CASE ANALYSIS

OF

WAMAN RAO V. UNION OF INDIA

((1981) 2 SCC 362, 1981 2 SCR 1)

By: -

SHIVANGI CHOUDHARY

1stYear, BA LLB

SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL, NOIDA

Mob.: 9919792221

E-mail: shivi19012000@gmail.com

www.probono-india.in

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  INTRODUCTION

In the year 1961, the Maharashtra government passed an Act named Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961which was enacted as an implementation of the Directive Principles
of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and(c) of Article 39 of the Constitution, which imposed a
maximum ceiling on the agricultural holding and allowed the Maharashtra government to acquire the
land in excess on the ceiling for the purpose of distribution of it to the landless farmers. The Act was
imposed on 26th January, 1962. After the imposition of the Act, there were many amendments made
in the Act, along with lowering of the ceiling, over the period. The validity of these Acts and the
related Amendments were challenged in the Bombay High Court. In the year 1976, the Divisional
Bench of Bombay High Court, dismissed the challenges in the Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State
of Maharashtra1 case. The court said that the provisions challenged were not open to challenge on the
ground that they varying rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution, since those Acts were
placed in the 9thSchedule by the Constitution through the 17 thAmendment Act, 1964, and the
Constitution 40th Amendment Act, 1976, and also that due to the promulgation of the emergency, the
fundamental rights conferred under the article 14 and 19 could not be enforced.2
This decision in the case of Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtrawas further
challenged in the Bombay High Court, where the appeal against the constitutional validity of the
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961, was dismissed in the case of
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra3in the year 1977. The main point encouraged in
those petitions was that the Principal Act, as revised, was void being violative of the subsequent
stipulation to Article 31A(1), to the extent that it made an artificial 'family unit' and fixed the ceiling
on the agricultural possessions of such "family unit'. The contention was that the infringement of the
specific stipulation denied the reproached laws of the insurance given by Article 31A. That
contention was dismissed by the Court on the view that regardless of whether the challenged
provisions were violative of the subsequent stipulation, they would get the protection of Article 31B
by reason of the incorporation of the Principal Act and the Amending Acts in the 9 th Schedule of the
Constitution. The Court thought about whether, actually, the arrangements of the condemned Acts
were violative of the subsequent stipulation and held that it was totally for the government to choose
what strategy to make to rebuild the agrarian framework and the Court could not beexpected
toassume the role of an economic adviser for pronouncing upon the wisdom of such policy. The
second provision to Article 31A(1) was therefore held not to have been breached.4

1
AIR 1977 Bom 99
2
Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar v. State of Maharashtra [1976] AIR 1977 Bom 99
3
[ 1977] AIR 915, 1977 SCR (2) 790
4
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [1977] AIR 915, 1977 SCR (2) 790
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 FACTS OF THE CASE

After the implementation the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act, 1961, there
were further many amendments made in the main Act, which basically led to several petitions in the
courts. These provisions were included in the 9th Schedule by the 17thConstitutional Amendment Act,
1964. The further amendments in the main Act were also included in the 9 th Schedule by the
39thConstitutional Amendment Act, 1975. The three major amending Acts which, basically made the
main act unconstitutional were, Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975 producedfundamental amendments in
the Principal Act by lowering ceiling on agricultural holding and creating an artificial family unit for
fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land. The next amending Acts were Maharashtra Act 47 of
1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 which exaggerated certain further changes in the main act.
These three amending Acts were enacted after the 39 th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1975,
andhence they were included in the 9thSchedule along with certain other provisions by the 40th
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. The result was that the main act, along with the amendments
made by all the subsequent amending acts was protected against invalidation under Article 31B.

 ISSUES OF THE CASE

1. Whether or not by the enactment ofArticle 31A(1)(a) by the way of Constitution

Amendment, the legislature had transgressed its power of constitutional amendment, and does
Article 31A (1) gives enough protection to the laws included under it from being challenged
on the alleged ground of fundamental rights namely articles 14, 19 and 31being infringed?
2. Whether article 31B which provides for 9 th Schedule can be challenged on the ground of
being inconsistent with the fundamental rights of the citizens?
3. Whether Article 31C which aims to achieve the goals laid down under Article 39 are open to
challenge on the alleged ground of violation of fundamental rights?
4. Whether the proclamation of emergency was mala-fide and the 40 th amendment which was
enacted by extending the life of the parliament was valid or not?
5. Whether the doctrine of stare decisis can be applied in upholding the constitutional validity of
any Article of the constitution or this principle can apply on to laws sought to be protected by
those Articles?

 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
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 FIRST ISSUES:
Section 4 of the 1stConstitutionAmendment Act, 1951, inserted Article 31A in the Constitution with
retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution. This issue was basically
challenging the validity of the Article 31A on the grounds that it takes away the fundamental rights
and hence is inconsistent with the basic structure of the constitution.
The court said that the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Ceiling on Holdings Act, which has been
questioned in this case, falls within the ambit of the Clause (a) of the Article 31A(1). The court said
that the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of laws which fall under
Clause (a) is total and complete, the application of those articles stands revoked, not merely reduced,
in respect of the questioned enactments which undoubtedly fall within the ambit of Clause (a). It was
further added that in every case where the fundamental rightsare withdrawn, does not necessarily
destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The court with the help of the Shankari Prasad v.
Union of India5 judgement and also the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru in the Provisional Parliament.
gave the example of the Zamindari Abolition Act The court said that the 1 stConstitutional
Amendment Act, is nothing and thus, should be taken as the part and parcel of the Constitution. It
was mentioned that it is unjust to procure a large amount of ground by a single person. The First
Amendment is aimed at removing social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector. It was
held that ceiling was meant to remove inequalities in the agricultural sector.
The court finally decided that the Section 4 of the 1 st Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951was not
destroying the basic structure of the Constitution, and the law which was for the purpose to
implement the objective in the Article 31 A(1)(a), that is the, Maharashtra Agricultural Lands
Ceiling on Holdings Act, does not infringe Article 14, 19 and 31.

SECOND ISSUE:
The second issue was regarding the validity of the Article 31B, the Article additionally contains a
tool for protecting laws from challenge on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights. Article
31B provides that any Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule will not be considered to be
void on the ground that they are inconsistent with by Part III of the Constitution, which contains the
Fundamental rights. Article 31B was added by Section 5 of the 1 st Constitutional Amendment Act,
1951.
The court very well established the similarities and the dissimilarities between the Article 31A and
31B, which helped the court to establish the validity of Article 31B in this case. The court decided to
use the Kesavananda Bharti6 case as a landmark and drew the line to find its validity. The model that
5
[1951] AIR 458, 1952 SCR 89
6
[1973] 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461
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 the parliament cannot exercise its amending power so as to destroy the basic structure of the
Constitution was promulgated and recognized for the first time in Kesavananda Bharati 7 judgement.
The court finally held that all the issues mentioned in the 9 th Schedule of the Constitution before the
Kesavananda judgement date, that is, 24th April,1973 would be upheld. The Acts and Regulation
mentioned and incorporated in the 9 th Schedule after the judgement were not upheld by the court.
The court granted full protection to the Acts and Regulations, incorporated in the 9 th Schedule under
the Article 31B, but not to the Issues mentioned after the judgement date.

THIRD ISSUE:
The petitioners brought attack against the validity of Article 31C. Article 31C was added to the
Constitution through the 25th Constitutional Amendment Act,1971. Initially, it required to give
protection to those laws only which gave effect to the policy of the State towards securing the
principles specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution. No such law could be
void on the ground that it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31.
The court took the decision of the Kesavananda Bharti 8 case on the opening clause of the Article
31C and decided that the appellants cannot go against it.
The court gave the closing statement by saying that if the validity of the Article 31A was upheld in
the court then logically the validity of the unamended part of the Article 31C will also be upheld.

FOURTH ISSUE:
The fourth issue was regarding the validity of the 40 th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976, with
which theAmending Acts 21 of 1975, 41 of 1975 and 2 of 1976 were placed in the 9 thSchedule. The
court mentioned that the original tenure of the Lok Sabha should have ended on March 18, 1976, but
yet its tenure was increased for one year by applying House of People (Extension of Duration)
Act,1976. One more Act called House of People (Extension of Duration) Amendment Act,1976 was
passed by which the residency was additionally stretched out for one year. The 40th amendment to
the constitution was made during the all-encompassing residency.
The court mentioned about the clause 4 and 5 inserted the Article 368 by the 42 nd Constitutional
Amendment Act, which were struck down in the Minerva Mills 9case, on the grounds that it was
damaging the basic structure of the Constitution. It was submitted under the watchful eye of the
Court that the declaration of emergency was made with mala-fide goal and there is by all accounts
no legitimization. Be that as it may, the Court found that proof cited was insufficient and satisfactory
protection has been given as Article 352 provision (3). Presently it is not, at this point feasible for
the President to pronounce emergency except if the choice of Union Cabinet has been conveyed to
7
ibid
8
ibid
9
[1980] AIR 1789, 1981 SCR (1) 206
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 him in a composed structure. Aside from that during that time the danger on security and sway of the
nation was conspicuous. Hence there is by all accounts no mala-fide behind the declaration of
emergency.
Along these lines on this ground the Court held that the expansion of the Lok Sabha was substantial
and lawful. Thus the 40th and 42nd Constitution Amendment Acts cannot be struck down on the
ground that they were passed by the Lok Sabha which didn't lawfully exist.

FIFTH ISSUE:
The Court has said that the doctrine of stare decisis can only be applied to the laws protected by the
Article and not to the Article itself. However, the Court has given specific reasons for saying so. The
Court added that it is disinclined to invoke the doctrine of stare decisis as Article 31A stands
constitutionally valid on its own merits independently. The Court has given four reasons for doing
so. Firstly, it is said that Article 31A breathes its own validity by drawing sustenance from the basic
tenets of the constitution itself. Secondly, the Court has referred a number of cases where the
validity of Article 31A was upheld. Thirdly, the Court reasoned that this principle of stare decisis
has limited application only. It is wise policy to restrict this principle to only those areas of law
where correction can be done by legislation. Otherwise the constitution will lose its flexibility which
is necessary to serve the needs of successive generations. The fourth and the last reason is that this
doctrine cannot be invoked to protect the Article but the laws only.

DISSENTING OPINION:
In this very case Justice Bhagwati offered his dissenting judgement. He was unable to agree with the
majority view, that principle of stare decisis cannot be applied to maintain the legitimacy of the
Articles yet to the laws just which are ensured by that Article. He found this very seat has
maintained the established legitimacy of Article 31A by basic use of this teaching. In Kesavananda
Bharati case the legitimacy of Article 31A was maintained. This choice ties the current one on the
basic ground of stare decisis. Consequently, he cannot concur with the majority view as that would
be in struggle with what this very seat has said in Ambika Prasad case10.

 JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS

The judgement of Waman Rao Vs Union of India is regarded as one of the benchmarks in the
constitutional jurisprudence of India. This case in a unique way clarifies various doubts which arose

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[1980] AIR 1762, 1980 SCR (3)1159
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out of Keshavananda Bharati case. This judgment is a complete one in the sense that before coming
to decision of the issues directly the Court has taken many things in considerations.
The first point is regarding the land reform and laws pertaining to it. Land reform is a scheme which
was introduced by the government immediately after attaining freedom. India being an agricultural
economy, forced the framers of the Constitution to given ample space to it in the Constitution,
whichmakes it a vital subject. India since its freedom needed to accomplish an egalitarian type of
society. India is a huge nation having sufficient amount of land and endless needy individuals.
Greater part of the individuals meets their business by rural exercises. During the British time frame,
there were hardly any people who used to hold place that is known for their ownership. Sections of
land were possessed by Zamindars and they used to utilize workers for farming and pay
exceptionally less sum. It was hard for those individuals to win their job in a fair manner. All these
had brought about enormous financial and social differences in the farming sector which is the
essential source of revenue in our nation. The founding fathers of Constitution had adequately seen
it and made system in the constitution itself to address these irregularities.
The Constitution was amended for the first time in the year 1951. This change drove a few
adjustments in the fundamental rights and began the time of land change through protected system.
It has presented two new articles in particular 31A and 31B and the infamous 9 th Schedule to make
the laws procuring zamindaris unchallengeable in the Court of law. This has in view of the land
change enactments were being tested under the steady gaze of different High Courts like Patna,
Nagpur, Allahabad and so forth on the ground of irregularity with the fundamental rights
uncommonly Article 14. In any case, the High Court differed in their sentiments. These sorts of
prosecutions were causing delay during the time spent agrarian changes which should be quick.
Consequently, it was thought to sidestep these inefficient prosecutions so as to give genuine impact
to the land change process.
Jawaharlal Nehru was a keendevotee of the scheme of agrarian reforms which was regarded as
process of social reforms. The Centre wanted to remove any obstacle to such land reform laws being
declared invalid by the courts and hence the amendment was made. In this regard the 9 th schedule
was an important innovation in the area of Constitutional Amendment. This was a new strategy
applied by the Union to protect the laws from becoming invalid, as the 9 th Schedule provided
complete protection to the Acts and Regulation that were under it. It grants immunity to the laws
from the ground of inconsistency with the fundamental rights. It also validated the laws
retrospectively once they come under the ambit of the 9 th Schedule. Initially, there were only 13
zamindari laws under it.

Presently in the current case the Court has properly perceived the need of promoting this procedure
of land change so as to assist the need of accomplishing an egalitarian type of society. Indian

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 agrarian sector is loaded with monetary and social incongruities and to evacuate a similar weight on
agrarian changes cannot be disregarded at any expense. In any case, this likewise evident that in
doing so the benefits of certain individuals will be encroached upon. Yet to accomplish bigger
intrigue, little close to home interests can be relinquished. The Court has commented that it is
altogether for the governing body to choose what strategy is to be embraced to rebuild the agrarian
framework and the Court ought not accept the job of a monetary counsel for articulating upon the
insight of such approach. One may thoroughly concur with this comment to be extremely down to
earth and sound.
Article 31C was presented by the 25 thAmendment Act to the Constitution. This provision
pronounces that a law offering impact to the state strategy towards making sure about the order
standards contained under Articles 31B or C would not be held void on account of its irregularity
with articles 14, 19 and 31. There was a further statement that if a law was so instituted to offer
impact to such strategy would be safe from being tested in any Court of law on the ground that that
it didn't offer impact to such arrangement. Presently in the current case the Court has alluded to the
instance of KesavanadaBharati case in which larger part of the appointed authorities held this Article
unavoidably substantial. The point of reference estimation of the Kesavananda Bharati Case was
sufficient for the Court to choose the legitimacy of this article. This Article is intended for the
assurance of those laws which are to offer impact to the order standards of state strategy under
Article 39(b) and (c). Furthermore, laws made for this reason must be held acceptable and legitimate
as they mean to accomplish certain more noteworthy advantage for the general public. In this
manner evidently it is beyond the realm of imagination to expect to call those laws invalid just in
light of the fact that they are here and there conflicting with the key rights. They plan to lessen
different social and financial incongruities existing inside the general public. It is in this way
anticipated that that parliament while making laws should offer impact to accomplish objectives
must exercise the force with due consideration and thought to ensure that the reason for existing isn't
weakened. In the event that is so done, at that point it will sustain the fundamental structure by
giving most extreme potential to those laws. Anyway, this judgment is not liberated from lacunae.
The lacunae can be found in two features—one is relating to the interpretation of Article 31C and
another is in regards to comprehension of the convention of stare decisis.

 BRIEF HISTROY OF BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE

The Constitution enables the Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws inside their
particular jurisdiction. Bills to amend the Constitution must be presented in the Parliament however
this power is not absolute. There are chances where the Supreme Court may find any law made by
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 the Parliament conflicting with the Constitution, it has the ability to announce that law to be invalid.
In this manner, it protects the beliefs and reasoning of the originalConstitution, the Supreme Court
has set out the basic structure doctrine. As indicated by the principle, the Parliament cannot destroy
or change the basic structure of the Constitution.
The term “basic structure” is no where mentioned in the Constitution and it was not present from the
beginning of the Constitution. This concept has gradually evolved over a period of time, when
judiciary tried to protect the basic rights of its citizen and the ideals and philosophy of the
Constitution.
The 1st Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951 was challenged in the ShankariPrashad vs Union of
India,195111case. It was challenged on the ground that it violated Part- III of the Constitution and
should be considered void, but the court gave the decision that the Parliament can amend anything in
the Constitution including the fundamental rights.
In the Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan 12, 1965 the court upheld the decision made in the Shankari
Prasad.
In Golak Nath vs State of Punjab13, 1967, the court reversed its judgement and said that the
Parliament has no rights to amend the Part-III of the Indian Constitution.
In Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala14,1971 the Parliament had the power to amend any
provision, but cannot dilute the basic structure.
In Indira Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain15, 1975 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its concept of basic structure.
In Minerva Mills Vs. Union of India, 1980, the concept of basic structure was further developed by
adding 'judicial review' and the 'balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles' to
the basic features.
In KihotoHollohan Vs. Zachillhu16, 1992 the concept of 'Free and fair elections' was added to the
basic features.
In Indira Sawhney Vs. Union of India17, 1992 ‘Rule of law’, was added to the basic structure.
S.R Bommai vs Union of India181994 federal structure, unity and integrity of India, secularism,
socialism, social justice and judicial review were reiterated as basic features
The basic structure of the Constitution;

1. Supremacy of the constitution

2. Republican and democratic form of government
3. Secular character of the constitution
4. Federal character of the constitution
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AIR. 1951 SC 458
12
1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933
13
1967 AIR 1643, 1967 SCR (2) 762
14
Supra 6
15
1975 AIR 865, 1975 SCR (3) 333
16
1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651
17
AIR 1993 SC 477, 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454
18
1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3), 1, JT 1994 (2)215, 1994 SCALE(2)37
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 5. Separation of power
6. Unity and Sovereignty of India
7. Individual freedom

REFERENCES

India l, 'Waman Rao Vs Union Of India-Certaining The Uncertainty - An Analysis'

(Legalserviceindia.com, 2020) <http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l36-Waman-Rao-Vs-
Union-of-India.html#:~:text=The%20decision%20of%20Waman%20Rao,out%20of
%20Keshavananda%20Bharati%20case.&text=India%20since%20its%20freedom%20wanted
%20to%20achieve%20an%20egalitarian%20pattern%20of%20society.> accessed 13 August
2020
KNOWLEDGE G, Polity T, and Josh J, 'Basic Structure (Doctrine) Of The Constitution'
(Jagranjosh.com, 2020) <https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/basic-structure-
doctrine-of-the-constitution-1437127016-1> accessed 13 August 2020
Kumar V, 'Basic Structure Of The Indian Constitution: Doctrine Of Constitutionally Controlled
Governance [From Kesavananda Bharti To I.R. Coelho]' (2007) 49
jstor<http://www.jstor.com/stable/43952120> accessed 13 August 2020
Shukla V, Constitution Of India (13th edn, EBC 1950)
'Waman Rao And Ors Vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. On 13 November, 1980' (Indiankanoon.org,
2020) <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1124708/> accessed 13 August 2020
Minerva Mills Ltd and Ors v Union Of India [1980] SC, AIR (SC)
Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v Union of India [1951] SC, AIR (SC)
VithalraoUdhaoraoUttarwar v State of Maharashtra [1977] Bom, AIR (Bom)

ABOUT AUTHOR

Shivangi Choudhary is a first-year BA.LLB student from Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA. She is
also an intern under ProBono India. She has a keen interest in Constitutional Law and IPR, and thus
is pursuing the course with a great zeal. She has participated in various law school activities and was
also in cultural committee.

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