middle ages. The Alliance between German and Asian tribes led to invasions and destruction
throughout Europe and North Africa. It was the “butterfly effect” working.
13
The discovery of gunpowder in China may have been the initial condition for Europe leaving
of the tragic situation in which it was emerged, particularly through its military expansion to the
Americas, with the known consequences.
Mário Soares, was attacked by a protester. The television showed this attack
and a profound change was given by this event to the electoral results. It was
the decisive moment of the turn of his first presidential campaign. He gained the
election, when at the moment of the incident he had just a very small percentage
of expected votes. Also being applied to political actors and parties, chaos
theory can be applied to the example of the Portuguese Party CDS/PP, which
is also interesting on this. After winning the party leadership in 1992, Manuel
Monteiro changed the party name, adding Partido Popular. However, in 1995,
Paulo Portas would assume the leadership and proposed reconciliation within
the party and the return to Christian-democracy, achieving good results in the
parliamentary elections. Paulo Portas has changed significantly the ideology of
the party returning to Christian democracy, which allowed him to get excellent
results in the elections. This phenomenon considering the ideological trajectory
can be modelled as “chaotic ideological system”, where a bifurcation point
conducted the system to a new order.
• Examples of political systems can be also presented. For example, in the Arab
region the Gulf war introduced chaos in the Arab political system. After the
war, it was easy to meet small changes provoking big effects in Arab politics.
The war has destabilized the system and several bifurcations were identified. In
the social sphere it was possible to find oscillations between traditional patterns
of stratification and modern patterns of power, privilege and influence. In the
political area it was possible to find oscillations between an internal sphere where
struggles of power are not soften by cultural norms and an external sphere where
such struggles are bounded by cultural norms (see [30]).
6.7 Some Notes on the Recent World Geo-strategic Situation
It is not simple to know where capitalism is going next as it continues to seek out
new sources for rehabilitation. Some democratic states are living troubled times
and new threatens arrive. Capitalism is a heterogeneous and continually dynamic
process of increasingly global connection – often made through awkward and
makeshift links – and those links can be surprising, not least because they often
produce unexpected spatial formations which can themselves have force ([1, 2, 37,
48], cited in [47]).
Chaos may reflect the true internal force that defines the disturbed system that is
trying to find out new waves of consolidation, being in an unstable balance and in a
precarious position facing, for instance, the new developments of European political
events. The politicians and parties are discredited and public opinion develops
successive manifestations of disrepute in relation to the politicians. People and
public opinion is increasingly more aware of the disarray that is disturbing their lives
and frustrates their expectations. The news, available around and everywhere, in all
media means bring public conscience of a disordered situation, which is becoming
persistent.
There is a new context for European countries that brings a state of chaotic
environment, that is reflected in economic, social and political crises, in a new state
of national and international context, particularly in Europe, which – in its essence –
is very unfriendly for citizens in the point of view that in the last decades the context
was socially and economically calmer and quieter. There is now a new reality with
sudden and rapid changes, characterized by confusions and things out of control.
These new circumstances prevail now and characterize modern society and
organizations, which are based on very complex systems. As Farazmand [10], cited
in I Font and Régis [30] says, political leaders and managers must therefore be
prepared to deal with such chaotic phenomena and manage complex organizations
accordingly. In fact, chaos theory works tools that permit to understand better this
political reality. In a certain way, there is an unpredictability of outcomes of chaotic
states or systems that pose some kind of dangerous, and eventually potentially fatal,
threats to individuals, groups and even to cultures. Considering the public policies,
the nowadays state of countries political positioning brings some concerns about a
critical point for the maintenance of the status quo. There is a strong complexity
that needs to be understood. Complex systems theory and chaos theory contribute
to understand it.
6.8 Two Recent Situations That Support the Existence

of Chaos
In fact, in politics chaos may be evidenced for many situations. Historically,

simple facts with no visible significant consequences have registered considerable
impacts that could not be predictable at the initial moment. Nowadays, such kind of
situations continues to occur in many socio-political contexts around the world. The
“Arabian Spring” is an example of how the “butterfly effect” can be found when
causing a wide spread regional political reform in the political regimes of some
countries in that geographical area. The “flapping of the butterfly wings” may be
represented by the immolation by fire of a Tunisian salesman that was the starting
point for the regime change in Tunisia first and then the contagion to Egypt and
Libya. The consequences would be seen as well in Syria where a civil war is yet in
course. The “butterfly effect” could also be named as the “drop of honey effect”,14
14
On a warm afternoon, on the second floor of a splendid palace that overlooked the market place
of the city, sat a king and his minister. While the king was eating some puffed rice on honey, he
looked over his land with satisfaction. What a prosperous city he ruled. What a magnificent city.
As he was daydreaming, a little drop of honey dripped from his puffed rice onto the window
ledge.
The minister was about to call a servant to wipe up the honey, when the king waved a hand to
stop him. “Don’t bother, it’s only a little drop of honey, it’s not our problem.”
which is very suggestive for socio-political events, from the tale written by the
Armenian poet Hovanés Tumanian (1869–1923).
Presenting another example and considering the political situation in Greece in
May 2012, a new stage came to be studied for Greek, European and World economy.
The political status quo was broken in Greece: a new party took an advantage
that it had never had. In fact an emergent crisis in Greece was severely felt after
the Greece-Troika agreement. Throughout this Program, Greece has to respect an
austerity program in order to put national budgeting at acceptable levels and is
complied to obey the agreement that is conducting Greek people to severe self
well being sacrificing. This situation led Greeks to vote in favor of a new situation
in the first round elections. Although the second round kept the status quo in the
political situation, the truth is that this could become an entire new situation that
could impose a new socio-economic condition to European Union and to the World
that could threat the world economic stability. The possible bankruptcy in Greece
was tormenting world leaders; a new status quo was being prepared for Europe with
considerable implications for the whole world. This scenario was adjusted after the
second round elections, but the alert was there.
The minister watched the drop of honey slowly trickle down the window ledge and land on the
street below.
Soon, a buzzing fly landed on the sweet drop of honey.
A nearby lizard shot out its long tongue and caught the fly.
The lizard was taken by surprise when a cat leapt on it.
The cat was pounced on by its worst enemy the dog that had broken free from its chain.
Meeowing and barking erupted from the street below the King and his minister. The minister
was about to call a servant to go and deal with the brawling cat and dog when the king said, “Relax,
the cat and dog belong to the market people. We shouldn’t interfere. It’s not our problem.”
The cat’s owner was horrified to see her cat being attacked by the big bully of a dog and started
whacking the dog with her broom. The dog’s owner was horrified to see her dog being attacked by
the big bully of a cat and started whacking the cat with her broom.
Soon, people started coming out from their stalls and houses to see what all the screaming and
shouting was about. Seeing their friend’s cat being attacked, they joined in berating the dog and its
owner. Others, seeing their friend’s dog being attacked by the cat, also joined in. Very quickly, the
shouting became violent and a fight broke out in the street.
The worried minister turned to the King but his only comment was, “Not our problem. Here,
have some more puffed rice and honey.” The king and his adviser ate as they watched the fray
below.
Soon the police were called in to break up the fight, but the people were so angry, each side
convinced that they were right, (right about what, they couldn’t remember). They started attacking
the policemen. The fight rapidly broke out into a full-scale riot.
The king eyed the minister and said, “I know what you are thinking, but the army will handle
it. Besides, this is not our problem.”
The riot swiftly escalated into a civil war with looting and destruction all over the city. Buildings
were set alight and by nightfall, the magnificent city was reduced to a pile of smoking ashes. The
king and his minister stood spellbound rooted to the spot where they had been watching all day.
Their mouths were hanging open in horror.
“Oh : : : ” said the king quietly, “maybe the little drop of honey WAS our problem.” (freely
adapted from the tale of Hovanés Tumanian).
6.9 Modelling Mathematically Dissipative Effect on Politics
Considering the model in Berliner [4], it is possible now to suggest a model on this
basis for economics politics in the area of fisheries, see [12–17].15
So, if a general situation is considered, the following equations may represent a
system in which fish stocks, at time t, are given by xt and catches by yt The model
is as follows:
xt C1 D F .xt / yt and
yt C1 D bxt : (6.3)
It is a generalization of Hénon model. The Jacobian is equal to b. As yt C 1 is a

portion of xt , 0 < b < 1. So, it is a dissipative model and the values of xt are restricted
to a bounded domain.
Considering the particular case below:
xt C1 D xt yt ; and
yt C1 D bxt : (6.4)
So,
xt C2 D xt C1 yt C1 and
xt C2 xt C1 C bxt D 0: (6.5)
Now, after solving the characteristic equation associated to the difference

equation (see
p
[11]) it is obtained:
p
k D 1C 214b or k D 1 214b ; calling D 1 4b and being 0 < b < 1, comes
that 3 < < 1.
So, 0 < < 1 if 0 < b < 14 and 3 < < 0. if 14 < b < 1, being D 0 when
b D 14 .
Consequently for 0 < b < 14 ,
p !t p !t
1C 1 4b 1 1 4b
xt D A1 C A2 (6.6)
2 2
15
And also, evidently, in the area of other reproducing and harvesting natural resources, see
[17–24]. Other interesting literature on chaos in biological systems are [29], [32–36] and [38, 39].
In the fisheries field see [5, 6] and [9]. Finally, see [46] for a very interesting connection between
ecology and the social sciences.
And for b D 14 ,
t
1
xt D .A1 C A2 t/ (6.7)
2
1
Finally, for 4
<b<1
p t
1 1
xt D b A1 cos arccos p t C A2 se n arccos p t (6.8)
2 b 2 b
In these solutions, A1 and A2 are real constants.

Note that the bases of t powers are always between 0 and 1. So, lim xt D 0 and
t !1
whatever the value of b, the dissipative effect is real, even leading to the extinction of
this species. Of course, this is evident according to the hypotheses of this particular
situation of the model.
Concluding this approach, the general model does not allow to obtain in general
such explicit solutions. But, of course, with simple computational tools it is possible
to obtain recursively concrete time series solutions after establishing the initial value
x0 and to check the dissipative effect.
Additionally a new example may be presented for politics, in general, consider-
ing the political credibility.
Call xt the political credibility, of a politician or of a party measured, for instance,
in number of votes, or in the number of chamber’s members, or even in money, in
the year t; and consider b the credibility rate, 1 b 1.
It is admissible that in the year t C 1, xt C 1 D xt C bxt , that is: in a certain year the
political credibility is the one of the former year plus, or minus, a part of it. So:
xt C1 .1 C b/ xt D 0: (6.9)
Solving this difference equation (see [11]) it is obtained16 :
xt D x0 .1 C b/t ; b ¤ 0 and xt D x0 ; b D 0: (6.10)
Then, according to this model, if the credibility rate is null the political credibility
is kept unchanged, assuming always the initial value. If 0 < b 1, the political
credibility follows an increasing exponential path. If 1 < b < 0, the political
credibility follows a decreasing exponential path converging to 0. Finally, if b D 1,
xt is permanently null. Evidently, values like 1 b < 0 define political credibility
paths that may lead to people’s chaotic behaviors.
16
Evidently, this is the compound interest capitalization formula, at interest rate b used for financial
purposes.
6.10 Concluding Remarks
We tried in this text, and we think that it was achieved, to show that in politics,
chaos may be evidenced for numerous situations. Historically, there are a lot of
simple facts, considered insignificant in the moment for the consequences they had,
that in a completely unexpected way gave raise to huge impacts that could not be
predicted, or even guessed, at the initial moment of its occurrence. In fact, they are
situations for which the output is not directly proportional to the input.
Nowadays, such kind of facts continues to occur in many socio-political contexts
around the world. It is at least strange that the simple – despite the greatness of the
personal sacrifice – immolation by fire of a Tunisian salesman was the starting point
for the regime change in Tunisia first and then the contagion to Egypt and Libya.
The consequences would then be seen as well in Syria where a bloody civil war is
still in course.
The “Arabian Spring” was presented in this work as an example of the way how
the “butterfly effect” can be found when causing a wide spread regional political
reform in the political regimes of some countries in that geographical area. The
“flapping of the butterfly wings” may be represented by that immolation by fire of
a Tunisian salesman. We suggested the use of the expression “drop of honey effect”
instead of the “butterfly effect”, when we are dealing with socio-political events,
inspired in the wonderful tale written by the Armenian poet Hovanés Tumanian
(1869–1923). The term “butterfly effect” seems more adequate when dealing with
physical and natural events. In fact, the “drop of honey effect” seems very adequate
an accurate to represent social and political situations on this.
The case of the 1986 Presidency of the Portuguese Republic electoral campaign
is an example of how an insignificant incident produces a complete change in the
electoral results. This is not, at least completely, a case of “small input-great output”
but instead of “small input-reverse output”, which by its turn evidences the presence
of chaos as well. Of course in this situation, for the candidate Mário Soares himself,
the “drop of honey effect” was the attack perpetrated against him, despite of its
bitterness.
In the end of this chapter two mathematical models, with difference equations,
were presented. They contribute to identify possible chaotic situations, in politics,
through the values of the models’ parameters. The more accurate is the evaluation
of these parameters, the more is the usefulness of each of the models.
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Chapter 7
Large Spatial and Temporal Separations
of Cause and Effect in Policy Making – Dealing
with Non-linear Effects
John McCaskill
Abstract There can be large spatial and temporal separation of cause and effect in
policy making. Determining the correct linkage between policy inputs and outcomes
can be highly impractical in the complex environments faced by policy makers.
In attempting to see and plan for the probable outcomes, standard linear models
often overlook, ignore, or are unable to predict catastrophic events that only seem
improbable due to the issue of multiple feedback loops. There are several issues
with the makeup and behaviors of complex systems that explain the difficulty many
mathematical models (factor analysis/structural equation modeling) have in dealing
with non-linear effects in complex systems. This chapter highlights those problem
issues and offers insights to the usefulness of ABM in dealing with non-linear effects
in complex policy making environments.
Keywords Complexity science • Non-linear effects • Agent-based modeling •

Policy making
7.1 Introduction
Policy makers at all levels face increasingly complex and ambiguous scenarios in
their efforts to find solutions to current problems. Those policy makers operating
in international organizations face a particularly daunting challenge because the
humanitarian urge to intervene to relieve human suffering is strong but the downside
consequences of such intervention can be daunting. The delivery of aid to a
distressed population in a troubled nation can never be neutral because there
are always winners and losers. Complexity lies at the heart of the difficulty in
J. McCaskill, Ph.D. ()

Public Affairs and Sociology, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Road,
GR31, Richardson, TX 75080, USA
e-mail: john.mccaskill@utdallas.edu

106 J. McCaskill
formulating policy in these types of scenarios. But even in the local politics, one
of the most disastrous statements a policy maker can utter is, “Problem X will be
remedied if only we do Y.” The cause and effect are difficult to assign because they
can be widely separated in either time or space. Multiple feedback loops serve to
exacerbate the problem of assigning cause and effect. While it is seemingly simple
to assess the cause and effect within a complex system in hindsight, the issue of
multiple feedback loops can make even that process problematic. Determining the
correct linkage between cause and effect prior to the scenario having played itself
out can be all but impractical.
Agent based modeling can be a useful tool for policy makers when it is used
as a method for conducting social simulation. Within the complexity of social
systems, identifying the proper linkage between cause and effect can be problematic
[4]. A more helpful paradigm in such a case may be to identify a set of possible
linkages between cause and effect. To that end, agent based modeling creates micro-
worlds in which agents interact with their simulated environment and each other
while following a simple set rules which guide their behavior [11]. Interactions
build upon each other which generate patterns and actions that can be significantly
more complex and seemingly alien to the original simple parameters assigned.
These micro-motives assigned to the agents generate macro-behaviors, which
closely resembles the process that occurs when individual humans, each with their
unique motivations, interact to generate large-scale social behavior [15]. Building
a proximate artificial society simulation from individual constituent agents in the
same manner that human societies are constructed, allows a researcher to conduct
“what if” type of experiments. These thought experiments allow for the observation
of not only the outcomes, but the evolution of the outcomes.
The ability to manipulate cascading interactions through relatively small scale
variables and watch the impact those changes cause as their influence permeates the
system is a powerful characteristic of agent based modeling. This attribute makes it
particularly useful in deriving an understanding of cause and effect within complex
systems. One of the defining characteristics of complex systems is that they contain
multiple feedback loops. These multiple feedback loops amplify the difficulties that
large degrees of temporal space between a cause and effect can have in identifying
the critical linkages [4]. Additionally, the interaction process that takes place among
the variables within a complex system can mask the true cause and effect and even
make it counter intuitive which further complicates the identification of critical
linkages. The very structure and design of agent based modeling provides a way
to peer through this veil of complexity and identify possible latent causes of system
behavior.
7.2 Agent Based Modeling
Complexity science has many tools available to investigate the non-linear behavior
of complex systems. These complex adaptive systems can be found in many
disparate fields of inquiry in both the natural and social sciences. Agent based
7 Large Spatial and Temporal Separations of Cause and Effect in Policy. . . 107
modeling is one of many tools, from the complexity sciences, available to investigate
complex policy problems. Complexity science investigates the non-linear behavior
of complex adaptive systems. Examples of complex adaptive systems can be found
in areas as diverse as immune response and economic markets as well as ecosystems
and human social organization. A common attribute among these systems is their
behavior cannot be described as mechanistic. This attribute causes problems with
many traditional methods for studying complex systems. Many traditional methods
utilize the underlying Newtonian paradigm that the system under investigation
behaves like a clockwork in that if the workings of the individual parts can be
understood, the entire system is then understood. In this type of deterministic
system, by uncovering a few external rules and applying them to the workings of
the individual parts, it is possible to predict the behavior of the system as a whole
under multiple circumstances [21]. Complex adaptive systems resist this type of
analysis because they are distinctly non-deterministic.
The unifying attribute of complex adaptive systems is what makes them different
from systems with linear behavior. Each of the parts of a complex adaptive system
follows rules that are unique and variable in their interactions within the larger
system. Complex adaptive systems are non-deterministic because their behavior is
not orchestrated by an overarching rule set. The behavior of these complex adaptive
systems is difficult to predict because they are stochastic, non-deterministic, and
non-linear which in turn means they readily produce emergent behaviors. Dramatic
changes in outcomes can be caused by small variations in initial conditions. “These
variations become problematic to predict because their outcomes vary as the product
of the system variables versus the sum of those variables” ([13], 67). The problem
as Holland [8] describes it is that “It is much easier to use mathematics when
systems have linear properties that we often expend considerable effort to justify
an assumption of linearity” (15).
The difficulty encountered by linear models in predicting emergent behaviors
is so great that the term “black swan” came into vogue thanks to Taleb’s [16]
bestselling book, The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable. Improbable
events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 2008 financial crisis, and the success
of the iPod all caused dramatic change; what Gersick [5] describes as punctuated
equilibrium. These types of events caused dramatic alterations in the systems when
they occurred and unfortunately, they did not always cause change for the better.
Typical linear models did not predict such events because they were caused by
outlier variables. Agent based modeling and other similar tools for modeling non-
linear behavior allow researchers to conduct thought experiments to gain insight
into the possible; regardless of its probability.
This chapter compares selected characteristics of agent based modeling with
factor analysis and structural equation modeling. Particular attention is devoted to
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these techniques as methods for predicting
the behavior in complex adaptive systems.
108 J. McCaskill
7.3 Characteristics of Agent Based Modeling
Agent based modeling is a particularly useful tool in studying complex systems

because it allows researchers to focus on the emergent behavior that small changes
in underlying rules or assumptions can make. Agent based modeling simulations
are built from the bottom up, meaning that there are a few simple rules that
govern the interaction of the elements of the model and these interactions build into
the emergent behavior that can be found in such simulations. This characteristic
differentiates them from top down models that have an overarching set of rules
defining the behavior of the elements. Top down models begin with a general
theory and utilize linear techniques for developing hypotheses for testing in order
to determine the model’s validity in specific instances. Similar linear techniques
can be utilized with inductive methods to build a generalized theory generated from
specific observations. Complex adaptive systems however, can cause problems with
the fit of these linear type models. These types of models also do not account for the
non-linear behavior of complex adaptive systems, which is their hallmark.
The non-deterministic nature of agent based modeling is one of the key character-
istics that differentiates it from linear based approaches. Rather than beginning the
design process of the model with the end-state in mind, as is the fashion for many
linear based approaches, the key characteristics and relationships are described for
a few critical variables are determined. In the agent based modeling approach, the
agents (actors) are identified and their behavioral characteristics are enumerated,
to include the characteristics of the agents’ interactions with each other and the
environment. The model also captures how the environmental variables respond to
each of the agents and represented within the model. The speed of the simulation
model algorithm can be varied as well as having the simulation stop and restart
at the researcher’s discretion to observe the real-time outcome of any part of
the simulation. This same interface allows for the alteration of the variables in the
simulation to create alternative relationships. The non-deterministic nature of the
agent based modeling methodology produces emergent behaviors thereby making it
an excellent vehicle for conducting thought experiments within the discipline of an
experimental methodology.
The Lotka-Volterra model was one of the early models used to describe non-
linear behavior in systems [8]. Alfred Lotka [12] first described the equations for
the model to represent un-damped chemical reactions. Vito Volterra [19] further
refined those equations in order to apply them to predator-prey interactions [3].
These equations are first-order, ordinary differential equations. If we are given that
N(t) is the number of prey at time t , and P(t) is the predator population, then the two
equations that describe the system are dN dt D N .a bP / and dt D P .cN d /
dP
where (a) is the birth rate of prey; (b) is the reduction in the number of prey due
to predation; (c) is the reproduction rate of predators as a result of consuming prey;
and (d) is the natural death rate of the predators. The graphs of the solutions to
these equations are shown in Fig. 7.1. The graphs show the solutions oscillating
Fig. 7.1 Lotka-Volterra

Predator-Prey Interactions
Number of Predators
Number of Prey
around a stationary point with the graph of the prey population leading the predator
population. Eventually, within this set of elliptical solutions, a dynamic equilibrium
is reached for the number of predators and prey. While the system may not begin
inside one of these solution sets it will eventually settle in one. The analysis of
this system is rather basic but it demonstrates the zero equilibrium solution which
is unstable, and a positive equilibrium, which is neutrally stable. Nevertheless this
simplified analysis provides a set of periodic solutions within the bounds of this
equilibrium. This model does however, have obvious limitations. If there are no
predators the prey population numbers grow unbounded. Despite its limitations, this
model has and become a classic in non-linear systems and has proven to be useful
in many fields such as population biology.
Researchers continue to suggest modification and improvements to the Lotka-
Volterra model, making it one of the most studied systems in mathematical
biology [3].
7.4 Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is an alternative modeling tool that is available to researchers mod-

eling complex systems. There are two types of analysis based on the common factor
model: confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory factor analysis. Confirmatory
factor analysis tests whether the explanatory variables are influencing the responses
of the dependent variables in the model in a predicted manner, while exploratory
factor analysis examines the nature of the explanatory variables influencing a
set of responses [2]. Figure 7.2 illustrates the assumed impact the underlying
common factors have on the five outcomes that are observed and the underlying
unique factors in the common factor model (U1–U5). Linear structural relations
(LISREL) also utilize this basic common factor model with the exception that it
can combine the confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling.
Structural equation modeling will be discussed later in this chapter.
110 J. McCaskill
CF CF
Measure Measure Measure Measure Measure
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
Fig. 7.2 Common factor model (Adapted from Ref. [2], 1)
The underlying premise of factor analysis is the reduction of a large number of

factors into a smaller number of latent (unmeasured) variables. By definition, there
are a large number of variables or factors in complex adaptive systems so rolling up
these distinct, measured variables into a more convenient number of latent variables
is a useful exercise. Another advantage to performing this exercise is that it helps
to control for measurement error. The ability to help control measurement error is
what makes factor analysis superior to OLS regression and ANOVA. Researchers
utilizing factor analysis are also able to account for and explain the covariance
among observed variables [22]. Despite these significant positive attributes, factor
analysis is still operating in a linear paradigm. When it is used to analyze complex
adaptive systems, this issue becomes a major shortcoming. Factor analysis cannot
account effectively for the influence of interactive, non-linear latent variables
within the model. The products of these variables and their interactions (remember
complex adaptive systems are non-linear), are what cause great difficulties for factor
analysis [10].
7.5 Structural Equation Modeling
Structural equation modeling is an improvement over factor analysis because it

allows the researcher to specify some of the complex relationships among latent
variables through regression or covariation [10]. It is a tool that provides researchers
a system of regression paths that subsumes path analysis, factor analysis, OLS
regression, ANOVA, and others. It has the additional benefit of being able to handle
exogenous variables which is a capability unavailable in factor analysis. Structural
equation modeling does however, suffer from a deficiency in its ability to test the
interaction among latent variables. This deficiency is more pronounced when the
analysis requires the multiplication of these interacting latent variables resulting in
quadratic effects [10]. Causal assumptions are frequently made when interpreting
the correlation data. “[T]here is of course nothing in structural equation modeling
that magically transforms correlational data into causal conclusions” ([9], 15).
One of the common requirements for all of the statistical models discussed is
the development of quantitative data for entry into their equations. By design, these
models are excellent tools for uncovering and confirming correlations but they are
not well adapted for determining causality. Additionally, because the variables in
complex adaptive systems are dealt with in a multiplicative versus additive fashion,
the product nature of the interactions of variables causes issues that are difficult for
these models to deal with. This is particularly true when the latent variables have
a non-normal distribution. This is not to say that when the distributions of latent
variables are not normal that it is an impossible for all statistical tools to deal with.
The problem lies in the greatly increased complexity of the interpretation of the
results. Finding a set of equations that are a best “fit” for the data is the overarching
purpose for these types of models. The issue of complex adaptive systems being
non-deterministic brings us back to the beginning of this discussion. Agent based
modeling is a tool that is well designed to operate in this type of environment.
In the social sciences, much of the knowledge is gained through observation.
To extend the understanding of various complex systems surrounding human
interactions, ethnographies, narratives, case studies, and other qualitative methods
have been used. Efforts to build theory from the outcomes of these studies have
led to the use of techniques such as meta-analyses and grounded studies. These in
turn have created some of the issues regarding latent variables and their tendencies
toward non-linear behaviors. Agent based modeling provides a powerful tool for
testing these theories generated from qualitative methods. Simulations that would
be unthinkable in the real world can be run in the safety of simulated environments.
Earlier in this discussion, we utilized the Lotka-Volterra model to describe
Holland’s [8] predator/prey system. As an alternative to solving a series of
differential equations, a researcher could access an agent based modeling software
library and run a series of controlled experiments. The “Wolf Sheep Predation”
model built by Wilensky [20] in NetLogo provides an example of the utility of agent
based modeling is Holland’s [8] predator/prey system. The model has two agent
types, wolves and sheep, moving through a simulated landscape where the rate of
grass regrowth can be controlled via the simulation interface. Other attributes can be
varied as well such as the initial numbers of each type of agent, the rate at which the
agents reproduce and the amount of sustenance each type of agent gains from eating.
A random number generator embedded in the NetLogo influences the placement of
the agents on the landscape; both in physical placement within the simulation as well
as their initial energy state and their propensity to reproduce. This randomness gives
the simulation a non-deterministic, stochastic quality. When the simulation is set in
motion, the sheep move through the environment eating the grass which re-grows at
an adjustable rate. The wolves move through the environment preying on the sheep
and both the sheep and wolves reproduce at an adjustable rate. While the simulation
is running, a series of plots are drawn graphically representing the populations of
the agents, wolves and sheep, as well as the status of the environment; the amount
of grass present. As the simulation progresses, the plots begin to show similar
oscillations as predicted by the Lotka-Volterra equations. By varying individual
parameters of the agents while holding the others constant, the model provides the
112 J. McCaskill
ability to generate a series of experiments. The model also enables the assessment
of changes to the environment by varying the rate of growth of the grass. The
interaction of all of these factors can have an effect on the populations of each
agent type as well as the environment. The ability to isolate variables within this
type of model simulation which is not possible in the ‘real world’ illustrates one of
the primary attributes of agent based modeling.
7.6 Policy Considerations
One of the primary outputs generated from the emergent behavior found in agent
based models are the unexpected linkages, or lack thereof, in cause and effect
regarding policy issues and outcomes. This result is not unexpected given the
complexity of the issues that swirl around human social systems. What is often
surprising is the resulting increase in the complexity of the interrelationships of the
agents and environmental factors highlighted by such a simple agent based model.
The overarching question for policy makers is what items should be considered
when evaluating the risks of a particular policy or policy change anywhere along the
continuum of options available? This concluding section suggests a few additions
to the numerous considerations for policy makers involved in such deliberations.
In the seminal work of Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly [18], she lists three
attributes of folly which she defines as the governmental pursuit of policy that is
counter to its self-interest. The first attribute is that “it must be perceived as counter-
productive in its own time, not merely by hindsight” ([18], 5). This is critical a
critical distinction. Frequently, black swan events are never seen to be looming on
the horizon because they are considered to be too improbable; but when looked at
in hindsight, even the dimmest of observers finds the foreshadowing of the event
obvious. This rule is critical to avoiding the curse of hindsight. Attribute two of
folly is “a feasible alternative course of action must have been available.” And the
third is, “the policy in question should be that of a group, not an individual ruler,
and should persist beyond any one political lifetime” ([18], 5). If policy makers
wish to avoid aligning these three interlocks, the obvious first question for them to
answer is whether the proposed action is in the collective best interest. While this
may seem too simplistic, the reality is far from it. For the most part, this question
is probably the most thoroughly debated. If the paradigms of the other agents and
other environmental factors involved are not considered outside the reference of
the policy maker’s own paradigm, the collective self-interest can be misinterpreted.
This is an area where agent based modeling simulations can be particularly helpful.
Compounding this issue is that the problem may not stem from the initial
decision, the problem may come from the reluctance to change course when events
are not aligning with expectations. The tendency to continue to spend money when
rational justification has passed, and continue down a path counter to self-interest is
known in accounting as the sunk costs fallacy. Resources that have been expended
cannot be recovered. Sunk costs, no matter how substantial or painful the lost,
should not enter into the decision of whether to continue the current course of
action. The decision should be based upon future costs. “The need to continuously
reevaluate circumstances and events should be treated as an imperative, not a sign
of weakness or indecision” ([13], 120).
One of the primary considerations for policy makers is determining what the
desired end state looks like when the intervention is complete. If the goal is to
establish a western style democracy in a country that has only known feudal
or autocratic rule throughout its history, the change capacity of the society may
prevent the intervening agency from achieving its desired end state. If such a
mismatch exists between the desired and probable end state, there will be a need
for exaggerated amounts of resources to effect the desired change due to the level of
resistance generated by the process. The question that must be considered is whether
there an alternative outcome that the international community can accept that will
be more aligned with the change capacity of the society in question [13]. Tuchman
is prescient when discussing such considerations across the arc of history when
she states, “This curious vacuum of understanding came from what may be called
cultural ignorance, a frequent component of folly” ([18], 31).
Given these seemingly simple considerations, are world leaders somehow
inspired to suddenly ignore their own best interests and those of their countrymen
and knowingly pursue counterproductive policy acts in sovereign nations? The
operative word in such a question is “knowingly.” Actions that are intuitive in
policy choices can turn out to be the antithesis of the correct course of action
because complex systems contain multiple feedback loops as well as cause and
effect relationships that can be widely displaced either temporally, spatially, or
both.
A final consideration for policy makers lies in the downside possibilities.
Complex adaptive systems frequently demonstrate characteristics associated with
punctuated equilibrium theory [5]. If the desired policy end state of a humanitarian
intervention is to drastically change the way a society is governed, then the down
side of that change must be considered. What if the change efforts fail or end
in a stalemate? What happens if once the incumbent governing structures; i.e.,
underlying deep structures are disrupted, the society regroups around an even worse
set of deep structures? For example, a totalitarian regime that was brutalizing its
own people is replaced by a democratically elected radical government that begins
conducting genocide against its own minorities and those of its neighbors? There
is no guarantee that this type of disruptive evolution will proceed in a positive
direction [5].
7.7 Conclusion
Are the policy makers in the international community prepared to deal with the
worst possible outcome? If they are not, then the intervention needs to be reconsid-
ered. After an equilibrium is disrupted—and history is not favoring a positive change
114 J. McCaskill
trajectory—is not the time to begin considering the possible downside outcomes.
A more valid planning paradigm may be whether the current status quo is worse
than the possible downside outcomes of intervention. While this recommendation
may appear overly pessimistic, it is useful to point out that pessimism can be a very
useful tool in avoiding folly.
Why should policy makers intentionally focus on the worst possible outcomes
when there is a good probability of a favorable outcome? It is because of an innate
failure in human cognition. We humans woefully overestimate our ability control
of events. Nassir Ghaemi [6] reports that in over 100 separate studies, a sizable
majority of people think they are more likely to experience positive events than
other people. Compounding this bias of optimism, most mentally healthy people
overestimate their level of control of events when they experience success. This
combination provides a basis for explaining how intelligent, rational policy makers
can be drawn into an action plan in which success depends upon a large number of
events going exactly right.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is an example of optimistic thinking
on combined with a failed understanding of U.S. predispositions. The Japanese
assumed the attack and subsequent destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet
would demoralize Americans and cause them to retire from the Pacific Theater. This
would allow Japan to continue to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
unmolested. Unfortunately for the Japanese policy makers, this action was the one
thing that would prove to galvanize an otherwise isolationist nation into action [18].
Another more example current example was the Bush administration’s belief that
the Iraq war would pay for itself via Iraqi oil revenues. The United States and British
policy makers were convinced that their forces would be seen as liberators by the
Iraqi people and these grateful people would reimburse the allies for the cost of
the intervention. Unfortunately for United States and British policy makers, reality
proved to be otherwise [7].
Given the dangers and difficulties in choosing the appropriate response to
human suffering that occurs throughout the course of political and social upheaval,
many of the policy options are potential traps; some real, some imagined, and all
intertwined in complexity. History is replete with troubled nations that have risen
in the consciousness of the world, to a level that have caused advocates to call for
humanitarian intervention, many of which to be led by military force. The January
28, 2012 edition of The Economist provided a list of troubled nations with new
issues (or old ones that are re-flaring). Uhuru Kenyatta, the top civil servant in
Kenya, has been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against
humanity for his involvement in a post-election killing spree that killed 1,500 and
displaced 300,000 more. What price is the international community willing to pay
in bringing an individual to justice?
The northern Nigerian city of Kano is under threat from a terrorist group known
as Boko Haram which has killed over 1,000 people in the past 3 years in an effort to
see sharia (Islamic law) strictly enforced [17]. Will an intervention of international
forces be required to allow the Nigerian government to withstand continued attacks
from this group? Yemen’s president has been ousted by unrest in the population
but the country is also an Al Qaeda stronghold. How will the security of the world
be affected if radical Islamist forces come to power in Yemen and what should the
international community do about it? Egypt has recently held democratic elections.
Will the military peacefully retire to its barracks after elections are held? What
if the Islamists that were elected turn out to be radicals? Should the international
community respond? The following synopsis of the current problems facing the
Middle Eastern states in the Arab Spring is provided by Charles Ries [14]:
There are specters of trouble ahead. There are signs of rising sectarianism. Violence against
Copts in Egypt, Sunni-Alawite-Kurdish tensions in Syria, Sunni-Shia rivalries in Bahrain,
and the caldron of sectarian and tribal struggles in Yemen are evidence of the re-emergence
of ancient suspicions at a time of rapid change. In Libya, regional and tribal rivalries must
be reconciled in order to construct a viable state. In Egypt, the military, which seemed to
be a hero of Tahrir Square for pushing Mubarak aside, of late has been reluctant to concede
power. (Ries [14], 2)
Following the fall of Qaddafi, Libya struggled to form a new government with
the help of the international community. That transition, while still emerging and
fragile, formed the basis for calls for intervention in Syria [17]. Activist heads of
state, such as the emir of Qatar, are joining the chorus emanating from analysts in
American think-tanks arguing that it is past time for direct military action from the
international community. Daniel Byman [1] with Brookings exemplifies the type of
arguments made by those in favor threatening military intervention:
But intervention must also be on the table to signal that the regime cannot put down the
opposition by force – U.S. and allied rhetoric should warn that this option will grow more
likely if Assad doesn’t step down. Ratcheting up the pressure today will help convince
Assad loyalists that the regime cannot weather the storm and that they need to abandon
ship now – rather than do so when the opposition is more bloodthirsty and less in the mood
to bargain. Only this forceful effort will end the rule of the leader who has been walking
his people into a nightmare. Any less will see the bloodshed continue indefinitely, possibly
sucking in neighboring states like Turkey and Israel, disrupting Iraq’s fragile state-building
efforts, raising tension further between Iran and the West, and giving autocrats elsewhere
in the Arab world credibility when they claim that the alternative to tyranny is not freedom
but chaos. (Byman [1], 1)
Consideration of a spreading conflagration in such a volatile region is never

a pleasant exercise. Compounding the pressure, over 5,000 Syrians killed in a
campaign of state violence with the violence escalating; more than were killed in
Libya which received international military intervention on behalf of the rebel forces
([17], 12). Does the international community have an obligation to provide more
than cease fire resolutions? Should there be an international military intervention
to relieve the terrible suffering of the Syrian people as well as bringing the despot
regime to justice?
Considering the down side consequences of such an action, the answer may
well be no. Much like that of Iraq, Syria has a complex ethnic and sectarian
constituency. Without a clear alternative leadership from within or in exile, and the
lack of a unified rebel force, military intervention is problematic. If the international
community were to consider a limited involvement such as airstrikes against the
Syrian state forces during their assault of civilians, those state forces may be
116 J. McCaskill
demoralized and a reduction in the violence against civilians could ensue. There
is an equally likely outcome that the regime would lash out even more viciously,
feeling cornered and out of options.
The probability of an unintended end state may be beyond the capacity of humans
to calculate given the complexity of these issues, widely separate cause and effect
relationships, and multiple feedback loops. Utilizing tools such as agent based
modeling can help provide policy makers with insight into some of the downside
outcomes possible when the deep structures of a society are disrupted. Considering
these downside possibilities in advance has the potential to provide a sobering does
of pessimism in the heady run-up to the use of military force and may be the key to
avoid joining Tuchman’s march of folly.
References
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Sage Publications, Inc.
Part III
Leadership, Political Science,
Chaos and National Security
Chapter 8
Chaos and Political Science: How Floods
and Butterflies Have Proved to Be Relevant
to Move Tables Closer
Joan Pere Plaza i Font
Prof. Lorenzo Ferrer Figueras in memoriam
Abstract Political Studies have traditionally struggled to acquire the status and
reputation of a scientific discipline. Any historical overall review of the upsurge of
Political Science show persisting debates on the predictive capacity of the study of
politics or even on the possibility to elaborate law-based explanations of political
phenomena.
In this vein Behaviouralism and Rational choice, which along the XX century
undoubtedly became the two most important schools of research in Political
Science, have strongly contributed to the normalization of the discipline, but also
have incorporated, as a side-effect, a set of principles related to the Newtonian
paradigm into Political Science.
This contribution argues that these assumptions require now further develop-
ments, and proposes the analytical framework provided by Chaos Theory as a
plausible way to re-conceptualize the ontological and epistemological foundations
of Political Science.
In so doing, it is defended that the school of research of Historical Institu-
tionalism proportionates a rich conceptual framework in political analyses that
perfectly fits the general assumptions of Chaos Theory. So much so, it is assumed
that concepts intrinsically associated to this analytical approach such as path-
dependency, increasing returns or critical junctures could arguably find their
equivalents in the ideas of sensibility to initial conditions, irreversability of non-
linear trajectories and breaking points.
Finally, it is defended that the history of the European Union integration provides
unbeatable examples of how social and political processes can perfectly be narrated
J.P. Plaza i Font, Ph.D. ()

Associate Professor on European Politics, Escola Superior de Comerç Internacional,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: joan.plaza@prof.esci.upf.edu

122 J.P. Plaza i Font
by means of the conceptual framework of Chaos Theory, and some particular

episodes are discussed in a tentative way to open the door to richer and more specific
empirical studies.
Keywords Political science • Chaos theory • Historical institutionalism • Path-

Dependency • European union
Since the growth in the specialization of scientific knowledge at first half of the
nineteenth century, scholars in Social Sciences in a broad sense, and Political
Studies in a narrower scope, both have traditionally maintained arduous debates
(internally and externally) on the scientific nature of their research fields. The
situation may be explained through both the relative youth of Political Science as an
autonomous discipline (August Comte still considered it to be a subfield of the wider
Sociology, to him the most recent and the most complex of all scientific disciplines)
as well as the very different nature of those sub-disciplines that now conform to the
ensemble of the field of study of Political Science.
In this vein, if one closely examines any of the numerous existing historical
synopses as an autonomous and independent endeavour (exempli gratia, [17]), it
is not difficult to identify those self-consciousness debates [21] that, generation
after generation, have led these scholars to the same open-ended questions on the
predictive capacity of the study of politics, the possibility to elaborate law-based
explanations of political phenomena, and the similitudes and differences the disci-
pline shows vis-à-vis other social studies. Those debates have undoubtedly became
an issue for recurrent controversies and disputes among confronted perspectives on
what the discipline might (and should) aspire to, and on the generic reflection on the
location of the study of politics in the context of knowledge and, more specifically,
in the concrete context of scientific knowledge (exempli gratia, [3, 52]).
Those tensions are largely reflected in the categories to refer to the area of
research as well as to refer those who dedicate themselves to it. Despite the
fact of the use of the label “Political Science” is well reputed, and Faculties and
Departments of Political Science mushroomed in many universities from de 1960s
onwards, terms such as “Political Studies” are not that uncommon either. So much
so, although it has been said, in one of the most cited handbooks, that “the history of
political science properly begins with Plato” whose Republic, Statesman and Laws
had to be considered the first classics of Political Science [4, p. 53], preference
probably should be given to not so encompassing formulations.
Put it differently, if nobody could refuse the idea that Plato himself, but also Sun
Tzu, Aristotle, Agustin of Hippo, Thomas of Aquinas, Mosheh ben Maimon, Machi-
avelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, Weber, Durkheim or
Arendt (among many others, such a kind of list cannot pretend to be exhaustive) par-
tially consecrated their work to political analysis, other reputed contemporary voices
(exempli gratia, [70]) would firmly refuse the idea that they were political scientists.
Use of the expression Political Science in this contribution is therefore entirely
intentional. It cannot be interpreted as a merely stylistic device in line with the
8 Chaos and Political Science: How Floods and Butterflies Have Proved to. . . 123
undoubted reputation that any reference to Science has when it comes to presenting
human knowledge [15]. Rather, it challenges the very foundations from which the
study of politics has traditionally been presented, as well as a strong statement of
wills aiming to solve those recurrent disciplinary self-consciousness debates. The
possibility of Political Science as a scientific endevour is real, but it also necessarily
requires a deep revision of what we as practitioners understand of “Science”, which
to a certain extent also obliges us to review the meaning of “Political”.
And it also urges a review of the undoubtly essential task of (probably) the
most relevant analytical traditions in Political Science so far, Behaviouralism and
Rational choice. Thus, without underestimating their intensive contribution to
make the study of politics definitively shift towards a normal science [37], and
independent from the ideological criticism that these schools have swept along,
the theoretical heritage of Behaviouralism and Rational choice requires certain
recontextualizations. The assumptions the Newtonian ideas of order, reductionism,
predictability and determinism that inevitably both approaches assumed, in the sense
of conceiving social and political phenomena as the pure collection of monadic -
individual- choices are require of further conpectualizations. To put it the other way
around, the assumption of the Newtonian paradigm was probably the trade-off that
the study of Politics paid to gain the status of science. But now further developments
are required.
At this point, the advances in the understanding of nonlinear processes that pro-
gressively emerged in 1980s and 1990s, opened the gate to the re-conceptualization
of foundations of Political Science, as it was the case of many other disciplines ([12]
in Psycology, for instance). In this line, some frontrunners have already analyzed
the epistemological and ontological consequences for the study of politics of the
paradigm of complexity in the recent years (exempli gratia, [8, 9, 33, 51, 67]).
Moreover, more specific analyses have also appeared sporadicly within academic
literature on a wide range of political domains such as International Relations [68],
federal regimes [36] or health care policies [62].
As such, and without omitting the sharp criticisms they have also received
(exempli gratia, [32, 35]), it is defended here that Chaos Theory (exempli gratia,
[22, 65, 74]) provides a non-negligeable analytical framework to satisfactorily
tackle the aforementioned self-consciousness debates within Political Science.
Finally, a part from those intellectual raids into the possibilities to apply, both
in a general and a more specific manner, the postulates of Chaos Theory to the
study of politics, it is also interesting to see how the Historical Institutional school
([60, 71]) has also developed a rich conceptual framework in political analyses
that perfectly fit the general assumptions of Chaos Theory [44]. So much so,
that concepts intrinsically associated to this analytical approach such as path-
dependency (inter alia, [25, 45, 55]), increasing returns [58] or critical junctures
[14] could potentially find their equivalents in the ideas of sensibility to initial
conditions, irreversability of non-linear trajectories and breaking points. And in
this analytical effort, the European Union integration processes provides unbeatable
examples of how social and political process can perfectly be narrated by means of
the conceptual framework of Chaos Theory.
This contribution is structured as follows. The most common ontological and

epistemological approaches to Political Science are discussed first. This description
leads to secondly focus on the most relevant consequences and negative side-effects
of this traditional mainstream assumptions for the study of Politics, as well as
to claim for newer research programmes. Finally, Historical New Institutionalism
is presented parallel to Chaos Theory in order to establish potentially fruitful
conceptual homologies for this field of study. In so doing, some particular example
issued form the on-going integration process of the European Union are mentioned.
8.1 A Long History of Ontological and Epistemological

Disagreements in the Study of Politics
In 1988, Gabriel Almond paraphrased the title of the Terrence Rattigan’s theatre
piece, Separate Tables, to describe the situation of Political Science at the time. He
suggested that, as happened to the Irish playwrighter’s characters, despite having
lunch in the same refractory, Political Science scholars were sitting at separate
tables. And this situation caused many members of different schools and research
traditions, or sects, as Almond [3] himself later preferred to call them, barely knew
the empirical or theoretical debates undertaken by those fellows sitting at the next
table, and was evident proof of the aforementioned deep self-consciousness debates
within the Political Science.
Following this well-known metaphor, those tables in the discipline refractory
were organized according to two established dimensions: one ideological and the
other methodological, in a way that mainstream orthodox scholars sat at four big
and lighted tables according to their preferences on those issues. In this vein, the
ideological continuum separated those scholars into “right” and “left” positions,
on the basis of their attitude towards the separation between the production of
knowledge and (political) action which also introduced a second distinction between
the desirable levels of professionalization of the discipline. On the other hand, the
methodological continuum distinguished those “hard” and “soft” positions based
on the type of research product that Political Science should produce. In line with
that, the most extreme “hard” proponents conceived that Political Science outputs
should proportionate a “combination of mathematical modelling, statistical analysis,
experiment, and computer simulation” [2, p. 829], while “soft” scholars used to
produce more descriptive and less formal analysis, close to historical rationale.
And it is not surprising that [2] faced this recurrent self-consciousness debate at
this very precise point in time, since it was already 30 years since the Behavioural
Revolution saw the light. This new research programme in the study of Politics,
which took place (specially in US Academy) in the 1950s, has commonly been
presented to be a critical impulse to overpass the former and mainstreaming theory
of the state and the starting-point of the “scientific” study of Politics (exempli gratia,
[16]). Nevertheless, [27] has also argued that this shift can not be considered a
revolution in Kuhnian terms, that is to say a paradigmatic shift in Political Science,
but rather the conclusion of the normalization of Political Science, as distinct
discourse and discipline, that had started in the 1920s, independently from war. In
his own words:
Although there has been a great deal of ambiguity and controversy about what Kuhn meant
by the term “paradigm” and about how, and the extent to which, his analysis could be
applied to the history of the social sciences, the most salient characteristics of his account
of a scientific revolution were manifest in the discipline of political science during this
period [in 1920s], and arguably only in this period [27, p. 597].
In any case, regardless of the exact moment when these paradigmatic changes
crystallized, it is not doubtful that the study of politics experienced a non-reversible
change. As a consequence, Behaviouralism in first place, and Rational Choice
immediately after the former became the mainstream traditions in political analysis.
Largely influenced by recent behavioural advances in psychology, behaviouralist
scholars rapidly sought to infer patterns of behaviour of individuals in political
contexts through the analysis of observed political data. Assuming that the observed
regularities lasted in time and were independent from cultural and societal contexts,
Behaviouralism worked to accumulate records of political regularities in order to
induce equivalent behaviours in the future.
Although they shared this claim in favour of a predictive scientific endeavour,
Rational Choice scholars proceeded very differently. Similar to Economics (exempli
gratia, [11]), they introduced to the study of politics a totally deductive strategy that
aimed to establish causal explanations through falsification of hypotheses and the
use of the hypothetic-deductive method, just as [63] had previously suggested.
So much so, by means of the Behaviouralist Revolution, the discipline assumed
that the task of the political scientist was to detect regularities of the external world
and to construct a solid theory that would predict the approaching outcomes, and
that in case of failure, this theory would be improved. And despite the fact that their
research strategies were slightly opposed each other in terms of logic of research,
and consequently in terms of research techniques and data gathering, Rational
Choice and Behaviouralism traditions shared from the very beginning very similar
attitudes with respect to the scope of scientific knowledge and social sciences.
This inoxerable shift in the discipline arguably went hand in hand with a certain
uncritical assumption of positivism and empiricism as their basis for the study of
Politics, in an effort to “normalize” the discipline in a Kuhnian sense [37], as
it stressed above. To put it differently, the two main analytical approaches that
followed this revolution, Behaviouralism itself and Rational Choice, implicitly
assumed that social and political actors behaved as billiard balls do [23], and
that they could be approached in the same way that the seventeenth century
Physics had traditionally studied the movement of celestial bodies, or the nineteenth
century ballistics had calculated the displacement at point of impact of particular
projectiles.1 This was exactly what [2, p. 829] underlined while emphasizing that
“soft” scholars showed “almost complete lack of conceptualization, hypothesizing,
efforts to prove propositions and the like”, which undoubtedly has been the flagship
for “hard” scholars.
As a consequence, it seems that independent of the choice of the label of
the continuum, [2] did not express a disagreement on methodological (technical)
arrangements to approach the political phenomena. Assuming that the rest of
elements in a given research programme are fixed, methodology deals with the
need to establish adequate research strategies to dilucidate which are the most
adequate techniques of inquiry, and this claim is not the core of Almond’s [2]
classification. On the contrary, he was rather emphasizing deep ontological and
epistemological disputes on the way to understand the study of politics that issued as
a non-expected consequence of the Behaviouralist Revolution. And it is reasonable
that he precisely detected those explainable cleavages along these two categories,
since these “building blocks” of any generic research [26] “underpin what we do as
social and political scientist” [47, p. 17].
Ontology is commonly understood as the branch of knowledge that addresses
the deep nature of being so that the key question is whether there exists a world-out-
there that is independent of the human ability to think of it. In this vein, two distinct
ontological positions have been traditionally distinguished: the foundationalist (or
objectivist) and anti-foundationalist (or constructivist). While the former assumes
the existence of the world regardless of our ability to approach it and recognizes that
the meaning of social and political phenomena is autonomous from the actors that
embody them, the later emphasizes the social construction of those phenomena.
Consistently, when [2] claimed that scholars on the far right of the ideological
continuum defended that the production of knowledge is at a different stage than
the action, he was indirectly presenting a foundationalist ontological position:
there is “reality out there” that can (should? ought to?) be known by means of
human (scientific?) knowledge, which is possible thanks to rationality. Actually,
following [69, p. 839], since the philosophical work of Descartes and Kant,
“Western philosophical thought has been increasingly enchanted with the dream
of realizing universal rationality as the highest form of knowledge and the basis for
truth”.
Moreover, when [2] places at the far left of the ideological continuum those
scholars who do not recognise a separation between the production of knowledge
and action, he is presenting an anti-foundationalist ontological perspective, opposed
to the former, in which the limits of the World are the limits of what can be imagined
or considered. It is not the different ideological perspectives that construct this
cleavage between scholars positions, it is rather their very different ontological
assumptions. Nevertheless, that being said, nobody could deny that the ideological
left is more familiar, or even, more prone, to reassert Constructivist positions, than
1
In actuality, this same analogy was used not only in Political Science but also in RI Theory, as
long as Realism perspective assumes this same configuration for States acting in Anarchy.
the ideological right. As a matter of further consideration, one may for instance
consider the attitudes towards Human and Fundamental rights, and the distinctive
consideration on Liberty and Freedom developed by both the ideological right
and left.
Moving to the other category, the heart of the epistemological debates lays
on the different ways in which the world can be approached (if possible). That
is, “epistemology focuses on the knowledge-gathering process and is concerned
with developing new models or theories that are better than competing models and
theories” [26, p. 177]. It is no longer a matter of the nature of the world; it is rather
a matter of how we (intellectually) deal with it. In this vein, the most common
classifications distinguish between scientific and hermeneutical (or interpretativist)
epistemological positions. In the study of politics, as well as in the study of any
other phenomena of the social realm, the former pretends to dilucidate causal
relationships that are considered to provide an explanation on the functioning of
the mechanisms that produce the political outcomes. This aspiration, as discussed
below, has been misinterpreted and has simply been reduced to a transposition of the
techniques (and also the foundations) of the natural sciences to the field of inquiry of
the political analyses. On the contrary, from an hermeneutical perspective, the task
of the political scientist is primarily devoted to interpret and provide with sense the
political behaviour and outputs of the political system. It is not necessarily involved
in the disclosing of causal explanations, since the meanings of social actions are
much more significant than facts, and that is what, under Almond’s point of view,
“soft scholars” pretend through the use of “thickly descriptive clinical studies”
[2, p. 829].
8.2 Long Term Side Effects of the Behavioural Revolution
Paramount to this evolution is the fact that the force of each of the tables was
not, nor ended up being, the same. Thus, in order to provide even greater fineness
to his metaphor, [2] should probably have mentioned that neither the number of
guests nor the outfit was the same for each of the tables. Despite his maintenance
that an “overwhelming majority of political scientists” were “somewhere in the
center – liberal and moderate in ideology, and eclectic and open to conviction
in methodology –” in a sort of “cafeteria of the center” [2, p. 830] distinct
from the orthodox original four, the evolution of Political Science in terms of
practitioners and research programmes has evolved significantly different. Contrary
to his perspective, the table on the “hard-right” quickly became the most populated,
and that with the best tablecloths and cutlery, as a consequence of growing social
reputation that they acquired along with the grandeur traditionally associated to
scientific knowledge.
To mention just one example, in a bibliographical review exercise that focused
on the four journals widely regarded as the most relevant in Political Science, not
exempt of methodological critics that this sort of analysis may rise,2 [48] showed
how Rational Choice and Behavouralism, became the widely dominant analytical
approaches in the discipline in the decades that followed the Behavioural Revolu-
tion. During the period 1997–2002 (inclusive) the 71 % of the articles published in
the American Journal of Political Science were Behaviouralist or utilised a Rational
Choice perspective, figure comparable to that showed by the American Political
Science Review (67 %). In the British case, figures were even a bit more complex.
Although British Journal of Political Science presented equivalent figures to those of
the US journals (71 %); Political Studies only published 42 % of their articles with
a clear behaviouralist or rational choice perspective, while it presented the higher
percentages of normative theory (31 %) and other non-positivist works (25 %).
The last figure seems to be probably the most relevant one. Apart from the
confirmation of the lieu commun that since the Behavioral Revolution the study of
politics has become eminently positivist,3 the fact that the number of non-positivist
works was so low (in the American Political Science Review presented even lower
rates of only 13 %) shows that the mainstream scholars of the discipline have
avoided, at least partially, to consider the well-established progress in the scientific
understanding of world, which has undoubtedly suggested the overcoming of the
positivist epistemological position typical of the Newtonian paradigm.
This has not been incompatible, moreover, to the fact that there remained some
space for normative theory, accorded to those scholars sitting at Almond’s [2] “soft”
tables. Coincidence or not, among the four journals tracked by Marsh and Savigny
[48], the only one that does not contain the reference to “science” in its own title
was also the most likely to make room for work detached to the Rational Choice or
Behaviouralism. While reserving for themselves the ability to produce “authentic”
knowledge on politics, through the maintenance of a certain “scientific know-how”
the mainstream scholars proved no inconvenience to the acknowledgement of the
works by some outsiders whose normative theory was considered much closer to
political philosophy and history of political ideas than to the Political Science itself.
All in all, although it might be totally unfair (and perhaps totally ridiculous)
not to recognize the importance of the research programmes led by “hard-right”
scholars, both in terms of the advance of factual knowledge and also in terms of
social recognition of the discipline, it could also be quite risky to omit that this
preponderance of behaviouralist and rationalist approaches entailed important side-
effects, mainly in the range of possible answers to those self-consciousness debates
aforementioned. Arguably, the expansion of rationalist and behaviourist research
strategies presented at least three crucial long-term side-effects.
Firstly, despite the advances arising from the attention paid on formalization
and the use of parsimonious explanations, these studies often failed to grasp the
complexity of the political and social reality. It is unquestionable that scientific mod-
2
For other alternative analyses see Norris [53] and Goodin and Klingemann [23].
3
As predominantly produced in the US, a fact that suggested to Marsh and Savigny [48, p. 161] to
talk about an “American dominance of the profession” in a way that “US profession is speaking to
the world, but they are not listening to the world”.
els are used to reduce the complexity of any phenomena, in order to be able to oper-
ate in (with) it. The question is whether the correspondence between the model itself
and the system of reference is sufficiently accurate. At this point, many Rational
Choice presentations have proved not fully scrupulous. As stressed by Schram [69,
p. 840] the increasing vogue to apply abstract economic-like models to problems of
public policy introduced “the progressive elimination of historical and social consid-
erations, increasingly decontextualizing its subject matter in ever more abstract and
mathematical terms to produce its own universal rationality of market-related behav-
ior” which does not necessarily fit with the political and institutional phenomena.
To put it in Hay’s [29, p. 39] words, “reality does not avail itself of the sort
of parsimony on which rationalism is premised”. And this is a paramount point
that merits emphasis, since any scientific endeavour in politics worthy of this name,
should in any case incorporate and deal with the nature of politics which necessarily
has consequences with the ontological and epistemological foundations assumed by
any research programme in Political Science. Moreover, it added an attitude about
the social function of discipline and a general attitude about the scope of action
of the scientific enterprise, that introduced the conviction about the possibility to
understand the truth about politics, and that this truth should also certainly permit
the improvement of any given political system.
Secondly, the consolidation of Bahaviouralism and Rational Choice also intro-
duced a quite simple idea of causality and linearity in social and political outcomes.
By means of these approaches, Political Science assumed the inherent vision to
the Newtonian paradigm of an orderly world, functioning as a clockwork with
observable and constant laws. As Geyer [19, p. 23] has pointed out:
The high point of the linear paradigm was reached in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly
in universities in the United States. Strengthened by the success of planning programmes
during World War II and the early post-war period, pressured by the growing cold war, and
lavishly funded by the expanding universities, American academics strove to demonstrate,
and hence control, the presumed rational nature of human interaction. This traditional
Newtonian approach was clearly expressed in the modernization theories of Third World
development, the realist vision of international relations, the behaviouralist writings of
sociologists, the positivist foundations of liberal economics and the rational plans of public
policy experts and urban planners.
Using the Newtonian frame of reference, modern social scientists unjustifiably assumed that
physical and social phenomena were primarily linear and therefore predictable.
These attitudes towards the scientific object and the scientific endeavour itself,
presented a third side-effect, which is of much greater interest now. The Behavioural
Revolution delegitimized any analysis of politics outside the scientific programme
it fixed. As a consequence of the radicalization of certain arguments concerning
technical, methodological, and even epistemological, aspects of the study of politics,
the Behavioural Revolution paved the way to (unjustified) claims against any
possibility to approach politics in a non-scientific base, and somehow made the
distance between Almond’s [2] tables bigger.
The mistake, in our view, lies in the presumption that the small amount
of plausibility evidenced by certain Rational Choice studies and their total lack
of attention to other possible sources of meaning out of the strict framework of

measurable variables, completely nullify the possibility of generating scientific
knowledge in the field of politics. But this assumption induces the confusion of the
whole and the part, by introducing the idea that the knowledge of the political as
a whole can not be scientific because a part of political analysis (eventhough it
has been the mainstriming branch of political studies from 1960s onwards) has
not totally succeed in its attempt to explain politics through the use the lents of
rationalism and empiricism. And this is a paramount element to consider the impact
and the potentiality of Chaos Theory in Social Sciences.
What is at stake is not the possibility of the scientific approach to the study
of politics, that which is assumed here to be possible and desirable, but the very
foundations which it has been done so far, at least by the mainstream of the
discipline.
8.3 Assuming Historicity: The Preponderant Role

of Historical New Institutionalism
Very similarly to the arguments being defended here, but using a far reaching
metaphor, [72, p. 1602] maintains that students of revolutions (as well as students
of any other large-scale political phenomena):
have imagined they were dealing with phenomena like ocean tides, whose regularities
they could deduce from sufficient knowledge of celestial motion, when they were actually
confronting phenomena like great floods, equally coherent occurrences from a causal
perspective, but enormously variable in structure, sequence, and consequences as a function
of terrain, previous precipitation, built environment, and human response.
This differentiation between a flood and a tide clearly highlights the main
feature of any political phenomenon, including revolutions: their historicity, or as
mentioned above, its nature of processes.
Just as what happened in Physics and other fields of knowledge, to overcome
the paradigm of order [20] that became majoritarian in the study of politics after
the Behavioural Revolution, it is important that Political Science scholars assume
that history does matter [46]. But it matters not in a simple cosmetic manner
according to which the discipline should incorporate a brief historical review to
their analyses so that they do not suffer from a lack of context. Nor is it in a
more sophisticated manner according to which political scientist should incorporate
historical references as a technique to widening the universe of potential cases for a
comparative research [59]. To assume that history matters should rather imply that
those explanations (and models) of political phenomena should assume the deep
ontological and epistemological consequences of this intrinsic feature.
And that is the reason why Tilly [72] stresses that political scientists do not
deal with tide-like phenomena, but rather with flood-like ones. While tides evoke
a cyclical and a historical phenomenon, where yesterday’s tide is equivalent to
tomorrow’s tide, and where the current tide has no open consequences to the one
to come tomorrow; with floods, the same does not occur. These are the results of
a very particular sequence of events, and each one is different and distinguishable
from its predecessors as well as its successors. Not only does the flood somehow
foreshadow future ones, it is also constrained by past ones. As van Middelaar [73,
p. 34] highlights: “Politics is a game that creates a connection in the present between
an ever open future and a never totally closed past”.
As a result, the discipline must incorporate a conceptual apparatus that permits
Political Science to deal with this historical embedding of political phenomena,
which necessarily puts in the spotlight the ontological and epistemological assump-
tions commonly accepted among Rational Choice and Behaviouralist analytical
traditions. As Tilly [72, p. 1602] himself recognizes:
If the social world actually fell into neatly recurrent structures and processes, the epochal
theories, invariant models, and the testing of deductive hypothesis would become more
parsimonious and effective means of generating knowledge. Because the social world
does not conform to that prescription, we need other programmes on both ontological and
epistemological grounds [italics in the original].
To express it in a newspaper headline, it is paramount that Political Science

assumes that the time for Laplace’s demon is over. And it is not due to the fact
that scholars do not have access to almost unlimitated computational capacities. It is
rather due to the evidence that real world out there have proved to be impervious to
any attempt to explain it through a deterministic lens.
The assumption of positivist tradition, and even Empiricism, that pretend that
the world is ruled by recurrent patterns (laws) and that it is knowable by means
of rationality is no longer tenable. As [66] argues, historical phenomena cannot be
explained with covering-laws as Hempel [30] believed. And that is also the emphatic
appeal of Political Science to abandon the Newtonian assumption of the political
world, that is to say to abandon the ontological and epistemological foundations of
the main research traditions issued with the Behavioural Revolution.
This shift should arguably follow the road paved by transdisciplinary scholars in
Chaos Theory. Without renouncing a foundationalist and deterministic ontological
perspective (there exists a world out there, whose behaviour is partially due to
complex causal chains) Political Science should abandon the pretensions that this
world is fully knowable, and that it is knowable by means of rationality. That is the
reason why Tilly [72] opts for floods and not for tides, because although they both
are causally motivated, floods are produced by unrepeatable chains of actions, in the
same way that political events are. To put it differently, floods are the clear evidence
of a particular equilibrium between necessity and contingency, a point which is
paramount to highlight since the most obvious feature of history is “the way [in
which] particular factors and events come together in just the right proportions to
realize their end” [66, p. 9].
It would be unreasonable to think, however, that the Behavioural Revolution
eliminated any analytical approach in Political Science that did not assume, even
tangentially, this consideration of the historicity of the political phenomenon that is
being stressed here.
In this regard, it is important to note that since the mid-1980s a not insignificant
galaxy of scholars from a wide range of empirical contexts, and perhaps without
necessarily realizing that they exemplified a coherent genre [60], started to challenge
in a very severe way both the research strategies and the fundamental postulates
of the two majoritarian traditions issued from the Behavioural Revolution. Despite
the many ambiguities that those proposals presented, since the very beginning, this
new approach was considered as a whole and called New Institutionalism, precisely
because if some aspect matched all those works it was in an effort to seek “to
ellucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political
outcomes” [28, p. 936].
As Hay [29, p. 11] maintains:
New institutionalism emphasises the mediating role of the institutional contexts in
which events occur, rejecting what it sees as the input-weighted political analysis of
behaviouralism and rational choice theory. In so doing, it draws attention to the significance
of history, timing and sequence in explaining political dynamics.
More specifically, this attention to how the historicity of political phenomena

permits and constrains any further political output has been widely reviewed
by scholars in Historical New Institutionalism, one of the three main branches
that traditionally have been distinguished under the generic umbrella of New
Institutionalism (exempli gratia, [28]).4
So much so that in the abstract of a seminal work of this political analysis
approach, Pierson [58, p. 251] maintains that the key claims of scholarship in
historical institutionalism include:
Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; a wide range of social outcomes may
be possible; large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events;
particular courses of action, once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse; and
consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that
shape the basic contours of social life.
This statement provides an approach to social and political phenomena that, not
surprisingly, perfectly fits in a generic description of any chaotic behaviour that,
following Herman [31] could be designated as any deterministic complex behaviour,
irregular and non-periodic, with random appearance but maintaining a latent order.
In actuality, the most relevant features of chaotic behaviours can be isolated in
Pierson’s definition [58] as well, clearly suggesting in this way the conceptual
linking between Historical New Institutionalism and Chaos Theory framework of
analysis.
The stress put on the idea that “political development is punctuated by critical
moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life” makes a clear
reference to the extreme sensibility to initial conditions reputed to any chaotic
4
Lowndes [43], for instance, provides a more precise discussion on the differences and specific
features within New Institutionalism. In this vein, she reports not three but rather eight different
new institutionalists traditions: (i) normative, (ii) rational, (iii) historical, (iv) international,
(v) sociological, (vi) network, (vii) constructivist and (viii) feminist.
system. That is the reason why [58] also emphazises that “specific patterns of
timing and sequence matter” and partially explain social life. On the other hand, the
confirmation that “large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent
events” is an evident reference to another constituting feature for any chaotic
behaviour, the asimetry in the outputs, which certainly confers to chaotic behavior
this irregularity in appearance [31]. This is an idea that Lorenz [40, 41] captured in
the notion of the butterfly effect, probably one of the most ground-breaking studies
in the study of non-linear dynamic systems. Finally, Pierson’s recognition [58] that
in social, political and institutional processes “particular courses of events, once
introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse” proportionates a far reaching link
to the phenomena of path-dependency, that exist in any chaotic behavior, and which
permits the framing of this latent order that is commonly attributed to them.
Arguably Historical New Institutionalism presents a non-stochastic view of the
World, equivalent to the world described by Chaos scholars. Indeed it introduces a
notion of (complex) causality, and indicates that the social life is an emergent result
issued from non-stochastic patterns of behaviour. In a random behaviour any kind
of state in future is possible. Given a point in the trajectory of a random system,
the next point cannot be predicted by any mean. On the contrary, among non-
stochastic behaviours any possible future state of the system responds to a given
range of possible states. And although this can be extremely wide, it still remains
finite, and always dependent on the previous states. As [13] notes, in these kind
of systems even if one may not be in disposition to know exactly what is going
to happen next, one may now at least that what will happen will be drawn from a
set of alternatives greater than one, but less than to many to cope with. Turning to
Tilly’s [72] metaphor, Historical New Institutionalist approach stresses that social
life may be conceived as a flood, neither as a tide nor as the result of the result of
pure meteorological randomness.
By assuming this condition of social and political phenomena, Political Science
scholars should then assume that, as Historical New Institutionalism suggests,
their objects are unique and caused, that is to say, they emerge from unrepeatable
complex causal chains. Or alternatively, as we have already defended elsewhere,
Political Science scholars should assume that political phenomena constitute the
(emergent) result of the iterative processes experienced by nonlinear dynamical
systems [61]. And this assumption is crucial since it carries away a non self-
evident corollary of much importance now: despite dealing with unique and caused
events, Political Science should abandon the will of predictibility, at least in the
way that seventeenth century Physics developed it, and the Behavioural Revolution
incorporated it later. To put it in another way, social and political events cannot
not be considered any longer to be determinated and determinable. At most, they
must be interpreted to be determinated and undeterminable phenomena. Table 8.1
captures this paramount difference and shows how Historical Institutionalism
(and Chaos Theory) finds itself in between the traditional approaches to Political
Science, providing an alternative to the unsolved quarrels among them in the self-
conciousness debates in the discipline [21].
Table 8.1 Main approaches in comparative politics in relation to their ontological and epistemo-
logical assumptions
Ontological assumptions
Determinated Undeterminated
Epistemological Determinable Rationalism (Non-sense)
assumptions undeterminable historical Social
institutionalism constructivism
Although examples could be countless, because of its relevance both empirically

and theoretically speaking, the process of European integration deserves special
mention. For the aim of this contribution, and within the narrative of his own
constitution process, it is worth noting that the European Union can be conceived
as the emerging result, unique and caused, sustained over time, of the interaction
of many different State-like and non-State-like actors. And it is interesting to
observe how, in any given moment of its long History, the European Union has
only been fully understood when analyzed from its own historicity, attending
the characteristics that have already been identified above: sensibility to initial
conditions, asymmetry in the results, existence of patterns of increasing-returns
and, ultimately, the concurrence of a complex causality. This view of the European
Union, determined and undeterminatable, destroys any attempts to explain its
evolution as the development of its original plan. Rather on the contrary, if any
adjective captures the essence of on-going project of European integration, it is
its openness. Specialized literature agrees on the fact the key players involved the
European integration project have never fixed a pre-defined model, but rather the
opposite, contingency and necessity have traditionally happened to configurate the
next stage of the integration process. Perhaps for this reason, Pierson himself [56,57]
has proposed a Historical new-institutionalist analysis to the path to European
Integration and argues that “Historical institutionalism provides the analytical tools
for thinking of the EC not as an international organization, but as a core level -albeit
still a weak one- of an emergent multitiered system of governance” [56, p. 158].
Moving to the most defining features of the any chaotic behavior and its
concordance to theoretical claims of Historical New Institutionalism approach, it
is undoubtly necessary to pay attention first to the sensibility to initial conditions
that has been even described as the most intuitive characteristic among them [49].
According to Prigogine [64], given a concrete point in the phase space of any
chaotic system, one may find another point, as close as possible to this initial one,
and with a separation distance of .ıx/0 , from which the same pattern of behaviour
of the system would lead the trajectory of the system to an end point whose distance
to the first end point could be hypothetically much wider than .ıx/0 . That is to say,
in chaotic systems, the smallest perturbation in any initial condition may lead to an
exponentially divergent final state, where .ıx/t D Œ.ıx/0 t .
This classic definition of the sensibility to initial conditions of any given chaotic
system is intimately linked to the notion of patterns of innovation [39]. In this vein,
the historicity of these phenomena is reflected in the fact that at the time when
initial conditions are considered potential long-term outcomes are too numerous
and too diverse to suggest a possible prediction (in Newtonian terms). Moreover,
it is important to mention that, as the system evolves, the range of variation of
these potential future states finishes shuffling only minor variations on one of those
potential outcomes. So much so, that the specification of a particular value for .ıx/0
just sets a pattern of evolution that happens to turn from considering a wide range of
alternatives at the beginning into refining certain small differences in some of them
at the end. This is reflected in Pierson’s words [58, p. 263] when he argues that
“the necessary conditions for current outcomes occurred in the past”, even though
he should arguably maintain that these conditions are not sufficient, otherwise the
undeterminability of chaotic processes would easily vanish.
Prigogine’s [64] definition can also address the second feature that has been
highlighted: extreme asymmetry in outcomes. As a result of the sensibility to
small variations in .ıx/0 , it can give rise to very different outcomes in magnitude,
both quantitatively and qualitatively. What might seem irrelevant may actually
be a substantial shift lever. As in the English nursery song in which because of
a single nail a whole kingdom was lost,5 this is a gripping element to explain
patterns of continuity and change in social and political phenomena in the real
world. Accordingly to that, Pierson [58, p. 260] warns that “the loose and diffuse
links between actions and outcomes render politics inherently ambiguous”. This
ambiguity stems from indeterminibility; and this, in turn, from the non-linearity
framing these processes.6
In any case it is important to note that given the complexity of the phenomena
under consideration, the sensibility that can produce skewed results in outcomes is
not concentrated at the initial moment, but rather it is distributed over the entire
length of the phenomenon in question. To put it differently, it is present in every one
of the moments that make up the system path although it shows its potentiality and
capacity of change in very certain points in the trajectory of the system. Literature
has labelled these paramount moments as junctures [14], bifurcations points [38],
or more simply, critical moments. But independent from that, they are the moments
where the system is closest to “edge of chaos” [39]. And this is an important remark
in a discipline such as Political Science whose statements and assumptions are
expressed in natural language that can lead to misinterpretations of the significance
5
For want of a nail the shoe was lost/ For want a shoe the horse was lost/ For want of a horse the
rider was lost/ For want of rider the battle was lost/ For want of a battle the kingdom was lost/ And
all for the want of a horseshoe nail [54].
6
It could be reasonably argued (exempli gratia, [50]) that the observance of irregular periodicity in
chaotic systems evolution may arise from a fully linear behaviour where the signal-to-noise ratio is
high. As a consequence, as in any sampling theory, the measurement of the difference .ıx/0 would
only lead to errors which progressively increase and which should then be labelled as noise. And
although it will not be developed here, this is a critical elements, since it opens the door to argue
that the indeterminibility (and hence lack of predictability of social and political processes) is not
a matter of its ontological and epistemological conditions, as it is advocated here, but a question of
methodology and available measurement techniques.
of initial conditions. As such, it is defended here that, each point in the path of any
social or political system might be considered as the initial point of the trajectory
from it, and consequently, be considered the reference from which to reach the
asymmetry in the final outcomes.
The history of the European integration process is extremely dotted with such
turning points [1]. For instance, Görtermarker [24] has highlighted how the outbreak
of the Korean War, just immediately before the creation of the first European
Communities, represented a shift in Allied plans on German rearmament. It was
no longer about whether Germany should be rearmed or not, but rather how. This
was the question that ultimately ended redefining the nature and specific objectives
of the first steps in the European integration project, and in accordance with that, the
subsequent creation of the ECCS, and soon after, the EEC and Euratom. Along this
same line, and without leaving the field of defense and security, Jopp and Diedrichs
[34] have emphasized how the outbreak of the successive wars in the Balkans, and
the evidence of the failure of the newly created European Union to act effectively
in its backyard, marked a before and after in the European Security and Defence
policy. And not only that, but it also suggested that the European Union create a
modus operandi in its neighborhood policy, which became one of the hallmarks of
the integration project as a whole.
On a different discussion, but always taking as a reference point the process of
European Union integration, Loth [42] defended very suggestively that the ECCS
project was only one of many institutional arrangements shuffled with the goal
of political unification of the Old Continent, not only in the aftermath of the
Second World War, but even from insatisactory drafting of the Treaty of Versailles,
illustrating by means of his narrative an authentic pattern of innovation.7
To attend now to the third feature defining any chaotic behaviour reporting
crucial elements highlighted by Historial New Institutionalism, it is necessary to
focus on the idea of path-dependency (exempli gratia, [7, 45]), probably one of the
most controversial notions in the Comparative Politics literature in the last decades
(exempli gratia, [25]).
Following Bennett and Elman [6, p. 252], all definitions of path-dependence have
in common four elements that, for the aim of this essay, it is important to bring up
now. In their own words: “Dissimilarities among political scientists on the concept
of path-dependence can be represented in terms of the different content scholars give
to, and emphasis they place on, four elements to most accounts: causal possibility,
contingency, closure and constraint”. Thus, for these authors, along the history of
a path-dependent system there has to be space for different possible outcomes, that
is to say, there must be space for “different feasible histories”. This suggests that
the complexity of the political and social phenomena reflects a logic of conditional
7
It is important to note, for methodological and technical purposes which will not be discussed
here, that this type of analytical approach, is subject to potential criticism in that they erase possible
counterfactual approaches and in so doing, they call into question their own causal question What
if ?, which, at the end of the day, is at the basis of any scientific research.
probability, in the sense that given a certain point in the trajectory of any chaotic
system some states are more likely than others in the future (some of them might
be even considered as zero-probability events). Secondly, the notion of contingency
refers to the fact that the causal history is also affected by random events, or at least
events that are not captured by the explanatory model. Thirdly, and as a result of the
foregoing, the closureness emphazises the fact that some causal paths become “less
possible or impossible” and that There needs to be some degree of narrowing, a
clousure of some previously feasible paths”. Finally, the idea of constraint becomes
relevant as evidence that once certain causal paths are chosen to reverse this pattern
of evolution can induce very high costs that prevent the system to assume totally new
different trajectories. In other words, the system could fall into what the economic
theory has traditionally called increasing-returns (exempli gratia, [5]).
All in all, this provides an approximation to the complex social and political
phenomena that fit, again, with one of the most frequent definitions of any chaotic
process: the order out of disorder. This attribute suggests the impossibility of
long-run predictions, but also supports the appearance of attractors in phase space
that defines their paths, their history, which must certainly be assumed to be one of
the “different feasible histories” to which [6] allude to. As a result, the tool of the
Lyapunov characteristic exponent, probably has much to say in the concretion and
further development of the concept of path-dependence. According to [10, p. 57],
“The Lyapunov characteristic exponent, i , of dynamical systems measures the
average rate by which the distance between close points becomes stretched or
compressed after one iteration. Lyapunovs are [actually] generalized eigenvalues
over an entire attractor in that they give the average rate of contraction or expansion
of trajectories on an attractor”. And is possibly the best measure to prove the
existence of chaotic behavior, or to quantify it.
The European integration process provides again, a wide range of phenomena
that can be seen as an example this preponderance of path-dependence resulting
from the existence of increasing-returns. Perhaps the area in which this is more
evident is in the gradual configuration of its institutional architecture, that is to
say the progressive conformation, both in symbolic and competential terms, of
each of the institutions of the European Union. In this sense, just to mention one
example, [18] has suggestively formulated how the EU Council Presidency, despite
being originally conceived as a merely intergovernmental organ, has increasingly
assumed defence of the Community interest, which obviously confers to it a
distinctive institutional position as the one it used to have when it was first created
in 1970.
8.4 Conclusions
The purpose of the current contribution is neither to set down any analytical
approach for the study of Politics nor to provide any empirical evidence. It mainly
appeals to the strengthening of an on-going research programme on the applications
of Chaos Theory in the field of Politics, and specially to the field of European
Politics, as well as to insert it in a long-run debates on the nature of purpose of the
discipline. Despite acknowledging that the contribution to the general knowledge
of Politics is not necessarily stuck to any scientific endeavour, it has also been
defended that, in case of choosing this particular way to produce knowledge
about the social and political world surrounding us, scholars in the discipline may
undoubtly abandone the ontological and epistemological assumptions that have
mainly dominated the discipline in the recent decades. Thus, it has been defended
that Behaviouralist and Rational Choice assumptions should now give way to new
approaches to understand and to analyze social and political complexity.
In this moment, Chaos Theory provides an unbeatable analytical framework,
which largely incorporates the shortages of these previous schools. Moreover, and
more importantly, it has been shown how these tools and perspectives perfectly
fit into the general framework of Historical New Institutionalism, an increasingly
reputed tradition in comparative politics. In so doing, it has highlighted the idea of
historicity of any social or political event as the bridging concept that permits the
establishment of conceptual homologies that potentially show fruitful elements of
debate.
Finally, because of its own intrinsic nature, the process of European Integration
has been proposed as an empirical reference to validate the potentiallity of adopting
Chaos Theory framework in the study of Politics.
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Chapter 9
Working Towards Führer: A Chaotic View
Ulas Cakar
Abstract Leadership is a concept that has been discussed since the beginning of
history. Even though there have been many theories in the field accepting leader-
ship’s role in bringing order, chaotic aspects of leadership are generally neglected.
This chapter aims to examine the leadership beyond an orderly interpretation of
universe. For this purpose, Third Reich period and leadership during this period
will be examined. Ian Kershaw’s “Working Towards Führer” concept provides a
unique understanding of leadership concept. It goes beyond the dualist depiction of
Third Reich, it does not state Adolf Hitler as an all powerful dictator, or a weak one.
Rather, he expresses that due to the conditions in the Third Reich, Adolf Hitler was
both of this. This complex situation can be understood deeper when it is examined
through the lens of chaos theory. This study contributes to the field by being the first
in using chaos theory for examining “Working Towards Führer” concept and its
development. Seemingly orderly nature of synchronization process and its vortex
will be shown. Adolf Hitler’s storm spot position in the chaotic system and its
dynamics are explained. War’s entropic power and its effect on the downfall of the
system is crucial in understanding this unique chaotic system. The chaotic pattern
of “Working Towards Führer” offers an opportunity to analyze the complexities of
the leadership concept.
Keywords Third Reich • Leadership • Chaos theory and leadership

• Synchronization
Führer: A leader especially one exercising the powers of a dictator applied especially to Adolf
Hitler’s ruling
U. Cakar ()
Faculty of Business, Department of Business, Dokuz Eylül University, Buca, İzmir 35160, Turkey
e-mail: ulas.cakar@deu.edu.tr

144 U. Cakar
9.1 Introduction
Leaders are the special focal points of the human society and leadership concept has
been studied since the ancient civilizations [4]. There have been many approaches
to leadership that provide different insights to the concept. These varieties of
approaches place leadership and sources of leadership among highly researched
and debated subjects of the organizational field [69]. In the modern times, big
man theories [11] continued working on the characteristics of the historical leaders.
Trait theories [59] concentrated on the possible characteristics of a leader to
choose the best leader, and was based on the assumption that leaders were born.
Then behavioral theories [28] have studied the possible leadership behaviors and
expressed the view that leaders can be made. Contingency theory [14] has developed
the field further by explaining the situational factors that requires different styles of
leadership. And in the neo-charismatic theories, transformational leadership [4] and
its extraordinary power on the followers has been discussed. Recently the follower’s
importance, primal leadership, servant leadership and spirituality of the leaders are
discussed [36].
Even though there is a great deal of debate regarding the nature of leadership,
there’s one thing in common; the leader’s position to bring order to the organization,
to the people and to the society. In other words, regardless of approach differences,
leader’s success comes from his/her ability to deal with chaos of the organizational
existence. And leadership approaches are a way of discussing the tools for this
success. Leaders’ methods for dealing with the chaos of the times, chaos of the
world and their efforts to create a meaningful orderly existence by using leadership
is at the heart of leadership studies. However, these chaotic aspects of leadership
are seen as a part of linear process of solving problems. In today’s science, to study
chaotic aspects of a system, we need to go beyond deterministic approaches [79]
because chaos can’t be understood with linear approaches [1, 84]. It lies beneath the
organizational structure and continuously challenges its existence [15, 16].
For a deeper understanding of the chaotic patterns in the leadership concept,
we have to go beyond the contemporary theories of leadership and examine the
historical examples. It may be argued that big man theories of leadership have
examined the historical leaders, but it shall be noted that this examination was for
the purpose of reaching an ideal leadership definition. Variety of civilizations such
as Turkic states, Ancient Greece, Roman Empire, Joseon Period Korea, Ottoman
Empire [21, 38, 65, 77] has studied leadership in a wider context and examined the
patterns according to their zeitgeists.
Yet still in order to examine the chaotic nature of the leadership we need more
than these historical evaluations. In order to reach this goal, this chapter will
examine a more recent period, leadership in the time of the Third Reich (1933–1945)
and its unique characteristics. Third Reich period has been studied widely by the
historians. Especially the leadership aspect of the Third Reich has been a crucial
factor in these studies and it was a real challenging concept. In the early periods,
9 Working Towards Führer: A Chaotic View 145
literature was affected by the freshness of the war experience, and the political
climate of cold war [2, 8, 41, 42, 45, 50, 77, 83, 85, 96]. As time passed studies
have become more objective and more in depth [6, 22, 29, 78] and Adolf Hitler’s
role in the drama and catastrophe of the Third Reich began to be discussed deeper
and deeper. But still details of Adolf Hitler’s leadership, charisma and goals are still
highly debated subjects [32, 93].
As Third Reich is a period that has been researched extensively, it will be
possible to reach even more reliable information in comparison to the past periods.
And more importantly, due to special characteristics of Third Reich, historian
Ian Kershaw’s “Working Towards Führer” concept on the period provides an
interesting examination of leadership. Basically; Kershaw’s “Working Towards
Führer” concept is an expression of the special structure of Third Reich and its
definition of Führer. This structure was an interesting combination of an all powerful
and at the same times a lazy dictator. Without using any reductionist methods, the
concept aims to provide a better understanding of the Third Reich period. Its aim
was not to provide a chaotic depiction of the Third Reich reality, but thanks to
holistic examination of the period, “Working Towards Führer” concept provides a
solid base to study the chaotic patterns underlying the leadership.
Ever since its introduction, “Working Towards Führer” concept has been
widely discussed [23, 25, 49, 55, 56, 68]. Even though there are differences in
interpretations, it’s generally accepted that Third Reich was not a monolithic empire
just consisting of mindless automatons that were doing the orders of the Adolf
Hitler without question [29, 51, 71]. Followers had their own initiatives toward
the Nazi ideal and it made everything more dangerous. At its peak Third Reich
was controlling most of Europe. When it’s examined in-depth it can be seen that it
was a complex structure which was extremely chaotic and was held together with
power [67].
In order to examine the chaotic patterns of “Working Towards Führer”, the
chapter will begin by explaining the roots of the concept before Third Reich; Nazi
party’s organizational roots and Adolf Hitler’s leadership situation. Then, Third
Reich’s power structure will be examined. Power elite’s situation will be defined
and their chaotic power structure will be defined in detail. In this process follower’s
role in the system, synchronization (gleichschaltung) process of the society and
devastating effects of the war, especially in the Eastern Front will be explained.
As a contribution, this chapter will provide a chaos theory based approach
that will provide a deeper understanding of the nature of the Third Reich and its
leadership. There have been many studies regarding Third Reich. But this chapter
is unique in applying chaos theory for studying Third Reich’s leadership. Study
of Third Reich from such a perspective will be contributing to the studies that
examine the Third Reich beyond an assumption of banality of evil assumption
(ordinary people accepting the premises of the state and committing unthinkable
acts). And it will go beyond a linear interpretation of reality and provide a new
chaotic understanding of this turbulent period.
146 U. Cakar
9.2 Working Towards Führer
Regarding the leadership of the Third Reich era, there were two dominant
approaches, one group regarding him as an all powerful dictator that controls
every aspect of the life in Third Reich, and the other group regarding him as
a weak dictator [62]. This debate continued for a long time and Ian Kershaw’s
“Working Towards Führer” concept has brought a new aspect to this debate and has
examined the leadership of the Third Reich with a new perspective. The expression
Führer meant a leader or a guide in German. But internationally it is seen as
synonymous with Adolf Hitler and has a dictatorial meaning. While examining
“Working Towards Führer” concept, Ian Kershaw uses a special approach. On one
hand, Kershaw rejects the notion of Adolf Hitler being a weak dictator, on the other
hand he says Adolf Hitler didn’t play too much active role in governing lives of
Third Reich citizens.
Before explaining the concept more in detail, its chaotic nature has to be
expressed. First of all, it is not a dualistic concept. “Working Towards Führer”
concept is based on rejection of a compulsory choice between the concept of weak
dictator and all powerful dictator alternatives. More interestingly, even though it
rejects the dualist conception of the Third Reich leadership, it approaches a special
synthesis of both extremes of the concept. This special synthesis is a natural chaotic
system that feeds on the interaction of extremities. And these extremities create a
special vacuum of power that generates a highly chaotic system in which “Führer”
persona and position is the one and only order bringer. Military might of the Allies
was the main reason that caused this chaotic system to collapse. This collapse was
triggered Adolf Hitler’s suicide. As soon as Adolf Hitler has committed suicide,
Third Reich’s existence has dissolved in such a rapid way which can’t be attributed
just to the military might of the Allies. This special nature will be explained in more
depth by examining the historical flow of the concept.
Kershaw takes the phrase “Working Towards Führer” from a routine speech of
a Prussian civil servant in 1934, that expresses the loyalty of the devout followers
([51], p. 529). In this approach, Hitler’s power over the Third Reich was accepted
but at the same time power and initiative of the subordinates and state mechanism
were not ignored [52, 54, 57]. Adolf Hitler’s wishes were mainly explained in
his autobiographical propaganda book “Mein Kampf” [44]. Even if people didn’t
read it, it was vulgarly expressed in his speeches. These wishes were brought to
life by both government and Nazi party members. For this, his personalized ruling
style enabled radical initiatives from below and provided backing for them. In the
transformation process of Third Reich, three tendencies enabled “Working Towards
Führer”; erosion of collective government, emergence of a clearer ideological goals
and “Führer” absolutism [51].
Adolf Hitler possessed great dictatorial powers, but he wasn’t using that power
for daily/mundane tasks. Lazy dictator expression is a good concept to explain his
indifference to the daily running of the Third Reich [51]. But at the same time for
the things he deemed important such as foreign affairs and war, he was not lazy
at all. As Third Reich went deeper into war, he became obsessed with military
issues. When we think of the fact that he was seeing himself as “Providence” chosen
agent of fate, he thought himself ahead of the ordinary issues (Except in the cases
that took his special interest). This distance and his belief in his special mission
have been greatly increased due to early successes. After a point, it can be noticed
that power of personality cult of Adolf Hitler clouded his own view too [60, 93].
Even his readings and personal studies were more toward the confirmation of this
infallibility [80].
In Third Reich, monocracy of the dictatorship was mixed with polycracy [51, 62]
in the style of medieval power distribution [67]. While his tools of government were
struggling for power between themselves, Adolf Hitler was keeping his superior
“Führer” position free of any challenges. The mistakes and problems in the system
were considered as other people’s fault, if only “Führer” knew he would correct
those [62]. He became the indispensable fulcrum of all the government but was free
of any formal processes [51].
9.3 Roots of the Third Reich’s Führer Concept
Till the beginning of 1st World War, Adolf Hitler was just a person who struggled to
become an artist and failed [83]. His insignificant academic record, lack of artistic
skill and bohemian life style was part of his mediocrity [39, 89]. In the war, he was
aloof but at least he was more accepted than civilian life [60]. After the war’s end,
Adolf Hitler found himself again in a struggle for acceptance. He was assigned as
an army informant to examine Anton Drexler’s German Worker’s Party, but he was
invited to be a party member when he has shown his discussion skills [12, 51, 89].
As time passed this party evolved into Nazi party, and in this party Adolf Hitler’s
oration skills and propaganda gift made him increasingly important in the party.
Since his power as orator has been essential for the party, he became the head of
party. Even though, he was supposed to become chairman of the party, he wanted
more. He wanted to become “Führer”, the leader and guide of the party. Also he
established the “Führer” principle; he will be the only leader of the party and he
alone could decide its policies and strategy [83]. As time passed and Nazi party has
grown stronger, this “Führer” principle got stronger and when Nazis have gained
the government, it began to be felt all through the Third Reich.
His comrades from the early days of the party such as Ernst Roehm, Rudolf
Hess, Hans Frank, Alfred Rosenberg, Hermann Goering and Heinrich Himmler have
played prominent roles in the movement [74]. After the failed Beer Hall Putsch
(military takeover), Adolf Hitler has been sent to prison and thanks to political
tendencies of the judicial system, his effect on the general public and party have
increased [12, 89]. During his prison time, he has finished writing his manifesto
“Mein Kampf” and also he kept himself away from the power struggle in the party.
When he got out of prison he reorganized the party and he reinstated himself as
the absolute leader. In this new organization his power as “Führer” was increased.
148 U. Cakar
He has chosen Rudolf Hess as deputy leader. This tells a lot about Adolf Hitler’s
leadership style. Because even though Rudolf Hess had a fanatic loyalty to “Führer”
he was a figure that didn’t have any power over the other prominent Nazis [51]. And
as time passed important figures such as Hermann Goering, Joseph Goebbels and
Heinrich Himmler has increased their power. And for each region of country there
were Gauleiters who were regional leaders of the party.
In order to control Nazi party’s echelons of power, Adolf Hitler used his
“Führer” power in a special way. As the leader he symbolized the highest power.
In any power struggle and conflict, he played a kind of Social Darwinist role; he
supported the strong one in the conflict [51]. But more interestingly, when his old
party comrades or the top echelon of the Nazi party got into conflict, he didn’t let
the weaker one to be crushed completely. Thanks to this, a disadvantaged person
may increase his power and can become a prominent power player again. This can
be seen clearly by the example of Joseph Goebbels, who was a real important figure
in the early periods and also after Nazis coming to power. During these periods
he had many power struggles with other elites of the Third Reich, and he was
generally protected by Adolf Hitler. But after his scandals, he has fallen from grace
of Adolf Hitler, and had to wait to clean his name. By the means of his zealous
devotion to total war, he regained his power during the downfall of Third Reich
[58]. Similar situation was about Herman Goering. Hermann Goering was an early
and charismatic power figure. He was the real creator of Gestapo and many tools of
government, but as war has continued, shortcomings of air forces caused his power
in Third Reich to decrease greatly [73, 75, 95]. But Adolf Hitler never completely
forsook him. Still, this special attitude was limited to close disciples and old fighters.
Because if somebody was not from the inner circle, then coming back wasn’t an
option. Such was the case of Ernst Haefstaengl, no matter how useful he was for
Adolf Hitler, his disputes with Goebbels made him fell out of grace, his life got into
peril [40].
The chaos created by the power struggles inside the Third Reich was something
Adolf Hitler desired. The struggle among members not only brought his social
Darwinist view to life, but also protected Adolf Hitler from any challenge because
people were lost in their power conflict. Even the assassination attempts were a
matter of military power struggle. Nazi party and Adolf Hitler’s old comrades were
not affected by the chaos of the attempt [52]. Only when war was about to end,
Heinrich Himmler struggled to defect to West and continue his power base. Even
that initiative could only be shown at a time when everything was gone.
Regarding the power struggles inside Nazi party and government, Adolf Hitler
was using another special catalyst of conflict. This catalyst was the vagueness and
overlapping natures of the authorities of the party and government officials [51].
When somebody got assigned to a position and given authority, that person would
soon see that assignment overlaps with another power elite’s turf. This was not only
because Adolf Hitler didn’t care that much about the daily running of the Third
Reich. It was also an intentional move of a dictator who wanted the followers to limit
each other’s growth so that, they won’t get more powerful. Like the spot in Jupiter
[33, 34], Adolf Hitler was staying as a solid powerful figure, and his position was
being fed by the entire storm raging around it. Adolf Hitler’s seemingly monolithic
powerbase was fed by the continuous struggle beneath it.
This power vortex has been part of the Nazi party, and after Adolf Hitler has
risen to the seat of government in 1933, it began to affect all the governmental and
social structure of Third Reich. This process has been accelerated by the “Night of
the Long Knives”. Night of the Long Knives was unique, surgeon like operation that
has removed points of orderly rule. On surface, we can see Adolf Hitler has got rid
of his old comrade, Ernst Roehm, who was the only possible challenge to his power.
People and government agencies have seen it as a symbol of Nazi party getting rid
of its marginal elements [83]. But at the same time many important figures from
other political groups, some of Adolf Hitler’s former enemies and even some Army
personnel, were surgically removed [30]. This precisely created power vacuum has
accelerated the process of change in Third Reich, from a problematic democratic
republic to a dictatorial reign of the Nazis.
9.4 Synchronization of the Third Reich
Synchronization (gleichschaltung) was the policy of subordinating all the institu-

tions and organizations under Nazi control. It began after Nazi coming to power;
its beginnings were about removing left wing parties but as time passed it spread to
all aspects of life. Third Reich’s synchronization process for the society [48] was a
major tool for realizing “Working Towards Führer”. Synchronization initiative was
coming from a desire to transform the society according to the Nazi ideals. As it can
be seen in Fig. 9.1, Nazi ideals and Führer’s effect was at the center of everything
and they were interacting with all related aspects of the life in Third Reich. It is a
vortex because it flows in a special fluid action. As the environment changes this
vortex responds.
Fig. 9.1 Synchronization of the Third Reich

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Synchronization was not going according to clear-cut linear plan, it was more
consisting of waves of synchronization [48]. And these waves were greatly affected
by the domestic and international affairs of the Third Reich. When it was time
for Berlin Olympics, negative actions against Jews has decreased, but after that
period we see an incremental increase [82, 83]. Agendas don’t change only the
vortex intensity changes. Especially Euthanasia and Control of church has shown
examples of these strange occurrences, because at first these plans were hidden,
than it came to public and intensified. Public’s reaction has effected these actions,
then war has effected their implementations. Even though they were part of the Nazi
administration their movements were not linear, they have shown fluid movement.
Because synchronization was an extensive process that has affected all parts of
the society [30]. Synchronization process has created a special power structure that
evolved over a well-established bureaucratic government legacy, disrupting its bases
of power but enabling new fiefdoms [74]. Departments, agencies and structures of
the state were in perpetual state of flux and most of the times were at odds with each
other [72].
At the heart of this synchronization vortex, Adolf Hitler’s leadership style created
a special chaotic state which was full of conflicting orders. Modern conception of
a ruler and his ministers has degraded into an endless struggle of power between
the power elite. In order to achieve this, Adolf Hitler has eliminated many of his
opposition in society, army and Nazi party (as mentioned above especially Ernst
Roehm) [30]. And as his rule got stronger, he got rid of even cabinet meetings. There
was not much of a modernly understood governing body in Third Reich; fiefdoms of
power were just struggling for their authority. A modern nation consisting of highly
trained experts has been governed in a way of an unholy alliance between the feudal
governing body and technocratic calculations [49]. And even more uniquely, Adolf
Hitler was not left powerless by these modern feudal lords. Adolf Hitler acted as a
beacon of order who was chosen by “Providence” and he was the “Führer” that
shows the way to everyone. He personally accelerated the chaotic stage, and didn’t
allowing his power players to be completely eliminated. As in the Ernst Roehm
case, and as in the case after the failed assassination attempt, he alone was the real
master of life and death in Third Reich. And he positioned himself in a very high
and mighty position which was not supposed to be bothered by the matters of the
mundane. It can be clearly seen that this is a natural chaotic system without the
pretense of order in it. Nazis claimed to bring order to the Third Reich, but what
they brought was an organized chaos that centered in the storm eye of the Adolf
Hitler.
“Working Towards Führer” concept can enable us to understand this special
organized anarchy. Basically Adolf Hitler was giving basic visions that attracted
the political zeal and material desires for the people. He was the figurehead of these
base emotions and desires. Jewish policy of Third Reich is a striking example of this.
As a part of Adolf Hitler’s main political agenda, Jews became marginalized with
racial laws of the Third Reich and they began to be removed from all parts of the
society [82]. This process has been accelerated by individual greed of the people
that desired the positions and belongings of the Jews in the society (There were
people who resisted this process, but they were also marginalized in comparison to
main tendencies of the society).
Struggles with churches, euthanasia program and implementation of the Holo-
caust [57] have shown all unique characteristics [30], that can’t be reduced to matter
of just Adolf Hitler ordering. Alfred Rosenberg and some prominent Nazis desire
for a more pagan based Nazi ideological religion became a part of struggle. In time,
churches’ ruling bodies were either changed or pacified according to party’s wishes
[19], so Adolf Hitler limited the pagan propaganda of Rosenberg and other Nazis.
Adolf Hitler was the main cause of all this church chaos but most of the work was
done by the subordinates. He was able to escape most of the blame [52].
Euthanasia program has been part of his desire for a perfect Arian race ideal.
Adolf Hitler has given a legal right to the subordinates to decide the persons that
are unfit to live depending on their conditions [30]. To an untrained eye, it may look
like, Adolf Hitler was just a harsh leader, the evil subordinates are the ones that ran
rampant and caused the real evil acts. In reality however, Adolf Hitler’s existence is
the enabling factor of all these actions, the evil initiatives wouldn’t have a chance
to come alive without him [76]. All the chaos was feeding the storm spot of Third
Reich. Many common citizens of Third Reich were seeing the subordinates as the
bad guys, and believed that only if “Führer” knew what they did; he may intervene
and correct it. Adolf Hitler managed to distance himself in such a way that he was
not seen as the cause of daily problems of the people. Even his close personnel was
in this psychology. This situation can be clearly seen in the personal interview [87]
with Traudl Junge (his secretary who wrote his last private and political will). In his
personal talks with his close workers and his close circle he continued indoctrinating
them with his long monologues about his views on life [43, 91].
And in the matter of Holocaust, it is even more challenging to evaluate his
actions. When you think of the fact that Adolf Hitler’s political propaganda was
extremely anti-Semitic, one can expect the evaluation of Adolf Hitler’s actions
should be easy. He always talked on the evil coming from the Jews, he was the one
that initiated racist laws to Third Reich, and in most of his speeches he mentioned
the vices of the Jews. At the beginning of Second World War, he even expressed that
the result of this war will be the elimination of Jews [83]. But there is none basic
problem, he never stepped into one of concentration camps and more importantly
he never issued a direct order. It is known that he authorized Euthanasia program,
and even utilized the Einsatzgruppen (mobile extermination teams). But despite all
the studies in the field, one can’t find his written order. This missing order was
even used as a revisionist argument for claiming Adolf Hitler’s non-involvement
in Holocaust. But when you look from the point of “Working Towards Führer”,
everything is clear. Adolf Hitler’s role was so central and enabling that he didn’t
need a direct order, he was the personified expression of Holocaust. He prepared
the environment; he provoked the anti-Semitism and enabled his subordinates to
compete with each other to realize his dream of getting rid of Jews. Storm center of
his anti-Semitism was creating many separate storms and even if the storms are all
around the center, it didn’t change the fact that the real storm and chaos were in the
seemingly orderly point in the system.
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During all these processes Adolf Hitler slowly eliminated even the cabinet
meetings of the government. In 1935 there were 12 gathering of ministers, by
1937 the number of gathering has been reduced to 6 [51]. And he eliminated
these meetings completely after his power has reached a special peak. This was
caused by the clever creation of Bloomberg-Fritsch scandal in 1938 (In which
Hermann Goering played a crucial role). It enabled Adolf Hitler to reach an absolute
authority over Army [30, 83]. And this situation combined with his successes in
international policy made him an infallible authority figure in the Third Reich. As
a whole the coordination process was far from unidirectional, linear or consistent
processes. Coordination actions can be mistaken for an orderly historical narrative
for Nazification because of the cumulative effect and fundamental motives, but it
didn’t depend on the strict content or causality [48]. Interpreting the coordination as
a clockwork and evil master plan will be more of a hindsight bias.
During all these synchronization and Nazi policy processes, Adolf Hitler’s
closest aides played a crucial role. These close aides of Adolf Hitler were like
followers of a religious movement, they were his disciples [74]. These power elites
of Nazi party were seemingly moving in accordance to Adolf Hitler’s whims but at
the same time they were in a continuous power struggle that has been accelerated
with the outbreak of the war [30, 74]. And this power play has continued till the last
days of Third Reich [58]. They shall be examined as well to understand the chaotic
structure of the Third Reich and its inner dynamics.
9.5 Chaotic Dynamics of the Adolf Hitler’s Disciples
In the stage of power play of Adolf Hitler’s disciples, Rudolf Hess can be seen as an
enigmatic character. He was given the position of Deputy Führer and his office has
been instrumental in the Nazification processes. Their effect can’t be explained with
just Weberian bureaucracy approach, since there was a great deal of radicalization
that came from the nature of Nazism [72]. He was a passive but extremely loyal
figure whose limited effect was lost after his escaping to United Kingdom. There
are many theories regarding this defection [61] but one thing is certain; after his
disappearance, Martin Bormann has taken over his role [95]. And his position has
become an important power base of Third Reich.
He was really close to Adolf Hitler; he was making the schedules and taking care
of any bureaucratic process. Even if Adolf Hitler didn’t have direct extermination
orders regarding Jews, Bormann had given many direct orders. He was so close that
even some of personal talks are arranged from his notes [91] It was closely related
to his role in taking care of necessary and mundane things on behalf of Adolf Hitler.
Because of this special position, he became like a secret leader of Reich. Also, since
Bormann was the one that made the appointments for Adolf Hitler and took care of
structure of “Working Towards Führer”, power elites had to meet Adolf Hitler to
enact any sanction on Bromann. Without meeting almost Olympian power of Adolf
Hitler, their actions had the risk of becoming invalid and dangerous for them.
After Battle of Stalingrad, as Adolf Hitler began to lose his hold on the reality,
his power increased greatly. When Martin Bormann didn’t want them to meet Adolf
Hitler, he could block most of the power elites. Heinrich Himmler, Herman Goering,
Joseph Goebbels and Albert Speer have seen actions of Bormann as a threat to their
own power and resisted them. Martin Bormann needed to do compromises with
power elites and form temporary coalitions to realize his own power [26]. Till the
day Adolf Hitler committed suicide, this game of power continued.
Changes in the position and power of Hermann Goering show the fluid nature
of power base. He had charismatic power coming from his famous position in Red
Baron’s fighter plane squad in 1st World War. He founded Gestapo in 1933, and
when the time came, he was the one that assigned Heinrich Himmler as the head
of Gestapo [74]. After the elimination of Ernst Roehm, Goering’s power became
the second greatest after Adolf Hitler. It included ruling of Prussia as well. Then he
became head of air force. Despite the fact that he did not have enough capacity; he
was even in charge of four year plan preparation [76]. Not only that, he was even
promoted to rank of Reichmarschall, and was the only guy holding this position
which was superior to all. Further, he was (even) assigned as the successor of Adolf
Hitler. But as the Third Reich began to lose the war in all fronts especially after the
failure of air support in Stalingrad, he lost his power greatly [73]. He concentrated on
his own pursuits such as confiscating goods and art treasures from all around Europe
[52]. When he learned that Adolf Hitler was going to commit suicide, he kept away
from his bunker and demanded to have power over the Third Reich. Because of this,
Adolf Hitler got enraged, removed all his titles and ordered his arrest [58]. Similar
to other power elites of the Third Reich, his power was based on the flux of Adolf
Hitler’s favor and whims. As it was so open to Adolf Hitler’s chaotic effect, there is
no orderly understanding of this power base, it was just changing according to ebb
and flow.
Heinrich Himmler’s rise in power is another good example of the chaotic nature
of Third Reich power structure. This seemingly normal looking man who received
training in agronomy has gone greatly out of his field. He was the one that has
grown SS structure and this tool was utilized at the Night of the Long Knives [51].
He was assigned as head of Gestapo, he increased his power so much that most of
the people in Third Reich were afraid of Gestapo more than anything else. After his
aide Heydrich’s assassination, his power became even more monolithic. It is even
claimed that he let Heydrich die to protect his own power base [74]. His control
over the domestic affairs was distinctively strong and his direct orders regarding
Holocaust could be traced directly. He was even given military troops in the last
stages of the war, yet he failed to command them well. When it was clear that
war was lost, he tried to make hidden negotiations with Allies [58]. After Adolf
Hitler’s death, his shadow state with Gestapo and SS couldn’t save him from his
rapid downfall.
Joseph Goebbels was an important journalist and orator from the early times of
the Nazi movement. He was assigned as propaganda minister who was responsible
for checking Nazification of any art work or propaganda material [83]. He was the
one who ordered the burning of the books. His rise to power has been hindered
154 U. Cakar
by his scandalous affair in 1938. He was always a womanizing person but in this
scandal his wife, Magda, has learned that he caused a wedding to break up. Because
of Adolf Hitler’s sympathy for Magda and children of the couple, the event had a
great impact on Goebbels power base. Adolf Hitler got angry and Goebbels had to
compensate this loss of prestige by even more fanatic anti-Semitism. We can see
his fanaticism increasing after the outbreak of the war [35]. After the certainty of
defeat he has filled as a figurehead for people when Adolf Hitler didn’t want to go
to public and other power elites were moving behind curtains [52]. He came back
to power in the last ditch attempt to total war, he gained even a greater control over
the propaganda mechanism [49]. He was adamantly loyal to Adolf Hitler but was
greatly skeptical and hostile towards the other members of the close circle [92].
Albert Speer’s tremendous rise in power and influence is another strange aspect
about Third Reich’s chaotic structure of power. He became member of Nazi party
in 1931. He was a gifted architect and was a creator of many important political
buildings such as Reich Chancellery [85]. He also made many plans to reconstruct
Berlin. As a failed artist and an amateur building planner, Adolf Hitler was in awe
of this gifted architect [58]. Thanks to this personal relation, Albert Speer had a
great influence over Adolf Hitler. In the process of failing economic initiatives of
Third Reich, Adolf Hitler has assigned him as Minister of Armaments and War
Production. Even more interesting than his being assigned to this seat, thanks to his
quick adaptation with the system, he managed to continue increasing war production
despite losses in battles and heavy air bombing [83].
Other than these most important disciples, there were many people who moved
according to the fluctuations of this power play. This chaotic storm seemed like
a monolithic leviathan to people in other countries. After the end of the war, due
to the political environment, parallels have been drawn between Third Reich and
Stalin era Soviet Russia [13]. However other than both being dictators, most of
the government apparatus were different [54]. Stalin made an extensive use of
governing mechanisms [70]. He was a real bureaucratic leader [13]. But Adolf Hitler
didn’t use much of the bureaucracy. Contrarily, his exercise of power was in expense
of bureaucratic hierarchy. Everything in the Third Reich has become centered on the
leader. Charismatic authority that Adolf Hitler has disrupted the well established
legal and bureaucratic system, and the system was moving only according to his
will [54].
Adolf Hitler’s charisma was a special mixture of coterie-charisma, centripetal
charisma and cultic charisma [25]. It was coterie charisma, because by the means
of his disciples and old fighters he attracted a hard core of supporters that believed
in his will and mission. Similar to “Working Towards Führer” model, centripetal
charisma concept asserts the view that leader is a special unifying figure that solves
the dissonance between followers. Cultic charisma is related with Adolf Hitler’s
belief in his almost messianic role as “Führer” and its cult power. This special
combination of charisma bases can’t be understood by linear understanding of
leader-follower relationship. There is something very fluent and dynamic in this
mixture. Ending result became a group of rivals competing for power to reach the
blessing of the leader. Adolf Hitler’s “Führer” position had the role of unifier,
Fig. 9.2 Chaotic dynamics of the Third Reich
activator and enabler [54]. Within the behemoth of governmental disorder of Third
Reich, “Working Towards Führer” was enabling radicalization and implementation
of Adolf Hitler’s ideological aims to become policy objectives [57]. This was
ultimate chaos that just moves according to the central chaos in the system.
The basic outline of chaotic dynamics of the Third Reich can be seen in Fig. 9.2.
Disciples of Adolf Hitler, Old Fighters and secondary characters (even though their
impact less, it consists a big population of minor figures and collaborators among
common people) working towards Führer to further both their and systems means.
The output of this black box of radicalization results in the war and synchronization
vortex. As mentioned in the previous section synchronization vortex is in a constant
stage flux depending on the domestic and international events and rotating around
Hitler’s will. And war by it’s main definition is an epitome of chaos. In this chaotic
dynamic, everything changes so fast, but only thing that doesn’t change was Adolf
Hitler’s storm spot. Individually Adolf Hitler may be having good mood or throwing
tantrums but this didn’t change effect of his existence and his professed will.
Only legitimacy in Third Reich was based on Führer’s will. Führer’s will was
for the most radical solutions regarding issues of war or extermination of the Jews
in Europe. Followers didn’t need many orders to do so; they were taking their own
initiatives to reach the most radical solutions and furthering the will of the Führer. In
the example of a middle level power player, Adolf Eichmann, we can see that he has
taken many initiatives to exterminate more of Hungarian Jews [95]. Even in the time
of defeat, he was eagerly continuing his ghastly work [17]. Concerning the regional
power bases, old fighters formed the Gauleiters, and they were running their regions
by the grace of Adolf Hitler and his disciples. There were many inner struggles in
this system such as propaganda ministry policies and personnel’s initiatives were
conflicting with the regional policies [71]. In a system like this, there is no need
or any direct order for marginalization of the system. The inner dynamics of this
156 U. Cakar
chaotic system was keeping this continuous storm circle at a certain level of chaos
till the point that the chaos of war has grown to such a level that it has passed the
sustainability threshold of the system.
9.6 Entropic Shadow of War
From its early beginnings, Nazi power was geared towards war. When the war began
in 1939, chaotic system of the Third Reich flourished because invasion of new
territories provided new resources [31, 41]. Thanks to them Third Reich was dealing
better with its inherent entropy and economic limits. Till the point of attack to Soviet
Union, chaotic system of the Third Reich had been spreading all through Europe.
Extensive use of technology and “blitzkrieg” method of war has been crucial in these
victories. Blitzkrieg was Third Reich’s innovative war tactics of mobile warfare
based on a highly coordinated and fast attack of tanks and planes [9, 10]. More
conservative generals were resisting this tactics, but Adolf Hitler has accepted use
of these tactics and given great deal of initiative to his generals for implementing
these tactics [63, 64]. Tank technology and tactics of Third Reich was superior to
its enemies at the beginning of the war [94]. In the early periods of attack on Soviet
Union, the chaotic system of Third Reich succeeded greatly by the help of this
innovative approach. But in time it was seen that Third Reich already reached limits
of not only its military power but also its capabilities to benefit from chaos.
The ruthless definition of Slavs as “inferior people” has increased the radicaliza-
tion of the occupational forces [3, 6, 47]. First many soldiers were killed in the early
days of occupation, and as time passed first Einsatzgruppen (mobile death teams)
activity increased, then death camps began to be formed. Plans such as Hunger Plan
were expressing the necessity to starve the civilian population in order to exploit the
food resources of the Soviet Russia [18]. Leningrad siege was mainly aiming for
starvation of the population [6, 81]. These actions caused an increase in people’s
will to resist and partisan initiative. When Third Reich’s assault on Soviet Russia
lost its momentum, systems deficiencies were being seen [6, 37, 78, 96]. Firstly,
Adolf Hitler began to change his generals when they failed reaching their objectives.
In the beginning of the war, he has given initiatives to his generals and it resulted
in military victories such as Poland, France and North Africa [86]. Even at the
early times, when he intervened in the flow of battle, there have been tactical errors
[20]. Adolf Hitler’s stopping the assault of his generals before Dunkirk caused a
great deal of English soldiers being evacuated. The reasons for his order are highly
debated but it’s among wrong decisions of military history [24].
Adolf Hitler’s changing of operational objectives in Russia and becoming
obsessed with capturing Stalingrad was the beginning of the end [31]. During
Stalingrad battle, he has even forbidden retreat and removed any tactical initiative
from General Friedrich Paulus, which has resulted in one of the greatest disasters of
military history [5, 41, 46]. Hermann Goering’s prestige also got greatly damaged
during this period. After the defeat of Stalingrad, he was intervening at every step
of generals, and taking away their initiatives. Generals were forbidden to do any
retreating action [47]. As Third Reich has lost more armies, Adolf Hitler became
more fanatical and tried to control everything in the field of battle [58]. Even
successful generals like Heinz Wilhelm Guderian lost his trust and had difficulty
in staying in position of power [37]. Adolf Hitler’s interference to operations,
especially to Kursk battle, has resulted in loss of Third Reich’s attack initiative
[6, 63, 64]. His seemingly orderly intervention disrupted the inner dynamics and
efficiency of his capable generals. During this period, Adolf Hitler’s disciples were
still continuing their power play. And after the Normandy landing, Third Reich
began to feel more of the weight of a two front war [7, 86, 88]. And under this
stress, his interference increased and resulted in the infamous Ardennes Offensive.
This offensive was a gamble in every sense, and it has caused Third Reich’s loss in
great deal of fighting power [27, 90]. It became almost certain that Third Reich was
about to lose everything [58].
When combined with entropy of the impending doom, inner dynamics of the
Social Darwinist structure of the Third Reich was broken beyond repair. Adolf Hitler
was directly intervening the parts of the Third Reich apparatus. And his seemingly
orderly views have led only to defeat. Entropic power of the system has gone beyond
any redemption.
In the last year of the war, Adolf Hitler gave his “Scorched Earth” order for
destroying the infrastructure and industrial capacity of the Third Reich so that
especially Soviets won’t get any spoils of war [83]. This order wasn’t realized.
By exploiting the bureaucratic processes, Albert Speer and his subordinates didn’t
implement the order [53, 85]. As system was being pushed to its limit, Adolf Hitler’s
chaotic system began to be deprived (lose) more of its power. But it shall not be
forgotten that after the failed assassination attempt to Adolf Hitler, when it was
learned that Adolf Hitler was alive, conspirators failed in taking over [66]. This
failure was because of inner strength of chaotic system. System corrected itself
so fast. However it has increased Adolf Hitler’s distrust of the people outside the
circle of his disciples and old fighters. He was getting more suspicious of his army
generals, so he became more stubborn with his wrong military decisions. Combined
with stress of the consequent defeats, Adolf Hitler began to lose his touch with
reality. When the enemy armies were at the gates of Berlin, he was delusional, he
was waiting for non-existent armies of the Third Reich [53, 97].
Real changes in the system began to be felt in the hidden actions of power elites.
Albert Speer’s disrupting the order of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler’s hidden
negotiations with Allied powers and Hermann Goering keeping himself away from
Adolf Hitler, were indicators of change. Common people’s life, soldiers’ fates were
still tied to the storm of Adolf Hitler’s chaos till his suicide. And this unique chaotic
system dissolved rapidly after Adolf Hitler died. In comparison to fanaticism of
Nazi party when Adolf Hitler was alive, there was not much resistance after him
[58]. Chaotic system of Third Reich has reached its boundary and lost its focal point
by Adolf Hitler’s death, and couldn’t hold itself together anymore. As there was no
more the eye of the storm, everything has gone down to primordial stage of nothing.
158 U. Cakar
9.7 Conclusion
Because of its unique characteristics, Third Reich has been a puzzling period
for the researchers. A modern state’s transformation into an extremely aggressive
dictatorship can’t be just explained with a linear understanding of the economic
and political factors. There are many interacting elements in this process and none
of them show linear characteristics. Chaotic patterns of the Third Reich have to
be examined in order to make sense of this complex period. Unique and holistic
approach of Ian Kershaw’s “Working Towards Fuhrer” concept provides necessary
tools for interpreting the complexities of the Third Reich and enables to identify
the vortex of synchronization. Simple definitions and villainization of important
individuals is not enough to understand this chaos. Examining the roots of the
“Working Towards Führer” concept has shown that this was in the core of the
Nazi movement. And as they came to power it began to affect Third Reich’s all
government mechanism. In this system, environment was like Jupiter’s stormy
atmosphere. Adolf Hitler was at the storm center, and his seemingly orderly situation
was originally the biggest storm in the environment. His disciples and old fighters
were instrumental in realizing the Nazification goals of this unholy storm.
As we examine the change processes in the Third Reich such as synchronization,
church struggle, euthanasia and Holocaust, we see that radical stance and philos-
ophy of Adolf Hitler was an enabling factor for these atrocities. But it was not as
simple as direct orders, most of the time; Fuhrer’s will was realized by eagerness
and fanaticism of followers. This special monocracy in the polycracy of followers
was run in this chaotic style. And in this process Adolf Hitler’s disciples were a
critical tool to provide their coterie charisma. They were realizing Adolf Hitler’s
will and whims, and at the same time they were in a constant fight for their almost
medieval style fiefdoms. Their stars were rising and falling but except Rudolf Hess’
flight to United Kingdom, nobody went out of the power game.
In Third Reich, order in the chaos and chaos in the order were clearly seen.
Adolf Hitler and his disciples were benefiting from the reading of the patterns of
this special chaotic system and its dynamics. There was no unidirectional way of
policy, Third Reich’s special power structure was not a traditional hierarchy; it
was a power vortex. Till his downfall, Adolf Hitler was the fulcrum of this chaotic
maelstrom. When Third Reich entered war, this chaotic system began to cannibalize
the resources of the occupied territories. As long as Third Reich was winning,
chaotic system flourished with the inputs and control zones for Adolf Hitler and his
followers. But as the tide of war has changed, system began to be challenged. Adolf
Hitler began to disrupt this special power play with his direct interventions to the
military system. This intervention has accelerated the downfall of the Third Reich.
Yet till the last days of Third Reich, Adolf Hitler’s Führer power was unchallenged
and was at the heart of this behemoth of governmental disorder.
Findings of Ian Kershaw’s “Working Towards Führer” concept’s non-dualist
approach can be used as an effective tool in making sense of organized anarchies
of past and present. Further studies can be done by making even deeper analysis on
unique events of the Third Reich to understand more of the ripple effects on this
dynamic system.
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Chapter 10
New Communitarianism Movements
and Complex Utopia
K. Gediz Akdeniz
Abstract Simulation is a rapidly growing field in social sciences. Simulation

theories in social sciences are considered to critique social dynamics and societies
which are mostly simulated by media, cinema, TV, internet, etc. Recently we
(Akdeniz KG, Disorder in complex human system. In: Fritzsch H, Phua KK
(eds) Singapore: proceedings of the conference in Honour of Murray Gell-Mann’s
80th birthday quantum mechanics, elementary particles, quantum cosmology and
complexity. World Scientific Publishing, Hackensack, pp 630–637, 2009) purposed
a simulation theory as a critique theory to investigate disordered human behaviors.
In this theory, “Disorder-Sensitive Human Behaviors (DSHB) Simulation Theory”,
chaotic awareness is also considered as a reality principle in simulation world to
complete Baudrillard Simulation Theory (Baudrillard J, Simulacra and simulation.
University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1995). We call the emergence of this
reality as zuhur which is different than simulacra. More recently we proposed the
complex utopia (Akdeniz KG, From Simulacra to Zuhur in Complex Utopia. 11th
International Conference of the Utopian Studies Society, Lublin, 2010; Akdeniz
KG, The new identities of the physicist: cyborg-physicist and post-physicist. In:
Proceedings of the conference of world international conference of technology
and education, Beirut, 2010) to critique the complex societies and communities in
simulation world. The challenging agents in the complex utopia are both simulacra
and zuhur. In this paper we would like to review “What is the complex utopia?” And
we shall critique some global events in framework of complex utopia with particular
examples in socio-economic and political contexts.
Keywords Simulation theories • Complex Utopia • The new identities • Arab

Spring • Communitarizm
K.G. Akdeniz ()

Department of Physics, Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey
e-mail: gakdeniz@istanbul.edu.tr

164 K.G. Akdeniz
10.1 Introduction
According to vision of modern communities and societies (enlightenment), the

modern utopia can be defined as an imaginary event where ideal societies are
isolated from the disordered human dynamics with paradigms related to the ideas of
modernization (western knowledge). Modern communities and societies are orderly
structures. In particular, disorder, uncertainty, coincidence and surprise can not have
any role in building up the ideal human systems in modern utopia. But today we are
under the shelling of simulations which are operated via internet, media, cinema, etc.
and thus human life is becoming more and more complex by each day. The modern
mechanisms in utopia and in dystopias (progress, optimism, rationality, absolute
knowledge, mono-stable solution) are starting to lose power. In today’s simulation
world; it is uncertain what is ideal (reality) and what is imaginary (hyper-reality).
And utopia-dystopia duality is also reconstructed [12].
In his simulation theory [10], Jean Baudrillard considered modern concepts
(social, political, economic, cultural and modern human behaviors) as “Principle of
Reality” of the modern societies. According to his theory, simulacra, representation
of emergence of such ordered simulation could cover reality with hyper-reality only
in modern societies. As he constantly mentioned in his works, the Baudrillard theory
is limited because of the “Principle of Reality” is not acceptable reality by non-
modern societies.
Therefore, recently we proposed “Disorder-Sensitive Human Behaviors
(DSHB)” simulation theory [3] to complete Baudrillard’s theory. Additional to
Reality Principle in simulation world, DSHB theory considers chaotic awareness
as another (not alternative) principle. Such that, “Chaotic Awareness Principle” is
related to the non-modern concepts of the society like commune type traditions
such as heterodoxy and disorder human behaviors which are neglected as social
forms by modernity. It is simulated disorderly by local (non-modern) simulation
mechanism and simulated orderly by global (modern) simulation mechanisms.
Certainly, emergence of these simulations is different than simulacra. For this
reason we call it as zuhur (Arabic Zahara) [2, 3]. The most important character
of zuhur is that it is not identified in modern societies. It could play the leading
part role in both modern and non-modern societies. It might transform non-modern
societies to an uncertain state, but it will transform today’s humanity to better
structure. Meantime zuhur can also provoke modern thinking (western civilization)
or reconstruct modern conception of reality principles in modern societies in all
scales.
10.2 From Complexity Science to Complex Utopia
In the last couple of decades, non-linear “Complexity Science” is presented as the

science of all sciences. According to complexity scientists [11, 13] the complex
systems is a collection of interacting objects; a crowd is a perfect example of such
10 New Communitarianism Movements and Complex Utopia 165
an emergent phenomenon which emerges from a large number of interacting people

(any collective action of humans in human system). And they specify the collective
action as violent actions of different groups of people who are fighting for control
of the same limited resources. The complexity researchers believe that complexity
science will transform our view of the universe. However, they don’t agree “yet” on
rigorous definition of the complexity. But most of them already consider common
ingredients of a complex system [11, 13].
Simulation, especially in societies, is an extremely complexity world and it is
very difficult to be recognized, using only the available realities of the modernity. So
in this world, simulation theories are generally considered only as critical analysis.
For this reason, we had limitations in our complex utopia definition [4, 7]: First of
all, as a complex structure, it is not a dystopia and it is not also a reconstruction of
utopia-dystopia duality. It is an agent-based complex social system (both in Modern
societies and non-Modern societies) which is simulated by internet, media, cinema,
TV, etc. Agents in complex utopia are characterized by simulacra (with modernity
reality principle) and zuhur (with chaotic awareness principle).
We indeed tried to keep the complex utopia definition not far from common
composition given by the complexity science researchers [11, 13]. Because of that,
it is open to self organization with no limitation of modern realty principle. This also
means that it is close to stability, prediction and the border of complex utopia which
can be drawn by its environment without central-control (close to normalization).
Additional to the metaphor of these common ingredients, in our complex utopia
definition, [4, 7] agents (simulacra and zuhur) are interacting each other not only by
long correlation (globally simulated information), but also by short range correlation
(locally simulated information). It means that the competitions which have already
begun in the simulation world within the human, family, society, science, art and
literature world : : : are results of the interaction between zuhurs and simulacras.
10.3 Cyborg Scientist and Post-physicist
First of all, in order to understand our “Complex Utopia” definition, it is good

to examine the identity deconstruction in scientific communities [4, 5]. In this
example [2, 3, 5]; the simulacra is characterized by “cyborg scientist” which is the
emergence of the orderly simulations in science (big science, global information and
education) with the principle of modern science reality. And zuhur is characterized
by “post-physicist” which is the emergence of the disorderly simulations in science
(mostly in scientific communitarianism; ecologist, trans-disciplinary and non-linear
science) with chaotic awareness reality. Nevertheless post-physicists will live a
communitarianist life and not participate in schizophrenically uncertain interna-
tional experiments for the global technology like CERN and will reject high energy
domination (big money) in science as heterodox activist (like Anatolian Dervish).
Challenges between cyborg scientist (simulacra) and post-physicist (zuhur) started
already in scientific community and it can cause unpredictable deconstructions in
166 K.G. Akdeniz
science [2, 3, 5]. In the future, the disagreements between cyborg scientists and
post-physicists could give new directions to science and transform scientific and
educational methods allowing us to observe our universe from another window
and to understand human in a new way. The first time in history it will be a complex
revolution (not a new paradigm) in simulation world of science and education. For
this reason, it will not be a surprise that such conflicts in simulation world will
play the central role in “clash of civilizations”. As we have mentioned before, since
there is a potential risk of human homogenization through regional education or
global education, this competition could be able to transform the world into an
un-known state but for a better humanism, and improve the quality of life. But it
is also possible that it could have adverse effects on the world [6]. Because, it can
also be stated from DSHB simulation theory that one of the most attractive and most
fruitful geographies for the zuhur (post physicists/philosophers) are in the Middle
East (North Africa, Iran and Turkey included). In this age people of this region will
respond to the new global occidental projects that their societies (non-modern) are
facing or will face quite soon [3, 5]. This could be one of the complex reasons in the
initiation of the Arab Spring.
10.4 The Arab Spring
Complex Utopia could be also occurring spontaneously in many socio-political

contexts around the world. More recently in Ankara, we presented a paper [8] in
order to make some comments on the future of the Arab Spring in the framework
of Complex Utopia. Because the Arab Spring is one of the most chaotic [1] and
complex set of events to unfold in the Arab World (Middle East and North Africa).
According to DSHD simulation theory [3, 5] these regions are the most socially
versatile environments for emergence of zuhur and since it is having the human
complexity whole (a collection of many interactions of cultures, diverse social
events and so on, fed also by Kabala, Gnostic and heterodoxy philosophy). For
example, a Tunisian young protestor (a 26-year-old unemployed fruit stand owner)
set himself on fire in a bazaar (public market) rather than any other place in the city
on 18th December 2010. It is well known that bazaars in Middle East and in North
Africa are one of the right examples of the communitarianism system in complexity.
That is a typical zuhur behavior definition in the DSHB Simulation Theory.
On the other hand, in the Arab World (especially in Egypt) there are great
numbers of educated people and students to be simulacra (hyper-reality) of the
pseudo-modern societies. And they are living with the depressive difficulty of
finding new roles to improve civilization in this region by using their own realities.
Furthermore, even for becoming simulacra they are also globally simulated in
modern context by non-Arabic social media and civil society operations. More
recently, operations of such organizations are growing steadily in the Arab Spring
via TV programs from all over the world with dish antennas and DSL modems.
In this chaos edge between simulacra (with modern realty principle-ordered) and
zuhur (with chaotic awareness principle-disordered), it is not possible to predict
the outcome of the events in simulation world of Arab societies in these days. At
least, the new type (first time in Arab History) communitarianist meetings in this
region, especially in Tahrir square, are not a surprise. Because, the emergence of
this communitarianism is the result of interactions between human behaviors of
simulacra and zuhur. Of course, such conflicts between simulacra and zuhur via
communitarianism could be a butterfly effect in not only Arab simulation world, but
all over the simulation world.
In this case, according to our simulation theory [6]; it will be a fundamental
example of complex revolutionary utopia for the first time in simulation world
history. And Arab Spring will be an experimental model of clashes of civilizations
and it can be considered as a Complex Utopia. It will improve the quality of life
in non-modern societies over the world, as well as non-modern Arab societies. On
the other hand, such regional revolution could be considered to have adverse effects
on modern societies (western civilization). For western world regional revolution,
as an undefined representation, can be a potential risk to the hegemony of western
knowledge in all scale and in all intellectual fields via transforming modern thinking.
On the other hand, the behaviors of non-modern Arab communitarianism are
under the control of simulacra minority occupation. How will it be possible for
zuhurs to stay alive to transform non-modern concepts in new forms for humanity?
In addition to the external pressure of the still complex legal and regulatory
environment in which civil society operate, organizations face internal challenges
as well. For this reason, it is not possible to predict the outcome of this condition
as a fundamental example for the modeling of complex utopia. This complexity in
Arab Spring could be also finalized by the aim of the simulacra collectivism. In this
situation, it will be the first regional sustainable revolution in simulation world to
transform only non-modern Arab societies to pseudo-modern societies. And it will
not able to provoke western knowledge to reconstruct modern conception of reality
principle.
10.5 Complex Utopia in Athena Streets
More recently Nicholas Anastasopoulos attracted attention of people studying

utopia in Tarragona (Spain) to the alternative forms of emerging social, economic,
political and cultural structures in Greece in the context of a communitarianist
movements [9]. He examined the potential of the Athenian urban and public
space in allowing freedom for the commons and in expressing current alternative
movements. The rise of such communitarianist movements in Greece could also
be examined in the framework of complex utopia definition. According to our
DSHB simulation theory, the 15-year-old boy was shot dead (December 2008) in
the Athens neighborhood of Exarcheia is not a coincidence. It is an emergence of
168 K.G. Akdeniz
disordered simulation of Exarcheia complexity with chaotic awareness principle.

Because, it is well known that in this place (like Tahrir square) many socialist,
anarchist, and antifascist groups are communized.
The challenge between simulacra (orderly politic) and zuhur (disorderly politic)
are emergence of modern communitarianist (already identified) movements.
Because, in all Greece, also in Exarcheia, there are a great number of educated
people and students to be simulacra (hyper-reality) of the modern societies. And
they are living with the depressive difficulty of finding new roles to improve
economy in this region by using modern realities. Furthermore, even to be simulacra
they are also globally simulated in modern context by themselves social media and
civil society operations via legal TV programs from all over the world and accessing
to the internet without any filters.
In this case, it is possible to predict the outcome of what is happening in
simulation world of Greek societies in these days. The behaviors of modern
communitarianism are under control by simulacra majority occupation, than how
will it be possible for zuhur (anarchic) to stay alive to radically transform modern
concepts in new forms for humanity. In addition to the international economic
pressure (like EU, IMF) regulatory in which civil societies operate, organizations
face internal challenges as well. Unfortunately, this complexity in Greek Societies
could be finalized by the aim of the simulacra collectivism. In this situation,
additional to Anastasopoulos conclusion “The social body and the state at present
seem to be on opposite sides. Many refer to the current state as a derailment of
democracy, while we can interpret it as a democratic dystopia” in his presentation,
we could comment that it will be first sustainable revolution (hyper-real) in modern
simulation world. And it will not able to provoke western knowledge to reconstruct
modern conception of reality principle.
10.6 Conclusion
In this paper we express that complex utopia is not only an alternative to utopia
and dystopia for the complex systems, it is also considered as a critique theory.
For example, by this theory we understand that the identities in science are already
reconstructed with conflicts between cyborg scientist (simulacra) and post-physicist
(zuhur).
In the case of the Arab World, the Arab Spring is not ended yet. But it is not
possible to predict from today that it will end as the first pseudo-modern revolution
or the first complex revolution in simulation world. It is interesting to note that this
uncertainty exist (but as Uprising or Revolution) in understanding the Arab Spring
the Chaos Theory point of view [1].
According to our theory the rise of communitarianism in Greece is not a
fundamental example for the modeling of complex utopia and it is already close
to being complex revolution. It will not end, but it could remain as post-modern
revolution in simulation world.
“Why ABD, the most of the EU countries and Russia are very involved in the
Arab Spring in all dimensions (not only colonist aims like goods and petroleum
etc.)? Why they operate with the social organizations by using internet access
and TV with digital antenna in Middle East and North Africa? Why they seek a
democratic outcome from all of these conflicts in the Arab World and are concerned
about the human rights?” This paper also concludes that one could consider the
complex utopia as being a possible model to try to answer such questions.
The other conclusion of this paper is to easily predict that in context of complex
utopia, Iran is not Egypt and Turkey is not Greece. This means that the investigation
of the self-sensitive simulacra-zuhur conditions in Iran and Turkey with chaotic
awareness reality could be very interesting study.
Acknowledgement Thanks to Dr. Nicholas Anastasopoulos for fruitful Tarragona conversation

on communitarianism in Greece. And thanks to Prof. Dr. Ş. Şule Erçetin, for her motivation me to
prepare this article.
References
1. Açıkalın, Ş. N., & Bölücük, C. A. (2014). Understanding Arab Spring with chaos theory:
Uprising or revolution. In S. Banerjee, Ş. Ş. Erçetin, & A. Tekin (Eds.), Chaos theory in
politics. Dordrecht: Springer.
2. Akdeniz, K. G. (2007). Post-physicist manifesto. Istanbul University Sociology Journal, 3,
15–18.
3. Akdeniz, K. G. (2009). Disorder in complex human system. In H. Fritzsch & K. K. Phua
(Eds.), Proceedings of the conference in Honour of Murray Gell-Mann’s 80th birthday
quantum mechanics, elementary particles, quantum cosmology and complexity (pp. 630–637).
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
4. Akdeniz, K. G. (2010). From Simulacra to Zuhur in Complex Utopia. In 11th international
conference of the Utopian Studies Society, Lublin.
5. Akdeniz, K. G. (2010). The new identities of the physicist: Cyborg-physicist and post-
physicist. In Proceedings of the conference of world international conference of technology
and education, Beirut.
6. Akdeniz, K. G. (2011). The possible new identities in science and philosophy. In F. Seroglou,
et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 11th international & 6th Greek history, philosophy and science
teaching joint conference (pp. 34–38). Thessaloniki: Epikentro.
7. Akdeniz, K. G. (2012). Heterodoxy and Complex Utopia. In 13th international conference of
the Utopian Studies Society, Tarragona.
8. Akdeniz, K. G. (2012). Is Arab Spring a Complex Utopia? In International Science Associa-
tion, 2012 international chaos, complexity and leadership symposium, Ankara.
9. Anastasopoulos, N. (2012). The rise of communitarianism and other alternative movements
from the Athenian cries. In 13th international conference of the Utopian Studies Society,
Tarragona.
10. Baudrillard, J. (1995). Simulacra and simulation. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
11. Johnson, N. (2007). Simply complexity. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
12. Sargent, L. T. (2010). Retheorizing Utopia/Utopianism in 21st century. In Keynote lectures in
11th international conference of the Utopian Studies Society, Lublin.
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New York: Simon & Schuster.
Chapter 11
Counter-Intelligence as a Chaotic Phenomenon
and Its Importance in National Security
Gökhan Kuloğlu, Zakir Gül, and Şefika Şule Erçetin
Abstract In today’s rapidly changing globalized world, remarkably fast and

important developments have been faced in the area of national security as in almost
all other areas. Advancements in communication and transportation technologies
have removed physical boundaries almost completely. National security institutions
now have to fight against new and complicated security threats that go beyond the
boundaries such as organized crimes and terror crimes. These ever-changing threats
and dangerous environment which become more and more complex every single
day force nations to review their current security structures and to take new and
effective measures in the required areas in order to ensure their national security.
As a matter of fact, counter-intelligence, which was quite important due to the
frequency of spying acts during the Cold War but lost its importance after the Cold
War had ended, has been one of these measures. Today, counterintelligence has
once again become one of the most important functions in the fight against national
security threats with changing dimensions. It is only possible for a nation to ensure
its national security fully by having not only a defensive and passive approach but
also offensive counter-intelligence.
Keywords Security • National security • Intelligence • Counterintelligence
G. Kuloğlu () • Z. Gül

Security Sciences Institute, Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: gokhankuloglu@yahoo.com; zakirgul@gmail.com
Ş.Ş. Erçetin
Hacettepe University and International Science Association, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: sefikasule@gmail.com

172 G. Kuloğlu et al.
11.1 Introduction
Throughout human history, one of the most rapidly changing concepts in terms
of content, methods and tactics used, has been “security”. Primitive men had to
protect themselves against ruthless environmental conditions, wild animals and their
own kind ([5]: 19). This very first understanding of security had mostly a defence
structure with simple barriers, shelters to hide, natural disguise, resort to tricks and
escape. However, with humankind to be organised within small social groups, the
concept of security went beyond this scope ([22]: 22). As a matter of fact, after the
concept of borders had emerged in the sixteenth century followed by the foundation
of national states, nations started to exert efforts in order to create a “legal monopoly
on violence” stated by Weber as one of the most significant features of the modern
state ([33]: 132).
States that had the legal monopoly on violence also assumed the responsibility
for protecting their citizens against domestic and foreign dangers and threats and
for ensuring their safety ([17]: 47–48). To this end, armies were formed and internal
security organisations were established within the course of time.
Today, however, defence-based and passive security understanding which is
mostly shaped according to the attacks of the enemy has been left and offensive
security strategies are being discussed such as pre-emptive attacks that aim to
act before the enemy which is causing a threat or getting ready for an attack
and to eliminate such threat. Such a pre-emptive attack is built upon the idea of
detecting that the enemy is about to attack and hence, acting before the enemy
and hitting it before it has any chance to attack would be more fruitful ([21]:
xi). This contemporary approach to security has been also reflected on the area
of intelligence as in all issues related to national security. Today, pre-emptive and
offensive methods are a matter of obligation as well as defensive security measures
in order to be sure of the possible and close attacks by the enemy and to eliminate
them. The responsibility of security measures for defence and attack belongs to the
scope of counterintelligence ([22]: 23).
This scope of responsibility assumed by the counterintelligence puts it at a
position which is remarkably important and indispensable for national security. If a
state is indifferent and does not attach sufficient importance to counterintelligence,
this means that it is also indifferent to all kinds of secret intelligence activities and
covert operations with regard to its national security by its enemies both at home
and abroad. In such a case, the state would be leaving its national security to the
mercy of others in a totally uncertain environment and it is impossible for a nation
to accept such a situation.
This study will handle the topic in three main aspects: counterintelligence and
its importance to national security, conceptual framework for counterintelligence,
and types of counterintelligence. In Sect. 11.2, concepts closely related to coun-
terintelligence such as security, national security, intelligence, counterintelligence,
espionage, counterespionage and covert operations/actions will be studied as well
11 Counter-Intelligence as a Chaotic Phenomenon and Its Importance. . . 173
as their position and importance in counterintelligence activities. Furthermore, in

Sect. 11.3, the importance of counterintelligence for national security and in the final
section, defensive and offensive aspects of counterintelligence will be examined.
11.2 Conceptual Framework of Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence is closely related to concepts such as intelligence, security,

national security, espionage, counterespionage and covert operation. Although all
these concepts are different from each other, they are inter-related and complemen-
tary to each other as one cannot exist without the other. Unless you have strong and
effective intelligence, counter-intelligence, espionage, and/or counterespionage it is
almost impossible to ensure national security and the borders of national security
or to prevent the covert operations of any parties and make similar operations to
address these. In this part of the study, all these complex terms are explained and
their complementary relations with each other are stated.
11.2.1 Security and National Security
The word “security” in English is made up of the prefix “se” (without) and the
stem “cura” (worry). In this respect, the word “securitas” means “staying away
from worries and tranquility”; and can be translated as “staying away from danger,
safety and security” in practice ([1]: 5). In other words, it is possible to define
security as “activities to minimize or eliminate dangers to any bodily harm” ([3]:
16–17). In any sort of dictionary, security can be defined as “the activities involved
in protecting a country, building or person against attack, danger, etc.”, “protection
against something bad that might happen in the future” or “the state of feeling happy
and safe from danger or worry” ([13]: 1063). One might confuse counterintelligence
with security as it is a security-based activity. However, security is only utilized
within counterintelligence activities for defence; and counterintelligence is not
comprised of merely security ([22]: 23).
National security handles the notion of security at national level, and thus is
defined as protecting a country’s domestic values against foreign threats ([12]: 19).
National security is also defined as the ability of national organizations to prevent
their enemies from using power and harming the security or national interest of
the citizens ([23]: 4). As mentioned above, states that bear the “legal monopoly
on violence” have the responsibility for protecting their citizens from all kinds
of threats that are either domestic or foreign and for creating an environment of
confidence for them. However, fulfilling such a task is not so simple and easy in
today’s complex world as it was in the past, because states of the contemporary
age face brand new and complicated threats such as international terrorism,
internal conflicts, organized crimes at an international scale, drug smuggling and

cybercrimes; and it is not possible to fight against such new types of threats using
passive or defensive military measures as in the classical manner. Such situations
require for taking measures against an attack as well as defensive ones. And this can
only be possible through strong counterintelligence.
11.2.2 Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Intelligence, in its broadest terms, is the request by policy makers for, collection,
analysis of certain information for national security and its submission to policy
makers ([18]: 9). The American Federal Bureau of Investigation defines intelligence
as “information that has been analyzed and refined so that it is useful to policy mak-
ers in making decisions—specifically, decisions about potential threats to national
security” [9]. It is possible to divide intelligence as “positive” and “negative”
depending on its purposes. The aim of positive intelligence is to acquire extensively
important information for national security, foreign affairs, economic interests, and
the government’s other plans and policies whereas the aim of negative intelligence is
to prevent such valuable data in terms of national security from enemies or potential
enemies. Therefore, negative intelligence is also named as counter-intelligence (US
Office of Counterintelligence (DXC) [28]: 141).
The first purpose of counterintelligence is to detect and uncover foreign actions
of intelligence that target a country and its interests ([32]: 6). According to the
Executive Order 12333-United States Intelligence Activities of December 1981
in the USA, counterintelligence is defined as “activities to detect and counter
espionage and activities that might form a threat towards the United States and
its interests directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services, terrorist
activities towards the United States and its interests as well as threats that stem from
developing, obtaining and producing mass destruction weapons to be used against
the United States” [27].
In general, with counterintelligence activities, preventing an adversary from
acquiring a piece of information that might be to its advantage is aimed on one
hand ([24]: 99), information is gathered and analyzed, and operational activities
are made against elements that form a threat against the national security on the
other ([19]: 18). Counterintelligence can also be defined as intelligence collection
with regard to the intelligence activities and abilities of the adversary in order
to discover and hinder intelligence operations and capabilities of it. It aims to
prevent and neutralize activities that form a threat for national interests by obtaining
information regarding the intelligence plans, operations and capabilities of the
enemy that is involved in destructive activities ([20]: 54). During counterintelligence
activities, secret operations are conducted to include making of secret agents from
the adversary’s intelligencers with the aim of gathering information that might be
used to neutralize activities made by the adversary for intelligence collection and
preventing the enemy from obtaining national security secrets ([8]: 11). Due to
its wide scope, counterintelligence that aims to use information for its own good
is a very important national security function in the fight against the threats from
foreign intelligence [26]. It has both analytical and operational elements ([25]: 284).
Although intelligence and counterintelligence are different concepts, there is a thin
line between them. Information discovered through counterintelligence activities
can neutralize the information borne by the enemy and uncover its capabilities and
possible intentions, thus feed into the intelligence cycle ([22]: 23).
Whereas, activities regarding positive and negative intelligence, i.e. intelligence
collection and counterintelligence, are conducted under a single roof of an intel-
ligence agency in Turkey, they are organized under the roof of different agencies
many developed democratic countries such as the USA and Canada. For instance,
in the USA, while CIA1 is conducting positive intelligence activities, FBI is
responsible for negative intelligence. Giving the foreign and domestic intelligence
jobs to several and separate agencies is considered more efficient and effective, and
the Turkish intelligence model is criticized [10]. The Chief of Turkish National
Intelligence Organization (MIT) Mr. Hakan Fidan summarizes the issue nicely in
the following quotation:
Unlike most of its allies and competitors, Turkey does not have an agency dedicated
to gathering solely foreign intelligence. In Turkey the whole intelligence activities are
conducted under one organization. MIT is held responsible for all kinds of intelligence
collection and analysis. Naturally this causes big gaps between the actual need and
provision of foreign intelligence. If there had been a separate foreign/strategic intelligence
organization, Turkey would have been much more successful in making and implementing
foreign policy. In fact, a separate foreign intelligence organization that is independent of
all domestic issues and concerns would contribute much to Turkey’s national interests. As
noted earlier, domestic and foreign intelligence are the assigned responsibilities of MIT,
whereas in most developed countries these tasks are usually divided between separate
agencies ([10]: 74–75).
And yet, combining domestic and foreign intelligence functions in one agency may
have some risks,2 as well ([2, 10]: 71).
1
In the United States of America, the National Security Act established the Central Intelligence
Agency in 1947 ([32]: 3). The Department of Energy and Department of State as well as CIA
and FBI are all involved in counter-intelligence activities in the area of national security ([22]:
28). Furthermore, with the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act approved in 2002, National
Counterintelligence Executive -NCIX, National Counterintelligence Policy Board and Office of
the National CI Executive-ONCIX were established in order to define and evaluate intelligence
threats towards the United States, to determine the priorities of CI agencies, and enable them to
fulfil their counterintelligence tasks better, to be sure that CI agencies fulfil their responsibilities in
an effective and efficient manner and to ensure the integration of CI activities throughout the US
([28]: 37).
2
Since the issue is not the main argument of this study, it is mentioned only briefly.
11.2.3 Espionage and Counterespionage
“Espionage” which stems back to very old times is indeed a French word and
means “spy”. A spy is a person who acts on behalf of another person or country
and is involved in secret activities to discover the secrets of the adversary and
gather information in its regard. Spies (agents) are placed in positions allowing
them to view, overhear, or conduct negotiations and discussions in person to obtain
information that could not be gained in any other way ([22]: 19). On the other hand,
counterespionage is a proactive activity and involves all the activities conducted by
an intelligence unit with the aim of preventing and hindering the spying activities
of the enemy’s intelligence unit and ultimately turning such activities to their
advantage ([24]: 108).
Today, it is a well-accepted fact that there is no better way of intelligence other
than making of secret agents from the adversary’s intelligencers ([28]: 146) and
this method has been also accepted as the most important factor in the defence
against a great number of crimes, particularly terrorism ([7]: 4). The enemy and its
operation are first defined; and then the adversary’s organisation is penetrated; and
the method is finally used to adverse the operation through various manipulative
techniques against the enemy itself ([28]: 31). With counterespionage, in addition
to protecting a nation’s intelligence interests, controlling and manipulating other
nations’ intelligence operations are also possible. Therefore, it plays a significant
role in terms of national security (ONCIX, vol. II [29]: 165). In his 69-page
report submitted to the President Eisenhower in 1954, American Lieutenant General
James Doolittle stated: “we must develop effective espionage and counterespionage
services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever,
more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us” ([4]: 9).
Counterespionage, which can also be defined as a secret war going on between the
rivalling intelligence units, ([22]: 197–198) cannot fully fulfil its duties without the
support of counterintelligence methods and practices ([22]: 24). What is more, it
depends on counterintelligence to complement it and mostly acts for neutralizing
the adversary as a part of counterintelligence ([22]: 197–198). Therefore, one can
call it the offensive or aggressive side of counterintelligence.
11.2.4 Covert Operation/Action
Cover operation/action is a broad term to define the activities that are conducted
in line with the national security policies and in conspiracy ([6]: 1). It is possible to
define this term as a multilateral, complementary, coordinated intelligence operation
for preventing undesired situations over a long period of time with the aim of
ensuring the targeted groups to do or preventing them from doing something or of
affecting the opinions of certain segments of the society (public opinion, prominent
people of the business world, political or military leaders, etc.) ([14]: 145).
Some might consider covert operation as a third option between diplomacy and
war; and they suggest it has four functions: propaganda, political, economic and
paramilitary activities. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s radio broadcasts
to the countries behind the Iron Curtain through the Radio Free Europe during
the Cold War can set an example for propaganda; CIA’s secret aid to the anti-
communist Christian Democratic Party in Italy during the Cold War can set an
example for political activity; and CIA’s efforts to remove electric stations in
Nicaragua with the aim of undermining the Marxist regime in 1980s can be an
example of economic covert activities. Furthermore, paramilitary covert operations
might involve assassinations towards the leader of any other country that is making
actions against yours ([16]: xii). As is clear from the abovementioned framework,
it is almost impossible to ensure a fully operating national security without
counterintelligence agencies that is sound and well-functioning in a world where
covert operations are present. With the aim of addressing this issue, the former
US Minister of Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger stated “we need an intelligence
community that, in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national
interest in the gray areas where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy
cannot operation” ([16]: xii).
11.3 The Importance of Counterintelligence in National

Security
Today, counterintelligence has become one of the most important, indeed, indis-
pensable elements of national security of people and their countries. In our
complicated world which has become a world of spies (agents), one can suggest
that people and countries owe their security to counterintelligence. Today, a ruthless
covert war is going on between those agents behind the closed doors. In such a
world, it is virtually impossible for a country which has valuable information to
condone espionage or disregard counterintelligence activities ([22]: 17). In addition
to fulfilling its tasks as a shield by protecting against any leakage about the
government or information security and by taking necessary security measures
against threats to national security, counterintelligence serves as a sword by carrying
out counterintelligence operations for attack with the aim of blunting intelligence
skills of the adversary while shaping others perceptions; and directly contributes
to national security in the end. Furthermore, information is provided on the plans,
intentions and capabilities of foreign powers that carry out intelligence operations
or covert operations against a country and its interests; and contribution is indirectly
made to the decision-making processes of that country ([32]: 3).
11.4 The Categories of Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence is made up of two main categories: defensive and offensive.

Defensive counterintelligence includes preventing crucial information on national
security from being obtained by the adversary’s intelligence agencies through their
activities and operations whereas offensive counterintelligence includes penetrating
into the adversary’s organisation and deceiving them ([28]: 33). Counterintelligence
tries to obtain more about the capabilities, intentions, methods and aims of the
enemy on the one hand; it tries to prevent them from exploiting theirs on the other.
This requires them to defend whereas attack when required ([28]: 152).
With defensive counterintelligence, information is gathered and analysed in
order to protect the military, diplomatic, technical and intelligence borders of the
country and prevent the enemy from penetrating into its organisation, deceiving and
manipulating it via secret activities. On the other hand, with offensive counterin-
telligence, strategies and policies are developed via information with regard to the
enemy’s intelligence; and the enemy is manipulated by exploiting its fragilities and
using them to the country’s own advantage ([11]: XXVİİİ). Standing out against
intelligence efforts of an enemy is the most basic function of counterintelligence
([11]: xii). In order to fully carry out this defensive function, it must be in harmony
with the offensive side as well ([22]: 47).
11.4.1 Defensive Counterintelligence
Deterrence is one of the most fundamental objectives of counterintelligence.

Deterrence is the ability to discourage the enemy’s intention to penetrate into the
operation or reverse the adversary’s data collection operation when a penetrative
operation has been launched and in progress. Within the scope of counterintelli-
gence, deterrence, in brief, is the ability of an agency to convince the adversary
that organising a data collection operation is costlier or riskier than the benefits
to be gained ([22]: 42–43). The most important thing in protecting information is
that a country and its different agencies decide what data is important and should
be protected ([24]: 99). Unless this can be managed, it becomes harder to decide
that security is needed in which department of the agency and at what level; and
in such a case, the same level of security is ensured not in the departments where
more confidential information is saved but in all departments – and this means the
resources of the agency is wasted ([22]: 77). In order to prevent this, planning in
counterintelligence plays a significant role ([22]: 51). And in order to determine the
counterintelligence requirements of agency for counterintelligence, a plan should
be made; and the first step to be taken is to conduct a threat analysis. This is
the first link in a three-stage chain of complementary nature. The subsequent two
links are sensitivity and risk analyses. This three-stage analytical process lays the
groundwork for an impeccable plan including prevention, preparation, response
and recovery (PPRR: Prevention, Preparation, Response, Recovery). All these

methods are interrelated owing to their nature; and they act as a building block
in a comprehensive process of developing a plan ([22]: 52).
One of the most important principles of defensive counterintelligence is defence
in depth. According to the concept of defence in depth, a barrier system should be
established. These barriers can be any instrument that can separate two areas with
a wide array of tools such as reinforced walls and doors, transparent glass walls,
and even computer pass codes. Barriers also function as an instrument that causes
the perpetrator to leave evidence behind him/her as how he/she has passed through
them. Therefore, the barrier system should be comprised of a series of layers. The
logic behind defence in depth is to cause the perpetrator to slow down as he/she
encounters each and every barrier. If there is only one single barrier, the targeted
information can be directly exposed to an attack despite being how hard it is. In
defence in depth system, the strongest barrier is the closest one to the targeted
data ([22]: 76). Defensive counterintelligence is fundamentally handled as physical
security, information security, personnel security and communications security.
11.4.1.1 Physical Security
Although physical security cannot serve as a certain disincentive, it can be argued

that counterintelligence aiming at defence is based on physical security in principle
([22]: 81). Perimeter fencing is the first thing that comes to mind among the security
measures which prevent others from accessing to the information they seek ([24]:
19). In order to increase the effectiveness of barriers enclosing the surrounding area,
razor strip bobbins which are vertically put up or strings which are horizontally
placed, patrols with dogs, closed circuit television systems, surveillance or motion-
sensitive alarms can be utilized. Barriers are often considered as physical obstacles.
However, passwords, security clearances or classifications placed on documents
and the like are regarded as barrier ([22]: 82). In addition to the conventional
measures such as tangle-foot wire, perimeter towers, internal and external doors,
windows, curtains, reflective films, key controls, security lighting, warning signals
or signboards, security watches; high-tech products and complicated barrier systems
such as electronic “trip wire” known as “perimeter alert system”, glass-break
sensors, speed styles, electronic pass cards, safe and storage rooms, sensor lighting,
closed circuit television systems, sensitive compartmented information facility
(SCIF), intrusion detection systems are widely used as physical security measures
([22]: 97). Furthermore, large volumes of national security data are stored in the
computer environments. Therefore, ensuring the security of computers is of great
importance. However, the security of computer is one of the most complicated
issues in terms of physical security and it is aimed to keep data safely by preventing
unauthorized people from accessing to these electronic systems within the scope of
counterintelligence for defence ([22]: 98–99).
11.4.1.2 Personnel Security
Personnel security includes potential personnel, investigating them before being

recruited to jobs which require access permission for the information that enemy
intelligence agencies seek to obtain, and screening them as well as controlling
whether the current personnel continue to meet the standards for having the access to
this kind of information. At this stage, the personalities and honesty of the potential
employees are taken into account and decided whether they are willing and able
to keep the confidential information. In the meanwhile, stability in the mental state
of personnel and his/her sensitivity to the possible blackmail to be made by the
enemy intelligence agency in the future are detected ([24]: 105). One of the ways
to infiltrate into an organization is to obtain the inside information from a reliable
personnel. Therefore, the goal of personnel security is to decide whether a person is
trusted with secrets, or is trusted during the covert operations, and he/she continue
to keep the secrets after everything is over ([22]: 109).
The process of investigating and screening personnel starts when applicant
applies for the job with personal history statement (PHS). The rationale behind
this is to find out whether the person is who he/she has claimed to be or not,
and to confirm whether the person is eligible to hold secrets secure ([22]: 111). In
this regard, the applicant’s residential history, educational history, marital history,
citizenship history, employment history, military background, finance and credit
history, criminal records are retrospectively investigated. In that vein, during this
investigation, candidate personnel’s memberships of any political parties, unions or
associations, personality, professional and credit references are also investigated.
When reviewing the applicant’s PHS, a background investigation will look for any
inconsistencies, discrepancies, or unaccountable periods (usually around a couple
of months or more), and above-mentioned information is investigated in a more
detailed manner if required. Furthermore, even though applicants may pass this
initial screening process, once they are hired, a probationary period is usually set as a
contingency for their possible dismissal in case they are suspected of having become
a security risk. Similarly, when personnel are promoted or assigned to more sensitive
duty, another screening procedure can be conducted again and in a more detailed
manner ([22]: 111). Some sensitive organizations may use polygraph in addition
these controls ([16]: 5) Another means of safeguarding sensitive information is
by drawing up nondisclosure agreements. These agreements are also called as
“secrecy agreements”. These agreements are intended to create a psychological
impression on personnel, reinforcing the importance of protecting information to
which they have been entrusted. They are in effect legal contracts, and can be used
as evidence in a court of law in case personnel are found to be in violation ([22]:
111–112).
On the other hand, to notice the changes in the behaviours of personnel and
to find out the reasons behind these changes are important personnel security
implementations. Changes in mental state or actions of the personnel such as
consuming alcohol in binge quantities, financial constraints or spending large sums
of money may indicate deeper personal challenges. Furthermore, relationships
with strangers should be also examined ([22]: 121–122). These examinations find
out whether personnel have motivations3 required for spying such as ideological,
financial or emotional instability or not. This situation necessitates taking new
and additional measures such as developing a detailed psychological profile and
establishing systems to alert in case personnel violate the security in order to
overcome their financial constraints and to have better living conditions ([24]: 107).
Another important issue for the personnel security is to train personnel about some
significant matters. Personnel are trained not to mention about classified information
in unsecure environments, not to share classified information with people whom
they have close relationship with such as spouses, to be cautious about fast-growing
friendships, infiltration attempts into the organizations through telephone, mail,
e-mail or in person and indirectly, and to be able to notice any physical surveillances
([22]: 122–124).
11.4.1.3 Information Security
In literature, the term “information security” can be often confused with the term
“computer security”. However, they have different meanings. Information security
does not include only computer security. It also covers books, magazines, reports,
photographs and data stored in the electronic environment such as other images
([22]: 132). Within the framework of counterintelligence, information means all data
recorded in hardcopies or stored in the files in electronic environment. Furthermore,
it refers to conversations and information synthesised in a cognitive process ([22]:
134). Information security has three basic foundations: confidentiality, integrity and
availability. Confidentiality, the first basic foundation of the information security,
refers to preventing unauthorized disclosure. Integrity, the second basic foundation,
means to detecting whether information is changed in anyway and distorts integrity
of the information, and availability, the third basic foundation, refers to ensure that
the persons who are authorised can have the access to the information according to
the principle of providing information to individuals required ([22]: 132).
If disclosure of information damages the national security, it is required to
classify this information ([22]: 132). The rationale behind classification of the
information is to ensure that only authorised personnel can have the access to the
information ([22]: 134). A classification system is to categorize the information
according to its sensitivity level and to decide the level of damage in case the
adversary obtains the information, and importance of keeping that information
([24]: 99). Today, countries have developed classification according to their systems.
For example, in the USA, there are five security levels in information classification4 :
3
In the USA, motivation was mostly ideological in spying events in 1930s and 1940s, motivation
was financial and sometimes emotional instabilities in 1970s ([24]: 107).
4
In the USA, the first system to classify the important documents for national security was
implemented by the Department of War in 1912. During the presidency of Harry Truman, a
unclassified, sensitive but unclassified, restricted, secret and top secret ([22]: 136).
Using the information classification may make the inappropriate disclosure of
information less possible, and a new top-down classification may be required in
time in case information in different documents becomes obsolete or less sensitive
([22]: 139). Within the scope of defence in depth principle, first line of defence
activity against the infiltration into the organization is outer barriers such as bars,
doors, and windows. The second line of defence is closets of files including sensitive
information and data, hardwares, and other devices ([22]: 143). Declassification is
an issue as important as classification is. Maintaining democratic principles and law
order is very essential ([22]: 138). In a great number of countries, legal arrangements
are made in order to hold information secure. These laws are designed that citizens
can directly apply to public institutions and obtain information. Under the title of
“Freedom of Information”, although they refer to “free access”, these laws state
information that cannot be obtain with public applications, and these exemptions is
a way to ensure governments to keep secret information secure.
11.4.1.4 Communications Security
Secret collection of both written and electronic messages has been one of
the most principal methods of intelligence collection method throughout the
human history. However, the prevention of this process and protection of the
content of the messages are the main responsibilities of the counterintelligence.
Enabling the security of electronic communications has been one of the
components of counterintelligence due to the widespread use of cable or radio
signals in communications since the beginning of twentieth century ([24]: 114).
Communications security (COMSEC-communications security), encompasses a
broad area from the physical security of communication equipment and devices
to transmission of signals and security of emission from cables and equipment;
it essentially aims the security of messages transmitted ([22]: 153). Technical
surveillance countermeasures (TSCM-technical surveillance countermeasures)
are the techniques and measures used to detect and neutralize the penetration
technologies which are classified in a wide range and used in accessing the critical
information by the enemy. As stated above, these countermeasures require the
compatible operation of counterintelligence and security as two different disciplines
([29]: 169). In modern world, some countries assign some security institutions with
communications security. In the US instance, NSA (National Security Agency)
is responsible for the whole communications security and responsible to enable,
classification system was implemented for all government institutions implemented for the first
time. In 1995, during the presidency of President Clinton, definitions, rules and procedures in
this regard were put forward and the foundation of the current system in the USA was laid ([24]:
99–100).
sustain and verify communications security of all institutions which possess

classified information, particularly intelligence agencies ([16]: 6).
“Electronic countermeasure sweep” is the best method for determining whether a
bug is underway in case of a suspicious wiretap and bug operation. From technologic
perspective, almost no room or atmosphere can be guaranteed to be proof against
audio surveillance. However, conducting sweeps at non-constant intervals is the
most effective way of countering audio surveillance ([22]: 154). To this end,
assuring telephone line cabinet, terminal box or data centers with locked facilities
is a very effective method ([22]: 156). Today, it is possible to secretly obtain
electromagnetic waves emitted by electrical hardware and reach the characteristics
of electrical signals thereof, thus measures should be taken in order to alleviate
the intensity of emission ([24]: 116). Coding of communications via cordless/cell
telephones, facsimile and radio systems can significantly contribute to security
([22]: 156).
11.4.2 Offensive Counterintelligence
Although the defensive aspect of the counterintelligence is widely known and

implemented, the offensive side of it is the least known and it requires expertise
encompassing very complex methods and tactics carried out in shadow. The core
aim of the counterintelligence is composed of following issues: preventing the
attempts at penetration by a hostile agent; protecting against inadvertent leakage of
classified information; preventing espionage, subversive activities, sabotage, terror-
ism and other politically motivated violence acts; and preventing the key technology
and equipment being obtained by others. Such a wide range of responsibility
necessitates being focused on offensive counterintelligence as well as defensive
one ([22]: 23). With the defensive activities of counterintelligence, offensive acts
of opposition are prevented. On the contrary, offensive acts bring about the opposite
response and attack is launched assuming that each target has a point of fragility
which can be exploited ([22]: 164). Offensive counterintelligence activities can be
analyzed under three main tenets as: detection, deception and neutralization.
11.4.2.1 Detection
Detection basically means to discover the existence of some events. Within the scope
of counterintelligence, an event is the violation or potential violation of classified
information ([22]: 171). Generally a five-step method is followed in order to detect a
security breach or attempts regarding the national security: firstly the event thereof is
described; then person or people involved in the event are tried to be identified and if
the people are detected, organizational relations are unveiled; their current positions
are detected and the proofs for their involvement are collected. For instance, if an
employee temporarily takes some documents away from the office and obtain the
copies of them, the systems to detect this event should be established in that office
beforehand. When the system alarms about the event, firstly the involved person or
people are identified and then relation is tried to be detected between the offenders
and the organization the last receiver of the information ([22]: 171–172).
11.4.2.2 Deception
Deception is a counterintelligence method used by an intelligence agency in order

to render the cognitive processes of a hostile agent, spy and analysts harmless and
cause faults in the thoughts of them ([22]: 187). Deception may also be considered
as an attempt to mislead the intelligence analysis of the opposition by providing an
erroneous picture about the current situation. A successful deception operation of an
intelligence agency corresponds to the intelligence failure of the other party ([24]:
117). Offensive counterintelligence tries to affect the decision makers of the enemy
by manipulating the intelligence product submitted to them ([32]: 10). The aim is to
mislead an intelligence agency’s operations, capabilities or intentions and to delay
their ability to react effectively and thus to project a false understanding that sends
them down a path that wastes time and resources and to conceal who is penetrating
an operation ([22]: 44–45). In fact, this deception is carried out by forming a
situation that may be expected under real conditions; however, it is completely
fictional ([22]: 187). Double agents working as positive intelligence collectors
from one aspect may also provide channels for deception ([31]: 169). Furthermore,
dummy companies may generally be used in order to deceive the opposition during
the counterintelligence operations. On the surface, these companies do not have any
difference from other companies operating in the market; however, their aim is to
support the covert intelligence operations and to camouflage the spies ([22]: 191).
Another method used for deception by intelligence agencies is called as “honey
pot”. In this method, a person is assigned with establishing a romantic or sexual
relationship with the agent of opposition, then this relation is exploited via threat
and blackmailing ([22]: 199).
Deception and counterintelligence are two nested concepts. The core aim of
counterintelligence activities may be described as not to be deceived despite all
efforts of opposition and to deceive the opposition ([15]: 71). In modern world,
intelligence services also perform deception operations which can be called as
“active measures” as well as efforts for gathering information (ONCIX, vol. III [30]:
243). In his speech John M. Deutch, former Director of U.S. Central Intelligence,
emphasizing the modern importance of the deception states that:
We operate in a world of deception. It is our job to keep this nation’s secrets safe and to
obtain the secrets of other nations. We engage in deception to do our job and we confront
deception undertaken by other nations. But we must never let deception become a way
of life. We must never deceive ourselves. We must be capable of engaging in deceptive
activities directed towards other nations and groups while maintaining scrupulous honesty
among ourselves (ONCIX, vol. III [30]: 314–319).
11.4.2.3 Neutralization
Offensive counterintelligence has also an operational aspect besides positive intelli-

gence. In other words, it gathers intelligence in order to describe the threats and
evaluate the foreign intelligence capabilities. Neutralizing the threats of foreign
intelligence is among the key objectives of offensive counterintelligence and
this mission bears vital importance in terms of protection of national security
secrets ([32]: 8). Counterintelligence aims to neutralize the operations of hostile
intelligence services or prevent them by paralysis. It can also be achieved by causing
a loss of interest or enthusiasm in carrying out the operation, or by inflicting a loss
of confidence in an opposition in turn will be unable to achieve its objective (in
whole or part) or it might be the arrest of a spy cell or the transfer of a suspected
spy to a remote office or location where they have no access to classified data ([22]:
45–46). The goal of the neutralization is to cause an opposition to halt the actions
it has launched and to eliminate covert espionage activities ongoing as a sleeper
cell. Disruption activities can be described as preventing actions performed for
frustrating hostile intelligence operations. It encompasses the detection of offenders,
expelling spies, monitoring and imprisoning them due to espionage or other relevant
crimes, depriving them from accessing critical information or people possessing the
information or people having the right to access the information ([22]: 204).
11.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Actual environment of threat witnessing a rapid evolution in terms of content and

methods as well as tactics has exposed the countries to various new threats such as
international organized crimes, terrorism and cybercrimes regarding their national
security. This atmosphere of asymmetric threat creates a significant risk in terms
of national and global security and forces the countries to adopt new security
strategies and measures based on objective of taking action and attacking before the
enemy. Today, it is not possible to take these complementary defensive and offensive
measures solely by means of great and bulky armies. This is because of the fact that
modern wars are no longer waged on battle fields but between opponent intelligence
services behind the closed doors via secret and covert operations. In this hidden war,
on the one hand it is tried to prevent the collection and manipulation of information
vital to national security by activities and operations of opposition intelligence
services, on the other hand operational actions are taken against factors posing a
threat against national security. In this war, intelligence and counterintelligence have
unquestionably become the most important arms. In a world where the spies swarm
and a secret war continues, it is almost impossible to protect the national security
and secrets fully; prevent the covert operations of the opposition or perform similar
operations without a strong and efficient counterintelligence function.
In recent years, some countries have started to establish counterintelligence agen-
cies as well as intelligence agencies with reference to above-mentioned evaluation.
The main duty of these agencies is to take defensive measures such as physical
security, personnel security, information security and communications security
based on deterrence and thus to detect the covert operations of the opposition
and penetrate and deceive these covert activities. Due to this broad scope of
duty, counterintelligence is closely related to concepts such as security, national
security, intelligence, espionage, counterespionage and covert operation; there is
a complementary and holistic relationship between these concepts. Since it is a
security-oriented activity, counterintelligence can be confused with security and it
can be perceived as solely a security-related activity or counterespionage activity.
Counterintelligence encompasses a close and holistic approach with different
activities against threats towards the national security of the country; however, it
is not composed of these functions. Only counterintelligence also has offensive
missions as well as defensive missions thereof; it is a whole with all its components.
A country trying to ensure national security should be aware of this bi-directional
area of the counterintelligence and review the current structure of the security.
Further, combining foreign and domestic intelligence issues in one single agency
may have some drawbacks and risks, in terms of counterintelligence. Instead, these
two types of intelligence services may function more efficiently and effectively
when assigned to separate agencies.
In conclusion, counterintelligence service in such rapidly changing, globalised,
complex and chaotic world is a prior need of any state, in order to stay alive. And, it
is only possible for a nation to ensure its national security fully by having not only
a defensive and passive approach, but also offensive counterintelligence.
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Part IV
Sex Complexity and Politics in Literature
Chapter 12
Sex Complexity and Politics in Black Dogs
by Ian McEwan
Mina Abbasiyannejad and Rosli Talif
Abstract Ian McEwan’s Black Dogs (BD) is a story of socio-political conflict

during the critical era of the Cold War. Black Dogs is riddled with party (political)
domination and its outcomes in society. Europe is still suffering the consequences
of the Second World War, perhaps the biggest war of the twentieth century. In the
aftermath of such worldwide upheaval, the conflicts that were in tandem with the
scramble for political domination emerged in diverse ways, affecting nations and
their human populations. Systematic sexual assault during the war years showed
that sex was used both for intimidation and humiliation. This study attempts to
picture the multidimensional aspects of politics which are practically related to the
most intimate human relationship, that is, sex. It pictures how personal is equated
with the political and vice versa. The theory of sexual politics is the theoretical
framework used to scrutinize power-structure relationship. By reviewing the major
conflicts in such a scenario, as the Cold War, and societal restriction, this study
concludes that conflict in the macrocosm (world and society) affects the microcosm
(individual) in McEwan’s Black Dogs. It provides a rather broad picture of politics
and sexuality and highlights the stresses of wider society on human dysfunctional
relationships. Rape as a tactic of war for a political goal demonstrates another aspect
of sex. Reviewing the period in which the story takes place and relating it to the
conflicts in society, the study goes beyond simple cause and effect problems among
individuals and portrays a holistic view of sexuality and society.
Keywords Sexual politics • Personal • Political • Conflict • Rape • War

• Complexity
M. Abbasiyannejad () • R. Talif

English Department, Faculty of Modern Languages and Communication,
University Putra Malaysia, Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia
e-mail: minaabbasiyannejad@gmail.com

192 M. Abbasiyannejad and R. Talif
12.1 Introduction
McEwan’s works has shift from early works to more socio-political including
feminist issues. He moved away from murder and macabre theme, although still
deals with certain conflict in his later works. Ryan [15] points to McEwan’s subject
shift in this way “he has been opening his novels to embrace wider public and
political issues, to explore the state of the nation and the post-war history that has
steered us into the quicksand of nuclear proliferation, ecological catastrophe and
sexual bewilderment” (p. 205). Slay in Ian McEwan indicates that in Black Dogs
McEwan concerns with the world of Politics and its effect on “intimate alliances”.
The novel is the reflection of social, psychological and political changes which has
occurred in latter twentieth century ([16], p. 134). He also admits that Black Dogs
is the “intoxication of violence, the conflict between political reform and religious
belief” (p. 141).
In his article “Escape into innocence: Ian McEwan and the Nightmare of
History”, Mark Delrez [4] suggests that Black Dogs is trying to paint a canvas of
wide historical scope, in contrast to more domestic dramas such as The Cement
Garden (1978) or The Comfort of Strangers (1981). In Black Dogs, McEwan’s
allegory of evil grows to include its own harrowing implications, since the story
tries to figure out, against the backdrop of world history, the validity of its own
founding metaphors. It seems that the writer dismisses religion completely after a
brief attempt to assess what it offers in response to the reality of violence in the
modern world. McEwan shows how dedicated he is to writing as a technique aimed
wholly at shaping sentences and paragraphs, as well as forming characters.
Childs [3] points to the cultural and political aspects of The Innocent. As he
observes it, the story is concerned with the rise and fall of England and USA power
during the Cold War. “McEwan’s novel has a number of preoccupations: covers
and concealment, tunnelling and borrowing, doubles and duplicity, ignorance and
revelation” (p. 76). He also identifies the theme of violence in the Black Dogs, in
which McEwan shows an accident beside the tumbling wall as a symbol of the
continuation of the destructive power of brutality (p. 103). Courtney [2], in “The
Intensity of the Event”, explains the importance of the idea of ‘the moment’ in
McEwan’s writing. For McEwan, ‘the moment’ is significant both aesthetically, as
exhibited through his textual emphasis and manipulation (especially of narrative
time), and philosophically, as a portal through which he can craft narrative, narrator
and character developments and implications (p. 21).
Regarding McEwan’s shift to gender themes, Malcolm’s [8] maintains, “while
many of McEwan’s female figures echo very traditional feminine stereotypes they
are often victims, it should be noted, or mothers, mystics, and emotionalists, like
June in Black Dogs” (p. 14). June and Bernard’s relationship begins in a time of
sexual encumbrances. McEwan portrays a stereotypical feminine figure of June in
Black Dogs and shows June’s tendency to emotion and spirituality, contrasting her
with Bernard who is a rationalist. Malcolm writes that, in Black Dogs, June is a
“benign mystic, but her beliefs are highly subjective and beyond reasonable proof”
12 Sex Complexity and Politics in Black Dogs by Ian McEwan 193
([8], p. 14). Byrnes [1] views Black Dogs a presentation of the sexuality theme as
an “interminable and irresolvable argument between Bernard and June” (p. 40). In
most of his work, McEwan pictures women as victims of political domination and
societal power.
By scrutinizing the characters’ relationship one finds traces of domination
throughout the story. Despite working in the same place, Bernard is unaware of
June’s presence. She explains Bernard’s attitude in this way, “Bernard did not see
June. He remembered no first encounter. She did not exist” (BD [9], p. 23). And after
he saw the beauty of June, his action was like that of a predator. June describes how
Bernard’s imposing look makes her feel overwhelmed: “His stare was so naked, so
guilelessly predatory, that she faltered on her way to his desk” (BD, p. 25). The word
predatory recalls the picture of a hunter and its prey and emphasizes the domineering
power of the male.
Millett [11] claims that “male supremacy, like other political creeds, does not
finally reside in physical strength but in the acceptance of a value system which is
not biological” (p. 27). There is a metaphoric act of being and acting like a predator
of beauty in the killing of the dragonfly. Bernard says: “It’s a beauty”, and June
replies “therefore you want to kill it” (BD, p. 54). Metaphorically he kills June since
she is a beauty as well. Ryan in his book Ian McEwan asserts that “The black dogs
are an image of the insatiable vortex at the core of the creative imagination, the
greedy source of narrative itself, and in these demonic creatures the author salutes
his own kind. They mark the nagging lack of meaning in the real and in the writer
which narration soothes with illusions of plenitude” ([14], p. 67).
12.2 A Brief Overview on Theory of Sexual Politics
Millett, in her book Sexual Politics, argues that “Sex is a status category with
political implications” ([11], p. 24). In this book she explains the role of patriarchy
in sexual relations, and discusses how sex relates to politics. She writes that “The
term politics shall refer to the power structured relationship arrangements whereby
one group of persons is controlled by another and patriarchy is one of these” (p. 23).
She therefore “defines the grounds of personal contact and interaction between
members of well-defined and coherent groups: races, castes, classes and sexes. For
it is precisely a certain group having no representation in a number of recognized
political structures that their position tends to be so stable, their oppression so
continuous” (p. 24).
In Black Dogs, the embodiment of society’s structure pictures women dominated
by men in various ways, as is shown in the stories. Millett [11] explicates her ideas
of sex in this way: “coitus can scarcely be said to take place in a vacuum, although
of itself it appears a biological and physical activity, it is set so deeply within
the larger context of human affairs that it serves as a charged microcosm of the
variety of attitudes and values to which culture subscribes” (p. 23). She thoroughly
appreciates the impact of circumstances on sexual relationships. In conclusion,

Millett’s theory of sexual politics is an appropriate system to interpret the signs
of conflict attributable to domineering behaviour between the sexes. Rape or sexual
abuse, as a notorious and obscene representation of sex, is repeated in McEwan’s
works. It is significant to mention that in some of them, sex, as a means of
dominance, is directly related to politics in its widest and most general meanings.
Richard Dunphy [6] points to the relation between sexuality and political issues
and admits the realization of why sexuality, and gender area “political battle ground”
once the theorisation of sexual difference begins (p. 5).
: : : to become involved in sexual politics usually means recognising not only that gender
and sexual identities and behaviour are political issues in the sense that they are the object of
state control and regulation and of battles between social forces and ideologies, but also that
the struggle to gain control over one’s body and its capacities and pleasures, the struggle
for self-definition and self-determination for choice is seen as central to the constitution of
the human subject. (p. 117, 118)
Jeffreys [7], in “Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics: 40 years on”, explains how sexual
practices play a substantial role in controlling women. She admits that Millett
successfully shows how sex is related to politics as long as we can use it as a medium
for domination. In the same vein, Stimpson et al. [18], in “Sexual Politics: Twenty
Years Later”, asserts that Millett is a social constructionist, whose theory maintains
that “the relationship between the sexes is a power relationship, and as important,
(while) the theory is a social construction” (p. 32). Shulman [17] explicates how
sexuality can be used as a means to exploit women when it is based on a power
relation. She writes:
: : : perceiving sexual relations as but one aspect of the power relations between men and
women, early, radical feminists questioned traditional definitions of women’s sexuality, of
women’s nature, of sexual satisfaction and health on the grounds that such definitions as
pronounced by men, tended to justify the sexual exploitation of women by men. (p. 597)
Reading history shows how, during wartime, women underwent much drastic
violence which is basically attributed to their sexuality. Millett [11] throws light
on the abhorrent crimes of war, when people can easily justify their villainous
deeds by positioning the enemy as the “inferior species or really not human at
all” (p. 46). For instance, a soldier rapes a wounded woman confidently, since it
is believed it is part of the battle. The expressed relationships between the sexes in
the selected story impress on us the consequences of socio-political conflicts in the
world, and are enlightened by historical summaries. When a sexual relationship is
based on power between men and women, inequality is inevitable, and the outcome
is a dynamic change in the normal relationship to a ruler and a ruled. The unequal
relationship either refers to economic power, which is shown by the state of money
and property they have, or is shown in another way, which is gaining or using power
in political terms to gain social influence. Approaching Black Dogs through sexual
politics gives us new insights into the power of domination and exploitation. The
theory provides us with an opportunity to delve deep into the novel and see the
relation between the public and the private. The patriarchal system, which is based
on domination, generates conflict at various levels, which is shown in the selected
work mostly implicitly.
12.3 Second World War and Cold War
Second World War as a major war in twentieth century involved many countries
in the world, specifically European countries. In 1939 Germany invaded Poland;
as a consequence Britain and France declared war on September 3 the same year.
The Allies which were namely Great Britain, France and Poland armies were not
as effective as German armies or Wehrmacht in terms of discipline, doctrine and
fighting spirit. After France collapsed, Italy entered the war and joined Germany on
10 June 1940. Germany invaded Great Britain and Blitz occurred in the winter of
1940–1941. After the sever invasion of Britain, Hitler’s change of strategy turned
to the Soviet Union. During 1939–1942 Hitler pursued certain aims based on his
racist’s ideology and his brutal conception of power politics. But finally Germany
failed and in 1945 the British and American armies moved to eastward swiftly
to reach Berlin and occupy as much as country before Soviet Union overcame
it. “The surrender of the German forces in northwestern Europe was signed at
Montgomery’s headquarters on Lüneburg Heath on May 4; and a further document,
covering all the German forces, was signed with more ceremony at Eisenhower’s
headquarters at Reims, in the presence of Soviet as well as U.S., British, and French
delegations. At midnight on May 8, 1945, the war in Europe was officially over”
([21], p. 49).
The legacies of the most devastating war remain for a long time. Soon after World
War II Cold War begins. Prevots [13] writes that:
Conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the two major powers to emerge
from World War II, seems to have been almost inevitable. Early in 1946, in his famous
long Telegram from Moscow, American diplomat George Kennan advised the Truman
administration that no modus vivendi with the Soviet Union was possible. Two weeks
later, in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, Britain’s wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill,
declared that an “iron curtain” had descended across Europe, partitioning the free West
from the communist East. Official embrace of the Cold War as the foundation of American
foreign policy came in March 1947. (p. 1)
War for domination between U.S. and Russia results in dividing Germany to two
different zones which are East and West. In the West part which was dominated part
U.S. the Americanization was applied as a cultural politics for the military goals.
Warburg explains the balance of power during Cold War and how it affects Europe
as a major part of conflict.
With power polarized in only two surviving superpowers, the traditional European method
of preserving peace by balance-of-power maneuvers had finally become totally obsolete.
In the absence of a world organization endowed with the power to enforce universal
disarmament, there could now be only either peace by agreement between the two
superpowers or a race for preponderance of power leading, in all probability, to war.
(Warburg [20], p. 327)
12.4 A Brief Overview of Rape in Wars
Second World War which has killed approximately 60 million, outbreaks by the
Germany’s in 1939. In this heinous war various barbaric actions has taken placed,
including, rape. Women are seriously vulnerable during the war, since they were
treated as spoils of wars. Over viewing history of rape reveals that rape is not a new
phenomenon, but it has been as a cultural problem since long. In Encyclopaedia of
Rape it is explained that “Rape has always been a part of human culture. The myths
of antiquity included accounts of rape; ancient societies counted rape among the
crimes listed in their law codes; and even the Bible contains stories of rape” ([19],
p. IX). Cultural development and ascendency of public awareness is still unable to
eliminate such an inhumane act of domination and oppression and it is persistently
repeated even in the modern world. “ Rape has had an impact on individual women
(as well as men and children of both sexes), but it has also affected the evolution and
development of cultures all over the world, as women have been abducted as brides,
claimed as prizes of war, and enslaved” ([19], p. IX). War time crimes have always
been one of the controversial issues. Systematic rape and sexual assault by the
militaries shows that sex is related to the broader issues like politics. Documentation
on the Second World War reveals many cases of rape and sexual slavery by the
armies of different countries. “The world learned that during the spring of 1945, as
Russian soldiers advanced and eventually occupied Berlin, they raped nearly one
million German women” ([19], p. 269). “In Becoming Abject: Rape as a weapon
of War” rape in war explained as an “example of asymmetric strategy” which is a
multipurpose action tactic.
War rape is perhaps the clearest example of an asymmetric strategy. In war rape, the enemy
soldier attacks a civilian (not a combatant), a woman (not another male soldier), and only
indirectly with the aim of holding or taking a territory. The prime aim of war rape is to
inflict trauma and thus to destroy family ties and group solidarity within the enemy camp.
Apart from demoralization of the enemy, war rape can also become an integral aspect of
ethnic cleansing (Diken and Laustsen [5], p. 111).
Diana Milillo in “Rape as a Tactic of war Social and Psychological Perspective”

explains that women has suffered mass rapes during history as a result of rape as a
war tactic “to advance one groups political, economic, social, or religious position
over another. Systematic mass rapes devastates individual women and destroys the
fabric of families and communities” ([10], p. 196). No matter which country is the
victor of the war, the loser will face the horrible consequences of humiliation by
the superior one. Black Dogs represents a new type of domination and humiliation
which is the result of Germany’s decision to resort to intimidation and terror.
12.5 Sexual Oppression of the Era
Black Dogs is set before the sexual revolution, when even discussing sex was
considered taboo. There are indicative examples in the story. “I had never heard
her use the word. In her BBC wartime broadcast voice she constricted the vowel
conspicuously, almost to a ‘six’. It sounded crude, quite obscene, on her lips”
(BD, p. 30). Even pronouncing the word is undesirable; this indicates the ultimate
disapproval of communicating sexual matters at that time. In their first sexual
initiation, June describes how Bernard acts after the sex, “beating his chest and
yelling like Tarzan while leaves came swirling in : : : he made laugh so hard that
I widdled on the bed” (italics added BD, p. 34). The iconic figure that she refers
to, Tarzan, shows her attitudes toward a male figure as a person of superior or
superhuman physical strength, showing off his strength to the inferior one.
Sex and sexuality was limited to the marital states, and the cultural restriction,
makes it difficult to even discuss the sex issues. In a conversation between June and
Jeremy, she describes her generations’ limitation. She says: “how bizarre attitudes
were then to sex, and all that went with it” (BD, p. 32). It is the time that marriage
had different meaning according to the socio-economic pattern of life. Marriage
was a contraction not necessarily based on love. When June describes her friends
and also her attitudes towards marriage, she declares the idea of exchanging and
presenting marriage as give and take situations.
I was always measuring men up for possible husbands. : : : .Desire never really came into
it, not my own anyway. There was only a vague general sort of longing for a friend who
was a man, for a house, a baby, a kitchen-the elements were inseparable. As for the man’s
feelings, that was a question of how far you let him go. We used to huddle up and talk about
it a great deal. If you were going to be married, sex was the price you must pay. After the
wedding it was a tough bargain, but reasonable enough. You couldn’t have something for
nothing. (BD, p. 31, 32)
Young were never prepared for the sexuality and there is no one to talk to. This
lack of preparation is repeated in McEwan’s works, by the characters anxiety and
uneasiness to begin the new experience. For instance June explains her feeling in
this way: “I wanted this man. I had lurid fantasies about him. I couldn’t talk to my
girlfriends honesty. They would have been shocked. Nothing had prepared me for
this” (BD, p. 32). McEwan highlights the fear of having sex for the first in his works
to show the overwhelming condition that young would encounter. June describes
her feelings for the first sex relationship in this way: “ I was about to have what I
had been thinking about for weeks, but I was miserable, full of dread, as if I were
being led off to my own execution” (BD, p. 32).
To go further even she describes her feelings towards sex a kind of criminal
activity which she considers. She explains “I was miserable about it, but I was also
tasted freedom. It was the freedom I imagine a criminal must experience, even if
only for a moment, as he sets about his crime” (BD, p. 33). June describes her
friend’s reaction, when she finds that Bernard and June sleep together. “She was
a year older than me and so disgusted that she didn’t speak to me for months”
(BD, p. 34). And Bernard describes his first sexual experience. Bernard says: “our
first time was a disaster, a complete bloody disaster” (BD, p. 63). Even when
Bernard in his old days, prefers not to talk about sex. Bernard says “For God’s
sake forget about sex” (BD, p. 64).
12.6 Rape as a Political Suppression
The Second World War, like all other wars in history, was riddled with different
forms of brutality. Apart from the huge number of civilians and soldiers who were
killed in the war, the starvation, mistreatment of prisoners and homelessness, was
the fact that women were always in danger of sexual abuse and mass rape. It is
estimated that during the Second World War, in Germany, a million and a half mass
rapes were committed by the Red Army’s soldiers ([12], p. 151).
To foreground the extreme form of power domination that uses masculine power
to humiliate and intimidate women we can refer to two nasty creatures, black dogs,
which were trained by the Gestapo, during the Second World War, to rape women.
This is just one example of the direct relation between politics and sex. In Black
Dogs, the political conflicts that shake Europe are the result of Germany’s invasion
of other countries, afflicting everyone, but especially women. There are two levels
of women’s disgrace: being the enemy and being a woman. Using rape as means
of domination and power enforcement is one matter, but using animals for this
task is something beyond imagination. What June encounters on her honeymoon
influences her for life and makes her unable to have a desirable life with her husband.
Even though June is set free from the dogs, she can never forget the stories of
women who have been their victims. In this way the conflict of power continues
its devastating aftermath. According to Millett, “patriarchy or male authority bears
a certain resemblance to the formulas of nations of war, heinousness is justified on
the grounds that the enemy is either an inferior species or really not human at all”
([11], p. 46). The two horrific black dogs of the story rape a woman and put her
in undignified situation. “She was in a bad way. Her clothes were torn, her nose
was bleeding, and she had a cut above her eyebrow, she was shouting – no, she was
gibbering : : : ” (BD, p. 135).
12.6.1 Sexual Violence: Political and Personal
June encounters the hideous black dogs while she travels in the hills. She is by
herself when she fights them off; there is no sign of Bernard, who is supposed to
be with her. June experiences this horrific moment alone and this is a symbolic
reference to the women who are raped in war. Men are basically absent, and there is
no more masculine power to protect them. She admits her transformation after her
fight with the nasty creatures, “One thing I learned that morning after the dolmen
was that I had courage, physical courage, and that I could stand alone. That’s a
significant discovery for a woman, or it was in my day” (BD, p. 35). Even after
Bernard is informed of what has happened to June he is unable to sympathize with
her. “She had not forgiven him for his absence at a critical time, and the description
of his ridiculous caterpillars had kept her resentment alive” (BD, p. 130).
Two dogs are running down a path into a gorge. The larger leaves a trail of blood, easily
visible on the white stones. June knows that the mayor of a nearby village has not sent out
his men to track the animals down. They descend into the shadow cast by the high cliffs,
down into thickets, and up the other side : : : heading into the mountains, and even though
they are going far away from her, this is the moment of terror that jolts her; she knows they
will return. (BD, p. 38)
The creatures are trained to manifest Gestapo political presence, they are going
to perform the role of soldiers, to intimidate, humiliate and parade their power, even
when they are expelled. Symbolically, women’s bodies represent the body of the
community, so any assault on women’s bodies is inflicted on the whole community.
The consequence of the horrific incident is June’s personality transformation and
the emotional distance between her and Bernard. Although they never officially end
the marriage they prefer to live separately. The two black dogs symbolize brutality
and savagery, which are the result of a war that haunts nations and intimidates
people profoundly. This indicates the fall of humanity to the animalistic level, which
represents an unwelcome legacy and the endless cruelty of wars.
12.7 Conclusion
The heinous portrayal of sexual violence as political domination is pictured in Black

Dogs. Sexual violation in the form of mass rapes has been practised as a means of
intimidation and domination throughout history. The legacy of the Second World
War spread fear among nations and is presented in the form of two black dogs
trained to rape women in the story. June’s personality is transformed after the
shocking experience with the Gestapo dogs. The political aim of rape by dogs is
to spread intimidation and domination within a nation. The shadow of the German
Gestapo is felt through the trained dogs which are left there to frighten people.
This event changes the lives of Bernard and June forever. This research foregrounds
McEwan’s ability to demonstrate the relation between macrocosm (society) and
microcosm (personal). He portrays a very vivid and thorough picture of supposedly
personal conflicts in human relations that are proven to be socio-cultural and
political. At the first glance, the conflicts that McEwan’s characters experience in
their relationships seem to be entirely personal and private. But as demonstrated in
this study, they are all the results of the cultural and political turbulence of their time.
These characters experience more or less the same forms of socio-political turmoil
in their own community. That makes them succumb to a society which determines
their oppression, domination and exploitation.
Appendix
Black Dogs is a story told by Jeremy, the son-in-law of June and Bernard 43 years
after the substantial accident on their honeymoon. While June is in the nursing
home Jeremy follows his parents-in-law story. June recalls the past events, how she
meets Bernard and their marriage. Both of them were young and inexperienced and
attracted to the communist party, since they thought this is the only way to amend the
devastating world. After the Second World War they join the party the same week
they get married. Both come from English upper class society, Bernard’s belittling
attitudes towards lower class people, overwhelm June and generate a sort of conflict
between them. There is the historical moment which describes the falling down of
Berlin Wall, when Bernard and Jeremy fly to Berlin to see the event with their own
eyes. Bernard is attacked by a bunch of young racist while watching the fall of
Berlin wall. He can escape the brutal moment with the help of a stranger woman.
The last chapter explains the horrible event in the past. While on their honeymoon,
Bernard and June are hiking across the war-torn Europe and June encounters two
unusually huge black dogs determined to attack her. She desperately defends herself,
and escapes the situation. When she informs Bernard, he is unable to understand the
gravity of the situations. June’s emotionally collapses when later someone who lives
in that area reveals that the dogs are not normal dogs, they were trained dogs to rape
women by Gestapo, and left there even after Gestapo has left the area. This is the
beginning of the emotional separation of the two souls. Although they love each
other, they cannot come along with each other and live separately.
References
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collapse-spring-1945

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Understanding Complex Systems

Editorial and Programme Advisory Board

Future scientific and technological developments in many fields will necessarily

For further volumes:

Chaos Theory in Politics

ISSN 1860-0832 ISSN 1860-0840 (electronic)

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Ankara Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın

Part I Politics, Uncertainty and Peace Intelligence

1 Organized and Disorganized Chaos a New Dynamics

Part II Politics, Complex Systems, Basin of Attractions

4 Economic Decision Making: Application of the Theory

Part III Leadership, Political Science, Chaos and National

8 Chaos and Political Science: How Floods and Butterflies

Part IV Sex Complexity and Politics in Literature

12 Sex Complexity and Politics in Black Dogs by Ian McEwan. . . . . . . . . . . 191

Şefika Şule Erçetin, Ali Tekin, and Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın

To the faith of humanity’s common future : : :

Keywords Security threats • Intelligence • Peace • Peace intelligence

Ş.Ş. Erçetin ()

S. Banerjee et al. (eds.), Chaos Theory in Politics, Understanding 3

offenseless personality, and integrative power. In Cultural studies it is discussed

1.3 Peace in International Relations Theories

As an interdisciplinary field of international relations, discussed theories are

1.4 Peace in the Literature of Chaos

1.5 Peace Intelligence

It seems hard to understand or explain or define the intelligence. If it is not,

Reflections of peace to the chaos can be defined by another perspective:

As a matter of fact, Lubkemann ([34]: 14) emphasizes that war should be

İbrahim Özkan and I. Burhan Türkşen

Keywords Uncertainty • Taxonomy • Chaos and complexity • Fuzzy sets and

There is no uncertainty theory that is commonly accepted in academia. A Google

İ. Özkan ()

S. Banerjee et al. (eds.), Chaos Theory in Politics, Understanding 17

2.3 Fuzzy Theory

2.4 Fuzzy Decisions

Event ‘1’ Event ‘2’ ::: Event ‘h’

In general every event has associated probabilities that is assigned. These

1. Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des

Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;

Ş.N. Açıkalın ()

S. Banerjee et al. (eds.), Chaos Theory in Politics, Understanding 29

Keywords Arab spring • Chaos theory • Egypt • Syria • International relations

3.2 Order, Anarchy, Disorder and Chaos

This first part is devoted to provide an overview of discussion on order, anarchy,

3.3 Chaos Theory – An Alternative Way

3.4 Chaos Theory and Arab Spring

It is impossible to make a total analysis of Arab Spring, since neither it is a

3.4.1 International System as a Chaotic

3.4.2 Butterfly Effect in Arab Spring

3.4.3 Interdependency in Arab Spring – New Journalists

Third related issue with chaos theory is interdependence in Arab Spring. As we

Role of youth population has kind of main position of interdependency analysis

elements of interdependence is highly relevant to each other, because of mainly

3.4.4 Edge of Chaos – The New Systems

3.5 Egypt – Would Revolution Ended in Coup d’etat?

3.6 Tunisia – A Struggling One

Thousands of people gathered to protest against Islamist government, protests rised

3.7 Syria – Civil War

3.8 Epilogue: Chaos as a Matter of Fact in the Middle East

1. Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University