MODULE 5: CONSTRUCTION AND

INTERPRETATION
I. Definition

1. Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, 29 September 1966

Construction
- The art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
law with respect to its application to a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
(Black, Interpretation of Laws)
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966

CASTRO, J., En Banc

Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

FACTS: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) conceived a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil
products – i.e. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number
of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Participation is to
be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration is
required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities to
justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law.
Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, opined that the scheme falls within the
purview of the provisions of The Postal Law – i.e. Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, sections
1954(a), 1982 and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable matter of any information regarding "any lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the
Postmaster General, praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the
contest to the attention of the public. The trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code
and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the public distribution of the contest rules by the mails.
The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions
of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein?

HELD: No. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by Caltex is not a lottery that may be
administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in question is used in association
with the word "lottery".

"Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements
of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio). In the
present case, the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed Caltex’s scheme. However,
with regards to the third element – i.e. consideration, SC found nowhere in the said rules of any requirement
that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given
for the privilege to participate. The scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance. Like a lottery, a “gift enterprise” comes also within the prohibitive
statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration. The apparent conflict of
opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical, the terms
"lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics
noscitur a sociis — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other
meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is
prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.
Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or
chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration
is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or
stimulated thereby. Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes
therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
II. Purpose of Construction

1. City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, 28 February 1969

- The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative intent.
In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end that it may be enforced." In varying language,
"the, purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true intention of the law."
They "are only valuable when they subserve this purpose." In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof." A statute "should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law."
City of Baguio v. Marcos
G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969

FACTS:
On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the land here involved was amongst
those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922. Respondent
Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of
land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his name.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita
J. Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned the cadastral court's
jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40 year period preceding the approval of
Republic Act 931.

HELD:
Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was
rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted that the
title of R.A. 931 authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title
to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its Section 1,
speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of
judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There thus
appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body.

It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read
than the act itself.” R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should receive blessings of liberal
construction. The court says that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted
to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931,
claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public
land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.

III. When construction is resorted to

1. Garcia v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 170735, 17 December 2007

- Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them
regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal,
application not interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the language of a statute is vague
and ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. An interpretation thereof is necessary in
instances where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. A law is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in either of two or more senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous. In the instant case, petitioner interprets Section
28(f) of the Social Security Law as applicable only to penalties and not to the liability of the employer
for the unremitted premium contributions. Respondents present a more logical interpretation that is
consistent with the provisions as a whole and with the legislative intent behind the Social Security
Law.
IMMACULADA L. GARCIA vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION LEGAL AND
COLLECTION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007

FACTS:

Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of
Impact Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube
containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory while the other was an Extrusion
Plant, which processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible tubes and similar containers for toothpaste and
other related products.

Around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. In March 1983, Impact
Corporation filed with the SEC a Petition for Suspension of Payments. On 8 May 1985, the union of Impact
Corporation filed a Notice of Strike with the Ministry of Labor which was followed by a declaration of
strike on 28 July 1985. The Ministry of Labor noted the inability of Impact Corporation to pay wages, 13th
month pay, and SSS remittances due to cash liquidity problems. On 3 July 1985, the SSS, through its Legal
and Collection Division (LCD), filed a case before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSS premium
contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees.
ISSUES:

1. Is Section 28 (f) of the Social Security Law applicable to penalties only?

2. Can a mere director or officer of an employer corporation be held liable for the unpaid SSS premium
contributions under Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law?
3. Being the only surviving director of Impact Corporation, can Garcia be made solely liable for the
corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and
penalties therefor?

RULING:
1. No. Garcia mistakenly concluded that Section 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and not to

the liability of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law does not
preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to Section 28(f) is Section 22 of the same law,
which provides that: (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding Section shall be remitted to the SSS
within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or
within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such
contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein
prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the
date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the
contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon
separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to
his employer.

It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the
law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.
Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred that the persons liable are absolved from
paying the unremitted premium contributions.

2. Yes. Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law provides that, “If the act or omission penalized by this Act
be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head,
directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.”

Garcia invokes the rule in statutory construction called ejusdem generic; that is, where general words follow
an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. According to her, to be held liable under the said
provision, one must be the "managing head," "managing director," or "managing partner."

According to the SC, the said provision does not qualify that the director or partner should likewise be a
"managing director" or "managing partner." The law is clear and unambiguous.

3. Yes. Garcia raises the defense that under Section 31 of the Corporation Code, only directors, trustees or
officers who participate in unlawful acts or are guilty of gross negligence and bad faith shall be personally
liable, and that being a mere stockholder, she is liable only to the extent of her subscription.

Section 31 of the Corporation Code, stipulating on the liability of directors, trustees, or officers, provides
that, “Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders
or members and other persons.”

Basic is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. A corporation
is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in
general, from the people comprising it. Following this, the general rule applied is that obligations incurred
by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. A director,
officer, and employee of a corporation are generally not held personally liable for obligations incurred by
the corporation.

Being a mere fiction of law, however, there are peculiar situations or valid grounds that can exist to warrant
the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. This situation might arise when a
corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to
carry out other similar unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so
circumvent the law.

Thus, Section 31 of the Corporation Law provides that "Taking a cue from the above provision, a corporate
director, a trustee or an officer, may be held solidarily liable with the corporation in the following instances:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of a corporation

2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge
thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto.

3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and
solidarily liable with the Corporation.

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action.

The situation of Garcia, as a director of Impact Corporation when said corporation failed to remit the SSS
premium contributions falls exactly under the fourth situation.

IV. Executive Construction

1. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 150947, 15 July 2003

- Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This
rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of
the human mind.

2. Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627

CIR V. MICHEL J. LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP, INC GR No. 150947, July 15, 2003

Davide, Jr.

FACTS:

-Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91 and Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 43- 91
were issued by the CIR imposing 5% lending investor’s tax on pawnshops.

- BIR issued Assessment Notice against Lhuillier demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax.

-Lhuillier filed an administrative protest with the Office of the Revenue Regional Director contending that
(1) neither Tax Code nor VAT Law expressly imposes 5% percentage tax on the gross income of
pawnshops; (2) pawnshops are different from lending investors; (3) RMO No. 15-91 is a new and additional
tax measure on pawnshops, which only Congress could enact; (4) RMO No. 15-91 impliedly amends the
Tax Code, which is proscribed by law; and (5) RMO No. 15- 91 is a “class legislation.”

-Lhuillier elevated the matter to CIR but still the protest was unacted. An Appeal was filed with the CTA
invoking Sec.228 of RA No. 8424 or Tax Reform Act of 1997.

-CTA denied CIR’s MTD and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. It declared RMO No. 15-91 and RMC
No. 43-91 null and void as well as the Assessment Notice.

-CIR appealed with CA but the latter affirmed CTA’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON pawnshops are included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing 5% tax under then
Sec.116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by EO No. 273.

RULING:

NO, pawnshops are not considered lending investors for the purpose of imposing 5% tax. Under the NIRC
of 1986, as amended, lending investor includes “all persons who make a practice of lending money for
themselves or others at interest” while Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 114 defined pawnshop as “a person or entity
engaged in the business of lending money on personal property delivered as security for loans and shall be
synonymous with brokerage.” Pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money but they are not
considered “lending investors” for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage taxes for the following
reasons: (1) pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments; (2) Congress never
intended pawnshops to be treated in the same way as lending investors; (3) Sec.116 of the NIRC of 1977, as
amended by E.O. No. 273, subjects to percentage tax dealers in securities and lending investors only. Under
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another
thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else
must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect; and (4) BIR had ruled several
times prior to the issuance of RMO 15-91 and RMC 43-91 that pawnshops were not subject to the 5%
percentage tax imposed by Sec. 116 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273. Moreover, RMO
No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 were issued in accordance with the power of the CIR to make rulings and
opinions in connection with the implementation of internal revenue laws, which was bestowed by then Sec.
245 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273. Such power of the CIR cannot be controverted.
However, the CIR cannot, in the exercise of such power, issue administrative rulings or circulars not
consistent with the law sought to be applied. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or
modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal
or amend the law.

DISPOSITIVE: PETITION DISMISSED

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC. vs SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (4 SCRA
627) G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

FACTS: The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all
employers in computing the premiums due to the system to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses
and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration. Victorias Milling Company
Inc protested that it is in contradictory to a previous circular (Circular No. 7) which expressly excludes
bonuses, overtime pay in the computation of their monthly premiums. Counsel of Victorias Milling
Company Inc further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social
Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in
the Official Gazette. Social Security Commission ruled that the Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation
that need approval of the President and Publication in the Official Gazette but a mere administrative
interpretation of a statute, a mere statement of general policy as to how a aw is to be construed, thus this
appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this
Act”

2. Whether or not the case cited by Victorias Milling Company applicable to the case?

HELD:

1. There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of

a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when
it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and
regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
sanction provided in the law.

2. The case of People v. Jolliffe cited by appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in
question is a rule or regulation. What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the
form of a circular. Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is
decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular,
regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which must be
published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.

The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present
case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they refuse to pay the
corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays to his employees, is not by
reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of the specific legal provisions contained
in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.
V. Judicial Construction

A. Basis, Extent, and Limitations

1. Article VIII, Section 1 and Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in
no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.

2. Record of the Constitutional Commission, 434- 436 (1986)

3. Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)

-Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order
to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give
way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit
or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al.,
44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot
shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must
so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a
judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that
action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial
tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions
in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected
power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to
the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

Violation of Separation of Powers

- We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the
power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department.
That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles
of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.

4. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act No. 590, Saturnino David, Collector of Internal Revenue, was able to collect
payment for income taxes from Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo. However, the two Justices wanted to
refund such payment because it had violated their privilege of being exempt from the collection of income
tax by virtue of the Constitution under Section 9, Article VIII. Thus, they filed before the Supreme Court to
declare Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional. The passage of such law was because the Legislature could
not accept the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer; exempting the judicial
officers to be taxed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
ISSUE:
WON the Legislature can pass a law that would not exempt the judicial officers from paying income tax
when in fact, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and decided in the Perfecto case, judicial officers are
exempt from paying income tax.
RULING:
The power to interpret laws is vested to our Judiciary; whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental
law, the courts must adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. What the Congress did was to
interpret the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office” found
in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of the jurisdiction of the Judiciary. If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Furthermore, the reason behind the exemption is to
preserve the independence of the Judiciary.

Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow the return of
former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President
Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to
national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the
instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos were to be
brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to
dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is
vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result
was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President
under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest
and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of
Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of
the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual
powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution refers to an express grant of power.
B. Requisites for Judicial Review

1. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No.

178552, 5 October 2010
- In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

2. David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control,
to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people
as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of
the theory of judicial review.

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-starting capacity.” Courts may
exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case
or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.

- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
> Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution.

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
> There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the
people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press
s
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public;
> the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules.
It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the
military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees

and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

>Respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition
the petitions are subject to judicial review

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council

SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146
Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010

Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus:

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGO
GR No. Concerned citizen,
178552 Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr. taxpayer, and
lawyer
GR No.
KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
178554
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL,
COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr.,
GR No. certiorari and
Lumbera, Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan, OSB,
178581 prohibition
Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret. Col. Cunanan,
Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes,
Ramos, De Jesus, Baua, Casambre
GR No.
SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
178890
GR No. IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and
179157 Tañada
GR. No. BAYAN-ST, other reg’l chapters and orgs mostly
179461 based in Southern Tagalog

Respondents:
 Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:
o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
o Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo
o National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales
o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
o Finance Secretary Margarito Teves
 AFP Chief of Staff General Hermogenes Esperon
 PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
 PGMA
 Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council, namely:
o National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
 o NBI
o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
o Intelligence Service of the AFP
o Anti-Money Laundering Center
o Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and investigative elements

FACTS:
 This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure
the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by
the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
 KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been
subjected to “close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by
“suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men
with military build.” They likewise claim they have been branded as “enemies of the State.”
 BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice
of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and
NPA. They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.
 Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution.
 Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand”
are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper  NO.
2. WON petitioners have locus standi  NO.
3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging”  NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine  NO.
5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens  NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy  NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism  NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners  NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of
its validity  NO.

HELD AND RATIO:

1. Petition for certiorari is improper.
a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies
when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted
without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most essential.
2. Petitioners lack locus standi.
a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, locus standi has been
defined as that requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
inquiry as a result of the act being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual
danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of
penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Such
necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to
clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate
how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and
duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of
“political surveillance” also lacks locus standi. The same is true for Wigberto Tañada and
Osmeña III, who cite their being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively.
No concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging.”
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of
accurate and ready determination
iii. known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to: (1) facts evidenced by public records and (2) facts of general notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence
or non-existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge
or proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity,
belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA
9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will
adopt the US and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet
to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organization under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona, to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the
 determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised
In the case at bar, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests
in the questions being raised.
5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.
a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress
for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any
direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under
RA 9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount
to an advisory opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The
pleadings must show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any
constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge.
This, however, is qualified by the presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory
petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case at
bar, the petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No demonstrable threat has been established,
much less a real and existing one.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the
implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and
supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not
speech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC: A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but
the Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the
therein subject election offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the
therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the
 Estrada case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the
same plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to
avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved
by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms.
b. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.
i. “As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be
possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis
of its validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal
laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly
focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a
crime entails some mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental
but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent
 of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as
conduct and not speech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:

- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in
this case are more procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it
becomes ripe for adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.