THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133047 August 17, 1999

HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP, namely SALLY SUN YAP, MARGARET YAP-UY and
MANUEL YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON YAP and BENJAMIN
YAP, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

What in essence petitioners seek is the enforcement of an alleged trust agreement

between Lorenzo Yap, now deceased, and his brothers Ramon and Benjamin, herein
co-respondents, covering a piece of land and its improvement. The case and factual
settings found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from
that priority made by the trial court.1âwphi1.nêt

Sometime in February 1966, Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated at 123
(formerly 75) Batanes Street, Galas, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 82001/T-414, from the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery. The lot was
thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 102132; forthwith, he also declared the property in his name for tax purposes
and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966 to 1992. In 1967, Ramon Yap
constructed a two-storey 3-door apartment building for the use of the Yap family.
One-fifth (1/5) of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon Yap while the
rest was shouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo, Benjamin and Ramon.
Upon its completion, the improvement was declared for real estate tax purposes in
the name of Lorenzo Yap in deference to the wishes of the old woman.

Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few months later, his heirs (herein petitioners)
left their family dwelling in Lucena City to reside permanently in Manila. Ramon Yap
allowed petitioners to use one unit of the apartment building.

On 18 March 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment
to his brother, his herein co-respondent Benjamin Yap, for the sum of P337,500.00
pursuant to a Deed of Sale, recorded on even date in the Memorandum of
Encumbrances of the title to said property. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73002
was in due time issued in the name of Benjamin Yap.

The controversy started when herein petitioners, by a letter of 08 June 1992,

advised respondents of the former's claim of ownership over the property and
demanded that respondents execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title
to them. At about the same time, petitioners filed a case for ejectment against one
of the bonafide tenants of the property.

On 29 July 1992, respondents filed an action with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Quezon City, docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12899, for quieting of title against
petitioners. In their answer, petitioners averred that sometime in 1966 the spouses
Carlos and Josefina Nery offered to sell the disputed parcel of land to their
predecessor-in-interest, Lorenzo Yap, for the sum of P15,000.00. Since Lorenzo and
his wife Sally Yap were at that time Chinese citizens, Lorenzo requested his brother
Ramon to allow the use of the latter's name in the purchase, registration, and
declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It
was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon Yap
until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that,
should Lorenzo predecease, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo's heirs
upon the latter's naturalization. Petitioners contended that it was Lorenzo who had
caused the construction of the 3-door apartment on the property, merely entrusting
the money therefor to Ramon Yap. The death of Lorenzo in 1970 prompted
petitioners to move in and occupy the apartment and the lot, without any objection
from Ramon and Benjamin, although the latter were allowed to stay in the premises
since they had no other place to live in. In 1991, petitioners acquired Philippine
citizenship and, forthwith, they requested Ramon Yap to have the title to the lot
transferred to their names but to their chagrin they discovered that Ramon had sold
the lot to his co-respondent Benjamin.

Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for the respondents and
adjudged Benjamin Yap to be the true and lawful owner of the disputed property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and
debunked the claim of petitioners that Ramon Yap was merely so used as a dummy
by Lorenzo Yap. Giving full weight and credit to the Deed of Sale executed by the
Nery spouses in favor of Ramon Yap, the appellate court stressed that to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the execution of a public document, the evidence
to the contrary should be clear and convincing even as it was equally incumbent
upon petitioners to show that the subsequent sale of the property to Benjamin had
only been simulated and fictitious. The appellate court, however, deleted the award
of attorney's fees in favor of respondents for, in its view, it was not adequately
shown that petitioners had acted in bad faith in pursuing their case.

Petitioners are now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals and contending that —

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

HOLDS THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FATHER, LORENZO YAP, BEING CHINESE
CAN NOT ENTER INTO A TRUST AGREEMENT AND THE EXISTENCE OF A TRUST
AGREEMENT CAN NOT BE PROVEN BEING CHINESE.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

HOLDS THAT THE FAILURE TO SHOW WRITTEN TRUST AGREEMENT RENDERS THE
ALLEGED AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE BY NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME AS ONE
UNDER IMPLIED TRUST.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

HOLDS THAT PAROL EVIDENCE AND/OR STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIED IN THE
CASE AT BAR.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

HOLDS THAT APPELLANTS HAVE TO REFUTE THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE
NERY SPOUSES IN FAVOR OF RAMON YAP BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSION OF THE SAID DEED OF SALE.

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

DID NOT CONSIDER THAT IN TRUST THE TITLE IS IN THE NAME OF THE TRUSTEE
AND NOT IN THE NAME OF THE NAKED OWNER.

VI

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HOLDS THAT RAMON YAP
CAN NOT BE A DUMMY OF LORENZO YAP BEING ALIEN AND DISQUALIFIED TO
OWN REAL PROPERTY.

VII

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE TITLE IN

THE NAME OF RAMON YAP VOID BEING ACQUIRED AS DUMMY.
 VIII

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

RULED THAT BENJAMIN YAP HAS POSSESSION OF APARTMENT UNIT 123 LIKEWISE
OWNERSHIP PERSONAL PROPERTIES THEREIN ON THE BASIS OF THE INVENTORY
OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT A QUO BY WAY OF A SUBSEQUENT MANDATORY
INJUNCTION WHICH WAS DENIED.1

The Court finds no merit in the appeal.

To begin with, a brief discussion on the trust relation between two parties could be
helpful. A trust may either be express or implied.2 Express trusts are those which
are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed,
or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.3 Implied trusts are those
which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent or, independently of the particular intention of the parties, as
being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of
equity.4 These species of implied trust are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts.5 A resulting trust is one that arises by implication of law and
presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to
which can be found in the nature of their transaction although not expressed in a
deed or instrument of conveyance.6 Resulting trusts are based on the equitable
doctrine that it is the more valuable consideration that the legal title that
determines the equitable interest in property.7 Upon the other hand, a constructive
trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly,
evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one that arises in order to satisfy
the demands of justice. It does not come about by agreement or intention but in
main by operation of law8 construed against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold.9

One basic distinction between an implied trust and an express trust is that while the
former may be established by parol evidence, the latter cannot. Even then, in order
to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be
as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an
authentic document.10 An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague
and inconclusive proof.11

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they submit in the case at bar boil down to
the appreciation of the evidence presented. The Court of Appeals, sustaining the
court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting,12 consisting mainly of the self-serving testimony of Sally Yap. She herself
admitted that the business establishment of her husband Lorenzo was razed by fire
in 1964 that would somehow place to doubt the claim that he indeed had the
means to purchase the subject land about two years later from the Nery spouses.
Upon the other hand, Ramon Yap was by then an accountant with apparent means
to buy the property himself. At all events, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals,
particularly when consistent with those made by the trial court, should deserve
utmost regard when not devoid of evidentiary support. No cogent reason had been
shown by petitioners for the Court to now hold otherwise.

Not to be dismissed, furthermore, is the long standing and broad doctrine of clean
hands that will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical relation, a trust
whether express or implied included, to perpetrate fraud or tolerate bad faith nor to
subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. The trust agreement between Ramon and
Lorenzo, if indeed extant, would have been in contravention of, in fact the
fundamental law. Then Section 5, Article XIII, of the 1935 Constitution has
provided that —

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations,
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The mandate has also been adopted in Section 14, Article XIV, of the 1973
Constitution and now reiterated under Section 7, Article XII, of the 1987
Constitution. A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the
enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though its
performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortuous act. It
likewise must follow that what the parties are not allowed to do expressly is one
that they also may not do impliedly as, for instance, in the guise of a resulting
trust.13

The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the resolution of the incidental

issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals of 08 January 1998 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 46838 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 112872 April 19, 2001

THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALEXANDER T. TY, represented by the

Administratrix, SYLVIA S. TY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ILDEFONSO E.GASCON, and ALEJANDRO B.
TY, respondents.

G.R. No. 114672 April 19, 2001

SYLVIA S. TY, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Alexander T. Ty, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondents.

MELO, J.:

Before the Court are two separate petitions for certiorari, G.R. 112872 under Rule
65 alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and G.R. No.114672 under Rule 45 on purely questions of law. As these two cases
involved the same parties and basically the same issues, including the main
question of jurisdiction, the Court resolved to consolidate them.

On February 27, 2001, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. 00-9-03 directing the
re-distribution of old cases such as the ones on hand. Thus, the present ponencia.

The antecedent facts are as follows:lawphil.net

Petitioner Sylvia S. Ty was married to Alexander T. Ty, son of private respondent

Alejandro B. Ty, on January 11, 1981. Alexander died of leukemia on May 19, 1988
and was survived by his wife, petitioner Sylvia, and only child, Krizia Katrina. In the
settlement of his estate, petitioner was appointed administratrix of her late
husband’s intestate estate.

On November 4, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for leave to sell or mortgage estate
property in order to generate funds for the payment of deficiency estate taxes in
the sum of P4,714,560.00. Included in the inventory of property were the following:

1) 142,285 shares of stock in ABT Enterprises valued at P14,228,500.00;itc-

alf

2) 5,000 shares of stock in Intercontinental Paper Industries valued at

P500,000.00;
 3) 15,873 shares of stock in Philippine Crystal Manufacturing, Inc. valued at
P1,587,300.00;

4) 800 shares of stock in Polymart Paper Industries, Inc. valued at

P80,000.00;itc-alf

5) 1,800 shares of stock in A.T. Car Care Center, Inc. valued at P188,000.00;

6) 360 shares of stock in Union Emporium, Inc. valued at

P36,000.00;lawphil.net

7) 380 shares of stock in Lexty, Inc. valued at P38,000.00; and

8) a parcel of land in Biak-na-Bato, Matalahib, Sta. Mesa, with an area of 823

square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number 214087.

Private respondent Alejandro Ty then filed two complaints for the recovery of the
above-mentioned property, which was docketed as Civil Case Q-91-10833 in Branch
105 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (now herein G.R. No. 112872), praying for
the declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale of the shares of stock
executed by private respondent in favor of the deceased Alexander, and Civil Case
Q-92-14352 in Branch 90 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (now G.R. No.
114672), praying for the recovery of the pieces of property that were placed in the
name of deceased Alexander by private respondent, the same property being
sought to be sold out, mortgaged, or disposed of by petitioner. Private respondent
claimed in both cases that even if said property were placed in the name of
deceased Alexander, they were acquired through private respondent’s money,
without any cause or consideration from deceased Alexander.

Motions to dismiss were filed by petitioner. Both motions alleged lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court, claiming that the cases involved intra-corporate dispute
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Other grounds raised
in G.R. No. 114672 were:

1) An express trust between private respondent Alejandro and his deceased

son Alexander:itc-alf

2) Bar by the statute of limitations;

3) Private respondent’s violation of Supreme Court Circular 28-91 for failure

to include a certification of non-forum shopping in his complaints; and

4) Bar by laches.lawphil.net

The motions to dismiss were denied. Petitioner then filed petitions for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals, which were also dismissed for lack of merit. Thus, the present
petitions now before the Court.

Petitioner raises the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court. She alleges that an intra-
corporate dispute is involved. Hence, under Section 5(b) of Presidential Decree
902-A, the SEC has jurisdiction over the case. The Court cannot agree with
petitioner.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law (Union Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198 [1998]). The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff (Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, 297
SCRA 448 [1998]; Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 [1998]), irrespective of
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein (Citibank, N.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 390 [1998]).
Jurisdiction cannot depend on the defenses set forth in the answer, in a motion to
dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration by the defendant (Dio vs.
Conception, 296 SCRA 579 [1998]).
Petitioner argues that the present case involves a suit between two stockholders of
the same corporation which thus places it beyond the jurisdictional periphery of
regular trial courts and more within the exclusive competence of the SEC by reason
of Section 5(b) of Presidential Decree 902-A, since repealed. However, it does not
necessarily follow that when both parties of a dispute are stockholders of a
corporation, the dispute is automatically considered intra-corporate in nature and
jurisdiction consequently falls with the SEC. Presidential Decree 902-A did not
confer upon the SEC absolute jurisdiction and control over all matters affecting
corporations, regardless of the nature of the transaction which gave rise to such
disputes (Jose Peneyra, et. al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al., 181 SCRA
245 [1990] citing DMRC Enterprises vs. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc., 132
SCRA 293 [1984]). The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction
over this case would be to consider, not merely the status of the parties involved,
but likewise the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy (Viray
vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 309 [1990]). When the nature of the controversy
involves matters that are purely civil in character, it is beyond the ambit of the
limited jurisdiction of the SEC (Saura vs. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA 465 [1999]).

In the cases at bar, the relationship of private respondent when he sold his shares
of stock to his son was one of vendor and vendee, nothing else. The question raised
in the complaints is whether or not there was indeed a sale in the absence of cause
or consideration. The proper forum for such a dispute is a regular trial court. The
Court agrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that no special corporate skill is
necessary in resolving the issue of the validity of the transfer of shares from one
stockholder to another of the same corporation. Both actions, although involving
different property, sought to declare the nullity of the transfers of said property to
the decedent on the ground that they were not supported by any cause or
consideration, and thus, are considered void ab initio for being absolutely simulated
or fictitious. The determination whether a contract is simulated or not is an issue
that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly those relative to obligations and contracts. Disputes concerning the
application of the Civil Code are properly cognizable by courts of general
jurisdiction. No special skill is necessary that would require the technical expertise
of the SEC.

It should also be noted that under the newly enacted Securities Regulation Code
(Republic Act No. 8799), this issue is now moot and academic because whether or
not the issue is intra-corporate, it is the regional trial court and not longer the SEC
that takes cognizance of the controversy. Under Section 5.2 of Republic Act No.
8799, original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving intra-
corporate controversies have been transferred to courts of general jurisdiction or
the appropriate regional trial court.

Other issues raised by the petitioner in G.R. No. 114672 are equally not impressed
with merit.

Petitioner contends that private respondent is attempting to enforce an

unenforceable express trust over the disputed real property. Petitioner is in error
when she contends that an express trust was created by private respondent when
he transferred the property to his son. Judge Abraham P. Vera, in his order dated
March 31, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-92-14352, declared:

… [e]xpress trusts are those that are created by the direct and positive acts
of the parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an
intention to create a trust. On the other hand, implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by
operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties. Thus, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the
trust is express; if the intent to establish a trust is to be taken from
circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is
implied (Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, 21 SCRA 1191 [1967].

In the cases at hand, private respondent contends that the pieces of property were
transferred in the name of the deceased Alexander for the purpose of taking care of
the property for him and his siblings. Such transfer having been effected without
cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.

A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of an
estate and places the title in the name of another, because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein
for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties.
Such a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4,
p. 678).

If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may be
proven by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil Code), and it matters not whether
property is real or personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 4,
p. 814).

Petitioner’s assertion that private respondent’s action is barred by the statute of

limitations is erroneous. The statute of limitations cannot apply in this case.
Resulting trusts generally do not prescribe (Caladiao vs. Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA 691
[1964]), except when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, an action to
reconvey will not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the
trustee (Manalang, et. al. vs. Canlas, et. al., 94 Phil. 776 [1954]). To allow
prescription would be to permit a trustee to acquire title against his principal and
the true owner.

Petitioner is also mistaken in her contention that private respondent violated

Supreme Court Circular 28-91, dated September 17, 1991 and transfer having been
effected without cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.

A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of an
estate and places the title in the name of another, because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein
for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties.
Such a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4,
p. 678).

If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may be
proven by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil Code), and it matters not whether
property is real or personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 4,
p. 814).1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner’s assertion that private respondent’s action is barred by the statute of

limitations is erroneous. The statute of limitations cannot apply in this case.
Resulting trusts generally do not prescribe (Caladiao vs. Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA 691
[1964]), except when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, an action to
reconvey will not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the
trustee (Manalang, et. al. vs. Canlas, et. al., 94 Phil. 776 [1954]). To allow
prescription would be to permit a trustee to acquire title against his principal and
the true owner.

Petitioner is also mistaken in her contention that private respondent violated

Supreme Court Circular 28-91, dated September 17, 1991 and transfer having been
affected without cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.

A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of an
estate and places the title in the name of another, because of the
presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein
for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties.
Such a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4,
p. 678).

If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may be
proven by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil Code), and it matters not whether
property is real or personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 4,
p. 814).
Petitioner’s assertion that private respondent’s action is barred by the statute of
limitations is erroneous. The statute of limitations cannot apply in this case.
Resulting trusts generally do not prescribe (Caladiao vs. Vda. de Blas, 10 SCRA 691
[1964]), except when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, an action to
reconvey will not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the
trustee (Manalang, et. al. vs. Canlas, et. al., 94 Phil. 776 [1954]). To allow
prescription would be to permit a trustee to acquire title against his principal and
the true owner.

Petitioner is also mistaken in her contention that private respondent violated

Supreme Court Circular 28-91, dated September 17, 1991 and which took effect on
January 1, 1992. Although Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
makes the requirement of filing a verification and certificate of non-forum-shopping
applicable to all courts, this cannot be applied in the case at bar. At the time the
original complaint was first filed on December 10 (for G.R. 112872) and 28 (for
G.R. 114672), 1992, such certification requirement only pertained to cases in the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Revised Circular 28-91, which
covered the certification requirement against non-forum shopping in all courts, only
took effect April 1, 1994. Further, the subject heading of the original circular alone
informs us of its topic: that of additional requisites for petitions filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to prevent forum shopping or multiple
filing of petitions and complaints. Section 1 of the Circular makes it mandatory to
include the docket number of the case in the lower court or quasi-judicial agency
whose order or judgment is sought to be reviewed. Such a requirement clearly
indicates that the Circular only applies to actions filed with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.

Contrary to what petitioner contends, there could be no laches in this case. Private
respondent filed his complaint in G.R. No. 112872 on December 10, 1992 (later
amended on December 23, 1992) and in G.R. No. 114672 on December 28, 1992,
only over a month after petitioner filed in the probate proceedings a petition to
mortgage or sell the property in dispute. Private respondent’s actions were in fact
very timely. As stated in the complaints, private respondent instituted the above
actions as the property were in danger of being sold to a third party. If there were
no pending cases to stop their sale, he would no longer be able to recover the same
from an innocent purchaser for value.

Withal, the Court need not go into any further discussion on whether the trial court
erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 112872 is DISMISSED, having
failed to show that grave abuse of discretion was committed in declaring that the
regional trial court had jurisdiction over the case. The petition for review on
certiorari in G.R. 114672 is DENIED, having found no reversible error was
committed.

SO ORDERED.lawphil.net

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.