LYCEUM OF THE PHILS VS COURT OF APPEALS CITATIONS
G.R. No. 101897. March 5, 1993.  SEC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the same was reversed on appeal
Facts:
 Petitioner is an educational institution duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). When it first
registered with the SEC on 21 September 1950, it used the corporate
name Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc. and has used that name ever
since.
 On 24 February 1984, petitioner instituted proceedings before the
SEC to compel the private respondents, which are also educational
institutions, to delete the word "Lyceum" from their corporate names
and permanently to enjoin them from using "Lyceum" as part of their
respective names.
 Some of the private respondents actively participated in the
proceedings before the SEC, the dates of their original SEC
registration being set out below opposite their respective names: o
Western Pangasinan Lyceum — 27 October 1950
 Lyceum of Cabagan — 31 October 1962
 Lyceum of Lallo, Inc. — 26 March 1972
 Lyceum of Aparri — 28 March 1972
 Lyceum of Tuao, Inc. — 28 March 1972
 Lyceum of Camalaniugan — 28 March 1972
 Petitioner had sometime before commenced in the SEC a proceeding
against the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. to require it to change its
corporate name and to adopt another name not "similar [to] or
identical" with that of petitioner. The SEC held that the corporate
name of petitioner and that of the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. were
substantially identical because of the presence of a "dominant" word,
i.e., "Lyceum," the name of the geographical location of the campus
being the only word which distinguished one from the other corporate
name. The SEC also noted that petitioner had registered as a
corporation ahead of the Lyceum of Baguio, Inc. in point of time, and
ordered the latter to change its name to another name "not similar or
identical [with]" the names of previously registered entities.
 Petitioner then wrote all the educational institutions it could find using
the word "Lyceum" as part of their corporate name, and advised them
to discontinue such use of "Lyceum."
to the SEC en banc, CA affirmed
Issue: Whether or not the corporate names of private respondent
institutions are "identical with, or deceptively or confusingly similar" to that
of the petitioner institution.
Held:
 No. True enough, the corporate names of private respondent
entities all carry the word "Lyceum" but confusion and deception
are effectively precluded by the appending of geographic names
to the word "Lyceum." Thus, we do not believe that the "Lyceum
of Aparri" can be mistaken by the general public for the Lyceum
of the Philippines, or that the "Lyceum of Camalaniugan" would
be confused with the Lyceum of the Philippines. In the name of
the petitioner, "Lyceum" appears to be a substitute for
"university;" in other places, however, “Lyceum," or "Liceo" or
"Lycee" frequently denotes a secondary school or a college.
 DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY MEANING: The doctrine of
secondary meaning originated in the field of trademark law. Its
application has, however, been extended to corporate names
since the right to use a corporate name to the exclusion of others
is based upon the same principle which underlies the right to use
a particular trademark or trade name.
 The question which arises, therefore, is whether or not the use by
petitioner of "Lyceum" in its corporate name has been for such
length of time and with such exclusivity as to have become
associated or identified with the petitioner institution in the mind of
the general public.
 No evidence was ever presented in the hearing before the
Commission which sufficiently proved that the word 'Lyceum' has
indeed acquired secondary meaning in favor of the appellant. If
there was any of this kind, the same tend to prove only that the
appellant had been using the disputed word for a long period of
time.
 THE MISSIONARY SISTERS OF OUR LADY OF FATIMA
Vs AMANDO V. ALZONA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 224307, August 06, 2018
FACTS:
The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima is a religious and
charitable
group whose primary mission is to take care of the abandoned and
neglected
elderly persons. It became a corporation August 31, 2001.
On the other hand, Purificacion Alzona is a benefactor of the
Missionary
Sisters. In August 29, 2001, she executed a deed of donation inter
vivos of her
house and lot in Laguna to the Missionary Sisters. The donation was
accepted
by the Superior General of the Missionary Sisters on the same date.
The Missionary Sisters then filed an application before the BIR that
they
would be exempted from donor's tax as a religious organization.
The
application was granted by the BIR. The Register of Deeds,
however, denied
the registration on account of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated
September
26, 2001 filed by the brother of Purificacion, respondent Amando.
Purificacion died without any issue in October 2001, and was
survived
only by her brother of full blood, Amando, who nonetheless died
during the
pendency of this case and was represented and substituted by his
legal heirs.
I n
2002, Amando filed a Complaint before the RTC, seeking to annul the
Deed executed between Purificacion and the petitioner, on the
ground that at
the time the donation was made, the latter was not registered
with the SEC
and therefore has no juridical personality and cannot legally
accept the
donation.
The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima is a religious and
charitable group whose primary mission is to take care of the
abandoned and neglected elderly persons. It became a corporation
August 31, 2001. On the other hand, Purificacion Alzona is a
benefactor of the Missionary Sisters. In August 29, 2001, she
executed a deed of donation inter vivos of her house and lot in
Laguna to the Missionary Sisters. The donation was accepted by the
Superior General of the Missionary Sisters on the same date. The
Missionary Sisters then filed an application before the BIR that they
would be exempted from donor's tax as a religious organization.
The application was granted by the BIR. The Register of Deeds,
however, denied the registration on account of the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated September 26, 2001 filed by the brother of
Purificacion, respondent Amando. Purificacion died without any
issue in October 2001, and was survived only by her brother of
full blood, Amando, who nonetheless died during the pendency of
this case and was represented and substituted by his legal heirs.
In 2002, Amando filed a Complaint before the RTC, seeking to annul
the Deed executed between Purificacion and the petitioner, on the
ground that at the time the donation was made, the latter was
not registered with the SEC and therefore has no juridical
personality and cannot legally accept the donation.
ISSUE/S:
A. Whether the petitioner is a de facto corporation. –NO
B. Whether or not the donation was valid considering that the
Missionary Sisters is not yet registered as a corporation at the
time of donation - YES
Ruling:
A. The RTC erred in holding that the petitioner is a de facto
corporation.
 Jurisprudence settled that "[t]he filing of articles of incorporation and who has assumed an obligation in favor of a non-existent corporation,
the issuance of the certificate of incorporation are essential for the having
existence of a de facto corporation." In fine, it Is the act of transacted with the latter as if it was duly incorporated, is
prevented from
registration with SEC through the issuance of a certificate of
denying the existence of the latter to avoid the enforcement of the
incorporation that marks the beginning of an entity's corporate contract.
existence. Whether or not the donation was valid considering that the
Missionary
Petitioner filed its Articles of Incorporation and by-laws on August 28, Sisters is not yet registered as a corporation at the time of donation
2001. However, the SEC issued the corresponding Certificate of RULING:
Incorporation only on August 31, 2001, two days after Purificacion The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative as it applied the doctrine
executed a Deed of Donation on August 29, 2001. Clearly, at the of
time the donation was made, the Petitioner cannot be considered a corporation by estoppel.
corporation de facto. The Missionary Sisters filed its Articles of Incorporation and by-
laws on
Whether or not the donation was valid considering that the August 28, 2001. However, the SEC issued the corresponding
Missionary Certificate of
Sisters is not yet registered as a corporation at the time of donation Incorporation only on August 31, 2001, two (2) days after
RULING: Purificacion
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative as it applied the doctrine executed a Deed of Donation on August 29, 2001. Clearly, at
of the time the
corporation by estoppel. donation was made, they cannot be considered a corporation de
The Missionary Sisters filed its Articles of Incorporation and by- facto. Rather,
laws on a review of the attendant circumstances reveals that it calls for the
August 28, 2001. However, the SEC issued the corresponding application
Certificate of of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel as provided for under
Incorporation only on August 31, 2001, two (2) days after Section 21 of
Purificacion the Corporation Code.
executed a Deed of Donation on August 29, 2001. Clearly, at The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of
the time the equity
donation was made, they cannot be considered a corporation de and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. In which
facto. Rather, case, a person
a review of the attendant circumstances reveals that it calls for the who has assumed an obligation in favor of a non-existent corporation,
application having
of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel as provided for under transacted with the latter as if it was duly incorporated, is
Section 21 of prevented from
the Corporation Code. denying the existence of the latter to avoid the enforcement of the
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of contract.
equity B. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative as it applied the
and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. In which doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
case, a person
The Missionary Sisters filed its Articles of Incorporation and by-laws
on August 28, 2001. However, the SEC issued the corresponding
Certificate of Incorporation only on August 31, 2001, two (2) days after
Purificacion executed a Deed of Donation on August 29, 2001.
Clearly, at the time the donation was made, they cannot be
considered a corporation de facto. Rather, a review of the attendant
circumstances reveals that it calls for the application of the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel as provided for under Section 21 of the
Corporation Code.
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of
equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. In which
case, a person who has assumed an obligation in favor of a non-
existent corporation, having transacted with the latter as if it was duly
incorporated, is prevented from denying the existence of the latter to
avoid the enforcement of the contract.
De La Salle Montessori International of Malolos vs. De La Salle Brothers
G.R. No. 205548
FACTS:
The Petitioner reserved with the SEC its corporate name De La Salle
Montessori International Malolos, Inc. from June August 2007,the SEC
issued a certificate of incorporation to petitioner and DepEd Region III
granted petitioner government recognition for its pre-elementary and
elementary and for its secondary courses.
The respondents, De La Salle Brothers et al. filed a petition with the SEC
seeking to compel petitioner to change its corporate name, claiming
that petitioner's corporate name is confusingly similar to that which
respondents have acquired a prior right to use, and that respondents'
consent to use such name was not obtained.
Thus, The SEC-OGC issued an Orderdirecting petitioner to change or
modify its corporate name. It held, among others, that respondents have
acquired the right to the exclusive use of the name "La Salle" with freedom
from infringement by priority of adoption, as they have all been incorporated
using the name ahead of petitioner.
The SEC OGC disagreed with petitioner's argument that the case of Lyceum
of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals15 applies since the word
"lyceum" is clearly descriptive of the very being and defining purpose of
an educational corporation, unlike the term "De La Salle" or "La Salle."16
Hence, the Court held in that case that the Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc.
cannot claim exclusive use of the name "lyceum."
On appeal, both SEC en banc and Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the SEC OSG. Hence this present petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner's corporate name is identical or deceptively
or confusingly similar to that of the respondents
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that a corporation's right to use its corporate
and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and
protect against the world in the same manner as it may protect its tangible
property, real or personal, against trespass or conversion. It is regarded, to a
certain extent, as a property right and one which cannot be impaired or
defeated by subsequent appropriation by another corporation in the same
field
Petitioner's assertion that the words "Montessori International of Malolos,
Inc." are four distinctive words that are not found in respondents' corporate
names so that their corporate name is not identical, confusingly similar,
patently deceptive or contrary to existing laws,38 does not avail. As correctly
held by the SEC OGC, all these words, when used with the name "De La
Salle," can reasonably mislead a person using ordinary care and
discretion into thinking that petitioner is an affiliate or a branch of, or is
likewise founded by, any or all of the respondents, thereby causing
confusion.
Generic terms are those which constitute "the common descriptive name of
an article or substance," or comprise the "genus of which the particular
product is a species," or are "commonly used as the name or description of a
kind of goods," or "characters," or "refer to the basic nature of the
wares or services provided rather than to the more idiosyncratic
characteristics of a particular product," and are not legally protectable
In that case, the Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc., an educational institution
registered with the SEC, commenced proceedings before the SEC to
compel therein private respondents who were all educational institutions,
to delete the word "Lyceum" from their corporate names and
permanently enjoin them from using the word as part of their respective
names

The Court there held that the word "Lyceum" today generally refers to
a school or institution of learning. It is as generic in character as the word
"university." Since "Lyceum" denotes a school or institution of learning, it is
not unnatural to use this word to designate an entity which is organized and
operating as an educational institution.

Here, the phrase "De La Salle" is not generic in relation to respondents. It is

not descriptive of respondent's business as institutes of learning, unlike
the meaning ascribed to "Lyceum."

There is thus no similarity between the Lyceum of the Philippines case and
this case that would call for a similar ruling.