Management Perspectives 13-1

Chapter 13: Management

Perspectives
After completing this chapter, students should:
• Be able to articulate the management responsibility and potential
civil and criminal indictments that could result from manage-
ment inattention to their Pipeline Corrosion Integrity Manage-
ment system.
• Be familiar with relevant case studies and understand thoroughly
how what they have learned in the PCIM course can be put into
practice.
Introduction
In today’s business and legal environment, Pipeline Integrity should
be a focus at the highest levels of management, including corporate
officers and the board of directors, who have a fiduciary
responsibility to operate the company in the best interest of the
public, the investors and the employees. When pipeline integrity is
compromised, the probability of leaks or spills increases
exponentially. Oil or gas leaks have a highly deleterious impact on
health, safety and the environment (HSE). Indeed, public safety and
environmental concerns fuel the need to manage pipeline infra-
structure effectively, and for stricter government regulations and
industry standards to provide measuring sticks by which to comply.
Recognition of the societal impact of pipeline leaks has significantly
elevated global focus on pipeline integrity. HSE concerns about
pipeline accidents now drive government regulations worldwide.
The U.S. Department of Justice has made the pipeline industry the
focus of increased environmental protection scrutiny supported by
new laws providing powerful new prosecution tools to go after
offenders. The U.S. government now holds individuals, including
non-management technical personnel, criminally responsible for
accidents arising from poor pipeline operations. Criminal
indictments, felony convictions, fines and civil penalties cost
pipeline companies millions of dollars following any reportable
pipeline leakage. Even if the corporation is charged in the event of a

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failure resulting in a breach of public safety, corporate executives

and technical personnel will not necessarily escape prosecution.
The direct costs of a pipeline failure are only a small fraction of the
cost of a pipeline incident that releases product to the environment.
Other costs include:
• Lost revenue from interruption of pipeline operations
• Lost product
• Expenditures for repair and the cost of property damage
• Public liability including increased insurance costs
• Public image including investor relations
• Civil and possibly criminal penalties
• Increased regulatory scrutiny

13.1 Case Studies

13.1.1 DG-ICDA, ECDA and ILI
13.1.1.1 Dry-gas Internal Corrosion Direct Assess-
ment (DG-ICDA)
The first part of this case study is based on the investigation of a
natural gas company to validate the DG-ICDA processes and
procedures. The objectives of the study were to:
• Perform an internal corrosion assessment using DG-ICDA
• Confirm the applicability of DG-ICDA for assessing internal
corrosion threats
• Optimize DG-ICDA procedures
• Compare the results to an in-line tool inspection
The segment of pipeline selected for the study was a 30 plus-year
old carbon steel pipe located in Texas. It is 32 miles long, 8 inch
diameter, with a 0.160 inch wall thickness. The service was
normally dry, natural gas with less than 2% carbon dioxide and zero
hydrogen sulfide.

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Pre-Assessment
Operating history indicated that the pipeline had been idle for a
period of four years before it was placed in service. While idle, the
line had been treated with corrosion inhibitors. This situation did not
preclude the use of DG-ICDA because the greatest extent of the
internal corrosion would have occurred during the 20 plus years of
operation prior to taking the line out of service and the three years of
operation after being returned to service. Records indicated that
methanol was occasionally injected when the line was in operation
due to changing flow conditions. The flow of natural gas was in the
same direction throughout the life of the pipeline.
As part of the pre-assessment, samples of internal residue were
collected and analyzed. Solid samples contained black powder (iron
sulfide) corrosion products. Some small amounts of amine and
carboxylate chemical inhibitors were detected, as well as trace
amounts of glycol and methanol
As a result of the pre-assessment, the pipeline segment was divided
into two DG-ICDA regions with the demarcation at roughly the mid
point.

13.1.1.2 DG-ICDA Indirect Inspection

The pipeline was located using a radio frequency pipe locator,
marked every 100 feet and the depth-of-cover measurements
recorded. GPS coordinates (X, Y and Z) were measured at each
location using sub-meter DGPS. Because the elevation data is
critical and must be accurate to determine inclination angles,
elevation angles were calculated every 100 feet along the segment
length. A real-time kinematics (RTK) GPS reference station was
established at the beginning of the DG-ICDA region. Using radio-
frequency communication with a stationary reference for error
correction, sub-centimeter accuracy was achieved. At each GPS
measurement location, the following data were recorded:
• Location
• Date
• Operator
• Antenna height

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• Start/Stop time
• Number of satellites
• Latitude, longitude and elevation
Critical angles were calculated for each region and the
corresponding pipeline operating conditions were recorded. For
each of the DG-ICDA regions, the results were:
• Region 1 – 10.5° at 28 million cubic feet/day and a pressure of
800 psi.
• Region 2 – 8° at 18 million cubic feet/day and a pressure of 400
psi.
Error limits in measurement of pipe depth and elevation are much
smaller than their impact on the critical angles and, therefore, do not
have a significant impact on the calculation (an 8° critical angle
corresponds to a rise of approximately 14 feet over a distance of 100
feet). Based upon the indirect inspection, five sites that exceeded the
critical angle were selected for direct examination. Three sites were
in DG-ICDA Region 1 (sites DG-ICDA 1, 2, 3) and two sites in
Region 2 (DG-ICDA 4, 5). Control sites were later selected in
conjunction with an in-line inspection and a subsequent ECDA.

13.1.1.3 DG-ICDA Direct Examinations

ICDA Site 1 is located in a mostly dry creek bed, between two hills,
with only limited standing water. The depth of the line is
approximately six feet. At this location, the pipe transitions from 0°
to 10.5° over a distance of 62 feet (see Figure 13.1 Schematic of
Pipe Elevation at DG-ICDA Site 1). Two excavations were
performed where the pipe angled from 0° to1.5° and from 7° to
10.5° (see Figure 13.2). The first excavation exposed 11 feet of pipe
and the second, 23 feet. The coating was removed and the pipe
surface prepared to SSPC-3 Power Tool Cleaning using a wire
wheel cleaning tool. A-scan ultrasonic thickness measurements
were recorded on a two inch grid. There were no indications of
internal corrosion detected.

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Figure 13.1 Schematic of Pipe Excavation for Site 1

ICDA Site 2 is located in a running creek between two hills. The

depth of the line is approximately 5 feet. At this location, the pipe
transitions from 0° to 10° over 97 feet (see Figure 13.3). The
excavation exposed 66 feet of pipe where the coating was removed
and the pipe surface prepared using a wire wheel cleaning tool (see
Figure 13.4). A-scan ultrasonic thickness measurements were
recorded on a two inch grid over 25 feet of the exposed pipe. There
were no indications of internal corrosion detected.

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Figure 13.2 Excavation at DG-ICDA Site 1

Figure 13.3 Schematic of Pipe Elevation at DG-ICDA Site 2

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Figure 13.4 Excavation at DG-ICDA Site 2

ICDA Site 3 is located in a running creek between two hills. The

depth of the line is approximately 4 feet (see Figure 13.5). The
excavation exposed 66 feet of pipe where the coating was removed
and the pipe surface prepared (see Figure 13.6). A-scan ultrasonic
thickness measurements were recorded on a two inch grid over 30
feet of the exposed pipe which detected no indications of internal
corrosion.

Figure 13.5 Schematic of Pipe Elevation at DG-ICDA Site 3

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Figure 13.6 Excavation at DG-ICDA Site 3

ICDA Site 4 is located in a running creek between two hills. The

depth of the line is approximately 4 feet (see Figure 13.7). The
excavation exposed 36 feet of pipe where the coating was removed
and the pipe surface cleaned to SSPC SP-3 (see Figure 13.8). A-scan
ultrasonic thickness measurements were recorded on a two inch grid
over 21 feet of the exposed pipe. No internal corrosion was detected.

Figure 13.7 Schematic of Pipe Elevation at DG-ICDA Site 4

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Management Perspectives 13-9

Figure 13.8 Excavation at DG-ICDA Site 4

DG-ICDA Site 5 is located in a running creek in a flat, grassy area

where the pipe then continues at a 12° angle of inclination. The
depth of the line is approximately 9.5 feet (see Figure 13.9). The
excavation exposed 25 feet of pipe where the pipe ditch filled with
approximately three feet of water (see Figure 13.10). The coating
was removed and the pipe surface prepared for testing. A-scan
ultrasonic thickness measurements were recorded on a two inch grid
over 11 feet of the exposed pipe which detected no indications of
internal corrosion. The direct examinations can be summarized as
follows:
The conclusions of the DG-ICDA Direct Examination were:
• There was no corrosion detected at locations most likely to accu-
mulate water.
• It is unlikely that there is internal corrosion in the remainder of
the segment.
• No additional direct examinations were necessary.

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Figure 13.9 Schematic of Pipe Elevation at DG-ICDA Site 5

Figure 13.10 Excavation at DG-ICDA Site 5

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Management Perspectives 13-11

Table 13.1: Tabular Representation of ICDA Direct Examination

Length of UT Inclination Angle, Wall Thickness,

S/N Excavation Inspection, feet degrees inches
1 Site 1 10 0 to 1.5 0.148 to 0.161
2 Site 1 20 7.5 to 10.5
3 Site 2 25 0 to 10 0.147 to 0.162
4 Site 3 30 0 to 10.5 0.145 to 0.161
5 Site 4 21 0 to 7.5 0.147 to 0.161
6 Site 5 11 0 to 8 0.149 to 0.163

Post Assessment
DG-ICDA was shown to be applicable as validated by running a
high resolution, MFL in-line inspection (see below).
The maximum corrosion rate is less than 2 mpy in the presence of
water as calculated by the dry gas model. The controlling factor in
determining the reassessment interval was the external corrosion
rate of 7 mpy, requiring a 9 year interval.

13.1.1.4 External Corrosion Direct Assessment

(ECDA)
For completeness, ECDA was performed over the same section of
pipeline with the following excavation determinations: 8 ECDA
direct examinations and 3 control examinations.

13.1.1.5 In-Line Inspection (ILI)

An ILI inspection using high resolution MFL was performed
throughout the pipeline segment. The log indicated problems with
the odometer system over 4.42 miles where no data was recorded.
This did not, however, impact the remainder of the inspection. The
ILI tool vendor attributed the problem to debris in the pipeline.
The ILI log identified 30 anomalies that needed to be excavated and
examined:
• Seven (7) external metal loss
• Seven (7) internal metal loss
• Two (2) internal anomalies, possibly dents

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• Ten (10) internal anomalies, possibly mill related

• Three (3) dents
• One (1) possible dent associated with metal loss
The results of the anomaly examination and classification were:
• 65% of the anomalies were correctly classified
• 15% of the anomalies were incorrectly classified
• 20% of the anomalies were false indications
• Six (6) excavations required pipe repairs
At one location, the ILI indicated a number of anomalies including
two (2) dents, one (1) external indication, four (4) mill defects and
seven (7) internal pits located along the pipe invert.
Note that this was not a location where liquids would have collected
inside the pipe. The pipe was excavated and a section removed. An
internal examination revealed a group of pits, with the deepest at
65% through wall penetration. The internal pitting found at this
location was not consistent with dry-gas internal corrosion due to
several factors:
• The pitting location was isolated and not widespread
• The point was downstream from where gas was injected
• The location was not at a point of liquid accumulation
The following possible causes for this were examined as follows:
• A previously corrosive conditions caused by wet-gas
This was concluded to be unlikely because of the localized
pitting. Corrosion caused by wet-gas would be much more wide
spread
• The corrosion could have occurred when the line was out of ser-
vice and chemically inhibited
This was concluded to be unlikely because of the localized
pitting. This too is unlikely due to the concentration of the
pitting

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• The corrosion occurred prior to installation or during previous

service
This was determined to be the most likely explanation and it was
also supported by observations from ECDA.
As a result of this comprehensive program of investigation, the
pipeline operator concluded that:
• ICDA determined that significant internal corrosion from peri-
odic accumulation of water is unlikely in the pipeline segment
under study. This conclusion was supported by the field exami-
nations of the pipe and the in-line inspection.
• ICDA was validated as an integrity verification and management
tool for normally dry-gas pipelines.
• ICDA demonstrated that internal corrosion from gas operations
is not considered significant for this pipeline.
• Available pigging technology is not foolproof in assessing pipe-
line integrity.
Acknowledgement: This case study is excerpted from a presenta-
tion by Drew Hevle, Senior Corrosion Engineer, Enbridge Energy
Inc. at the NACE International Pipeline Integrity, Direct Assessment
Seminar, January 11-12, 2006, Houston, Texas.

13.1.2 External Corrosion Direct Assessment

(ECDA)
A gas company operates 212 miles of DOT reportable transmission
lines subject to the pipeline integrity rule. The lines are located in
congested areas on the east coast of the United States as follows:
Table 13.2: ECDA Case Study Data

State Miles

Virginia 105
Maryland 69
District of Columbia 20
West Virginia 18

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The pipeline system overview is presented in Figure 13.11.

Washington Gas System Overview

Washington Gas System Overview
Major Gate Station > 2 MMSCFH
Brink

Leesburg
Rockville/Westmore
Dranesville Rockville
Plant

Herndon
Chantilly
Centreville
Gardiner

Ravensworth
Plant
PRESSURE LEGEND:
Bright Red -- Low Pressure (inches w.c.)
Blue -- 20 psig
Brown/Dark Red -- 30 psig White
Purple -- 50 psig
Green -- 55 psig
Plains
Magenta -- WG Transmission pressure

Figure 13.11 System Overview

Within the 212 miles of transmission lines, High Consequence

Areas (HCAs) were determined by a virtual survey within
Smallworld using the Potential Impact Circle (PIC) method. Prior to
calculating the potential impact radius, the accuracy of the
following information was considered:
• Building Class attributes were accurately presented in Small-
world that could affect the HCA analysis
• Using aerial data, identified site polygons were created as
defined by 49 CFR 192, Subpart O
• Confirmed location of the pipeline segment
The PIC approach calculates the impact radius based upon the
following pipeline attributes:
• Pipeline diameter
• Maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP)

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Management Perspectives 13-15

• Constant of 0.69 for natural gas

Based upon the analysis, 84 miles of pipeline were in identified high
consequence areas. ECDA was chosen to perform the baseline
assessment for one of the pipeline segments.

Pre-Assessment
The pipeline segment consists of approximately 8.8 miles within
one HCA. It is 24 inched in diameter, with an MAOP of 240 psi,
installed 50 years ago. Over its life there have been three (3)
replacement offsets. Two of these are 220 feet and 37 feet along
highly traveled streets. The third is 370 feet long, installed in 1970,
with a deep vertical drop to get down to street level from an elevated
freeway.
The ECDA pipeline segment is almost entirely underneath 18-inch
thick, reinforced concrete roads that have been overlaid with
asphalt. The area is congested and highly traveled (see Figure
13.12). There is a good history of cathodic protection of the pipeline
segment. The pipeline segment was divided into four (4) sections
based on positioning of isolation flanges. It was treated as one
ECDA region because of the similar environmental conditions
surrounding the piping. The pipe is approximately 6 feet below soil
surface.

13.1.2.1 Indirect Inspection

The following indirect inspection techniques were considered:
• Close Interval, Pipe-to-Soil Potential Survey (CIS)
• Direct Current, Voltage Gradient Survey (DCVG)
• Alternating Current, Voltage Gradient Survey (ACVG)
• AC Current Attenuation (ACCA)
CIS and DCVG techniques were selected for use along with depth
of cover and GPS measurements. Holes were drilled at 7.5. foot
intervals to contact the underlying soil to collect accurate,
meaningful data. Approximately 4,400 holes were needed (see
Figure 13.13 and Figure 13.14).

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North

DC – Maryland line

Approximate path
of 7 miles

24 in dia
API 5LX-42 ERW
Installed 1955
MAOP 240 psi

Figure 13.12 ECDA Segment

Figure 13.13 Traffic Control for Indirect Inspections

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Figure 13.14 Marking Hole Location for Indirect Inspection

Based on the indirect inspections there were four (4) anomalies

found in four (4) locations. In addition to performing direct
examinations (digs) at these locations, NACE SP0502 requires two
(2) “null” digs making a total of six (6) digs.

13.1.2.2 Direct Examinations

The Direct Examination phase of the project consisted of:
1. Excavating the Pipe
- Cutting concrete
- Removing soil
- Shoring

2. Data collection
- SCC, MIC testing
- Soil and water sampling
- pH, pipe-to-soil potential and resistivity measurements

3. Assessing coating
- Coating type, condition, adhesion
- Coating removal, testing water pH under coating

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- Collection of corrosion products

4. Measurement of pipe defects
- Ultrasonic wall thickness measurements
- Evaluation of corroded areas, pit depth, configuration
- Crack assessment, magnetic particle, dye penetrant method

5. Evaluation of remaining strength

- RSTRENG
- ASME B31G
- Modified ASME B31G
- DNV Standard RP-F101

6. Prioritization
- Immediate action required
- Scheduled action required
- Suitable for monitoring

7. Root cause analysis

At the first indirect inspection anomaly, a large tree stump was in

contact with the pipe (see Figure 13.15). This was corrected and the
pipe recoated.

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Management Perspectives 13-19

Figure 13.15 Tree Stump on Pipe

At the second anomaly, an 8 inch water, 24 inch water and 8 inch

gas distribution line were in close proximity (see Figure 13.16).
Their presence caused the changes in pipe-to-soil potential detected
during the CIS. At the third anomaly, a 2-inch service connection
was responsible for potential changes (see Figure 13.17). At the
fourth anomaly, the coating was in poor condition (see Figure
13.18). The pipe was inspected and the area recoated.

Figure 13.16 Foreign Pipelines in Close Proximity

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Figure 13.17 Two Inch Service Connection

Figure 13.18 Damaged Coating

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Post Assessment
The project demonstrated that ECDA was an effective tool for
assessing pipeline integrity. The definition of the pipeline segment
and the indirect inspection techniques employed were valid.
There were many lessons learned in this project that will be helpful
in future ECDA projects under pavement in congested areas:
• D.C. transit systems cause stray currents that need to be
addressed during an ECDA project.
• Overhead AC transmission lines can cause induced voltages on
the pipeline that may affect survey techniques and/or require
additional filtering for collection of accurate measurements.
• Projects are complicated further when there are two jurisdictions
involved (in this case Washington D.C. and Maryland).
• Crossings of other pipelines (e.g., water, gas distribution) need to
be identified as well as metal jacketed power and communica-
tions cables.
• Street permits and procedures for closing streets need to be thor-
oughly understood and addressed prior to commencement of
field operations.
• The logistics of traffic control and drilling of test holes through
the pavement are a part of the process that needs to be carefully
planned.
• There may be restrictions as to the hours where traffic lanes and
streets can be closed and when pipeline excavations can be
made.
• Provisions need to be made to address abandoned and parked
cars.
• Line location and alignment is critical to the success of the proj-
ect including collection of GPS data to facilitate data integration.
• Excavation and shoring procedures should be documented and
should comply with OSHA requirements.
• The jurisdiction may have procedural requirements for backfill-
ing excavations and handling excavated material. In cases where
the same dirt could not be used to backfill, the excavated mate-

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rial should be directly placed in the truck without contacting the

ground, and the excavation should be backfilled with imported
material.
• The reassessment interval was calculated in accordance with
NACE SP0502 and determined to be twenty (20) years with con-
firmatory direct assessments required in seven (7) and fourteen
(14) years.
Acknowledgement: This case study is excerpted from a presen-
tation by Susan Borenstein, Pipeline Integrity Engineer, Washington
Gas at the NACE International Pipeline Integrity, Direct Assessment
Seminar, January 11-12, 2006, Houston, Texas.

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