LABOR LAW & LEGISLATION (HR 192) - 8th SATURDAY

1. G.R. No. 211962

[ G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020 ]

JOSE ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

At the core of sexual harassment in the workplace, as penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise
known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, is abuse of power by a superior over a
subordinate.1 Sexual harassment engenders three-fold liability: criminal, to address the wrong
committed against society itself; civil, to address the private wrong against the offended party; and
administrative, to protect the public service.2 Courts and administrative bodies should not hesitate to
penalize insidious acts of sexual harassment, especially when committed by high-ranking public
officers.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by petitioner Jose Romeo C. Escandor (Escandor). He prays for the reversal of the assailed
October 17, 2013 Decision3 and February 28, 2014 Resolution4 of the Special Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The assailed Decision found Escandor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of sexual harassment as penalized by the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act. The assailed Resolution,
denied Escandor's Motion for Reconsideration.

Escandor was the Regional Director of the National Economic and Development Authority Region 7,
Cebu City from August 16, 1992 to October 31, 2005. Private complainant Cindy Sheila C. Gamallo
(Gamallo) was a contractual employee of the National Economic and Development Authority Region
7 for the United Nations Children's Fund assisted Fifth Country Program for Children from March
1995 to December 2003.5

In an Information6 dated March 21, 2007, Escandor was charged with violating Republic Act No.
7877 as follows:

That in (sic) or about the period from the month of July 1999 until November 2003, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above- named accused JOSE
ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, a public officer, being the Regional Director of NEDA Regional Office
No. 7, based in Sudlon, Lahug, Cebu City (SG-28), in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position, and with grave abuse of
authority, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally perform or make a series of unwelcome sexual advances or verbal or physical behaviour
of sexual nature, and demand, solicit, and request sexual favors from Mrs. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-
Gamallo, then a Contractual Employee of the NEDA Regional Office No. 7 for the UNICEF-assisted
Fifth Country Program for Children (CPC V), and, thus, the accused's subordinate, thereby
exercising authority, influence or moral ascendancy over said Mrs. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo in
her working place, namely by: telling her that he has fallen in love with her and has been attracted to
her for a long time already, maliciously grabbing her hands, embracing her and planting a kiss on
her forehead; telling her that if it were possible, he would have prevented her marriage with her
husband; asking her for a date; groping her thigh; sending her winpop messages showing his
amorous concern for her; on the office Christmas party of 2002, by grabbing her on a stairway and
kissing her on the lips; giving her gifts of chocolates, wine and a bracelet on that same Christmas,
and consistently throughout this time, sending her text messages suggestive of sex; which acts of the
accused resulted to an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment as these caused discomfort and
humiliation on his subordinate, Ms. Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo, adversely affecting her and her
family, thus constituting sexual harassment.7 (Emphasis supplied)

In her Complaint-Affidavit,8 Gamallo averred that the first incident of sexual harassment happened
one afternoon in July 1999, when Escandor called her in his office.9 There, Escandor apologized for
his temper the previous day when he got angry at Gamallo for the delay in the payment of her salary.
Escandor, who was standing near his computer, then asked Gamallo to approach him. When she did,
he "grabbed her hand, embraced her, and kissed her on the forehead."10

Gamallo further narrated the succeeding incidents of sexual harassment, as follows:

9. One day sometime in 2000 RD Escandor called me to his office. . . . Then he said that I deserved
to be happy, that I am beautiful and smart and that many men admired me. . . . To my great horror, he
told me he had been attracted to me for a long time and if it was only possible, he would have
prevented me from marrying Mark. ... He said he liked the way I walked . . . He declared I was the
kind of woman he wanted. . .

10. In the afternoon of the same day, ... he gently said he loved me and he could no longer hold
back his attraction to me. . . . Suddenly, I felt his hand on my thigh.11

After these incidents, Gamallo told her colleague, Lina Villamor, about what Escandor did to her.12

Escandor's alleged advances continued in the succeeding days, when Escandor would frequently ask
Gamallo personal questions such as her mood, what she did at home and during weekends, and
details about her family, among others.13 Because of the frequency of Escandor summoning Gamallo
to his office, Gamallo related the incidents to Rafael Tagalog (Tagalog), her immediate superior.
Together with Villamor, Tagalog helped Gamallo avoid situations where she would be alone with
Escandor. Whenever Escandor would look for Gamallo, either Tagalog or Villamor would
accompany her to his office.14

However, Escandor's alleged advances did not stop. He incessantly sent Gamallo unsolicited
messages through Winpop, an intra-office messaging system, such as "Hello," "How are you today,"
"I miss you," "You look beautiful," "You look nice in your dress," and "I love you more every day."15
When Gamallo did not reply to these messages, Escandor threatened her that she would be removed
from the meeting list.16

During their Christmas party in 2000, Gamallo claimed she felt conscious as Escandor stared at her
during her dance performance with her officemates. After the party, she went to get her things from
the third floor of the office and when she reached the guard's station, Escandor was there. Upon
reaching him, he grabbed her and was about to kiss her on the lips. However, she moved away and
the kiss landed on her left check. Gamallo then ran downstairs where Villamor was waiting for her.17
In the same year's Christmas, Gamallo received chocolates, wine, an agenda book and a bracelet
from Escandor.18 A few days after, Gamallo told then Asst. Regional Director of the National
Economic Development Sandra Manuel (Manuel) about the incidents. Manuel advised her not to
resign, but made arrangements with Tagalog and Villamor to guard her.19
In February 2001, while in Cebu for a workshop, Escandor tracked Gamallo and Villamor to a folk
house near their hotel. He did not make any advances but insisted to pay for their drinks, which
Gamallo and Villamor refused.20

Escandor's sexual advances allegedly continued, until Gamallo finally quit her job in November
2003.21

Three colleagues testified to corroborate Gamallo's account.22 Villamor testified that not only had
Gamallo told her about Escandor's sexual advances, but that she herself saw Escandor make such
overtures, causing Gamallo great distress to the point of reducing her to tears.23 She said that after
those instances, she tried to prevent Gamallo from being left alone with Escandor.24

Tagalog claimed that he, too, found out about the sexual harassment after he saw Escandor commit
"some improper acts and advances... to wards Gamallo."25 He said that "he counseled her to give
Escandor the benefit of the doubt [since] he might be undergoing a midlife crisis."26 Still, as
Gamallo's immediate superior, he said he did his best to "protect her from Escandor."27

Finally, Manuel averred that in 2000, she also learned of Escandor's indiscretions—first, when
Villamor told her, and second, when Gamallo herself confided in her.28 She said that while she
"dissuaded Gamallo from resigning," she "reported the matter to the [National Economic and
Development Authority] Deputy Director General."29 This caused the latter to confront Escandor.30
Escandor, learning about her action "accused her of disloyalty and told her to resign from NEDA."31

In his defense,32 Escandor testified that he never engaged in the acts recounted by Gamallo. He
claimed that the acts allegedly committed by him are "pure fabrication."33 He explained that his
office was always open and its inside was visible from the outside, as their office was designed such
that every room would have one door beside a large glass window measuring around four by six feet,
making the people inside visible.34 He also claimed that he could not have harassed Gamallo as his
wife, who was employed at the same office, could also see the things happening in his office, just
like the other employees.35

According to Escandor, the filing of the Complaint was part of an effort by a group of disgruntled
employees to remove him and his wife from office.36 He averred that the Complaint was also filed in
retaliation to the filing of administrative cases against Gamallo's husband, Atty. Russ Mark Gamallo
(Atty. Gamallo), who was also a National Economic and Development Authority employee. 37

To prove this scheme against him, Escandor presented as lone witness John Louis Savellon, a utility
worker at the National Economic and Development Authority, who testified that some of his
officemates asked for his support to oust Escandor.38 When he declined, Atty. Gamallo and a certain
Mark Cabadsan harassed him. He also said that he heard someone say in the library, "Tan awa nato
asa kutob si Escandor kini kafile sa sexual harassment cases" (Let us see how far Escandor can go
when the sexual harassment cases are filed).39

Escandor also questioned Gamallo's credibility, averring that her acts when she was still with the
National Economic and Development Authority were inconsistent with her claims of sexual
harassment. Escandor questioned Gamallo's signature in a Memorandum Petition indorsed to the
Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority in October 2000 against the
demand of Senator Osmena for Escandor's ouster.40 Escandor also questioned Gamallo's March 2003
application to be his secretary.41

On October 17, 2013, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision42 finding Escandor guilty of sexual
harassment. It found that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of sexual harassment as
defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877.43 It gave credence to Gamallo's testimony,
noting that "there is nothing in the records that would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or
untruthful."44

The Sandiganbayan also noted that Escandor presented only one corroborating witness, despite
identifying several individuals who were allegedly present during the incidents of sexual harassment:

Escandor's testimony identifies several people who were allegedly present during the incidents
recounted by Gamallo - Mrs. Escandor, his secretary, the other staff, the security guard, and so on.
However, with the exception of Mrs. Escandor whose testimony was excluded, it is unfortunate for
the accused that only Savellon could corroborate part of his defense that the NEDA employees
allegedly schemed to oust Escandor from office. It is unbelievable, to say the least, that Escandor, a
person of high rank at the NEDA, could not find other witnesses to refute Gamallo's claims, while
the complainant was able to gather witnesses who testified on her behalf.45

The Sandiganbayan disposed of the case in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Jose Romeo C. Escandor is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt and is sentenced to imprisonment for six (6) months and to pay a fine of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.46

Escandor filed a Motion for Reconsideration,47 where he stated that the Sandiganbayan erred in
ignoring undisputed evidence and established facts on record showing the belated filing of the
Complaint. He averred that the Decision "contravened the exacting test in assessing the credibility of
a sexual harassment complaint."48 He also stated that the Sandiganbayan erroneously disregarded the
doctrinally settled rule in evaluating major self-contradictions and irreconcilable inconsistencies.49
His motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its February 28, 2014 Resolution.50

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that the evidence fails to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.51 He likewise
assails his conviction as having been made for an offense which was never charged in the
Information since Gamallo testified to events that supposedly transpired during the Christmas Party
in 2000, whereas the Information alleged sexual harassment for events that supposedly transpired
during the Christmas party in 2002.52 He claims that this amounts to a violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him.53

He further assails his conviction based on a complaint that was filed after the lapse of the three (3)
year prescriptive period under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7877.54

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not Jose Romeo C. Escandor's guilt for sexual harassment under Republic Act No.
7877 has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Second, whether or not the discrepancy in the date of the Christmas party in which some complained
act/s were allegedly committed suffices to absolve Jose Romeo C. Escandor of liability.

Third, whether or not the Complaint against Jose Romeo C. Escandor was filed on time.

I (A)
Republic Act No. 7877, otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, was the first
criminal statute enacted in the Philippines to penalize sexual harassment. It was adopted pursuant to
the declared policy that "the State shall value the dignity of every individual, enhance the
development of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human rights, and uphold the dignity
of workers, employees, applicants for employment, students or those undergoing training, instruction
or education."55

It defines sexual harassment as follows:

SECTION 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual Harassment Defined. — Work, education
or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, pi-ofessor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of
whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

(b) In an education or training environment, sexual harassment is committed:

(1) Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;

(2) Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to

the offender;

(3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of
honors and scholarships, or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges,
or considerations; or

(4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment
for the student, trainee or apprentice.

Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined,
or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been
committed, shall also be held liable under this Act.

Sexual harassment, as initially conceived, was the product of a consciousness that emerged among
women, and propelled various feminist movements. Its subsequent recognition in law is an offshoot
of those campaigns.

The concept of sexual harassment began in the context of unwanted sexual relations imposed by
superiors on subordinates in the workplace.56 As early as 1887, the plight of women working in
factories and the extortion vis-a-vis sexual favors that they experience have been noted by several
commentators.57 In 1840, women's moral reform societies in the United States started petition drives
for statutes penalizing seduction, in response to what were then inadequate legal protection of
women against sexual predation at work.58 In the decade before the American Civil War, women's
rights movement began pursuing discussions on women's socioeconomic conditions which make
them vulnerable to sexual coercion.59 Women's rights advocates publicized the case of domestic
servant Hester Vaughn who was held guilty of infanticide. After being fired by her employer who
impregnated her, Vaughn gave birth alone and impoverished, and left her infant dead60 Vaughn's case
propelled efforts by women's groups to institute legal reforms to protect women from sexual
predation, and to enable other modes of collective self-help, such as organizing labor unions for
women.61

These developments made by the early feminist and labor movements were sustained in the 1970s by
several lawyers and activists representing women in courts. It was during this time that a concerted
retaliation against sexual harassment was pursued by advocates.62 The term "sexual harassment" was
coined by Lin Farley during a consciousness-raising session for a Cornell University course on
women and work, where the women in the discussion group repeatedly described being fired or
quitting a job because they were harassed and intimidated by men.63 In her works, Farley recognized
the sexual coercion women experienced at work as a "social order that situates sexual relations
between men and women in relations of economic dependency."64 In April 1975, Farley testified
before the New York City Human Rights Commission Hearings on Women and Work, and defined
sexual harassment as "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over
her function as a worker."65 Inspired by the case of Carmita Dickerson Wood, an administrative
assistant at Cornell University who quit her position due to harassment by her supervisor, Farley and
other women activists at Cornell formed the Working Women United, a women's rights organization
that sought to combat sexual harassment of women in the workplace.66

In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her book "Sexual Harassment of Working Women" which
propelled the adoption of laws on sexual harassment in the United States.67 Her central argument
was that sexual harassment was sex discrimination: "Sexual harassment is discrimination 'based on
sex' within the social meaning of sex, as the concept is socially incarnated in sex roles. Pervasive and
'accepted' as they are, these rigid roles have no place in the allocation of social and economic
resources."68 Through the works of Lin Farley and Catharine MacKinnon, the discourse on sexual
harassment translated into that of anti-discrimination.

In 1964, in the United States, the Civil Rights Act prohibited acts of discrimination on the basis of
sex, among others.69 American jurisprudence subsequently recognized two (2) categories of sexual
harassment: first, quid pro quo; and second, hostile environment sexual harassment.70 Quid pro quo
harassment conditions employment or job benefits on sexual favors;71 while hostile environment
sexual harassment results from sexual advances which make the working environment hostile or
abusive to the employee.72

The two types of sexual harassment recognized in American jurisprudence are akin to sexual
harassment as defined under Republic Act No. 7877. Section 3(a)(l)73 similarly recognizes that
sexual harassment is committed when a sexual favor is made a condition for employment or for the
grant of certain benefits. Likewise, Section 3(a)(3)74 recognizes sexual harassment as committed
when the offender's advances result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.

In the Philippines, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is a relatively new law. Although the
Revised Penal Code, enacted in 1930, already penalized offenses relating to violations of chastity,
Congress saw it fit to enact a new law specifically punishing sexual harassment committed in an
"employment, education, or training environment."75

The original provisions of the Revised Penal Code on Rape (prior to its amendment in 1997) already
punished a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman under specified circumstances.76 That the
crime is committed in an employment, school, or training environment was not an element. This is
also true for other crimes centering on a perpetrator's lascivious, harassing or otherwise vexatious
conduct, such as Acts of Lasciviousness,77 Seduction,78 and Unjust vexation.79 These offenses pertain
to acts which are not necessarily committed in an employment, training, or school environment.

Under Republic Act No. 7877, an act of sexual harassment may result in three distinct liabilities:
criminal, civil, and administrative.80 An action for each can proceed independently of the others.81 In
a criminal action, the accused is prosecuted for a wrong committed against society itself or the State
whose law he or she violated.82 In a civil action, a defendant is sued by the plaintiff in an effort to
correct a private wrong.83 The purpose of an administrative action, on the other hand, is to protect the
public service by imposing administrative sanctions to an erring public officer.84

Sexual harassment as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7877 requires three elements for
an accused to be convicted: (1) that the employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence,
or moral-ascendancy over another; (2) the authority, influence, or moral ascendancy exists in a
work-related, training-related, or education-related environment, and (3) the employer, employee,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who has authority, influence, or moral-ascendancy over another makes a demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor.85

The key elements which distinguish sexual harassment, as penalized by Republic Act 7877, from
other chastity-related and vexatious offenses are: first, its setting; and second, the person who may
commit it. As to its setting, the offense may only be committed in a work-related, training-related, or
education-related environment. As to the perpetrator, it may be committed by a person who exercises
authority, influence, or moral ascendancy over another.86

Since Republic Act No. 7877 is a special criminal statute, the offense of sexual harassment is malum
prohibitum. Thus, in prosecuting an offender for sexual harassment, intent is immaterial. Mere
commission is sufficient to warrant a conviction.87 The Court explained in Narvasa v. Sanchez88 the
reason why, even without intent, sexual harassment is penalized:

Assuming arguendo that respondent never intended to violate [Republic Act No.] 7877, his attempt
to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had existed since time immemorial
— that intimate physical contact between individuals must be consensual. Respondent's defiance of
custom and lack of respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man.
Respondent's act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner's honor and dignity.89
(Emphasis supplied)

This is in contrast with crimes mala in se, which are so serious in their effects on society as to call for
almost unanimous condemnation of its members. In crimes mala in se, the intent governs; but in
mala prohibita, the only inquiiy is whether the law has been violated.90

Vedana v. Judge Valencia91 explained that the criminalization of sexual harassment was in keeping
with "humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization":
In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through the
legalization of now prohibited practices.1âшphi1 Indeed, even within this century, persons were
discriminated against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that the
validity of human beings being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other jurisdictions.
But in humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization, the law has stepped in and
seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that the moving force of
civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately, this is what
humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher standard of
living. Thus, in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem
conduct constitutive of sexual harassment or hazing, acts previously considered harmless by custom,
as criminal.92

Conviction under Republic Act No. 7877 subjects the offender to criminal penalties.93 Under Section
7, any person who violates the law shall, upon conviction, be penalized by imprisonment of not less
than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than P10,000.00 nor more than
P20,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Since in a criminal
action, the State prosecutes the accused for an act or omission punishable by law,94 the action is
commenced by filing the complaint with the regular courts or the office of prosecutor.95 The criminal
action arising from violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7877 prescribes in three (3)
years.96

Criminal liability for sexual harassment notwithstanding, the offended party may pursue a separate
civil action. As stated in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7877:

SECTION 6. Independent Action for Damages. Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of
work, education, or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent
action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 6 is consistent with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that, "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable." The rationale for this was explained in Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada:97

Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he
offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State
whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
omission.98(Emphasis supplied)

Civil liability arises from the damage or injury caused by the felonious act.99 Thus, in a civil action,
the real party plaintiff is the offended party, while in a criminal action, the plaintiff is the "People of
the Philippines." Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in a civil action is mere
"preponderance of evidence," in contrast to "proof beyond reasonable doubt" which is required for
conviction in a criminal action.100

Being independent from criminal action, the conviction or acquittal of the accused is not a bar to an
independent suit for damages in a civil action.101 Accordingly, in London v. Bagnio Country Club,102
this Court allowed an independent action for damages against the accused despite the existence of an
ongoing criminal case.

Aside from the actual perpetrator, the employer, or the head of office or institution may also be
impleaded in an independent action for damages.103 They would be solidarily liable for damages if
they did not take immediate action on a sexual harassment complaint.104
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7877 requires the employer or head of office to promulgate
appropriate rules and regulations to prevent the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to
provide procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.105

In the government, the Civil Service Commission promulgated CSC Resolution No. 01-0940,
otherwise known as the Administrative Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases, which apply
to all government officials and employees.106 For the private sector, each organization's rules
promulgated in accordance with Section 4 shall apply.

Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 7877 further requires employers and heads of offices to create a
"committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment." Pursuant to this, all
national or local agencies of the government, state colleges and universities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, were required to create their own Committee on
Decorum and Investigation.107

Unlike in criminal and civil actions which are brought before regular courts, an administrative action
is commenced by filing a complaint with the disciplining authority or agency, or with the Committee
on Decorum and Investigation, which shall receive and investigate sexual harassment complaints.108

CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 3 defines sexual harassment as follows:

SECTION 3. For the purpose of these Rules, the administrative offense of sexual harassment is an
act, or a series of acts, involving any unwelcome sexual advance, request or demand for a sexual
favor, or other verbal or physical behavior of a sexual nature, committed by a government employee
or official in a work-related, training or education related environment of the person complained of.

(a) Work-related sexual harassment is committed under the following circumstances:

(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any employment
decision (including, but not limited to, matters related to hiring, promotion, raise in salary, job
security, benefits and any other personnel action) affecting Jc the applicant/employee; or

(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the complainant's work
performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment; or

(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity,
discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a co-employee, applicant, customer,
or ward of the person complained of.

(b) Education or training-related sexual harassment is committed against one who is under the actual
or constructive care, custody or supervision of the offender, or against one whose education, training,
apprenticeship, internship or tutorship is directly or constructively entrusted to, or is provided by, the
offender, when:

(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts as a basis for any decision affecting
the complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a grade, the granting of honors or
a scholarship, the payment of a stipend or allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege
or consideration.

(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the performance, or
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive academic environment of the complainant; or
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably expected to cause discrimination,
insecurity, discomfort, offense or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee,
apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person complained of.

CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 4 further gives examples on where and how sexual harassment
may take place:

1. in the premises of the workplace or office or of the school or training institution;

2. in any place where the parties were found as a result of work or education or training
responsibilities or relations;

3. at work or education or training-related social functions;

4. while on official business outside the office or school or training institution or during work or
school or training- related travel;

5. at official conferences, fora, symposia or training sessions; or

6. by telephone, cellular phone, fax machine or electronic mail.

CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, Section 5 enumerates illustrative forms of sexual harassment:

a) Physical

i. Malicious Touching;

ii. Overt sexual advances;

iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation.

b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks;

c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or writing notes with sexual underpinnings;

d) Other forms analogous to the foregoing.

Casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with
other people present, do not constitute sexual harassment.109 Accordingly, in Aquino v. Acosta,110 the
Court agreed with the report of the investigating Justice that the complainant failed to show by
convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a
'beso-beso' fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice
or ill motive. The Court explained:

In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant should be
understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the
assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing escapades. The busses
on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and lewd design.111

Unlike in a criminal action where the penalty is a fine, imprisonment, or both, the penalty in an
administrative action is, at most, dismissal, from the service.112 This is because an administrative
action seeks to protect the public service by imposing administrative sanctions to the erring public
officer.113 As has been explained:
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline; thus, a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, and utmost devotion and dedication to
duty, respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good.114

In addition to Republic Act No. 7877, Congress has since enacted Republic Act No. 11313,
otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act. Signed into law on July 15, 2019, it penalizes gender-based
sexual harassment, and is founded on, among others, the recognition that "both men and women
must have equality, security and safety not only in private, but also on the streets, public spaces,
online, workplaces and educational an training and training institutions."115 It addresses four (4)
categories of gender-based sexual harassment: gender-based streets and public spaces sexual
harassment; gender-based online sexual harassment; gender-based sexual harassment in the
workplace; and, gender-based sexual harassment in educational and training institutions.

In line with fundamental constitutional provisions regarding human dignity and human rights, the
Safe Spaces Act expands the concept of discrimination and protects persons of diverse sexual
orientation, gender identity and/or expression. It thus recognizes gender-based sexual-harassment as
including, among others, "misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist slurs."

The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. The gravamen of the offenses punished under the Safe Spaces
Act is the act of sexually harassing a person on the basis of the his/her sexual orientation, gender
identity and/or expression, while that of the offense punished under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act
of 1995 is abuse of one's authority, influence or moral ascendancy so as to enable the sexual
harassment of a subordinate.

All the elements of sexual harassment, as penalized by Republic Act No. 7877, are present in this
case.

Gamallo had earlier filed an administrative complaint with the National Economic Development
Authority Central.116 The present case, however, is exclusively concerned with Escandor's criminal
liability and will be decided exclusively of and without prejudice to his administrative liability. On
this, we find all the requisites for criminal liability present, and sustain Escandor's conviction.

On the first requisite, it is clear that Escandor had authority over Gamallo. He was the Regional
Director of the National Economic and Development Authority Region 7, while Gamallo was a
contractual employee in that office.117 Escandor's authority also existed in a work-related
environment; thereby satisfying the second requisite for sexual harassment.

While the third requisite calls for a "demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor," this Court
has held in Domingo v. Rayala118 that it is not necessary that these be articulated in a categorical oral
or written statement. It may be discerned from the acts of the offender.119 Thus, the Court found in
that case that the accused's acts of "holding and squeezing Domingo's shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money
allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones"120 satisfy the third requisite.

Here, Gamallo testified to several acts of sexual harassment committed by Escandor. Among these
were grabbing her hand,121 kissing,122 engaging in improper conversations,123 touching her thigh,124
giving her gifts,125 telling her that "she was the kind of girl he really wants," asking her out on
dates,126 and sending her text and Winpop messages telling her that he missed her, that she looked
beautiful, and that he loved her.127 All these acts undoubtedly amount to a request for sexual favors.
At the core of sexual harassment in the workplace is power exercised by a superior over a
subordinate. The power emanates from how the superior can remove or disadvantage the subordinate
should the latter refuse the superior's sexual advances.128 Thus, sexual harassment is committed when
the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring of the victim or the grant of benefits thereto; or
when the sexual act results in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.129

In this case, Gamallo stated that the acts of Escandor made her feel "disrespected,"130 "humiliated and
cheap,"131 "uneasy,"132 and "frightened."133 She could also not concentrate on work,134 could not
sleep135 and found herself "staring into empty space."136 When she disabled her Winpop messaging
because of Escandor's inappropriate messages, she was threatened that she will be deleted from the
National Economic and Development Authority meeting list. Villamor, Tagalog and Manuel, who all
testified for Gamallo, tried to protect her from Escandor. Villamor and Tagalog made sure that
whenever Escandor called for Gamallo, either of them would go with her.137 Manuel even had to
relay the incidents to the National Economic and Development Authority Deputy Director General.
Undoubtedly, Escandor's acts resulted in an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment for
Gamallo.

I (C)

Escandor counters that, "[t]he evidence preferred ... is totally repugnant to human standard[s],
common experience and observation."138 He claims that the credibility of Gamallo is "zero not only
because of unreasonable delay, but also because of the inherent improbability of her story, her
propensity to resort to falsehood and her strong motive to falsely accuse and get back at the
accused."139

Contrary to Escandor's assertions, the Sandiganbayan found Gamallo's testimony credible.140 We

sustain this conclusion.

Factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to
great respect. These findings will not be disturbed in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances.141 This is because trial
provides judges with the "opportunity to detect, consciously or unconsciously, observable cues and
micro expressions that could, more than the words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or
betray lies and ill will."142

The matters raised by Escandor have been more than adequately addressed by the Sandiganbayan:

In the present case, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that Gamallo is dishonest or
untruthful. She was able to give her testimony in Court and answer the questions put to her on
cross-examination. Her former supervisor, Tagalog, attests that he had never heard of any act of
immorality committed by Gamallo.143

The Sandiganbayan, being the court which conducted trial, "is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses."144 Indeed, this court must "give the highest respect to [its] of the testimony
of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on
the stand."145

In Batistis v. People of the Philippines146 this Court held that only questions of law may be
entertained in petitions for review on certiorari filed with this court from decisions of the
Sandiganbayan:
The factual findings of the [trial court], its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent
facts and circumstances of substance, which if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were
ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted.147

When the victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing, consistent with human nature, and
unflawed by any material or significant controversy, it passes the test of credibility and the accused
may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. 148

Escandor's claims fail to cast such degree of doubt on the Sandiganbayan's findings as to justify
absolving him of liability. On the other hand, Gamallo has adequately testified to the acts attributed
to Escandor. Moreover, her account is supported by the testimonies of three colleagues: Villamor,
Tagalog and Manuel. As against these, Escandor only had his own testimony and bare denials.

II (A)

Escandor further argues that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of sexual harassment
committed during their 2000 Christmas party despite the Information pertaining to acts of sexual
harassment committed on another date, i.e., their 2002 Christmas party.149

This contention fails to impress.

The Information detailed Escandor's acts of sexual harassment as follows:

. . .telling her that he has fallen in love with her and has been attracted to her for a long time already,
maliciously grabbing her hands, embracing her and planting a kiss on her forehead; telling her that if
it were possible, he would have prevented her marriage with her husband; asking her for a date;
groping her thigh; sending her winpop messages showing his amorous concern for her; on the office
Christmas party of 2002, by grabbing her on a stairway and kissing her on the lips; giving her gifts of
chocolates, wine and a bracelet on that same Christmas, and consistently throughout this time,
sending her text messages suggestive ofsex[.]150

The recital lists several distinct acts (or sets of acts) of sexual harassment; the incident in the
"Christmas party of 2002" being just one. That each act was distinct is manifested in how they were
recited in the information: separated by a semicolon for each act, or set of acts, making them distinct
items in a list.151 Each of these acts or sets of acts, if proven, is sufficient to convict Escandor. Thus,
even if the Court does not appreciate the allegations relating to events that transpired during the
Christmas party— whether it was in 2002, as alleged in the Information, or in 2000, as testified to by
Gamallo—this does not absolve Escandor of liability.

II (B)

Escandor also argues that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of acts of sexual
harassment based on the Information which alleges an indefinite time when the offense charged was
committed.152

It is now too late for Escandor to assail the validity of the information.

Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court requires that the time of the commission of the offense
must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information will permit; otherwise, the right of the
accused to be informed would be violated. The accused must raise the issue of defective information
in a motion to quash or bill of particulars, which may only be filed before arraignment.153

Petitioner failed to assail the Information within the permitted period. Thus, it is now too late for him
to claim that the information was defective. When the accused fails, before arraignment, to move for
the quashal of such information and goes to trial thereunder, he thereby waives the objection and
may be found guilty of as many offenses as those charged in the information and proved during
trial.154

Assuming he is permitted to assail the Information, it is still not defective. Rule 110, Section 11 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the
information the precise date that the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of
the offense. In this case, the time of the commission of the offense is not an essential element under
Republic Act No. 7877. Thus, the phrase "on or about" in the information does not require the
prosecution to prove any precise date.155

III (A)

Escandor assails his conviction citing "unreasonable delay and silence"156 as it was only initiated five
years after the alleged incidents. He argues that the belated filing of the Complaint renders Gamallo's
actuations doubtful.157 He notes that Gamallo is a college graduate, a National Economic and
Development Authority Project Staff, and has a lawyer for a husband158 Citing Digitel
Communications v. Mariqirit,159 he argues that it was simply against the natural order of events and
against human nature that she would not complain about the sexual incidents immediately.160

Escandor is mistaken. There is no time period within which a victim is expected to complain about
sexual harassment. 161 The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and
more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee. Thus, in Philippine Aelous v.
NLRC,162 this Court emphasized that filing after four years does not invalidate sexual
harassment:

Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her
employer's sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff
that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation
had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could
only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged
indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a
daily "monster" roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily
but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as
long as she could outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as
mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of
tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not
bitterness, that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no
place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her,
harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he
"found" the perfect reason to terminate her.163

As aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, Escandor is mistaken in his interpretation of Digitel.164

Digitel stemmed from a Complaint for constructive dismissal due to professional and sexual
harassment. In that case, this Court stated that "there is, strictly speaking, no fixed period within
which an alleged victim of sexual harassment may file a complaint, [although] it does not mean that
he or she is at liberty to file one anytime she or he wants to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint
must be justifiable or reasonable as not not to cast doubt on its merits."165

Neither has prescription set in by the time Gamallo filed her Complaint Affidavit on September 4,
2004. Escandor's acts of sexual harassment persisted until December 2003, the end of Gamallo's
employment with the National Economic and Development Authority Region 7. By the time she
filed her Complaint-Affidavit, only about nine (9) months had lapsed. This is well-within the three
(3) years permitted by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7877 within which an action under the same
statute may be pursued.

III (B)

Escandor further imputes ill-motive to Gamallo in filing the charges.

He submits that the charges were in retaliation to Escandor's administrative complaints against
Gamallo's husband who also worked at the National Economic and Development Authority. He also
emphasized Gamallo's act of signing the petition in support of his retention as Regional Director.

These fail to discredit Gamallo. She already explained the circumstances surrounding her
participation in the petition against Escandor:

ATTY. MARONILLA:

Q: Around the same date, Madam Witness, September 2000, do you not recall having signed a
memorandum in support of the accused against the effort of then Senator Osmena to remove him
from NEDA Legislative?

PROS. RAFAEL:

The question, Your Honor, has no basis.

JUSTICE DE LA CRUZ:

Answer.

WITNESS:

A: I signed that document.

ATTY. MARONILLA:

Q: Madam Witness, the question is, do you recall?

A: Yes Sir.

Q: Can you recall the tenor of that document?

A: It was depending (sic) NEDA as an institution. It did not depend (sic) the integrity of Director
Escandor as a person. It was on the NEDA extreme political pressure, and also Director Escandor
was not guilty of the wrongdoing that the Senator was accusing him of. We were really depending
(sic) the integrity of NEDA, not the integrity of Director Escandor.166

The memorandum sought to "uphold the image of NEDA as a government institution that has
resisted undue political pressures."167 Such image, according to the "[National Economic and
Development Authority] Region 7 Staff," will be tainted "should transfers or reshuffle of regional
directors be made because of political pressure."168 The mere happenstance of Gamallo's
participation in an effort to protect the National Economic and Development Authority as an
institution is not itself a disavowal of and, in no way, precludes Escandor's harassment of Gamallo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Sandiganbayan, finding petitioner Jose Romeo Escandor guilty of the offense of sexual harassment
as defined and punished under Sections 3 and 7 of Republic Act No. 7877, and penalizing him with
imprisonment of six (6) months and a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, J., (Chairperson), Hernando*, Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ. concur.

2. R.A. 10361

AN ACT INSTITUTING POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTION

AND WELFARE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Domestic Workers Act” or “Batas
Kasambahay”.

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. – It is hereby declared that:

(a) The State strongly affirms labor as a primary social force and is committed to respect, promote,
protect and realize the fundamental principles and rights at work including, but not limited to,
abolition of child labor, elimination of all forms of forced labor, discrimination in employment and
occupation, and trafficking in persons, especially women and children;

(b) The State adheres to internationally accepted working conditions for workers in general, and
establishes labor standards for domestic workers in particular, towards decent employment and
income, enhanced coverage of social protection, respect for human rights and strengthened social
dialogue;

(c) The State recognizes the need to protect the rights of domestic workers against abuse,
harassment, violence, economic exploitation and performance of work that is hazardous to their
physical and mental health; and

(d) The State, in protecting domestic workers and recognizing their special needs to ensure safe and
healthful working conditions, promotes gender-sensitive measures in the formulation and
implementation of policies and programs affecting the local domestic work.
SEC. 3. Coverage. – This Act applies to all domestic workers employed and working within the
country.

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the term:

(a) Debt bondage refers to the rendering of service by the domestic worker as security or payment
for a debt where the length and nature of service is not clearly defined or when the value of the
service is not reasonably applied in the payment of the debt.

(b) Deployment expenses refers to expenses that are directly used for the transfer of the domestic
worker from place of origin to the place of work covering the cost of transportation. Advances or
loans by the domestic worker are not included in the definition of deployment expenses.

(c) Domestic work refers to work performed in or for a household or households.

(d) Domestic worker or “Kasambahay” refers to any person engaged in domestic work within an
employment relationship such as, but not limited to, the following: general househelp, nursemaid or
“yaya”, cook, gardener, or laundry person, but shall exclude any person who performs domestic
work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis.

The term shall not include children who are under foster family arrangement, and are provided
access to education and given an allowance incidental to education, i.e. “baon”, transportation,
school projects and school activities.

(e) Employer refers to any person who engages and controls the services of a domestic worker and is
party to the employment contract.

(f) Household refers to the immediate members of the family or the occupants of the house that are
directly provided services by the domestic worker.

(g) Private Employment Agency (PEA) refers to any individual, legitimate partnership, corporation or
entity licensed to engage in the recruitment and placement of domestic workers for local
employment.

(h) Working children, as used under this Act, refers to domestic workers who are fifteen (15) years
old and above but below eighteen (18) years old.

ARTICLE II

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

SEC. 5. Standard of Treatment. – The employer or any member of the household shall not subject a
domestic worker or “kasambahay” to any kind of abuse nor inflict any form of physical violence or
harassment or any act tending to degrade the dignity of a domestic worker.

SEC. 6. Board, Lodging and Medical Attendance. – The employer shall provide for the basic
necessities of the domestic worker to include at least three (3) adequate meals a day and humane
sleeping arrangements that ensure safety.
The employer shall provide appropriate rest and assistance to the domestic worker in case of
illnesses and injuries sustained during service without loss of benefits.

At no instance shall the employer withdraw or hold in abeyance the provision of these basic
necessities as punishment or disciplinary action to the domestic worker.

SEC. 7. Guarantee of Privacy. – Respect for the privacy of the domestic worker shall be guaranteed
at all times and shall extend to all forms of communication and personal effects. This guarantee
equally recognizes that the domestic worker is obliged to render satisfactory service at all times.

SEC. 8. Access to Outside Communication. – The employer shall grant the domestic worker access to
outside communication during free time: Provided, That in case of emergency, access to
communication shall be granted even during work time. Should the domestic worker make use of the
employer’s telephone or other communication facilities, the costs shall be borne by the domestic
worker, unless such charges are waived by the employer.

SEC. 9. Right to Education and Training. – The employer shall afford the domestic worker the
opportunity to finish basic education and may allow access to alternative learning systems and, as far
as practicable, higher education or technical and vocational training. The employer shall adjust the
work schedule of the domestic worker to allow such access to education or training without
hampering the services required by the employer.

SEC. 10. Prohibition Against Privileged Information. – All communication and information
pertaining to the employer or members of the household shall be treated as privileged and
confidential, and shall not be publicly disclosed by the domestic worker during and after
employment. Such privileged information shall be inadmissible in evidence except when the suit
involves the employer or any member of the household in a crime against persons, property, personal
liberty and security, and chastity.

ARTICLE III

PRE-EMPLOYMENT

SEC. 11. Employment Contract. – An employment contract shall be executed by and between the
domestic worker and the employer before the commencement of the service in a language or dialect
understood by both the domestic worker and the employer. The domestic worker shall be provided a
copy of the duly signed employment contract which must include the following:

(a) Duties and responsibilities of the domestic worker;

(b) Period of employment;

(c) Compensation;

(d) Authorized deductions;

(e) Hours of work and proportionate additional payment;

(f) Rest days and allowable leaves;

(g) Board, lodging and medical attention;

(h) Agreements on deployment expenses, if any;

(i) Loan agreement;

(j) Termination of employment; and

(k) Any other lawful condition agreed upon by both parties.

The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop a model employment contract for
domestic workers which shall, at all times, be made available free of charge to domestic workers,
employers, representative organizations and the general public. The DOLE shall widely disseminate
information to domestic workers and employers on the use of such model employment contract.

In cases where the employment of the domestic worker is facilitated through a private employment
agency, the PEA shall keep a copy of all employment contracts of domestic workers and shall be
made available for verification and inspection by the DOLE.

SEC. 12. Pre-Employment Requirement. – Prior to the execution of the employment contract, the
employer may require the following from the domestic worker:

(a) Medical certificate or a health certificate issued by a local government health officer;

(b) Barangay and police clearance;

(c) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance; and

(d) Duly authenticated birth certificate or if not available, any other document showing the age of the
domestic worker such as voter’s identification card, baptismal record or passport.

However, Section 12(a), (b), (c) and (d) shall be standard requirements when the employment of the
domestic worker is facilitated through the PEA.

The cost of the foregoing shall be borne by the prospective employer or agency, as the case may be.

SEC. 13. Recruitment and Finder’s Fees. – Regardless of whether the domestic worker was hired
through a private employment agency or a third party, no share in the recruitment or finder’s fees
shall be charged against the domestic worker by the said private employment agency or third party.

SEC. 14. Deposits for Loss or Damage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any other person to
require a domestic worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, furniture and equipment in the household.

SEC. 15. Prohibition on Debt Bondage. – It shall be unlawful for the employer or any person acting
on behalf of the employer to place the domestic worker under debt bondage.

SEC. 16. Employment Age of Domestic Workers. – It shall be unlawful to employ any person below
fifteen (15) years of age as a domestic worker. Employment of working children, as defined under
this Act, shall be subject to the provisionsof Section 10(A), paragraph 2 of Section 12-A, paragraph 4
of Section 12-D, and Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the
“Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”.

Working children shall be entitled to minimum wage, and all benefits provided under this Act.

Any employer who has been sentenced by a court of law of any offense against a working child
under this Act shall be meted out with a penalty one degree higher and shall be prohibited from
hiring a working child.

SEC. 17. Employer’s Reportorial Duties. – The employers shall register all domestic workers under
their employment in the Registry of Domestic Workers in the barangay where the employer’s
residence is located. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall, in
coordination with the DOLE, formulate a registration system for this purpose.

SEC. 18. Skills Training, Assessment and Certification. – To ensure productivity and assure quality
services, the DOLE, through the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),
shall facilitate access of domestic workers to efficient training, assessment and certification based on
a duly promulgated training regulation.

ARTICLE IV

EMPLOYMENT – TERMS AND CONDITIONS

SEC. 19. Health and Safety. – The employer shall safeguard the health and safety of the domestic
worker in accordance with laws, rules and regulations, with due consideration of the peculiar nature
of domestic work.

SEC. 20. Daily Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to an aggregate daily rest period
of eight (8) hours per day.

SEC. 21. Weekly Rest Period. – The domestic worker shall be entitled to at least twenty-four (24)
consecutive hours of rest in a week. The employer and the domestic worker shall agree in writing on
the schedule of the weekly rest day of the domestic worker: Provided, That the employer shall
respect the preference of the domestic worker as to the weekly rest day when such preference is
based on religious grounds. Nothing in this provision shall deprive the domestic worker and the
employer from agreeing to the following:

(a) Offsetting a day of absence with a particular rest day;

(b) Waiving a particular rest day in return for an equivalent daily rate of pay;

(c) Accumulating rest days not exceeding five (5) days; or

(d) Other similar arrangements.

SEC. 22. Assignment to Nonhousehold Work. – No domestic worker shall be assigned to work in a
commercial, industrial or agricultural enterprise at a wage rate lower than that provided for
agricultural or nonagricultural workers. In such cases, the domestic worker shall be paid the
applicable minimum wage.

SEC. 23. Extent of Duty. – The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree for the former
to temporarily perform a task that is outside the latter’s household for the benefit of another
household. However, any liability that will be incurred by the domestic worker on account of such
arrangement shall be borne by the original employer. In addition, such work performed outside the
household shall entitle the domestic worker to an additional payment of not less than the existing
minimum wage rate of a domestic worker. It shall be unlawful for the original employer to charge
any amount from the said household where the service of the domestic worker was temporarily
performed.

SEC 24. Minimum Wage. – The minimum wage of domestic workers shall not be less than the
following:

(a) Two thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500.00) a month for those employed in the National Capital
Region (NCR);

(b) Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month for those employed in chartered cities and first class
municipalities; and

(c) One thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) a month for those employed in other
municipalities.

After one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, and periodically thereafter, the Regional Tripartite
and Productivity Wage Boards (RTPWBs) shall review, and if proper, determine and adjust the
minimum wage rates of domestic workers.

SEC 25. Payment of Wages. – Payment of wages shall be made on time directly to the domestic
worker to whom they are due in cash at least once a month. The employer, unless allowed by the
domestic worker through a written consent, shall make no deductions from the wages other than that
which is mandated by law. No employer shall pay the wages of a domestic worker by means of
promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than the cash wage as
provided for under this Act.

The domestic worker is entitled to a thirteenth month pay as provided for by law.

SEC. 26. Pay Slip. – The employer shall at all times provide the domestic worker with a copy of the
pay slip containing the amount paid in cash every pay day, and indicating all deductions made, if any.
The copies of the pay slip shall be kept by the employer for a period of three (3) years.

SEC. 27. Prohibition on Interference in the Disposal of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for the
employer to interfere with the freedom of any domestic worker to dispose of the latter’s wages. The
employer shall not force, compel or oblige the domestic worker to purchase merchandise,
commodities or other properties from the employer or from any other person, or otherwise make use
of any store or services of such employer or any other person.

SEC 28. Prohibition Against Withholding of Wages. – It shall be unlawful for an employer, directly
or indirectly, to withhold the wages of the domestic worker. If the domestic worker leaves without
any justifiable reason, any unpaid salary for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days shall be
forfeited. Likewise, the employer shall not induce the domestic worker to give up any part of the
wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever.

SEC. 29. Leave Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least one (1) year of service shall
be entitled to an annual service incentive leave of five (5) days with pay: Provided, That any unused
portion of said annual leave shall not be cumulative or carried over to the succeeding years. Unused
leaves shall not be convertible to cash.

SEC. 30. Social and Other Benefits. – A domestic worker who has rendered at least one (1) month of
service shall be covered by the Social Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PhilHealth), and the Home Development Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG, and shall be
entitled to all the benefits in accordance with the pertinent provisions provided by law.

Premium payments or contributions shall be shouldered by the employer. However, if the domestic
worker is receiving a wage of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and above per month, the domestic
worker shall pay the proportionate share in the premium payments or contributions, as provided by
law.

The domestic worker shall be entitled to all other benefits under existing laws.

SEC. 31. Rescue and Rehabilitation of Abused Domestic Workers. – Any abused or exploited
domestic worker shall be immediately rescued by a municipal or city social welfare officer or a
social welfare officer from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in
coordination with the concerned barangay officials. The DSWD and the DILG shall develop a
standard operating procedure for the rescue and rehabilitation of abused domestic workers, and in
coordination with the DOLE, for possible subsequent job placement.

ARTICLE V

POST EMPLOYMENT

SEC. 32. Termination of Service. – Neither the domestic worker nor the employer may terminate the
contract before the expiration of the term except for grounds provided for in Sections 33 and 34 of
this Act. If the domestic worker is unjustly dismissed, the domestic worker shall be paid the
compensation already earned plus the equivalent of fifteen (15) days work by way of indemnity. If
the domestic worker leaves without justifiable reason, any unpaid salary due not exceeding the
equivalent fifteen (15) days work shall be forfeited. In addition, the employer may recover from the
domestic worker costs incurred related to the deployment expenses, if any: Provided, That the
service has been terminated within six (6) months from the domestic worker’s employment.

If the duration of the domestic service is not determined either in stipulation or by the nature of the
service, the employer or the domestic worker may give notice to end the working relationship five
(5) days before the intended termination of the service.

The domestic worker and the employer may mutually agree upon written notice to pre-terminate the
contract of employment to end the employment relationship.
SEC. 33. Termination Initiated by the Domestic Worker. – The domestic worker may terminate the
employment relationship at any time before the expiration of the contract for any of the following
causes:

(a) Verbal or emotional abuse of the domestic worker by the employer or any member of the
household;

(b) Inhuman treatment including physical abuse of the domestic worker by the employer or any
member of the household;

(c) Commission of a crime or offense against the domestic worker by the employer or any member
of the household;

(d) Violation by the employer of the terms and conditions of the employment contract and other
standards set forth under this law;

(e) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the employer, or member/s of the
household; and

(f) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

SEC. 34. Termination Initiated by the Employer. – An employer may terminate the services of the
domestic worker at any time before the expiration of the contract, for any of the following causes:

(a) Misconduct or willful disobedience by the domestic worker of the lawful order of the employer in
connection with the former’s work;

(b) Gross or habitual neglect or inefficiency by the domestic worker in the performance of duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer on the domestic worker;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the domestic worker against the person of the employer or
any immediate member of the employer’s family;

(e) Violation by the domestic worker of the terms and conditions of the employment contract and
other standards set forth under this law;

(f) Any disease prejudicial to the health of the domestic worker, the employer, or member/s of the
household; and

(g) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

SEC. 35. Employment Certification. – Upon the severance of the employment relationship, the
employer shall issue the domestic worker within five (5) days from request a certificate of
employment indicating the nature, duration of the service and work performance.

ARTICLE VI

PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES

SEC. 36. Regulation of Private Employment Agencies (PEAs). – The DOLE shall, through a system
of licensing and regulation, ensure the protection of domestic workers hired through the PEAs.

The PEA shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer for all the wages, wage-related
benefits, and other benefits due a domestic worker.

The provision of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the “Labor Code of
the Philippines”, on qualifications of the PEAs with regard to nationality, networth, owners and
officers, office space and other requirements, as well as nontransferability of license and commission
of prohibited practices, shall apply.

In addition, PEAs shall have the following responsibilities:

(a) Ensure that domestic workers are not charged or levied any recruitment or placement fees;

(b) Ensure that the employment agreement between the domestic worker and the employer stipulates
the terms and conditions of employment and all the benefits prescribed by this Act;

(c) Provide a pre-employment orientation briefing to the domestic worker and the employer about
their rights and responsibilities in accordance with this Act;

(d) Keep copies of employment contracts and agreements pertaining to recruited domestic workers
which shall be made available during inspections or whenever required by the DOLE or local
government officials;

(e) Assist domestic workers with respect to complaints or grievances against their employers; and

(f) Cooperate with government agencies in rescue operations involving abused or exploited domestic
workers.

ARTICLE VII

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

SEC. 37. Mechanism for Settlement of Disputes. – All labor-related disputes shall be elevated to the
DOLE Regional Office having jurisdiction over the workplace without prejudice to the filing of a
civil or criminal action in appropriate cases. The DOLE Regional Office shall exhaust all
conciliation and mediation efforts before a decision shall be rendered.

Ordinary crimes or offenses committed under the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws
by either party shall be filed with the regular courts.

ARTICLE VIII

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 38. Information Program. – The DOLE shall, in coordination with the DILG, the SSS, the
PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG develop and implement a continuous information dissemination program
on the provisions of this Act, both at the national and local level, immediately after the enactment of
this law.

SEC. 39. “Araw Ng Mga Kasambahay”. – The date upon which the President shall approve this
“Domestic Workers Act” shall be designated as the “Araw ng mga Kasambahay”.

ARTICLE IX

PENAL AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 40. Penalty. – Any violation of the provisions of this Act declared unlawful shall be punishable
with a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal action by the aggrieved
party.

SEC. 41. Transitory Provision; Non-Diminution of Benefits. – All existing arrangements between a
domestic worker and the employer shall be adjusted to conform to the minimum standards set by this
Act within a period of sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That adjustments
pertaining to wages shall take effect immediately after the determination and issuance of the
appropriate wage order by the RTWPBs: Provided, further, That nothing in this Act shall be
construed to cause the diminution or substitution of any benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by
the domestic worker hired directly or through an agency.

SEC. 42. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this
Act, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, and the Director General of the Philippine National
Police, in coordination with other concerned government agencies and accredited nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) assisting domestic workers, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of this Act.

ARTICLE X

FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 43. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining parts or provisions not affected shall remain in full force and effect.

SEC. 44. Repealing Clause. – All articles or provisions of Chapter III (Employment of
Househelpers) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended and renumbered by Republic Act No.
10151 are hereby expressly repealed. All laws, decrees, executive orders, issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SEC. 45. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

3. G.R. No. 248694

 [ G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RANIE ESTONILO Y DE

GUZMAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Ranie Estonilo y De Guzman
(Estonilo) assailing the Decision2 dated November 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08617, which affirmed with modification the Judgment3 dated, July 28, 2016
of the Regional Trial Court of ██████████, Pampanga, Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos.
10-5R94 and 10-5895, and accordingly, found Estonilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of violation of Section 5 (a) (5), Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,4 otherwise known
as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act."

The Facts

This case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations filed before the RTC, each charging Estonilo
of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, defined and penalized under Section 4, in relation to Section 6
(a) of RA 92058,5 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," the accusatory
portions of which read:

Criminal Case No.10-5894

The period from March 6, 2010 to March 13, 2010, in the ██████████, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and harbor, maintain, hire, provide and/or receive ██████████, a minor 12 years
old, by any means or under the pretext of domestic employment or sexual exploitation taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the minor in violation of Section 4 in relation to Sec. 6 (a) Republic
Act No. 9208.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No.10-5895

The period from March 6, 2010 to March 13, 2010, in the ██████████, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and harbor, maintain, hire, provide and/or receive ██████████ a minor 11 years old,
by any means or under the pretext of domestic employment or sexual exploitation taking advantage
of the vulnerability of the minor in violation of Section 4 in relation to Sec. 6 (a) Republic Act No.
9208.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution claimed that sometime in January 2010, Estonilo approached AAA,8 then 12 years
old, in an effort to convince the latter to "mamakla" in exchange for money. For this purpose,
Estonilo even introduced him to a "client" who offered P2,000.00 for AAA's sexual services, but
AAA refused. However, Estoni1o was persistent with his recruiting efforts, and this culminated in
the evening of March 6, 2010. On that night, AAA was on his way home with his friend, BBB, then
11 years old, when Estonilo called their attention. Estonilo persistently coerced AAA to have sex
with BBB at a nearby vacant lot in exchange for P300.00 so that they will learn how to perform
sexual acts. The children acceded and had sexual contact with each other with AAA inserting his
penis into BBB's mouth and anus. About a week later, or on March 13, 2010, AAA, BBB, and their
friends were frolicking at a swimming pool when Estonilo arrived with his bicycle. Estonilo called
AAA and told him to have sexual contact with BBB at a nearby bathroom. Fearing that Estonilo
might get mad, AAA and BBB again had sexual contact with each other. At that time, Estonilo even
suggested that AAA have sex with BBB's 11-year old aunt who was with them, but AAA refused.
The next day, AAA felt pain while urinating, prompting his mother to bring him to a doctor. After
examination, the doctor revealed that AAA contracted an infection because of anal intercourse and
the same might progress into a sexually transmitted disease if left untreated. This resulted in AAA
divulging his ordeal to his mother.9

For his part, Estonilo mainly relied on denials, averring that he does not know AAA or BBB
personally, and that he is busy with his maintenance job in a hotel during weekdays and his
carinderia during weekends.10

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment11 dated July 28, 2016, the RTC found Estonilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 for each count, and to pay AAA and BBB
P20,000.00 each as moral damages.12

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Estonilo took
advantage of the vulnerability of two (2) minors, namely, AAA and BBB, to engage in sexual acts
with one another in exchange for money. On this note, the RTC found untenable Estonilo's bare
defenses of denial in the face of the clear and categorical testimonies made by both AAA and BBB
describing their ordeal under the hands of Estonilo.13

Aggrieved, Estonilo appealed14 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated November 23, 2017, the CA modified the RTC ruling, finding Estonilo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of violation of Section 5 (a), paragraph (5),
Article III of RA 7610. Accordingly, the CA sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum for each count, and ordered him
to pay AAA and BBB each the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.16

The CA held that the prosecution had indeed established beyond reasonable doubt the fact that
Estonilo, through coercion and for monetary consideration, ordered AAA and BBB to engage in
sexual conduct with one another. However, it opined that Estonilo could not be held criminally liable
for Qualified Trafficking in Persons, as it was not shown that Estonilo committed acts of trafficking,
i.e., how he recruited, obtained, hired, provided, offered, transported, transferred, maintained,
harbored, or received AAA and/or BBB for the purpose of trafficking. This notwithstanding and
applying the variance doctrine as enunciated in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the CA ruled that Estonilo's acts of offering money and imposing his will on the
victims constitute a violation of Section 5 (a), paragraph (5), Article III of RA 7610, and as such, he
must be held criminally liable therefor.17

Hence, this appeal.18

 The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Estonilo should be held criminally liable for his
supposed acts against AAA and BBB.

The Court's Ruling

As a preliminary matter, the general rule is that appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the
Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari before it under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;19
except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty," in which case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal filed before the CA.20 In
this case, Estonilo clearly availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal before the
CA21 despite the latter court modifying his conviction to a crime not punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court will
resolve this case on the merits in order to resolve the substantial issue at hand with finality.22

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.23

Guided by the foregoing consideration, and as will be explained hereunder, the Court deems it proper
to reinstate the RTC ruling convicting Estonilo of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4
(a) in relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208.24

Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The same
provision further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a
child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does
not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph." In this regard, Section 4 of the
same law provides the acts constituting "Trafficking in Persons."25 Portions of this provision
pertinent to this case read:

SECTION 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to commit any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those
done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude
or debt bondage; xxx

For a successful prosecution of Trafficking in Persons, the following elements must be shown: (a) the
act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders"; (b) the means used which include
"threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another;" and (c) the purpose of
trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."26 In
addition, Section 6 of RA 9208 provides that the crime is qualified when, inter alia, the trafficked
person is a child, to wit:

SECTION 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified

trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child; xxx

In this case, the courts a quo found that the prosecution, through the testimonies of both AAA and
BBB, was able to establish that Estonilo had indeed befriended the two (2) minors in order to recruit
them and thereafter, pimp them to his clients. For this purpose, he was able to take advantage of
AAA and BBB's minority and coerce them into committing sexual acts with one another, under the
pretext that they needed to learn how to perform such acts with fellow males so that they can earn
monetary consideration for the same. Hence, the Court finds no reason to overturn the findings of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as there was no showing that they overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It bears pointing out that the RTC
was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.27 As such, Estonilo's criminal liability for the aforesaid acts must stand.

In this regard, the CA erred in opining that no trafficking existed as "there was no person to whom
[Estonilo] endorsed or recruited his victims,"28 and further stressing that the sexual acts transpired
not between AAA or BBB and any of Estonilo's clients, but between AAA and BBB themselves.29
As aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, neither the presence of the
trafficker's clients, nor their intercourse with the victim/s, is required to support a finding of
trafficking. As held in People v. Aguirre:30

Furthermore, the presence of the trafficker's clients is not an element of the crime of recruitment or
transportation of victims under Sections 3 (a) and 4 (a) of RA 9208. In the same vein, the law does
not require that the victims be transported to or be found in a brothel or a prostitution den for such
crime of recruitment or transportation to be committed. In fact, it has been held that the act of sexual
intercourse need not have been consummated for recruitment to be said to have taken place. It is
sufficient that the accused has lured, enticed[,] or engaged its victims or transported them for the
established purpose of exploitation, which includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, and the removal or sale of organs. In this case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established
accused-appellants' recruitment and transportation of private complainants for purposes of
prostitution and sexual exploitation.31 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the fact that neither AAA nor BBB had sexual contact with any of Estonilo's clients will not
affect the latter's criminal liability for Qualified Trafficking in Persons. To be sure, the gravamen of
the crime of trafficking is "the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human
being for [inter alia,] sexual exploitation"32 - which, as already discussed, was established to have
been committed by Estonilo.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Estonilo, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208 states that persons
found guilty of Qualified Trafficking shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P2,000,000.00 but not more than P5,000,000.00, for each count thereof. Finally, and
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Estonilo must also pay AAA and BBB each the amounts of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until full payment.33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 23, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR HC No. 08617 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 10-5894, accused-appellant Ranie Estonilo y De Guzman is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, defined and penalized under Section 4
(a), in relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In addition, he is ordered to pay the
victim, AAA, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, both with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until full payment; and

(b) In Criminal Case No. 10-5895, accused-appellant Ranie Estonilo y De Guzman is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons, defined and penalized under Section 4
(a), in relation to Section 6 (a) of RA 9208. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In addition, he is ordered to pay the
victim, BBB, the amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, both with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.

Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.

4. G.R. No. 167512

G.R. No. 167512 March 12, 2007

V.L. ENTERPRISES and/or FAUSTINO J. VISITACION, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SHERIFF WILLY GABITO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
(DOLE) and CAMILO FRANCISCO, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Writ of Execution and Notice of Sale on Execution,
relating to the following Orders:

1. Resolutions dated 9 November 20041 and 3 February 20052 of the Court of Appeals;

2. Order dated 5 May 1999 of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Director
Maximo Lim;3
3. Alias Writ of Execution dated 11 August 2004 issued by DOLE Acting Regional Director for the
National Capital Region (NCR) Ciriaco A. Lagunzad III;4 and

4. Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Properties dated 11 October 2004 issued by Sheriff Willy
Gabito.5

The facts of this case are as follows:

On 10 March 1998, the DOLE conducted an inspection of the establishment of petitioner company
V.L. Enterprises. On 5 May 1999, then Regional Director Maximo Lim issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein petitioners] V.L. ENTERPRISES AND/OR MR.

FAUSTINO VISITACION is hereby ordered to pay CAMILO FRANCISCO and TWENTY TWO
WORKERS SIMILARLY SITUATED the total amount of EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY
TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT PESOS (₱822,978.00) corresponding to
their claims within ten (10) days upon receipt of this order, otherwise, a Writ of Execution shall be
issued.6

Petitioners appealed the aforequoted Order of the Regional Director.

On 23 June 1999, DOLE Undersecretary Jose M. Español, Jr. rendered an Order directing petitioners
V.L. Enterprises and/or Faustino J. Visitacion, to post cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award; otherwise, the appeal will be dismissed for not having been perfected.

On 29 July 1999, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, invoking therein that in a
similar case pending with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC NCR Case No.
00-10-0762-27) involving the same parties and issues, petitioners had already posted a supersedeas
bond.

On 14 February 2000, Undersecretary Jose M. Español, Jr. rendered a Resolution, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent is
DENIED. Respondents are hereby given ten (10) days from the receipt of this Order to post the
requisite bond. Otherwise its appeal shall be dismissed.7

On 31 July 2002, DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas affirmed the 14 February 2000 Order and
deemed the appealed order to have become final and executory.

On 11 August 2004, Acting NCR Regional Director Ciriaco A. Lagunzad issued an Alias Writ of
Execution, directing petitioners to pay respondent Camilo Francisco and several similarly situated
employees the sum of ₱422,978.00. On the basis of said Alias Writ of Execution, Sheriff Wilfredo A.
Gabito issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Properties on 11 October 2004.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87230, seeking the nullification of the following Issuances:

1. Order dated 5 May 1999 of DOLE Regional Director Maximo Lim;

2. Alias Writ of Execution dated 11 August 2004 issued by DOLE Acting NCR Regional Director
Ciriaco A. Lagunzad III; and
3. Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Properties dated 11 October 2004 issued by Sheriff Willy
Gabito.

On 9 November 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack of merit in the first
assailed Resolution. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was likewise denied
by the Court of Appeals in the second assailed Resolution.

Petitioners received a copy of the latter Resolution on 3 February 2005.8 Instead of appealing said
Court of Appeals Resolution via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, however, petitioner filed on 11
April 2005 the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Writ of Execution and Notice of Sale on
Execution with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order.

The petition must fail.

We have aptly held in Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation,9 that:

A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not
a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of an appeal, a motion for
new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to
prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. x x x.

Therefore, the petition cannot prosper insofar as it prayed for the annulment of the Court of Appeals
Resolution as petitioners did not file a Petition for Review on Certiorari within the reglementary
period. On the other hand, the prayer for the annulment of the three other Issuances, namely the 5
May 1999 DOLE Order, the 11 August 2004 Alias Writ of Execution, and the 11 October 2004
Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Properties, should also be denied in view of the final and
executory judgment of the Court of Appeals. The appeal to this Court of the Court of Appeals
Resolutions is but a continuation of the process of appeal against the assailed Issuances, and the
failure to actively pursue the former without any justifiable reason effectively bars the petition for an
annulment of said Issuances.

Be that as it may, the petition would still fail even if we decide the same on the merits. Petitioners’
ground for annulment of the three Issuances is the alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
DOLE Regional Director in awarding amounts which exceeded ₱5,000.00. Petitioners cite the 1991
Minute Resolution in 5D’s Liners v. Department of Labor and Employment,10 which in turn cited
Servando’s Incorporated v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,11 thus –

We further hold that to harmonize the above-quoted three (3) provisions of the Labor Code, the
Secretary of Labor should be held as possessed of his plenary visitorial powers to order the
inspection of all establishments where labor is employed, to look into all possible violations of labor
laws and regulations but the power to hear and decide employees' claims exceeding ₱5,000.00 for
each employee should be left to the Labor Arbiter as the exclusive repository of the power to hear
and decide such claims. In other words, the inspection conducted by the Secretary of Labor, through
labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers, may yield findings of violations of labor
standards under labor laws; the Secretary of Labor may order compliance with said labor standards,
if necessary, through appropriate writs of execution but when the findings disclose an employee
claim of over ₱5,000.00, the matter should be referred to the Labor Arbiter in recognition of his
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

and the 1993 Decision Halili Inn, Incorporated v. Trajano,12 which reads –
[T]he original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide employee’s money claims arising from
employer-employee relations exceeding the aggregate amount of ₱5,000.00 for each employee is
vested in the Labor Arbiter (Art. 217 (a) (b), Labor Code as amended) and this is confirmed by the
provisions of Art. 129 of the same Code, which excludes from jurisdiction of the Regional Director
or any hearing officer of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the power to hear and
decide claims of employees arising from employer-employee relations exceeding the amount of
₱5,000.00 for each employee.

Petitioners must have been unmindful of the fact that one year from the issuance of the Halili
Decision, or on 2 June 1994, Republic Act No. 7730 amended Article 128(b) to its present wording
so as to free it from the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 12913 and 217.14 Thus, as it is now
worded, the authority under Article 12815 may be exercised by DOLE regardless of the monetary
value involved, unlike in Article 129 where the authority is only for claims not exceeding ₱5,000.00
per claimant. Thus, we held in Allied Investigation Bureau Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment16:

We dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act 7730 [Approved on June 2, 1994]
which amended Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representative, in the exercise of their visitorial and enforcement powers, are now
authorized to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code
and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or
industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, sans any restriction with respect to the
jurisdictional amount of ₱5,000.00 provided under Article 129 and Article 217 of the Code.

This was further affirmed by our ruling in Guico v. Quisumbing,17 which stated categorically the
abandonment of the Servando ruling:

With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner alleged that the Regional Director has no
jurisdiction over the instant case since the individual monetary claims of the 21 employees exceed
₱5,000.00. He further argued that following Article 129 of the Labor Code, as amended, and Section
1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6715, the jurisdiction over this case
belongs to the Labor Arbiter, and the Regional Director should have indorsed it to the appropriate
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On the other hand, the
respondent Secretary held that the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 on his visitorial
and enforcement power under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, has been repealed by
Republic Act No. 7730. He pointed out that the amendment "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of
Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code to the contrary" erased all doubts as to the amendatory nature
of the new law, and in effect, overturned this Court's ruling in the case of Servando's Inc. v. Secretary
of Labor and Employment.

We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed out, this
Court's ruling in Servando — that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce
compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim exceeds
₱5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending Article
128 (b) of the Labor Code, viz:

Article 128 (b) — Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the
contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial
safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their
orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and
enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in
the course of inspection.

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (Italics supplied.)

The records of the House of Representatives show that Congressmen Alberto S. Veloso and Eriberto
V. Loreto sponsored the law. In his sponsorship speech, Congressman Veloso categorically declared
that "this bill seeks to do away with the jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling
(referring to Servando) and to finally settle any lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement
powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment." Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus
untenable.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Writ of Execution and Notice of
Sale on Execution is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice