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The Psychological Record, 1979, 29, 135-140.

COMMENTS AND QUERIES


CULTURALIZATION AND THE A PRIORI IN PSYCHOLOGY

The complaint by Humanists that psychologists devote insufficient


attention to human cognitive behavior is vitiated by their own
assimilation of absolutistic and a priori philosophy. Their aim is to
propagate doctrines of consciousness especially in the form of mind and
faculties in consonance with the prevailing mentalistic trend.
Undoubtedly the general persistence of psychic belief is accounted for
by the process of culturalization. In early development there is
transcendental indoctrination. Later the general intellectual behavior and
scientific work of individuals is strongly influenced by transcendental
institutions. Hence scientists display multiplicity of personality. This
evolutional process is illustrated by several case histories.

HUMANISMI AND HUMANISM2


If there is any justification for the demand of Humanist psychologists
to convert psychological doctrine, it is not merely because psychology
has been too extreme in cultivating conditioning behavior. It is true that
the conditioning movement has penetrated very deeply and widely into
psychological investigation, although not at the total expense of sensing
and feeling behavior.
A more substantial justification would be that psychologists have
neglected to concern themselves with the complex and intricate
adjustments of persons to the ever-present things and events of human
existence and behavior. Actually psychological treatises are short on
discussions of behavior in religious, moral, social, domestic, industrial,
and legal situations—in brief, behavior in actual human circumstances.
Thinking, speaking, imagining, and creating are treated only if they are
reduced to theories about the workings of imaginary brain models.
Behavior such as beliefs, cultural judgments, attitudes, evaluations are
placed beyond the pale of conventional psychology.
However, any sympathy one may entertain with respect to the
complaints of the formal Humanists is soon dissipated by two interrelated
circumstances. In the first place Humanistic psychologists adhere to a
fallacious philosophy which harbors absolutistic notions, and the belief in
136 OBSERVER
various a priori principles. Thus Humanistic psychologists, no less than
other psychological sectaries, presuppose the existence of substantive
entities called minds possessing innate and inherent properties and
capacities. In consequence Humanists interpret complex human
psychology in absolute, transcendental terms. At the basis of their
complaint about psychology is the minimization of consciousness as a
mental force, power, faculty, or determiner of what organisms do.

Contributing to the neglect by psychologists of complex human


adjustments is the unwitting acceptance of a creational rather than an
evolutional view of behavior. Little attention is given to immediately
present circumstances as sources of origin of psychological events. All
mentalistic psychologists, not excepting the Humanists, appear to
demand the kind of certainty, permanence, and stability as are to be
found only in historical abstractions. Absolute and a priori philosophy
plays a large role in modern psychology. Instead of describing
psychological events as the interaction of organisms with objects in
complex situations, preexisting mentality is made to act through the
biological structures of organisms. Hence the powerful psychological
tradition that to attain reliable and valid data about psychological
behavior, mind and consciousness must be attached to the elementary
biological processes of organisms. It is this line of thinking that is
formulated in the soul-mind, body-brain dogma. It is only because
psychologists are committed to the belief in psychic essences and
processes that they require anchorage for them in tangible substances,
such as organismic structures and their functions. Thus arise the various
theories of the relationship of mind and body, for example,
interactionism, parallelism, and double-aspect identity.

PERSEVERANCE OF CULTURALIZATION
It remains now to account for the persistent belief of psychologists
in the existence and operation of mental states and processes. That fact is
entirely a matter of culturalization. It is a central theme of these
comments that the early development of psychic beliefs leaves habits and
traits throughout the life of the individual.
Many fundamental traits of persons—likes, dislikes, beliefs, type of
language, judgments, tastes—developed in early youth persist
throughout the lifetime of individuals. It is such traits of behavior which
color the later developments of behavior and in general serve as definite
marks of personal identification. The growth and decline of such traits
contribute to the psychological quality of persons in their interrelations
with other individuals.
A most important word of caution: the culturalization process
obviates any possible notion of innateness or a priori in the development
and operation of psychological traits or modes of behavior. The entire
origin, perseverance or decline of talents, capacities, beliefs, and social
habits can be observed. in the evolution of psychological responses and
their products, in particular human situations. A naturalistic analysis of
psychological behavior and personality consists of an evolutional
development of an individual from original conception to the enormous
capacities and characteristics of cultivated persons.
CULTURALIZATION AND THE A PRIORI 137

PERSONALITY EVOLUTION
Every human individual, even the most complex and effective,
develops psychologically from a zero point on the curve of biological
maturation. A human neonate is not psychologically more advanced than
a vegetable. In the early stages of behavior development, behavior
consists of biological reflexes, the activity of biological structures. Later
in the evolution of the individual the biological reflexes become
completely overshadowed by psychological behavior or adjustments to
stimulus conditions. It must be noticed that the psychological traits are
just as much a part of the human personality as the biological activities
which precede and accompany them. For the most part, every normal
human individual will consist as much of a system of potentialities
derived from complex interaction with things and events as of any of the
participating biological factors.
The entire culturalization process is excellently illustrated by the
linguistic behavior of individuals, which is so integrant a part of the
psychological equipment of persons. Language behavior consists of
highly specialized forms of action similar to the linguistic behavior of
persons with whom the individual lives and interacts. Everyone knows
how the original language of a person influences the performance of
further language reactions. It is most difficult for people to speak a
second or third language without accents developed while learning the
original language.
Now it is important to notice that the same principles apply to all
other types of cultural equipment and behavior. Just as the individual
develops language or speech as intercommunicative performances, so
will. he or she be marked by the actions called beliefs and in general
attitudes toward his or her peers and indeed himself or herself. Witness
the paranoia of even the most primitive people who regard themselves as
THE people, so magnifying their own civilizational qualities as
compared with the members of neighboring groups. The devastations of
wars of religion testify to the essentiality of personality relative to the
social surroundings. Anthropological groups may well be described as
sets of persons who share in the performance of certain rites, handicrafts,
beliefs, and other indigenous behavior together with the products that
result from such behavior.
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SCIENTISTS AS MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES
All the preceding comments are prefatory to the great problem of
how scientists who are devoted to the study of things and events as they
occur and interact with other objects and events still are involved with
miraculous and fictional traits. It is the culturalization process that
accounts for the fact that scientists entertain transcendental beliefs and
assumptions. That is why psychism, which developed in the post-Greek
periods of our history, can maintain itself in the face of the actual things
and events with which they are deeply concerned. This kind of situation
makes possible the splitting of personalities who, on the one hand,
perform competent work of precise observation, and on the other, impose
fictitious and mythical interpretations on the observed events. It is
possible to demonstrate this undesirable situation by analyzing two case
histories, one from the field of physics and one from psychoneurology.

The Case ofMax Planck


We consider first the views of the celebrated Planck, a physicist,
who merits much credit as an effective transformer of the complexion of
his scientific speciality. Max Planck's entire scientific career was
characterized by the modifications of scientific descriptions, and yet he
persisted in thinking in terms of absolutes, universally valid propositions,
and invariants. He proclaimed that "everything that is relative
presupposes the existence of something that is absolute, and is
meaningful only when juxtaposed to something absolute" (Planck, 1949,
p. 46). Originally he rejected the notion of atoms though later he founded
the quantum theory, the primary contention of which is the specificity
and the particle nature of action or energy. His lecture entitled "Religion
and Natural Science" (1949) makes clear that he was definitely a
multiple personality, .in the sense of careful and critical scientist but also
a believer in the most primitive religious doctrines. The religious beliefs
and attitudes he undoubtedly acquired in his elementary psychological
development.
Planck's writings indicate clearly that his earliest basic
psychological equipment was carried along with his various later
interests and achievements. As the following quotation reveals, he
evaluated religion with science in the same equal measure:

It will then appear with ever increasing clarity that even though the
methods are different—for science operates predominantly with the
intellect, religion predominantly with sentiment—the significance of the
work and the direction of progress are nonetheless absolutely identical.
Religion and natural science are fighting a joint battle in an
incessant, never relaxing crusade against scepticism and against
dogmatism, against disbelief and against superstition, and the rallying
cry in this crusade has always been and always will be: "On to God! "
(Planck, 1949)
It seems impossible for a person of Planck's education and
achievements not to differentiate his fervent and constant belief in an
omniscient and omnipotent God from that accepted by uneducated
people. Our author states that religious symbols are of human
formulation as is evident from his rationalizations. It is inevitable that the
sophistication of so great and good a man should be a refined religious
attitude.
Another bit of rationalization arises from the support that Planck
gets from the prevalence of dualistic psychology. Religion can be just as
effective as science in combating superstition and dogma, since it differs
only in the faculty that promotes it. Science operates with the intellect
while religion is supported by faith built on feelings.

The Case ofRoger Sperry


Our second example of what is apparently the continuation of
antiscientific attitudes throughout a scientific career centers around
Professor Sperry, an experienced worker in neurology. He is interested in
bridging
CULTURALIZATION AND THE A PRIORI 139

science and values. Basically his view is that scientific thinking excludes
values from its domain because psychology and neurology reject
subjective consciousness. His own formula is that "mind moves matter in
the brain" (Sperry, 1977, p. 239).
As a psychoneurologist, Sperry deplores that modern experimental
objective psychology and the neurosciences have divested the human
brain not only of "conscious mind but also the other spiritual components
of human nature including the immortal soul" (Sperry, 1965, p. 73).
Obviously Sperry, though he mentions the "Father in heaven," goes only
so far as the spiritism of the brain. The brain for Sperry is of course the
mind, which is:
richly equipped in advance with established value determinants and
intrinsic logical constraints in the form of innate and acquired needs,
aims, and motivational and other goal-directed factors. (Sperry, 1977, p.
241)

Undeniably, Sperry imposes on his brain-mind propositions ideas he


absorbed in his early childhood. As we should expect, his own writings
carry the stigmata of unhomogenized ideological mixtures.

ABSOLUTE ABSTRACTIONS VS. EVENTUALITIES


Both our case studies show clearly the great canyon that separates
the interests of intellectual workers who concern themselves entirely
with a world of concrete happenings from those that include also the
realm of autistic constructions. The latter, of course, reflect traditional
140 OBSERVER
philosophical systems which seek absolute certainties furnished by
intuitive self-evidence, and are founded mainly upon the linguistic
competence of the constructors rather than upon events. From an
anthropological and psychological standpoint, such philosophical
systems originate as futile mechanisms for escaping from harsh and
unbearable living conditions.

CULTURAL SYSTEMS AND SCIENTIFIC PROTOPOSTULATES


Sciences are all works of human individuals. Accordingly they vary
with the general civilizational circumstances and institutions of particular
social communities. Many such systems do not encourage or even
tolerate any scientific work. In other cultural systems scientific work is
cultivated but constrained and guided by rules and guidelines set up by
and in the name of the political philosophy governing particular national
units. But whatever the relationship may be between the science and
politics of any social system, there is manifest a considerable influence
upon science of the basic characteristics of the civilizational matrix.
Both of our case studies clearly reveal examples of the
psychological and cultural processes whereby scientists may be excellent
investigators of events yet cherish beliefs in transcendental and spiritistic
entities. Early they are culturalized into a transcendental civilization,
perhaps specifically a religious culture of a theistic type. Then the
transcendental institutions appear as inevitable and as natural as the
actual world of things and events.
An analysis of the writings of both scientists reveals the continuity of
their notions with the historical religious institutions of Western
European civilization. It is the common assumptions prevalent in social
groups that constitute the protopostulates of the thinking and reasoning
of cultivated scientists. Consequently, one is not surprised to read in the
official journal of the American Psychological Association a confession
like the following: "I am quite prepared to accept the possible existence
of realities or planes of being in addition to the world of sensory
phenomena" (Frank, 1977, p. 555).
OBSERVER

REFERENCES
FRANK, J. D. 1977. Nature and functions of belief systems. American Psychologist, 32, 555.
PLANCK, M. 1949. A scientific autobiography and other papers. New York:
Philosophical Library.
SPERRY, R. W. 1965. Mind, brain, and humanist values. In J. R. Platt (Ed.), New views
of the nature of man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
SPERRY, R. W. 1977. Bridging science and values: A unifying view of mind and brain. American
Psychologist, 32, 237.

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