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Yale French Studies
[At the end of the Oedipus Tyrannus], when the truth so doggedly sought
is finally understood in the fullness of its perfect circularity, there remain
just as many oracles to decipher as before. Oedipus learns to displace
limits in order to learn about the permanency of limits.
The detective story does not propose to be "real": it proposes only, and
as a game, that the mystery is located on this side of the unknown. It
replaces the awesomeness of limits by a false beard-a mask that is only
superficially menacing and can be removed in due time. It redefines mys-
YFS 76, Autour de Racine: Studies in Intertextuality, ed. Richard E. Goodkin, ? 1989
by Yale University.
81
Here is, it would appear, the limiting factor in any mutual consid-
eration of tragedy and detective fiction: while tragedy tells us that
even the "solutions" of its enigmas retain an inextricable element of
mystery, the premise of detective fiction is that we-or at least some-
one, presumably the detective-can get to the bottom of things, can
solve the mystery and come up with simple answers to the questions it
poses. Thus at the end of Agatha Christie's Mysterious Affair at Styles,
as Grossvogel puts it:
The lovers are reunited, the upper-middle-class ritual is once again re-
sumed. Law, order, and property are secure, and, in a universe that is
forever threatening to escape from our rational grasp, a single little man
with a maniacal penchant for neatness leaves us all the gift of a tidy world,
a closed book in which all questions have been answered.4
3. David I. Grossvogel, Mystery and Its Fictions: From Oedipus to Agatha Christie
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 40.
4. Mystery and Its Fictions, 52.
5. "The Professor and the Detective" in TheArt of the Mystery Story (1929), quoted
in Porter, The Pursuit of Crime, 223.
6. Michael Riffaterre, "Interpretation and Undecidability," New Literary History
12: 2 (Winter 1981): 228.
Orders and Iphigenie, that fact alone forces us to frame this intertex-
tuality in terms more complicated than a straightforward detection.
This absence of a direct link between the two texts actually covers
over a complex series of indirect ones. Paretsky tells me that she is
familiar with several other versions of the Iphigenia myth, those of
Euripides and Gluck,'2 and Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis is- itself an
extremely important model for Racine's play. I will be establishing the
intertextual relation between Iphigenie and Killing Orders not simply
on the basis of a shared source, but rather on the basis of a shared
reading: my premise here is that both Racine's Iphigenie and Killing
Orders are (among other things) readings of Euripides' play, and that
we, in turn, can learn something about all three works in question-
and about the workings of intertextuality-by reading the two read-
ings together. It will be as hard for us to "move" from Killing Orders to
Racine as it is for Paretsky's heroine to move to Racine Avenue (she
does so only after her home is destroyed), and we will "get to Racine"
only by the establishment of a triple relation: first between Killing
Orders and Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis, then between Iphigenia in
Aulis and Racine's Iphigenie, and finally (and indirectly), between
Iphigenie and Killing Orders.
12. Paretsky tells me that her heroine is named after the protagonist of Gluck's
Iphigenia operas (Iphigenie en Aulide, the libretto for which is largely based on Racine's
Iphigenie, and Iphigenie en Tauride), but that she is also familiar with Euripides'
Iphigenia in Aulis (private communication of 3 March 1988). In an earlier novel of
Paretsky's, we are told that her heroine's mother named her for an operatic character ("her
love of opera had led her to burden me with an insane name, " Indemnity Only [New York,
Dial Press, 19821, 48).
13. All line references to Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis are to the text established by
Frangois Jouan in Euripide (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1983), vol. 7.
As we now turn to the detective novel Killing Orders, let us first give a
rather detailed synopsis of the novel's complex events. Chicago
private eye V. I. Warshawski is called in to investigate some stock-
certificate forgeries discovered in a Dominican priory safe when V. I. 's
great-aunt Rosa, who works for the priory, is fired from her job, under
suspicion of complicity in the forgeries. The reason V. I. agrees to help
her Aunt Rosa in spite of the old lady's mysterious hatred of her is that
V. I.'s mother, Gabriella, whom the old lady particularly despised, on
her deathbed made V. I. promise to help her great-aunt if she were ever
in need. However Rosa soon calls her off the investigation, the origi-
nals of the forged stock certificates are mysteriously returned to the
priory, and V. I. begins receiving threatening phone calls warning her
not to look into the matter further. Nonetheless she pursues the inves-
tigation and uncovers an attempt by a secret lay organization of the
Catholic Church called Corpus Christi to take over an insurance com-
pany called Ajax. The mastermind behind this takeover bid is Xavier
O'Faolin, a crooked Church functionary in charge of the Vatican's
financial affairs, who is attempting to gain control of Ajax in order to
"launder" (i.e., put into circulation) millions of dollars from a huge
bank embezzlement operation; the forged stock certificates were com-
missioned by one of the Dominican friars attempting to raise money
for the takeover by secretly selling some of the priory's stock holdings
and replacing the original certificates with forgeries. This forgery
scheme also involves the Mafia, which provided the forgeries and is
therefore also interested in squelching V. I.'s investigation: the tele-
phone threats on V. I. are carried through when a Mafia-hired assailant
attempting to throw acid in her eyes is deflected and instead burns her
14. This in itself may seem a simplified reading of the Iphigenia in Aulis; certainly
other plays of Euripides suggest more openly that in tragedy the heroic order never fully
establishes a clear and unquestionable priority over the familial order, but it does seem
to me that the Iphigenia in Aulis is one of the plays of Euripides that least openly
challenges the heroic order.
neck and back, and her apartment is subsequently set on fire and
gutted.
The most serious crime in the novel, however, is not a financial
crime, but one committed to cover up the traces of the Ajax takeover
bid, and it is here that we start to approach the novel's relations to
Iphigenia in Aulis. When V. I. asks her friend Agnes Paciorek, a stock-
broker, to look into the Ajax takeover, Agnes is killed, and V. I.'s
investigation of her murder slowly comes to focus on Agnes's own
mother, Catherine Paciorek, a multimillionaire member of Corpus
Christi and a close friend of O'Faolin. This death, which, as we shall
see, comes to take on the value of a sacrifice, becomes the focus of the
novel; and although V. I. never proves conclusively that Catherine
Paciorek had her daughter put to death to keep her own involvement in
the takeover a secret, she does discover evidence linking Catherine
Paciorek to the takeover when she breaks into a stock-broker's office
and xeroxes records of stock transactions. V. I. also disguises herself as
a Dominican friar in order to break into O'Faolin's room at the priory
and steal a letter implicating O'Faolin in the "laundering" of the em-
bezzled money. Armed only with these pieces of evidence, along with
a few notes scribbled by Agnes on the day of her death, she convinces
Catherine Paciorek's husband of his wife's guilt. O'Faolin is killed
when a bomb is anonymously planted in his car, presumably to pre-
vent him from implicating the Mafia in the F. B. I. investigation into
the forgery.
So concludes the public aspect of the investigation, but the end of
the novel places a greater importance on the personal and private
ramifications of the inquiry. Catherine Paciorek, consumed with fear
and anger at being discovered and with guilt over her role in her
daughter's death, has a stroke which leaves her incapacitated. V. I.
receives an anonymous gift of $25,000 (presumably from the Mafia
don, as compensation for her burnt apartment) which allows her to buy
the co-op on Racine Avenue. Aunt Rosa reveals that the reason for her
hatred is that many years earlier, before V. I.'s birth, Rosa's husband
fell in love with V. I. 's mother, Gabriella, and when Rosa threw her out
of her house, he committed suicide. Finally, V. I. reveals that her
middle name is Iphigenia.
V. I.'s climactic revelation notwithstanding, the points of contact
between Killing Orders and the Iphigenia in Aulis may not be immedi-
ately apparent. Indeed, the differences in genre, setting, and tone
which separate the two works may make our premise seem somewhat
He took a pipe from the desk top next to him and began the pipe
smoker's interminable ritual with it. With luck I'd be gone before he
actually lit it. All smoke makes me ill.... [5]
This first mention of smoke establishes its links to ritual, in this case
the harmless ritual of the pipe but by association the ritual of sacrifice.
Indeed the attack on V. I.'s life takes the form of arson, as her apart-
ment is set on fire (148-50).
As the last sentence of the novel points out, Iphigenia is associated
in mythology with the goddess Artemis (277)-who demands
Iphigenia's sacrifice and whose priestess Iphigenia later becomes in
some versions of the myth-and V. I. 's association with Iphigenia as a
protegee of Artemis is supported by two motifs in the novel: running,
the principal activity of the huntress Artemis, and woods and forests,
her preferred habitat. V. I. not only jogs religiously, but she mentions it
every time she does. Trees and woods are everywhere in the novel:
whether in the city or in the distant suburbs, street names (Chestnut
Street, 148, Oak Street, 173, Arbor Drive, 104), town names (Lake
Forest, where the Pacioreks live), even names of corporations (Wood-
Sage, the dummy corporation established by Corpus Christi to take
over the Ajax insurance company) seem to echo Artemis's domain.
And V. I.'s final confrontation with Mrs. Paciorek, which takes place
Anger was tightening my vocal cords. "No one protects me, Roger. I
don't live in that kind of universe.... Just because the people I deal with
play with fire instead of money doesn't mean I need or want protection. If I
did, how do you think I'd have survived all these years?"
I was clenching and unclenching my fists, trying to keep rage under
control. Protection. The middle-class dream. My father protecting
Gabriella in a Milwaukee Avenue bar. My mother giving him loyalty and
channeling her fierce creative passions into a South Chicago tenement in
gratitude. [177]
15. Insofar as Killing Orders depicts an oppressive patriarchal system which is re-
jected or at least resisted by its heroine, I consider it to be a feminist novel, but part of the
novel's strength lies in the complexity of its attitude toward women. In fact the novel
also presents a number of unsympathetic female characters who fully accept the system,
key among whom are Aunt Rosa and Catherine Paciorek; V. I. explicitly comments on
Aunt Rosa's position as willing victim: "served Rosa right for all her antifeminist at-
tacks to be the victim of wage discrimination herself" (132). Thus it is not, I think,
contradictory to say that Agnes is sacrificed by her mother but to a patriarchal order.
16. In a private communication of 3 March 1988.
17. Sara Paretsky actually works for an insurance company.
"It was enough for Agnes to know I believed in something for her to
believe the opposite. Abortion. The war in Vietnam. The Church. I
thought I had seen my family name degraded in every possible way. I
didn't realize how much I could have forgiven until she announced in
public that she was a homosexual." [136]
These were all "brothers," not "fathers." Since they tended to look
alike in their fresh white robes I promptly forgot their names. [19]
As the watchman fumbled with his keys, I hit the off button and looked
around desperately for a hiding place. The machine had a paper cupboard
built in underneath. My five-feet-eight frame fit badly, but I squeezed in
and pulled the door as nearly shut as I could. [124]
18. The financial plot which sets off the action of the novel is a plan to "launder"
dirty money, that is, to remove its identifiability and thus get it back into circulation as
an indistinguishable part of the economic order: to this extent it is no surprise that the
money is supposed to be laundered by the takeover of "Ajax."
19. Paretsky's Indemnity Only, the first novel in which V. I. appears, also features an
infanticide (albeit an unintentional one).
"Do you know what my middle name is, Lotty? " I burst out. "Do you
know the myth of Iphigenia? How Agamemnon sacrificed her to get a fair
wind to sail for Troy? Since that terrible day at the priory, I can't stop
dreaming about it. Only in my dreams it's Gabriella. She keeps laying me
on the pyre and setting the torch to it and weeping for me. Oh, Lotty! Why
didn't she tell me? Why did she make me give her that terrible promise?
Why did she do it?" [277]
This is the point at which the Iphigenia story becomes Oedipal: V. I.,
reacting against what she perceives as her mother's conformity and
subservience to the familial order, discovers that she herself has spent
her entire life doing nothing more than repeating her mother's original
rebellion against the family order: Gabriella's loyalty to her husband is
a compensation for his saving her from the streets when her Aunt Rosa
kicked her out for her involvement with her aunt's husband. The
promise exacted from V. I. by her dying mother then takes on the value
of an oracle which openly says one thing ("protect the familial
order. . .") but harbors a hidden meaning (". . . because your natural
tendency will be to attack it"). For the true sense of V. I.'s "oracle"-
like Oedipus's-is that the familial order is itself based on suppressing
disorder, on suppressing Gabriella's, or V. I.'s, or anyone else's revolt.
20. Apart from the sexist policeman Bobby Mallory, there are actually surprisingly
few clearly unsympathetic male characters in the novel. Even Don Pasquale, the Mafia
figure who is the head of yet another patriarchal order, is rather likable (as Paretsky
explains it, the fact that he is named for Donizetti's Don Pasquale gives the reader a hint
that he is not going to be a "malevolent" figure; private communication of 3 March
1988).
I pulled back and started to kick when I sensed his arm coming up toward
my face. I ducked and fell over in a rolling ball, felt liquid on the back of my
neck underneath the muffler.... [T]he back of my neck began burning as
though I'd been stung by fifty wasps.... The collar of the crepe de chine
jacket had dissolved. I twisted around to look at my back in the mirror. A
thin ring of red showed where the skin had been partially eaten through. A
long fat finger of red went down my spine. Acid burn. [101]
The attempt to blind V. I. would seem to put Killing Orders into the
tradition of Oedipal detective fiction, with the investigator trying to
find out more than she is allowed to see. But the attack on V. I.'s eyes,
the site of her identity as an investigator ("my eyesight, my live-
lihood," 141; cf. the term "private eye," which V. I. uses to describe
herself, 146), fails, or rather is deflected into a different kind of attack:
21. For the inextricable relations between order and resistance, see the work of
Michel Foucault, particularly his discussion of the nature of power, e.g., "there are no
relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective
because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised;
resistance to power . . exists all the more by being in the same place as power."
Power!Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton, England: Harvester, 1980), 142. See also
The History of Sexuality 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, Pantheon, 1978), 94-96.
22. In Racine's Iphigdnie, as we shall see, the sacrifice, which requires that the
victim's neck be cut, is undermined, since Eriphile plunges the sword into her breast.
"And if you're taking those to a dry cleaner, there's a good one around the
comer on Racine."
The woman at the cleaners informed me triumphantly that it would
cost me extra to get the smoke out. She made a great show of inspecting
each garment, clucking her teeth over it, and writing it down on a slip with
the laboriousness of a traffic cop writing a ticket. At last, impatient, I
grabbed up the clothes and left.
A second cleaner, sharing a dingy storefront with a tailor several blocks
23. This confusion goes against a number of "rules" of what has come to be called
the classical detective novel-what Todorov calls the "roman a 6nigme." "Typologie du
roman policier," Poetique de la prose (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 57. For example, if in the
classical detective novel there are two stories and not one, "the story of the crime and
the story of the investigation" (Todorov, 57), in the Oedipal detective story it is not
possible to distinguish fully between the investigation and the crime; the investigation
itself is part of the crime.
24. Sara Paretsky informs me that she was not making a conscious allusion to Racine
here (private communication of 3 March 1988).
down, was more obliging. The woman at the counter accepted the smoky
clothes without comment and wrote up the ticket quickly. [2031
The cleaner "on Racine" emphatically points out the price of getting
the smoke out, that is, the price of the attempted sacrifice of V. I(phi-
genia). The other cleaner, which is also where V. I. has her Dominican
uniform made, is not on Racine Avenue but on Montrose Avenue (206,
207-08), and here the smoke can be removed at no extra cost (203).
Indeed, Racine's entire play, and particularly in its relation to Eu-
ripides', asks this very question: At what price can the smoke of the
sacrifice be "removed"? What is the price of the death of Eriphile,
Iphigenie's double? What is the cost of tragic catharsis, or "cleansing"?
Can the smoke of the sacrificial fires ever be removed once and for all?
25. "Preface d'Iphigenie," in Jean Racine, Theatre complet, ed. J. Morel and A. Viala
(Paris: Gamier Freres, 1980), 510. All quotations of Iphigenie will be taken from this
edition, and line numbers will be bracketed in the body of the text. All translations from
French are mine.
26. In Euripides' play, as we have seen, Iphigenia is not actually sacrificed, but the
substitution of the animal victim doesn't raise all of the complex issues that Racine's
doubled Iphigenia does.
sacrifice and toward those who try either to impose it on her or to save
her from it. Racine's play will bring the "detective" element of our
intertextual reading to an end, for discovering "which" Iphigenie does
not mean understanding the tragedy; let us examine why this is so.
The center of Racine's play is the relation linking Iphigenie and
Eriphile, or the two "Iphigenies": Eriphile is Iphigenie's double pre-
cisely because the two figures are the two components of a single
personality attempting to form itself. Iphigenie herself wonders aloud
whether she and Eriphile can ever be separated:
"Vous n'avez devant vous qu'une jeune princesse": this means not
only "Eriphile is no one to feel inhibited in front of," but also, "There
is only one princess here, not two." Iphigenie's assurances to Eriphile
of Agamemnon's devotion are the language of duty speaking to desire:
Eriphile, who revels in her status as unloved, rejected daughter ("Je
requs et je vois le jour que je respire,/ Sans que pere ni mere ait daigne
me sourire" [I was given life and see the light of day,/ Without a father
or a mother ever condescending to smile at me], 425-26), is also
Iphigenie's hidden desiring function, which by the very nature of de-
sire is never satisfied, so that this "Iphigenie" can never be sufficiently
reassured of her father's love. If Iphigenie may allow herself to think
only of Agamemnon's utter devotion to her ("Quel bonheur de me voir
la fille d'un tel pere!" [What happiness to see myself the daughter of
such a father!], 546; "J'ai cru n'avoir au ciel que des graces a rendre" [I
thought I had only thanks to give to heaven], 550), when she assures
Eriphile of Agamemnon's fatherly affection she is doing nothing more
than soothing her own secret fears. This is the dutiful Iphigenie trying
to close the gap between herself and the desiring Iphigenie; it is the
conscience trying to make desire accept the very limitations which are
inimical to desire, trying to put desire in order.
This link of similarity and opposition between Iphigenie and
Eriphile most strongly characterizes their relationship to the shared
object of their desire, Achille. Although the masochistic nature of
Eriphile's desire has been commented upon, the complex nature of
Iphigenie's love for Achille has not been sufficiently emphasized. At
the outset, there is no conflict between virtue and desire for Iphigenie:
desire is, in fact, compatible with familial order, as Achille is approved
of by both Iphigenie's father ("[Cet amant]/ Qu'un pere de si loin
m'ordonne de chercher" [This lover/ That my father orders me to seek
out from so far away], 600), and her mother (Clytemnestre: "Je vous l'ai
dans Argos presente de ma main" [I introduced him to you in Argos
with my own hand], 640). But whereas Iphigenie at no time fully op-
poses or revolts against her father's plans for her own sacrifice, that
exemplary bit of obedience draws our attention away from her refusal
to reject Achille. Iphigenie herself draws the parallel between the two
"sacrifices," of her life and of her love for Achille:
The ordered sacrifice ("II ordonne a mon coeur cet affreux sacrifice")
that Iphigenie refuses to make is a sacrifice of her own disorder, of her
desire for Achille, and when she says "obeissons," her gesture of obe-
dience (offering up her life) is designed-and undoubtedly succeeds in
its intention-to cover up a more serious act of revolt against
Agamemnon's authority than a refusal of the sacrifice of her life would
be, that of not sacrificing her love for Achille. Continuing to love
Achille against the demands of virtue means creating an internal divi-
sion, a split embodied by Eriphile, the "desiring" Iphigenie.
Iphigenie's heroic illusion is that Eriphile, the nonvirtuous lover, is
not a part of her, is not "another Iphigenie. " Iphigenie nowhere openly
admits either to herself or to anyone else that her love for Achille is in
any danger of undermining her status as the most virtuous of
daughters. It is Eriphile alone who bears the brunt of her reproaches,
Eriphile who is labelled as perfidious, and this is so precisely because it
is Eriphile's role to oppose rather than conform to anything that is
presented to her. Iphigenie, "virtuous" to the end, would literally
sooner die than recognize that she is out of order, indeed, that there is
an adversative relation at the heart of the familial order itself.27
When at the end of Racine's play the "true" identity of Iphigenie as
sacrificial victim is revealed, when Eriphile plunges the knife into her
breast rather than wait to have her throat cut as the terms of the
sacrifice demand, what we are being told is that the sacrifice is a
failure, that the "other Iphigenie" has not been properly killed-that
is, has not been correctly or truly sacrificed-because what she repre-
sents can no more be extricated once and for all than it can ever be
27. My discussion owes a great deal to Ren6 Girard's theory of sacrifice and its
central role in the establishment and maintenance of social order. See in particular
Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1977). For a very interesting Girardian reading of Racine's Iphigenie, see Gerard
Defaux, "Violence et passion dans l'Iphigenie de Racine," PFSCL 11, no. 21 (1984): 685-
715.
28. As Aristotle points out, this is a case in which recognition and reversal coincide
(Poetics, 1 1). Moreover Oedipus is also told that he will die when he learns his identity
(Oedipus Tyrannus, 438).
and all of the Greek warriors: Clytemnestre even closes the play with a
statement demonstrating her rather shocking illusion that the drama's
conflicts have been resolved by Achille ("Par quel prix, quel encens, 6
ciel, puis-je jamais/ Recompenser Achille, et payer tes bienfaits!" [By
what prize, what offering, o heavens, can I ever/ Reward Achille, and
pay back your benefits!], 1791-92); in her mind Iphigenie's insurance
policy is still (or already) in Achille's name.
For Iphigenie alone, and perhaps for the spectator as well, this is a
tragedy of recognition. What Iphigenie seems to understand in her
tears is the failed nature of the sacrifice, the impossibility of situating
Eriphile outside of herself, the return of the Oedipal in her story. Thus
to ask "which Iphigenie?" is not to have understood Racine's tragedy;
it is to want to make the tragedy into a detective story, a story in
which, finally, order is restored, rather than one which explores the
nature of order and reveals its relation to the disorder which it can
never fully do away with.
The recognition that takes place at the end of Iphigenie is thus not
simple: Iphigenie seems to recognize the complex nature of the sacri-
fice of Eriphile; at the same time as she understands its inevitability,
she understands its artificiality and its limitations, that is, its non-
definitive nature. The end of Iphigenie tells us that sacrifice is neces-
sary for the maintenance of an order, but that it must always be re-
newed, and it is the necessity of this renewal which can be understood
only by tragic recognition. Achille and the Greeks must truly believe
that (only) the "right" Iphigenie has been sacrificed to affirm their
alliance, but the tragedy of recognition tells us that nothing, not even
sacrifice, ever solves the problem of disorder once and for all.
V. I.'s recognition at the end of Killing Orders makes it, too, into a
tragedy.29 V. I. recognizes that the social order is a killing, repressive
force, a tyranny which bases its authority on combatting a disorder
which it can neither tolerate nor do without; that it requires little
more than knowing how to transform its victims-like V. I.'s moth-
er-into its guardians, criminals in the next series of sacrifices; and
that social norms themselves are based on-indeed, have need of-her
protest. She recognizes that the victim of the (killing) familial order,
29. As Paretsky herself puts it, deciding to give V. I. the middle name Iphigenia
"altered how I thought of the character and made it possible to see her in the tragic light
of [Killing Orders]" (private communication of 3 March 1988).
Agnes Paciorek, is also (in the eyes of that order) a criminal simply
being punished, that given the relation of antinomy between the famil-
ial order and the heroic order the concepts of criminal and victim are
not completely discrete.
The common point in the recognitions which end these two works
is that in both cases order is not a simplification, but rather a binariza-
tion, a division into two seemingly opposing components one of which
constantly attempts to exclude the other, but which are in fact in a
state of symbiosis, each struggling to affirm and express its rights, each
needing to repress the other in order to define itself. Although finding
the criminal in works which question the adequacy of order itself may
require a good deal of detective work, "identifying" the criminal is not
simply an act of detection, but rather, ultimately, an act of recognition,
of recognizing that the criminal's identity is itself not simple.
Thus, Iphigenie and Killing Orders offer remarkably similar read-
ings of Euripides: both works are about the impossibility of ever killing
disorder completely and of doing away with sacrifice. More compel-
lingly than the question: "which Iphigenia?", Iphigenie and Killing
Orders pose the question: "how many Iphigenias?" Now that we have
finally brought Iphigenie and Killing Orders together, let us conclude
by looking to the Oedipus Tyrannus one last time to examine the true
nature of "la seule Iphigenie" who is left at the end of Racine's tragedy
and the solitary Iphigenia figure who is identified at the end of Par-
etsky's detective novel.
The question "how many criminals?" is actually the very question
which has organized much recent criticism about the Oedipus Tyran-
nus; it is the single issue which most compromises that play's status as
a simple detective story: how many people attacked Laius at the
crossroads? If the eyewitness's response to this question, "many,"
holds firm, then Oedipus is cleared of blame in his father's death, for he
was alone when he defended himself against the old man at the
crossroads, but as has been noted by a number of critics,30 the Oedipus
Tyrannus never comes back to this crucial question, and Oedipus
finally comes to assume his guilt in the matter. What in a detective
story would be the key to the outcome of the investigation is sum-
marily dropped.
This apparent side-stepping of the question of the number of crimi-
30. See, for example, William Chase Greene, "The Murderers of Laius," TAPA 60
(1929): 75-86; Karl Harshbarger, "Who Killed Lalus?", Tulane Drama Review 9, no. 4
(Summer 1965): 120-31; Sandor Goodhart, "Oedipus and Lalus' Many Murderers,"
Diacritics 8 (Spring 1978): 55-71.