BRAZILIAN PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE AND INDEPENDENCE1

Ernani Carvalho2
Natália Leitão3

Abstract

Which factors explain the independence of Brazilian Public Prosecution Office (Ministério
Público)? Assuming the 1988 Constitution as a landmark to analyze the Brazilian institutions,
the principal aim of this article is to identify which formal features influence Public
Prosecution Office independence (Ministério Público). Prior studies examine the importance
of its functional independence but there are few efforts to measure it. On methodological
grounds, the research design adopts nested analysis methodology, combining a principal
component analysis model with deep case study and documental analysis (legislation and
jurisprudence). Our results suggest that: 1) the variables that influence the Public Prosecution
Office’s independence can be grouped into two dimensions, one institutional and one of its
members, and 2) in Brazil, the members’ independence is higher than the institutional one.

Key-words: Public Prosecution Office; institutional independence; measurement.

1
Chapter word count: 9.819 words
2
Professor of Political Science department, Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). Publications: O novo
desenho institucional do Ministério Público e o processo de judicialização da política. Revista Direito GV, v. 6,
p. 399-422, 2010; Judicialização da Política no Brasil: controle de constitucionalidade e racionalidade
política. Análise Social (Lisboa), v. XLIV, p. 315-335, 2009; Revisão judicial e judicialização da política no
direteito ocidental: aspecto relavantes de sua gênese e desenvolvimento. Revista de Sociologia e Política
(UFPR), p. 161-179, 2007.
3
Master’s degree in Political Science from Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). ). Publications: O novo
desenho institucional do Ministério Público e o processo de judicialização da política. Revista Direito GV, v. 6,
p. 399-422, 2010; Bridge over trouble waters: Brasil, Mercosul e União Européia (1980-2008). In: Estevão C.
de Rezende Martins; Miriam Gomes Saraiva. (Org.). Brasil, União Européia, América do Sul: anos 2010-2020.
Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Konrad Adenauer, 2009.
Introduction4

Brazilian political institutions have been subject of intense scrutiny in political

science. Issues such as the party system (Mainwaring 2001), the legislative-Executive
relationship (Figueiredo and Limongi 2001; Ames 2003) became canonical objects of
research. Interestingly, we cannot say that for the institutions of the justice system. The
literature on the Judiciary, the Public Prosecution Office, Public Defender is still limited,
being more restricted to law scholars.
Since Dahl (1957), judiciary has an important role as a decision making institution
on controversial issues of national policy. As a result, different scholars come up to analyze
"how and under which circumstances the courts influence the decisions made within the
executive and legislative branches" (Taylor 2007: 230)
Being a part of the judicial system, the Public Prosecution Office (Ministério
Público) is considered an important political actor (Sadek 2008; Kerche 2003; Arantes 2002).
Their members are able to change the course of public life and impose their decisions over
other institutions (Sadek 2009). The Ministério Público experienced some changes with the
Brazilian Constitution of 1988. Previously linked to the Executive branch, its current
constitutional position does not link it to any of the branches of State. In addition, the
Ministério Público acquired functional autonomy, which means the ability to make decisions
without orders from other agencies or branches of the state5.
Given these powers and the high degree of autonomy appointed by the literature
(Arantes 2002; Kerche 2003; Mazzilli 2007; Sadek 2008, 2009), the main goal of this article
is to identify which features of the institutional design of the Public Prosecution Office can be
used to understand its independence.
The theoretical debate about the Public Prosecutor Office in Brazil is incipient
(McAllister 2008). In the United States, issues such as discretion enjoyed by prosecutors,
accountability, and the existence of bargains are essential in the debate (LaFave 1970; Lynch
1997; McAllister 2008). In Brazil, the literature was initially concerned with the factors that
led to the independence of Public Prosecution Office (Arantes 2002; Kerche 2003). In other
words, the works sought to explain how the Ministério Público got independence from other
branches of the state. Other important issues, such as control, accountability, degree of

4
We are thankful to Dalson Britto for the review of this text.
5
For a deeper explanation of the process of reform of Brazilian Public Prosecution Office, see Arantes 2002;
Kerche 2003; and Aguiar 2011(in this volume).
discretion, common themes in American literature, are slowly entering in the Brazilian
literature.
We analyze elements referred in the literature (Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart 2003;
McAllister 2008; Aaken, Feld, and Voigt 2008; 2010) that are part of the dimension of
independence of the Public Prosecution Office. Here, independence is understood as the
ability to make decisions without interference from other actors. Moreover, the concern is
with formal institutional characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is divided in 3 sections. First, we review the literature
and then employ a principal component analysis model to estimate a measure of
independence. Then, we analyze the variables in a more substantive and depth way to the
specific case of Brazil. Finally, we present our concluding remarks on the subject.

1. Measuring the independence

1.1. Brief review

Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003) evaluate the independence considering two
dimensions: the appointment process and the tenure of the head of institution 6. Regarding the
first dimension, they argue that the lower level of independence is found in cases where the
process is dominated by legislators. Mixed appointments, with participation of different
agencies, offer a slightly higher level of independence. The independence increases if the
nomination process is conducted by judicial institutions, without interference of politicians.
Finally, greater independence is found when society chooses, a rare phenomenon in Latin
America.
The second dimension is the tenure in office of the head of the institution. Moreno,
Crisp, and Shugart (2003) assess this dimension by a term ratio (TR): a ratio of the official’s
term (TIC) to the term of the elected branch that is involved in the appointing process (TIP):

If there are two elected branches involved in the process (or two legislative
chambers), it is taken the shortest term. Cases where the tenure is for life are coded as 20
years. Cases in which politically insulated councils are alone responsible for the appointment,
the ratio were coded as 5. Finally, Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003) emphasize that these

6
They analyze different justice institutions in Latin America. Here, we only report data on prosecution offices.
calculations are based on the existence of a fixed term, that can only be stopped through an
extraordinary process of impeachment. However, there are cases that a term can be easily
stopped. Thus, countries in which the head of the institution may be dismissed by a
legislative majority receive the value zero for the term ratio.
Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003) claim that ratios less than or equal to 1.00
represent less independence, since each president or legislature has at least one opportunity to
change the head of the institution. Ratios from 1.01 to 1.49 provide a slight more
independence. Longer mandates increase the chance of independence, once they decrease the
likelihood of punishment by the elected branches. The figure below replicates data from
Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003).

Figure 01: Independence of Prosecution Office in Latin America

Key to scale on appointment process
Legislative-dominant
0. Legislative majority only
1. Legislators, with opposition
participation
Mixed
2. Legislators and elected president
3. State entity other than legislature
or elected president
4. Judges and politicians
5. Civic groups and politicians
Judicial-dominant
6. Supreme Court or council of
judges with participation by state
entity other than legislature or
elected president
7. Supreme Court or council of
judges
Civil-society-dominant
8. Commission of lawyers,
academics, etc., with participation by
state entity other than legislature or
elected president
9. Commission of lawyers,
academics, etc.

Source: Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003)

Brazil is the country with lower independence in the dimension of the appointment
process and the second lowest in the dimension of tenure in office, staying ahead of Ecuador
and Peru, both with zero value. This result may seem surprising since the literature on
prosecutors in Brazil highlights its independence. However, Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart
(2003) argue that the independence identified in the Brazilian prosecution cannot be
explained by these variables. According to Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003), “the
appointment process and exceedingly short term work against the independence of the
institution, and thus the relative freedom of the public prosecution from political influence
could vary with the commitment to prosecutorial independence of specific federal
administrations” (Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart 2003: 107).
Although the indicators suggested by Moreno, Crisp, and Shugart (2003) are central
to understand institutional independence, we believe that there are other variables that explain
prosecution independence. In particular, features of its own institutional design. For example,
Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010) propose different variables to measure independence.
They define “Procuracy” as an institution that: “(1) it has the competence to gather
information on the behavior of criminal suspects or to instruct the police to gather more
information; (2) on the basis of that information, it has the competence to indict a suspect; (3)
during a trial, it represents the interests of the public” (Aaken, Feld, and Voigt 2010: 5-6).
They create two indicators of Procuracy’s independence: one measuring formal
independence (de jure) and another measuring its factual independence (de facto). This
article replicates the formal independence indicator, since the objective is to analyze the
formal institutional features of the Procuracy. This indicator consists of 16 variables grouped
into five sub-indicators. Each variable takes values from 0 to 1. The authors add the values
and divide by the number of variables available for each case. Thus, the sub-indicators also
range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates greater independence and 0 less independence. Sub-
indicators are added and divided by 5, resulting in the indicator of formal independence. One
problem with this is that the sub-indicators have the same weight, i.e., the same importance
for the final indicator. The figure below summarizes the variables used by the authors:
 Figure 02: Variables of formal independence indicator
Subindicator
1. General institutional traits
2. Personal independence of
prosecutors
3. Formal independence from
government
4. Monopoly in initiating
prosecutions
5. Degree of discretion
Source: Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010)
Variables
Is the procuracy mentioned in the Constitution?
There are formal qualification requirements to become a
prosecutor?
Difficulty of removing prosecutors from office
There is a general rule to allocate incoming cases to specific
prosecutors?
Term length
Renewability
Appointing organ of the head of institution
Promotion
Removal from office
Transfer
Internal orders
External orders
The power to substitute a prosecutor in handling a specific case
Does the procuracy enjoy a monopoly to prosecute crimes?
Are decisions subject to judicial review?
Legality principle?

The following table summarizes the results for the index of formal independence.
7
Table 01: Formal independence indicator
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 Argentina .861 68 USA .316
2 Armenia .714 69 Australia .305
3 Latvia .699 70 France .299
4 Italy .695 71 Trinidad/ Tobago .281
5 Ecuador .692 72 Cote d'Ivoire .273
6 Romania .689 73 Malaysia .267
7 Spain .682 74 Israel .245
8 Venezuela .681 75 Kazakhstan .241
9 Belgium .679 76 Denmark .226
10 Estonia .670 77 Kenya .157
16 Brazil .598 78 Botswana .116
52 United Kingdom .418
Source: Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).

Argentina leads the ranking, with the highest level of independence. Brazil is not
among the top ten, but is far from being a country with less independence, staying at the
sixteenth position. However, it is emphasized that as the indicator consists of five sub-
indicators, countries may have different performance in each. In Argentina, the variation is
7
Only selected countries are displayed. Appendix A shows full list.
small: the values of the sub-indicators vary from .703 (subindicator 2) to 1 (subindicator 5).
The United States have a wider range: from 0 (subindicator 4 and 5) to .703 (subindicator 2).
The range in Brazil is also great. Its lowest value is .167 (subindicators 4 and 5) and its
highest value is 1 (subindicator 3). This indicates, for example, that in the sub-indicator that
measures the discretion (5), Brazil shows a little independence, whereas in subindicator of
formal independence (3), it assumes the highest value of independence. The figure below
shows the performance of these countries8.

Figure 03: Subindicator of Independence

Source: Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010)

An unexpected conclusion refers to Brazil’s low performance in the subindicator

which measures discretion. The literature on procuracy agencies indicates that prosecutors in
Brazil have high discretion. We believe that this disparity is due to the fact that the concern of
Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010) is with the penal function of the institution. However,
the functions of the Brazilian procuracy go beyond criminal issues and the institution also has
civilian functions. The highest degree of discretion of prosecutors in Brazil is relative to these
civilian functions. In the prosecution, the prosecutors have low discretion because of the
principle of legality, which requires the prosecutors to take the Judiciary in all cases which
there is enough evidence of guilt (Kerche 2003; McAllister 2008). A member of the public
procuracy cannot propose or implement alternative sentencing arrangements. Only the

8
To observe the performance of all countries included in the sample of Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010),
see Appendix B.
Judiciary can do that. Still, the prosecutors have discretion with regard to establishing that the
evidence is sufficient, since it can be decided by the closure of the case.

1.2. A new measure

McAllister (2008) identify two components to analyze the independence of the

Brazilian Prosecution Office:
The first component is the political independence of the Ministério Público as an
institution. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 provides for such independence
by largely removing the institution from the control of the three branches of
government. The second component of prosecutorial independence is the
functional independence of its prosecutors. This allows individual prosecutors to
pursue cases in the manner they deem appropriate, largely free of influence by
prosecutors that form leadership of the institution (McAllister 2008: 108-109).

Here, we examine whether these two components can be found when we include
other countries in the analysis. Based on data from Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010), we
run a principal component analysis to determine in what extent institutional variables could
be grouped in these two components. The figure below summarizes the variables included in
the model9:

Figure 04: Variables

Variable Description
V1 External orders
V2 Internal orders
V3 Power to substitute a prosecutor in handling a specific case
V4 Appointing organ of the head of institution
V5 Destituição do chefe do Ministério Público
V6 Transfer against their will to another position
V7 Transfer against their will to another location
Source: Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).

The table below shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. N varies because
there are missing cases. V1 has the highest mean (.569) while V2 has the lowest (.112). V1 has
the more homogeneous variation (.798), indicating a low variation of this variable across
countries

9
We could have included other variables in the analysis, but they did not meet the assumptions for it, we mean,
or they had very low communalities or contributed to more than one factor, violating the assumption of simple
structure (Hair et al 2005). For an introduction see Hair et al (2006). For an advanced application of factor
analysis and see Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).
 Table 02: Descriptive Statistics
Coefficient of
Variables N Mean Std. deviation
variation
V1 72 .569 .454 .798
V2 76 .112 .266 2.375
V3 72 .514 .503 .979
V4 78 .340 .341 1.003
V5 67 .474 .426 .899
V6 74 .351 .481 1.370
V7 66 .258 .441 1.709
Source: Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).

We employed a principal component analysis based on these variables in order to

reduce them into a few components (Kim and Mueller 1978).
On methodological grounds, the first step is to observe data suitability. For that, we
should analyze the sample size (N) and the sample adequacy. Regarding the sample size,
although the descriptive statistics table shows values around 70, for our PCA remains only 49
countries. That is because the missing cases should be removed from the sample10. Hair et al
(2006) indicate a minimum of 50 cases for the factor analysis techniques be performed. But it
is also important to note the ratio between the sample size and the number of variables
included in the analysis. There is no consensus on an optimal number. The minimum
threshold suggested by Hair et al (2006) is 5 cases to each variable. In this case, the sample
size is compatible with PCA, since we have seven cases for each variable (49÷7).
In what refers to sample adequacy, there are few tests available to analyze. The most
used is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test (KMO) and the
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (BTS). The results of these tests are presented below.

Table 03: KMO and Bartlett’s test

KMO .663
BTS Approx. Chi-Square 75.454
Df 21
Sig. .000

10
A methodological tool to handle missing cases is to substitute them for the mean. However, this procedure
reduces sample variance usually affecting communalities and it could lead to overestimation of correlations
coefficients. We are thankful to Dalson Britto for this warning.
 KMO suggests that the data is suitable for factor analysis (.663) since the value
obtained exceeds 0.5, the minimum level necessary suggested by Hair et al (2006). BTS is
statistically significant (p <.000), reinforcing the suitability of the sample.
After verifying the suitability of the data, the next step is to examine the
communalities of the observed variables. The table below summarizes the communalities
associated with each observed variable.

Table 04: Communalities

Variable Initial Extraction
V1 1 .480
V2 1 .583
V3 1 .406
V4 1 .507
V5 1 .624
V6 1 .712
V7 1 .693
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

Communality is “the total amount of variance an original variable shares with all
others variables included in the analysis” (Hair et al 2006: 102). The higher the value of
communality, greater the degree of association between variables and components extracted.
Technically, we should keep only the variables with communalities above .5. In our case,
only two variables do not hold this assumption: V1 (external orders) and V3 (power to
substitute a prosecutor in a case against his will). In a more conservative approach, the
researcher may exclude them from analysis. However, we choose to keep them because both
variables had communalities above .4, suggesting only a slight mismatch (Schwab 2007).
Furthermore, Schawb (2007) and Hair et al (2006) suggest that the researcher have to
consider not only statistical criteria, but also the substantive contribution of each variable.
Given the lack of empirical literature on the subject, there are no theoretical reasons to
dismiss these.
The next step is to determine the number of components to be extracted. The table
below summarizes these data.
 Table 05: Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

Component Total % of variance cumulative% Total % of variance cumulative%

1 2.640 37.720 37.720 2.640 37.720 37.720
2 1.365 19.504 57.224 1.365 19.504 57.224
3 .824 11.765 68.989
4 .774 11.056 80.045
5 .694 9.911 89.956
6 .435 6.218 96.174
7 .268 3.826 100
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis

Following the Kaiser’s criteria (eingenvalue rule) we should extract only components
with value superior to 1. Thus, it is observed that two components should be extracted. The
first carries 37.72% of total variance and the second 19.50%. Additionally, the researcher
should analyze the cumulative percentage of variance that is carried by the factors. Hair et al
(2006) suggest a minimum level of 60%. In our case, the value is 57.244 %, which is pretty
close.
Finally, the rotated matrix shows which variables load in each extracted component.
The table below summarizes this information.

Table 06: Rotated Component Matrixa

Component
1 2
V4 .003 .712
V5 .136 .778
V1 .092 .687
V6 .741 .403
V7 .810 .194
V2 .763 .035
V3 .631 -.082
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.11

11
We adopted Varimax rotation (orthogonal method) which assumes that extracted components are statistically
independent (zero correlation) since its interpretation is more straightforward. On substantive grounds,
however, the independence assumption is hard to meet. For this reason, we run another model using oblique
rotation which allows working with correlated components. We observed a .203 positive correlation between the
extracted components.
 The values indicate the factor loadings, i.e., the correlation between original
variables and the component (Hair et al 2006). The higher the absolute value of the load
factor, the more importance it has for that component. Each variable should only contribute to
one single component (simple structure matrix assumption). According to Hair et al (2006),
loadings between .3 and .4 are the minimum for considering a variable contributes to the
component. Loadings greater than .4 are important and just loads greater than 0.5 are
considered to have practical significance. Observe that only the variable V6 contribute to both
components, however, its factor loading in component 2 (.403) is only slightly above the
minimum allowed (.4), considered that it only contributes to the component 1.
Variables V6, V7, V2, and V3 are associated with component 1. The variables V4, V1,
and V5 are associated with component 2. The variables of component 1 are associated with
the independence of prosecutors while the variables of component 2 are associated with the
independence of the prosecutor as an institution, as suggested by McAllister (2008).
However, it would be naïve to believe that these components are independent. On theoretical
grounds, we believe that these two components mix and are mutually reinforcing12.
Finally, scores13 were generated for these components in order to identify how
countries behave in these two dimensions. The figure below illustrates the dispersion of
countries according to members’ independence (component 1) and institution’s independence
(component 2).

12
Another procedure in factor analysis is to evaluate the reliability of these components. One of the most
commonly used measures of reliability is the Cronbach's alpha (α). Values between .6 and .7 are the minimum
acceptable limits (Hair et al 2006). The first component (independence of the members) has four items and the
value of α is .675. The second component (independence of the institution) has three items and α was .465.
Although it is below the minimum, it is noteworthy that this measure is positively affected by the number of
items included, that is, the greater the number of items, the higher the α (Hair et al 2006). As the scale has only
three items and theoretically makes sense they would be together, we chose to accept this value.
13
We have developed a standard measure of independence (mean zero and standard deviation 1)
 14
Figure 03: Members’ Independence and Institution’s Independence

4 1

3 2

We can separate the countries into four groups: 1) in the upper right, countries that
are above average in both dimensions (Peru, Italy, USA, etc..); 2) at the bottom right,
countries that are below average in dimension of members’ independence and above average
in dimension of independence of the institution (Bulgaria, Colombia, Austria, etc..); 3) in the
bottom left, countries that are below average in both the institutional independence as the
members (France, Germany, Canada, etc..); and 4) in the upper left corner, above the average
country in the independence of members and the following members (Argentina, Belgium,
Netherlands, etc.). Brazil (in red) is in the fourth group, and it is the country with the greater
independence of the members.
A quantitative analysis is certainly very enlightening about the independence of
Public Prosecution Office and the effort of measurement that has endeavored to do can be a
breakthrough for research on the topic. However, it is evident that it cannot answer all the
important aspects of the independence of Public Prosecution Office. Thus, we believe that a
substantive analysis of these variables can contribute greatly for what we know about
prosecution office independence. The next section presents a detailed analysis of the
Brazilian Public Prosecution Office institutional design.

14
The list of countries and their abbreviations is at Appendix A.
2. Independence and the Brazilian Public Prosecution Office (Ministério Público)

Constitutional Location
The constitutional location of an institution is a factor that may influence their
degree of independence. Ministério Público is located in the chapter “The essential functions
to justice” of the title “The Organization of Powers”. That is, it is disconnected from the
chapters of the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary.
There is debate about which is the best placement of the Public Prosecution Office in
the Federal Constitution, if it is within the Legislative, because of overseeing the
implementation of laws, if it is within the Judiciary, if it is within the Executive branch, or if
it is as a fourth power (Mazzilli 1993, 2005). According to Kerche (2003), this is an
important variable, but it is not sufficient to understand the independence of Ministério
Público:
This placement only makes sense when we pay attention to the few
institutional instruments that politicians hold to reverse decisions of
Ministério Público. Just remember that the Constitution of 1946 took off the
Ministério Público of the Branches of State in its constitutional provision.
However, no one could say that this alone could make the organization an
independent agency of the Executive. To say only one aspect, the President
was responsible for the appointing and dismissing the attorney general based
solely on his will. In short, the new Ministério Público has become insulated
because it has institutional guarantees for that and not because his
constitutional placement (Kerche 2003: 34-35).

Similarly, Mazzilli (1993) says:

The independence is not a result of the placement of Ministério Público, or

of calling it an autonomous agency; it depends of the guarantees and
instruments of action given to the institution and its members (Mazzilli
1993: 57).

In this sense, if this placement had not been accompanied by guarantees and
instruments of action, Ministério Público hardly would enjoy the independence that it enjoys
today. For example, the Public Defender also is found in the separate chapter “the functions
essential to justice”, but it is far from having the same status of Ministério Público15.

15
For better understanding of Brazilian Public Defender, see Madeira (2011) in this volume.
External orders
Analyzing whether one institution is susceptible to interference from other agencies
or branches of the state is a central variable in assessing its degree of independence. The
higher the possibility of external influences, the less independence. The lower the possibility
of external influences, the higher independence Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).
The § 2 of article 127 of the Brazilian Constitution provides functional and
administrative autonomy to Ministério Público. The first refers to
The freedom that the Ministério Público has, as an institution, in the face of
other agencies or state institutions, to make their decisions without being
constrained to the instructions or decisions of other agencies or branches of
the state, being only subordinate to the Federal Constitution and the law
(Mazzilli 2005: 37).

Thus, formally, other branches of government cannot give instructions to Ministério

Público. The administrative autonomy is the “possibility of Ministério Público, under the
law, to perform the acts themselves on administrative management of the institution”
(Mazzilli 2005: 42). Hence, there is no external interference over Ministério Público
administrative procedures/actions.
Although not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the financial autonomy was
also granted, i.e., the Ministério Público has the ability to prepare its budget proposal within
the limits established by the Budget Guidelines Law (Constitution, Article 127, § 3).
Financial autonomy also provides the ability to manage and apply budgetary resources for the
institution and manage the use of budget allocations.
In short, it is clear that, formally, the Ministério Público do not follow instructions
or guidelines from other agencies or branches of government, which increases its degree of
independence.

Term length, renewability, and appointing organ

Three variables are crucial in the analysis of the independence of an institution: the
term length, if it is renewable, and the appointing organ (Kerche 2003; Aaken, Feld, and,
Voigt 2008). For Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008),

Life tenure and appointment by others than politicians guarantees the

greatest personal independence, while appointment by politicians for a
renewable term generates the lowest independence, as it can be expected to
motivate prosecutors to cater to the interests of the organ that has the power
 to re-elect them. Appointment for a non-renewable fixed term generates
more personal independence than appointment for a renewable term (Aaken,
Feld, and Voigt 2008: 07-08).

The figure below illustrates the typology proposed by Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008,
2010). The positive sign indicates greater independence and the negative sign, less
independence.

Figure 04: Term length, renewability, and appointing organ

Source: Based on Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).

In Brazil, there are the Ministério Público da União, which is related to federal
issues, and the Ministérios Públicos dos Estados (each province/state has one).
In the case of Ministério Público da União, the General Attorney has fixed term of
two years and he/she is appointed by the president, among career members over thirty-five
years old, after having the name approved by the majority of the Senate (by secret ballot), and
after public hearing. The General Attorney may be reappointed to the post (Constitution,
Article 128, § 1, Article 52, III, e). Thus, following Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010)
criteria we should conclude that the Ministério Público da União has a low independence
since the term has a fixed time (not lifelong), is renewable, and the indication is given by the
Executive’ Chief (politicians).
According to Mazzilli (2007),
an institution almost entirely unrelated to any direct popular legitimacy or
representative regarding the choice of their representatives or heads, the
Ministério Público does not cease to receive an indirect form of
representative legitimacy when the head of the executive branch, necessarily
elected by the popular will, chooses the General Attorney. However, despite
this advantage, there are serious risks and disadvantages with this solution,
allowing a politician to choose the one that, in theory, will have the power to
oversee the acts of this same politician (Mazzilli 2007: 167).
 One danger is the president selects a name in tune with their interests. As a result,
the General Attorney would create an institutional policy in accordance with the wishes of the
president, and he/she would not have the incentive to sue the president. Furthermore, the
mandate is renewable. Another point is the participation of Senate in the appointing process,
so the Attorney General may be motivated to take into account the interests of the Senate.
However, two considerations must be made, both for comparison with the
Ministério Público before the 1988 Constitution. The first refers to the fact that the president
must choose a name among the members of the institution, which represents a small step
towards greater independence. Before, the president could choose the name of “notorious
legal knowledge”, even if the person was outside of the Ministério Público (Mazzilli 2007).
The second consideration is related to the existence of a term. Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008,
2010) do not consider in their typology the possibility that existed in Brazil before 1988: the
lack of term. The General Attorney could be dismissed at any time by the president. That is,
with respect to these variables, before the Constitution of 1988, the Ministério Público was
less independent.
The case of Ministério Público dos Estados is a little different. The General
Attorneys of Justice are appointed by the governor from triple list formed by its members.
He/she has a fixed term and can be reappointed (Constitution, Article 128, § 3). But, unlike
the General Attorney, who has no limit to the number of renewals, the General Attorneys of
Justice can only be renewed once (Constitution, Article 128, § 1, § 3). Although the
appointment has political participation, indicating a low independence, at least there is a
direct participation of the members of the institution in the formation of the triple list.
Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010) typology is not exhaustive and does not apply
directly to Brazil. They do not foresee the lack of a term (situation prior to 1988), and in
relation to renewability, they only provide two situations: the possibility of renewal or not.
The possibility of reappointment to the position only once (as is the case with the Attorneys
General of Justice), which would be between these two, is not considered by the authors. In
addition, the appointing process considered only by politicians and no-politicians, what does
not cover the setup created for Ministério Público Estadual, which has the participation of
members and politicians.
The chart below summarizes these variables for Brazilian’s case:
 Figure 05: Term length, renewability, and appointing organ in Brazil
Term Renewability Appointing organ
Ministério Público da
União (MPU) – Fixed Renewable Politicians
federal level
Ministérios Públicos Politicians
dos Estados (MPE) – Fixed Partially renewable +
province/state level Members

Adapting the typology of Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010) to Brazil, we
observe that the Ministerio Público dos Estados are more independent than the Ministério
Público da União. The first combines a partially renewable term (can only be renewed once)
with an appointment process made by politicians (chief of executive), with the participation
of no-politicians (members of the institution), which ensures greater independence. The
second represents the smallest category of independence proposed by Aaken, Feld, and Voigt
(2008, 2010): chief appointed by politicians for a fixed term and renewable.

Removal from office of the head of Public Prosecution Office

Another important variable related to the level of independence of Ministério
Público is how the head of the institution can be removed.
According to Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010), if the dismissal is monopolized
by politicians, the independence is lower. This is because the incentive to surrender to
political pressure will be higher, since the president, for example, can make threats whose
punishment would be the removal from office. The monopoly held by the Executive
generates less independence than if the monopoly is of the Legislature. If the dismissal
requires the participation of two branches, the independence is higher than with the
participation of only one of them. The highest level of independence is achieved if the
dismissal is only possible by judicial process. The figure below illustrates this point:

Figure 06: Removal from office

Source: based on Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010).

 In the case of Ministério Público da União, the removal of the General Attorney
happens with the initiative of the President, and must be preceded by approval of an absolute
majority of the Senate (Constitution, Article 128). The Senate cannot dismiss the Attorney
General, it merely allows the president dismisses16.
In this case neither the president nor the Senate has to justify their decision. But
there is not an arrangement similar to the one previous of the 1988 Constitution, in which the
president could dismiss the Attorney General in the same way that he could exonerate a
minister, for example. With the inclusion of Senate in the procedure for removal, a control
system of the Ministério Público was created, and now the Attorney General cannot be
dismissed by the simple desire of the President (Mazzilli 2007).
The dismissal of the General Attorneys of Justice is made by absolute majority of
the Legislature in the form of its complementary law (Constitution, Article 128, §, 4). In this
case, the interference of the executive is not required, and the removal is monopoly of the
Legislature. The chief of Executive may represent the Legislature a request for dismissal, but
the final decision is by the Legislature.

Monopoly in Prosecution?
According to Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008)
Such a monopoly, even when politicians cannot formally instruct or interfere
with the prosecutor’s decision, provides incentives for politicians who are at
risk of being prosecuted to influence the procuracy by, for example,
intervening in their appointment process or offering bribes. If other actors
can also initiate a trial, it will be more difficult to prevent being prosecuted
through such means (Aaken, Feld, and Voigt 2008: 09).

They argue that if there is a monopoly to start the process, the incentive for
politicians to intervene is higher, so the independence is smaller. The monopoly can increase
the incentive for politicians to offer a bribe, for example. However, for the existence of the
monopoly necessarily entail less independence, it is essential that it increases also the
incentive for public prosecutors to accept the bribe. There is no guarantee that public

16
The removal is different from impeachment (Mazzilli 2007). The Attorney General might lose their position
in case of being tried and convicted of a responsibility crime. In this case, the trial rests exclusively upon the
Senate (Constitution, Article 52, II).
prosecutors will be influenced. Thus, the causal mechanism between monopoly and
independence is fragile.
In Brazil, the Ministério Públuco can initiate criminal and civil trials. Regarding
criminal law, Ministério Público promotes the public prosecution (ação penal pública), with
exclusivity, according to the law (Constitution, Article 129, I). Ministério Público has the
monopoly on public prosecution because if it finds that there was no crime, there is no trial.
By requiring the filing of the police investigation, the prosecutor gives the last word,
because if the judge does not grant the filing, he may refer the case to the
Attorney General, but the file will be inescapable if the object of the
insistence of the Attorney General. [...] The truth is that the prosecutor
determines the filing, the Judiciary cannot refuse it, nor determine steps
(Mazzilli 2007: 299).

Mazzilli (2007) also points out that this procedure is unsatisfactory with regard to
controlling the activity of Ministério Público. This is because the power of final decision lies
in the hands of the General Attorney. This, in turn, is still subject to political influence, given
his way of appointing and dismissing the charge.
Because this decision is in the hands of the General Attorney and this may be subject
to external pressures, we find here a lower level of independence. However, this does not
happen because of the monopoly to initiate a prosecution (as proposed by Aaken, Feld, and
Voigt (2008), but for the monopoly to file a police investigation. That is, holding constant the
fact that Brazilian prosecutors have a monopoly on prosecution, but assigning a collegial
ministerial body (as the case of civil action) the final decision on the closing, the Ministério
Público may become more independent and less susceptible to external pressures. This is
because a collective body is less subject to political influence than a single person, the
Attorney General.
In the civil area, Ministério Público has the function of initiating civil investigation
and public civil action to protect public and social, environmental and other diffuse and
collective interests (Constitution, Art. 129, III).
Ministério Público does not have monopoly on the use of public civil action. Union,
states, municipalities, public companies, foundations and joint stock companies also have
standing to promote civil action. However, studies claim that the Brazilian Public Prosecution
Office is the principal author of the public civil actions (Sadek 2009; Casagrande 2008).
 As the police inquiry, the filing of the civil inquiry is promoted by the Ministério
Público. But there is more control, once the responsible prosecutor makes a report justifying
the decision of filing, which in turn will be examined by the collegiate body.
Moreover, even if the final decision is the filing, other legitimate institutions can
judge the action (Mazzilli 2007). That is, the division of ownership ensures greater control of
the action of the Ministério Público, because if it files a lawsuit by political pressures,
another institution can still initiate the civil action. However, the absence of monopoly does
not increase the independence of the Ministério Público, it remains susceptible to external
pressures. The division of ownership increases the probability that the process as a whole
does not suffer from external pressures.
So far we analyzed the variables related to the institution. From now, we will
analyze the variables that relate to prosecutors (members).

Internal Orders
If members of an institution must follow orders from the head of the institution,
their independence is lower than if they are only subject to the Constitution and the law. In
the Brazilian Public Prosecution Office there is the principle of functional independence
(Constitution, Art. 127, § 1º), which “means that each member and each agency of Ministério
Público have independence to exercise their functions regardless other members and organs
from the same institution” (Mazzilli 2005: 37). Thus, the existing hierarchy in the prosecution
service is administrative rather than functional (Mazzilli 1993). That is, members of
Ministério Público do not have to follow an institutional line adopted by the chief, which
increases their independence. The prosecutors cannot be ordered such as: propose action, or
fails to file an action, or recourse or support of this thesis, not that.
We must distinguish functional independence from functional autonomy.
According to Mazzilli (2007):
Functional autonomy is of the institution of Ministério Público (the freedom
the institution has to exercise it craft regardless other organs of state); the
functional independence is an attribute of the agencies and prosecutors (the
freedom that each one has to exercise their functions regardless other organs
or agents of the same institution) (Mazzilli 2007: 202).

In fact, functional independence complements the functional autonomy. It decreases

the possibility of external influences once that even if the chief of Minsitério Público has
converged interests with the president or governor, the prosecutors do not have to follow that
line. That is, even if there is not de facto functional autonomy (i.e., the chief of Ministério
Público is informally subject to external orders), functional independence ensures a greater
degree of freedom, as their members are not obliged to follow orders from their chief.
Thus, regarding to the possibility of receiving internal orders, the prosecutors have a
high degree of independence.

Removal from office of low-levels prosecutors

The existence of criteria to remove a member of the Public Prosecution Office
increases its independence. This is because the dismissal cannot be used as a way to punish
members who do not follow a particular statement of the executive or the head of the
institution himself.
The 1988 Constitution provides the guarantee of tenure to the members of
Ministério Público, which means that after two years in office they only loses his job for a
final court ruling (Constitution, Art. 128, § 5º, I, a). The idea is to give specific guarantees to
those officials who have a duty to investigate and prosecute high officials. Thus, how they
cannot be dismissed, except by of judicial process, they enjoy greater security in the exercise
of their functions, being less susceptible to pressure.
In this sense, regarding how to fire the prosecutors, Ministério Público enjoys a
high independence.

Promotion
If there are rules for the prosecutors be promoted, greater their independence.
Besides, “self-governing bodies of the procuracy, which can decide on promotions are
supposed to lead to the highest degree of independence” (Aaken, Feld, and Voigt 2008: 8).
In the case of Ministério Público da União, the Superior Council organizes and
approves the criteria for merit promotion. In Ministério Público dos Estados, the Organic
Law regulates the system of promotion of prosecutors (Law 8.625/1993, Art. 61), which
reveals a high level of independence.
Tranfers against their will
According to Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010), the possibility of transfer against
the wishes of prosecutors can be a device to external pressures. If the principle of not
transferring against their will is not respected, a prosecutor may suffer retaliation if he/she
does not follow a particular order.
In the case of Brazilian Public Prosecution Office, there is the principle of
irremovability, which refers to:
impossibility of forcibly removing the holder of his office, except by reason
of public interest, by decision of the college authority, ensuring ample
defense. The goal is always the preservation of the functions of office, not
only keeping the prosecutor in the county, but delete them functions
(Mazzilli 2007: 206).

That is, irremovability refers to protection of the office and their functions. This is
important because the chief of Ministério Público could maintain a prosecutor in a particular
locality, but draw their functions.
Therefore, prosecutors cannot be forcibly transferred of their positions or their
functions, which, according to Aaken, Feld, and Voigt (2008, 2010), indicates a high level of
independence.
There is one exception, the compulsory removal, which moves in the position of
prosecution, removing he/she from all duties of the previous position. It occurs only for
reasons of public interest, by decision of the appropriate Collegiate Body, ensured ample
defense (Constitution, Article 128, § 5, I, b). Although the Constitution provides this
exception, the compulsory removal can only be made after a process in which the prosecutor
is entitled to defend itself and there is control of the legality of the process by the judiciary. In
addition, the compulsory removal can only happen if it involves public interest. That is, the
possibility of a prosecutor be removed by external pressure decreases.
Thus, even with this exception, in respect to the variable treated here, the Brazilian
prosecutors have a high degree of independence.

Are incoming cases allocated to specific prosecutor by a general rule?

The existence of rules for distribution of cases increases the independence of
prosecutors because it reduces the possibility of influence of other powers or of the head of
the institution since the cases cannot be allocated according to the interest of the President or
the Attorney General, for example.
 In the case of the Brazilian Public Prosecution Office, these rules exist. The cases
are distributed to prosecutors from previous criteria, established in law or acts of the College
of Prosecutors.
Hence, with respect to the distribution of cases to prosecutors, the prosecutors have a
high level of independence.

Power to substitute a prosecutor in handling a specific case

Just as the existence of rules for the allocation of cases increases the independence
of prosecutors, the existence of rules to the reallocation of these cases also increases
independence. If a case can be reallocated to another prosecutor, against the wishes of the
current charge, the lower is the independence of the institution. In this case, the prosecutor is
more susceptible to external pressures: the case is going to a path that dissatisfies the chief of
the executive or the General Attorney, the case is reassigned to another member.
In Brazilian Public Prosecution Office the substitution is only possible to suit the
public interest. The substitution can be temporary or permanent. In both cases, there is
control of the act.
It is clear the high degree of independence of prosecutors in Brazil. They are
protected from the influences of various forms, whether by the way how it is gave their
promotion, removal and, especially, its functional independence.

4. Conclusion
This study aimed to discuss some relevant aspects of the new institutional design of
Brazilian Public Prosecution Office. The main objective was to identify which factors are
likely to explain on the independence of Ministério Público.
We reviewed the literature looking for the variables that matter to understand
independence. We run a model of principal component analysis to estimate an indicator of
independence. The results suggested that independence has two dimensions: one of members
and one of institution. In Brazilian case, members’ independence is higher than the
institutional one.
In addition, we conducted a deep case study of Brazilian Public Prosecution Office
institutional design. On one hand, the prosecutors are protected from the influences of various
forms, whether by the way it gave their promotion, removal and, especially, its functional
independence. On the other hand, the Ministério Público as an institution, although it has
functional autonomy and is constitutionally released from the others powers of the state, other
variables such as the appointing process and removal of the Attorney General, influence
negatively their independence.
Finally, we emphasize that there is a range of problems that the research agenda on
the public prosecutor can address. The institution is increasingly emerging as an important
political actor in the process of decision making and its influence grows as an organ of the
Justice System. A limitation of this paper is our narrow focus on formal features, since
informal practices play a role to understand how institutions work. However, systematic
understanding of the formal institutional design of the Public Prosecution Office is a key step
for the advancement of research on this theme.

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 APPENDIX

APPENDIX A – Formal independence indicator (de jure)

Rank País Valor Rank País Valor Rank País Valor

1 Argentina .861 27 New Zealand .517 53 China .412
2 Armenia .714 28 Georgia .516 54 Malawi .403
Czech
3 Latvia .699 29 .503 55 Benin .399
Republic
4 Italy .695 30 Bolivia .500 56 Sri Lanka .386
5 Ecuador .692 31 Croatia .495 57 Netherlands .377
6 Romania .689 32 Namibia .477 58 Canada .374
7 Spain .682 33 Cambodia .475 59 Jamaica .367
8 Venezuela .681 34 Bangladesh .465 60 South Africa .364
9 Belgium .679 35 Finland .462 61 Switzerland .357
10 Estonia .670 36 Mauritius .461 62 Japan .357
11 Kyrgyz Republic .629 37 Honduras .458 63 Zambia .350
12 Colombia .627 38 Peru .457 64 Germany .345
13 Guatemala .623 39 Egypt .455 65 Slovakia .342
14 Ukraine .609 40 Nicaragua .453 66 Vietnam .328
15 Paraguay .608 41 Russia .453 67 Cameroon .317
16 Brazil .598 42 Costa Rica .452 68 United States .316
17 Poland .596 43 Lithuania .447 69 Australia .305
18 Austria .584 44 México .442 70 France .299
Trinidad e
19 India .581 45 Turkey .438 71 .281
Tobago
20 Bulgaria .555 46 North Korea .435 72 Cote d’Ivoire .273
21 Morocco .548 47 Hungary .434 73 Malaysia .267
22 Greece .547 48 Norway .433 74 Israel .245
23 Philippines .544 49 Nigeria .427 75 Kazakhstan .241
24 El Salvador .542 50 Sweden .426 76 Denmark .226
25 Panama .540 51 Lebanon .418 77 Kenya .157
United
26 Slovenia .526 52 .418 78 Botswana .116
Kingdom
APPENDIX B – Subindicator of formal independence indicator (de jure)

Subindicator 1 – General institutional traits

País Valor País Valor País Valor

Argentina .875 Venezuela .750 Germany .375
Armenia .875 Austria .625 Australia .375
Brazil .875 Bangladesh .625 Benin .375
Ecuador .875 Bulgaria .625 Canada .375
Spain .875 Cambodia .625 Cote d’Ivoire .375
Philippines .875 China .625 Slovakia .375
Greece .875 United States .625 France .375
Paraguay .875 Estonia .625 Mauritius .375
Kyrgyz Republic .875 Finland .625 Nicaragua .375
Czech Republic .875 Guatemala .625 Netherlands .375
Turkey .875 Italy .625 Switzerland .375
Egypt .833 Japan .625 Botswana .250
South Africa .750 Latvia .625 Kazakhstan .250
Belgium .750 New Zealand .625 Lithuania .250
Bolivia .750 Peru .625 Malawi .250
Colombia .750 Vietnam .625 Kenya .250
North Korea .750 Cameroon .500 United Kingdom .250
Croatia .750 Denmark .500 Russia .250
El Salvador .750 Georgia .500 Sri Lanka .250
Trinidad e
Hungary .750 Honduras .500 .250
Tobago
Lebanon .750 Nigeria .500 Zambia .250
Morocco .750 Panama .500 Costa Rica .125
Norway .750 Sweden .500 India .125
Poland .750 Ukraine .500 Israel .125
Subindicator 2 – Personal independence of prosecutors

País Valor País Valor País Valor

Italy 1.000 Israel .667 El Salvador .416
Finland .962 Malawi .666 Guatemala .416
Romania .962 New Zealand .625 Denmark .407
United Kingdom .875 Egypt .610 Poland .400
Trinidad e
Namibia .851 .603 Benin .389
Tobago
Austria .843 North Korea .592 Cote d’Ivoire .389
Belgium .833 Nicaragua .592 France .389
Morocco .833 Lithuania .592 Bangladesh .375
Russia .833 Turkey .583 Panama .374
India .830 Czech Republic .573 Nigeria .351
Armenia .813 Kazakhstan .537 Cameroon .333
Sri Lanka .796 Japan .536 México .309
Greece .778 Cambodia .523 Ukraine .296
Sweden .778 South Africa .518 Kyrgyz Republic .291
Mauritius .778 Hungary .518 Ecuador .261
Estonia .760 Australia .518 Jamaica .250
Brazil .750 Slovakia .517 Paraguay .240
Venezuela .722 Colombia .508 Switzerland .219
Latvia .713 Philippines .500 Canada .194
Netherlands .712 Honduras .500 Vietnam .188
Argentina .703 Germany .500 Kenya .167
United States .703 Costa Rica .500 Georgia .129
Norway .688 Bolivia .481 China .073
Bulgaria .684 Slovenia .481 Lebanon .056
Zambia .684 Croatia .458 Botswana .000
Peru .667 Spain .444 Malaysia .000
Subindicator 3 – Formal independence from government

País Valor País Valor País Valor

Brazil 1.000 Russia .500 Malaysia .333
Latvia .875 Greece .500 Austria .250
Argentina .875 Sweden .500 Sri Lanka .250
Armenia .833 Malawi .500 Netherlands .250
Venezuela .833 New Zealand .500 United States .250
Mauritius .750 Egypt .500 Bulgaria .250
Trinidad e
Estonia .750 North Korea .500 .250
Tobago
Czech Republic .750 South Africa .500 Turkey .250
Slovenia .750 Hungary .500 Kazakhstan .250
Croatia .750 Slovakia .500 Costa Rica .250
Kyrgyz Republic .750 Philippines .500 Cote d’Ivoire .250
Georgia .750 Honduras .500 Cameroon .250
India .667 El Salvador .500 México .250
Bolivia .667 Poland .500 Canada .250
Norway .625 Nigeria .500 China .250
Peru .625 Ukraine .500 Australia .167
Colombia .625 Jamaica .500 Japan .125
Spain .625 Vietnam .500 Cambodia .125
Guatemala .625 Lebanon .500 Denmark .125
Ecuador .625 Finland .375 Switzerland .125
Paraguay .625 Morocco .375 Zambia .000
Italy .500 Lithuania .375 Nicaragua .000
Romania .500 Bangladesh .375 Germany .000
United Kingdom .500 Panama .375 France .000
Namibia .500 Israel .333 Kenya .000
Belgium .500 Benin .333 Botswana .000
Subindicator 4 – Monopoly in initiating prosecutions

País Valor País Valor País Valor

Argentina 1.000 Latvia .583 Egypt .333
Ukraine 1.000 Spain .567 North Korea .333
Austria 1.000 Slovenia .533 Honduras .333
Canada 1.000 Russia .533 Turkey .333
New Zealand .833 Venezuela .500 Botswana .330
Costa Rica .833 Colombia .500 Philippines .300
Trinidad e
Ecuador .800 Italy .500 .300
Tobago
Romania .800 El Salvador .500 Cameroon .300
Poland .733 Benin .500 Jamaica .250
France .733 Netherlands .500 Sweden .200
Guatemala .700 Japan .500 Hungary .200
Paraguay .700 Cambodia .500 Finland .200
Panama .700 Lithuania .467 Cote d’Ivoire .200
China .700 Australia .467 Brazil .167
Nicaragua .700 Zambia .467 Czech Republic .167
Germany .700 United Kingdom .465 Peru .167
Estonia .667 India .433 Slovakia .167
Belgium .633 Greece .433 Kazakhstan .167
Lebanon .633 Nigeria .433 Norway .100
Morocco .633 Mauritius .400 Israel .100
Sri Lanka .633 Croatia .367 Denmark .100
México .633 Namibia .367 Bolivia .000
Kyrgyz Republic .600 Bulgaria .367 South Africa .000
Georgia .600 Switzerland .367 Vietnam .000
Malawi .600 Kenya .367 Malaysia .000
Bangladesh .600 Armenia .333 United States .000
Subindicator 5 – Degree of discretion

País Valor País Valor País Valor

Ecuador .900 Bangladesh .350 South Africa .050
Spain .900 Nigeria .350 New Zealand .000
Argentina .850 Austria .200 France .000
Romania .850 Slovenia .200 Sri Lanka .000
Italy .850 Cameroon .200 Malawi .000
India .850 Hungary .200 Japan .000
Bulgaria .850 Brazil .200 Australia .000
Ukraine .750 Peru .200 United Kingdom .000
Guatemala .750 Germany .150 Mauritius .000
Panama .750 Lebanon .150 Namibia .000
Colombia .750 Morocco .150 Kenya .000
Switzerland .700 Russia .150 Egypt .000
Paraguay .600 Greece .150 North Korea .000
Nicaragua .600 Croatia .150 Botswana .000
Trinidad e
Georgia .600 Turkey .150 .000
Tobago
Venezuela .600 Sweden .150 Jamaica .000
Cambodia .600 Finland .150 Kazakhstan .000
Bolivia .600 Cote d’Ivoire .150 Norway .000
Costa Rica .550 Czech Republic .150 Israel .000
Estonia .550 Slovakia .150 Denmark .000
Lithuania .550 Canada .050 Malaysia .000
México .350 Netherlands .050 United States .000
APPENDIX C – Countries abbreviation

País Abreviação País Abreviação País Abreviação

South Africa ZAF Slovenia SVN Nigeria NGA
Germany DEU Spain ESP Norway NOR
Argentina ARG United States USA New Zealand NLZ
Austria AUT Estonia EST Netherlands NLD
Belgium BEL Finland FIN Paraguay PRY
Brazil BRA France FRA Peru PER
Bulgaria BGR Georgia GEO Kenya KEN
Czech
Cameroon CMR Greece GRC CZE
Republic
Canada CAN Hungary HUN Romania ROM
Kazakhstan KAZ Mauritius MUS Russia RUS
Colombia COL Italy ITA Sri Lanka LKA
North Korea PRK Latvia LVA Sweden SWE
Cote d’Ivoire CIV Lebanon LBN Switzerland CHE
Trinidad e
Costa Rica CRI Lithuania LTU TTO
Tobago
Croatia HRV Malawi MWI Turkey TUR
Denmark DNK Namibia NAM Ukraine UKR
Slovakia SVK