Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/safety

Hazards correlation analysis of railway accidents: A real-world case study

based on the decade-long UK railway accident data
Ning Wang a, Xin Yang a, *, Jianhua Chen b, *, Hongwei Wang c, Jianjun Wu a
a
State Key Laboratory of Advanced Rail Autonomous Operation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China
b
Shenzhen Polytechnic, Shenzhen, China
c
National Research Center of Railway Safety Assessment, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: With the continuous development and construction of railway transportation, the railway accidents occur
Hazards correlation analysis frequently which greatly threatens the life safety of passengers and the further development of railway industry.
Knowledge graph Discussing and summarizing experience from past accidents is benefit to improve the safety of railway. This
Railway accidents
paper proposes a modeling method for the correlation analysis of hazards in railway accidents based on the
Safety management
knowledge graph theory. By describing the association between accidents and hazards in the knowledge graph
network, the potential law of accident occurrence is revealed. The innovation of this study is that it considers the
correlations between hazards. In addition, the hazards are further refined, and new topology indexes that adapt
to the heterogeneous structure characteristics of knowledge graph are presented. Based on actual railway ac­
cident data in the UK, a number of key hazards have been identified using the methods proposed in this paper.
The experimental results show that by controlling key hazards one by one, the harmful consequence caused by
hazards to accidents is also continuously decreasing. Finally, based on the experimental exploration of the
correlation between key hazards, corresponding preventive measures were developed. The method based on
knowledge graph is expected to be applied to explore the relationship between hazards in railway accidents and
provide additional decision-making information for the prevention of railway accidents.

1. Introduction
Railway transportation is a high-speed, massive, and high-frequency
mode of transportation. It involves the safety of numerous personnel,
goods and materials. If an accident occurs during railway transportation,
it will not only cause serious casualties and property losses, but also have
a significant impact on social and economic development. In the railway
transportation system, train derailment, runaway and collision are
common railway accidents. Especially in terms of traffic accidents,
major railway traffic accidents have happened in various countries.
Most of the accidents have caused serious consequences such as heavy
casualties. For example, on April 28, 2008, the T195 train from Beijing
to Qingdao was off-line when it arrived at the Jiaoji railway, and
collided with the 5034 train from Yantai to Xuzhou, causing 71 deaths
and 416 injuries. On February 22, 2012, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, a
train hit a buffer barrier at the end of the rail and derailed, killing 49
people and injuring more than 600. Therefore, railway transportation
safety is very necessary, and ensuring railway transportation safety is an
important link in maintaining the safety of national and people’s lives
and property.
Under the foregoing facts, railway accidents have received extensive
attention from scholars. For example, Evans (2021) and others conduct
relevant research on fatal train accidents in European Railways up to
2019. There are many hazards causing railway accidents. In order to
prevent the occurrence of railway accidents, it is necessary to explore
and study the key hazard factors in railway accidents. In recent years,
many scholars have analyzed the hazard factors of railway accidents,
Chang et al. (2009) examines the causality among driving performance,
traffic actors and intersection accidents using path analysis. Stanton and
Walker (2011) discuss the psychological factors involved in the Lad­
broke Grove rail accident. Based on the ordered probit model and data
analysis, Hao et al. (2016) find that driver, environment and weather
characteristics have a strong impact on the severity of injuries in acci­
dents at highway-rail grade crossings. Haleem (2016) investigates haz­
ard factors of traffic casualties at private highway-railroad grade
crossings in the United States, including temporal crash characteristics,

* Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: 11111047@bjtu.edu.cn (X. Yang), cjh@szpt.edu.cn (J. Chen).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2023.106238
Received 20 September 2022; Received in revised form 20 April 2023; Accepted 16 June 2023
Available online 25 June 2023
0925-7535/© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
N. Wang et al.
geometry, railroad, traffic, vehicle, and environment. Li et al. (2019)
integrate theoretic accident model and the process (STAMP) and human
factors analysis and classification System (HFACS), and reveal a number
of prominent accident reasons caused by human factors. However, most
railway accidents are not caused by a single factor. The hazards that lead
to railway accidents can be divided into four categories: personnel fac­
tors, equipment factors, environment factors and management factors.
Scholars also discuss the connections between the multiple hazards
factors. Mirabadi and Sharifian (2010) use association rule data mining
technology to analyze the data of past accidents in Iran’s railway,
consider human factors, vehicles, tracks, signal systems and other haz­
ard factors, and identify the potential relations between hazard factors.
Evans and Hughes (2019) study the relations between travelers, delays
and failures to road users at railway level crossings in the UK. Exploring
the relations between different hazards and obtaining valuable knowl­
edge from them will contribute to the development of railway safety.
In the research of security hazard analysis in many fields, network
models are commonly used to reveal the characteristics and hidden
knowledge of complex systems in this field (Wu et al., 2021; Zeng et al.,
2021). At present, the commonly used network models include Bayesian
network, Complex network and the emerging knowledge graph network
in recent years.
Bayesian networks are often used to infer uncertain knowledge in
railway transportation. Logical structure diagram and probability cal­
culations are used for reasoning to explore useful information in railway
transportation. Wang et al. (2017a, 2017b) build a Bayesian network
fault prediction model with fault causes as model variables to evaluate
the impact of weather on railway switches. Dindar et al. (2018) use
Bayesian network to study the impact of weather on railway turnout
systems and analyze the probability of train derailment. Huang et al.
(2020) used interpretative structural modeling combined with Bayesian
networks to quantitatively analyze the relationship between various
factors in the railway dangerous goods transportation system. However,
in the process of using Bayesian networks to explore railway accident
information, most scholars describe the relationship between nodes as a
causal relationship of hazards, other types of nodes including time, ac­
cident hazard consequences, and so on. and edges that can describe the
relationship between them. At the same time, edges that can describe the
relationships between various types of nodes are also missing. On the
other hand, although Bayesian network is a directed network, it cannot
form the representation of ring graph. However, in the complex system
of real hazard of railway accidents, the factors of hazard can influence
each other and form a directed ring graph. Therefore, Bayesian network
also has some limitations for the correlation analysis of hazard of
complex systems.
Complex network theory is a new theory which has been rising in
recent years. It is an abstract concept for a large number of real complex
systems. It can describe various interactions or relations within complex
systems, such as a causal relationship (Liu et al., 2018). The model based
on complex network theory can form a directed ring graph, explore the
correlation between a large number of hazards, and break through the
limitations of Bayesian network. Therefore, it is widely used in the
research of exploring the relations between knowledge. It provides a
new way to understand the complex interactions between railway haz­
ards. In terms of subway safety research, Li et al. (2017) establish a
subway hazard network using the complex network theory and discuss
the correlation between hazards. In the subway construction safety
research, in order to analyze and understand the complexity of the ac­
cident network, Zhou et al. (2014) establish a complex network model of
subway construction accidents, which finally proves that it can control
the original accident and prevent the occurrence of secondary accidents
and derivative accidents. Zhou et al. (2019) combin the complex
network with the association rule mining algorithm, and propose an
improved Apriori algorithm to explore the type of anomaly monitoring,
revealing the association rules between the security hazard monitoring
type and the hazard coupling. In the aspect of railway security, complex
2
Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
network theory has also been widely used. Klockner and Toft (2018)
propose a safety net method that can be used to understand the
complexity of the relationship between system factors in railway safety
accidents. Liu et al. (2019) build an iterative causal network model for
railway operation accidents and develope indicators to analyze the
causes of railway accidents. Based on Pearson correlation coefficient,
Hua and Zheng (2019) analyze the correlation between railway cause
factors, establish a railway accident cause network model, and analyze
the overall structure of the network by using the basic topology index of
the complex network. Lam and Tai (2020) propose a hazard analysis
framework for railway accidents, and consider the correlation of railway
accident data from three perspectives of local, global and scenario. Li
and Wang (2018) propose a hazard monitoring model based on complex
network to identify and analyze the correlation between accident cause
factors.
However, most of the railway accident networks proposed by the
above scholars are one-dimensional complex networks, which can only
provide limited information. In general, the process of railway accidents
is relatively complex and affected by various factors. In order to explore
the correlation between hazard factors and obtain more useful infor­
mation about railway accidents, the multi-dimensional network model
provides a new perspective. In one-dimensional complex networks, de­
gree, clustering coefficient, centrality and other network topology
analysis indexes are widely used. By comparison, in multi-dimensional
complex networks, the corresponding network topology analysis in­
dexes are relatively few. Although Liu et al. (2021) expand the multi-
dimensional indexes for railway accidents, it only contains qualitative
causal relationships and hazard types without considering quantitative
causality, hazard occurrence time and other valuable information.
Therefore, in order to further explore the correlation between hazards
and provide effective information for the prevention of railway acci­
dents, it is necessary to study and innovate the multi-dimensional
network of railway accidents and its topological analysis indexes.
As a new network, the knowledge graph was proposed by Google in
2012. It is a typical multilateral relationship graph, which is composed
of nodes (entities) and edges (relationships between entities) (Zhang
et al., 2022). Knowledge graph describes related domain knowledge
entities into connected network nodes, which can describe various re­
lations between knowledge entities. The greatest advantage of this
knowledge graph network compared to complex network is that it can
contain various types of nodes and the association relationships between
various types of nodes. In addition to the causal relationship, explore the
relationship between other nodes. At the same time, the knowledge
graph can break through the limitation of Bayesian network, build a
directed ring knowledge graph network, and explore the relationship
between hazard in complex systems. At present, knowledge graph has
been applied to knowledge modeling in various fields, Ma (2022) sum­
marizes the construction and application of knowledge graph in Geo­
science. At the same time, it has also been explored by many scholars in
the field of food science and industry (Min et al., 2022), medical (Gong
et al., 2021), drug discovery (Bonner et al., 2022) and social networks
(Agouti, 2022), etc. In recent years, scholars have also made many re­
searches in the field of transportation using knowledge graph theory. In
the field of urban transportation, Tan et al. (2021) explore the relations
between transportation entities by using the knowledge graph theory.
Tian et al. (2022) propose a tracking method for people exposed to
epidemic situation in public transport based on knowledge graph theory.
Liu et al. (2021) propose a method to build railway operational accident
knowledge graph model by using the theory of knowledge graph, and
formulate new heterogeneous topology indexes to analyze the topology
characteristics of the network. However, it overlooks the correlation
strength between accidents and hazards as well as the fact that the
number of hazards is small, which can’t fully reveal the correlation
between accident hazards.
This study proposes a modeling method of railway accidents based
on knowledge graph, and analyzes the correlation between hazards, so
N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Table 1
Description of railway accident.
Railway Description of Accident occurrence All the hazards and accidents Relations Casualties
accident time
report

R072011 At 00:25 hrs on Tuesday 4 May 2010 five Night Management hazard:There are defects in There are defects in the inspection, No casualties
wagons ran away and two of them the inspection, maintenance and maintenance and management of all
derailed close to Ashburys station in management of all components of the components of the train → Brake system
Manchester. The runaway was caused by train;Equipment hazard:Brake system problem → Runaway accident →
ineffective handbrakes on the wagons. problem;Types of accidents:Runaway Derailment accident
The investigation found deficiencies in accident;Derailment accident.
the maintenance plan for the wagons.
Nobody was injured in the derailment.
R142013 Around 07:06 on 28 June 2012, when Daytime Management hazard:Insufficient Insufficient preparation plans for severe No casualties
the train was moving along a straight preparation plans for severe weather weather conditions such as floods and
track, it hit a washed out embankment conditions such as floods and storms; storms → The flood caused by heavy
near Cckmore, Northern Ireland. The Environmental hazards:The flood caused rain → Embankments eroded by the
investigation found that on June by heavy rain;Embankments eroded by the current → Collision accident
27,2012, heavy rainfall in the catchment current;Types of accident:Collision
area of the nearby brokerage River, and accident.
the culvert system on the river could not
cope with the flow from heavy rainfall,
causing water to flow back behind the
railway embankment and causing local
flooding. Weather preparation
procedures do not include planning for
flood or rainstorm events and fail to
respond appropriately to rainfall events.
There were no injuries.
R062018 At around 18:05 on July 28, 2017, a Daytime Management hazard:Insufficient Insufficient inspection and maintenance Three people
train heading north entered Abergavini inspection and maintenance of cables and of cables and wires→Cable and wire were slightly
Station, and a power cable hanging from wires;Equipment hazard:Cable and wire fracture defect fault;→Electrical injured
the station pedestrian bridge was stuck fracture defect fault;Types of accident: accidents → Collision accidents.
on the roof. The train dragged the cable Electrical accidents;Collision accidents.
out of the remaining fixtures until one
end of the cable fell off the connected
distribution cabinet. The free end of the
cable quickly spun and collided with a
group of passengers on the pedestrian
bridge stairs, three of whom suffered
minor injuries. The investigation found
that the cable did not undergo regular
inspections in accordance with the
electrical installation requirements.

Table 2
Mortality and weighted injury quantification.
Injury degree Weighting

Class 1 Minor injury / multiple Class 2 injuries 0.008

Multiple Class 1 minor injuries / more severe injury 0.04
1–2 Major injuries 0.2
Multiple major / single fatality 1
Multiple fatalities 5

Table 3
Railway accidents and average consequences.
Accident Description of accident Average consequence (DWI/Year)

A01 Collision accident 2.652

A02 Derailment accident 0.1624
A03 Runaway accident 0.0504
A04 Falling accident 0.2224
Fig. 1. Distribution of occurrence proportion of various accident types. A05 Dragging accident 0.1024
A06 Electrical accident 0.0288
A07 Overspeed accident 0.004
as to further explore the correlation between hazards of railway acci­ A08 Near miss 0.0008
dents, and provide useful information for the prevention of railway ac­
cidents. In this study, hazards correlation analysis knowledge graph
(HCAKG) model is established. When constructing HCAKG, four ma­ useful information of HCAKG with more dimensions. Finally, the
trixes are used to extract various relations between knowledge entities. effectiveness of the method is verified through analyzing real-life
In order to analyze the topological structure of HCAKG, topological accidents.
analysis indexes considering time factors is proposed to explore the

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Table 4 their relations.

Hazards and description.
Hazards description Type of 2.1.1. Step 1: Identify knowledge entities
Hazards The first step in the establishment of HCAKG is to identify knowledge
H01 Insufficient experience or ability of train driver H-Type entities. The interactions between hazards in railway accidents even­
H02 Train driver’s misjudgment of dangerous situation H-Type tually leads to the occurrence of accidents. In order to prevent the
H03 Train driver ignores or misunderstands the warning H-Type occurrence of railway accidents, it is necessary to explore the relations
… … H-Type between the hazards that cause railway accidents. Therefore, the first
EI01 Brake system problems EI-Type
EI02 Braking system equipment and performance problems EI-Type
thing that can be determined is to select hazards and railway accidents
EI03 Road rail vehicle fault or abnormal state EI-Type as knowledge entities. In addition, in order to obtain more information
… … EI-Type related to hazards and formulate targeted prevention strategies, types of
E01 Leaves E-Type hazard, hazard occurrence time and accident consequences are consid­
E02 Landslide E-Type
ered as knowledge entities.
E03 High Weather temperature E-Type
… … E-Type
M01 Inadequate preparation plan for flood and rainstorm M-Type 2.1.2. Step 2: Identify the relations between knowledge entities
M02 Inappropriate shift scheduling or work planning M-Type The second step of building HCAKG is to determine the relations
M03 The supervision and review of the safety work system M-Type between knowledge entities. The relations between knowledge entities
is invalid
… … M-Type
determined in this study includes the causal relationship between haz­
ards, the correlation between hazards and accidents, the correlation
between hazards and types of hazard, the correlation between hazards
and their occurrence time, and the correlation between accidents and
Table 5 accident consequences. The relationships between knowledge entities
Knowledge entities and triples of R072011、R142013 and R062018. are described by four keywords, namely ‘Result − In’, ‘Type − Is’,
Railway knowledge entities Knowledge triples ‘Value − Is’ and ‘Happened − When’.
accident The keyword ‘Result − In’ indicates a causal link between knowledge
report entities. The knowledge entities include hazards and accidents. For
R072011 M14: There are defects in the <M14, Result-In1, EI01>,< example, if and only if H01 is the direct causal factor leading to H02,
inspection, maintenance and EI01, Result-In1, A03>,<A03, their knowledge triple can be expressed as < H01, Result − In1, H02 >.
management of all components Result-In1, A02>,<M14, Type-
The keyword ‘Type − Is’ is used to describe the correlation between
of the train;EI01: Brake system Is, M-type>,<EI01, Type-Is, EI-
problem;A03: Runaway accident; type>,<M19, Happened-
hazards and types of hazard. For example, H01 is H-Type hazard. The
A02: Derailment accident;M- When1, Night>,<EI01, knowledge triple can be expressed as < H01, Type − Is, H-Type >.
type;EI-type;Night;Con. Happened-When1, Night>, The keyword ‘Value − Is’ shows the relations between accident and
<A02, Value-Is0, Con>,<A03, their consequences, and is recorded as a specific value. For example,
Value-Is0, Con>
assume that the accident consequence of accident A01 is quantified as
R142013 M01: Insufficient preparation <M01, Result-In1, E07>,<
plans for severe weather E07, Result-In1, E12>,<E12, 0.008. The knowledge triple can be expressed as < A01, Value − Is 0.008,
conditions such as floods and Result-In1, A01>,<M01, Type- Con >.
storms;E07: The flood caused by Is, M-type>,<E07, Type-Is, E- The keyword ‘Happened − When’ reveals the correlation between
heavy rain;E12: Embankments type>,<E12, Type-Is, E-type>, hazards and their occurrence time. For example, if hazard H01 occurs
eroded by the current;A01: <M01, Happened-When1,
Collision accident;M-type;E-type; Daytime>,<E07, Happened-
once at night, the knowledge triple can be expressed as < H01,
Daytime;Con. When1, Daytime>,<E12, Happened − When 1, night >.
Happened-When1, Daytime>,
<A01, Value-Is0, Con> 2.1.3. Step 3: Build the model
R062018 M06: Inadequate inspection and <M06, Result-In1, EI18>,<
Due to the different types of mutual definitions between knowledge
maintenance of overhead EI18, Result-In1, A06>,<A06,
linesEI18:Broken cables and Result-In1, A01>,<M06, Type- graphs, seven matrices are defined to construct the model.
wires or defective capacitorsA01: Is, M-type>,<EI18, Type-Is, EI- The first matrix is the causal strength matrix (CSM), and CSMij is
Collision accident;A06: Electrical type>,<M06, Happened- defined by Eq. (1). The CSMij is determined by the knowledge triples
accident;M-type;EI-type; When1, Daytime>,<EI18,
including the keyword’Result − In’. In the knowledge triples, i represents
Daytime;Con. Happened-When1, Daytime>,
<A01, Value-Is0.04, a hazard or an accident, j represents a hazard or an accident too, δ
Con><A06, Value-Is0.04, represents a specific value, and KTs represents all knowledge triples
Con> identified in step 2. CSM can describe and map the causal relations be­
tween hazards and accidents into a network graph. Because there is a
one-way causal relationship between knowledge entities, the causal
2. Method
relationship edge is described as a directed edge in this study. The higher
the frequency of causal relationship is, the higher the degree of corre­
2.1. Modeling of hazards correlation analysis knowledge graph
lation strength is. Therefore, weighted edges are used to describe the
correlation strength between causal relationships. In other words, when
To analyze the hazard correlation of railway accidents, HCAKG
CSMij = δ, there are δ causal relationship edges from knowledge entity i
needs to be established. HCAKG is a knowledge graph containing
to knowledge entity j.
knowledge entities (nodes) and relations (different types of edges) be­
{
tween knowledge entities. Each edge is represented as a triple of the δ < i, Result − Inδ, j >∈ KTs
CSM ij = (1)
form (head entity, relation, tail entity) (Wang et al., 2017a, 2017b). 0 < i, Result − Inδ, j >∕∈ KTs
Knowledge entities and their relationships are usually described by
knowledge triples. Knowledge triples are represented as <Entityhead , The second matrix is the type matrix (TYM), and TYMij is a matrix
Relation, Entitytail >, where Entityhead , Entitytail represent two entities and defined by Eq. (2). The TYMij is determined by the knowledge triples
Relation represents the relationship between Entityhead and Entitytail . including the keyword’Type − Is’. In the knowledge triples, i represents a
Therefore, building HCAKG requires identifying knowledge entities and hazard, j represents the type of hazard, and KTs represents all

4
N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 2. Knowledge graph of R072011、R142013 and R062018.

knowledge triples identified in step 2. Through TYM, the knowledge

triples describing hazard and types of hazard can be mapped to a graph,
that is, if TYMij = 1, there is an edge marked’Type − Is’ from entity i to
entity j
{
1 < i, Type − Is, j >∈ KTs
TYM ij = (2)
0 < i, Type − Is, j >∕
∈ KTs

The third matrix is the result matrix (RM), and RMij is defined by Eq.
(3). The RMij is determined by the knowledge triples including the
keyword’Value − Is’. In the knowledge triples, i represents an accident, j
represents the consequence of accident, δ represents a specific value, and
KTs represents all knowledge triples identified in step 2. RM can map the
knowledge triples describing the result value into the graph, in other
words, if the value of RMij > 0, there is an edge marked’Value − Isδ’ from
entity i to entity j.
{
δ < i, Value − Isδ, j >∈ KTs
RM ij = (3)
0 < i, Value − Isδ, j >∕
∈ KTs

The fourth matrix is the time matrix (TIM), which is a matrix defined
by Eq. (4). The TIMij is determined by the knowledge triples including
the keyword ‘Happened − When’. In the knowledge triples, i represents a
hazard, j represents the occurrence time of hazard, δ represents a spe­
cific value, and KTs represents all knowledge triples identified in step 2.
Fig. 3. Causal strength matrix.
This means that through TIM, the knowledge triples describing the time
relationship can be mapped into a graph. Because there is a one-way
causal relationship between knowledge entities, the edge of the corre­
lation between hazards and time is described as a directed edge in this
study. The higher the frequency of the correlation is, the higher the

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 4. Type matrix、Result matrix and Time matrix.

Fig. 5. Shortest path matrix and Causal reachability matrix.

intensity of the correlation is. Therefore, weighted edges are used to
describe the intensity of the correlation between hazards and time. That
is, when TIMij = δ, there are δ time relationship edges from knowledge
entity i to knowledge entity j.
{
δ < i, Happened − Whenδ, j >∈ KTs
TIM ij = (4)
0 < i, Happened − Whenδ, j >∕∈ KTs
Based on the first matrix, the remove weighted causal matrix
(RWCSM) is constructed, and RWCSMij is defined by Eq. (5). In order to
facilitate the subsequent construction of the shortest path matrix, the
weight relationship of causality is not be considered here, and the cau­
sality is described as RWCSM matrix.
{
1CSM ij > 0
RWCSM ij = (5)
0CSM ij = 0
The shortest path matrix (SPM) is constructed based on the RWCSM,
and is defined as SPMij by Eq. (6). Where SPMij represents the shortest
path length from hazard i to hazard j or accident j and the shortest path
length from accident i to accident j, u and v represent two entities, N
represents all entities on the shortest path. SPM can capture the length

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Table 6 of correlation between hazards and other hazards is stronger.

Relationship between knowledge entities. ∑ ∑
AcciTI
h = CAM hi × TIM TI
i / SPM hi (8)
Accident Knowledge triples i∈HN i∈HN
report
∑ ∑
R012011 <M19, Result-In1, M03>, <M03, Result-In1, H32>, <H32, Result- PcciTI
h = CAM ih × TIM TI
i / SPM ih (9)
In1, M04>,<M04, Result-In1, H28>, <H28, Result-In1, A01>, i∈HN i∈HN
<M19, Type-Is, M-type>, <M03, Type-Is, M-type>, <H32, Type-Is,
H-type>, <M04, Type-Is, M-type>, <H28, Type-Is, H-type>,<M19, The type distribution proportion of hazards is an index to measure
Happened-When1, Night>, <M03, Happened-When1, Night>,<H32, the relationship between a specific hazard and other types of hazard in
Happened-When1, Night>, <M04, Happened-When1, Night>,<H28, different time periods, including the active type distribution proportion
Happened-When1, Night>,<A01, Value-Is0.008, Con>.
and the passive type distribution proportion. The active type distribu­
R032011 <M13, Result-In1, EI02>, <EI02, Result-In1, A02>, <M13, Type-Is,
M-type>,<EI02, Type-Is, EI-type>,<M13, Happened-When1, tion proportion is intended to measure the proportion distribution of
Daytime>, <EI02, Happened-When1, Daytime>,<A02, Value-Is0.04, other hazard types caused by a specific hazard in different time periods.
Con>. Active type distribution proportion AhtdpTI hT refers to the proportion of T-
…… ……
R152020 <M10, Result-In1, EI15>, <EI15, Result-In1, EI17>, <EI17, Result-
Type hazards in all hazards that can be directly caused by a specific
In1, A10>,<M10, Type-Is, M-type>, <EI15, Type-Is, EI-type>, hazard h in the TI time, which can be calculated by Eq. (10). Similarly,
<EI17, Type-Is, EI-type>,<M10, Happened-When1, Night>, <EI15, the passive type distribution proportion is intended to measure the
Happened-When1, Night>,<EI17, Happened-When1, Night>,<A10, proportion distribution of the hazard type that leads to a specific hazard
has-Value0, Con>.
R162020 <M13, Result-In1, EI01>, <EI01, Result-In1, A03>, <A03, Result-
in different time periods. Passive type distribution proportion PhtdpTI Th
In1, A02>, <M13, Type-Is, M-type>, <EI01, Type-Is, EI-type>, represents the proportion of T-Type hazards among all hazards that can
<M13, Happened-When1, Daytime>, <EI01, Happened-When1, directly lead to a specific hazard h in the TI time. It can be calculated by
Daytime>,<A03, Value-Is0, Con>, <A02, Value-Is0, Con>. Eq. (11). Compared with previous studies, the strength of the correlation
between hazards in the causal strength matrix and time dimension are
characteristics of causal paths in the network model. considered here. When the causal relationship between hazards is
∑ stronger, the type distribution proportion is higher, and its proportion
SPM ij = RWCSM pq (6) will be greater. In a certain period of time, the more the occurrence
u,v∈N times of hazards, the higher the distribution proportion index of hazard
The final matrix is the causal accessibility matrix (CAM), and CAMij is types in that period of time, and the greater their proportion.
defined by Eq. (7). Where CAMij indicates whether there is a causal path ∑ ∑
AhtdpTI
hT = (CSM hj × TYM jT × TIM TI
j )/ (CSMhi × TIM TIi ) (10)
from hazard i to hazard j or accident j. Moreover, CAM can also capture j∈HN i∈HN
whether there is a causal path from the accident i to the accident j.
∑ ∑
{ PhtdpTI
Th = (CSMjh × TYM jT × TIM TI
j )/ (CSM ih × TIM TI
i ) (11)
1SPM ij > 0
CAM ij = (7) j∈HN i∈HN
0SPM ij = 0
The accessibility between types of hazards is an index to measure the
degree of association between different types of hazards in different time
2.2. Network topology analysis indexes periods, including direct accessibility between types of hazards and in­
direct accessibility between types of hazards. The two indexes can reveal
As a knowledge graph model, HCAKG model contains various en­ the strength of the association between hazard types from both local and
tities and relations. The traditional one-dimensional topological analysis global perspectives. The direct accessibility between types of hazards is
indexes are no longer applicable to this multi-dimensional model. intended to measure the strength of the direct correlation between the
Although Liu et al. (2021) propose topological analysis indexes which is two types of hazards in different time periods. That is, the direct
suitable for multi-dimensional models, it ignores time and other infor­ accessibility between types of hazards DaTI PQ refers to the strength of the
mation and is still not applicable to this model. Therefore, it is necessary direct causal relationship between the P-Type hazards and Q-type haz­
to propose new network topology analysis indexes containing more in­ ards in the TI time, which can be calculated by Eq. (12). Similarly, the
formation such as time to explore the correlation between hazards in indirect accessibility between types of hazards is intended to measure
HCAKG. In HCAKG model, N represent the collection of all nodes, HN is the strength of the indirect correlation between the two types of hazards
the collection of all hazard nodes, AN is the collection of all accident in different time periods. The indirect accessibility between types of
nodes, TN is the collection of nodes of all types of hazard, TIN is the hazards IaPQTI refers to the strength of indirect causal relationship be­
collection of all time type nodes, CN is the consequence node. Therefore, tween the P-Type hazards and Q-type hazards in the TI time, which can
N = {HN, AN, TN, TIN, CN}. be calculated by Eq. (13).
The causal correlation intimacy of hazards is an index to measure the ∑
degree of causal relationship between hazards in different time periods, DaTI
PQ = (RWCSM ij × TYM iP ×TYMjQ × TIM TI TI
i × TIM j ) (12)
including active causal correlation intimacy and passive causal corre­
i,j∈HN

lation intimacy. Active causal correlation intimacy AcciTI h refers to the

degree of difficulty that a specific hazard h causes other hazards in TI
time, which can be calculated by Eq. (8). The higher the active causal
correlation intimacy of hazards, the easier it is for hazards to cause other
hazards at that time. Similarly, the passive causal correlation intimacy
PcciTI
h refers to the difficulty degree of a specific hazard h caused by other
hazards in TI time, which can be calculated by Eq. (9). When the passive
causal intimacy of hazards is higher, the hazards are more likely to be
caused by other hazards at that time. Compared with previous studies,
the information of time dimension is considered here. When the number
of occurrence of hazards is more in a certain period of time, the higher
the causal correlation intimacy of hazards is, indicating that the degree
∑
IaTI
PQ = (CAM ij × TYM iP ×TYMjQ × TIM TI TI
i × TIM j ) (13)
i,j∈HN
The accessibility between types of hazards and time is an index to
measure the degree of correlation between the types of hazards and
different times, including direct accessibility between types of hazards
and time and indirect accessibility between types of hazards and time.
These two indexes can reveal the strength of the relationship between
different types of hazards and occurrence time from both local and
global perspectives. The direct accessibility between types of hazards
and time is intended to measure the strength of the direct correlation
between different types of hazards and different times. That is, the direct

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 6. Knowledge graph of hazards of railway accidents.

accessibility between types of hazards and time DtiaTIW indicates the de­
including direct harmful consequence of hazard and intermediate
gree of direct correlation between W-type hazards and TI time, which harmful consequence of hazard. Direct harmful consequence reveals the
can be calculated by Eq. (14). Similarly, the indirect accessibility be­ severity of harmful consequence of hazards from the perspective of each
tween types of hazards and time is intended to measure the strength of hazard, and intermediate harmful consequence reveals the severity of
the indirect correlation between different types of hazards and different harmful consequence of hazards from the whole knowledge graph
times. That is, the indirect accessibility between types of hazards and network model. These two indicators can provide decision-making basis
time ItiaTI for investment in accident prevention.
W indicates the degree of indirect correlation between W-type
hazards and TI time, which can be calculated by Eq. (15). The direct harmful consequence of hazards is intended to measure
∑ the severity of injury to personnel when a specific hazard occurs in TI
DtiaTI
W = (RWCSM ij × TYM iW × TIM TI
j ) (14) time. The direct harmful consequence of generated by hazard h in TI
i,j∈HN
time can be calculated by Eq. (16). TIM matrix records the intensity of
∑ hazard occurrence time, that is, the number of hazards occurring in TI
ItiaTI (CAM ij × TYM iW × TIM TI (15) time in N years, so TIMTIh /N represents the likelihood of occurrence of
W = j )
i,j∈HN
the hazard h in TI time; CAMhAi is an entity of the causal reachability
Harmful consequence indexes of hazards measure the severity of the matrix. RMAiCon is an entity of the result matrix, representing the average
hazards caused by a given hazard to personnel in railway accidents, consequence of accident Ai.

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 7. Distribution of causal correlation intimacy.

The intermediate harmful consequence of hazards is intended to 3. Case analysis

measure the severity of personal injury caused by a specific hazard in TI
time. It should be noted that this particular hazard can be caused by
other hazards, and will also lead to the occurrence of other hazards,
which plays an intermediate role in the spread of hazards. From the
perspective of the whole knowledge graph network model, if this
particular hazard is controlled or eliminated, it will affect direct harmful
consequence of other hazards that produce this hazard, and also affect
the direct harmful consequence of other hazards caused by this hazard,
that is, it will reduce the direct harmful consequence of other hazards,
and play a role in mitigating and controlling the consequences of acci­
dents. The intermediate harmful consequence of hazards can be calcu­
lated by Eq. (17), where CAMih and CAMhAi is the entity of the causal
reachability matrix. DhcTIh is the harmful consequences generated by the
hazard i in TI time.
∑ cident types, there is an accident report recording the occurrence of
DhcTI TI
h = (TIM h /N) × (CAMhAi × RM AiCon ) (16)
Ai∈AN
∑ and then the derailment accident occurred. The statistics of these two
IhcTI
h = (CAM ih × CAM hAi × DhcTI
i ) (17)
i∈HN,Ai∈AN
3.1. Data collection
In this study, the decade-long UK railway accident data from 2011 to
2020 are selected. Relevant information can be obtained from the
website of the UK railway accident investigation office. A total of 176
railway accident reports were selected, excluding subway accidents and
tram accidents.
In the process of counting railway accident data, the information
required to be recorded is the number of railway accident, the occur­
rence time of railway accident, and the basic situation of the hazards and
the type of hazards in railway accident. The statistics of railway accident
data with accident number R072011、R142013 and R062018 are
shown in Table 1 below. It is worth noting that in the statistics of ac­
multiple types of accidents. For example, in the accident report
R072011, the record shows that the Runaway accident occurred firstly
types of accidents are carried out, and there is a ‘Result − In’ causal
relationship between the two accidents.
Based on the comprehensive analysis of the accident data reports
over the past 10 years, the collected accident types are Collision acci­
dent, Derailment accident, Runaway accident, Falling accident, Over­
speed accident, Dragging accident, Electrical accident and Near Miss.
The proportion of each accident type is shown in Fig. 1.

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 8. The type distribution proportion of H-Type hazards in daytime.

Fig. 9. The type distribution proportion of EI-Type hazards.

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 10. The type distribution proportion of E-Type hazards.

Fig. 11. The type distribution proportion of M-Type hazards.

3.2. HCAKG construction
First of all, railway accident, railway accident consequences, haz­
ards, types of hazards, hazard occurrence time are identified as knowl­
edge entities from the 176 railway accident reports collected above. In
this model, the accident consequences are measured by the severity of
casualties, which is quantified by the death and weighted injury (DWI)
shown in Table 2 (RSSB. 2014.).
If only accidents numbered R072011、R142013 and R062018 have
occurred within 3 years, take the accident reports R072011、R142013

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N. Wang et al.
Fig. 12. Accessibility between different types of hazards in daytime.
Fig. 13. Accessibility between different types of hazards in night.
and R062018 in Table 1 as examples to calculate the harm consequences
of the accident. According to Tables 1 and Table 2, it can be seen that in
the accident reports numbered R072011、R142013 and R062018, there
are no casualties in R072011 and R142013, so the degree of the damage
is not estimated, and the Weighting is 0. But in R062018, there are three
people were slightly injured, so the Weighting is 0.04 according to
Table 2. In these there reports, the average consequence of collision
accidents in 3 years was 0 + 0.04 / 3 = 0.0133 DWI/Year, the average
consequence of Electrical accidents in 3 years was 0.04 / 3 = 0.0133
DWI/Year. The average consequence of derailment accidents and
runaway accidents within three years are both 0 / 3 = 0 DWI / Year.
According to the above calculation method, the average consequences of
different accident types during 10 years can be calculated, as shown in
Table 3.
The railway accidents numbered A01 ~ A08 are identified as acci­
dent knowledge entities that are shown in Table 3. And their conse­
quence is identified as accident consequence knowledge entities
numbered Con. The 89 hazards numbered H01 ~ H34, EI01 ~ EI21, E01
~ E15 and M01 ~ M19 and the four types(H-Type、EI-Type、E-Type and
M-Type) of the 89 hazards are identified that are shown in Table 4. Due
to space limitations, see the appendix for details. Meanwhile, in this
study, Daytime and Night are identified as time knowledge entities.
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Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
The links between knowledge entities are described by knowledge
triples with keywords ‘Result − In’, ‘Type − Is’, ‘Value − Is’ and
‘Happened − When’.
The railway accidents numbered R072011, R142013 and R062018
are used as examples to identify knowledge entities and the Knowledge
triples, the results shown in Table 5 below.
Taking the knowledge triples identified in Table 5 as an example,
Neo4j is used to build the knowledge graph shown in Fig. 2 can be
constructed.
The required matrix in the model constructed from the knowledge
graph in Fig. 2. Where the CSM matrix is shown in Fig. 3, the TYM
matrix, the RM matrix, and the TIM matrix are shown in Fig. 4 (a), 4 (b),
and 4 (c). And the RWCSM matrix and the CAM matrix are shown in
Fig. 5 (a) and 5 (b), respectively. The subsequent index calculation can
be performed according to the constructed matrix.
Through the data processing method of the above three accident
reports, other accident reports in the past 10 years can be analyzed and
all knowledge triplets can be obtained. By recording and analyzing other
accident reports in the past 10 years, all of the knowledge triples can be
obtained. Due to space limitations, only some knowledge triples are
listed here that are shown in Table 6.
Based on the identified all knowledge entities and knowledge triples,
N. Wang et al.
Fig. 14. Accessibility between types of hazards and time.
Neo4j is used to build a knowledge network model of railway accidents
that is shown in Fig. 6. The knowledge graph network model is
composed of 105 nodes and 525 edges. 105 nodes include 89 hazards, 4
types of hazards, 8 accidents, Con, Daytime, and Night. The 525 edges
consist of 89 edges containing the keyword ‘Type − Is’, 274 edges con­
taining the keyword ‘Result − In’, 8 edges containing the keyword
‘Value − Is’, and 154 edges containing the keyword ‘Happened − When’.
Fig. 15. Direct harmful consequences of hazards.
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Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
Correspondingly, the correlation matrix can be obtained in Fig. 6,
calculate the subsequent indicators, and analyze the hidden information
in the data.
3.3. Topology analysis results
3.3.1. Causal correlation intimacy of hazards
First, Eqs. (8) and (9) are used to calculate the active causal corre­
lation intimacy and passive causal correlation intimacy of each hazard.
Fig. 7(a) shows the active causal correlation intimacy and passive
causal correlation intimacy of H-Type hazards in daytime and night. On
the whole, in daytime and night, the passive causal correlation intimacy
of hazards is generally higher than their active causal correlation in­
timacy. The passive causal correlation intimacy of H04, H05, H13, H19
in daytime and H04 and H34 in night is significantly higher than that of
most hazards, which is more likely to be caused by other hazards, and
requires special attention.
Fig. 7(b) shows the active causal correlation intimacy and passive
causal correlation intimacy of EI-Type hazards in daytime and night. On
the whole, the passive causal correlation intimacy of hazards in daytime
and night is generally higher than their active causal correlation in­
timacy. Among them, the passive causal correlation intimacy of EI11,
EI14, EI16, EI19 in daytime and EI14, EI16 in night are higher than that
of most hazards. It shows that it is more likely to be caused by other
hazards during this time period, which requires special attention.
Fig. 7(c) shows the active causal correlation intimacy and passive
causal correlation intimacy of E-Type hazards in daytime and night. On
the whole, the passive causal correlation intimacy of hazards is generally
higher than their active causal correlation intimacy in daytime and
night. The passive causal correlation intimacy of E04, E07, E10 in
daytime and E07, E10 in night are higher than that of most hazard,
indicating that it is more likely to be caused by other hazards during this
N. Wang et al.
Fig. 16. Intermediate harmful consequences of hazards.
time period, which requires special attention.
Fig. 7(d) shows the active causal correlation intimacy and passive
causal correlation intimacy of M-Type hazards in daytime and night. On
the whole, the passive causal correlation intimacy of hazards is generally
lower than their active causal correlation intimacy. The passive causal
correlation intimacy of most hazards is 0, indicating that it cannot be
caused by other hazards, while only M04 and M05 in daytime and M03,
M04 and M05 in night have a passive causal correlation intimacy greater
than 0, indicating that it can be caused by other hazards in this time
period. Among them, M04, M07 and M12 in daytime have a high degree
of active causal correlation, indicating that these hazards are more likely
to lead to other hazards in this period of time, which requires special
attention.
Obtain the correlation between different hazards in different time
periods, which is conducive to develop prevention strategies for hazards.
3.3.2. Type distribution proportion of hazards
The active type distribution proportion of hazards and the passive
type distribution proportion of hazards can be calculated by. (10) and
Eq. (11).
The active type distribution proportion and the passive hazards type
distribution proportion of H-Type hazards in daytime and night are
shown in Fig. 8 respectively. Through analysis, it can be found that in
daytime and night, most H-Type hazards can cause H-Type hazards, a
small number of hazards can cause the generation of other types of
hazards, and a small number of hazards such as H07, H10, H11, H28,
H30, whose active type distribution proportion is 0, indicating that they
can’t cause the generation of other hazard types, which will directly lead
to accidents. In daytime and night, most H-Type hazards are caused by
H-type and M-Type, indicating that there is a strong correlation not only
between H-type hazards and M-type hazards, but also between H-type
hazards. The passive type distribution proportion of H09, H15, H16 and
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Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
H33 is 0 in daytime, indicating that they cannot be directly affected by
other hazards in daytime.
The active type distribution proportion and the passive type distri­
bution proportion of EI-Type hazards in daytime and night are shown in
Fig. 9 respectively. Through analysis, it can be found that in daytime and
night, most EI-Type hazards are more likely to lead to EI-Type hazards.
In daytime and night, EI-Type hazards are mainly caused by M-Type and
EI-Type hazards.
The active type distribution proportion and the passive type distri­
bution proportion of E-Type hazards in daytime and night are shown in
Fig. 10 respectively. Through analysis, it can be found that in daytime
and night, E-Type hazards are more likely to lead to E-Type and EI-Type
hazards, indicating that the occurrence of general natural disasters will
lead to the occurrence of other secondary natural disasters, as well as
mechanical equipment and other failures. In daytime and night, most of
the E-Type hazards are caused by M-Type hazards and E-Type hazards,
which also indicates that improper management will also lead to the
occurrence of environmental hazards.
The active type distribution proportion and the passive type distri­
bution proportion of M-Type hazards in daytime and night are shown in
Fig. 11 respectively. Through analysis, it can be found that all M-Type
hazards can lead to the occurrence of other types of hazards in daytime
and night, among which H-Type hazards and EI-Type hazards account
for a large proportion. In daytime and night, only M03, M04 and M05
are M-Type hazards caused by other types of hazards, and most of them
are M-Type hazards, with a small number of H-Type hazards.
Exploring the type distribution proportion index is conducive to the
subsequent development of targeted prevention strategies for each
hazard and the prevention of railway accidents.
3.3.3. Accessibility between different types of hazards
The direct accessibility between different types of hazards and the
N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 17. Harmful consequences of all hazards.

Fig. 18. Changes of harmful consequences in daytime.

indirect accessibility between different types of hazards can be calcu­
lated by Eqs. (12) and (13). Fig. 12 shows the statistical results of direct
type accessibility index and indirect type accessibility index between
different types of hazards in daytime. Fig. 12 shows that during the daily
time period, the direct accessibility between H-Type hazards and H-Type
hazards, EI-Type hazards and EI-Type hazards, M-Type hazards and H-
Type hazards, M-Type hazards and EI-Type hazards are all high, indi­
cating that the relations between these hazards are relatively close from
a local perspective. The indirect accessibility between H-Type hazards
and H-Type hazards, M-Type hazards and H-Type hazards, M-Type
hazards and EI-Type hazards are all high, indicating that from a global
perspective, the relationships between these hazards are relatively close.
Fig. 13 shows the statistical results of direct accessibility between
different types of hazards and indirect accessibility between different
types of hazards in night. As seen in Fig. 13, in the night time period, the
indirect accessibility between H-Type hazards and H-Type hazards, M-

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N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Fig. 19. Changes of harmful consequences at night.

Fig. 20. Prevention strategy development process.

16
N. Wang et al.
Table 7
Prevention suggestions for some key hazards.
Key hazards Recommended precautions
H07 (Train driver Improving the job
accelerates, requirements of train drivers
overspeed or fails to to ensure that they have
decelerate in time) sufficient ability and
experience before taking up
their posts
Strengthening the warning
training for train drivers
Reasonably arrange the shift
arrangement and rest time of
train drivers, and carry out
health and safety inspection
before train drivers take up
their posts
Provide more complete
management training for
management and monitoring
staff to ensure their post
ability
Improve track monitoring,
cleaning and early warning,
and timely ensure the stable
and suitable operation status
of tracksGuarantee and
maintain the protection and
warning system of the train on
time to ensure that the train
driver receives accurate alarm
information and makes timely
adjustment
EI07 (Vehicle with Replacing faulty wheels in
broken train time, checking and ensuring
components) the normal use status of
wheels on time
Improving the inspection
procedures of train parts and
components, improving the
safety inspection standards
Ensuring the operation status
of train track, and improving
the safety inspection
standardsTimely clean up
fallen leaves and other dirt
that may damage and pollute
train components
E08 (Blocking lines of Strengthening the
instruments and management training for the
equipment) operators of mechanical
equipment to ensure the
operation specification and
accuracy
Timely check the circuit,
electrical and other systems to
ensure that the wires are in a
safe position
Timely clean up the blocking
of track lines caused by strong
windsImprove the safety
inspection system, timely
inspect and maintain the
equipment and environment
around the track lines, and
timely eliminate potential
safety hazards
M04 (No or Reasonably planning the work
inappropriate safe arrangement of railway staff
work system to ensure moderate workload
implemented) and prohibit long-term fatigue
operation
Strengthening the pre job
training of on-site safety con­
trollers and conducting more
operation training before tak­
ing up their posts to ensure
Safety inspection plan
Appropriately increase
the inspection schedule
during the daytime
Arrange the daytime
and night shift
inspection without any
difference
Appropriately increase
the inspection schedule
during the daytime
Appropriately increase
the inspection schedule
during the daytime
17
Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
Table 7 (continued )
Key hazards Recommended precautions Safety inspection plan
their ability to match their
posts
Conducting more complete
management training for
management and monitoring
staff to ensure their ability to
take up their posts
More detailed division and
arrangement of the
responsibilities of personnel at
each post to ensure that the
responsibilities of personnel at
each post do not
conflictStrengthen the
training management of
management personnel and
track workers, and increase
the supervision plan“.
Type hazards and H-Type hazards, M-Type hazards and EI-Type hazards
are high, indicating that from a global perspective, the relationships
between these hazards are relatively close. From a local perspective, the
direct accessibility between H-Type hazards and H-Type hazards, EI-
Type hazards and EI-Type hazards, M-Type hazards and H-Type haz­
ards, M-Type hazards and EI-Type hazards are high, indicating that the
relationships between these hazards are relatively close.
Exploring the accessibility between different types of hazards is
helpful to get the correlation between different types of hazards locally
and as a whole. It is helpful to formulate prevention strategies for rail­
way accidents.
3.3.4. Accessibility between types of hazards and time
The direct accessibility between types of hazards and time and in­
direct accessibility between types of hazards and time can be calculated
by Eq. (14) and (15). Fig. 14 shows the statistical results of direct
accessibility between types of hazards and time and indirect accessi­
bility between types of hazards and time in daytime and night. As can be
seen from Fig. 14, direct accessibility and indirect accessibility of H-
Type hazards and daytime period, M-Type hazards and daytime period,
and M-Type hazards and night time period are all high, indicating that
these hazard types are closely related to the corresponding time period,
whether from a local or global perspective.
Exploring the connection between different types of hazards and
different time periods is conducive to formulate prevention strategies for
railway accidents.
3.3.5. Harmful consequences of hazards
The direct harmful consequences and intermediate harmful conse­
quences of hazards can be calculated by Eq. (12) and (13). The direct
harmful consequences of H-Type hazards in daytime and night are
shown in Fig. 15 (a). From the figure, it can be seen that among H-type
hazards, H04 and H14 cause greater harm in daytime. The direct
harmful consequences of EI-Type hazards in daytime and night are
shown in Fig. 15 (b). From the figure, it can be found that among E-Type
hazards, EI06, EI11, EI12, EI16, etc. cause greater harm in daytime. The
direct harmful consequences of E-Type hazards in daytime and night are
shown in Fig. 15 (c). From the figure, it can be found that among E-type
hazards, E07 causes greater harm in daytime. The direct harmful con­
sequences of M-type hazards in daytime and night are shown in Fig. 15
(d). From the figure, it can be found that M07, M14 and M17 among M-
type hazards cause greater harm in daytime, and these hazards need to
be paid special attention to. On the whole, the harmful consequences of
most hazards in daytime are greater than those in night.
The intermediate harmful consequences of H-Type hazards in day­
time and night are shown in Fig. 16 (a). From the figure, it can be found
that among H-Type hazards, H07, H11, H14, etc. cause greater
N. Wang et al. Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238

Table A1 Table A1 (continued )

Hazards, hazards type and occurrence frequency. Hazards description Type of
Hazards description Type of hazard
hazard
EI19 Failure or damage of signal device or failure of signal EI-Type
H01 Insufficient experience or ability of train driver H-Type system
H02 Train driver’s misjudgment of dangerous situation H-Type EI20 Line kerbs, guardrails, etc. are damaged or blocked EI-Type
H03 Train driver ignores or misunderstands the warning H-Type effectively
H04 Train driver stress, fatigue or distraction H-Type EI21 Inadequate warning devices at intersections EI-Type
H05 The train driver’s inspection before departure is not in H-Type E01 Leaves E-Type
place E02 Landslide E-Type
H06 Train driver fails to operate or misoperates in violation of H-Type E03 High Weather temperature E-Type
regulations E04 Strong wind or aerodynamics E-Type
H07 The train driver overspeed or fails to slow down in time H-Type E05 The tree is in danger E-Type
H08 Illegal operation by road vehicle drivers H-Type E06 Low visibility caused by heavy fog and glare E-Type
H09 Insufficient experience or ability of road vehicle drivers H-Type E07 Rainfall, snow melting, river water, flood, water flow, etc E-Type
H10 Road vehicle driver drives the vehicle in an unsafe H-Type E08 Blocking lines of vehicles, instruments and equipment E-Type
position E09 Cows, trees and other animals and plants block the line E-Type
H11 Passengers and pedestrians in unsafe positions H-Type E10 Retaining wall, retaining wall, stone, landslide debris, ice E-Type
H12 Passengers and pedestrians are distracted, tired or H-Type block track
uncomfortable E11 Intrusion of foreign vehicles, objects and animals E-Type
H13 Wrong judgment of pedestrians, passengers and riders on H-Type E12 Decrease of embankment stability (water erosion) E-Type
dangerous situations E13 Collapse and falling of reinforced concrete and retaining E-Type
H14 Unsafe behavior by pedestrians, passengers and riders H-Type wall
H15 Pedestrians, passengers and riders ignore or H-Type E14 Ice accumulation on contact rail (device on electric E-Type
misunderstand the warning traction vehicle)
H16 Excessive workload of staff H-Type E15 Viaduct damaged and sunk (supporting track) E-Type
H17 The signalman is distracted or tired H-Type M01 Inadequate preparation plan for flood and rainstorm M-Type
H18 Signalman ignores relevant information or makes wrong H-Type M02 Inappropriate shift scheduling or work planning M-Type
judgment M03 The supervision and review of the safety work system is M-Type
H19 Signalman fails to conduct command operation or H-Type invalid
conducts wrong command operation M04 No or inappropriate safe work system implemented M-Type
H20 The controllers of site safety fatigue or distraction H-Type M05 Open for operation under abnormal or unsafe conditions M-Type
H21 Misjudgment or wrong decision of controllers of site H-Type M06 Inadequate inspection and maintenance of overhead lines M-Type
safety M07 Inadequate track structure inspection and maintenance M-Type
H22 Violation or wrong operation of controllers of site safety H-Type system
H23 The controllers of site safety lacks experience in H-Type M08 Missing, insufficient or inconsistent provision of safety M-Type
implementing safe system of work information communication
H24 The controllers of site safety did not implement or H-Type M09 Ineffective risk management of vehicle intrusion into the M-Type
implemented an inappropriate safety work system track
H25 Person in charge of possession stressed or tired or H-Type M10 Defects in risk management of level crossings M-Type
distracted M11 Defects in the monitoring, contact and management of the M-Type
H26 Person in charge of possession operation error or illegal H-Type signal system plan and its staff
operation M12 Defects in the evaluation, inspection and maintenance of M-Type
H27 Distractions of other track workers H-Type equipment and environment around the track line
H28 Other track workers in unsafe position H-Type M13 The acceptance, test and inspection of train braking M-Type
H29 Miscalculation of dangerous situation by other track H-Type performance are invalid
workers M14 Defects in the inspection, maintenance and management M-Type
H30 Other track workers’ illegal operation or wrong operation H-Type of each component of the train
H31 Other track workers have not received, ignored or H-Type M15 The design and approval process of mechanical M-Type
misunderstood warnings equipment, parts, systems, etc. is flawed
H32 Manage and monitor the wrong or illegal operation of the H-Type M16 Unclear assignment of responsibilities of site staff M-Type
staff M17 Inadequate training, supervision and management of train M-Type
H33 Inadequate safety inspection of relevant staff before H-Type drivers
departure M18 Invalid competency management system for rail road M-Type
H34 Track - road vehicles, mechanical equipment and other H-Type vehicle machine operators
operators’ illegal operation or operation error M19 Inadequate training, supervision and management of M-Type
EI01 Brake system problems EI-Type relevant management personnel and track workers
EI02 Braking system equipment and performance problems EI-Type
EI03 Road rail vehicle fault or abnormal state EI-Type
EI04 Train wheel failure or load change EI-Type intermediate harmful consequences in daytime. The intermediate
EI05 Uneven train load EI-Type harmful consequences of EI-Type hazards in daytime and night are
EI06 Train door design problems EI-Type
shown in Fig. 16 (b). From the figure, it can be found that among EI-Type
EI07 Damage and falling off of train components EI-Type
EI08 Train direction and line error EI-Type hazards, EI04, EI07, EI09, etc. cause greater intermediate harmful
EI09 Suspension and suspension fault of train EI-Type consequences in daytime. The intermediate harmful consequences of E-
EI10 Train protection and warning system fault EI-Type Type hazards in daytime and night are shown in Fig. 16 (c). From the
EI11 Bogie distortion, damping failure, power shaft and other EI-Type figure, it can be found that among E-Type hazards, E08 causes the
defects
EI12 Failure of train mechanical parts such as screws and EI-Type
greatest intermediate harmful consequences in daytime. The interme­
bearings diate harmful consequences of M-Type hazards in daytime and night are
EI13 Guard rail not installed EI-Type shown in Fig. 16 (d). From the figure, it can be found that among M-Type
EI14 Track twist fault EI-Type hazards, M04 causes the greatest intermediate harmful consequences in
EI15 Track slippery pollution EI-Type
daytime. These hazards need to be focused. On the whole, the inter­
EI16 Track tilt damage, cycle top and other defects EI-Type
EI17 Fault and defect of circuit and electrical system EI-Type mediate hazard consequences of all hazards in daytime are greater than
EI18 Broken cables and wires or defective capacitors EI-Type or equal to those in night.
Fig. 17 (a) and 17 (b) show the harmful consequences of all hazards
in daytime and night respectively. From the perspective of each hazard,

18
N. Wang et al.
each hazard can bring great harm to the participants of railway acci­
dents. However, in general, direct harmful consequences of H-Type
hazards and M-Type hazards are generally larger than those of other
types of hazards in daytime. At night, the direct harmful consequences of
some M-Type hazards are larger than other types of hazards. In daytime
and night, the intermediate direct harmful consequences of H-Type
hazards are generally larger than those of other types of hazards.
Because some hazards play an intermediate role in the causal path of
accidents, if the hazards with high intermediate harmful consequences
are eliminated or controlled, the harmful consequences of a large
number of hazards will be reduced, so as to prevent and control the
injury of accidents.
4. Discussion
The results of the case study show that the method based on
knowledge map is useful for exploring railway accidents. The proposed
topological index can adapt to the multidimensional structural charac­
teristics of railway accidents, and provide useful information for un­
derstanding the potential laws of railway accidents and the correlation
between hazards.
4.1. Comparison of harmful consequences related to hazards
According to the intermediate harmful consequence index of haz­
ards, the hazards with high intermediate harmful consequence index can
be identified. The hazards with higher intermediate harmful conse­
quence are controlled one by one in the two time periods of daytime and
night, and it is found that the direct harmful consequence of the whole
accident is also gradually reducing, as shown in Figs. 18 and 19. Among
them, the harmful consequences in daytime are relatively heavy. By
eliminating the hazard, we can see that the degree of influence on its
control is also large. Therefore, from the perspective of the whole
knowledge graph, eliminating the hazards with higher intermediate
harmful consequence can greatly reduce the direct harmful consequence
in accidents.
As is shown in the Fig. 18 and Figs. 19, 17 hazards were removed in
turn, accounting for 19.1% of all hazards. In the daytime, by removing
19.1% of the hazards, 21.9% of the direct harmful consequences of all
hazards and 57.5% of the intermediate harmful consequences of all
hazards can be reduced. In the night, 20% of the direct harmful conse­
quences of all hazards and 56.9% of the intermediate harmful conse­
quences of all hazards can be reduced by removing 19.1% of all hazards.
It can be found that the proposed indexes can effectively reduce the
direct harmful consequences of all hazards and intermediate harmful
consequences of all hazards, and the impact on intermediate harmful
consequences of all hazards is greater.
4.2. Developing preventive measures
The third step is to consider the influence of different time factors
according to the correlation between the key hazard and other hazards.
Through the topological analysis indexes, the correlation between
hazards can be got. According to these relations, relevant strategies can
be formulated to provide reference for the prevention of railway acci­
dents. The prevention strategy shall be formulated in accordance with
the following three steps, as shown in Fig. 20. The first step is to identify
the key hazards according to the intermediate harmful consequence
index of the hazards in different time. The second step is to analyze the
relationship between key hazards and other hazards by using casual
correlation intimacy. The third step is to analyze other hazards that
cause the key hazards, and formulate specific prevention strategies
considering the influence of different time.
Because there are a large number of intermediate hazards with more
heavy intermediate harmful consequences identified in the two time
periods of daytime and night, four hazards from various types of hazards
19
Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
as an example are choosed to introduce the prevention strategies for
each hazard. H11, EI07, E08 and M04 have heavy intermediate harmful
consequences in the two time periods of daytime and night. Therefore,
these four hazards are selected for the formulation of specific prevention
strategies, as shown below.
H07 (Train driver accelerates, overspeed or fails to decelerate in
time): It can be seen from Fig. 7 (a) that in daytime and night, the active
causal correlation intimacy of H07 is 0, indicating that it is caused by
other hazards, cannot lead to other hazards, and will directly lead to
accidents. The passive causal correlation intimacy of H07 in daytime is
greater than that of H07 in night, indicating that H07 in daytime is more
likely to be caused by other hazards. In this knowledge graph model, the
hazards that directly lead to H07 are mainly H01, H03, H04, H06, EI10,
E10 and M03. Therefore, some targeted measures can be formulated for
these hazards, “Improving the job requirements of train drivers,
ensuring that they have sufficient ability and experience to work again”,
for example. More measures can be seen in Table 5. At the same time,
when carrying out daily safety hazard protection, management depart­
ment can choose to appropriately increase the daytime inspection
scheduling plan. Eliminate H07 by blocking the occurrence of these
hazards in time, so as to block the relationship with other hazards and
prevent accidents.
EI07 (Vehicle with broken train components): as can be seen from
Fig. 7 (b), the active causal correlation intimacy of EI07 is 0 in daytime
and night, indicating that it is caused by other hazards, cannot lead to
other hazards, and will directly lead to accidents. The passive causal
correlation intimacy of EI07 in daytime and night are not 0 and equal,
indicating that EI07 can be caused by other hazards with the same in­
tensity. In this knowledge graph model, the hazards that directly lead to
EI07 are EI04, EI12, EI15 and E01. Therefore, some targeted measures
can be formulated for these hazards, such as “Replacing faulty wheels in
time, checking and ensuring the normal use status of wheels on time”,
more measures can be seen in Table 7. At the same time, during the daily
protection of safety hazards, the daytime and night shall be arranged for
undifferentiated inspection, so as to ensure that the inspection and
scheduling plans during the day and night are generally consistent. EI07
can be eliminated by blocking the occurrence of these hazards in time, so
as to block the relationship with other hazards and prevent accidents.
E08 (Blocking lines of instruments and equipment): as can be seen
from Fig. 7 (c), the active causal correlation intimacy of E08 is 0 in
daytime and night, indicating that it is caused by other hazards, which
cannot lead to other hazards, and will directly lead to accidents. In both
daytime and night, the passive causal correlation intimacy of E08 is not
0, and the passive causal correlation intimacy of E08 in daytime is high,
indicating that it is easier to be caused by other hazards in daytime. In
this knowledge graph model, the hazards that directly lead to E08 are
H34, EI17, E04 and M12. Therefore, some targeted measures can be
formulated for these hazards, for example, “Strengthening the man­
agement training for the operators of mechanical equipment to ensure
the operation specification and accuracy”, more measures can be seen in
Table 5. At the same time, when carrying out daily safety hazard pro­
tection, management department can choose to appropriately increase
the daytime inspection scheduling plan. Eliminate E08 by blocking the
occurrence of these hazards in time, so as to block the relationship with
other hazards and prevent accidents.
M04 (Not implemented or unsuitable safety work system imple­
mented): as can be seen from Fig. 7 (d), M04 has a high degree of active
causal correlation intimacy in daytime and a low degree of active causal
correlation intimacy in night, indicating that it is more likely to lead to
the occurrence of other hazards in daytime, which requires special
attention. The low degree of passive causal correlation intimacy in both
daytime and night indicates that it is not easy to lead to other hazards in
this time period. In this knowledge graph model, the hazards that lead to
M04 are H16, H22, H32, M16, M19. Therefore, some targeted measures
can be formulated for these hazards, for instance “Reasonably planning
the work arrangement of railway staff, ensuring moderate workload and
N. Wang et al.
prohibiting long-term fatigue operation”, more measures can be seen in
Table 7. At the same time, during the daily protection of safety hazards,
the daytime inspection scheduling should be appropriately increased.
M04 can be eliminated by timely blocking the occurrence of these
hazards, so as to block the relationship with other hazards and prevent
accidents.
It is noteworthy that most of the identified hazards with more heavy
intermediate harmful consequences are H-type hazards. That is,
personnel factors greatly affect the occurrence and severity of accidents.
By identifying the relationship between these hazards and other hazards
and taking specific prevention and management measures, the spread
and impact of hazards can be greatly controlled. Based on the above
analysis, corresponding preventive measures and safety inspection
schemes have been determined and formulated as shown in Table 7
below.
4.3. Further application prospects
The correlation analysis method based on knowledge graph has high
application value in the field of safety. This paper discusses the appli­
cation of this method in the correlation analysis of railway accident
hazrad. The correlation between various hazards in railway accidents is
obtained. The key hazards of railway accidents have been explored.
Preventing and controlling key hazards is conducive to the prevention of
railway accidents. The method proposed in this paper is not only limited
to the field of railway safety, but also can be applied in other safety fields
such as maritime safety, highway safety, and subway safety.
The real benefits of this method for the development of the safety
field is that it can identify the knowledge entities and the relations be­
tween the knowledge entities in the corresponding fields based on the
accident and disaster data in different fields. Thereby establishing a
knowledge graph model that conforms to a specific accident. By
analyzing the constructed model using topological analysis indexes that
conform to the characteristics of the model, it can explore the relations
between hazards in different fields. Obtaining key hazards and elabo­
rately preventing and controlling them is conducive to the development
of the security field.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a new correlation analysis model of railway accident
hazards based on knowledge graph is proposed. In order to find the
deeper correlation between hazards and prevent railway accidents, new
topological analysis indexes are formulated. This method has been
applied to the actual railway accidents in the UK. The results show that
this method can effectively find out the relations between accidents and
hazards. Through further analysis of the revealed relations, it provides
an effective decision-making basis for the prevention of railway acci­
dents. The method based on knowledge graph is expected to be applied
to explore other types of railway accidents and provide additional
decision-making information for railway accident prevention.
However, this research still has some inadequate, requires further
study and improvement in the future work. More abundant data can be
considered and more considerations can be added in model building.
Moreover, more knowledge entities and their relations should be
included and a knowledge model with more information should be
established so as to further explore the relations between hazards.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Ning Wang: Writing – original draft, Methodology, Data curation.
Xin Yang: Writing – original draft, Methodology, Conceptualization.
Jianhua Chen: Writing – review & editing, Methodology. Hongwei
Wang: Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization. Jianjun Wu:
Writing – review & editing, Methodology.
20
Safety Science 166 (2023) 106238
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (Nos. 72071015, 72288101, 71890972/71890970), and the
111 Project (No. B20071).
Appendix A
See Table A1
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