To what extent is it accurate to interpret the 1950s and

1960s as an era of pronounced consensus within British

politics?
Introduction
Many consider consensus politics a vital mainstay of post-war politics,
but there has been much debate over how real this consensus actually
was. The post war consensus is the idea that from 1945 to the late
1970s, there was a general agreement in politics, such as the creation
the modern welfare state. Overall, this essay will argue that there was a
political consensus in the 1950s and 1960s, albeit one that did not go
unchallenged. My aim in proving this will be to demonstrate that the
post-war consensus was widely held across the political spectrum using
the support for the new welfare state. My objective in proving this will
be to contrast and compare support and opposition for the new,
Keynesian welfare state envisioned by Beveridge amongst the public,
politicians and key institutions.

Main Body
When discussing the consensus among the general public, one need
look no further than the widespread and enduring popularity of the
Beveridge report among the general population.s. Authored by William
Beveridge during the Second World War, this document advocated for
the state to take a leading role in tackling poverty by tackling the five
giants: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease (National
Archives, N/A). In complete contrast to the Laissze Faire economics of
the depression thirties, where the state had done little to counter the
mass unemployment of the depression, the Beveridge report laid the
foundations for the new welfare state with its revolutionary social
security policies, which covered people, “cradle to grave” (Day, 2017)
including work injury, unemployment, retirement and even an
expansion of the health services. These reforms were incredibly
popular according to polls of the day, with 88% in 1943 approving of
the establishment of free to the point of service healthcare, 71%
approval in 1946 for the expansion of social security and overall, 88%
believed the report should be implemented, majorities that were
electorally impossible to refuse, demonstrating the existence of a
consensus amongst the general public (National Archives, N/A)
(Hudson, 2016:4-5). This consensus, with blips, persisted well in the
1950s, with 90% approving pension increases in 1951 and 1954, with
approval for cutting welfare spending in the single digits, and support
remained very high throughout the period (Hudson, 2016:4-6). This
enduring consensus is linked irreparably to the war, where the origins
of the welfare state lie, and is the cause for this consensus amongst the
people. Many of Beveridge’s proposals originate in war measures, such
as the emergency health service and the NHS, but the reason the
Beveridge report aroused this consensus is because the report was a
reward for military service, something Beveridge recognised “the war is
abolishing landmarks of every kind... the opportunity for... a clear field”
(Beveridge, 1943:6). In 1941, large swathes of the country were
dissatisfied on parliament’s discussions about the Beveridge report
because they believed it was a betrayal of troops on the front, (Hudson,
2016:4-6) and this becomes particularly obvious when we look at
political cartoons on the matter. Phillip Zec’s under the counter, written
for the left-wing daily mirror, a newspaper read by common people, is a
perfect example of this, as it displays an angry working-class couple
scolding a Churchill look-alike grocer, running the “Tory Peace Stores
(very limited) with the “goods” such as “decent schools” and “good
homes “ being reserved for the rich, with the couple claiming that these
“goods” were bought both in 1918 and 1939 (Roberta, 2020).
This very clearly demonstrates the belief that the Beveridge report was
supported by ordinary people and only opposed by treacherous
politicians. These ideas are reflected in many other cartoons, with
another being an ordinary soldier drinking to a, “brave new world”
clearly demonstrating the Beveridge report was reward for services
common people rendered during the war, and reluctance on behalf the
conservatives as a betrayal (Stedman, 2005) (Hudson, 2016:4-6).
In short, polling data shows virtually unanimous support amongst the
general population for the implementation of the Beveridge report
because of its’ status as a reward for winning the war, (demonstrated
by political cartoons and Beveridge himself) demonstrate a political
context in which there was a political consensus.
However, some could argue that while there is evidence to suggest that
the principles of the Beveridge report were widely popular, the
consensus regarding welfare among the public was never as solid as it
seemed, as much of the public held views closer to Thatcher than
Beveridge, despite the public’s wholehearted support for the Beveridge
report. These attitudes, according to a long-term survey on attitudes
towards welfare by half a dozen academics, showed “remarkable
consistency” from the 1940s to the 1960s (Hudson, J:7-8). One such
poll, commissioned by the Conservatives in 1968, found 78% believed
that the welfare state had caused people to work less and 89% believed
that people used benefits to escape work, evoking imagery of those on
benefits as parasites, despite the fact that in the 1960s, 56% favoured
increases in social spending (Hudson, J:6-7). This demonstrates that the
public’s support for the Beveridge report’s principles was far from
unanimous, which promoted social insurance as a temporary measure
in case of “interruption... of earning power” amongst workers, with
more permanent measures being reserved for crippling injury, rather
than the long-term subsistence which social parasitism implies
(Beveridge, 1943:7). This is because of a difference in purpose; while
Beveridge’s welfare state was technocratic, with the sole purpose being
to get workers back to work as quickly as possible, the public
maintained the dichotomy of deserving vs undeserving poor, and this is
why these conservative attitudes on welfare endure until Thatcher
made good on them in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, polling data from
across the period of the supposed consensus shows “overwhelming”
support for the moralistic welfare state (Hudson, J:6-8). In 1968, 65%
were willing to pay more tax for “vulnerable groups” to receive state
support, such as the lonely elderly, the disabled, with ex-prisoners and
alcoholics at the end of the list (Hudson, J:6-8). Adding to this, a year
earlier in 1967 there were fears of “abuse of free prescriptions” and
73% believed there were people on benefits that didn’t need them, as
well as 61% believing tenants should be able to buy their council homes
(Hudson, J:6-8). The significant presence of moralistic welfare state
amongst the general public, such as deserving-undeserving dichotomy,
in stark contrast to Beveridge’s utilitarian approach proves that there
was not a public consensus on welfare, even though the Beveridge
report was widely popular and politically ascendant in the post-war
period.
While there were differences of opinion between the public and
Beveridge on matters such as the deserving and undeserving poor,
given that the welfare state had the unity of virtually all Britons, some
diversity of opinion regarding implementation does not mean there
was no consensus throughout this period, and instead reinforces it, as
this unity in spite of difference displayed by the 1945 electorate, a
pivotal events in establishing the consensus for later decades is proof of
this. This is vital to the consensus of the 1950s and 1960s because this
is where the consensus began. According to historian Stephen Fielding,
the 1945 election was not a victory of doctrinal socialism (Fielding,
1992:1) among the masses that would have attacked the influence
conservative ideas about welfare concepts, such as the deserving-
undeserving dichotomy. Rather, it was the result of a broad “unfocused
left vote” (Fielding, 1992:13) that had far more differences than to
whom welfare should be granted; the coalition was cynical of and
disparate from party politics, from diverse class background and whose
only goals were the establishment of the welfare state. Bipartisanship,
something soundly rejected by the Labour party, even comparing it to
fascism, (Fielding, 1992:8) was widespread amongst these voters, with
over two-fifths from 1944 to 1945 supporting a coalition with the
conservatives while 55% at the same time supporting a, “anti-
conservative popular front” (Fielding, 1992:7) demonstrating how all
this coalition wanted was welfare, traditional cleavages in British
politics fell by the wayside due to this, welfare being all that mattered.
Neither were these voters from the traditional working class milleu that
Labour usually embodied, with many working class and middle-class
voters united for welfare. Evidence of the unity of the coalition in the
face of traditional political divides is how the Conservatives failed to
harness the coalition of consensus; where the Conservatives
emphasised ideology, such as when Churchill compared socialism to the
Gestapo, (something 69% disapproved of) Labour, “wrapped
themselves in the Beveridge report” (Fielding, 1992:10-12) a non-
ideological commitment that had the support of 90%, and won the
election as a result of this. Ultimately, this proves that the only thing
this new “unfocused left” (Fielding, 1992:10) had consensus on was the
Beveridge report (aside from a handful of adjacent issues like
nationalisation which lacked welfare’s saliency (Fielding, 1992:12)) was
welfare, and its political diversity beyond that, such as implementation
of welfare is actually a sign of the success of the consensus, rather than
a sign of division, exactly because it was able to form a consensus from
these voters that would be vital in beginning a consensus that would
last for throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This is precisely because it
shows that the consensus on welfare was able to overcome these
issues. The Beveridge report bridged the class divide for the Labour
party. Welfare conquered partisanism, as voters would elect whichever
party would implement the Beveridge report, be it Labour or a
Conservative coalition. Welfare conquered ideology, focus on which
was the downfall of the Conservatives in the face of post-war voters
who had no normal political experience and mistrusted the old parties,
and finally welfare conquered class, which had defined the Labour party
since its’ and gave it broad appeal across the population it needed to
win the 1945 landslide. To conclude, the great political unity the British
population displayed in the 1945 election in spite of their differences
shows that there was a political consensus in the post-war period,
without which the consensus in later decades could never have
happened.
While it is true that amongst the voting population there was a
unanimous theoretical consent for modern innovations such as the
welfare state, (above all other issues) this is undermined by the
widespread political apathy that pervaded British society during the
1945 elections, damaging the idea of a consensus in later because if the
Britons didn’t believe in change in 1945, the start of the consensus, why
believe in it later. periods because. Though support for welfare reform
was high, this was mostly theoretical, as most Britons believed this
reform would never happen, and there cannot be a political consensus
if there is no intent to carry out these policies, meaning this consensus
is theoretical at the time of the 1945 election. While, on the surface,
political apathy seems not to be especially great in the 1945 election,
with a turnout of 72.5%, compared to 76.4% in 1931 and a whopping
83.9% in 1950 (Clark, 2023). When sources from the 1945 election are
analysed however, we see widespread apathy, embodied best by an
overwhelming sense of hopelessness and despair that the New
Jerusalem, for example Beveridge’s welfare state, would ever be built.
The best evidence for this are the works of British war propagandist J.B
Priestly, (Fielding, 1992:5) who describes British desires for reform as,
“Hope, doubt, despair come flashing, flickering, darkening. To-day you
say: ‘we must do it ourselves’ Tomorrow you may be saying again: They
won’t be doing anything” establishing hope for reform as essentially a
dream that will never happen. This despair so was so intent Furthering
this idea of theoretical support, one Labour candidate in 1945 recalled
one of his fellow soldiers hoping the New Jerusalem would him and his
family in a cottage eating Chocolate, (Fielding, 1992:11) proving again
that post-War desires for reform were, “vague and nebulous” (Fielding,
1992:11) and excerpts from the A.B.C.A, (Army Bureau of Current
Affairs) which were blamed for stoking left wing sentiment by
Conservative politicians were equally consumed by despair, decrying
the uselessness of Labour and the perceived vice-like grip of the
Conservatives on British society (Fielding, 1992:6-7). Civilian society
seemed no more hopeful, with fewer party flags displayed than there
had been prior and low attendance at political gatherings, (Fielding,
1992:10-11) with no small number of political scientists, such as Roger
Eatwell, believing the vote for Labour was a protest vote against the
political establishment (Fielding, 1992:10). So great was this sentiment,
that many were surprised that Labour had won the election at all
(Fielding, 1992:9). The status of a vote for Labour as “negative
enthusiasm” (Fielding, 1992:9) reinforces the idea of the theoretical
consensus as opposed to an actual one, as victory in the elections took
many by surprise. To conclude, the 1945 is a pivotal moment in the
history of the post-war political consensus of the 1950s and 1960s, and
if the people were in a such a political malaise that they couldn’t
conceive of their own victory in the election, a consensus could not
have existed in later periods?
Support is theoretical and unfocused

Conclusion
To summarise, this essay has discussed to what extent it is accurate to
interpret the 1950s and 1960s as a period of pronounced consensus in
British politics and has found that, with caveats, the interpretation that
there is a consensus is correct. This achieves the aim to find widespread
support for the political consensus and my objective to find support
specifically for the welfare state has also found, with exceptions, such
as political apathy and welfare moralism, that there was a consensus on
the welfare reform envisioned by Beveridge.

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35.

Reflective Essay
In addition to your essay, you are required to provide a self-reflection
which focuses upon the skills and knowledge you have gained
throughout the unit and how you intend to build on your learning. The
reflective piece should be between 300-400 words in length, and you
are required to demonstrate engagement with a topic not discussed in
your essay.
I feel that my time in the development in politics course, I feel I have
had substantial opportunity to grow my confidence in the learning
environment, particularly the discussions we had in seminar regarding
the various topics that the studied in the unit. I feel that these
discussions have helped me understand how to engage with,
understand, and most importantly respond to the ideas and arguments
of others, and I believe this is an important skill not only in the
academic environment but also employment, as well as life in general.
Of great assitance in gaining this skill, has, naturally, been the subjects
themselves. Of particular aid were the several seminars had on the
post-war Prime Ministers of the 1960s and the 1970s, mainly Edward
Heath and Harold Wilson. These are political figures about which there
is much to discuss and do not have clear legacies, unlike Clement Atlee
and Margaret Thatcher, allowing for very divergent opinions to from
and fuel discourse. One example of discussions about these Prime
Ministers was especially helpful was when we were discussing Wilsons's
educational reforms, such as his promise to expand access to
university. I took the position that this was an ineffective reform
because the amount of degree requiring jobs had not increased in line
with university graduates, and that, in the modern day, businesses had
simply added degree requirements to jobs which don’t need them, and
only stifled social mobility that Wilson sought to build, while others
took a contrary view. This preluded a lively discussion about social
mobility and education, which I greatly enjoyed, and I learned a great
deal about how to engage with others in a healthy, informative and
academic environment, where previously I tended to dominate the
room and not let anyone else speak. Overall, I think the discussions had
in this unit have helped me to become much more understanding and
considerate of the value of the opinions and arguments of others.