Secrtariat du GRECO

Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 (0)3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 (0)3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING




Strasbourg, 26 March 2010 Greco (2010) 9E












RULES OF PROCEDURE












Adopted by GRECO at its 1
st
plenary meeting
(Strasbourg, 4-6 October 1999)


Amended by GRECO at its 4
th
, 7
th
, 12
th
, 13
th
, 14
th
, 22
nd
and 46
th
plenary meetings
(Strasbourg, 12-15 December 2000, 17-20 December 2001,
9-13 December 2002, 24-28 March 2003, 7-11 July 2003,
14-18 March 2005, 22-26 March 2010)













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The Group of States against Corruption (hereinafter referred to as GRECO),

Having regard to Resolution (98) 7 and (99) 5 authorising and adopting
respectively the partial and enlarged Agreement establishing the Group of States
against Corruption GRECO,

Having regard to the Statute of GRECO,

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 8 of the Statute of GRECO,

Adopts the following Rules of Procedure:



TITLE I
ORGANISATION OF GRECO



Chapter I
Members of GRECO


Rule 1
Membership of GRECO

1. Membership in GRECO shall take effect on the day following receipt by the
Secretary General of the notification made in pursuance of Article 4, paragraphs 1,
2 and 4 of the Statute of GRECO.

2. Membership in GRECO resulting from ratification of the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) or the Civil Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 174), will take effect on the day of the entry into force of either of these
Conventions in respect of the State concerned, in pursuance of Article 4, paragraph
3 of the Statute of GRECO.


Rule 2
Participation of the European Community

1. The European Community may become a member of GRECO in accordance
with the following procedures:

a) upon invitation by the Committee of Ministers to participate in
GRECO, in accordance with Article 5 of the Statute;
b) if it becomes a Party to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 173), upon invitation by the Committee of Ministers, in
accordance with Article 33 of this Convention;
c) if it becomes a Party to the Civil Law Convention on corruption (ETS
174), in accordance with Article 15 of this Convention.


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2. The invitation to the European Community to accede to the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) in accordance with Article 33 of this
Convention shall settle the modalities of participation referred to in Article 5 of the
Statute of GRECO. Such an invitation shall also be regarded as an invitation to
become a member of GRECO in accordance with Article 5 of its Statute.

3. The modalities of participation in GRECO of the European Community shall
be regulated by an agreement between the Committee of Ministers and the
European Community on the basis of a proposal made by GRECO and endorsed by
the Statutory Committee. In the light of the proposal of the Statutory Committee,
the Committee of Ministers shall issue the invitation, under paragraph 1, sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Rule.


Rule 3
Composition of GRECO

1. Each member shall appoint its delegation under Article 6 of the Statute of
GRECO within a period of two months after the entry into force of the present
Rules. Any new member of GRECO shall appoint its delegation under Article 6 of
the Statute of GRECO within a period of two months following its notification for
membership in GRECO.

2. When appointing the delegation under paragraph 1 above, the member shall
inform the Secretariat of the name, address and working language/s of the
designated representatives and specify the person who shall act as the Head of
delegation. Delegations shall be appointed on a permanent basis. However,
members are entitled to designate one substitute per representative.

3. Members shall promptly notify the Executive Secretary of any change in the
composition of its delegation.


Rule 4
Other representatives not having the right to vote

Representatives appointed under Article 7 of the Statute of GRECO, shall be
entitled, with the Presidents permission, to make oral or written statements on the
subjects under discussion.



Chapter II
Presidency of GRECO


Rule 5
Election of the President and Vice-President

1. GRECO shall elect its President and Vice-President from among the
representatives designated by the members entitled to vote. The member having
appointed the representative who is elected President shall be entitled to appoint
an additional representative as part of its delegation to GRECO.

2. Subject to paragraph 3, the President and Vice-President shall be elected for
two years. They may be re-elected once.


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3. If the terms of office of the President or the Vice-President expire during an
evaluation round, these shall be extended until the end of that round. However, the
terms of office of the President or the Vice-President shall end if he or she ceases
to be a representative in GRECO.

4. If the President ceases to be a representative in GRECO or resigns his or her
office of President before its expiry, the Vice-President shall immediately and
automatically become President for the remainder of the term of that office. The
Bureau shall designate a new Vice-President from among the representatives
sitting on it for the remainder of the term of that office. The non-elected candidate
having obtained the highest number of votes at the last election shall fill the
resulting vacant seat in the Bureau.

5. Any member may submit candidatures for the offices of President and Vice-
President of GRECO. Candidatures may be submitted either in writing to the
Executive Secretary before the meeting during which the election is due to take
place or orally during that meeting, at least 48 hours in advance of the election.

6. The elections referred to in this Rule shall be held at the meeting
immediately preceding the beginning of each evaluation round. Elections shall be
held by secret ballot and by a majority of the votes cast.

7. If no candidate is elected after the first ballot, a second ballot shall take
place between the two candidates who have received most votes; in the case of
equal number of votes, the candidate having precedence according to the length of
time he or she has been in office in GRECO, will be elected. Candidates having the
same length of time in office in GRECO shall take precedence according to their
age. Re-elected candidates shall take precedence having regard to the duration of
their previous term of office.


Rule 6
Functions of the President and of the Vice-President

1. The President shall preside over the plenary meetings of GRECO and
meetings of the Bureau. He or she shall direct the work of GRECO and perform all
functions conferred upon him or her by the Statute, by the Rules of procedure and
by GRECO.

2. When performing his or her functions, the President shall remain under the
authority of GRECO and shall be exclusively guided by the interest of GRECO.

3. The President may delegate certain of his or her functions to the Vice-
President, one or more of the members of the Bureau or to the Executive
Secretary.

4. The President shall fix the dates of the meetings of GRECO in consultation
with the Bureau and the Executive Secretary.

5. The President shall represent GRECO before the Statutory Committee, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and any other Council of Europe
body.

6. The Vice-President shall take the place of the President if the latter is unable
to carry out his or her duties.


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Rule 7
Replacement of the President and the Vice-President

If the President and Vice-President are at the same time unable to carry out their
duties or if their offices are at the same time vacant, the duties of the President
shall be carried out by another representative sitting on the Bureau according to
the order of precedence laid down in Rule 5 (7). The non-elected candidates having
obtained the highest number of votes at the last election shall fill the resulting vacant
seats in the Bureau.


Rule 8
Limitation on the exercise of the functions of President

The President, Vice-President or any other representative carrying out the duty of
the President, shall be replaced in the Chair during the discussion and adoption of
the evaluation report concerning the member, who appointed them to sit on
GRECO.



Chapter III
Bureau


Rule 9
Composition and functioning of the Bureau

1. The Bureau shall be composed of the President, the Vice-President and up to
five representatives to be determined in proportion to the number of members of
GRECO.

2. Rule 5, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5, shall apply, mutatis mutandis to the
election and submission of candidatures to seats in the Bureau. However, non-
elected candidates to the offices of President or Vice-President will be deemed to
have also submitted their candidature to vacant seats in the Bureau.

3. Rule 5, paragraphs 6 and 7, shall also apply to the election of vacant seats
in the Bureau. However, in the first ballot, candidates having obtained the majority
of the votes cast will be elected. In the second ballot, the remaining vacant seats
will be filled by candidates following the decreasing order of the number of votes
received respectively.

4. The Bureau shall function according to and be entrusted with the tasks
enumerated in Article 9 of the Statute of GRECO.

5. Meetings of the Bureau shall be convened at regular intervals by the
Executive Secretary upon instruction of the President or whenever the Executive
Secretary considers it necessary for the proper functioning of GRECO.



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Chapter IV
Secretariat of GRECO


Rule 10
Composition of the Secretariat

1. The Secretariat shall be composed in conformity with Article 19 of the
Statute of GRECO.

2. The Executive Secretary shall be appointed by the Secretary General and be
an official of the Directorate General I - Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe. The
Executive Secretary shall carry out the duties described in the Statute of GRECO
and in the present Rules of Procedure.

3. The Executive Secretary shall be assisted by sufficient staff to ensure the
proper and effective functioning of GRECO. The staff shall be appointed by the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe and be attached to the Directorate
General I - Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe.



Chapter V
Other administrative arrangements


Rule 11
Convocation

1. Meetings of GRECO shall be convened by the Executive Secretary upon
instruction of the President, by letter addressed to the Heads of delegation and to
the other representatives referred to in Article 7 of the Statute of GRECO.

2. A copy of the letter of convocation shall be sent to the substitutes, as well
as to each members representative in the Statutory Committee.


Rule 12
Agenda

The agenda shall be adopted at the beginning of each meeting on the basis of a
draft prepared by the Executive Secretary and appended to the letters of
convocation.


Rule 13
Documents

The Secretariat shall be responsible for the preparation and circulation of all the
documents intended to be considered by GRECO. The documents must, as a
general rule, be forwarded to the Heads of delegation and to the other
representatives referred to in Article 7 of the Statute of GRECO, at least two weeks
before the opening of the meeting.


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Rule 14
Languages

1. The working languages of GRECO shall be English and French.

2. Any document to be considered by GRECO submitted in a language other
than one of the working languages shall be addressed to the Secretariat together
with a translation into one of the working languages.

3. Replies to the evaluation questionnaire and any supporting documents shall
be submitted to the Executive Secretary in one of the working languages agreed
between the Secretariat and the country undergoing the evaluation.

4. Whenever a country visit is to be conducted, the working language of the
evaluation shall be agreed upon between the Secretariat and the country
undergoing the evaluation. The ensuing evaluation report will be prepared and
adopted in the agreed language.


Rule 15
Quorum

There shall be a quorum if a majority of the members are present.


Rule 16
Voting

1. The voting in GRECO shall take place in conformity with paragraphs 6 and 7
of Article 8 of the Statute of GRECO.

2. When a decision has been taken on any matter, such matter shall not be re-
opened except at the request of a member, approved by a four-fifth majority of the
votes cast.

3. Only votes in favour or against are taken into account when counting the
number of votes cast.

4. The voting rules contained in the Statute of the Council of Europe, the Rules
of Procedure of the Committee of Ministers and of the Ministers Deputies, shall
mutatis mutandis apply as subsidiary rules to GRECO.


Rule 17
Order of voting on proposals and amendments

1. Where a number of proposals relate to the same subject, they shall be put
to the vote in the order in which they were submitted. In case of doubt, the
President shall decide.


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2. Where a proposal is the subject of an amendment, the amendment shall be
put to the vote first. Where two or more amendments to the same proposal are
presented, GRECO shall vote on whichever departs furthest in substance from the
original proposal, and thus until all the amendments have been put to the vote.
However, when the acceptance of one amendment necessarily entails rejection of
another, the latter shall not be put to the vote. The final vote shall then be taken
on the proposal as amended or not amended. In case of doubt as to the order of
priority, the President shall decide.

3. Parts of a proposal or amendment may be put to the vote separately.

4. In the case of proposals with financial implications, the most costly shall be
put to the vote first.


Rule 18
Order of procedural motions

Procedural motions shall take precedence over all other proposals or motions
except points of order. They shall be put to the vote in the following order:

a) suspension of the meeting,
b) adjournment of the meeting,
c) adjournment of discussion on the item in hand,
d) closure of discussion on the item in hand.


Rule 19
Decisions and meeting reports

1. At the end of each meeting, the Executive Secretary shall submit to GRECO
for its approval a list of the decisions taken during the meeting.

2. A report of GRECOs deliberations at each meeting shall be prepared under
the authority of the Executive Secretary. The report shall be circulated as soon as
possible to the representatives sitting on GRECO.


Rule 20
Working parties

1. GRECO may, whenever it is necessary, set up ad hoc working parties to deal
with specific matters. Working parties shall comprise a limited number of
representatives of at least five members.

2. The Chairperson of the working party shall be designated by the Bureau.
The terms of reference of such working parties shall be defined by GRECO.



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Rule 21
Communications containing information submitted for GRECOs consideration, etc.

1. The Executive Secretary shall bring to GRECOs attention communications
containing information submitted for GRECOs consideration, unless they manifestly
fall outside its field of competence.

2. The Executive Secretary shall keep a register of all communications
received.

3. GRECO may provide expertise within its field of competence to Council of
Europe bodies and to other bodies if considered appropriate.



TITLE II
EVALUATION PROCEDURE


Rule 22
General provision

1. The Rules contained in the present title aim at further elaborating Articles
10 to 16 of the Statute of GRECO. They shall therefore apply without prejudice to
the provisions contained in those Articles.

2. The evaluation procedure shall be based on the principle of mutual
evaluation and peer pressure and shall be instrumental to reach the aims of
GRECO, as enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of its Statute.


Rule 23
Evaluation rounds

1. GRECO will determine the length of each evaluation round in the light of the
provisions selected to be covered.

2. The selection of provisions for a given evaluation round may include the
following:

a) one or more of the Guiding Principles set out in Resolution 97(24),
b) one or more provisions contained in the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173),
c) one or more provisions contained in the Civil Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 174), and/or
d) one or more provisions contained in any other international legal
instrument adopted in pursuance of the Programme of Action against
Corruption.


Rule 24
Questionnaire

1. The mutual evaluation questionnaire shall be sent to all members
undergoing an evaluation. Unless otherwise decided by GRECO the replies to the
questionnaire shall be returned to the Executive Secretary within the time limit set
by GRECO.


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2. The replies to the mutual evaluation questionnaire shall be detailed, answer
all questions and contain all necessary appendices. Whenever a country visit is to
be carried out, these documents shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary at
least three months before the visit.


Rule 25
Experts

1. Each member shall provide to the Executive Secretary a list containing the
names of a maximum of five experts, within a period of three months following the
adoption of the present Rules or, subsequently, of the notification of membership.

2. The members will be allowed to modify this list. In the absence of
modification notified by the member, the list shall continue to be valid.

3. Representatives appointed to sit on GRECO in accordance with Article 6
paragraph 1 of the Statute may also be included in the list mentioned in
paragraph 1 above.


Rule 26
Evaluation team

1. The Bureau shall make proposals to GRECO concerning the composition of
the evaluation team (hereafter referred to as the team) referred to in Article 12,
paragraph 1 of the Statute.

2. Unless otherwise determined by GRECO, the team shall be composed of
three experts from different members selected from the list referred to in Article 10
paragraph 4 of the Statute, assisted by a member of the Secretariat. Exceptionally,
teams may comprise additional experts and, where appropriate, scientific experts.

3. Before GRECO approves the Bureaus proposals, the list of experts shall be
submitted to the member undergoing the evaluation in order for it to express its
views. In the case of disagreement judged by GRECO to be justified, the Bureau shall
submit alternative proposals.

4. If the team makes a request for additional information under Article 12,
paragraph 2 of the Statute, the member shall promptly comply with that request and
provide detailed and complete answers to all questions.


Rule 27
Country visits

1. Country visits shall be carried out in conformity with Article 13 of the
Statute. The dates of the visit shall be determined by the Executive Secretary in
consultation with the host-country and shall correspond to the programme of visits
adopted by the Bureau.

2. A country visit shall, as a rule, not take place earlier than 3 months after the
reception of the reply to the questionnaire by the Executive Secretary.



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3. On the basis of a draft programme submitted by the member undergoing
the evaluation to the Secretariat, the team will agree to the programme proposed
for the visit as soon as possible.

4. Before starting the country visit, a preparatory meeting shall take place in
order to allow a preliminary exchange of views among the experts in the team and
the Secretariat.

5. The length of the country visit shall, in principle, not exceed four days and
have a reasonable timetable. The Bureau or the Executive Secretary may, in
special cases, extend the length of a visit.

6. There shall be a final on-site meeting with the authorities of the host
member in order to discuss all outstanding issues related to the evaluation.

7. The country visit shall end with a concluding meeting between experts in the
team and the Secretariat to develop a common assessment of the country visit with
respect to the provision(s) under examination. The points made shall be
summarised at the end by the Secretariat.


Rule 28
Preparation of the draft mutual evaluation reports

1. The mutual evaluation reports shall consist of a descriptive part, based on
the reply to the questionnaire and other information gathered, and an analytical
part, containing observations and recommendations and their motivation.

2. To facilitate the work of the evaluation team, the Secretariat shall prepare
the draft descriptive part if necessary consulting the member submitted to
evaluation - and submit that text to the experts in the team at least one month
before any country visit takes place.

3. The experts in the team shall submit their individual written contributions,
focusing on the analytical part, including draft recommendations and observations,
to the Secretariat within 14 days from the receipt of the draft descriptive part or, if
the evaluation round includes a country visit, within 14 days from the end of the
visit.

4. The Secretariat shall produce within an additional period of 14 days a
preliminary draft mutual evaluation report (P1) on the basis of the contributions
received from the experts in the team. This preliminary draft shall be sent out to
the experts in the team for comments.

5. Comments on the preliminary draft shall be made available to the
Secretariat and to the other experts in the team within 14 days.

6. On the basis of the comments made, the Secretariat shall revise the
preliminary draft (P2) and make it available to the experts in the team. In case of
particular difficulty the Secretariat may organise, prior to the finalisation of the
draft evaluation report, a co-ordination meeting with the experts in the team and
the representative(s) of the evaluated member.



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7. The revised draft (P2) shall be sent to the member undergoing the
evaluation for written comments. The member shall have at least 21 days for
making its comments. If the member is unable to provide comments within this
time limit, the matter shall be raised with the Executive Secretary who may extend
this deadline.

8. The comments provided by the member shall be circulated to the experts in
the team with a view to determining which of them are acceptable. If the views of
the experts differ on this question, the Executive Secretary shall negotiate a
compromise solution.

9. The revised version of the draft report (P3) shall be sent to all
representatives sitting on GRECO at least two weeks before the Plenary meeting at
which the draft report will be examined and adopted.

10. Where minor drafting issues need to be solved before submitting the revised
draft to the Plenary for discussion, the Executive Secretary shall organise a pre-
plenary meeting, on the eve of that meeting, between the experts of the team and
the representatives of the member undergoing the evaluation. A final amended
draft (P4) may be issued at the end of this meeting.


Rule 29
Examination, discussion and adoption of the draft reports

1. The examination of evaluation reports by the Plenary shall, as a rule, be
carried out within 6 months from the end of the country visit. In case this time limit
cannot be adhered to, the Secretariat shall inform GRECO of the reasons.

2. The debate on each draft evaluation report shall start with an oral
presentation by the evaluation team and, in response to it, the representatives of
the member undergoing the evaluation may make a general statement.

3. Upon a proposal by the Executive Secretary, the Bureau may invite two
intervenors from among the representatives on GRECO to pose questions during the
discussion on the draft evaluation report. Such questions shall be made available in
writing to all the representatives sitting on GRECO prior to the meeting. The
intervenors and the evaluators may not emanate from the same member.

4. Subsequently, representatives and experts in the evaluation team shall be
entitled to put additional oral questions during the discussion.

5. The mutual evaluation report shall be adopted by the Plenary at the close of
the discussion. The report may include recommendations addressed to the member
undergoing the evaluation in line with article 15, paragraph 6 of the Statute.


Rule 30
Compliance with recommendations

1. Members of GRECO shall comply with the recommendations contained in the
evaluation report and implement them fully, within the time limit set by GRECO.



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2. In conformity with article 15, paragraph 6, of the Statute members shall
address to GRECO a situation report (hereinafter RS-report) indicating the
measures taken to follow the recommendations in the evaluation report. GRECO
will examine these reports and decide whether or not the recommendations have
been complied with.


Rule 31
Compliance procedure

1. Upon proposal by the Bureau, GRECO shall select two members to be
responsible for preparing a compliance report (hereinafter RC-report) indicating
whether the member has complied with the recommendations addressed to that
member in the evaluation report. The selection shall be based on criteria, such as
involvement in the first evaluation (providing of evaluator or intervenor) and
similarity of legal systems or geographical proximity with the member evaluated.
The Heads of delegation or the persons designated by them (hereafter
rapporteurs), shall present the report to the Plenary. Only members of
delegations or evaluators of GRECO may be appointed rapporteurs.

2. The Secretariat shall assist the rapporteurs in drafting the RC-report (P1),
which shall reflect the common view of the rapporteurs (P2).

3. The draft RC-report (P2) shall be sent to the member undergoing evaluation
for comments. The comments shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary within
14 days from the reception of the draft RC-report.

4. The Secretariat shall assist the rapporteurs in revising the draft RC-report,
taking into account the comments provided by the member.

5. The revised draft RC-report (P3) shall be sent to GRECO representatives at
least 14 days before the Plenary meeting at which it will be examined.

6. The draft RC-report (P3) shall as a rule be dealt with by GRECO no later
than six months after the reception of the RS-report by the Secretariat. In case this
time limit cannot be adhered to, the Secretariat shall inform GRECO of the reasons.

7. GRECO shall adopt the RC-report in plenary, following examination and
debate. The member submitted to the compliance procedure shall be represented
by the Head of delegation who may be assisted by other national representatives or
experts. At the request of the Head of delegation, GRECO may postpone the
adoption of the RC report if it considers that additional information or expertise is
necessary.

8.1 The RC-report shall indicate whether each individual recommendation :

I. has been implemented satisfactorily or otherwise been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner;
II. has been partly implemented;
III. has not been implemented.



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8.2 In case of conclusion II) or III) above the RC-report shall indicate whether
the member is required to submit, within a period specified by GRECO, additional
information regarding the implementation of the recommendation in question.

8.3 The RC-report shall also contain an overall conclusion on the implementation
of the recommendations. If the said conclusion is that the response to the
recommendations is globally unsatisfactory GRECO will decide to apply Rule 32.

9.1 On the basis of the additional information submitted by a member pursuant
to paragraph 8.2 of this Rule, the Secretariat shall draw up a brief appraisal of the
implementation of the recommendations in question, for consideration and
adoption by GRECO. The adoption of this appraisal shall terminate the compliance
procedure unless the additional information is clearly insufficient; in this case
GRECO shall ask for further information. The appraisal shall be included in an
addendum to the relevant RC-report.

9.2 The additional information shall as a rule be dealt with by GRECO no later
than six months after its receipt by the Secretariat.


Rule 31 revised
1

Compliance procedure As from the Third Evaluation Round

1. Upon proposal by the Bureau, GRECO shall select two members to be
responsible for preparing a compliance report (hereinafter RC-report) indicating
whether the member has complied with the recommendations addressed to that
member in the evaluation report. The selection shall be based on criteria, such as
involvement in the first evaluation and similarity of legal systems or geographical
proximity with the member evaluated. The Heads of delegation or the persons
designated by them (hereafter rapporteurs), shall present the report to the
Plenary. Only members of delegations or evaluators of GRECO may be appointed
rapporteurs.

2. The Secretariat shall assist the rapporteurs in drafting the RC-report (P1),
which shall reflect the common view of the rapporteurs (P2).

3. The draft RC-report (P2) shall be sent to the member concerned for
comments. The comments shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary within 14
days from the reception of the draft RC-report.

4. The Secretariat shall assist the rapporteurs in revising the draft RC-report,
taking into account the comments provided by the member.

5. The revised draft RC-report (P3) shall be sent to GRECO representatives at
least 14 days before the Plenary meeting at which it will be examined.

6. The draft RC-report (P3) shall as a rule be dealt with by GRECO no later
than six months after the reception of the RS-report by the Secretariat. In case this
time limit cannot be adhered to, the Secretariat shall inform GRECO of the reasons.

1
Pursuant to Decisions 23 and 24 of GRECO 46 (Strasbourg, 22-26 March 2010).


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7. GRECO shall adopt the RC-report in plenary, following examination and
debate. The member submitted to the compliance procedure shall be represented
by the Head of delegation who may be assisted by other national representatives or
experts. At the request of the Head of delegation, GRECO may postpone the
adoption of the RC report if it considers that additional information or expertise is
necessary.

8.1 The RC-report shall indicate whether each individual recommendation :

I. has been implemented satisfactorily or otherwise been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner;
II. has been partly implemented;
III. has not been implemented.

8.2 In case of conclusion II) or III) above the member concerned is required to
submit, within a period specified by GRECO, a second RS-report with additional
information regarding action taken to implement the recommendation(s) in
question.

8.3 The RC-report shall also contain an overall conclusion on the implementation
of the recommendations. If the said conclusion is that the response to the
recommendations is globally unsatisfactory GRECO will decide to apply Rule 32.

9. On the basis of the second RS-report submitted by a member pursuant to
paragraph 8.2 of this Rule, the rapporteurs selected in accordance with paragraph
1 of this Rule shall draw up a second RC-report, for consideration and adoption by
GRECO. Paragraphs 1 to 8.1 and 8.3 of this Rule shall apply accordingly to the
preparation and adoption of the second RC-report. The adoption of the second RC-
report shall terminate the compliance procedure unless GRECO decides to apply
Rule 32 or asks for further information because the information contained in the
second RS-report is clearly insufficient.


Rule 32
Steps to be taken in respect of GRECO members found not to be in compliance with
the recommendations contained in the mutual evaluation report

1. Any action in respect of non-complying members shall be guided by the
following principles :

- equality of treatment between GRECO members;
- a graduated approach for dealing with non-complying members;
- approval by the Plenary of the steps to be taken, whilst allowing for
some flexibility regarding their application.

2. The procedure for dealing with non-complying members shall include the
following steps:

(i) GRECO requiring the head of delegation of the non-complying member to
provide a report or regular reports on its progress in implementing the relevant
recommendations within a fixed time-frame;



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(ii) the President of GRECO sending a letter, with a copy to the President of the
Statutory Committee, to the Head of Delegation concerned, drawing his/her
attention to non-compliance with the relevant recommendations;

(iii) GRECO inviting the President of the Statutory Committee to send a letter to
the Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe of the member concerned,
drawing his/her attention to non-compliance with the relevant recommendations;

(iv) GRECO inviting the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to send a
letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member State concerned, drawing
his/her attention to non-compliance with the relevant recommendations;

(v) arranging a high-level mission (including the President and the Executive
Secretary of GRECO, the Director General of Legal Affairs and selected Heads of
delegation) to the non-complying member to reinforce this message;

(vi) in the context of the application of Article 16 of the Statute, bringing the
matter before the Statutory Committee.


Rule 33
2

Public statement

1. The President of GRECO shall inform the Statutory Committee of any action
taken in conformity with Rule 32, in particular of the results of the high level
mission and of the failure of the member to comply with the recommendations.

2. The Statutory Committee shall decide whether to issue a public statement
under Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Statute, in the light of the report
submitted by the President of GRECO.

3. This decision shall be effective if it is confirmed at the subsequent meeting
of the Statutory Committee, in accordance with Article 16, paragraph 3 of the
Statute.



TITLE III
CONFIDENTIALITY


Rule 34
General provision

1. Information gathered by GRECO in relation to an evaluation or compliance
procedure, including replies to the questionnaire, reports on a country visit, RS-
reports and related correspondence shall be confidential. The same shall apply to
all GRECO meeting reports.


2
This rule was adopted by the Statutory Committee at its 3
rd
meeting (Strasbourg,
14 December 1999) on the basis of a proposal submitted by GRECO. The Statutory
Committee agreed to include this provision in the Rules of Procedure.


18
2. In accordance with Article 15, paragraph 5 of the Statute, evaluation reports
shall be confidential. The same shall apply to RC-reports. However, GRECO may
adopt a summary of each evaluation or RC-report and make it public. In addition,
GRECO may make the whole evaluation report and/or a RC-report public, with the
comments of the member concerned, whenever requested to do so by that
member.

3. No personal data shall be published without the express consent of the
person concerned.


Rule 35
General rule concerning representatives, experts and other persons assisting
GRECO, including scientific experts and interpreters

1. Representatives on GRECO, their substitutes, experts participating in
evaluation teams, the Secretariat and other persons assisting GRECO are required,
during and after their term of office, to maintain the confidentiality of the facts or
information of which they have become aware during the exercise of their
functions.

2. A provision to the above effect shall be inserted in the contracts of scientific
experts and interpreters recruited to assist GRECO.


Rule 36
Consequences of breach of confidentiality by representatives and experts on
GRECO

1. If there are serious grounds for believing that a representative in GRECO
has violated the obligation of confidentiality, GRECO may, after the representative
concerned has had an opportunity to state his or her view, decide to inform the
Statutory Committee of the matter.

2. If there are serious grounds for believing that an expert has violated the
obligation of confidentiality, GRECO shall, after the person concerned has had an
opportunity to state his or her views, decide on the measures to be taken, including
the possibility of removing the expert from the list.


Rule 37
Consequences of breach of confidentiality by the Secretariat, scientific experts and
interpreters

If there are serious grounds for believing that a member of GRECOs Secretariat, an
interpreter or a scientific expert has violated the obligation of confidentiality,
GRECO may, after the person concerned has had an opportunity to state his or her
views, decide to inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of the
matter and request that appropriate measures be taken.


Rule 37a
Observers

Rules 35 and 37 shall apply by analogy to Observers to GRECO and their
representatives.




19
TITLE IV
ANNUAL GENERAL REPORT OF GRECO


Rule 38
Annual report

1. In accordance with Article 8, paragraphs 1, iii. and 3 of the Statute, the
Executive Secretary shall submit every year a draft general activity report to
GRECO. Once adopted by GRECO, the report shall be transmitted to the Statutory
Committee and to the Committee of Ministers. If so requested, the President of
GRECO will present this report to the Committee of Ministers during an oral
hearing. Subsequently, the report shall also be transmitted to the Parliamentary
Assembly and made public.

2. The report shall contain inter alia information on the organisation and
internal working methods of GRECO as well as the agreed public summaries in
respect of the evaluation reports which have been adopted within the period
concerned.

3. The report shall be adopted at the first meeting of GRECO in a given
calendar year and cover the whole of the preceding calendar year.



TITLE V
FINAL CLAUSES


Rule 39
Amendments

1. Any member, the President or the Executive Secretary may, at any time,
propose an amendment to these Rules. A proposal to that effect shall be submitted
in writing to the Bureau. It shall be for the Bureau to decide whether or not this
proposal is submitted to GRECO.

2. If the Bureau decides not to submit the proposal to GRECO, it shall be
included on the agenda of GRECO only if it receives the support of one fourth of the
members of GRECO at any given moment.

3. The GRECO may adopt the amendment suggested by a two-third majority of
the votes cast.


Rule 40
Entry into force of the Rules

The present Rules entered into force on 1
st
November 1999. The amendments
agreed by GRECO in 2000 and 2001 entered into force on the day following their
adoption
3
. The amendments agreed by GRECO on 13 December 2002 entered into
force on the first day of the Second Evaluation Round
4
. The amendments agreed
on 28 March 2003 entered into force on the same day. The amendments agreed on
18 March 2005 and 26 March 2010 entered into force on the same days
respectively.

3
16 December 2000 and 21 December 2001.
4
1 January 2003.
Secrt ari at du GRECO
Consei l de l Europe
www. greco. coe. i nt
GRECO Secret ariat
Council of Europe
F- 67075 St rasbourg Cedex ( + 33 ( 0) 3 88 41 20 00 Fax + 33 ( 0) 3 88 41 39 55



DI RECTORATE GENERAL I LEGAL AFFAI RS
DEPARTMENT OF CRI ME PROBLEMS



Publ i c
St rasbourg, 15 June 2001 Gr eco Eval I Rep ( 2001) 1E Fi nal






Fi r st Eval uat i on Round






Eval uat i on Repor t on Spai n







Adopt ed by t he GRECO
at i t s 5
t h
Pl enary Meet i ng
( St rasbourg, 11- 15 June 2001)
2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Spain was the sixth GRECO member to be examined in the first Evaluation round on the same
dates as Luxembourg. The GRECO evaluation team (hereafter GET) was composed of Mr
Norbert JANSEN, Senior Public Prosecutor in Germany (prosecution expert), Mr Jakub
FARINADE, Head of Unit of Supervision on Investigations at the General Customs Inspectorate
in Poland (law-enforcement expert) and Ms. Ruth Fitzgerald, Office of the State Attorney General
of Ireland (policy expert). The GET, accompanied by a member of the Council of Europe
Secretariat, visited Madrid from 6 to 8 November 2000. Prior to the visit the GET experts were
provided with a comprehensive reply to the Evaluation questionnaire
1
as well as extracts of
relevant legislation.

2. The GET met with officials from the following State institutions: Secretary of State for Justice,
Directorate General of Legislation Policy and International Legal Co-operation of the Ministry of
Justice, Special Attorney Generals Office for the Repression of Economic Offences related with
Corruption (ACPO) including the Judicial Police and Civil Guard units attached to this Office,
National Court and Prosecution Service assigned to it, State Prosecution Service (SPS)
2
s Office,
Bank of Spain including the Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money-
Laundering and Financial Offences, Directorate General of Treasure and Financial Policy of the
Ministry of Finance, Office of the Controller General of the Administration of the State, Service of
Inspection of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Directorate General of Civil Service of
the Ministry of Public Administrations and Office of the Legal Advisor to the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs.

3. Moreover, the GET met with journalists from El Mundo a national newspaper which in the recent
past has unveiled a number of significant corruption cases.

4. The agenda of the meetings appears at Appendix I.

5. It is recalled that GRECO agreed, at its 2
nd
Plenary meeting (December 1999) that the 1
st

Evaluation round would run from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2001, and that, in accordance
with Article 10.3 of its Statute, the evaluation procedure would be based on the following
provisions:

Guiding Principle 3 (hereafter GPC 3: authorities in charge of preventing, investigating,
prosecuting and adjudicating corruption offences: legal status, powers, means for gathering
evidence, independence and autonomy);

Guiding Principle 7 (hereafter GPC 7: specialised persons or bodies dealing with
corruption, means at their disposal);

Guiding Principle 6 (hereafter, GPC 6: immunities from investigation, prosecution or
adjudication of corruption).

6. Following the meetings indicated above, the GET experts submitted their individual observations
and proposals for recommendations to the Secretariat, on the basis of which the present report
has been prepared.

1
See document GRECO Eval I (2000) 16.
2
State Prosecution Service (SPS) and State Attorney General's Office (SAG's office) are synonyms. The State Attorney
General or Fiscal General del Estado is the Head of the SPS (see section (b) below).
3
7. The principal objective of this report is to evaluate the measures adopted by the Spanish
authorities, and wherever possible their effectiveness, in order to comply with the requirements
deriving from GPCs 3, 6 and 7.

8. The report will first describe the situation of corruption in Spain, the general anti-corruption policy,
the institutions and authorities in charge of combating it -their functioning, structures, powers,
expertise, means and specialisation-, the investigation techniques and the system of immunities
preventing the prosecution of certain persons for acts of corruption.

9. The second part contains a critical analysis of the situation described previously, assessing, in
particular, whether the system in place in Spain is fully compatible with the undertakings resulting
from GPCs 3, 6 and 7.

10. Finally, the report includes a list of recommendations made by GRECO to Spain in order for this
country to improve its level of compliance with the GPCs under consideration.

II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION

11. The Kingdom of Spain is a medium size State (505 000 sq. Km), neighbouring Portugal, France
and Andorra. The population in 1998 was 39,371,000 which represents a concentration of 78
inhabitants per sq. Km. The population growth rate over previous year was 0.1%. The GDP in
1999 was 712.1 billion US$ with per capita of 18.100 US$ which represents 81% of OECD
countries. GDP growth over 1997-98 was 4% (3.7% over 1998-99), which for this period
represents increases by components of 4.1% for private final consumption expenditure and 2.0%
for Government final consumption expenditure. Unemployment in 1998 was at 18.6% of active
population representing 26.4% of women and 13.6% of men
3
.

12. Spain is a member of the European Union (EU) and of most international organisations including
the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OECD. It is also a member of the Financial
Action Task Force on money laundering and observer in the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force, and as member of the EU is subject to EC Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the use
of the Financial system for the purpose of money laundering.

13. Spain has a European continental legal system where the minimum age of criminal responsibility
is eighteen years. It is bound by a large number of different bilateral agreements and conventions
on international judicial and police co-operation and could provide mutual legal assistance in
corruption cases on the basis of those treaties as well as on the basis of the reciprocity rule. It is
party to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds from Crime of 1990 and member of the Council of Europe Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) although it has not yet signed the Criminal and Civil law Conventions on
corruption (ETS No 173 and 174).

a. The phenomenon of corruption and its perception in Spain

14. Corruption is a complex phenomenon in Spain. The recent history of the country and transition
from dictatorship to democracy explains to a considerable extent the changing perception that
the Spanish society has of this phenomena. According to information provided to GET corruption
is closely related with political parties funding. In the transitional phase political parties did not

3
Soure: OECD in figures 2000. OECD, Paris, 2000.
4
always obey the strict rules on funding and it was considered that a certain degree of political
corruption was tolerated in the light of the particular circumstances of this period. However, over
the years, these phenomena grew and became unacceptable to the public, particularly as some
notorious cases of individual corruption by senior officials (including the Director General of the
Civil Guard and the Governor of the Bank of Spain) as well as ministers were unveiled. By the
early 90s the fight against corruption marked political debate. Several measures were taken and
as a result political credibility became an overriding value.

15. There is no single definition of corruption in the Spanish legal system. Rather, a number of
corruption offences are envisaged stricto senso in the Spanish Criminal Code of 1995 under
various headings
4
. Articles 419 to 427 cover to passive and active corruption of Spanish
authorities and public officials and Article 24 provides that the term authority encompasses the
members of Parliament, including the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, the legislative
assemblies of the autonomous communities and the European Parliament, as well as members
of the judiciary and officials of the SPS. Articles 428 to 431 cover trading in influence, which
refers to Spanish authorities and officials. Article 445a (as revised following the accession to the
OECD convention on bribery in international transactions) covers corruption in international
business and refers to bribery of foreign public officials in international commercial transactions.

16. In addition, the law setting up the ACPO (see section b.3 below) gives the ACPO powers in
relation to other offences provided for by the Criminal Code including offences against the
Treasury (Articles 305-310), smuggling and offences against exchange control, abuse of official
authority (Articles 404-406), use and misuse of privileged information (Article 418, where private
individuals are concerned and Article 442 in respect of public officials), misappropriation of public
funds (Articles 432-435), fraud and extortion (Articles 436-438), negotiations prohibited to
officials (Articles 439-441), illegal exercise of functions (Articles 506-508) and all offences
connected therewith.

17. Finally, where any of the corruption related offences as defined above are committed in an
organized manner, the offence of unlawful association also comes into play under Article 515,
para. 1 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision as embodying a
concept of association considerably broader than the one in private law, requiring a certain
degree of consistency, as opposed to a sporadic character, and a hierarchical organisation.

18. The Spanish legal system provides for the administrative and civil liability, whether direct or
subsidiary, of legal persons resulting from damages caused by their managers or employees.
However, there is no provision for the criminal liability of legal persons based on the notion of
guilt, as legal persons are not considered as possibly having a criminal intent. Therefore, in
practice such liability is assigned to those persons acting on behalf of the moral person as
provided by Article 31 of the Spanish criminal Code. However, according to Article 129 of the
Spanish criminal Code, legal persons endangering society can be subject to security measures
"in the cases provided for in this Code". The Spanish authorities are currently considering the
possibility of applying Article 129 of the Spanish criminal Code to economic and corruption
offences.

19. Corruption offences are predicate offences for the purpose of money laundering offences as
provided in the Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from
crime (ETS no. 141) to which Spain is Party and to which it has made no reservations.

4
A translation of the relevant provisions is included in Appendix II to this report.
5
20. Following Article 131 of the Criminal Code, limitation periods vary according to the seriousness of
the corruption offence concerned. Thus, for the most serious forms of passive and active
corruption of Spanish authorities and public officials, Spanish law provides a limitation period of
15 years, this period being of 5 to 10 years for less serious forms of the offence.

21. Offences involving corruption are classified as public under Spanish legislation and prosecution
may follow automatically the receipt by the judge or law officer of the notitia criminis. Thus, the
judicial machinery for the prosecution of this kind of offence may be set in motion: at the initiative
of the judicial authority, following a report or a complaint lodged by an individual or by the SPS,
or at the initiative of a member of the public through the exercise of the actio popularis.

22. There are no specific statistics in Spain on corruption offences despite the fact that thorough
judicial statistics are collected
5
. However, the ACPO provided the GET with information on the
number of cases assigned to it, which provides an indication of the extent of the phenomenon.
This information is summarised below. However, it should be mentioned that the number of
cases dealt with by the ACPO comprises both cases involving corruption offences strictly
speaking (see paragraph 15 above) which are less numerous, and cases involving economic
offences (see paragraph 16 above).

Number of corruption cases assigned to the ACPO
until 23.10.2000
6


Year Cases
1996 47
1997 23
1998 40
1999 20
2000 13

23. However, it should be pointed out that the number of cases dealt with by the ACPO are
insignificant in comparison with the total number of criminal offences dealt with by the Courts
7

and the number of decisions in criminal matters which range in the hundreds of thousands
8
.
Thus, the low figures quoted above simply mean that the ACPO concentrates on the most
significant cases.

24. According to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for the year 2000, Spain is
ranked 20 out of 90 countries (score 7 out of 10 (best)) in the tenth best position among the 15
EU member countries. In 1999, Spain ranked 22 (score 6.6) in the twelfth best position among
EU members.


5
See for instance Estadisticas Judiciales de Espaa published yearly since 1952. The GET was provided with the following
general statistics: number of cases considered by ACPO since it began to function: 80, number of cases which actually have
been considered by the Courts as a result of ACPOs action: 30-40.
6
For statistics on cases dealt with by the Spanish courts see Relacin de procedimientos judiciales atribuidos a la
competencia de la Fiscala especial para la represin de los delitos econmicos relacionados con la corrupcin desde su
constitucin hasta el da de la fecha, 23 de octubre de 2000.
7
Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America, Joaqun Martn-Canivell, Heuni, Helsinki 1998, Table 1. Total
number of criminal offences dealt with by the Courts, 1985 to 1991 in Spain. Total number of criminal offences dealt with by
the Courts in 1991 were 2,114,202.
8
Estadsticas Judiciales de Espaa, 1998. Total number of crimes convicted in 1998 was 110.672 of which 47.380 crimes
against private property, 29.310 traffic related, 7317 drug related.
6
25. At domestic level, the Spanish Higher Council of Sociological Surveys' Barometer edition of
November 2000
9
ranked corruption in the ninth place among the main political problems, after
terrorism, rivalries between political parties, passiveness of political parties, unemployment,
nationalism and separatism and social and economic problems. Therefore, it can be said that
today corruption is not, in general, perceived as being a major threat to society.

26. Finally, it is worth recalling the role plaid by the media, notably by the press, in the detection of
numerous corruption scandals. The wide media coverage of some corruption cases might have
contributed to a perception of this phenomenon going beyond that resulting from the number of
serious cases dealt with by the ACPO, following its selective approach.

27. Finally, it should be noted that there appears to be no connection between corruption of public
officials and organised crime, other than some marginal cases publicised by the press where
links were established between organised crime and certain elected local representatives.

b. Bodies and institutions in charge of the fight against corruption

28. Notorious corruption scandals unveiled in the early 90s and growing public concern about them
resulted in the adoption of several measures with a view to tackling these phenomena including
the setting up of (a) a Special Attorney Generals Office for the Repression of Economic Offences
related with Corruption (hereafter ACPO), which is a specialized institution including several
investigative law enforcement units. It plays a key role in the Spanish anti-corruption policy
namely investigation and prosecution and therefore, merits particular attention.

29. The ACPO forms part of (b) the State prosecution service, whose territorial offices will in certain
cases be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of corruption related offences, instead
of the ACPO. In all cases the State prosecution service just as the courts and tribunals will be
assisted by (c) the law enforcement authorities.

30. The Spanish courts (d) are competent for the adjudication of corruption-related cases. The
ordinary territorial courts are competent for ordinary cases, while the National Court (Audiencia
Nacional), a court whose competence covers the whole of the Spanish territory, has exclusive
competence over certain particular offences.

31. In addition, a number of specialised economic or financial institutions responsible for auditing
public accounts or fighting money laundering and other financial crimes contribute to the fight
against corruption by unveiling suspect transactions. They are grouped under the heading (e)
Other bodies and include the Court of Auditors, both at national and regional level, the
Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences, the Executive
Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary
Offences (SEPBLAC) and the National Securities Exchange Commission.

32. Finally, it should be noted on the one hand that in Spain, public administrations, law enforcement
agencies, courts and tribunals, and offices of public prosecutions have their own inspectorates
responsible for ensuring that they function properly, for instance the General Council of the
Judiciary for judges, the Public Prosecution Service (SPS) Inspectorate for prosecutors. Although
all inspection bodies have a general remit and were not set up specifically to combat the

9
Barmetro del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Sociolgicas. Provisional results for November 2000. Survey no. 2402.
Ranking of replies to the question According to you, which are the most significant political problems affecting the
Spaniards? (Question No. 36, spontaneous reply, several answers possible, maximum three replies).
7
corruption of public officials in the exercise of their functions, they nonetheless have a duty to
pursue investigations in cases where corruption is suspected. On the other hand it is also worth
noting that staff serving in State institutions whether executive or judicial do not appear to have
specific codes of conduct. This can be explained by the fact that Spain subscribes to the
continental model of civil service. In addition, it should be noted that two laws on
incompatibilities, which apply respectively to civil servants and high officials, impose specific
duties upon these categories of persons and provide for administrative offences and disciplinary
sanctions. These laws aim at ensuring the neutrality and the integrity of the civil service vis--vis
corrupt behaviour.
10


(a) The Special Attorney Generals Office for the Repression of Economic Offences
related with Corruption (ACPO)

33. The ACPO was set up in 1995 but only became properly operational, with adequate material and
human resources, in early 1996. It forms part of the Spanish State Prosecution Service (hereafter
SPS)(b), with which it shares various characteristics including the broad legal basis of its
operations as provided for by Article 124 of the Constitution and the SPS Statute It differs,
however, from other public prosecution offices by its multidisciplinary character.

34. Indeed, the ACPO is unique in that it is supported by several special units assigned to it from the
Tax Department (three inspectors and six deputy inspectors), from the Support Unit of the Civil
service's General Administrative Inspectorate (two inspectors and three administrators) and from
the Civil Guard or gendarmerie and the National or criminal police (25 officers). This combination
of officials from different branches of the public service, under the sole authority of the head of
the ACPO, represents a departure from the traditional operating methods of Spanish offices of
public prosecution.

35. Moreover, the ACPO has a direct link - via the tax inspection unit assigned to it - with the Tax
Inspectorates national database containing details of the tax returns of all individuals and legal
entities in Spain over the last six years. This is also a unique feature and valuable resource for
the work of the ACPO. Moreover, on the basis of the general rules, the ACPO may also have
access to other relevant national data bases held by public authorities, including those held by
the law enforcement authorities. Prosecutors assigned to the ACPO also have permanent
authorisation to travel within Spain and abroad in connection with their work.

36. The ACPO counts 11 prosecutors under the direction of a Chief Prosecutor selected by the
Government on a proposal submitted by the SAG, after having consulted the Attorney General
Council (Consejo Fiscal, see below). The prosecutors selected have undergone training on
economic crime and tax fraud, and most had previous professional experiences in dealing with
economic offences. ACPO resources are provided by the SPS budget, which, in turn, is part of
the Ministry of Justices budget.


10
It should also be noted that Law 30/1984 of 2 August on measures for the reform of the civil service, as revised by Laws
Nos. 22/1993, 27/1994, 42/1994, 12/1995, 13/1996, 6/1997, 66/1997, 50/1998, 39/1999 and 55/1999 has introduced for the
first time a series of ethical principles including integrity, neutrality, independence, transparency, service to citizens,
accountability and a commitment to foster models of good practice. Moreover, the Directorate General of Civil Service within
the Ministry for Public Administrations is considering the introduction of a Code of Conduct for Public Officials inspired by
Council of Europe recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to the Governments of Member States No. R (2000) 10 on
Codes of Conduct for Public Officials.
8
37. The ACPO is competent for two major areas of offences, in principle separated from one
another: economic offences and offences committed by public officials in the exercise of their
official duties. Article 18 paragraph 3 of the Law establishing the ACPO provides the list of
offences which prompt the ACPOs competence. These are:

a. Offences against the Public Treasury, smuggling, and in questions of money exchange
control
b. Prevarication offences
c. Offence of abuse or illicit use of privileged information
d. Misappropriation of public funds
e. Fraud and extortion
f. Offences of exercise of undue influence
g. Offences of bribery
h. Negotiations forbidden to civil servants
i. Certain offences against property and socio-economic order (Sections IV and V of Title
XIII of Book II of the Penal Code)
j. Offences related with the above

38. This means that the ACPO has a broad competence to deal with corruption cases, regardless of
the type of criminality it is associated with.

39. In order for the ACPO to intervene, in addition to falling within the above list, the offences
concerned must be of special significance as defined by the SAG who can do so in a general
manner
11
or on a case-by-case basis by specific instructions. However, in all cases, the
determination of the special significance has to be objective and be based on criteria resulting
from legislation or case law.

40. The Head of the ACPO added that, in practice, a quantitative criterion was also applied in
deciding whether the case falls under the jurisdiction of ACPO, as ACPO will intervene only when
the economic damage is significant
12
.

41. Where either of the two conditions is not met, it is not the ACPO but the relevant territorial Office
of the SPS which will be competent.


11
See SAGs Instruction No. 1/1996 of 15 January 1996 which provides guidance for cases in which the ACPOs
competence to intervene is warranted.
Thus for instance, in the case of offences committed by civil servants, the ACPO is competent for those cases attributed to
persons who hold the status of Senior Official in the terms described in article 1 of Law 12/1995, of 11 May (RCL
1995/1425), on incompatibilities of members of the Government of the nation and of Senior Officials of the General State
Administration, and their equivalents in its Regional, Provincial and Local Administration.
The SAGs office may, however, when there are sufficient reasons, on the one hand pass knowledge of the actions against
the above to the respective Attorney Generals Offices when, despite the relevance of the perpetrator, the facts lack
significance and complexity.
On the other hand, the ACPO may also be attributed the competence to intervene in matters in which other authorities and
civil servants of inferior rank are implicated when the complexity of the facts, their economic significance and the social
alarm they have produced calls for such measures.
Finally, in cases of offences attributed to persons who enjoy privileges at the Second Hall of the Supreme Court or at the
Civil and Criminal Halls of the Higher Regional Courts, in accordance with articles 57.2, and 73.3.a) of the Organic Law of
the Judiciary (RCL 1985/1578, 2635 and ApNDL 8375), the SAG shall decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not
competence is attributed to the ACPO.
12
An indicative figure of 100 Million Pesetas ( 600,000, approx.) was mentioned in this respect, although it was stressed
that this was a flexible criterion.
9
42. The ACPOs intervention has a two-pronged approach: the investigation proceedings and
intervention in criminal proceedings. Investigation proceedings are instituted as a result of a
complaint either of individual persons or of the Administration or ex officio. The ACPO then
informs the Attorney General's Office which would have been territorially competent in order to
avoid overlapping proceedings.

43. The ACPO is required to keep the SAG informed about the cases it is dealing with and any
developments relating thereto, in particular any possible changes in competence
13
.

44. The SAG has a certain margin of discretion when exercising the power to attribute cases to the
ACPO. Given the particular nature of the offences dealt with by ACPO, the SAG is required to
report every six months to the Board of Court Attorneys Generals (Junta de Fiscales Jefes de de
Sala) and to the Attorney General Council (Consejo Fiscal) about procedures in which the
ACPO has been called upon to intervene. The Board of Court Attorney Generals (Junta de
Fiscales Jefes de Sala) or the Attorney General Council (Consejo Fiscal, see below) may then
make observations in view of which, the SAG may ratify his decisions or may modify them, with
suitable grounds, when he considers this appropriate.

(b) The State Attorney Generals Office or SPS

45. The SPS is governed by Law 50/1981, of 30 December and counts the following bodies:

a. the State Attorney General (SAG)
b. the Attorney General Council (Consejo Fiscal)
c. the Board of Court Attorney Generals (Junta de Fiscales Jefes de Sala)
d. the Attorney Generals Office at the Supreme Court
e. the Attorney Generals Office at the Constitutional Court
f. the Attorney Generals Office at the National Court
g. the Special Attorney Generals Office for the Prevention and Repression of Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs (ADPO)
h. the Special Attorney Generals Office for the Repression of Economic Offences related
with Corruption (ACPO) (see (a) above)
i. the Attorney Generals Offices at the Superior Courts of Justice
j. the Attorney Generals Offices at the Provincial Courts

46. Article 124 of the Constitution provides that the SPS has the mission of promoting justice in
defence of the law, the rights of the citizens and the general interest as well as contributing to
guaranteeing the independence of the Courts. It also states that members of this office act in
accordance on the one hand, with the principles of unity and hierarchical subordination, and on
the other hand, with those of legality and impartiality.

47. As a result, all prosecutors are subject to the SAG, who is in turn appointed by the King on the
proposal of the Government after consulting the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) (cf.
Art. 124 para. 4 of the Constitution). The Government, through the Ministry of Justice, may ask
the SAG to introduce motions in court in order to promote and defend the public interest. The
latter will respond to the Government on the feasibility and adequacy of implementing its request
after consulting the SAGs Council.


13
Article 25 of the Organic Statute of the Attorney Generals Office.
10
48. In addition, differences with regard to the interpretation of the law can sometimes arise between
the SAG and individual attorneys serving in the SPS. Such disputes must be resolved through a
procedure laid down in the SPS Statute. The effective result of this procedure is that the SAG
after statutory consultation with various bodies linked to the SPS, will formulate a view which will
prevail over that of the individual prosecutor. This makes the SAGs conduct transparent and
open to criticism. Should a difference arise between a senior public prosecutor and a
subordinate, a similar procedure is followed although the final decision rests with the SAG.

49. The rules and principles governing the investigation and prosecution of corruption-related
offences are the general rules laid down in the Law on Criminal Procedure. Spain follows the rule
of strict mandatory prosecution in accordance with the SPS Statute and Article 105 of the Law on
Criminal Procedure
14
. The public prosecutor, as soon as she/he receives a report or information
on a possible offence must institute criminal proceedings, regardless of any proceeding initiated
at the request of the interested party.

50. In criminal procedures, the SPS pursues criminal actions before the courts and requests judicial
authorities to carry out searches in order to detect offences and discover offenders. It may also
order such measures as preventive detention of suspects and may order the police to conduct
whatever investigation activities she/he considers necessary.

51. The SPS is not entirely free to suspend or bring to an end an investigation or prosecution of an
offence. In every case, the prosecutor's decision is subject to a final decision by the judge. The
competent Investigating Judge has the power to investigate the case, encompassing the
procedural documents involved in preparation of the trial and the verification of perpetration of
the offences and of the charges upon the offenders. The investigating judge is empowered to do
so even if the prosecutor is opposed to the continuance of the proceedings. The public
prosecutor may decide to discontinue inquiries, which proceeds the investigation phase, if he or
she considered that the facts do not constitute an offence. However, the prosecutor is then
obliged to inform the interested parties of this discontinuation, so that they may resubmit their
complaint to the investigating judge, who will have the final word.

52. Thus, the SPS does not have the possibility of closing criminal cases with cautions or simplified
procedures, but may only request the withdrawal of the case once the investigating process has
being completed, if it considers that no offence has been committed.

53. As it has been said above, the ACPO is not competent in all cases to prosecute corruption
related offences. Where the ACPO is not competent, other organs of the Prosecution Service or
the relevant territorial SAGs Office are competent. In such cases, however, the ACPO may
assist these prosecution offices, at their request.

(c) Law enforcement agencies

54. There are two basic law enforcement agencies: the Civil Guard and the National Police as stated
above. In addition, some regions (autonomous communities), like Catalonia and the Basque
Country, have set up their own police forces. Both the Civil Guard and the National Police have
units specifically assigned to the ACPO and specialised in the fight against corruption. These
units are a link between the ACPO and the agencies to which the officers belong.


14
Some degree of prosecutorial discretion (defined as "regulated opportunity") was recently introduced for the first time by
the new law on criminal liability of minors.
11
55. In addition to that, within the Civil Guard two units combat money laundering: the Criminal
Investigation Department, which comprises various units deployed in judicial districts, with task
forces to combat economic crime on the national and regional levels; and the Tax Service with
investigative units at regional, provincial and local level and a nationwide anti-money laundering
investigative squad created in 1994.

56. As far as the National Police is concerned, within the General Commissariat of the Judicial
Police, several units have responsibility for specifically combating money laundering and thus
can contribute to the work of the ACPO, namely: the Monetary Offences Investigative Squad (a
police unit that reports to SEPBLAC and has jurisdiction over the whole Spanish territory) (see
(e) below) and the anti-drug and organised crime units (UDYCO) set up since February 1997 in
each of the major police prefectures including Madrid, Galicia, Catalonia, Valencia, Eastern and
Western Andalusia, the Canary Islands and the Balearics and with jurisdiction over their
respective territories.

57. Finally, it should be noted that under Spanish procedural law, only the investigating judge or the
public prosecutor is empowered to co-ordinate joint action in cases of the type under
consideration, and that the police cannot close a criminal case since according to the law it does
not have such power.

(d) Courts and tribunals

(d1) Introduction

58. Corruption cases, like all other cases, are adjudicated by the courts, which according to Article
117 of the Spanish Constitution have sole competence to exercise judicial functions. The
Constitution, the Organic Law on the Judiciary
15
and several ordinary laws, as well as specific
procedural statutes govern the organisation and functioning of the judicial system.

59. There is a uniform judicial system, including courts of general civil and criminal- and specialised -
social, labour and administrative - jurisdiction. The Act of 22 May 1995 introduced the jury in trials
dealing with certain types of offences, including corruption-related offences. There is no special
jurisdiction dealing with corruption cases. The establishment of extraordinary courts is, in any case,
forbidden by the Constitution.

60. Judges are selected on the basis of competitive examinations and appointed for their lifetime. In the
performance of their duties, judges are bound only by the Constitution and the Law and may not
receive any order or instruction. They enjoy immunity for acts performed in the exercise of their
duties (see section d. below). They may only be removed from office as a result of disciplinary
proceedings for serious breaches of their duties, for instance, by committing a criminal offence in the
performance of their functions. Disciplinary proceedings are regulated by the law and are an internal
matter for the judiciary.

61. The Judiciary is governed by the General Council of the Judiciary (GCJ) which is an
independent organ responsible for recruiting and appointing judges, training, career and
disciplinary decisions over the whole of the Spanish territory. The GCJ does not exercise any
judicial function. It is chaired by the President of the Supreme Court, and composed of twenty

15
Organic law 6/1985 of 1 July revised thereafter by Organic law 7/1988, 16/1994.
12
Members, appointed by the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament
16
. Neither the Ministry of
Justice nor any other agency of the Executive have powers to decide on issues relating to the
functioning of the judiciary, ensuring thus full separation of powers and guaranteeing judicial
independence. As the governing body of the judiciary, the Council has a constitutional and
institutional status similar to that of the Government and the two Houses of Parliament against
which it can bring cases involving conflicts of competence before the Constitutional Court.

(d2) The investigation stage of proceedings

62. Spain has the institution of the Investigating Judge (IJ), responsible for the investigation of cases
where suspicion is reasonably directed towards a possible perpetrator. The IJ is also competent for
authorising the use of investigative measures (see c. below), which could affect the exercise of
fundamental rights and freedoms of the suspect.

(d3) Judicial Organisation

63. For the purposes of the administration of justice, Spain is divided into Districts, Provinces and
Regions.

64. District Courts which are made of one judge- have jurisdiction to deal in the first instance in
criminal cases where the penalty is lower than 6 years imprisonment. All other criminal cases are
dealt in the first instance by the Provincial Courts which are made of three judges-, with the
exception of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the National Court (see below) and cases
where the suspect is a member of a regional Government or the central Government or
Parliament, which fall respectively under the jurisdiction of the Higher Regional Court and the
Supreme Court (see section d. below).

65. The Higher Regional Courts are at the top of the judicial organisation of each region, from which
they take their name and over which they exercise jurisdiction, without prejudice to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. They constitute the final court of appeal in relation to the
application of the law of the region in question. The Higher Regional Courts consist of three
Chambers (Civil and Criminal, Administrative and Labour), within which various Sections may
also be formed.

66. The Supreme Court, sitting in Madrid and exercising jurisdiction over all of Spain, is the highest
judicial body in all areas of the law, except in relation to constitutional rights. It consists of 5
Chambers (Civil, Criminal, Administrative, Labour and Military), within which different Sections
may be formed.

67. Finally, the Constitutional Court is competent to examine the compatibility of legislation with the
Constitution and decide on "amparo" appeals on alleged breaches of fundamental rights and
freedoms.

(d4) The National Court

68. The National Court, sitting in Madrid, exercises jurisdiction over all the Spanish territory of Spain
and consists of three Chambers (Criminal, Administrative and Labour), within which different

16
Each of the Houses of Parliament appoints, by a majority of three-fifths of its members, six Members from among serving
Judges drawn from all judicial categories and four Members from among lawyers and other jurists of recognised
competence with more than fifteen years professional standing.
13
Sections may also be formed (4 in the Criminal Chamber, each made of three judges). Six
investigative judges are attached to the National Court. They are competent for conducting the
investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the National Court.

69. In the criminal field, it is competent for particularly serious offences as provided by Article 65,
paragraph 1,c of the Organic Law on the Judiciary. Although it is not specifically empowered to
deal with corruption offences, its jurisdiction in this field results from the power conferred upon it
to deal with economic offences in the private sector
17
. However, it should not be considered as a
special or exceptional court which, as indicated above, are forbidden by the Constitution (Article
117).

70. At the end of the investigation conducted by the investigative judge, the trial will take place either
before a Central Criminal Court (made of one judge) or before one of the Sections of the Criminal
Chamber of the National Court (each made of three judges) depending on whether the penalty is
lower or higher than five years imprisonment. Against the Central Criminal Court's decision it is
possible to file an appeal before the Criminal Chamber of the National Court with no subsequent
appeal. When the sentence is adopted by a Section of the Criminal Chamber, it is possible to
lodge a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court.

71. The National Court also plays ex lege an important role in international judicial relations as it
deals with offences committed by Spaniards abroad, with extradition claims by third countries,
with international letters rogatory by foreign judges for offences that, if committed in Spain, would
have fallen to the competence of the National Court, with transfers of Spanish prisoners
convicted abroad, with denouncements filed by other nations and with transfers of proceedings
for offences to be prosecuted in Spain.

(e) Other bodies

72. In addition to those mentioned above, there are a number of specialised economic or financial
institutions which play a role either in (e1) auditing public accounts or (e2) in the fight against
money laundering and can in this capacity also contribute to the fight against corruption by
unveiling suspicious transactions.

(e1) Courts of Auditors

73. The Courts of Auditors are responsible for auditing public accounts and, although these are not
specifically empowered to deal with corruption related offences, they may unveil, in the course of
their work, certain practices by departments of the national, regional or municipal administration
that mask criminal conduct.

74. They exist both at national
18
and regional level and they co-operate successfully with the ACPO.
Moreover, the national Court of Auditors includes a special Attorney General's Office, the head of
which is, as of right, a senior member of the Court. The fact that this special office is also an
integral part of the SPS makes for ease and efficiency of relations between it and the ACPO.


17
E.g.: terrorism, fraud possibly affecting the national economy or with repercussions in more than one province, offences
against public health committed by organized groups, money-laundering, offences committed by Spaniards abroad, offences
against the Head of State, etc.
18
See Article 136 of the Constitution.
14
(e2) Anti-money laundering institutions

75. In addition to the Courts of Auditors, there is a series of financial specialized bodies which co-
operate with the ACPO although more often in relation to economic crime and money laundering
cases than corruption ones. These are the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering
and Monetary Offences, the Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money
Laundering and Monetary Offences (SEPBLAC) and the National Securities Exchange
Commission
19
.

76. The Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences is placed
under the authority of the Secretary of State for the Economy, which chairs it and is made of
representatives of the Government Delegation for the National Anti-Drug Plan, the Special Anti-
Drug Prosecutors Office, the ACPO, the Directorates General of the National Police and the Civil
Guard, the Bank of Spain, the National Securities Exchange Commission, the Directorate
General for Insurance, the Directorate General for Tax inspection, the Directorate General of
Treasury and Regions having their own police forces.

77. The Commissions primary functions are to direct and foster activities designed to prevent the
financial system or businesses of any other kind from being used to launder money; to organise
co-operation in this area between government agencies and the private sector; to finalise draft
provisions governing money laundering-related matters; to submit proposed sanctions to the
Minister of the Economy and Finance, if authority for the approval of such sanctions lies with the
Minister or with the Council of Ministers as a whole.

78. The Sub-Directorate General for the Inspection and Supervision of Capital Movements of the
Directorate General for the Treasury and Financial Policy acts as the Commissions secretariat,
drafting implementation standards for provisions involving violations of Act No. 19/1993 and
initiating sanction procedures in respect of violations of that Act and of Act No. 40/1979 of
10 December which contains the legal regime for exchange control.

79. The Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary
Offences (SEPBLAC) was established by Act No. 19/1993 and is the support unit for the
Commission. It is the Spanish financial intelligence unit and is placed under the authority of the
Bank of Spain, which appoints its Director and has a Monetary Offences Investigative
Squad (BIDM) which is a law enforcement unit of the Directorate General for the Police directly
reporting to SEPBLAC. In addition, SEPBLAC staff includes employees of the Bank of Spain, the
Ministry of the Economy and Finance and the law enforcement agencies. It incorporates
inspectors from the areas of government finance, customs, the Bank of Spain and BIDM.

19
In order to understand their possible contribution in the fight against corruption, it is necessary to consider briefly the
Spanish anti-money laundering policy. This policy involves a two-pronged system including prevention and enforcement
elements at domestic level and strong emphasis on co-operation internationally. Preventive aspects are rooted in Act No.
19/1993 of 28 December on certain measures for the prevention of money laundering and Royal Decree No. 925/1995 of
9 June approving regulations in application of the aforementioned Act, which seek to prevent and block money laundering
by imposing administrative obligations for reporting and co-operation on financial institutions and on other, non-financial
institutions. The primary targets of the Act and the corresponding regulations are the people and institutions making up the
financial system. However, the collaboration with SEPBLAC extends beyond the aforementioned.
With regard to enforcement aspects, approval of the new Penal Code shifted the definition of the offence of money
laundering from one exclusively tied in with goods arising from illicit drug trafficking, to a new one that also includes funds
derived from all serious crimes as provided by Article 13 of the Criminal Code, i.e. those punished with at least 3 years of
imprisonment. Among the other enforcement-related provisions is the creation of the ACPO (see (a) above) and the special
investigative units set up within the National Police and the Civil Guard (see (c) above).
15
80. Although it is placed under the authority of the Bank of Spain, which provides the necessary
resources, the SEPBLAC performs its own functions independently. It is, however, subject to the
directives and supervision of the Commission.

81. SEPBLACs primary mission is to receive and analyse reports of suspicious and unusual
transactions from financial institutions and from other non-financial professions and to perform
general supervisory functions. In the exercise of its functions in relation to financial institutions
which are subject to special legislation, the SEPBLAC is entitled to obtain from the Bank of
Spain, the National Securities Exchange Commission or corresponding regional bodies, all
information and collaboration necessary to accomplish them.

82. In addition to financial and non-financial institutions, all authorities or officials who discover facts
which could constitute an indication or proof of money laundering are required to report them to
the SEPBLAC.

83. Finally, the National Securities Exchange Commission is in charge of supervising and inspecting
the securities market in Spain and the activities of all natural and legal persons taking part
therein and it is empowered to impose sanctions. It is also part of the regulatory machinery of
that market which oversees and inspects securities exchanges. It has reported a number of
suspected offences on the securities market to the ACPO and has always assisted it when asked
to do so.

c. Sources of information and investigation techniques

84. The Code on Criminal procedure imposes upon both public officials (article 259) and citizens in
general (article 262) a general obligation to report any crimes which come to their knowledge to
the law enforcement or judicial authorities. However, non compliance with this obligation is
subject to administrative sanctions. Moreover, the law provides for a certain number of
exceptions to the obligation to report (members of the same family, ).

85. By virtue of Article 18 of the Constitution, only judges are empowered to authorise, in the course
of criminal investigations, the search of a domicile or other premises, except to catch offenders
red-handed. This same provision requires a prior judicial authorisation for intercepting
communications. Consequently, neither the SPS nor the police may, without prior judicial
authorisation, intercept communications or search a domicile except, in this latter case, in
flagrante delicto. The Law on Criminal Procedure provides the legal basis for the use of
investigation techniques, although it does so in a general manner and not specifically for
investigations relating to corruption offences.

86. Subject to this constraint and given that prosecutors are empowered, under Article 4 of the
Statute of SPS, to take or order to be taken such action as is lawful under the Law on Criminal
Procedure and does not involve measures that call into question or restrict rights, they have
considerable room for manoeuvre. Thus, in the context of investigation on corruption-related
offences, the prosecutor may request solicitors, registrars and any public authorities to certify the
authenticity of legal documents, may request information from the land registry, the commercial
registry or the civil registry as well as police records of all types and is entitled to assistance from
any civil servant or authority in the exercise of his or her duties.

87. Reference should be made to solicitors legal professional privilege. Thus, according to Article
416 paragraph 2 of the Law on Criminal Procedure, in the context of criminal proceedings,
16
solicitors are not under the obligation to provide testimony about facts they learned from their
clients in their capacity of defendants. However, this privilege is not considered absolute or
unlimited. In certain cases, investigative judges may order the search of the office of a solicitor
who is related with a person involved in criminal proceedings, for whom the solicitor does not act
as defendant but simply provides legal advice about a behaviour which is criminally punishable.
Moreover, the Supreme Court declared in its decisions of 13 June 1990 and 2 July 1991 that
solicitors have the duty to co-operate with the tax authorities and provide information about their
clients under certain circumstances.

88. Moreover, it should be mentioned that SEPBLAC informs the ACPO about suspicious
transactions and thus provides an important contribution to the investigation of corruption-related
offences. In 1999 and 2000, the SEPCLAC informed the ACPO of 70 and 92 such transactions,
respectively.

89. Organic Law 15/99 of 13 December 1999 on the protection of personal data contributed to cast
light in this area by establishing that the person or body concerned may only disclose personal
data with the prior consent of the person concerned, unless otherwise provided by law. Article
11 paragraph 2, d of the law further stipulates that the consent of the person concerned shall not
be required for the disclosure of data to inter alia the SPS, judges or the courts, in the
performance of their duties.

90. This provision enables the SPS to obtain information from banks, including certain account data;
to identify telephone subscribers although not to obtain details of the destination or content of
their calls which would require judicial authorisation; and to afford direct assistance to the courts
or public prosecution services of other countries under the terms of international agreements
such as, for instance, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS
No. 30) and the Schengen Agreement.

91. Moreover, this law does not preclude the application of other laws, such as those regulating bank
secrecy, which in practice may represent an obstacle for ACPO investigations. Indeed, according
to information provided to the GET, banks and other financial institutions would only provide to
the ACPO information on the account holder and the state of his/her accounts, but will not
provide it directly with full details on account movements or complete financial records and
transactions. Where the ACPO is not provided with this information on a voluntary basis, it could
obtain it on the basis of the investigative judges authorisation. The GET observed that the
situation differed in the case of the Special Attorney Generals Office for the Prevention and
Repression of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs (ADPO) or special anti-money laundering institutions
(see b. (e2) above), which are empowered to obtain such information without the need of a
judicial authorisation.

92. This is all the more surprising since the setting up of the ACPO was modelled on the basis of the
ADPO (set up by Law 5/1988), which according to Article 3.d) does have the power to investigate
the economic and financial situation as well as the business operations of all kinds conducted by
any person or company suspected of drug-related offences. Moreover, ADPO is empowered to
summon public administrations, legal persons and individuals to provide all information deemed
necessary in this respect.

93. Similarly, it can be noted that the Law on Criminal Procedure provides the ADPO with the
possibility of using controlled deliveries and undercover agents in the investigation of drug-
trafficking offences. As a result of a recent legislative change (organic law 5/1999), the use of
17
these means of investigation may be authorised by the Investigative Judge or the prosecutor
(and in some instances the judicial police) in investigations relating to organised crime cases
involving certain explicitly defined offences
20
. The list of explicitly defined offences excludes
corruption-related ones.

94. The effect of the requirement for judicial authorisation in respect of certain measures - given that
the judge authorising such a measure thereby assumes control of the investigation - is that
prosecutors normally only seek authorisation for measures involving certain restrictions of rights
once the preliminary phase of an investigation has been completed and the measures in
question appear necessary to take the case further.

95. Investigative measures can be applied to persons other than suspects incidentally and under
certain circumstances. However, it is important to note that the Constitutional Court has stressed
that the use of special investigation techniques which entail a restriction of basic rights is strictly
subject to the principle of proportionality.

96. The Law on the Protection of Witnesses and Experts provides for various forms of protection
which guarantee sufficient protection of witnesses and experts at risk. The GET was informed
however, that the ACPO has never availed itself of the possibilities offered by this legislation.

d. Immunities from investigation, prosecution and adjudication for corruption offences

97. The following categories of persons benefit, in the Spanish legal system, from immunities in
criminal proceedings: (a) members of the national parliament (deputies and senators) (b)
members of regional parliaments and (c) serving members of the judiciary.

98. These categories of persons benefit from non criminal liability and immunity.

99. Non-criminal liability (defined as inviolabilidad by the Spanish Constitution) is of a substantial
character and provides that its beneficiaries cannot be held criminally liable for any opinion
expressed or vote cast during a sitting of the Parliament or its working bodies in the case of
parliamentarians, or that they cannot be criminally liable for any opinion expressed in the court in
the course of proceeding in the case of judges. This immunity cannot be lifted and its purpose is
to ensure proper performance of the particular function of its beneficiary. []

100. Immunity implies that no criminal investigation and prosecution can be undertaken against the
above-mentioned categories of persons without the prior authorisation by the competent
authority, for instance the respective House in the case of deputies and senators. An exception
exists in the case of flagrante delicto in which case the beneficiaries of the immunities can be
arrested.

101. In addition, there is also a procedural privilege attributing to specific (higher) judicial organs the
jurisdiction to try persons holding certain posts
21
. It is provided for in Articles 56 and 57 of the

20
For the purposes of this legislation, organised crime is defined as the association of three or more persons with the
intention of permanently or repeatedly committing one or more of the offences included in a list contained in paragraph 4 of
Art. 202 bis.
21
Namely: the Head of Government, the Presidents of the Congress of Deputies and Senate, the President of the Supreme
Court and of the General Council of the Judiciary, the President of the Constitutional Court, members of the government,
deputies and senators, members of the General Council of the Judiciary, Constitutional Court and Supreme Court judges,
the Presidents of the National Court and its divisions, the Presidents of the Higher Regional Courts, the State Attorney
General, Supreme Court Divisional Prosecutors, the President and members of the Court of Auditors, the President and
18
Law on Criminal Procedure which establishes that the relevant Chamber (Civil or Criminal) of the
Supreme Court is competent to deal with cases involving the civil liability of these persons in the
exercise of their functions and for criminal cases involving them.

(a) Deputies and senators

102. Article 71 of the Constitution provides that deputies and Senators enjoy inviolability for the
opinions expressed during the exercise of their functions and that during their terms of office,
they likewise enjoy immunity and may only be arrested in cases of flagrante delicto and may not
be indicted or tried without prior authorisation of the respective House.

103. The Rules of Procedure of the Congress of Deputies of 10 February 1982 (Rules Nos. 10-14)
and the Rules of Procedure of the Senate of 26 May 1982 (Rule No. 22) contain detailed
provisions in this respect.

104. In cases of flagrante delicto, the deputy or senator concerned may be arrested and proceedings
may be initiated against him or her without the above-mentioned authorisation above. However,
the relevant House must be informed of the arrest or initiation of proceedings within 24 hours.

105. In other cases, where the above-mentioned authorization is granted, articles 750-756 of the Law
on Criminal Procedure lay down the procedure to be followed. Where such authorization is not
granted, proceedings can be pursued against persons co-accused who do not enjoy immunity.
Decisions of the Houses regarding the lifting of immunity may be appealed before the
Constitutional Court for breach of the right of effective judicial protection (art. 24 of the
Constitution) by the parties to the procedure, ie the accused, the victim or the plaintiff (private
accuser).

106. The Constitutional Court has cast light on the nature and extent of the parliamentarian
immunities by stating that they are not personal rights but rights associated with membership of
the legislative body and enjoyed by parliamentarians in that capacity with a view to enabling the
Parliament to function effectively and freely. Inasmuch as they constitute obstacles to the
functioning of the law, the Constitutional Court has stressed that they have to be interpreted
strictly as being subject to the limits imposed by the Constitution and to the principle of
reasonable proportionality to their ultimate purpose, and that they may not, therefore, be
interpreted according to any criteria that would permit their abuse by resulting in the
unconstitutional prevention of access to the procedures prescribed by law
22
.

(b) Members of regional parliaments

107. The conditions applying to members of national parliament applies mutatis mutandis to members
of regional parliaments, who also enjoy inviolability in respect of the opinions expressed and the
way they vote in the exercise of their functions, even after they have ceased to perform those
functions.

108. Cases involving such persons are heard by the Higher Regional Courts.


members of the Council of State, the Ombudsman and the presidents and councillors of those regions whose statute of
autonomy so provides.
22
See Constitutional Court Decisions No. 9/1990, No. 526/1986, No. 51/1985.
19
(c) Serving judges

109. Articles 398-400 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary provide that serving judges may only be
arrested by order of the competent court or in case of flagrante delicto.

110. This immunity aims at protecting the independence of the judiciary and for that reason,
Article 399 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary provides that civil and military authorities must
refrain from issuing orders to judges or summoning them to appear.

111. Judges are free from arrest or detention, except by order of the competent judicial authority or in
cases of flagrante delicto (see Article 398 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary). Criminal
proceedings against a judge must be instituted, either before the competent Higher Court of
Justice or before the Supreme Court, depending on the hierarchical position of the judge in
question.

112. If a judge considers that his independence is being disturbed or interfered with, he or she may so
inform the GCJ, although neither the latter nor any other subordinate organ of government of the
judiciary may issue general or specific instructions concerning the interpretation or application of
the law by judges pursuant to their judicial powers.

III. ANALYSIS

a. A policy for the prevention of corruption

113. In the light of the information gathered, the GET noted that Spain has been affected, particularly in
the early and mid-1990s, by a significant number of corruption cases concerning prominent political
figures, high officials and business leaders. Most of these cases attracted considerable media
attention, as they were being investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated by the Spanish courts.
However, the GET observed that there seemed to be little knowledge about the true extent of the
corruption phenomenon in the country, even if the 2000 Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index and domestic sociological studies
23
provide useful indications in this regard. The
GET was, of course, aware of the difficulties of measuring the extent of hidden corruption
phenomena.. However, the GET observed that, leaving aside the figures relating to cases dealt
with by ACPO, no comprehensive statistical information on investigated, detected, prosecuted or
adjudicated corruption cases was available in Spain.

114. The GET observed that an extensive public debate on corruption issues had taken place in Spain
in connection with the different scandals that came to light in the nineties. Many parliamentary
debates and political statements have been devoted to the problem of corruption, which
prompted the Government to take important measures such as the creation of ACPO. The GET
observed that the awareness which developed in Spain about the danger of corruption did not
lead to the adoption of a comprehensive and multidisciplinary anti-corruption strategy, including,
in addition to repressive elements, preventive, educational, research and other elements The
GET underlined, in this respect, its conviction that such an strategy is essential in order to ensure
a coordinated approach among the different authorities involved in the struggle to successfully
eliminate and prevent corruption. The GET considered that additional efforts would be necessary
to raise the awareness of Spanish public officials and institutions about the need to remain
vigilant and report any suspicion of corrupt practices to the competent authorities. Moreover, the

23
See 7.
20
GET noted that Spain is the only GRECO member, which has not signed any of the Council of
Europe conventions on corruption.

115. Therefore, the GET recommended the Spanish authorities to draw up an overall multidisciplinary
strategy, involving the different authorities concerned in the prevention, detection and
prosecution of corruption offences and, in this context, to conduct research on the extent and
typologies of corruption phenomena in Spain and compile detailed statistics about detected
corruption cases The Spanish authorities could also consider, in this connection, signing the
Criminal and/or the Civil law Convention (s) on corruption, as a visible element of such a
strategy.

b. Institutions, bodies and services dealing with the prevention, investigation, prosecution
and adjudication of corruption offences

116. In spite of the above, the GET noted that the Spanish authorities had reacted promptly to high-
level political corruption scandals by enacting new criminal legislation and setting up a special
anti-corruption prosecution office the ACPO- within the State prosecution Service (SPS). The
GET considered that the setting up of the ACPO was a crucial step in the fight against corruption
in Spain. It welcomed its multidisciplinary character, which brings together prosecutors, tax
inspectors, civil service inspectors as well as police officers (Civil Guard and National Police), the
high degree of specialisation of its staff and its deep involvement in all major corruption cases in
the last years. In the GETs opinion, the ACPO indeed provides the basis for an efficient
prosecution of corruption offences.

117. Given that ACPO is called to intervene everywhere in the Spanish territory to deal with the most
complicated and serious corruption and corruption-related crimes, which often have nation-wide
impact and international connections, the GET considered that it was too modestly staffed (11
prosecutors) to be able to cope effectively with all the important tasks attributed to it although the
Head of the ACPO declared that the resources put at his Offices disposal were quite substantial
if compared with those of other prosecution offices in Spain. Moreover, it observed the selective
approach followed to define ACPOs jurisdiction, which seeks to concentrate, in view of the
limited resources available, on the most serious corruption cases. Thus, the vast majority of
corruption cases, which do not fill the criteria for attribution to ACPO, fall under the ordinary
jurisdiction of the competent local/provincial/regional prosecution office. The GET also realised
that territorial prosecution offices lacked any special units, specially trained prosecutors or
administrative support to investigate, gather the evidence and bring charges in corruption cases.
It is true that they could request ACPO support in specific cases, but in view of the limited
resources at ACPOs disposal, such support was unlikely to meet the needs of an efficient
investigation and prosecution of complex corruption offences. The GET noted that Law 10/95
provides the possibility for the SAG to appoint special anti-corruption delegates in territorial SPS
offices. Such possibility has been used only in Barcelona and Valencia.

118. Consequently the GET recommended, firstly, to strengthen the ACPO by providing it, within the
limits of general budgetary constraints, with additional resources, in particular additional staff,
with a view to enabling it to deal more effectively with its tasks and support the territorial SPS
offices dealing with corruption cases. It further recommended to make a more extensive use of
the possibility offered by Law 10/95 of appointing special SAG delegates entrusted with the task
of investigating and prosecuting corruption-related offences in major cities, attached to the
ACPO, and composed of experienced and specially trained prosecutors assisted by equally
qualified police officers and officials.
21
119. The GET noted with satisfaction the high degree of independence of the Spanish judiciary.
According to the Constitution, judges are independent, irremovable and subject only to the rule of
law. It observed that it is a criminal offence for a member of the Government, other judges or any
other person or body to exert any pressure on a judge in the performance of his or her functions.
In the GETs view, judicial independence is also fostered by the fact that the Judiciary has its
own governing body the GCJ- empowered to take decisions, inter alia, in the judges
recruitment, training, career, including promotions, disciplinary proceedings and sanctions. The
fact that the Spanish legal system does not allow for the executive or the legislative powers to
interfere in these areas, is a valuable safeguard, which contributes to preserve the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary and its ability to deal with corruption cases free from political
influence or pressure.

120. The GET further noted that the investigating judge is a fundamental figure in the criminal
procedure, as it is currently organised by Spanish law. Once in charge of the case, even ex
officio, the investigating judge is the master of the procedure, extensive powers being conferred
upon him/her to direct the investigation, adopt provisional measures, gather evidence and
generally prepare the case for a decision on the merits by the competent court.

121. The GET observed that the Audiencia Nacional, a centralised judicial body, has become with
time, a highly specialised jurisdiction dealing with most serious financial crime and corruption
cases and with extensive powers in the field of international co-operation. It pointed out the key
role played by the central investigating judges of the Audiencia Nacional, empowered to direct
the investigations on the whole of the Spanish territory.

122. With regard to the SPS the GET noted that according to the Constitution, the SAG is appointed
by the King on a proposal by the Government, which is empowered to dismiss the SAG at any
time. Therefore, in order to remain in his or her post the SAG must keep the Governments
confidence. The GET observed, in this connection, that it is for the Government also to appoint
the Head of the ACPO, upon a proposal made by the SAG after consulting the Attorney General
Council. In addition, the SAG has the power to withdraw a case from ACPOs jurisdiction.

123. Besides, the GET took note that the SPS discharges its duties with due respect to the principles
of unity of action and hierarchical dependency. This means, inter alia, that the SAG is
empowered to give instructions to the individual prosecutor dealing with a case. The statute of
the SPS provides for specific rules to settle disputes between the SAG and an individual
prosecutor objecting to the instructions received. In any case, if no agreement is reached, the
SAGs opinion will prevail, although a prior consultation of the SPSs statutory bodies is required.

124. Thus, the GET reached the conclusion that the SPS and consequently the ACPO - did not enjoy
the same degree of independence and operational autonomy as judges. The GET was
nonetheless aware of the fact that the Spanish legal system provides for some safeguards to
prevent cases from being arbitrarily abandoned or charges from being dropped. First, the
principle of mandatory prosecution, according to which, if there is enough evidence that an
offence has been committed, the prosecutor must press charges against the perpetrator(s).
Second, that regardless of the prosecutors decision not to pursue the case further, the final
decision lies always with the IJ. Finally, the Spanish legal system provides for ample
opportunities for any member of the public (not only the victim of the offence) to institute a
criminal action and eventually press charges against the suspect even if the prosecutor refuses
to do so.

22
125. According to the information provided to the GET, the Spanish Government does not, in practice,
give instructions to prosecutors in charge of individual cases. Besides, the GET was not aware of
any particular case in which political influence would have been exerted on a prosecutor dealing
with a corruption case. However, insofar as such instructions are possible under Spanish law, the
GET recommended the Spanish authorities to [] guarantee that the nature and the scope of the
powers of the Government in relation to the SPS be established by law, and that any future
exercise of such powers be made in a transparent way and in accordance with international
treaties, national legislation and the general principles of law. The GET further recommended
that instructions of a general nature be made public in writing and that instructions to prosecute
in a specific case carry adequate guarantees of transparency and equity, the prosecutor in
charge of the case being entitled to submit to the court any legal arguments of his/her choice,
even where they are under a duty to reflect in writing the instructions received. In addition, the
GET recommended to the Spanish authorities [] that instructions not to prosecute in a specific
case be in principle prohibited or remain exceptional and subject to appropriate specific control
24
.

126. The GET also noted that the ACPO was dependent for its budget upon the budget of the SPS,
which is, in turn, part of the budget of the Ministry of Justice. This could have an incidence on the
publics perception of the ACPOs independence. The GET therefore recommended to the
Spanish authorities to take particular care to ensure that this financial dependency does not
diminish the SPSs independence.

c. Sources of information

127. The GET observed that all public officials were under the obligation to report to law-enforcement
authorities any criminal offence coming to their knowledge and that failure to comply with such
obligation could be sanctioned under Article 262 of the Code of criminal procedure. Besides, it
noted that a series of specialised economic and financial institutions responsible for auditing
public accounts and fighting money laundering, although not specifically dealing with corruption-
related offences, were in a position to contribute incidentally but efficiently, in the course of their
work, to the fight against corruption by unveiling suspect transactions and practices by the
national, regional or local administrations that may be hiding acts of corruption. In this
connection, the GET noted with satisfaction the numerous reports of suspect transactions
transmitted by SEBLAN to ACPO, which enable the launching of procedures to determine the
possible corrupt origin of suspected funds.

128. In spite of this favourable legal and institutional framework, the GET noted that no information
was available regarding the sanctions taken against civil servants for failing to comply with Article
259 of the Code of criminal procedure. In addition, the GET learnt with concern that in practice
those authorities competent to investigate and prosecute acts of corruption rarely receive any
suspicion reports from public administrations. The fact that investigations on corruption are
triggered by media reports or by reports from specialised economic and financial institutions
rather than by suspicion reports emanating from public officials, civil service inspectors or
supervisory bodies could be indicative, in the GETs view, of insufficient awareness in the civil
service of the need to co-operate with law-enforcement authorities and of the need to improve
co-ordination between the different authorities involved in the fight against corruption. The GET
reiterated, in this context, the recommendation made above (cf. paragraph 112) on the drawing
up of an overall and multidisciplinary strategy for the prevention of corruption which would steer

24
See Council of Europe Recommendation No R (2000) 19 on the Role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system.
23
awareness among Spanish officials about the dangers of corruption and stress the need to
remain vigilant, in particular in vulnerable sectors, and report existing signs of corrupt practices
to the authorities in charge of detecting, investigating and prosecuting corruption offences.

129. The GET welcomed recent legislative changes introduced by the Government department
responsible for the civil service with a view to introducing ethical principles and promoting models
of good practice in the ethical field. It recalled that Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Model Code of
Conduct for public officials appended to Recommendation (2000) 10 on Codes of conduct for
public officials - provides that public officials should report to the competent authorities any
evidence, allegation or suspicion of unlawful or criminal activity relating to the public service
coming to his or her knowledge in the course of, or arising from, his or her employment. The
GET considered that the adoption of a National Code of conduct for public officials, in line with
the Model Code as recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, could
be a useful tool to raise awareness among Spanish officials and increase the number of reports
on possible corrupt practices as well as the general level of co-operation with those investigating
and prosecuting corruption offences.

130. The GET observed that the provisions of the Law on Criminal Procedure dealing with the
investigation of criminal offences were equally applicable to the investigation of corruption related
offences. It noted that, according to the Constitution, only the investigating judge is competent to
authorise, in the course of criminal investigations, a limited range of measures which could
interfere in the exercise of the suspects fundamental rights and freedoms. It also noted that a
strict application of the principle of proportionality is required by the Constitutional courts case
law to justify the adoption of such measures.

131. The GET noted that specific legislative measures had been introduced in Spain to protect
witnesses and other persons who co-operate with the judicial authorities. Spanish law provides
for the possibility of withholding the disclosure of witness identity during the investigation of the
case, of testifying without being seen by the suspect and his or her lawyer, and of providing new
identity and financial means to witnesses at risk. Spanish law does not permit the possibility of
anonymous witnesses.

132. The GET took note that Organic Law 5/1999 had recently amended the Law on Criminal
Procedure, including new provisions (Articles 263 bis and 282 bis), which empower Investigating
judges and Public prosecutors to authorise the use of controlled deliveries (in this case the
authorisation by head of Judicial police is also possible) and undercover agents in the
investigation of a list of serious offences committed by organised criminal groups. It noted,
however, that corruption offences were not included in the list of serious offences and was told
that this was due to the fact that such means were considered to be of a limited use in the
context of investigation of corruption offences.

133. This being so, the GET recommended to extend the scope of Articles 263 bis and 282 bis of the
Law on criminal procedure to enable the use of controlled deliveries and undercover agents in
the investigation of corruption related offences committed by organised criminal groups.

134. The GET additionally observed that the above-mentioned powers were given indeed to the
ADPO, which, in addition, has wide powers to summon, without a prior judicial authorisation, the
Civil service, banks and other financial institutions and private individuals to disclose all
information necessary for the investigation of the economic and financial situation of a suspect.
The GET noted that the ACPO did not have such powers. Without taking a stand on whether
24
such invasive powers were strictly necessary in the context of the investigation of corruption
offences and although in practice the ACPO manages to obtain such information without
particular difficulties, the GET was of the opinion that insofar as they were available for the
investigation of certain serious crimes they should also be available for the investigation of
corruption, which, just as much as money laundering, can usually be tracked from the transaction
back to the source.

135. Thus, the GET also recommended to confer upon the ACPO similar powers to those conferred
upon the ADPO to summon public and private individuals and authorities to disclose the
information in their possession which would reveal the economic situation of the suspect.

d. Immunities

136. The GET considered that the scope of the procedural immunity afforded to members of
parliament and judges was generally acceptable, particularly in view of the fact that the
Constitutional Court through various decisions has provided clear indications on the nature and
extent of these immunities, stressing that they are not personal privileges but attached to a
function and with a view to ensuring that these functions are discharged effectively.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

137. Spain has been affected by corruption to an extent which is difficult to evaluate with precision.
Major political corruption scandals drew considerable media attention in the early-90s, lead to
many parliamentary debates on the subject and prompted the Government to take important
counter-measures. However, little information is available on the number of detected,
investigated, prosecuted or adjudicated corruption cases. No detailed statistics or research had
been elaborated to measure the extent of corruption phenomena in the country. The GET
realised that although a collective awareness had emerged in Spain of the dangers entailed by
corruption, this had not lead to the elaboration of an overall and multidisciplinary strategy in this
field involving all authorities concerned, promoting awareness among public officials about the
dangers of corruption and encouraging them to report to the law-enforcement authorities any
suspicions of corrupt practices.

138. This being so the GET considered, however, that the setting up of the Special anti-corruption
Prosecution Office (ACPO) was a crucial step forward. Indeed, the ACPO represents a highly
specialised and effective instrument to combat corruption. Prosecutors and officers assigned to it
have not only undergone general training in handling corruption-related offences but also have
particular experience in the field. Thus, the ACPO follows a multidisciplinary approach which is
essential to fight corruption successfully. However, the ACPO is only competent for certain
cases, although these are the most significant ones. It is also competent to assist any prosecutor
investigating into a corruption case anywhere in the country. The GET expressed some concern
about the limited resources, particular staff, available to the ACPO and about the lack of
specialised units or support for other prosecution services dealing with the great majority of less
notorious corruption cases.

139. The GET acknowledged that the independence of the Spanish judiciary was constitutionally
safeguarded and that Government and Parliament had no competence over the recruitment,
career, training and disciplinary sanctions of judges, matters which fall under the jurisdiction of
the General Council of the Judiciary, the governing body of the Spanish judiciary. It also noted
that the investigating judge plays a key role in the Spanish criminal procedure and that the
25
Audiencia Nacional has become a specialised jurisdiction which deals with serious cases
relating to economic crime and corruption. However, the GET observed that the State
Prosecution Service (SPS) has a lower degree of independence than the judiciary on account of
the rules for appointing and dismissing the State Attorney General and the latters powers to give
instructions to the prosecutor in charge of the specific case. The SPSs budgetary dependency
on the Ministry of Justice could contribute to the perception of a certain degree of SPS
dependency on the executive. The GET noted, however, that there are safeguards to prevent
cases from being unreasonably abandoned or charges from being arbitrarily dropped, such as
the principle of legality, the power of the investigating judge to continue with the case and the
large possibilities offered to the victims and citizens in general to exercise a criminal action.
Moreover, the GET further pointed out that, in practice, the public service, acting quite differently
from different supervisory bodies in the financial sector, very seldom report to the ACPO or the
police indications of possible acts of corruption. The GET criticised the fact that certain
investigative techniques, available in the investigation of some serious offences, could not be
used for the purpose of detecting or gathering evidence of serious corruption offences.

140. In view of the above, GRECO addressed the following recommendations to Spain:

i. to draw up an overall multidisciplinary strategy, involving the different authorities
concerned in the prevention, detection and prosecution of corruption offences and, in this
context, to conduct research on the extent and typologies of corruption phenomena in
Spain and compile detailed statistics about detected corruption cases; the Spanish
authorities could also consider, in this connection, signing the Criminal and/or the Civil law
Convention (s) on corruption, as a visible element of such a strategy;

ii. to strengthen the ACPO by providing it, within the limits of general budgetary constraints,
with additional resources, in particular additional staff, with a view to enabling it to deal
more effectively with its tasks and support the territorial SPS offices dealing with corruption
cases;

iii. to make more extensive use of the possibility offered by Law 10/95 of appointing special
SAG delegates entrusted with the task of investigating and prosecuting corruption-related
offences in major cities, attached to the ACPO, and composed of experienced and
specially trained prosecutors assisted by equally qualified police officers and officials;

iv. to guarantee that the nature and the scope of the powers of the Government in relation to
the SPS be established by law, exercised in a transparent way and in accordance with
international treaties, national legislation and the general principles of law, that instructions
of a general nature be made public in writing and that instructions to prosecute in a
specific case carry adequate guarantees of transparency and equity, the prosecutor being
entitled to submit to the court any legal arguments of their choice, even where they are
under a duty to reflect in writing the instructions received;

v. to guarantee that instructions not to prosecute in a specific case, be prohibited in principle
or remain exceptional and subject to appropriate specific controls;

vi. to take particular care to ensure that the financial dependency of SPS does not diminish its
independence;

26
vii. reiterated, in this context, the recommendation made above (cf. i.) on the drawing up of an
overall and multidisciplinary strategy for the prevention of corruption which would steer
awareness among Spanish officials about the dangers of corruption and stress the need to
remain vigilant, in particular in vulnerable sectors, and report existing signs of corrupt
practices to the authorities in charge of detecting, investigating and prosecuting corruption
offences;

viii. to consider the possibility of adopting a National Code of conduct for public officials, in line
with the Model Code as recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe in Recommendation R (2000) 10, which could be a useful tool to raise awareness
among Spanish officials and increase the number of reports on possible corrupt practices
as well as the general level of co-operation with those investigating and prosecuting
corruption offences;

ix. to extend the scope of Articles 263 bis and 282 bis of the Law on criminal procedure to
enable the use of controlled deliveries and undercover agents in the investigation of
corruption related offences committed by organised criminal groups;

x. to confer upon the ACPO similar powers to those conferred upon the ADPO to summon
public and private individuals and authorities to disclose the information in their possession
which would reveal the economic situation of the suspect;

141. Moreover, the GRECO invites the authorities of Spain to take account of the observations made
by the experts in the analytical part of this report.

142. Finally, in conformity with article 30.2 of the Rules of Procedure, GRECO invites the authorities of
Spain to present a report on the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations
before 31 December 2002.


27
APPENDIX I

Programme of the visit


Tuesday, 7
th
November

10.00 Welcome to the evaluation team in the Ministry of Justice
Presentation on the programme of the visit.
11.00 Interview with the Secretary of State of Justice, Mr. Jos Mara Michavila
11.30 Visit to Special Public Prosecutors Office for Economic Crimes
14.00 Working lunch with the members of the Special Public Prosecutors Office for Economic
Crimes.
16.00 Continuation of visit. Meeting with members of the Judicial Police and Civil Guard attached to
this Office.


Wednesday, 8
th
November

9.00 Visit to Audiencia Nacional. Interview with the President of Audiencia Nacional and judges of
this Court.
12.00 Visit to SPS. Interview with the Attorney General and members of the Technical Secretariat of
this Prosecution Service.
17.00 Meeting with national media representatives, specialized in corruption matters.


Thursday, 9
th
November

10.00 Meeting in the Bank of Spain with representatives of:

Executive Service of the Commission of the Bank of Spain for Prevention of Money-
Laundering and Financial Offences.
Directorate General of Treasure and Financial Policy.
Office of the Comptroller General of the Administration of the State.
Service of Inspection of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

16.00 Visit to Directorate General of Civil Service of the Ministry of Public Administrations


Friday, 10
th
November

10.00 Final meeting of the evaluation team in the Ministry of Justice with representatives of:

Directorate General of Legislation Policy and International Legal Co-operation.
Special Public Prosecutors Office for Economic Crimes.
International Legal Consultants of the Foreign Office.
28

APPENDIX II

Spanish Criminal Code


TITLE XIV

On offences against the Public Treasury and Social Security

Article 305.

1. Any person who through action or omission, defrauds the national, autonomous or
local Treasury by evading payment of taxes, amounts retained at source or amounts that should have
been retained or payments derived from remuneration in kind, obtaining fraudulent tax rebates or
enjoying other forms of improper fiscal benefits through the same action or omission, when the amount
of the defrauded tax payable, or the amount not paid in retained taxes or the amount of the fraudulently
obtained rebate or other fiscal benefit improperly enjoyed, exceeds the amount of fifteen million
pesetas, will be punished with a prison sentence of one to four years and a fine of up to six times said
amount.

The upper half of the scale of sanctions stated in the previous paragraph will be applied when
the fraud is made with the concurrence of any of the following circumstances:

a) The use of intermediate person or persons in such a way that the identity of the party
truly obliged to pay the tax is concealed.
b) The transcendence or seriousness of the fraud in terms of the defrauded amount or the
existence of an organised structure that affects or could affect a large number of
taxpayers.

In addition to the sanctions mentioned, the perpetrator will lose the right to obtain grants or
public subsidies and the right to enjoy benefits or fiscal incentives or Social Security incentives for a
period of three to six years.

2. For the purposes of determining the amounts established in the previous paragraph, if
it concerns periodical or periodical declarations of taxes, retentions, payments on account or rebates, it
will be the amount defrauded within the corresponding fiscal period or declaration, and if this period
should be less than twelve months, the defrauded amount will correspond to the period of one year. In
any other case, the amount will be understood to refer to each of the different concepts for which a
taxable circumstance is susceptible to payment.

3. The same sanctions will be imposed when the conduct described in the first section of
this article is committed against the Public Treasury of the Autonomous Communities Regions), when
the defrauded amount exceeds the amount of 50.000 ecus.

4. Any person who regularises his fiscal situation in terms of the debts that are referred to
in the first section of this article, before the Tax Authority have given notice of any investigative actions
to determine the fiscal debts that are to be regularised, or in the event of such actions not being
undertaken, before the Public Prosecutor, the State Lawyer or the Representative of the Regional or
Local Administration have laid a complaint or brought an action against said person, or when the Public
29
Prosecutor or the Examining Judge carry out actions that will allow said person to have formal notice of
the commencement of proceedings, will be exempt of criminal liability.

The exemption from criminal liability described in the previous paragraph will likewise apply to
said subject for possible accounting irregularities or other instrumental falsifications that, exclusively in
connection with the fiscal debts subject to regularisation, may have taken place, prior to the
regularisation of said persons fiscal situation.

Article 306.

Any person who through action or omission defrauds the Autonomous Communities' General
Budget or other funds administrated by the Communities, for an amount exceeding fifty thousand ecus,
evading the payments which should be paid in or using the funds obtained for any purpose other than
that for which they were supposed to be used, will be punished with a prison sentence of one to four
years and a fine of up to six times said amount.

Article 307.

1. Any person who through action or omission, defrauds the Social Security so as to
evade the payment of the relevant contributions and concepts of joint tax collection, obtaining improper
rebates or enjoying allowances that are similarly undue and fraudulent, when the amount of defrauded
contributions or rebates or allowances exceeds fifteen million pesetas, will be punished with a prison
sentence of one to four years and a fine of six times said amount.

The upper half of the scale of sanctions stated in the previous paragraph will be applied when
the fraud is made with the concurrence of any of the following circumstances:

a) The use of intermediate person or persons in such a way that the identity of the party truly
obliged to contribute to the Social Security the tax is concealed.
b) The transcendence or seriousness of the fraud in terms of the defrauded amount or the
existence of an organised structure that affects or could affect a large number of
contributors to the Social Security.

2. For the purposes of determining the amount mentioned in the previous paragraph, it
will be considered as being that defrauded in each settlement, rebate or allowance, and when these
correspond to a period of less than twelve months, the amount will refer to a natural year.

3. Any person who regularises his contributory position with the Social Security in
connection with the debts referred to in the point 1 this article, before being notified of the
commencement of inspection actions carried out to determine said debts or, in the case that said
actions have not been initiated, before the Public Prosecutor or the Social Security Lawyer lays a
complaint or brings an action against said person, will be exempt of criminal liability.

The exemption from criminal liability described in the previous paragraph will likewise apply to
said subject for possible instrumental falsifications that, exclusively in connection with the debt subject
to regularisation, may have taken place, prior to the regularisation of said persons contributory
situation.

30
Article 308.

1. Any person who obtains a grant, a tax allowance or subsidies from public
Administrations for more than ten million pesetas, by falsifying the conditions required for its concession
or concealing information that would have prevented its authorisation, will be punished with a prison
sentence of one to four years and a fine of up to six times said amount.

2. The same sanctions will be imposed on any person who in the performance of an
activity funded by grants from Public Administration for an amount exceeding ten million pesetas, does
not comply with the established conditions, by substantially altering the ends for which the grants were
conceded.

3. In addition to the sanctions mentioned, the perpetrator will lose the right to obtain
grants or public subsidies and the right to enjoy benefits or fiscal incentives or Social Security
incentives for a period of three to six years.

4. Any person who in respect of the grants, allowances or subsidies referred to in the first
and second sections of this article, repays the amounts received, increased by interest calculated from
the time the funds were received at a rate equivalent to the legal rate of interest plus two percentage
points, before said person has been notified of the initiation of inspection actions or control in respect of
said grants, allowances or subsidies, or in the event of said actions not being undertaken, before the
Public Prosecutor, the Treasury Counsel or the Representative of the Autonomous or Local
Administration should lay a complaint or bring an action against said person, will be exempt from
criminal liability.

The exemption from criminal liability described in the previous paragraph will likewise apply to
that person for possible instrumental falsifications that, exclusively in connection with the debt subject
to regularisation, may have taken place, prior to the regularisation of said persons contributory
situation.

Article 309.

Whoever improperly obtains funds from the General Budgets of the Communities or other
funds administrated by such bodies, for an amount exceeding fifty thousand ecus, by falsifying the
conditions required for their granting or by concealing information that would have prevented its
authorisation, will be punished with a prison sentence of one to four years and a fine of six times said
amount.

Article 310.

Any person who is obliged by the Tax Legislation to keep mercantile accounts, trading books or
fiscal registers will be punished with arrest for of between seven to fifteen weekends and a fine of three
to ten months should said person:

a) Neglect absolutely the duties and obligations imposed in respect of the direct
estimation of fiscal bases regime.
b) Maintain different sets of accounts for the same activity and financial year that hide or
simulate the company's true situation.
c) Not annotate in the mandatory books, the business, activities, operations or in general,
economic transactions, or annotates figures different from the true ones.
31
d) Enter fictitious accounting entries in the mandatory registers.

The consideration as an offence of the situations referred to in c) and d) will require that the tax
declarations were not made, or that those that were presented were a reflection of falsified accounts
and that the amount, overstated or understated, of the charges or payments omitted or falsified
exceeds, without arithmetic compensation between them, the amount of thirty million pesetas for each
fiscal year.

TITLE XIX

Offences against Public Administration

CHAPTER I

On the prevarication of public officials and other improper behaviour

Article 404.

Any public authority or official that knowingly dictates an arbitrary decision in any
administrative case will be punished with specific disqualification from public
employment or post for a period of seven to ten years.

Article 405.

Any public authority or official that, in the exercise of his competence and aware of the illegality,
proposes, appoints or concedes the post of a determined public office to any person without the legally
established requirement being fulfilled, will be punished with a fine of three to eight months and the
suspension from work or public office for a period of six months to two years.

Article 406.

The same fine will be imposed on the person that accepts the proposal, appointment or takes
possession of the post mentioned in the previous paragraph, knowing that he does do not fulfil the legal
requirements established.

Article 418.

The individual that takes advantage, for himself or for third parties, of secret or price-sensitive
information obtained from a public official or authority, will be punished with a fine of up to three times
the benefit obtained or provided. If the event causes serious damage to the public cause or to a third
party, the punishment will be a prison sentence of one to six years.

32
CHAPTER V

On bribery

Article 419.

The public authority or official that, for own benefit or that of a third party, asks for or receives,
directly or through an intermediary, a gift, or presents or accepts an offer or promise for carrying out,
while performing his task, any action or omission that may constitute an offence, will be punished with a
prison sentence of two to six years, a fine of up to three times the value of said gift and the specific
disqualification from any public employment or post for seven to twelve years, irrespective of the penal
sanctions corresponding to the crime committed by virtue of gift or promise.

Article 420.

The public authority or official that, for own benefit or that of a third party, asks for or receives,
directly or through an intermediary, a gift, or presents or accepts an offer or promise for carrying out, in
the course of performing his task, any unjust action or omission that does not constitute a criminal
offence and does in fact execute the unjust action or omission, will be punished with a prison sentence
of one to four years, and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for six to nine
years, and if the act or omission is not executed, the prison term will be from one to two years and
specific disqualification from any employment or post for three to six years. In both cases, in addition a
fine of up three times the value of the gift will be imposed.

Article 421.

When the requested, received or promised gift should be in exchange for the public authority or
official not carrying out an act that they should while performing his task, the punishment will be a fine
of up to double the amount of the gift and the specific disqualification from any public employment or
post for a period of one to three years.

Article 422.

The foregoing provisions will be equally applicable to juries, arbitrators, experts, or any other
person that participates in exercising the public function.

Article 423.

1. Any person who corrupts or attempts to corrupt, through the use of sops, gifts, offers or
promises, the public authorities or officials will be punished with the same custodial and
financial sanctions as the public authorities or officials themselves.
2. Any person who attends to such requests from public authorities or officials will be
punished with sanctions one grade lower than those described in the previous
paragraph.

Article 424.

When bribery is involved in a criminal cause to the favour of the offender, and committed by the
spouse, common law spouse, ascendant, descendant or sibling, natural or by adoption, the briber will
be punished with a fine of three to six months.
33

Article 425.

1. The public authority or official that solicits a gift or presents or accepts an offer or
promise so as to carry out an act inherent to their duty, or as recompense for an act
already carried out, will be punished with a fine of up to three times the value of the gift
and suspension from practise for a period of six months to three years.

2. In the case of recompense for an action already performed, if this were to constitute an
offence, in addition a penalty of a prison sentence of one to three years, a fine of six to
ten months and the specific disqualification from any employment or post for a period of
ten to fifteen years would be imposed.

Article 426.

The public authority or functionary that accepts a gift that is offered to him in consideration of
said persons function or for the performance of an action that is not legally prohibited, will be punished
with a fine of three to six months.

Article 427.

Any person who has acceded occasionally to a request for a gift from a public authority or
functionary and has notified the relevant authority responsible for investigating such a circumstance,
before the commencement of the corresponding legal procedures and no more than ten days after the
date of such an event, will be exempt of any penalty for the offence of bribery.

CHAPTER VI

On the trading in influence

Article 428.

The public authority or functionary that influences another public authority or functionary, on the
exercise of the authority of their rank or any other situation derived from their personal or hierarchical
relationship with this person or with any other authority or functionary so as to attain a resolution which
may directly or indirectly generate an economical benefit for such a person or third party, will be
punished with a prison sentence of six months to one year, a fine of up to double said benefit or gain,
and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of three to six years. If the
benefit sought was indeed obtained the sanctions to be applied will be in the upper half of the scale.

Article 430.

Those that offer to carry out the actions described in the previous articles, requesting sops,
gifts or any other remuneration, from third parties, or accept offers or promises, will be punished with a
prison sentence of six months to one year.

In any of the cases that this article refers to, the judicial authority may also impose the
suspension of activities of the society, company, organisation or office and the closure of its facilities
open to the public for a period of six months to three years.

34
Article 431.

In all the cases reviewed in this chapter and the previous, the sops, gifts or presents will be
confiscated.

CHAPTER VII

On Misappropriation of Public Funds

Article 432.

1. The public authority or functionary that, so as to profit, takes or allows a third party, with
the same aim, to take the public funds that are in said persons charge due to their
position, will be punished with a prison sentence of three to six years and absolute
disqualification for the period of six to ten years.

2. The penalty of a four to eight year prison sentence and absolute disqualification for ten
years will be imposed if the misappropriation of funds were especially serious in terms
of the amounts stolen or the damage thereby caused or loss produced to the public
service. The same sanctions will be imposed if the misappropriated objects have been
declared to have historical or artistic value, or if they are goods destined to assuage
any public calamity.

3. When the misappropriation is less than five hundred thousand pesetas, there will be a
fine of between two and four months, a prison sentence of six months to three years
and suspension from practise for six months to one year.

Article 433.

The public authority or official that uses public funds or resources at their disposal due to the
nature of their post, for ends other than for the public cause, will be punished with a fine of six to twelve
months and suspension from practise for six months to three years.

If the guilty person does not repay the stolen amounts within ten days after the commencement
of the legal proceedings, he will be punished with the sanctions contemplated in the previous article.

Article 434.

The public official or authority that, for their own or any other partys profit, and causing loss to
the public services, gives any private application to movable or immovable goods belonging to any
autonomic or local state Administration or Entity or Bodies depending on these, will be punished with a
prison sentence of one to three years and specific disqualification from any employment or post for a
period of three to six years.

Article 435.

The provisions of this chapter extend to:

1. Those that are in charge, for any reason, of funds, revenues or effects belonging to
public Administrations.
35

2. Those legally designated as holders of public sums or effects.

3. Those administrators or depositories of money and embargoed goods, confiscated or
deposited by the public authorities, even though these may belong to private
individuals.

CHAPTER VIII

On fraud and illegal levy

Article 436.

The public authority or official that, intervening through their post in any of the actions involved
in any form of public contracting or in the disposal of public property, connives with interested parties or
uses any other method, to defraud any public entity will be punished with a prison sentence of one to
three years and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of six to ten
months.

Article 437.

The public authority or official that asks for, directly or indirectly, undue rights or duties or fees,
or being due, for amount above the legally established rates, will be punished, without prejudice to the
repayments which are legally required, with a fine of six to twenty four months and suspension from
practise for six months to four years.

Article 438.

The public authority or official that, taking advantage of his position, carries out any illegal,
deceitful or appropriation offence, will be punished with the penalties specifically assigned to these
situations, in the upper half of the applicable scale, and the specific disqualification from any public
employment or post for two to six years.

CHAPTER IX

On negotiations and activities prohibited to
Public Officials and abuse of office

Article 439.

Any public authority or public official who, being responsible for making a report, in the exercise
of his duty, concerning any contract, matter, operation or activity, takes advantage of this circumstance
to force or make easier his participation in any form, directly or through another person, in such
business or activities, will be punished with a fine ranging from twelve to twenty for months and specific
disqualification from any public employment or post from one to four years

Article 440.

Experts, arbitrators, liquidators, or disposal specialists that behave in the fashion described in
the previous article, in relation to the goods or objects in respect of which they have intervened in the
36
appraisal, division or adjudication, as well as tutors, guardians, or testamentary executors in respect of
goods belonging to their wards or the estate, will be punished with a fine of twelve to twenty four
months and the specific disqualification from public employment or post, profession or business,
guardianship, tutelage or custodianship, as the case may be, for a period of three to six years.

Article 441.

The public authority or public official who - outside situations allowed by laws and regulations -
exercises, directly or indirectly, any professional activity or gives any permanent or temporary advice,
under the dependence of or in the service of private entities or citizens, in matters in which he must
ordinarily participate or have handled, advised or decided in the office or body in which he is appointed
to or he depends on, will be punished with a fine ranging from six to twelve months, and suspension
from practise for a period of one to three years.

TITLE XIX BIS

On crimes of bribery in international commercial transactions

Article 445 Bis

Whoever that, through presents, gifts, offers or promises, bribes or tries to bribe, whether directly or
through intermediaries, authorities or public officials whether foreign or from international organizations
in the exercise of their post to the advantage of them or of a third party, or complies with their demands
in respect to this, in order that they act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business, will be punished with the penalties set forth in Article 423 in each respective case.

SECTION 2

On the usurpation of powers

Article 506.

The public authority or official that, not having the required powers, dictates a general provision
or suspends its enforcement, will be punished with a prison sentence of one to three years, a fine of six
to twelve months and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of six to
twelve years.

Article 507.

The Judge that improperly assumes administrative powers that he does not have, or impede
the legitimate exercise of them by those who do hold them, will be punished with a prison sentence of
six months to one year, a fine of three to six months and the suspension from practise for a period of
one to three years.

Article 508.

1. The public authority or official that improperly assumes judicial powers or impedes the
enforcement of a sentence passed by the competent judicial authority, will be punished with a
37
prison sentence of six months to one year, a fine of three to eight months and suspension from
practise for a period of one to three years.

2. The administrative or military authority or official that attacks the independence of Judges,
guaranteed by the Constitution, by giving them instructions, orders or intimations related to cases
or proceedings that they are judging, will be punished with a prison sentence of one to two years,
a fine of four to ten months and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a
period of two to six years.


Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.greco.coe.int
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55

DIRECTORATE GENERAL I - LEGAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIME PROBLEMS




Strasbourg, 1 July 2005 Public
Greco RC-I (2003) 7E
Addendum





First Evaluation Round







Addendum
to the Compliance Report on Spain







Adopted by GRECO
at its 24
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 27 June - 1 July 2005)
2
|. |NTR00U6T|0N

1. 0REC0 adopled lre F|rsl Rourd Eva|ual|or Reporl or 3pa|r al |ls 5
lr
P|erary Veel|rg (11-15
Jure 2001). Tr|s reporl (0reco Eva| l Rep (2001) 1E) Was rade puo||c oy 0REC0, lo||oW|rg
aulror|sal|or oy lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es or 19 Jure 2001.

2. 3pa|r suor|lled lre 3|lual|or Reporl requ|red oy 0REC0's corp||arce procedure or 31 Varcr
2003 corcerr|rg lre |rp|ererlal|or ol lre recorrerdal|ors. 0r lre oas|s ol lrese reporls ard
a P|erary deoale, 0REC0 adopled lre F|rsl Rourd Corp||arce Reporl (RC-reporl) or 3pa|r al
|ls 15
lr
P|erary reel|rg (13-1Z 0clooer 2003) Wr|cr Was rade puo||c or 1Z 0clooer 2003. Tre
Corp||arce Reporl (0reco RC-l (2003) ZE) corc|uded lral s|x ol lre ler recorrerdal|ors (||, v,
v|, v|||, |x ard x) rad oeer |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y or dea|l W|lr |r a sal|slaclor||y rarrer,
Wrereas lour ol lre recorrerdal|ors rad oeer parl|y |rp|ererled (|, |||, |v ard v||); 0REC0
requesled add|l|ora| |rlorral|or or lre|r |rp|ererlal|or. Tre add|l|ora| |rlorral|or requesled
Was suor|lled or 1Z Vay 2005.

3. Pursuarl lo Ru|e 31, paragrapr 9.1 ol 0REC0's Ru|es ol Procedure lre oojecl|ve ol lre preserl
Adderdur lo lre F|rsl Rourd Corp||arce Reporl |s lo appra|se lre |rp|ererlal|or ol
recorrerdal|ors |, |||, |v ard v||, |r lre ||grl ol lre add|l|ora| |rlorral|or relerred lo |r paragrapr
2.

||. ANALY8|8

Recommendat|on |.

1. SRE0D recommenoeo ro orau up an overa|| mu|r|o|sc|p||nar, srrareg,, |nvo|v|ng rne o|llerenr
aurnor|r|es concerneo |n rne prevenr|on, oerecr|on ano prosecur|on ol corrupr|on ollences ano, |n
rn|s conrexr, ro conoucr researcn on rne exrenr ano r,po|og|es ol corrupr|on pnenomena |n $pa|n
ano comp||e oera||eo srar|sr|cs aoour oerecreo corrupr|on cases; rne $pan|sn aurnor|r|es cou|o
a|so cons|oer, |n rn|s connecr|on, s|gn|ng rne 0r|m|na| ano/or rne 0|v|| |au 0onvenr|on {sj on
corrupr|on, as a v|s|o|e e|emenr ol sucn a srrareg,.

5. 0REC0 reca||s lral |l corc|uded |r lre RC-reporl lral, |r sp|le ol lre var|ous |ega| ard
|rsl|lul|ora| |r|l|al|ves urderla|er oy lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es |r d|llererl areas, lurlrer ellorls
reeded lo la|e p|ace |r pracl|ce lo sal|slaclor||y |rp|ererl lr|s recorrerdal|or, |rc|ud|rg
s|gralure ol lre Cr|r|ra| ard/or C|v|| LaW Corverl|ors ard rore locused reasurererl ard
ara|ys|s ol lre preroreror ol corrupl|or |r lre courlry.

. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r rave reporled lral lre ral|ora| slralegy lo coroal corrupl|or cors|sls or
severa| ru|l|d|sc|p||rary reasures, Wr|cr are ellecl|ve|y |rp|ererled |r pracl|ce, rolao|y: (|)
adopl|or ol |eg|s|al|or (rare|y, reW |eg|s|al|or or rorey |aurder|rg lrarspos|rg lre re|evarl EC
0|recl|ves |r lr|s l|e|d); (||) eslao||srrerl ol spec|a||sed ur|ls W|lr corpelerc|es |r lre l|grl
aga|rsl corrupl|or (Courl ol Aud|lors, Corr|ss|or lor lre Preverl|or ol Vorey Laurder|rg ard
F|rarc|a| 0llerces, 3pec|a| Allorrey 0erera|'s 0ll|ce lor Ecoror|c Cr|res re|al|rg lo Corrupl|or,
elc.); (|||) deve|oprerl ol |r|l|a| ard corl|ruous lra|r|rg lor puo||c oll|c|a|s address|rg lre suojecl
ol corrupl|or; (|v) |rlerral|ora| co-operal|or, as recessary. Tre aulror|l|es rave added lral
researcr or lre preroreror ol corrupl|or |s carr|ed oul, oul dela||ed slal|sl|cs aooul delecled
corrupl|or cases rave rol yel oeer galrered. F|ra||y, 3pa|r s|gred lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or
or Corrupl|or (ET3 1Z3) ard lre C|v|| LaW Corverl|or or Corrupl|or (ET3 1Z1) or 10 Vay 2005.

3
Z. 0REC0 ras la|er role ol lre |rlorral|or prov|ded ard urderslards lral reasures lo courleracl
corrupl|or corl|rue lo oe |rp|ererled |r 3pa|r; lrey a|| corsl|lule |rporlarl e|ererls ol a
ru|l|d|sc|p||rary slralegy aga|rsl corrupl|or. Furlrerrore, 0REC0 We|cores lre s|gralure ol lre
aoove-rerl|ored corverl|ors ard ercourages lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es lo lre|r lurlrer ral|l|cal|or.
loWever, ro spec|l|c exarp|es rave oeer prov|ded corcerr|rg lre corrupl|or-re|aled researcr
corducled lo dale; roreover, dela||ed slal|sl|cs aooul delecled corrupl|or rave rol yel oeer
corp||ed. Trerelore, |r 0REC0's op|r|or, rore cou|d oe dore lo reasure ard ara|yse lre
exlerl ard lypo|og|es ol corrupl|or prerorera |r 3pa|r.

8. lr lre ||grl ol lre lorego|rg, 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or | ras oeer parl|y
|rp|ererled.

Recommendat|on |||.

9. SRE0D recommenoeo ro make more exrens|ve use ol rne poss|o|||r, ollereo o, lau '0/95 ol
appo|nr|ng spec|a| $rare /rrorne, Senera| {$S/j oe|egares enrrusreo u|rn rne rask ol
|nvesr|gar|ng ano prosecur|ng corrupr|on-re|areo ollences |n maor c|r|es, arracneo ro rne $pec|a|
/rrorne, Senera|s Dll|ce lor rne Repress|on ol Econom|c Dllences re|areo u|rn 0orrupr|on
{/0PDj, ano composeo ol exper|enceo ano spec|a||, rra|neo prosecurors ass|sreo o, equa||,
qua||l|eo po||ce oll|cers ano oll|c|a|s.

10. 0REC0 reca||s lral lre RC-reporl corc|uded lral add|l|ora| ellorls rad lo oe urderla|er lo a||oW
lor lurlrer supporl serv|ces ol spec|a| 3A0 de|egales al lre |eve| ol |oca|/prov|rc|a|/reg|ora|
prosecul|or oll|ces.

11. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r rave reporled lral |rcreased oudgelary rears are a||ocaled or ar
arrua| oas|s lo slrerglrer rurar ard lecrr|ca| capac|ly ol spec|a||y lra|red puo||c proseculors
ard po||ce oll|cers. lr parl|cu|ar, s|x spec|a| 30A de|egales rave oeer appo|rled lo ass|sl |r lre
|rvesl|gal|or ard prosecul|or ol corrupl|or-re|aled ollerces al suo-ral|ora| |eve| |r A||carle, lre
8a|ear|c ls|ards, 8arce|ora, V|aga, Las Pa|ras ard Terer|le.

12. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or ||| ras oeer |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y.

Recommendat|on |v.

13. SRE0D recommenoeo ro guaranree rnar rne narure ano rne scope ol rne pouers ol rne
Sovernmenr |n re|ar|on ro rne $rare /rrorne, Senera|s Dll|ce {$P$j oe esrao||sneo o, |au,
exerc|seo |n a rransparenr ua, ano |n accoroance u|rn |nrernar|ona| rrear|es, nar|ona| |eg|s|ar|on
ano rne genera| pr|nc|p|es ol |au, rnar |nsrrucr|ons ol a genera| narure oe maoe puo||c |n ur|r|ng
ano rnar |nsrrucr|ons ro prosecure |n a spec|l|c case carr, aoequare guaranrees ol rransparenc,
ano equ|r,, rne prosecuror oe|ng enr|r|eo ro suom|r ro rne courr an, |ega| argumenrs ol rne|r
cno|ce, even unere rne, are unoer a our, ro rel|ecr |n ur|r|ng rne |nsrrucr|ons rece|veo.

11. 0REC0 reca||s lral lre RC-reporl corc|uded lral |rp|ererlal|or ol lre 2003 3P3' relorr, Wr|cr
a|red al prolecl|rg lre |rdeperderce ol lre puo||c prosecul|or serv|ces ard al errarc|rg lre|r
lrarsparercy, reeded lo oe lurlrer lesled lo assess corp||arce W|lr recorrerdal|or |v.

15. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r rave reporled lral ex|sl|rg |eg|s|al|or, |rc|ud|rg lre Acl 11/2003
arerd|rg lre 0rgar|c 3lalule ol lre 3P3, prov|des lor s|gr|l|carl saleguards lo ||r|l ard corlro|
lre ralure ard scope ol lre poWers ol lre 0overrrerl |r re|al|or lo lre 3P3. Furlrerrore, Cr|el
1
Allorreys 0erera| al lre ex|sl|rg spec|a| 3P3, |rc|ud|rg lre ACP0, are appo|rled lor a l|ve-year
per|od lo ersure aulorory ard corl|ru|ly ol lre|r rardale desp|le goverrrerla| crarges (Arl|c|e
1, Acl 11/2003). Tre aulror|l|es rave added lral a reW arerdrerl ol lre 0rgar|c 3lalule ol
lre 3P3 |s erv|saged lo slrerglrer lre 30A |rdeperderce.

1. 8ased or lre |rlorral|or supp||ed, 0REC0 We|cores lre sleps la|er oy lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es
lo |rp|ererl lr|s recorrerdal|or. ll ercourages 3pa|r lo pursue lre erv|saged |eg|s|al|ve
relorr ol lre 3P3 a|r|rg al |rcreas|rg lre 30A |rdeperderce W|lr respecl lo lre 0overrrerl.
0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or |v ras oeer dea|l W|lr |r a sal|slaclory rarrer.

Recommendat|on v||.

1Z. SRE0D re|rerareo, |n rn|s conrexr, rne recommenoar|on maoe aoove {cl. |.j on rne orau|ng up ol
an overa|| ano mu|r|o|sc|p||nar, srrareg, lor rne prevenr|on ol corrupr|on un|cn uou|o sreer
auareness among $pan|sn oll|c|a|s aoour rne oangers ol corrupr|on ano srress rne neeo ro
rema|n v|g||anr, |n parr|cu|ar |n vu|nerao|e secrors, ano reporr ex|sr|ng s|gns ol corrupr pracr|ces ro
rne aurnor|r|es |n cnarge ol oerecr|ng, |nvesr|gar|ng ano prosecur|ng corrupr|on ollences.

18. 0REC0 reca||s lral lre RC-reporl corc|uded lral lre |ssue ol spec|l|c reporl|rg pracl|ces |r
seclors al r|s| cou|d oe pa|d lurlrer allerl|or, |r parl|cu|ar |r lre ||grl ol lre l|rd|rgs ol researcr
ard ara|yses lo oe produced accord|rg lo recorrerdal|or |.

19. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r rave |rd|caled lral lra|r|rg or corrupl|or ard puo||c elr|cs |s prov|ded al
oolr lre erlry-|eve| ard lrrougroul lre adr|r|slral|ve career ol c|v|| servarls. Voreover, largeled
lra|r|rg la|es p|ace lor lrose oll|c|a|s Wrose pos|l|or |s parl|cu|ar|y vu|rerao|e lo acls ol
corrupl|or.

20. 0REC0 |s ol lre op|r|or lral a lra|r|rg sysler lor puo||c oll|c|a|s or puo||c elr|cs |s |r p|ace;
roWever, ro corcrele reasures |r lre spec|l|c serse lo ra|se puo||c oll|c|a|s' aWareress aooul
lre reed lo reporr ex|sr|ng s|gns ol corrupr pracr|ces ro rne aurnor|r|es |n cnarge ol oerecr|ng,
|nvesr|gar|ng ano prosecur|ng corrupr|on ollences, rave oeer reporled.

21. 8ased or lre |rlorral|or al |ls d|sposa|, 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or v|| ras oeer
parl|y |rp|ererled.

|||. 60N6LU8|0N

22. lr add|l|or lo lre corc|us|ors corla|red |r lre F|rsl Rourd Corp||arce Reporl or 3pa|r ard |r
v|eW ol lre aoove, 0REC0 corc|udes lral 3pa|r ras |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y, or dea|l W|lr |r a
sal|slaclory rarrer, recorrerdal|ors ||| ard |v. Recorrerdal|ors | ard v|| rave oeer parl|y
|rp|ererled. lr lr|s correcl|or, 0REC0 ercourages 3pa|r lo errarce |ls ellorls lo carry oul
researcr ard ara|ys|s or lre preroreror ol corrupl|or ard lo ersure lral parl|cu|ar allerl|or |s
pa|d |r lr|s corlexl lo spec|l|c reporl|rg pracl|ces |r seclors al r|s|. ll a|so |rv|les 3pa|r lo pursue
lre erv|saged arerdrerl ol lre 0rgar|c 3lalule ol lre 3lale Allorrey 0erera|'s 0ll|ce a|r|rg al
|rcreas|rg |rdeperderce ol lre 3lale Allorrey 0erera| W|lr respecl lo lre 0overrrerl.

23. Tre adopl|or ol lre preserl Adderdur lo lre Corp||arce Reporl lerr|rales lre F|rsl Eva|ual|or
Rourd corp||arce procedure |r respecl ol 3pa|r.
Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.greco.coe.int
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex ( +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL I LEGAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIME PROBLEMS




Strasbourg, 17 October 2003 Public
Greco RC-I (2003) 7E







First Evaluation Round







Compliance Report
on Spain







Adopted by GRECO
at its 15
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 13-17 October 2003)

2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. GRECO adopted the First Round Evaluation Report on Spain at its 5
th
Plenary Meeting (11-15
June 2001). This Report (Greco Eval I Rep (2001) 1E) was made public by GRECO, following
authorisation by the Spanish authorities on 19 June 2001.

2. In accordance with Rule 30.2 of GRECOs Rules of Procedure, the Spanish authorities submitted
their Situation Report (RS-report) on the measures taken to follow the recommendations on 31
March 2003. The information is based on the situation at this date. Spain submitted comments
and additional information on the basis of the P2 version, on the occasion of a meeting held
according to rule 28 para. 6 on 16 September 2003
1
.

3. At its 13
th
Plenary Meeting (24-28 March 2003), GRECO selected, in accordance with Rule 31.1
of its Rules of Procedure, Croatia and the United States of America to provide Rapporteurs for
the compliance procedure. The Rapporteurs appointed were Mr Ivan PLEVKO (Deputy District
Attorney, Croatia) on behalf of Croatia and Joseph GANGLOFF (Senior Counsel, Office of
International Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice) on behalf of the United States of America. The
Rapporteurs were assisted by the GRECO Secretariat in drafting the Compliance Report (RC-
Report).

4. The RC-Report was adopted by GRECO, following examination and debate pursuant to Rule
31.7 of the Rules of Procedure, at its 15
th
Plenary Meeting (13-17 October 2003).

5. Under Article 15 para. 6 of the GRECO Statute and Rule 30.2 of the Rules of Procedure, the
objective of the RC-Report is to assess the measures taken by the Spanish authorities and,
wherever possible, their effectiveness in order to comply with the Recommendations contained in
the Evaluation Report.

II. ANALYSIS

6. It was recalled that GRECO in its Evaluation Report addressed 10 recommendations to Spain.
Compliance with these recommendations is dealt with below.

Recommendation i.

7. GRECO recommended to draw up an overall multidisciplinary strategy, involving the different
authorities concerned in the prevention, detection and prosecution of corruption offences and, in
this context, to conduct research on the extent and typologies of corruption phenomena in Spain
and compile detailed statistics about detected corruption cases; the Spanish authorities could
also consider, in this connection, signing the Criminal and/or the Civil law Convention (s) on
corruption, as a visible element of such a strategy.

8. The Spanish authorities considered recommendations i. and vii. together and provided joint
information on these recommendations. A draft bill was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 17
January 2003, aimed at introducing the all crime approach as regards money laundering and
the confiscation of proceeds from crime, increase of penalties for embezzlement, measures to
curb corruption and enhance integrity in the financial markets, improvements to the control of
cash transactions and other payments etc. The Spanish authorities also indicate that attention is

1
During the discussions, the Spanish authorities emphasized that new measures have been adopted afterwards, in particular
as regards legislation enacted within a short time after the period under consideration.
3
being paid to foreign experience (e.g. the SCPC in France, or through an international Meeting of
the Committee of Experts in the Fight against Corruption, to be organised with the Iberian
American countries in December 2003). Finally, the Spanish authorities stressed the existence
and role of the different units with competencies in the fight against corruption, which were
mentioned in the evaluation report: Court of Auditors, the National Securities Exchange
Commission, the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offences,
etc. No further developments have happened as regards these bodies.

9. It is stated that technical obstacles only, relating in particular to the statute of Gibraltar, would
hinder the signature and ratification of the Criminal ands Civil Law Conventions, until the
negotiations currently under way on this issue reach a satisfactory conclusion.

10. GRECO took note of the information provided by Spain, notably the governmental draft bill.
GRECO found that no specific action plan had been initiated. On the other hand, Spain has
adopted a number of measures in different areas (new legislation on money laundering,
awareness raising as mentioned under recommendation vii., implementation of anti-corruption
conventions etc.) and the authorities maintain that these reflect the existence of a
multidisciplinary strategy. As to the measurement and analysis of the phenomenon of corruption
in Spain, GRECO would have expected more focused, responsive information. GRECO also took
note of the steps taken to remove the obstacles to the signature of the conventions.

11. GRECO concluded that recommendation i. has been partly implemented and invited Spain to
continue the analysis on the phenomenon and measurement of corruption in the country and to
provide additional information on it.

Recommendation ii.

12. GRECO recommended to strengthen the ACPO by providing it, within the limits of general
budgetary constraints, with additional resources, in particular additional staff, with a view to
enabling it to deal more effectively with its tasks and support the territorial SPS offices dealing
with corruption cases.

13. The Spanish authorities provided detailed information on the newer developments relating to the
State Prosecution Office (SPS) in general, and the Special Attorneys Office for the Repression of
Economic Offences related with Corruption (ACPO) in particular. The IT system was developed
with access to judicial database. Training in IT, specifically geared to prosecutors, was provided
in all 18 Autonomous Communities. As part of the National Agreement to Reform the Justice
System, of 2000, the number of prosecutors has constantly increased with 129 new positions in
2001 and 85 in 2002. 20 further new positions are envisaged for 2003. The number of those
working for the ACPO is 11 with a total number of staff of 71, as at the time of the evaluation visit.
However, the Spanish authorities underlined that the increase of means in the SPS also had a
beneficial impact on the ACPO.

14. GRECO took note of the information provided by Spain, including the modernisation of
communication and network facilities. As the Spanish authorities indicate, this modernisation is
meant to facilitate access to and exchange of data and information, the interconnection and
efficiency of relations between the services, etc. . It observed that the increase of staffing of the
SPS, although it did not lead to a corresponding increase at the level of the ACPO, is likely to
reduce the need for it to provide support to local/regional prosecution offices (a concern which
was expressed in the evaluation report).

4
15. GRECO concluded that recommendation ii. has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation iii.

16. GRECO recommended to make more extensive use of the possibility offered by Law 10/95 of
appointing special SAG delegates entrusted with the task of investigating and prosecuting
corruption-related offences in major cities, attached to the ACPO, and composed of experienced
and specially trained prosecutors assisted by equally qualified police officers and officials.

17. The Spanish authorities recalled the conditions under which special SAG delegates can be used
according to the law, that is to counter a significant and structural increase of the workload in a
given district/region. It has also been indicated that for the time being, there has been no such
structural need for additional SAG delegates, so that the SPS has seen no necessity to use the
possibility offered by Law 10/95. The Spanish authorities also reminded the significant increase of
the number of prosecutors and that the implementation of this recommendation is not part of the
Ministry of Justices competencies (due to the principle of self-organisation of the SPS).

18. GRECO took note of the information provided by Spain and the concern expressed in the
evaluation report as regards the lack of specialisation and support services at the level of
local/provincial/regional prosecution offices (which handle the vast majority of corruption cases).
Efforts have been made to strengthen the specialisation/training (see paragraph 35) and to
enhance the working conditions of the prosecutors and local prosecution offices (in addition to the
increase of human means). GRECO was of the opinion that these measures have to some extent
allowed to reach the same result as the one targeted by the recommendation.

19. Consequently, GRECO considered that recommendation iii. has been partly implemented and
invited the Spanish authorities to provide additional information on the use of SAG delegates in
the light of the future results of research work resulting from the recommendation i.

Recommendation iv.

20. GRECO recommended to guarantee that the nature and the scope of the powers of the
Government in relation to the SPS be established by law, exercised in a transparent way and in
accordance with international treaties, national legislation and the general principles of law, that
instructions of a general nature be made public in writing and that instructions to prosecute in a
specific case carry adequate guarantees of transparency and equity, the prosecutor being entitled
to submit to the court any legal arguments of their choice, even where they are under a duty to
reflect in writing the instructions received.

21. The Spanish authorities informed that some aspects of the SPS continue to be the subject of
periodic debates and there has been a discussion on the general framework reforming the SPS.
A draft organic law amending the Organic Statute of the SPS - is currently in Parliament
2
: it
would allow the Attorney General Council (as a representative body of public prosecutors) to
render its opinion on appointments of prosecutors. It would also provide that the Attorney General
must present to the Parliament his offices annual report - which includes the general instructions
issued (it is assumed that the Parliament would be in a position to ask him explanations on how
certain possible cases have been dealt with), and this report would be published in the official
journal, thus enhancing the transparency of the prosecutions work.


2
Act 14/2003, amending the Organic Statute of the Attorney Generals Office was adopted on 26 May.
5
22. The Spanish authorities reminded that the country has adopted a mixed model, as regards the
State Prosecution Services position. The Attorney General himself is appointed and removed by
the Government, after consultation with the General Council of the Judiciary, and the SPS is
under the authority of the Prosecutor General (principles of unity of action and hierarchical
dependence, according to Article 124 of the Constitution). However, the Government cannot give
instructions of a general or specific nature; it can only draw the attention of the Attorney General
on the relevant legal steps to be taken in relation to certain problems or events.

23. As regards the relations within the SPS, the Spanish authorities reminded that the Spanish
system is based on the principle of mandatory prosecution, and that a distinction must be made
between instructions and orders. Individual prosecutors must abide to both instructions and
orders, which are both mandatory (Article 25 of the Statute of the SPS), but orders require an
immediate behaviour (instructions are of a more general character) and may lead to serious or
very serious disciplinary liability in case of non-compliance. The Spanish authorities stressed that
consideration is currently being given to this issue in the framework of the overall reform of the
SPS (instructions and orders would be submitted in a written form so that there could be a record
of its basis and scope).

24. GRECO took note of the ongoing process of the SPS reform in Spain, and in particular the draft
amending the Statute of the SPS sent to Parliament. Various mechanisms protecting the
independence of the public prosecution services are in place and they are being reinforced by
measures favourable to greater transparency and the involvement of professional bodies dealing
with the career system within the SPS. All these new measures would need to be tested before
reaching firm conclusions.

25. For the time being, GRECO concluded that recommendation iv. has been partly implemented. It
invited Spain to report on the implementation of the new measures.

Recommendation v.

26. GRECO recommended to guarantee that instructions not to prosecute in a specific case, be
prohibited in principle or remain exceptional and subject to appropriate specific controls.

27. The Spanish authorities, in addition to the information provided under the previous
recommendation, reminded that Spain has adopted the principle of mandatory prosecution; they
also reminded the existing provisions of Article 27 of the SPS Statute.
3
According to the general
framework of the SPS under discussion (see also previous recommendation), such orders and
instructions would need to be submitted in a written form and general criteria for action would be
drafted in order to unify the practice at the level of each prosecutorial service, including territorial
services in each province/region. In addition, meetings would be held at these levels in order to

3
if the Public Prosecutor receives an order or instruction that he/she considers contrary to the laws or that, for whatever
reason, he/she considers illegitimate, the Prosecutor shall advice his/her Chief Prosecutor of his/her opinion in a reasoned
report. If the order or instruction came from the Chief Prosecutor, and if he/she does not consider the arguments alleged to
be satisfactory, he/she shall pose the question to the Board of the Prosecution Office. Once the Board renders its opinion,
the Chief Prosecutor shall render his/her final decision either to ratify or reconsider the order or instruction. If the order or
instruction came from a superior, the report shall be sent to him/her. If this superior does not accept the arguments alleged,
he/she shall decide the dispute in the same way after consulting with the Board of the Prosecution Office. If the order is given
by the State Attorney General, he/she shall decide the dispute after consulting with the Board of Court Attorney Generals. If
the superior ratifies his/her own instructions, he/she shall do so in a reasoned opinion and expressly relieve the subordinate
of any liability that could derive from its fulfillment, or alternatively, entrust the issue to another Public Prosecutor.
6
facilitate the exchange of experience and practices among prosecutors from different services
and districts.

28. GRECO took note of the reminder provided, and of the faculty for a prosecutor to disagree with a
superiors order or instruction, which may lead to the application of the collective control
mechanisms under Article 27 of the Statute. Although there can be no absolute guarantee against
a possible illegitimate order/instruction, measures aimed at reducing further such risks by
increasing opportunities for detection and accountability are in a process of adoption, and it is
assumed that general criteria for action and general meetings at the level of the different
prosecutorial services could even provide, to a certain extent, for additional safeguards.

29. GRECO was of the opinion that recommendation v. has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
The Spanish authorities might wish to submit to GRECO the general criteria to be adopted in the
future.

Recommendation vi.

30. GRECO recommended to take particular care to ensure that the financial dependency of SPS
does not diminish its independence.

31. The Spanish authorities indicated that the budget of the SPS is part of the general State Budget,
as adopted annually in Parliament, and that the institutions independence is guaranteed by the
Constitution and Organic Statute. The SPS has taken advantage of recent allocations for the
administration of justice, and infrastructure and new technologies schemes and programmes for
streamlining justice as a whole. The IT system was harmonised in all prosecutors offices and
training was provided.

32. GRECO took note of the information provided which shows that the SPS has taken advantage of
an increase of means, and was of the opinion that there are no reasons - under such
circumstances - to put the financial independence of the SPS further at question.

33. Therefore, GRECO concluded that recommendation vi. has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation vii.

34. GRECO reiterated, in this context, the recommendation made above (cf. i.) on the drawing up of
an overall and multidisciplinary strategy for the prevention of corruption which would steer
awareness among Spanish officials about the dangers of corruption and stress the need to
remain vigilant, in particular in vulnerable sectors, and report existing signs of corrupt practices to
the authorities in charge of detecting, investigating and prosecuting corruption offences.

35. Part of the information provided by the Spanish authorities is already summarized under
Recommendation i. They also reported on various training activities for judges, prosecutors,
police officers, treasury inspectors, civil servants including at the level of the National Civil
Service Institute dealing with ethics, corruption, disciplinary aspects, conflicts of interests etc.

36. GRECO took note of the information provided on awareness raising measures and valued this as
positive achievements. However, the issue of specific reporting practices in sectors at risk could
be paid further attention, in particular in the light of the findings of research and analyses to be
produced according to recommendation i.

7
37. GRECO concluded that recommendation vii. has been partly implemented. It invited Spain to
submit additional information as regards practices for the reporting of corruption and the issue of
early detection, in particular in sectors at risk.

Recommendation viii.

38. GRECO recommended to consider the possibility of adopting a National Code of conduct for
public officials, in line with the Model Code as recommended by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe in Recommendation R (2000) 10, which could be a useful tool to raise
awareness among Spanish officials and increase the number of reports on possible corrupt
practices as well as the general level of co-operation with those investigating and prosecuting
corruption offences.

39. The Spanish authorities and current debates on the necessary reform of the civil service
acknowledge the importance of codes of conducts for public officials. Codes of conducts are also
said to be increasingly popular in the public and private sector. The Ministry and the Secretary of
State for the Public Administrations (in October and November 2002) have confirmed the need for
a broad pact to reform the public administrations and the Government has proposed the creation
of a sub-commission within the Congress of Deputies to work on this pact and draft a set of basic
regulations for the civil service. The Government submitted it to the Council of State, which
according to the Spanish authorities - considered that this reform would not be compatible with
the Spanish legal tradition (in particular, it would raise the problem of the legal enforceability of
such a code). Finally, the Spanish authorities provided a comprehensive list of statutory texts
containing provisions similar to principles found in codes of conducts.

40. GRECO took note that, in accordance with the recommendation, consideration had been paid to
the adoption of a Code of Conduct for Public Officials. It also observed that the issue of ethics
relating to the performance of official duties is dealt with in a number of legal texts of a different
nature.

41. It concluded that recommendation viii. has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation ix.

42. GRECO recommended to extend the scope of Articles 263 bis and 282 bis of the Law on criminal
procedure to enable the use of controlled deliveries and undercover agents in the investigation of
corruption related offences committed by organised criminal groups.

43. The Spanish authorities take the view that the second paragraph of article 263 bis covers also
controlled deliveries of money that are carried out within the scope of article 301, that is within the
framework of offences related to money laundering. Given that the concept of controlled delivery
(as is also the case with the undercover agent) is particularly useful to combat organised crime,
the reference to article 301 would thus permit the use of this investigative technique in the most
important cases related to corruption, which frequently are derived from or give rise to money
laundering operations. It is also indicated that the Council of Ministers recently approved an
amendment to the Criminal Code which would substitute the reference, in Article 301, to goods
that are derived from a serious offence with goods that are derived from an offence. Like
Article 263 bis, Art 282 bis also refers to Article 301, regulating the laundering of money, and
which by virtue of the aforementioned reform, will define as a punishable offence the acquisition,
conversion or transmission of goods derived from any offence. And again, the set of offences
related to corruption are included among these offences.
8

44. GRECO took note of the information provided and observed that the list of offences linked with
organised crime for which the investigative measures in question can be used was not amended
to explicitly include corruption. GRECO did not disagree with the theoretical construction
submitted by the Spanish authorities and observed that, as a result of the amendment to the
Criminal Code above, the requirement of the recommendation has been met.

45. Therefore, GRECO concluded that recommendation ix. has been dealt with in a satisfactory
manner.

Recommendation x.

46. GRECO recommended to confer upon the ACPO similar powers to those conferred upon the
ADPO to summon public and private individuals and authorities to disclose the information in their
possession which would reveal the economic situation of the suspect.

47. The Spanish authorities underlined that, even though at the time of its setting up, the ADPO was
expressly granted wide powers,. in practice the ACPO has been exercising similar powers,
although they have not been formally conferred. In particular, practice has shown that its
multidisciplinary/interagency composition, with the presence of units of the tax Inspectorate and
judicial police within the ACPO allows for direct and swift access to all relevant information. This
situation was confirmed by the Head of this agency on the occasion of a statement made before
the Finance Committee of the Senate on 31 October 2000.

48. GRECO took note of the information provided, indicating that the ACPOs access to information is
broader than in the texts, has continued to evolve and is considered satisfactory by the ACPO
itself.

49. GRECO concluded that recommendation x. has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

III. CONCLUSIONS

50. GRECO reached the overall conclusion that Spain has implemented satisfactorily or is in the
process of implementing all the recommendations contained in the First Round Evaluation
Report.

51. In view of the above, GRECO concluded that recommendations ii., v., vi., viii., ix. and x. have
been implemented satisfactorily or have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
Recommendations i., iii., iv., and vii. have been partly implemented.

52. GRECO invited the authorities of Spain to submit to it additional information as well as, where
appropriate, the legal provisions relating to the implementation of recommendations i., iii., iv. and
vii.

53. Besides, the Spanish authorities might wish to submit to GRECO additional information relating to
the implementation of recommendation v.

54. GRECO invited the Head of the Spanish delegation to submit the information required by
paragraph 52 above by 31 March 2005.

Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.greco.coe.int
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55

DIRECTORATE GENERAL I - LEGAL AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIME PROBLEMS

Strasbourg, 20 May 2005 Public

Greco Eval II Rep (2004) 7E

Second Evaluation Round

Evaluation Report on Spain







Adopted by GRECO
at its 23
rd
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 17-20 May 2005)

2
|. |NTR00U6T|0N

1. 3pa|r Was lre 1
lr
0REC0 reroer lo oe exar|red |r lre 3ecord Eva|ual|or Rourd. Tre
0REC0 Eva|ual|or Tear (rerealler relerred lo as lre 0ET) Was corposed ol Vrs Arca
JuRVA, lead Proseculor, lrlerral|ora| Cooperal|or 3erv|ce, Nal|ora| Arl|corrupl|or
Proseculor's 0ll|ce, Rorar|a; Vs Jare LEY, 0epuly 0|reclor, 0overrrerl Re|al|ors ard 3pec|a|
Projecls, u.3. 0ll|ce ol 0overrrerl Elr|cs, ur|led 3lales ol Arer|ca; Vr Jace| 0AR3TKA,
Judge, 0eparlrerl ol lrlerral|ora| Co-operal|or ard Europear LaW, V|r|slry ol Jusl|ce, Po|ard.
Tr|s 0ET, accorpar|ed oy a reroer ol lre Courc|| ol Europe 3ecrelar|al, v|s|led 3pa|r lror 19-
22 0clooer 2001. Pr|or lo lre v|s|l lre 0ET experls Were prov|ded W|lr a corprerers|ve rep|y lo
lre Eva|ual|or quesl|orra|re (docurerl 0reco Eva| ll (2003) 11E), as We|| as cop|es ol re|evarl
|eg|s|al|or.

2. Tre 0ET rel W|lr lre V|r|sler ol Jusl|ce ard oll|c|a|s lror lre lo||oW|rg goverrrerla|
orgar|sal|ors: lre V|r|slry ol Jusl|ce, lre 3lale Prosecul|or 3erv|ce, lre V|r|slry ol Puo||c
Adr|r|slral|or, lre V|r|slry ol F|rarce, lre Courl ol Aud|l, lre V|r|slry ol lre lrler|or ard lre
0elerder ol lre Peop|e/0roudspersor. Voreover, lre 0ET rel W|lr reroers ol lre lo||oW|rg
ror-goverrrerla| |rsl|lul|ors: 0erera| Assero|y ol lre Jud|c|ary, c|v|| servarls' lrade ur|or
represerlal|ves ard a represerlal|ve ol a Nor-0overrrerla| 0rgar|sal|or.

3. Tre 2
rd
Eva|ual|or Rourd rurs lror 1
sl
Jaruary 2003 lo 31 0eceroer 2005, |r accordarce W|lr
Arl|c|e 10.3 ol lre 3lalule ol 0REC0. Tre eva|ual|or procedure dea|s W|lr lre lo||oW|rg lreres:

- Theme | - Proceeds of corrupt|on: 0u|d|rg Pr|rc|p|es 1 (se|zure ard corl|scal|or ol
proceeds ol corrupl|or) ard 19 (correcl|ors oelWeer corrupl|or ard rorey
|aurder|rg/orgar|sed cr|re), as corp|eled, lor reroers rav|rg ral|l|ed lre Cr|r|ra| LaW
Corverl|or or Corrupl|or (ET3 1Z3), oy Arl|c|es 19 paragrapr 3, 13 ard 23 ol lre
Corverl|or;

- Theme || - Pub||c adm|n|strat|on and corrupt|on: 0u|d|rg Pr|rc|p|es 9 (puo||c
adr|r|slral|or) ard 10 (puo||c oll|c|a|s);

- Theme ||| - Lega| persons and corrupt|on: 0u|d|rg Pr|rc|p|es 5 (|ega| persors) ard 8
(l|sca| |eg|s|al|or), as corp|eled, lor reroers rav|rg ral|l|ed lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or
or Corrupl|or (ET3 1Z3), oy Arl|c|es 11, 18 ard 19, paragrapr 2 ol lre Corverl|or.

3pa|r ras rol ral|l|ed lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or or Corrupl|or
1
.

1. Tre preserl reporl Was prepared or lre oas|s ol lre rep||es lo lre quesl|orra|re ard lre
|rlorral|or prov|ded dur|rg lre or-s|le v|s|l. Tre ra|r oojecl|ve ol lre reporl |s lo eva|uale lre
ellecl|veress ol reasures adopled oy lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es |r order lo corp|y W|lr lre
requ|rererls der|v|rg lror lre prov|s|ors |rd|caled |r paragrapr 3. Tre reporl corla|rs l|rsl a
descr|pl|or ol lre s|lual|or, lo||oWed oy a cr|l|ca| ara|ys|s. Tre corc|us|ors |rc|ude a ||sl ol
recorrerdal|ors adopled oy 0REC0 ard addressed lo 3pa|r |r order lo |rprove |ls |eve| ol
corp||arce W|lr lre prov|s|ors urder cors|deral|or.

1
0r 10 Vay 2005, 3pa|r s|gred oolr lre Cr|r|ra| ard lre C|v|| LaW Corverl|ors or Corrupl|or.
3

||. ThEHE | - PR06EE08 0F 60RRUPT|0N

a. 0escr|pt|on of the s|tuat|on

lrler|r reasures

5. Tre use ol prov|s|ora| reasures (|rc|ud|rg lre se|zure ol proceeds) car oe ordered 1) lo preverl
lre supposed ollerder lror a|ler|rg r|s l|rarc|a| pos|l|or or cred|l, resu|l|rg |r lre |oss ol
corporerls ol possess|or correcled lo or oola|red lror lre corrupl|or ollerce urder
|rvesl|gal|or; 2) Wrer lrere are reasors lo presure lral ar oojecl car serve as ev|derce; 3)
ard, |r case ol drug re|aled ollerces, lo secure lre payrerl ol a corl|scal|or order. Arl|c|es 589
lo 11 ol lre Code ol Cr|r|ra| Procedure (rerealler CCP) are app||ed W|lr regard lo lre se|zure
ol assels ('o|enes).

. Tre dec|s|or lo use prov|s|ora| reasures car or|y oe rade lrrougr ar |rvesl|gal|or ol assels,
Wr|cr W||| guararlee lre corsequerl l|rarc|a| ||ao|||l|es ol lre ollerder. 3ucr ar |rvesl|gal|or |s
carr|ed oul oy lre 3lale Prosecul|or 3erv|ce (rerealler 3P3) Wrer |l |s rade aWare ol a poss|o|e
cr|r|ra| ollerce. Tre 3par|sr aulror|l|es slale lral lre prov|s|ors corla|red |r Arl|c|e 12Z ol lre
Cr|r|ra| Code (rerealler CC) corcerr|rg corl|scal|or (see paragrapr 8 oe|oW) reler a|so lo
prov|s|ora| reasures (se|zure, lreez|rg). Trese prov|s|ors car oe app||ed lo a|| cr|r|ra| ollerces,
|rc|ud|rg corrupl|or.

Varagererl ol se|zed assels

Z. Tre CCP prov|des lor lre |derl|l|cal|or, descr|pl|or ard secur|ly ol lre se|zed goods, Wr|cr are
sea|ed, Wrer poss|o|e, ard pul |rlo sale|eep|rg urder lre raragererl ol a corpelerl slorage
ur|l, deslroyed or so|d. Tre reasures adopled lor lre raragererl ol se|zed goods deperd or
lre|r ralure: |l lre goods are per|srao|e lre judge ray order lre|r sa|e, ard lre proceeds car oe
used lo secure lre execul|or ol lre l|ra| judgererl; lre goods car oe slored (|r puo||c
eslao||srrerls or |r slorage cerlres) or raraged oy ar 'aom|n|srraoor Wro |s ror|raled oy lre
judge; Wrer assels rave oeer se|zed lror a corpary or group ol corpar|es, lre jud|c|a|
adr|r|slral|or ol lre corpar|es |s regu|aled oy lre Code ol C|v|| Procedure; |l lre goods pose a
poss|o|e darger lral cou|d resu|l lror lre|r slorage, lre|r e||r|ral|or W||| oe ordered. lr cases ol
||||c|l drugs, adequale sarp|es W||| oe |epl lor lulure ev|derce or exar|ral|or.

Leg|s|al|or or corl|scal|or

8. Arl|c|e 12Z ol lre CC del|res corl|scal|or as a pera|ly lral |s erlorced oy lre jud|c|a| aulror|l|es
as ar accessory sarcl|or ('consecuenc|a accesor|a) lo lre corr|lrerl ol a cr|re, |rc|ud|rg
corrupl|or. ll resu|ls |r lre d|spossess|or ol assels lral corlr|oule lo lre persora| lorlure ol lre
perpelralor. Trese assels are lre |rslrurerls used lo corr|l lre cr|re ard |||ega| l|rarc|a| ga|rs
oola|red lror lre corr|lrerl ol lre cr|re, ard |rc|ude ary proceeds ol cr|re lral rave oeer
corverled. Corl|scal|or |s corpu|sory Wrer a cr|r|ra| ollerce, |rc|ud|rg corrupl|or, ras oeer
corr|lled. lr add|l|or, lre corl|scal|or ol rorey, preserls ard g|lls |s exp||c|l|y requ|red urder
Arl|c|e 131 ol lre CC lor or|oery ard lrad|rg |r |rl|uerce. ll |s rol poss|o|e lo deducl experd|lures
lor ga|r|rg lre proceeds, Wr|cr cou|d oe suojecl lo corl|scal|or.

1

Nalure ol corl|scal|or

9. Corl|scal|or ol proceeds ol cr|re |s regarded as parl ol lre sarcl|or lre purpose ol Wr|cr |s lo
d|spossess lre ollerder ol lrese proceeds. As a corsl|lul|ora| cord|l|or der|ved lror lre
pr|rc|p|e ol presurpl|or ol |rrocerce, currerl 3par|sr |eg|s|al|or requ|res lre pr|or corv|cl|or ol
a cr|r|ra| oelore corl|scal|or order car oe |ssued. loWever, lrere |s ar excepl|or lo lr|s ru|e
urder Arl|c|e 12Z.3, Wr|cr perr|ls corl|scal|or ever Wrer ro serlerce |s prorourced aga|rsl lre
ollerder oecause ol |ac| ol cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly (dealr ol lre ollerder, lor exarp|e) or Wrer, lor
parl|cu|ar reasors, lre proceed|rgs |r respecl ol lre delerdarl carrol oe pursued, prov|ded, |r
lre |aller case, lral lre |||ega| ralure ol lre delerdarl's assels ras oeer proved.

Varagererl ol corl|scal|or

10. Tre rarrer |r Wr|cr corl|scal|or |s carr|ed oul |s cord|l|ored oy lre craracler ol lre goods lo oe
corl|scaled. 0oods lror |ega| lrade W||| oe so|d ard lre proceeds W||| oe used lo cover lre
ollerder's c|v|| ||ao|||ly, e.g. lo ersure lre payrerl ol darages lo |rjured parl|es ol lre cr|re. ll
lre prol|ls ol lre sa|e are rol used lo pay lre ollerders' deols or |l lrere |s ar excess arourl,
lrey W||| oe cred|led lo lre Puo||c Treasury. As lor goods ol |||ega| lrade, |.e. ||||c|l drugs ard
l|rearrs, courls W||| e|lrer order lre|r |rred|ale deslrucl|or or ray |eep lrer urder lre
prolecl|or ol lre re|evarl jud|c|a| oody. wrer lre corl|scaled goods are ver|c|es, ooals, a|rcralls
or ary olrer |rslrurerl or properly used |r lre corlexl ol drug lrall|c||rg, lre 3lale W||| order lre|r
lrarsler lo a spec|a| lurd, lre purpose ol Wr|cr |s lo l|rarce drug add|cl|or preverl|or
prograrres, a|d prograrres lor drug add|cls ard lre preverl|or ard prosecul|or ol drug-
re|aled cr|re.

va|ue corl|scal|or

11. Arl|c|e 12Z.2 CC prov|des lor va|ue corl|scal|or 'Wrer, lor Wralever reasor, |l |s rol poss|o|e lo
corl|scale lre goods or proceeds d|recl|y. lr v|eW ol lre lacl lral lre Code does rol prescr|oe a
procedure lor ca|cu|al|rg lre va|ue lo oe corl|scaled, lr|s exerc|se rusl oe carr|ed oul or ar
|rd|v|dua| oas|s.

Tr|rd parl|es

12. Corl|scal|or car oe ordered a|so W|lr regard lo lr|rd parl|es. Trere |s ore excepl|or lo lre
app||cal|or ol lr|s gerera| ru|e: a corl|scal|or order carrol exlerd lo oojecls or properl|es ol lr|rd
parl|es Wro Were rol re|aled lo, or uraWare ol, lre cr|re ard |l lre goods rave oeer oola|red
|ega||y. Arolrer excepl|or lo lre ru|e ol rardalory corl|scal|or |s Wrer lre va|ue ol lre proceeds
der|v|rg lror |ega| lrade |s d|sproporl|ora| lo lre craracler ard grav|ly ol lre cr|re.

lrvesl|gal|or corcerr|rg proceeds ol cr|re

13. Tre 3pec|a| Allorrey 0erera|'s 0ll|ce lor lre Repress|or ol Ecoror|c 0llerces re|aled lo
Corrupl|or (rerealler ACP0) ras al |ls d|sposa| '3upporl ur|ls spec|a||sed |r |rvesl|gal|ors
a|red al |derl|ly|rg ard lrac|rg proceeds ol ecoror|c cr|re, |rc|ud|rg corrupl|or. lr parl|cu|ar,
lre 3upporl ur|ls ol lre Tax lrspeclorale ard lre 0erera| 3lale F|rarc|a| Corlro||er's 0ll|ce
ass|sl lre ACP0 |r re|al|or lo rovererls ol lurds, l|sca| ard laxal|or exar|ral|or ard l|rarc|a|
operal|ors, ard prov|de d|recl access lo lre Tax lrspeclorale's Corso||daled 0ala 8ase. lr
appropr|ale cases, lre ACP0 car see| ass|slarce lror olrer Tax lrspeclorale ood|es. lr
5
accordarce W|lr Arl|c|e 95 ol lre 0erera| Taxal|or LaW (LaW 58/2003), lre 3P3 ard lre jud|c|a|
ood|es are ao|e lo co||ecl a|| |rlorral|or reeded lor carry|rg oul cr|r|ra| |rvesl|gal|ors.
Voreover, lre Nal|ora| Po||ce Force ard lre C|v|| 0uard 3upporl ur|ls ass|sl lre ACP0 |r lrac|rg
ard recover|rg |||ega||y ga|red properly, lurds ard cap|la|.

3lal|sl|cs

11. lr lre aoserce ol slal|sl|cs or corl|scal|or, lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es prov|ded |rlorral|or or lWo
corcrele cases ol corrupl|or Wrere 1,500 ard 51,000 Euros Were corl|scaled.

Vorey Laurder|rg

15. urder lre currerl 3par|sr |eg|s|al|or (Arl|c|e 301 CC) rorey |aurder|rg car oe assoc|aled W|lr
ary cr|re. LaW 19/2003 or lre Lega| Reg|re goverr|rg lre Vovererl ol Cap|la| ard Fore|gr
Ecoror|c Trarsacl|ors ard 3pec|l|c Veasures lo Preverl Vorey Laurder|rg spec|l|es lre
oo||gal|ors ol l|rarc|a| (ard olrer) re|evarl orgar|sal|ors, |.e., acl|ors lo oe la|er ard procedures
lo oe lo||oWed |r order lo preverl lre aouse ol lre l|rarc|a| sysler ard olrer areas ol lre
ecoror|c seclor lor lre purposes ol rorey |aurder|rg. Tre |aW eslao||sres reW requ|rererls
corcerr|rg cooperal|or W|lr lre corpelerl aulror|l|es dea||rg W|lr arl|-rorey |aurder|rg |ssues
ard app||es lo pr|vale persors or erl|l|es |rvo|ved |r proless|ora| or ous|ress acl|v|l|es lral are
espec|a||y vu|rerao|e lo rorey |aurder|rg. LaW 19/2003 ras a|so oroadered lre rarge ol
ood|es/proless|ora|s oo||ged lo reporl susp|c|ous lrarsacl|ors ard roW |rc|udes aud|lors,
accourlarls, lax corsu|larls, rolar|es ard |aWyers.

1. Trese requ|rererls allecl lre oar||rg ard l|rarc|a| seclor |r lerrs ol lre |derl|l|cal|or ol c||erls,
lre|r proless|ora| acl|v|l|es elc., ard |rc|ude lre respors|o|||ly lo reporl lo lre 3par|sr Flu (lre
Execul|ve 3erv|ce ol lre Corr|ss|or lor lre Preverl|or ol Vorey Laurder|rg ard F|rarc|a|
0llerces - 3EP8LAC
2
) ary acl|v|ly lral cou|d oe re|aled lo rorey |aurder|rg. 3EP8LAC ras lre
duly lo reporl lo lre corpelerl jud|c|a| aulror|l|es a susp|c|or ol rorey |aurder|rg acl|v|l|es, ard
lo supp|y lrer W|lr ary recessary ass|slarce or cooperal|or. Tre Execul|ve 3erv|ce's Acl|v|l|es
Reporl ol 1999 reporled lral 1091 pre||r|rary |rvesl|gal|ors rad oeer corc|uded. Tre ruroer ol
cases re|aled lo corrupl|or reporled oy 3EP8LAC lo lre ACP0 Was 39 |r 2002 ard 135 |r 2003.

Corrupl|or ard rulua| |ega| ass|slarce

1Z. 3pa|r |s parly lo a ruroer ol o||alera| ard ru|l||alera| |rlerral|ora| |rslrurerls corcerr|rg
rulua| |ega| ass|slarce, Wr|cr are |rcorporaled |rlo ral|ora| |eg|s|al|or orce puo||sred |r
accordarce W|lr Arl|c|e 9 ol lre Corsl|lul|or. Nal|ora| |eg|s|al|or, urder Arl|c|e 2Z ol lre
0rgar|c LaW or lre Jud|c|ary, eslao||sres a procedure lor requesls oy 3par|sr aulror|l|es lor
|rlerral|ora| |ega| ass|slarce re|al|rg lo prov|s|ora| reasures ard corl|scal|or, Wr|cr sl|pu|ales
lral requesls (rogalory |ellers) oy 3par|sr jud|c|a| aulror|l|es oe rade |r accordarce W|lr lre
prov|s|ors ol lre |rlerral|ora| lreal|es. Tre |rlerral|ora| lreal|es app||ed |r cases ol prov|s|ora|
reasures ard corl|scal|or are lre Europear Corverl|or or Vulua| Ass|slarce |r Cr|r|ra|
Vallers; lre Corverl|or or Laurder|rg, 3earcr, 3e|zure ard Corl|scal|or ol lre Proceeds lror
Cr|re; ard lre ur|led Nal|ors Corverl|or aga|rsl Trarsral|ora| 0rgar|sed Cr|re. lr 3pa|r lre
cerlra| aulror|ly respors|o|e lor l|||rg, ard respord|rg lo, sucr requesls |s lre V|r|slry ol Jusl|ce.

2
Tre Corr|ss|or |s ar |rler-deparlrerla| oody, cra|red oy lre 3ecrelary ol 3lale lor lre Ecorory ard corposed ol lre
0|reclors ol |rsl|lul|ors |rvo|ved |r coroal|rg rorey |aurder|rg (Po||ce, 3pec|a| Proseculors' 0ll|ces, 8ar| ol 3pa|r,
3ecur|l|es ard Excrarge Corr|ss|or, 0erera| 0|reclorale ol lrsurarce, Tax Agercy, elc.). 0re reroer ol lre Corr|ss|or
|s a represerlal|ve ol lre ACP0.

Furlrerrore, 3pa|r ras ral|l|ed lre Corverl|or lor lre App||cal|or ol lre 3crerger Agreererl,
|rc|ud|rg prov|s|ors re|al|rg lo |ellers rogalory lor searcr ard se|zure poWers, ard lre prov|s|ora|
app||cal|or ol lre Corverl|or or Vulua| Ass|slarce |r Cr|r|ra| Vallers oelWeer lre Veroer
3lales ol lre Europear ur|or, Wr|cr |rc|udes prov|s|ors assoc|aled W|lr |rlerral|ora| jud|c|a|
cooperal|or corcerr|rg access lo oar| accourl |rlorral|or
3
. Trese |rslrurerls rave crealed a
d|recl corrur|cal|or crarre| oelWeer jud|c|a| aulror|l|es prov|d|rg ar acce|eral|or ol |rlerslale
corrur|cal|or.

18. ll 3pa|r |s lre requesled slale lrer lre requesl|rg slale rusl ao|de oy lre |rlerral|ora|
|rslrurerls lo Wr|cr 3pa|r |s a parly (see paragrapr aoove). lr lre case ol lre aoserce ol lre
app||cal|or ol a lrealy, lre cooperal|or W||| oe regu|aled oy lre pr|rc|p|e ol rec|proc|ly, ard |ls
ex|slerce W||| oe delerr|red oy lre 3par|sr 0overrrerl lrrougr lre V|r|slry ol Jusl|ce as slaled
|r Arl|c|e 2ZZ ol lre 0rgar|c LaW or lre Jud|c|ary.

b. Ana|ys|s

19. lr 3pa|r, recourse lo prov|s|ora| reasures lor lre lreez|rg ard se|zure ol assels |s a usua|
pracl|ce lor lre po||ce ard prosecul|or serv|ces. 0ela||ed |ega| prov|s|ors ard procedures
corcerr|rg lre se|zure ard raragererl ol se|zed assels are |r p|ace, d|llererl|aled accord|rg lo
lre ralure ol lre assels. Arl|c|es 589-11 ol lre Code ol Cr|r|ra| Procedure corla|r prov|s|ora|
reasures, Wr|cr car oe la|er |r order lo ersure, |r pr|rc|p|e, lral lre delerdarl car reel
r|s/rer l|rarc|a| ||ao|||l|es. A|so, lre se|zure ol lre corpus oe||cr| - |rc|ud|rg lre rears,
|rslrurerls ard proceeds re|aled lo lre cr|re ard/or lourd or lre scere ol lre cr|re - |s
prov|ded lor oy Arl|c|es 331-338 ol lre Code ol Cr|r|ra| Procedure, lre purpose ol lrose
prov|s|ors oe|rg lo secure ev|derce dur|rg cr|r|ra| proceed|rgs. A|lrougr lrere |s ro spec|l|c
regu|al|or regard|rg corrupl|or ollerces, Arl|c|es 331-338 ol lre Code ol Cr|r|ra| Procedure
eslao||sr sore recrar|srs lo guararlee lral corl|scal|or |s ellecl|ve W|lr regard lo a|| ||rds ol
cr|res, |rc|ud|rg lrose re|aled lo corrupl|or, lror lre oeg|rr|rg ol lre |rvesl|gal|ors. loWever,
lre 0ET roled lral spec|l|c prov|s|or a||oW|rg prov|s|ora| reasures lo oe la|er |r order lo
guararlee lre ellecl|veress ol a corl|scal|or order ras or|y oeer rade |r re|al|or lo drug re|aled
ollerces, oul rol |r re|al|or lo corrupl|or ollerces: Arl|c|e 3Z1 paragrapr 1.2 ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code
slales lral, |r case ol drug re|aled ollerces, "u|rn rne purpose ol ensur|ng rne ellecr|veness ol rne
conl|scar|on, rne gooos, means, |nsrrumenrs ano ga|ns cou|o oe se|zeo or lrozen {.j s|nce rne
oeg|nn|ng ol rne |nvesr|gar|on. Trerelore, lre 0ET recommends that a |ega| prov|s|on be
|ntroduced spec|f|ca||y prov|d|ng for prov|s|ona| measures to be taken for the purpose of
guarantee|ng the effect|ve conf|scat|on of the proceeds of corrupt|on.

20. Tre 0ET We|cored lre recerl |eg|s|al|ve deve|oprerls |r lre l|e|d ol corl|scal|or ol lre
|rslrurerls ard proceeds ol cr|re. Tre |rlroducl|or ol va|ue corl|scal|or ard ol |n rem
corl|scal|or represerls esserl|a| loo|s lor lre ellecl|ve depr|val|or ol l|rarc|a| advarlages
oola|red lrrougr a cr|re, |rc|ud|rg corrupl|or. Tre corl|scal|or ol proceeds/|rslrurerls lourd |r
lre possess|or ol a lr|rd parly, excepl lor oona l|oe lr|rd parl|es, |s a|so addressed oy lre |aW. As
regards lre app||cal|or ol lrese reasures, lre rol|or ol oona l|oe lr|rd parl|es |s |rlerpreled |r a
reslr|cl|ve rarrer, exc|ud|rg lrose persors Wro srou|d rave oeer aWare ol lre ||||c|l ralure ol
lre goods or Wro Were urao|e lo prov|de a reasorao|e exp|aral|or lor a sudder |rprovererl ol
lre|r l|rarc|a| s|lual|or. Voreover, accord|rg lo lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es, prov|rg lre ||||c|l or|g|r ol
lre assels corcerred does rol recessar||y |rp|y a requ|rererl lo prov|de d|recl prool lral assels
der|ve lror a parl|cu|ar ollerce, |l oe|rg sull|c|erl lo rave corv|rc|rg c|rcurslarl|a| ev|derce ol

3
Tre 3par|sr aulror|l|es slale lral lre Corverl|or or Vulua| Ass|slarce |r Cr|r|ra| Vallers oelWeer lre Veroer 3lales ol
lre Europear ur|or |s preserl|y |r lre ral|l|cal|or process.
Z
lre cr|r|ra| or|g|r ol lre goods (e.g. |ac| ol ar ecoror|ca| exp|aral|or lor cerla|r reverues;
l|r|rg ol a purcrase co|rc|d|rg W|lr lral ol lre corr|ss|or ol a cr|r|ra| ollerce; lre |rvo|vererl
ol lre oWrer ol assels |r cr|r|ra| acl|v|ly, elc.). loWever, lre |ac| ol slal|sl|ca| dala or lre
ruroer ol cases, va|ue ard grourds lor la||rg prov|s|ora| reasures as We|| as lre ruroer ol
cases ard lre va|ue ol corl|scaled properly re|aled lo corrupl|or ra|e |l d|ll|cu|l lo oola|r ar
accurale |dea ol lre ellecl|veress ol lre ex|sl|rg |eg|s|al|or ard lre ellorls rade |r pracl|ce oy
|aW erlorcererl agerc|es lo depr|ve a perpelralor ol properly oola|red ur|aWlu||y as a resu|l ol
corrupl|or. Trerelore, lre 0ET ooserves rnar srar|sr|cs snou|o oe co||ecreo, ano proper|,
ana|,seo, concern|ng prov|s|ona| measures ano suosequenr conl|scar|on oroers |n cases ol
corrupr|on.

21. Tre 0ET exar|red lre |rsl|lul|ora| lrareWor| ard lre loo|s ava||ao|e lo lre |aW erlorcererl
agerc|es |r order lo perlorr l|rarc|a| |rvesl|gal|ors Wrerever a corrupl|or ollerce or olrer
ser|ous ecoror|c ollerces are d|scovered. Tre 3pec|a| Allorrey 0erera|'s 0ll|ce lor lre
Repress|or ol Ecoror|c 0llerces re|aled W|lr Corrupl|or (ACP0) |s supporled oy ur|ls ol lre
Tax lrspeclorale (AEAT) ard ol lre 3lale F|rarc|a| Corlro||ers 0ll|ce (l0AE), Wr|cr car prov|de
|rred|ale access lo lre ral|ora| lax dalaoase ard |r-rouse experl ass|slarce. Tre
corl|derl|a||ly ol lre |rvesl|gal|ve acl|v|l|es perlorred oy lre lax ard l|rarc|a| |rspeclors lor lre
ACP0 proseculors |s guararleed oy a proloco| s|gred oelWeer lre V|r|slry ol Jusl|ce ard lre
lWo aulror|l|es corcerred. loWever, or|y lre 11 ACP0 proseculors oerel|l lror d|recl ard
|rred|ale supporl ol AEAT ard l0AE lrspeclors. Proseculors lror a|| over 3pa|r use lre regu|ar
crarre|s lo oola|r lre dala lrey reed, oy l|||rg a reasored requesl lo lre reg|ora| 0e|egal|or ol
AEAT. Tre sW|llress ol lre lax aulror|ly's rep|y var|es lror reg|or lo reg|or ard lror case lo
case. A|lrougr lre 0ET Was lo|d lral lre ACP0 or|y carr|es oul |rvesl|gal|ors ard prosecul|ors
lor lre rosl ser|ous corrupl|or ollerces, lre s|gr|l|carl d|llererce oelWeer lre ruroer ol cases
ass|gred lo ACP0 ard lrose ass|gred lo olrer proseculors' oll|ces |s slr|||rg: |r 2003, 5 or|oery
cases Were |rvesl|galed oy ACP0 as corpared lo 80 |rvesl|galed oy ord|rary proseculors'
oll|ces. Tr|s sroWs lral lre vasl rajor|ly ol corrupl|or cases |s oe|rg dea|l W|lr oy lre 'ord|rary
prosecul|or serv|ces.

22. Tre 0ET Was lo|d lral |rlorral|or reeded lo lrac| rorey l|oWs car sorel|res oe d|ll|cu|l lo
oola|r lror lre oar|s, Wr|cr are rol oo||ged lo corrur|cale dela||ed |rlorral|or or spec|l|c
oar||rg operal|ors lo proseculors, ur|ess lre aulror|sal|or ol ar |rvesl|gal|ve judge |s preserled.
Tre r|s| ol oar| cuslorers oe|rg a|erled Was a|so rerl|ored lo lre 0ET as ore ol lre reasors
Wry proseculors are re|uclarl lo l||e requesls lor dala lror oar|s. Tre reed lor respecl|rg lre
corl|derl|a||ly ol |rvesl|gal|ve lrac||rg |eads lo prelererce oe|rg g|ver lo lre use ol coro|red
sources ol |rlorral|or, rosl|y |rd|recl sources, lre ral|ora| lax dalaoase oe|rg rerl|ored as lre
rosl va|uao|e. Trerelore, lre 0ET |s ol lre op|r|or lral exlerded, |rred|ale access (|r a
corlro||ed rarrer) lo lre lax dalaoase lor proseculors dea||rg W|lr corrupl|or ard corrupl|or
re|aled ollerces cou|d speed up |rvesl|gal|ors a|red al lrac||rg lurds. Tre 0ET Was p|eased lo
|earr lral lre 0overrrerl |rlerds lo relorr lre spec|a| proseculors' oll|ces corpelerl lor
dea||rg W|lr corrupl|or ard orgar|sed cr|re, |r order lo errarce lre|r operal|ve capac|ly. Tr|s
relorr cou|d oe a good opporlur|ly lo a|so slrerglrer lre capac|ly ol ACP0's supporl ur|ls.

23. Trere are lWo po||ce lorces al ral|ora| |eve|: lre Nal|ora| Po||ce ard lre C|v|| 0uard. Trey rave
spec|a| deparlrerls lor lre |rvesl|gal|or ol ecoror|c cr|re, rorey |aurder|rg, orgar|sed cr|re
ard corrupl|or. Tre lrad|l|ora| d|v|s|or |rlo lWo ral|ora| po||ce ood|es W|lr |arge|y separale areas
ol corpelerce, oolr lerr|lor|a| ard raler|a|, does rol appear lo creale parl|cu|ar proo|ers. Tral
sa|d, lre 0ET loo| lre v|eW lral lre separale ard urcoord|raled dalaoases ol lre lWo po||ce
lorces ray We|| rarper lre carry|rg oul ol |rvesl|gal|ors, |rc|ud|rg l|rarc|a| |rvesl|gal|ors a|red
8
al lrac||rg |rslrurerls ard proceeds ol corrupl|or ard lac|||lal|rg lre se|zure lrereol. 0ur|rg lre
or-s|le v|s|l, lre 0ET Was |rlorred lral ar |r|l|al|ve lo |rlegrale lre dalaoases |rlo ore |s oe|rg
cors|dered oy lre V|r|slry ol lrler|or. Tne SET ooserves rnar rne serr|ng up ol a s|ng|e oaraoase
lor rne har|ona| Po||ce ano rne 0|v|| Suaro snou|o oe g|ven a n|gn pr|or|r,
1
.

21. Tre adopl|or ol LaW ro. 19/2003 - Wr|cr exlerds lre calegor|es ol erl|l|es W|lr ar oo||gal|or lo
reporl ary urusua| or susp|c|ous lrarsacl|or - ras rad ar |rporlarl |rpacl or revea||rg poss|o|e
correcl|ors oelWeer rorey |aurder|rg ard corrupl|or. For |rslarce, rolar|es Were |rc|uded ard,
s|rce lre erlry |rlo lorce ol lre |aW, 21 cases ol rorey |aurder|rg re|aled lo corrupl|or rave
oeer reporled oy rolar|es, as a resu|l ol lre|r oo||gal|or lo reporl suspecled cases ol rorey
|aurder|rg |r correcl|or W|lr lre acqu|s|l|or ol properly or lre sell|rg up ol corpar|es. Tre 0ET
Was |rlorred lral 135 reporls Were serl oy 3EPLAC lo ACP0 |r 2003 corpared lo or|y 39 |r
2002, ar |rcrease ol 235. A|lrougr lre reporl|rg sysler |s We|| regu|aled, ro leedoac| or lre
oulcore ol lre reporls l||ed |s apparerl|y prov|ded. lr lr|s correcl|or, lre 0ET Was |rlorred lral
|r 2005 lre V|r|slry ol F|rarce Wou|d sel up ar |rpacl eva|ual|or p|ar or lre resu|ls ol
susp|c|ous lrarsacl|or reporls. 3ucr ar |rpacl eva|ual|or Wou|d, |r lre 0ET's op|r|or, greal|y
re|p c|ar|ly lre pallerrs used oy perpelralors lo |aurder ||||c|l assels ard lo rev|se gu|de||res lo
lre reporl|rg erl|l|es corcerr|rg lre |derl|l|cal|or ol aororra| lrarsacl|ors or acl|v|ly. Tne SET
ooserves rnar rne serr|ng up ol an |mpacr eva|uar|on p|an concern|ng rne ourcome ol susp|c|ous
rransacr|on reporrs snou|o oe pursueo as a marrer ol urgenc,.

25. Tre 0ET correrds lre |rlroducl|or lo 3par|sr arl|-rorey |aurder|rg |eg|s|al|or ol lre 'a||
cr|res approacr lrrougr lre recerl relorr ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code. Tr|s arerdrerl a||oWs lor lre
prosecul|or lor rorey |aurder|rg ol proceeds der|v|rg lror a|| corrupl|or ollerces corla|red |r
lre 3par|sr Cr|r|ra| Code, |rc|ud|rg lrose Wr|cr, rol oe|rg cors|dered as ser|ous cr|res, Were
exc|uded oy lre prev|ous |eg|s|al|or. Neverlre|ess, lre 0ET roled lral urder 3par|sr |eg|s|al|or
corrupl|or |r lre pr|vale seclor |s rol cors|dered cr|r|ra| ollerces, corlrary lo lre perl|rerl
prov|s|ors ol lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or aga|rsl Corrupl|or, ard as a corsequerce lre ||sl ol
pred|cale ollerces lo lre rorey |aurder|rg ollerce |s ||r|led. As a|ready rerl|ored |r lre
descr|pl|ve parl ol lr|s reporl, 3pa|r ras rol yel ral|l|ed lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or or
Corrupl|or. Accord|rg lo lre r|grer aulror|l|es rel oy lre 0ET, ard |r parl|cu|ar lre V|r|sler ol
Jusl|ce, preparal|ors lor lre s|gralure/ral|l|cal|or ol lre aoove-rerl|ored corverl|or are al ar
advarced slage
5
. Tre 0ET roles lral lre ral|l|cal|or ol lre corverl|or ard lre ersu|rg |eg|s|al|ve
crarges Wou|d ersure lral lre ||r|s oelWeer a|| lypes ol corrupl|or ard rorey |aurder|rg are
la|er |rlo cors|deral|or; lr|s r|grl a|so lac|||lale |rlerral|ora| jud|c|a| cooperal|or |r lr|s area.

1
Aller lre v|s|l, lre 0ET Was |rlorred lral lre Roya| 0ecree 2Z8/2005 ol 11 Varcr rod|l|es lre slruclure ol lre V|r|slry ol
lre lrler|or ard creales, W|lr|r lre 0|recc|r 0erera| de lrlraeslrucluras y Valer|a| de 3egur|dad (3lale lrlraslruclures ard
3ecur|ly Valer|a| 0ll|ce) a 3uodeparlarerl ol lrlorral|or 3yslers ard 3ecur|ly Corrur|cal|ors, as ore ol lre ra|r
oojecl|ves ol lre V|r|slry ol lre lrler|or |s lre creal|or ard raragererl ol corror po||ce dalaoases. 3|rce 30 Varcr 2005,
lre Po||ce ard lre C|v|| 0uard are srar|rg s|x dalaoases (Nal|ora| lderl|ly Cards, weapors ard Exp|os|ves, Reporls or
Trave||ers, 0NA, 3Al0 (Auloral|c F|rgerpr|rl lderl|l|cal|or 3erv|ce ard vo|ce Recogr|l|or).
5
3ee loolrole No. 1.
9
|||. ThEHE || - PUL|6 A0H|N|8TRAT|0N AN0 60RRUPT|0N

a. 0escr|pt|on of the s|tuat|on

0erera| slruclure

2. 3pa|r |s a de-cerlra||sed 3lale cors|sl|rg ol Aulororous Corrur|l|es

goverred oy lre|r
respecl|ve 0overrrerl, Par||arerl ard Adr|r|slral|or
Z
. Tre puo||c adr|r|slral|or |s corposed
ol lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or, lre Aulororous Corrur|l|es' Adr|r|slral|ors, lre Erl|l|es
lral coro|re lre |oca| Adr|r|slral|or ard puo||c r|grl ood|es lral are deperderl or, or allacred
lo, lre 3lale, lre Aulororous Corrur|l|es or |oca| Erl|l|es.

Leg|s|al|or or orgar|sal|or

2Z. lr 3pa|r, lre gerera| pr|rc|p|es goverr|rg lre orgar|sal|or ard operal|or ol lre 3lale
adr|r|slral|or are corla|red |r lre Corsl|lul|or: goverrrerl ard adr|r|slral|or (Arl|c|es 9Z-103),
lerr|lor|a| orgar|sal|or ol lre 3lale (Arl|c|es 13Z-158). lr parl|cu|ar, lre pr|rc|p|es ol lre
lurcl|or|rg ol lre Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors are del|red |r Arl|c|e 9.1 ol lre Corsl|lul|or Wr|cr slales
lral '(.) puo||c aulror|l|es are respors|o|e lor prorol|rg (.) cord|l|ors ersur|rg lral lreedor
ard equa||ly ol |rd|v|dua|s (.) are rea| ard ellecl|ve (.). Arl|c|e 10 ol lre Corsl|lul|or ard lre
LaW or lre Corlerl|ous-Adr|r|slral|ve Jur|sd|cl|or slale lral lre Courls rave lre jud|c|a|
adr|r|slral|ve aulror|ly over Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or. lr add|l|or, lrere are a ruroer ol |ega| acls
lral regu|ale lre |rp|ererlal|or ol lre corsl|lul|ora| pr|rc|p|es ard lre Wor| ol spec|l|c
orgar|sal|ors: lre LaW 30/1992 or lre Lega| Reg|re goverr|rg Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors ard
Corror Adr|r|slral|ve Procedures (rerealler 'LaW 30/92); lre LaW 30/1981 or Veasures lor
lre Relorr ol lre C|v|| 3erv|ce (rerealler 'LaW 30/81); lre LaW or lre Corlerl|ous-
Adr|r|slral|ve Jur|sd|cl|or; lre 0overrrerl LaW or lre Procedure lor E|aooral|rg Regu|al|ors;
lre LaW or lre lrcorpal|o|||l|es ol Persorre| ol lre 3erv|ce ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or.

Arl|-corrupl|or po||cy

28. As regards arl|-corrupl|or po||c|es |r puo||c adr|r|slral|or, lre 0rgar|c LaW or Cr|r|ra| Code
Relorr dea|s W|lr lre preverl|or ol ard lre l|grl aga|rsl corrupl|or. Furlrerrore, lrere are
|rsl|lul|ora| corlro| recrar|srs regard|rg lre l|grl aga|rsl corrupl|or, Wr|cr are rearl lo ersure
lral adr|r|slral|ve lurcl|ors are carr|ed oul |r respecl ol oas|c pr|rc|p|es ard oojecl|ves. Trese
ood|es |rc|ude lre 0roudsrar, lre Courl ol Aud|lors, lre Nal|ora| 3ecur|ly Excrarge
Corr|ss|or, lre Corr|ss|or lor lre Preverl|or ol Vorey Laurder|rg ard Ecoror|c 0llerces,
lre 3lale Adr|r|slral|or Puo||c Accourls 0eparlrerl (l0AE), lre 0erera| lrspeclorale ol lre
V|r|slry ol Ecoror|c Alla|rs ard F|rarce, lre lrlerra| Aud|l 0eparlrerl ol lre Tax lrspeclorale,
ard lre 0erera| 0|reclorale lor lre lrspecl|or, Eva|ual|or ard 0ua||ly ol 3erv|ces. A|| lrese
ood|es p|ay a ro|e |r perlorr|rg d|sc|p||rary |rvesl|gal|ors or corrupl corducl ol puo||c oll|c|a|s.

Access lo |rlorral|or ard puo||c corsu|lal|or

29. Arl|c|e 105 o ol lre Corsl|lul|or slales lral |eg|s|al|or W||| delerr|re lre gerera| puo||c's access
lo a|| adr|r|slral|ve docurerls, W|lr lre excepl|or ol lrose perla|r|rg lo 3lale secur|ly ard

Arda|us|a, Cala|or|a, lre 8asque Courlry, Carar|es, Aragor, lre Corrur|ly ol va|erc|a, lre 8a|ear|c ls|ards, Casl|||a y
Ler, Casl|||a-La Varcra, Vadr|d, La R|oja, Reg|r de Vurc|a, 0a||c|a, Navarra, Exlreradura, Carlaor|a, Aslur|as ard lre
lWo Aulororous C|l|es ol Ceula ard Ve||||a.
Z
Arl|c|es 118 ard 119 ol lre Corsl|lul|or delerr|re lre corpelerc|es lral Aulororous Corrur|l|es ray assure.
10
delerce, cr|re |rvesl|gal|ors ard persora| pr|vacy. Tre r|grl lo access adr|r|slral|ve docurerls
|s dea|l W|lr oy Arl|c|e 3Z ol LaW 30/1992, Wr|cr aulror|ses access lo lre docurerls urder lre
cord|l|ors lral: a) lrere are ro orgo|rg proceed|rgs re|evarl lo lre requesled docurerls; o) lre
docurerls do rol corla|r persora| dela||s; c) access lo lre docurerls W||| rol cause darger lo
e|lrer lre puo||c |rleresl or lr|rd parl|es Wrose prolecl|or |s ol grealer |rporlarce; d) lrey do rol
corla|r |rlorral|or or ral|ora| delerce ard 3lale secur|ly, cr|re |rvesl|gal|ors, |rlorral|or
prolecled oy |rduslr|a| or correrc|a| secrecy - ard are rol suojecl lo spec|l|c |eg|s|al|or (red|ca|
dala, C|v|| Reg|sler, e|eclora| l||es, elc). Tre V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors a|so prov|des lre
puo||c access lo a W|de array ol |rlorral|or lrrougr |ls |rlerrel s|le
8
.

30. Tre pracl|ce ol puo||c corsu|lal|or |s goverred pr|rar||y oy Arl|c|e 105 a ol lre Corsl|lul|or,
Wr|cr slales lral 'lre LaW sra|| regu|ale lre rear|rg ol c|l|zers d|recl|y, or lrrougr lre
orgar|sal|ors ard assoc|al|ors recogr|sed oy |aW, |r lre process ol draW|rg up lre adr|r|slral|ve
prov|s|ors Wr|cr allecl lrer.. Puo||c rear|rgs la|| |rlo lWo calegor|es:

lrose lral are ol a gerera| ralure (regu|aled oy Arl|c|e 21 ol lre 0overrrerl LaW or lre
Procedure lor E|aooral|rg Regu|al|ors): Wrer lre dec|s|or allecls lre r|grls ol lre
corrur|ly, a rear|rg W|lr lre |rleresled parl|es or W|lr lre|r assoc|al|ors car oe
orgar|sed W|lr|r a spec|l|c per|od ol l|re, ur|ess lrere are ser|ous reasors |r lre puo||c
|rleresl rol lo do so;
lrose lral corcerr exc|us|ve|y ore or rore parl|es (|rd|v|dua|s) (carr|ed oul |r
accordarce W|lr Arl|c|es 81-8 ol LaW 30/1992): oelore |ssu|rg lre dec|s|or, lre re|evarl
adr|r|slral|or rol|l|es lre |rleresled parl|es so lral lrey car la|e parl |r lre procedure.
0rce ar adr|r|slral|ve dec|s|or ras oeer rade, |l car oe cra||erged lrrougr lre
adr|r|slral|or crarre|s ard lre courls, accord|rg lo lre appea| sysler descr|oed oe|oW.

Adr|r|slral|ve procedures

31. ll lre puo||c (or |rd|v|dua|s) rave oeer ur|aWlu||y der|ed access lo docurerls, or rore gerera||y
Warl lo cra||erge ar adr|r|slral|ve dec|s|or, lrey ray slarl ar adr|r|slral|ve procedure, ard, |l
rol sal|sl|ed W|lr lre dec|s|ors la|er oy lre adr|r|slral|ve ood|es, lrey car or|rg lre case oelore
lre courls. Tre |oWer adr|r|slral|ve |eve| |s eslao||sred oy LaW 30/1992 ard erla||s lrree
d|llererl lypes ol appea| aga|rsl ary adr|r|slral|ve acl lral resu|ls |r lre |rlr|rgererl ol lre |aW:
lo a r|erarcr|ca||y super|or oody ol lre adr|r|slral|or |r quesl|or; a re|rslalererl appea|, Wr|cr
perr|ls a d|recl appea| lo lre adr|r|slral|ve oody |r quesl|or; ar exlraord|rary appea| or
grourds ol error ol lacl lo oe |odged W|lr lre sare |rsl|lul|or lral rade lre dec|s|or. Tre upper
jur|sd|cl|ora| |eve| ol lre appea| sysler |s prov|ded lor oy lre LaW or lre Corlerl|ous-
Adr|r|slral|ve Jur|sd|cl|or, ard |s used lor appea|s aga|rsl adr|r|slral|ve acls lral are ar
|rlr|rgererl ol lre adr|r|slral|ve |aW (or ever |r case ol |racl|v|ly ol lre Adr|r|slral|or); |l car oe
addressed orce a|| adr|r|slral|ve rered|es rave oeer exrausled.

Tre 0roudsrar

32. Arl|c|e 51 ol lre Corsl|lul|or ra|es exp||c|l prov|s|or lor lre eslao||srrerl ol ar 0roudsrar,
suosequerl|y |rlroduced oy 0rgar|c LaW 3/1981. Tre 0roudsrar ror|lors lre acl|v|l|es ol a||
persors/ood|es carry|rg oul lurcl|ors W|lr|r lre puo||c adr|r|slral|or |rc|ud|rg r|r|slers, c|v||
servarls ard adr|r|slral|ve aulror|l|es (al cerlra| |eve|, al lre |eve| ol lre aulororous
corrur|l|es ard al |oca| |eve|). Tre purpose ol lre |rvesl|gal|ors ol lre 0roudsrar, Wr|cr are
e|lrer |rsl|galed ol r|s oWr |r|l|al|ve or lo||oW|rg a requesl, |s lo eslao||sr Wrelrer lre acls ard

8
WWW.rap.es
11
dec|s|ors ol persors lu|l||||rg lre dul|es ol lre Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or are |r corp||arce W|lr lre
gu|d|rg pr|rc|p|es ol lre Adr|r|slral|or. Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or ood|es are oo||ged lo cooperale |r
lre |rvesl|gal|ors ol lre 0roudsrar. Tre 0roudsrar ras access lo a|| docurerlal|or
requ|red W|lr lre excepl|or ol c|ass|l|ed docurerls, |r Wr|cr case 'lre la||ure lo lurr|sr lre sa|d
docurerls rusl oe approved oy lre Courc|| ol V|r|slers (Arl|c|e 22.1). Tre 0roudsrar W|||
reporl lo lre 3lale Prosecul|or 3erv|ce ary suspecled cases ol cr|r|ra| ollerces re/sre Wou|d
core across. 3|r||ar |rsl|lul|ors ex|sl |r rosl ol lre 3par|sr Aulororous Corrur|l|es.

Erp|oyrerl |r lre 3lale adr|r|slral|or

33. Arl|c|es 23.2 ard 103.3 ol lre 3par|sr Corsl|lul|or eslao||sr lre ra|r pr|rc|p|es lor lre access lo
C|v|| 3erv|ce accord|rg lo equa||ly, rer|l ard ao|||ly. Crapler lv ol lre LaW 30/1981 or Veasures
lo Relorr lre Puo||c 3erv|ce prov|des lor lre pr|rc|p|es ol se|ecl|or ol c|v|| servarls, corpel|l|or
lo l||| vacarc|es ard prorol|or procedures. Arl|c|e 3 ol lr|s LaW po|rls oul lral 'adr|ss|or lo lre
lrsl|lul|ors ard 0rades ol c|v|| serv|ce W||| oe orgar|sed lrrougr puo||c exar|ral|ors ard W||| oe
goverred oy lre ru|es ol lre exar|ral|or |r quesl|or. Furlrer, |r lerrs ol lre se|ecl|or syslers
lo oe used, Arl|c|e 1 spec|l|es lral 'lre adr|ss|or ol c|v|| serv|ce persorre| W||| oe corducled
lrrougr a sysler ol oper exar|ral|ors, reslr|cled erlry exar|ral|ors or se|ecl|or ooards, Wr|cr
sra|| guararlee |r a|| everls, lre pr|rc|p|es ol equa||ly, rer|l ard ao|||ly. 0per exar|ral|ors W|||
oe lre slardard erlry procedure, ur|ess, |r v|eW ol lre ralure ol lre pos|l|or lo oe l|||ed, lre use
ol reslr|cled erlry exar|ral|ors ard, |r excepl|ora| c|rcurslarces, se|ecl|or ooards procedures
are orgar|sed. 3lardard exar|ral|ors cors|sl ol ro|d|rg ore or rore lesls lo delerr|re lre
capac|ly ard ao|||l|es ol lre card|dales; reslr|cled erlry |s oased or crec||rg ard c|ass|ly|rg lre
card|dales' rer|ls ard draW|rg up a ||sl ol lre oesl app||carls. Trere |s ro sysler ol rolal|or lor
c|v|| servarls Wro are |r a pos|l|or parl|cu|ar|y vu|rerao|e lo corrupl|or.

Tra|r|rg

31. Tra|r|rg |s prov|ded al oolr lre erlry-|eve| ard lrrougroul lre adr|r|slral|ve career ol c|v||
servarls. Tre var|ous lra|r|rg prograrres rol or|y address lre suojecl ol corrupl|or ard puo||c
elr|cs, oul a|so la|e |rlo accourl lre suoslarce ol lre c|v|| servarls' careers, Wrere pr|or|ly |s
espec|a||y g|ver lo lrose Wrose pos|l|or |s parl|cu|ar|y vu|rerao|e lo acls ol corrupl|or. Tre
Cerlre lor Tra|r|rg ol 3er|or C|v|| 3erv|ce, cors|dered as ore ol lre lop c|v|| servarls' ood|es |r
lre 3par|sr Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or, orgar|ses ar e|grl rorlrs lra|r|rg prograrre prov|ded oy
lre Nal|ora| Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or lrsl|lule, dur|rg Wr|cr |essors or 'Puo||c Elr|cs address, |nrer
a||a, poss|o|e s|lual|ors perla|r|rg lo corrupl|or lral a r|gr grade c|v|| servarl cou|d core across
dur|rg r|s proless|ora| career. Tre Nal|ora| Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or lrsl|lule a|so ollers lra|r|rg
prograrres lrrougroul lre year lo c|v|| servarls ol a|| |eve|s lral usua||y address |ssues ol puo||c
elr|cs. Tre Tra|r|rg Prograrre |r 2003 |rc|uded a course or 'Puo||c 3erv|ce Elr|cs a|red al
lre c|v|| servarls Wro carry oul dul|es al lre |rlerred|ale |eve|. lr add|l|or, a 3er|or Varagererl
Prograrre (addressed lo 0|reclors Wro carry oul dul|es ol ser|or respors|o|||ly al lre read ol
3lale Adr|r|slral|or deparlrerls) ras 'Elr|cs ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors as ore ol |ls suojecls.
Tr|s prograrre |asls a lola| ol 50 rours ard creales a lorur lor d|scuss|rg exper|erces ard
ra||rg suggesl|ors lo errarce puo||c orgar|sal|ors ard lre use ol raragererl |r lre puo||c
seclor.

12
Corl||cls ol |rleresl ard lrcorpal|o|||l|es

35. Ru|es perla|r|rg lo lre gerera| |rcorpal|o|||l|es lor c|v|| servarls are corla|red |r LaW 53/1981 or
lrcorpal|o|||l|es ol Persorre| ol lre 3erv|ce ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors. Tre LaW |s der|ved lror
lre lurdarerla| rol|or lral erp|oyees ol lre Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors are corr|lled lo a spec|l|c
erp|oyrerl posl W|lr lre exerpl|ors requ|red oy lre Puo||c 3erv|ce |lse|l; |l eslao||sres lre
pr|rc|p|e lral pr|vale acl|v|l|es rusl rol r|rder or cause prejud|ce lo lre slr|cl accorp||srrerl ol
dul|es, or casl douol or lre oojecl|v|ly or aulorory ol lre erp|oyee. Crapler lv corla|rs
prov|s|ors regard|rg c|v|| servarls ard pr|vale acl|v|l|es
9
. Arl|c|e 19 rerl|ors excepl|ors
regard|rg acl|v|l|es urder lre ru|e ol |rcorpal|o|||l|es (|.e. adr|r|slral|or ol persora| or lar||y
rer|lage; producl|or ard puo||cal|or ol ||lerary, arl|sl|c ard sc|erl|l|c raler|a|).

3. As regards 3lale 0overrrerl reroers, 3ecrelar|es ol 3lale ard l|gr 0ll|c|a|s ol lre 0erera|
3lale Adr|r|slral|or, lre LaW 12/1995 or lrcorpal|o|||l|es ol lre 3lale 0overrrerl Veroers
ard l|gr 0ll|c|a|s ol lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or corl|rrs, as a gerera| pr|rc|p|e, lre
aoso|ule |rcorpal|o|||ly oelWeer puo||c ard pr|vale acl|v|l|es, regard|ess ol Wrelrer lre |aller are
l|rarc|a||y reWarded or rol, oul perr|ll|rg cerla|r acl|v|l|es, Wr|cr are '|og|ca||y exc|uded, lo oe
pracl|ced, oecause lrey do rol |rl|uerce lre oll|c|a|'s corr|lrerl ard aulorory. Corsequerl|y,
lre |aW prov|des lor lre eslao||srrerl ol lWo reg|slers lo ror|lor lrose oll|c|a|s' acl|v|l|es: lre
Acl|v|l|es Reg|sler corcerrs acl|v|l|es lral r|gr oll|c|a|s rave dec|ared lral lrey rave pracl|ced or
W||| exerc|se orce lrey rave l|r|sred lre|r serv|ce; lre Properly ard R|grls Reg|sler requ|res lre
0ll|c|a|s lo corl|rr lre properly ard rer|lage r|grls lrey oWr, as We|| as regol|ao|e l|rarc|a|
assels, srares |r corpar|es, elc. wrer r|gr oll|c|a|s |eave oll|ce lrey are oarred lror exerc|s|rg
pr|vale lurcl|ors ||r|ed W|lr cases |r Wr|cr lrey rave la|er dec|s|ors dur|rg lre|r l|re |r oll|ce,
ror car lrey la|e parl |r lecrr|ca| ass|slarce corlracls, serv|ce corlracls or s|r||ar corlracls W|lr
Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or, W|lr|r lre lWo years lo||oW|rg lre|r deparlure lror lre c|v|| serv|ce. lr
add|l|or, persorre| Wro rave |ell oll|ce, oul are rece|v|rg a lorr ol payrerl as a resu|l ol |eav|rg
are loro|dder lo parla|e |r ary pr|vale ous|ress |rleresls assoc|aled W|lr lre experl|se ol lre
pos|l|or lral lrey re|d. lr cases ol a v|o|al|or ol lre regu|al|ors or |rcorpal|o|||l|es, d|sc|p||rary
sarcl|ors car oe app||ed
10
.

9
Arl|c|e 11.1: 'lr accordarce W|lr lre lerrs ol Arl|c|e 13 ol lre preserl LaW, persorre| W|lr|r lre scope ol app||cal|or ol lr|s
LaW carrol perlorr pr|vale acl|v|l|es, Wrelrer |rd|v|dua||y or lrrougr ar |rlerred|ary, |rc|ud|rg lrose ol a proless|ora|
ralure, Wrelrer lor lre|r oWr accourl or urder lre d|recl|or or al lre serv|ce ol erl|l|es or |rd|v|dua|s d|recl|y re|aled W|lr
sucr acl|v|l|es as are deve|oped |r lre deparlrerl, oody or erl|ly lo Wr|cr sa|d persorre| are ass|gred. Tr|s pror|o|l|or
does rol app|y lo pr|vale acl|v|l|es lral lre d|recl|y corcerred parly ray perlorr |r respecl ol a |ega||y recogr|sed r|grl.
Arl|c|e 12.1: lr a|| everls, persorre| urder lre area ol app||cal|or ol lr|s LaW W||| rol oe ao|e lo perlorr ary ol lre lo||oW|rg
acl|v|l|es: a. Pr|vale acl|v|l|es, |rc|ud|rg proless|ora| acl|v|l|es, Wrelrer lor lre|r oWr accourl or urder lre d|recl|or or al lre
serv|ce ol erl|l|es or |rd|v|dua|s, |r rallers lral lrey are currerl|y parl|c|pal|rg |r or |r Wr|cr lrey rave parl|c|paled |r lre
course ol lre |asl lWo years or rave lo parl|c|pale |r oy v|rlue ol lre|r puo||c ro|e.
Tr|s |rcorpal|o|||ly app||es |r parl|cu|ar lo proless|ora| acl|v|l|es ollered lo persors Wro rusl oe g|ver a serv|ce dur|rg
lu|l||rerl ol dul|es |r lre puo||c ro|e.
o. Veroersr|p ol lre 8oard ol 0|reclors ol corpar|es or Varag|rg 8oard ol pr|vale erl|l|es Wrose acl|v|ly |s d|recl|y re|aled
lo lre deparlrerl, oody or erl|ly |r Wr|cr lre persorre| prov|de lre|r serv|ces.
c. lo|d|rg pos|l|ors ol ary ralure, Wrelrer d|recl|y or lrrougr ar |rlerred|ary, |r corpar|es, corcess|orary l|rrs, Wor|s
corlraclors, serv|ce prov|ders ard supp||ers, |eas|rg ard adr|r|slral|ve roropo||es, or |r corpar|es W|lr puo||c seclor
parl|c|pal|or or guararlee, Wralever lre |ega| slalus ol sucr corpar|es.
d. Parl|c|pal|or W|lr over 10 ol cap|la| |r corpar|es or ous|resses relerred lo |r lre paragrapr aoove.
10
Aller lre v|s|l, lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es reporled lral a drall LaW corcerr|rg lre Corl||cl ol lrleresl regu|al|or lor lre
Veroers ol lre 0overrrerl ard l|gr oll|c|a|s ol lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or Was urder cors|deral|or oy lre
Par||arerl.
13
0|lls

3Z. Arl|c|e 12 CC slales lral ary aulror|ly or puo||c oll|c|a| |s pror|o|led lror accepl|rg g|lls or
doral|ors |r assoc|al|or W|lr lre|r pos|l|or. v|o|al|or ol lr|s prov|s|or sra|| oe sarcl|ored W|lr a
l|re rarg|rg lror lrree lo s|x rorlrs
11
.

0o||gal|ors lo reporl cr|r|ra| ollerces

38. Arl|c|e 108 CC slales: 'Tre aulror|ly or c|v|| servarl, Wro, corlrary lo lre oo||gal|ors
correspord|rg lo r|s/rer pos|l|or, |rlerl|ora||y or|ls prorol|rg prosecul|or ol lrose cr|res ol
Wr|cr s/re oecores aWare ol or ol lre respors|o|e persors ol sucr cr|res, W||| oe pur|sred W|lr
rerova| ol puo||c oll|ce lor a per|od ol rorlrs lo 2 years. lr add|l|or, Arl|c|e Z secl|or (d) ol lre
Roya| 0ecree 33/198 slales lral |l |s cors|dered a ser|ous ollerce Wrer lrose |r a pos|l|or ol
aulror|ly lo|erale ollerces c|ass|l|ed as ser|ous or very ser|ous, Wr|cr rave oeer corr|lled oy
suoord|rales
12
. 0ll|c|a|s Wro rave reporled a cr|re carrol oe sarcl|ored or reroved.

Code ol Corducl

39. lr lre 3par|sr sysler, a|| lre acls ol puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees, |rc|ud|rg lrose ol ser|or
oll|c|a|s, are goverred oy d|llererl ru|es Wr|cr rave lre slalus ol |aW. Tre express|or 'Code ol
Corducl' |s cerla|r|y a reW corcepl |r lre 3par|sr sysler. lr sore ood|es, sucr as lre Nal|ora|
Corr|ss|or lor lre 3loc| Excrarge, lre 0ll|c|a| Cred|l lrsl|lule or lre 8ar| ol 3pa|r, sucr
Codes rave oeer prepared as a suosequerl deve|oprerl, oul or lre oas|s ol ex|sl|rg |ega|
ru|es. Al lre l|re ol lre v|s|l, lrere Was ro code ol elr|cs app||cao|e lo puo||c
oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees
13
. Add|l|ora||y, slud|es Were oe|rg rade W|lr a v|eW lo prepar|rg a 3lalule lor
Puo||c 0ll|c|a|s. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r slaled lral lr|s Wou|d corp|y W|lr Arl|c|e 103.3 ol lre
Corsl|lul|or
11
ard lral lre 3lalule Wou|d cover orgar|sal|ora| ard slall reeds eslao||sr|rg lre
recessary |ega| lrareWor|. lr lrese slud|es, erpras|s W||| oe p|aced or lre re|evarce ol drall|rg
a code ol elr|cs, so lral lre puo||c serv|ce elr|c W||| |rsp|re corducl ard preserve puo||c
erp|oyrerl lror corl||cls ol |rleresl ol ary ||rd. Tre dec|ared oojecl|ve |s lo erad|cale aous|ve,
lraudu|erl or s|r||ar oerav|our. lr lr|s corlexl, lre lulure 3lale Agercy lor lre Eva|ual|or ol lre
0ua||ly ol 3erv|ces ard Puo||c Po||cy, Wrose las|s Were urder d|scuss|or al lre l|re ol lre v|s|l,
W||| oe a reW orgar|sal|or Wr|cr srou|d oe |r crarge ol assess|rg roW puo||c serv|ce acl|v|l|es
are de||vered lo lre puo||c, ard W||| lrerelore oller cr|ler|a W|lr regard lo lre corducl ol puo||c
oll|c|a|s |r prov|d|rg lrese serv|ces.

10. Tre 3par|sr aulror|l|es slale lral lre lacl lral a code ol elr|cs as sucr ras rol oeer
|rcorporaled |r ary |ega| lexl does rol rear lral elr|cs corsl|lule a corcepl ur|roWr lo c|v||
servarls. Tre corcepl ol a code ol corducl |s oecor|rg |rcreas|rg|y W|despread |r lre puo||c
ard pr|vale seclors ard |essors or elr|cs are regu|ar|y re|d dur|rg oas|c ard |r-serv|ce lra|r|rg
lor puo||c oll|c|a|s. Voreover, lre rol|or ol a code ol corducl |s |rd|recl|y |rp|ererled lrrougr
lre eslao||srrerl ard erlorcererl ol lre |aWs perla|r|rg lo dul|es ard oo||gal|ors ol puo||c
oll|c|a|s, ard lre pera| sarcl|ors, d|sc|p||rary reasures, |rcorpal|o|||l|es ard pror|o|l|ors lral
are exc|us|ve|y app||cao|e lo puo||c oll|c|a|s. Trese reasures rave lre purpose ol guararlee|rg

11
Tre r|r|rur ard rax|rur da||y l|re |s eslao||sred |r lre CC ard lr|s l|re |s l|xed or a case oy case oas|s oy lre judge
la||rg |rlo accourl d|llererl cr|ler|a.
12
Tre c|ass|l|cal|or ol cr|res |s slaled |r Arl|c|es -8 ol lre Roya| 0ecree 33/198.
13
As regards reroers ol 0overrrerl ard r|gr pos|l|ors W|lr|r lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or, see loolrole ro. 13.
11
'Tre |aW sra|| regu|ale lre slalus ol c|v|| servarls, erlry |rlo lre c|v|| serv|ce |r accordarce W|lr lre pr|rc|p|es ol rer|l ard
ao|||ly, lre spec|a| lealures ol lre exerc|se ol lre|r r|grl lo ur|or reroersr|p, lre sysler ol d|sao|||l|es, ard guararlees
regard|rg |rparl|a||ly |r lre d|scrarge ol lre|r dul|es.
11
lre elr|ca| corducl ol c|v|| servarls, ard lre|r ellecl|veress |s rearl lo oe ersured lrrougr lre
erlorcererl ol pera|l|es ol oolr ar adr|r|slral|ve ard cr|r|ra| ralure. Tre reasures used lo
ror|lor ard guararlee lre elr|ca| corducl ol c|v|| servarls car oe lourd |r lre Cr|r|ra| Code; lre
LaW 30/81; lre Roya| 0ecree 33/198; ard LaW 12/1995.

3arcl|ors ard 0|sc|p||rary reasures

11. Roya| 0ecree 33/198 calegor|ses ollerces lo Wr|cr sarcl|ors car oe app||ed |rlo very ser|ous,
ser|ous ard r|ror r|sderearours {la|ra), ary lypes ol d|scr|r|ral|or, ard oreacr ol prov|s|ors
regard|rg |rcorpal|o|||l|es; lre 0ecree a|so spec|l|es lre sarcl|ors Wr|cr car oe |rposed:
d|scrarge, cessal|or ol dul|es, re|ocal|or ol posl ard crarge ol res|derce ard prooal|orary
reasures. ll a|so prov|des lor lre eslao||srrerl ol a Cerlra| Persorre| Reg|slry lral records
|rlorral|or corpr|s|rg lre d|sc|p||rary sarcl|ors app||ed lo goverrrerl ard adr|r|slral|ve
persorre| ard dec|s|ors lral rave oeer ordered W|lr regard lo sarcl|ors erlorced or puo||c
oll|c|a|s. lr add|l|or, sore spec|l|c prov|s|ors are prov|ded as regards lre 3lale 3ecur|ly Forces
(Nal|ora| Po||ce ard C|v|| 0uard).

b. Ana|ys|s

12. 0ur|rg lre v|s|l, lre 0ET rel W|lr puo||c oll|c|a|s represerl|rg or|y lre 0erera| 3lale
Adr|r|slral|or. No puo||c oll|c|a|s ol lre Aulororous Corrur|l|es or |oca| Erl|l|es Were preserl
|r ary ol lre reel|rgs re|d. Trerelore lre 0ET's |roW|edge ol arl|-corrupl|or acl|v|l|es ard lre
regu|alory lrareWor| app||cao|e lo puo||c adr|r|slral|or al suo-ral|ora| |eve| Was oola|red or|y
lrrougr lre arsWers lo lre quesl|orra|re, lre |ega| lexls ard olrer Wr|ller raler|a|s prov|ded lo
lre 0ET oelore ard dur|rg lre v|s|l.

13. As parl ol lre rev|eW ol lre orgar|sal|or, lurcl|or|rg ard dec|s|or-ra||rg processes ol puo||c
adr|r|slral|or, lre 0ET rel W|lr lre 0roudsrar ard lre Courl ol Aud|l as represerlal|ves ol
oll|ces W|lr superv|s|or ard overs|grl ol lre puo||c adr|r|slral|or. 0ecerlra||sal|or |s sr|ll|rg
rore puo||c lurds lo lre Aulororous Corrur|l|es lrar rad oeer lre case |r lre pasl. Tre 0ET
Was lo|d lral superv|s|or ard overs|grl resources al lral |eve| ras rol a|Ways |epl pace W|lr
lrose crarges. Tne SET ooserves rnar rne appropr|are $pan|sn aurnor|r|es snou|o encourage rne
/uronomous 0ommun|r|es ano rne |oca| governmenr enr|r|es ro |nc|uoe superv|s|on ano overs|gnr
|n rne|r organ|sar|ona| p|ans ro rne exrenr rnar rnose serv|ces are nor prov|oeo o, rne Senera|
$rare /om|n|srrar|on ano ro l|no opporrun|r|es ro snare gooo pracr|ces u|rn ano among rne
/uronomous Reg|ons ano |oca| governmenr enr|r|es, unenever appropr|are
15
.

11. w|lr regard lo dec|s|or-ra||rg processes, as roled |r lre descr|pl|ve parl ol lre preserl reporl,
3pa|r ras slardard slalulory adr|r|slral|ve procedures app||cao|e lo a|| |eve|s ol puo||c
adr|r|slral|or. Procedures prov|de lor jud|c|a| rev|eW ol adr|r|slral|ve dec|s|ors ard lre 0ET

15
Aller lre v|s|l, lre 0ET Was |rlorred lral lre recerl l|rsl drall ol lre wr|le 8oo| or Loca| 0overrrerl Relorr, Was
prepared oy lre 3par|sr V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or. Tr|s docurerl |s ava||ao|e |r lre V|r|slry's Weo page
(WWW.rap.es), |r order lo co||ecl as rary op|r|ors as poss|o|e lror puo||c ard pr|vale seclors. Arorg |ls a|rs, lre wr|le
8oo| ray prov|de sore re|p lo delerr|re corpelerc|es ol Loca| 0overrrerl, rolao|y |r order lo eva|uale cosls ard oeller
arl|cu|ale orgar|sal|or ard perlorrarce. Tre d|slr|oul|or ol corpelerc|es oelWeer Adr|r|slral|ors (3lale, Aulororous
Corrur|l|es ard Loca| 0overrrerl), |s corducled or lre oas|s ol co-operal|or ard co-ord|ral|or pr|rc|p|es. As ar
exarp|e, reW |rslrurerls ol co-ord|ral|or arorg adr|r|slral|ors are sell|ed, |||e lre '3eclor|a| Corlererce lor Loca|
lssues (|r Wr|cr parl|c|pales lre 0erera| Adr|r|slral|or, lre Reg|ors ard Loca| Adr|r|slral|ors), lre Corr|ss|or ol
0|reclors 0erera| |r Loca| 0overrrerl (Wr|cr la|es parl |r lre preparal|or Wor|s ol lre '3eclor|a| Corlererce) ard lre
Corlererce lor C|l|es (lral coro|re lre preserce ol lre o|ggesl c|l|es, lre reg|ors ard lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or lo
Wor| |r spec|l|c uroar ard relropo||lar proo|ers).
15
Was |rlorred lral rol|ce ol lre r|grl lo appea| ard lre procedures lor sucr ar appea| |s g|ver as
a slardard pracl|ce lo lrose Wro are parl|es lo proceed|rgs.

15. As lar as lrarsparercy ol goverrrerl acl|v|l|es |s corcerred, LaW 30/1992 or lre Lega| Reg|re
goverr|rg Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors ard Corror Adr|r|slral|ve Procedures prov|des lor access lo
|rlorral|or (Arl|c|es 35 ard 3Z) ard requ|res puo||c oll|c|a|s lo eslao||sr ard ra|rla|r cerla|r
oll|c|a| records so lral |rlorral|or rera|rs ava||ao|e lo oe accessed (Arl|c|e 38). Prov|s|ors
corla|red |r Arl|c|e 3Z, roWever, do rol appear lo prov|de lre r|grl lo rave access lo |rlorral|or
olrer lrar lral corla|red |r l||es re|al|rg lo 'proceed|rgs lral rave oeer c|osed ard or|y lo
|rd|v|dua|s Wro are lre 'ro|ders ol lral r|grl or lo lr|rd parl|es Wro rave a 'd|recl ard |eg|l|rale
|rleresl |r sucr |rlorral|or. lr lre 0ET's op|r|or, lr|s |aW does rol appear lo oe a ver|c|e lor lre
gerera| puo||c lo successlu||y requesl |rlorral|or lral |s rol a parl ol spec|l|c adr|r|slral|ve
proceed|rgs or s|rp|y gerera| adr|r|slral|ve |rlorral|or. 0ll|c|a|s rel oy lre 0ET Were rol
aWare ol ary slud|es ol lre ellecl|veress or ell|c|ercy ol lre |aW. 0re oll|c|a| rel oy lre 0ET
expressed lre v|eW lral lre 0overrrerl rad slarled lo |rlerprel lre |aW rore oroad|y ard Was
prov|d|rg rore |rlorral|or, Wr||e arolrer le|l lral prov|s|ors or lre access lo |rlorral|or Were
oe|rg |rlerpreled |r a rore reslr|cl|ve rarrer. w|lr regard lo rore gerer|c goverrrerl
|rlorral|or, lre 0ET roled lral a|| |eve|s ol lre 0overrrerl Were ra||rg use ol Weos|les lor lre
prov|s|or ol sucr |rlorral|or.

1. lr sp|le ol lre lacl lral lre 0ET rad as|ed lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r lo reel W|lr lre press ard
N00s - lrose Wro r|grl lyp|ca||y ra|e requesls lo lre 0overrrerl lor |rlorral|or - or|y ore
N00 represerlal|ve Was rel; ro represerlal|ves ol lre press Were |rv|led lo reel W|lr lre 0ET.
Furlrer, courl dala prov|ded lo lre 0ET aooul adr|r|slral|ve appea|s d|d rol d|sl|rgu|sr cases ol
der|a|s lor requesls lor |rlorral|or lror olrer lypes ol adr|r|slral|ve appea|s; as a corsequerce,
lre 0ET Was rol |r a pos|l|or lo lorr a c|ear v|eW regard|rg lre |rp|ererl|rg pracl|ces ol lre
0overrrerl, oased upor lre lrequercy or oulcore ol lrose appea|s. lr lre 0ET's v|eW,
lrarsparercy ol puo||c adr|r|slral|or |s a cr|l|ca| e|ererl |r lre l|grl aga|rsl corrupl|or, ard lre
0ET roled lral Wr||e 3pa|r ras |ega| prov|s|ors address|rg lre re|ease ol 0overrrerl
adr|r|slral|ve |rlorral|or, lrose prov|s|ors cou|d eas||y oe read rore rarroW|y lrar r|grl re|plu|
|r lral l|grl. The CET recommends to conduct a rev|ew of the |ega| prov|s|ons that prov|de
the pub||c w|th r|ghts to access Covernment |nformat|on and the |mp|ementat|on pract|ces
that have been deve|oped to determ|ne |f the |aw(s} and|or current |mp|ementat|on
pract|ces are |nappropr|ate|y ||m|t|ng the pub||c's access to |nformat|on that wou|d he|p
support the Covernment |n |ts f|ght aga|nst corrupt|on.

1Z. w|lr|r 3pa|r lrere ex|sls a p|ura||ly ol puo||c erp|oyrerl re|al|orsr|ps. Trere are lWo gerera|
calegor|es ol c|v|| servarls: puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees r|red urder corlracl. 0ecerlra||sal|or
ras a|so crarged lre d|slr|oul|or ol lrese pos|l|ors W|lr|r lre d|llererl |eve|s ol lre puo||c
adr|r|slral|or. Accord|rg lo oll|c|a| slal|sl|cs or puo||c erp|oyrerl, lre 3lale Puo||c
Adr|r|slral|or, prev|ous|y lre pr|rary erp|oyer, (Wr|cr |rc|udes Corps ard 3lale 3ecur|ly
Forces, 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or, Jusl|ce Adr|r|slral|or ard Puo||c erl|l|es) represerls 23
ol lre pos|l|ors (510.88 slall), Wrereas lrose |r lre Aulororous Corrur|l|es are 19
(1.12.05Z slall), |r |oca| goverrrerls 21 (53.392 slall) ard |r ur|vers|l|es 1 (92.51Z slall).
0esp|le lre d|vers|ly ol erp|oyrerl re|al|orsr|ps, |rlorral|or prov|ded oy lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r
lo lre 0ET |rd|caled lral lrere Were pr|rc|p|es ard gu|de||res lor corducl lral app|y lo a|| c|v||
servarls: (1) equa| access lo erp|oyrerl; (2) erp|oyrerl oased upor rer|l ard corpelerce;
ard (3) |rparl|a||ly |r lre perlorrarce ol dul|es.

1
18. lr order lo reel a Corsl|lul|ora| requ|rererl, 3pa|r ras corlerp|aled relorr |r puo||c serv|ce lor
a ruroer ol years. Vosl recerl|y, 0rder APu/3018/2001 Was |ssued |r 3epleroer 2001. Tral
0rder eslao||sred a Corr|ss|or lor lre sludy ard preparal|or ol lre 8as|c 3lalule ol Puo||c
Erp|oyrerl (rerealler Corr|ss|or). Tre 0rder a|so eslao||sred lral |eg|s|al|or srou|d oe
prepared oased or lre pr|rc|p|es ol operress ard lrarsparercy, parl|c|pal|or, respors|o|||ly,
ell|cacy ard corererce. Tre Corr|ss|or Was lo reporl W|lr|r rorlrs aller lre |ssu|rg ol lre
0rder. Corsequerl|y, al lre l|re ol lre v|s|l, sore ol lre suojecls ol lre currerl eva|ual|or Were
sl||| urder cors|deral|or oy lr|s Corr|ss|or
1
.

19. Al lre l|re ol lre v|s|l, 3pa|r d|d rol rave ore gerera| erlorceao|e lexl lral cou|d oe cors|dered
as a code ol corducl lor |ls puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees |r lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or,
ror Was lre 0ET aWare ol sucr codes al lre Aulororous Corrur|ly or |oca| goverrrerl |eve|s.
Tre |ssue ol a code ol corducl Was lre suojecl ol ore ol lre recorrerdal|ors addressed lo
3pa|r |r lre Eva|ual|or Reporl ol lre F|rsl Rourd. 0REC0 slaled |r |ls corp||arce reporl lral
lr|s recorrerdal|or rad oeer dea|l W|lr|r a sal|slaclor||y rarrer.

50. lr lre 0ET's v|eW, codes ol corducl corp|ererled oy a la|r d|sc|p||rary sysler serve lWo
purposes. Trey rol or|y prov|de oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees W|lr gu|darce as lo lre|r respors|o|||l|es
ard r|grls, oul W|de|y puo||c|sed codes a|so |rlorr lre puo||c aooul Wral |l srou|d expecl ol puo||c
serv|ce oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees, so lral puo||c corl|derce |r lre oll|c|a| |s rol urderr|red. A
pracl|ca| aspecl ol codes W|lr adr|r|slral|ve erlorcererl recrar|srs car a|so sel slardards ol
puo||c serv|ce lral are r|grer lrar rere|y rol v|o|al|rg a cr|r|ra| slalule. 0ur|rg lre v|s|l, lre 0ET
|earred lror var|ous sources lral |l Wou|d oe re|plu| lo oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees |l lrey rad rore
gu|darce or lre suojecl ol g|lls loo, s|rce urder lre currerl sysler 3pa|r pr|rar||y re||ed upor
lre Cr|r|ra| Code lo address lr|s raller.

51. w|lr regard lo lre ellecl|veress ol 3pa|r's currerl sysler ol ru|l|p|e p|eces ol |eg|s|al|or dea||rg
W|lr oo||gal|ors ard r|grls ol puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees, lre 0ET lourd (1) lral lrere Was ro
gerera| Wr|ller corp||al|or ol lre cr|r|ra| ard d|sc|p||rary slardards ava||ao|e lo oll|c|a|s ard
erp|oyees or lo lre gerera| puo||c ard (2) lral |rlorral|or or d|sc|p||rary sarcl|ors Was rol
corp||ed cerlra||y |r a rarrer lral cou|d oe used lo delerr|re |l lrere Were lrerds |r lre lypes ol
|rappropr|ale oerav|our or |l, lrrougroul lre 0overrrerl, appropr|ale d|sc|p||rary sarcl|ors
lo||oWed successlu| cr|r|ra| prosecul|ors. Ralrer, Wrer lre 0ET as|ed lor sucr |rlorral|or, |l
Was lo|d oy represerlal|ves ol lre V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or lral lre |rvesl|gal|or serv|ce
ol eacr r|r|slry or erp|oy|rg erl|ly Wou|d oe respors|o|e lor corp|||rg sucr |rlorral|or
|rd|v|dua||y. No ore aulror|ly rev|eWed lre coro|red resu|ls. lr corc|us|or, |l appeared lo lre
0ET lral 3pa|r d|d rol corp||e oas|c |rlorral|or recessary lo eva|uale lre ellecl|veress ol lre
ex|sl|rg cr|r|ra| ard d|sc|p||rary sarcl|ors |r respecl ol r|soerav|ours ol puo||c
oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees. Trerelore, the CET recommends that a fu|| eva|uat|on of the
effect|veness of the current system of cr|m|na||d|sc|p||nary sanct|ons that subst|tute for an
enforceab|e code of conduct for pub||c off|c|a|s|emp|oyees be conducted and that study
be made pub||c. |t recommends further that 8pa|n comp||e the current cr|m|na||d|sc|p||nary
prov|s|ons and make them ava||ab|e to pub||c off|c|a|s and emp|oyees and pub||sh the
comp||at|on for pub||c |nformat|on.

1
lr Varcr 2005 (0rder APu/51/2005), suosequerl lo lre 0ET's v|s|l, lre 0overrrerl adopled lre 'Code lor 0ood
0overrarce ol reroers ol lre 0overrrerl ard ol lre r|gr pos|l|ors W|lr|r lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or Wr|cr
corla|rs a ruroer ol pr|rc|p|es ol relererce (va|ores oe relerenc|a) 'lral are lo goverr lre perlorrarce ol reroers ol lre
0overrrerl ard ol lre r|gr pos|l|ors ol lre 0overrrerl lo respord lre derards ard ex|gerc|es ol lre c|l|zers. Tre Code
covers sucr suojecls as po||l|ca| acl|v|l|es, puo||c |rlorral|or, g|lls ard use ol l|l|e.
1Z
52. As regards lre sysler lor delerr|r|rg corl||cls ol |rleresl ard |rparl|a||ly, lre 0ET roled lral lre
|aWs or lrcorpal|o|||l|es (LaW 53/1981 ard LaW 12/1995) locus or ouls|de acl|v|l|es ard
erp|oyrerls. lr lre 0ET's v|eW, Wr||e pror|o|l|rg ouls|de acl|v|l|es does re|p W|lr corl||cls ol
|rleresl, |l does rol lu||y address lre |ssue. 0ur|rg lre v|s|l, lre 0ET lourd lral Wr|ller slardards
or c|ear gu|darce lo puo||c oll|c|a|s or lre acl|ors lrey srou|d la|e (rerov|rg orese|l lror a||
parl|c|pal|or as c|v|| servarl, |.e. recusa|) |r lrose c|rcurslarces Wrere ar |rleresl or acl|v|ly Was
rol pror|o|led (sucr as lar|||a| |rleresls or acl|v|l|es) oul does |r lacl corl||cl W|lr lre|r dul|es, Was
e|lrer rol |roWr lo ex|sl or cerla|r|y rol We|| urderslood oy lre oll|c|a|s corcerred. Tre 0ET
ac|roW|edged lral sore |rd|v|dua| agerc|es rave |rlerra| gu|de-||res or lre |ssue ol recusa|, oul
lr|s |s rol lre case lor lre overa|| c|v|| serv|ce |r 3pa|r. Trerelore, the CET recommends that
cons|derat|on be g|ven to draft|ng gu|de||nes for pub||c off|c|a|s|emp|oyees address|ng
s|tuat|ons where |nterests or act|v|t|es of the pub||c off|c|a||emp|oyee are not proh|b|ted
but may st||| create a conf||ct of |nterest w|th h|s|her actua| dut|es and respons|b|||t|es.

53. 3pa|r ras lWo reporl|rg Reg|slers lor 3lale 0overrrerl Veroers ard l|gr 0ll|c|a|s ol lre
0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or: ore lor reporl|rg ouls|de acl|v|l|es ard ore lor reporl|rg properly
ard r|grls. Tre Acl|v|l|es Reg|sler |s puo||c ard corla|rs lre r|gr oll|c|a|s' dec|aral|ors
corcerr|rg a|| lre|r acl|v|l|es, lre|r parl|c|pal|or |r erlerpr|ses elc. ll a|so corla|rs lre r|gr
oll|c|a|s corrur|cal|ors corcerr|rg lre lulure acl|v|l|es lrey ray deve|op orce d|sr|ssed lror a
puo||c lurcl|or. lr see||rg |rlorral|or or roW lrese reporls are rev|eWed ard used, lre 0ET
rol|ced lral lrey are rol used |r ary proacl|ve Way lo re|p adv|se oll|c|a|s or roW lo avo|d
polerl|a| corl||cls ol |rleresl W|lr lre|r spec|l|c |rleresls or acl|v|l|es or |rcorpal|o|||l|es. Tre 0ET
Was a|so lo|d oy represerlal|ves ol lre V|r|slry ol F|rarce ard Treasury, Wr|cr ras |rlorral|or
or lre oWrersr|p ol corpar|es ard ous|resses, lral lrey Were rol corsu|led oy rev|eWers ol lre
Reg|slers Wrer lre rev|eWers delerr|red Wrelrer 10 ol a parl|cu|ar corpary or ous|ress Was
oWred oy a puo||c oll|c|a| (a slardard eslao||sred |r lre LaW 53/1981 or lrcorpal|o|||l|es ol
Persorre| ol lre 3erv|ce ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or). Tne SET ooserves rnar rn|s Reg|srer s,srem
snou|o oe reoes|gneo |n a ua, rnar uou|o a||ou rne reporrs ro oe useo ro prov|oe |no|v|oua|
counse|||ng on rne prevenr|on ol conl||crs ol |nreresr ano |ncompar|o|||r|es.

|V. ThEHE ||| - LECAL PER80N8 AN0 60RRUPT|0N

a. 0escr|pt|on of the s|tuat|on

0el|r|l|or ol |ega| persors

51. lr 3pa|r, lrere are lrree ra|r lypes ol |ega| persors: assoc|al|ors, eslao||sred oy a group ol
peop|e Wro srare lre sare corror |rleresl ard des|re lo acr|eve lre sare oojecl|ve;
corporal|ors, Wr|cr are eslao||sred ard recogr|sed or|y oy LaW or olrer 3lale regu|al|ors;
lourdal|ors, sel up lo prov|de surs ol rorey lor crar|ly, researcr ard olrer areas ol gerera|
|rleresl. Tre pr|rc|pa| |ega| persors are lrad|rg corpar|es (soc|eoaoes mercanr||es), Wr|cr
corpr|se parlrersr|ps, ||r|led parlrersr|ps, ||r|led corpar|es ard sra|| ||r|led corpar|es.

Eslao||srrerl ard reg|slral|or

55. Tre requ|rererls lor eslao||srrerl ray oe d|llererl deperd|rg or lre ralure ol lre |ega| persor.
Tre rosl |rporlarl |ega| persors |r 3pa|r are lre ||r|led corpar|es Wrose reg|slral|or |s
regu|aled oy lre Rev|sed Texl ol lre LaW ol L|r|led Corpar|es. Arl|c|es 2 lo 8 ol lr|s |aW corla|r
ru|es or corpary rares, lre correrc|a| ralure ol corpar|es, r|r|rur srare cap|la|,
ral|ora||ly, reg|slered address, corsl|lul|or ard |rscr|pl|or, |rlorral|or or parlrers ard persors
18
W|lr rarager|a| lurcl|ors. Arl|c|e 119 ol lre Code ol Correrce slales: '8elore correrc|rg lre
ous|ress, a|| correrc|a| Corpar|es rusl reg|sler lre|r corsl|lul|or, arl|c|es ol assoc|al|or,
agreererls ard cord|l|ors |r ar oll|c|a| acl lral rusl oe preserled lor |rscr|pl|or |r lre Corpary
Reg|slry. lr add|l|or, lre LaW or L|r|led Corpar|es prov|des lral 'lre corpary W||| oe
corsl|luled lrrougr a puo||c acl lral W||| oe recorded |r lre Correrc|a| Reg|slry (rerealler lre
Reg|slry). 0rce lre erlry ras oeer rade, lre corpary W||| oecore a |ega| erl|ly. Tre
Correrc|a| Reg|slry |s a 3lale 0rgar|sal|or. Tre Reg|slry |s corposed ol lWo d|llererl
orgar|sal|ors: lre Terr|lor|a| Correrc|a| Reg|slr|es (|ocaled |r lre cap|la| ol eacr prov|rce ard
respors|o|e lor reg|sler|rg a|| |rlorral|or or ous|ress slarled |r lre|r lerr|lory as We|| as record|rg
accourl|rg ard aud|l|rg docurerls re|aled lo lre corpary), ard lre Cerlra| Correrc|a|
Reg|slry (|ocaled |r Vadr|d, Wrose ra|r las| |s lo cerlra||se lre |rlorral|or rece|ved oy lre
Terr|lor|a| Reg|slr|es ard lo puo||sr lrer |r lre Reg|slry |lse|l ard |r lre 0ll|c|a| Correrc|a|
Reg|slry 8u||el|r).

L|r|lal|or |r exerc|s|rg lurcl|ors |r a |ega| persor

5. Arl|c|es 5 (oe |as penas accesor|as) ard 10Z (||r|lal|or ol r|grls) ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code prov|de
lral a persor lourd gu||ly ol ar ollerce, |rc|ud|rg a corrupl|or ollerce, car oe oarred lror
ro|d|rg cerla|r pos|l|ors or exerc|s|rg cerla|r lurcl|ors, |rc|ud|rg rarager|a| lurcl|ors |r a |ega|
persor (lre sysler pror|o|ls parl|c|pal|or |r erlreprereur|a| acl|v|ly - oWr|rg a corpary,
possess|rg srares |r |l, or rurr|rg a corpary -, ard lre ro|d|rg ol puo||c oll|ce). Tr|s
d|squa||l|cal|or serves as ar add|l|ora| serlerce, Wr|cr car oe |rposed lor 1 lo 5 years.

Leg|s|al|or or lre ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors

5Z. Tre currerl |ega| lrareWor| does rol prov|de lor corporale cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly. Cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly car
or|y oe ass|gred lo ar |rd|v|dua| Wro, acl|rg as 'adr|r|slralor or |r lre rare or |r
represerlal|or ol a |ega| persor, corr|ls cr|r|ra| ollerces. Trere |s a degree ol c|v|| ||ao|||ly lor
|ega| persors |r lral Arl|c|e 120 CC prov|des lral |ega| erl|l|es car oe respors|o|e lor lre
darages caused urder c|v|| |aW 'lor cr|res or ollerces lral rave oeer corr|lled oy lre|r
erp|oyees, represerlal|ves or raragers dur|rg lre exerc|se ol lre|r oo||gal|ors or serv|ces.

3arcl|ors

58. As rerl|ored |r lre prev|ous paragrapr, or|y c|v|| ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors lor ollerces corr|lled
oy a ralura| persor ex|sls. lr add|l|or, Arl|c|e 129 CC (oe |as consecuenc|as accesor|asj prov|des
lor a cerla|r ruroer ol accessory reasures W|lr regard lo |ega| persors (sucr as c|os|rg or
d|sso|ul|or ol lre corpary, suspers|or ol |ls acl|v|l|es) Wr|cr 'lre judge or lre courl (.) car
|rpose (.) lo preverl lre corl|rual|or ol lre |||ega| acl|v|ly ard |ls ellecls. Trese reasures
cou|d oe app||ed or|y lo cerla|r ollerces. As regards lre corrupl|or ollerces, Arl|c|e 129 CC ray
or|y oe app||cao|e W|lr respecl lo or|oery ol lore|gr puo||c oll|c|a|s. No sysler ras oeer crealed
lor record|rg |ega| persors lo Wr|cr lrose accessory reasures r|grl oe app||ed.

0educl|o|||ly

59. Tre gerera| pr|rc|p|e rerl|ored oy lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es |s lral experses re|aled lo lre
perpelral|or ol cr|res carrol oe suojecl lo lax deducl|or. Arl|c|e 11 ('Nor-deducl|o|e experses)
ol lre rev|sed lexl ol lre or Corpary Tax LaW slales lral 'doral|ors ard gereros|l|es W||| rol oe
cors|dered as lax deducl|o|e experses. Neverlre|ess, lre sare Arl|c|e adds lral 'lr|s does rol
app|y lo lre experses |rcurred |r puo||c re|al|ors W|lr cuslorers or supp||ers, or |r ra||rg
19
payrerls lo lre corpary persorre| |r respecl ol lre usua| lrad|l|ors, or |r prorol|rg, d|recl|y or
|rd|recl|y, lre sa|e ol lre corpary's producls or serv|ces, or lrose lral are corre|aled lo lre
corpary's |rcore.

0. 0educl|o|||ly ol experses, ever |l du|y accourled lor - Wr|cr Wou|d requ|re appropr|ale supporl|rg
docurerls - carrol oe a||oWed Wrere sucr experses are re|aled lo ar ur|aWlu| lrarsacl|or
der|v|rg lror a corlracl W|lroul jusl cause, |rc|ud|rg Wrere lre |rd|v|dua| corcerred cou|d
rypolrel|ca||y avo|d cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly oW|rg lo lre preserce ol ore ol lre grourds lor |rrur|ly
(slale ol recess|ly, |rsuperao|e lear, elc). 0ur|rg lre eva|ual|or v|s|l, lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es, ard
|r parl|cu|ar lre lax aulror|l|es, r|gr||grled lral ever lrougr lrere |s ro spec|l|c prov|s|or slal|rg
lral or|oes carrol oe deducled, case |aW ard Wor||rg pracl|ce ol lax |rspeclors reporled|y sroW
lral or|oes are rol deducl|o|e: |r case ol experses Wr|cr r|grl or|g|rale lror douollu| l|rarc|a|
acl|v|l|es ard/or experses, lax |rspeclors Were sa|d lo oe lu||y aWare ol lre reed lo exar|re sucr
parl|cu|ar s|lual|or rore lrorougr|y.

Tax aulror|l|es

1. Pursuarl lo Arl|c|e Z.1 ol Roya| 0ecree 939/198, Wr|cr approves lre 0erera| Regu|al|or ol Tax
lrspecl|or, 'lre Tax lrspeclorales W||| reporl lre everls lral lrey oecore aWare ol |r lre course
ol lre|r |rspecl|ors ard lral ray corsl|lule puo||c cr|res or adr|r|slral|ve ollerces, Wr|cr
d|recl|y or |rd|recl|y |rlr|rge lre l|rarc|a| r|grls ol lre lr|ard Reverue, lo lre |ega| aulror|l|es, lre
3lale Prosecul|or 3erv|ce (3P3) or lre appropr|ale ard corpelerl orgar|sal|ors. L||eW|se, lrey
W||| prov|de lre dala lral |s requ|red oy lre corpelerl |ega| aulror|ly Wrer prosecul|rg lre
aoovererl|ored cr|res. Voreover, Arl|c|e 95.3 ol lre 0erera| Tax LaW prov|des lral Wrer
|rlorral|or |r lre possess|or ol lre lax adr|r|slral|or |rd|cales lre poss|o|e ex|slerce ol ar
ollerce, lre lax adr|r|slral|or W||| suor|l lo lre 3P3 a dela||ed reporl or lre lacls. Tax
aulror|l|es Wor| c|ose|y W|lr lre |aW erlorcererl agerc|es - ard espec|a||y W|lr lre 3P3 W|lr|r
Wr|cr a spec|a| 3upporl ur|l ol lre 3lale Adr|r|slral|or lax Agercy ras oeer sel up - ard
supporl lrer |r corp|ex cases, rare|y lrose re|aled lo ecoror|c cr|res, |rc|ud|rg corrupl|or.

Accourl ollerces

2. Trere |s a gerera| oo||gal|or lor a|| ous|resses lo |eep corp|ele accourl|rg records ard ooo|s
as We|| as re|evarl corpuler prograrres, l||es ard arcr|ves lor s|x years. As lar as v|o|al|or
prov|s|ors or lre proper ra|rlerarce ard corserval|or ol accourl|rg ard olrer corpary
records are corcerred, lre Code ol Correrce does rol corla|r d|recl sarcl|ors; roWever, |l a
corpary goes oar|rupl, lre |ac| ol appropr|ale records W||| oe sarcl|ored oy dec|ar|rg lre
corpary lraudu|erl). 8y corlrasl, lre Cr|r|ra| Code prov|des lor a spec|l|c 'accourl|rg cr|re
(Arl|c|e 310)
1Z
. Tre 3par|sr aulror|l|es rerl|ored a|so Arl|c|es 200 ard 201 ol lre Corpary Tax
LaW ard Arl|c|e 181 ol lre 0erera| Tax LaW prov|d|rg lor spec|l|c sarcl|ors lor accourl ollerces.

1Z
'Tre pera|ly ol sever lo l|lleer Wee|erds ol corl|rererl ard a l|re ol lrree lo ler rorlrs sra|| oe app||ed lo pur|sr ary
persor Wro |s oo||galed oy lax |aW lo |eep correrc|a| accourl|rg records, ooo|s or lax records ard:
a) Aoso|ule|y la||s lo d|scrarge lre sa|d oo||gal|or |r lre procedure lor d|recl eva|ual|or ol laxao|e oases.
o) Keeps d|llererl accourl|rg records relerr|rg lo lre sare ous|ress ard ous|ress year, Wr|cr records r|de or s|ru|ale lre
lrue s|lual|or ol lre corpary.
c) Fa||s lo erler ecoror|c dea|s, acls, operal|ors or lrarsacl|ors |r gerera| |r lre rardalory ooo|s or erlers l|gures olrer
lrar lre lrue l|gures lor sucr |lers.
d) Va|es l|cl|l|ous accourl|rg erlr|es |r lre rardalory ooo|s.
20
Aud|lors ard accourlarls

3. Aud|lors, accourlarls, lax adv|sors as We|| as rolar|es ard |aWyers are |rc|uded |r lre ||sl ol
lrose persors (orgar|sal|ors) Wro are suor|lled lo a ruroer ol spec|l|c oo||gal|ors (lo reporl
susp|c|ous lrarsacl|ors lo lre 3EP8LAC, lo sore acl|or a|r|rg al galrer|rg lurlrer e|ererls
re|aled lo a susp|c|ous s|lual|or elc) Wrer lrey core across ary acl|v|l|es lral cou|d oe re|aled lo
rorey |aurder|rg. Tre rorelary sarcl|ors prov|ded |r case ol la||ure lo reporl are lre sare as
lor a|| |rsl|lul|ors rav|rg a reporl|rg oo||gal|or |r lr|s corlexl: 1 ol lurrover lor ser|ous cr|res,
5 lor very ser|ous cr|res ard W|lrdraWa| ol ||cerse ol exerc|se ol lre proless|or.

b. Ana|ys|s

1. w|lroul ar appropr|ale oll|c|a| reg|slral|or, ro |ega| persor |s a||oWed lo correrce |ls acl|v|ly.
Tre reg|slral|or sysler lor correrc|a| corpar|es, operal|rg v|a Terr|lor|a| Correrc|a|
Reg|slers, as lar as lre co||ecl|or ol dala ard puo||cal|or ol |rlorral|or |s corcerred, |s oe lacro
a cerlra||sed sysler. A|| |rlorral|or |s lrarslerred lo lre Cerlra| Correrc|a| Reg|slry, Wr|cr |s
respors|o|e lor |ls puo||cal|or |r lre 0ll|c|a| Correrc|a| Reg|slry 8u||el|r. Nol a|| lre |rlorral|or
|epl |s ava||ao|e lo lre puo||c (e.g. lre or|g|r ol lurd|rg cap|la|). Tre Reg|slry |s lu||y corpuler|sed
ard lre puo||c ras access lo lre |rlorral|or puo||c|y ava||ao|e v|a |rlerrel. Tre lee lor access lo
a corpary l||e |s r|re euro, Wr|cr |s la|r|y roderale ard lrus carrol oe seer as ar ooslac|e lo
lrose see||rg lr|s |rlorral|or. LaW erlorcererl ard jud|c|a| aulror|l|es rave access lo a|| lre
|rlorral|or corla|red |r lre l||es - urder lre gerera| cord|l|ors Wr|cr app|y lo |rvesl|gal|ve ard
cr|r|ra| proceed|rgs.

5. 3pa|r ras rol yel ral|l|ed lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or or Corrupl|or. Tre currerl eva|ual|or
does rol, lrerelore, dea| W|lr lre ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors lor corrupl|or ollerces as prov|ded oy
lre Cr|r|ra| LaW Corverl|or or Corrupl|or. Trerelore, lre 0ET ras |oo|ed |rlo lre ||ao|||ly ol
|ega| persors lor corrupl|or W|lr|r lre lrareWor| ol 0PC 5. ll |s c|ear lral lre 3par|sr |ega|
sysler does rol prov|de lor corporale ||ao|||ly. Lega| persors ray oe re|d ||ao|e lor lre darage
caused oy corrupl|or or|y W|lr|r lre lrareWor| ol c|v|| |aW prov|s|ors or lorls. lr lre 0ET's v|eW,
lr|s |s |rsull|c|erl. Arl|c|e 5 ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code prov|des lor cases Wrere accessory sarcl|ors
(penas accesor|as) car oe app||ed. Tr|s |rc|udes lre pror|o|l|or lo perlorr cerla|r acl|v|l|es
prov|ded lral lre courl eslao||sres lral lrere |s a ||r| oelWeer lre ollerce corr|lled ard lre
lype ol acl|v|ly exerc|sed, |rc|ud|rg lre ro|d|rg ol a rarager|a| pos|l|or |r a |ega| persor.
lrlorral|or or lre |rpos|l|or ol sucr reasures |s |epl |r lre reg|slry ol cr|r|ra| corv|cl|ors.
3|rce lrere |s ro d|recl ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors lor corrupl|or ollerces, lrere |s corsequerl|y ro
reg|sler ol |ega| persors |rvo|ved |r corrupl|or acl|v|l|es. Trerelore, the CET recommends 1} to
|ntroduce an adequate system of ||ab|||ty of |ega| persons for acts of corrupt|on, |nc|ud|ng
effect|ve, proport|onate and d|ssuas|ve sanct|ons, and subsequent|y, 2} to cons|der to
estab||sh a reg|stry of |ega| persons wh|ch have been subject to corporate sanct|ons.

. LaWs 11/2202 (or 'Veasures lo Relorr lre F|rarc|a| 3ysler) ard 2/2003 (arerd|rg LaWs or
lre 3loc| Excrarge ard or L|r|led Corpar|es) corla|r prov|s|ors Wr|cr oo||ge |arge corpar|es
lo rave a code ol corducl ol Wr|cr a|| corpary slall are lo oe aWare. Tre 3par|sr Craroer ol
Correrce, Wr|cr |s a puo||c oody, carr|es oul vocal|ora| lra|r|rg courses lor corpary slall,
Wr|cr |rc|ude, |nrer a||a, |ssues re|aled lo good goverrarce. Tre 0ET We|cores lre lra|r|rg
acl|v|l|es carr|ed oul oy lre Craroer ol Correrce ard cors|ders lral, la||rg |rlo accourl |ls
slalus ard lre lacl lral |l |s operal|rg urder lre superv|s|or ol lre V|r|slry ol Trade, lr|s agercy
r|grl p|ay ar ever rore acl|ve ro|e |r prov|d|rg arl|corrupl|or educal|or lo lre ous|ress
corrur|ly. Trerelore, the CET recommends that the 8pan|sh author|t|es encourage
21
through a|| poss|b|e means the 6hamber of 6ommerce to p|ay a more act|ve ro|e |n
promot|ng eth|cs |n bus|ness.

Z. Tax deducl|o|||ly ol or|oes |s addressed or lre oas|s ol lre gerera| pr|rc|p|e ol c|v|| |aW, Wr|cr
pror|o|ls draW|rg ary |ega| corsequerce lror ar acl Wr|cr |lse|l corsl|lules ar ollerce (or ar
e|ererl lrereol), or Wr|cr |s re|aled lo lre perpelral|or ol ar ollerce. Tr|s gerera| approacr
cou|d oe cors|dered as oe|rg equ|va|erl lo a d|recl pror|o|l|or ol lre deducl|or ol or|oes pa|d, or
lre cord|l|or lral lre lax aulror|l|es are We|| aWare ol sucr a pror|o|l|or ard acqua|rled W|lr |ls
pracl|ca| |rp|ererlal|or. Tre 0ET |s urder lre |rpress|or lral lr|s |s lre case |r 3pa|r. lr
add|l|or, Arl|c|e 11 ol lre Corpary Tax LaW, Wr|cr pror|o|ls lre deducl|or ol 'doral|ors ard
gereros|l|es, ollered oy corpar|es, cou|d oe seer as rav|rg a polerl|a| arl|-corrupl|or ellecl.
Tr|s ellecl does rol appear lo oe urderr|red oy lre exerpl|or prov|ded lor oy lre sare Arl|c|e
Wr|cr slales lral 'lral exerpl|or does rol app|y lo lre experse |rcurred |r puo||c re|al|ors W|lr
cuslorers or supp||ers, or |r ra||rg payrerls lo lre corpary persorre| |r respecl ol lre usua|
lrad|l|ors, or |r prorol|rg, d|recl|y or |rd|recl|y, lre sa|e ol lre corpary's producls or serv|ces, or
lrose lral are re|aled lo lre corpary's |rcore, g|ver lral lre lax aulror|l|es Were lourd lo oe
lra|red lo crec| Wrelrer lre serv|ce goods |r quesl|or rave oeer prov|ded (ard ever Wrelrer
lre corpary |s |r a pos|l|or lo prov|de lral serv|ce goods) or Wrelrer lre |aller cou|d d|ss|ru|ale
douollu| l|rarc|a| acl|v|l|es or experses.

8. lr lre 0ET's op|r|or, lax aulror|l|es are We|| aWare ol lre lax |rp||cal|ors ol rosl corrupl|or
ollerces ard prepared lo perlorr lre|r delecl|or ard |rvesl|gal|or las|s. lr order lo oecore a lax
oll|c|a|, lre app||carls rave lo urdergo a ore-year lra|r|rg course. Furlrer lra|r|rg |s prov|ded oy
lre lrsl|lule ol Tax 3lud|es Wr|cr, arorg olrers, covers lre lypo|ogy ol lax ollerces. Ru|es or
|rcorpal|o|||ly app||cao|e lo lax |rspeclors are rore slr|rgerl lrar lrose app||cao|e lo olrer c|v||
servarls. 3pa|r ras deve|oped a We|| lurcl|or|rg sysler ol cooperal|or oelWeer lre prosecul|or
serv|ces ard lre lax aulror|l|es. Tax |rspeclors are urder a spec|l|c oo||gal|or lo reporl ary lacl
'lral ray corsl|lule puo||c cr|res or adr|r|slral|ve ollerces d|recl|y lo lre 3lale Prosecul|or
3erv|ce.

9. Accourlarls ard pr|vale aud|lors are oo||ged lo reporl susp|c|ous lrarsacl|ors urder arl|-rorey
|aurder|rg |eg|s|al|or, Wr|cr prov|des lor sarcl|ors lor ror-lu|l||rerl, Wr|cr ray rarge lror 1
lo 5 ol lre|r year|y lurrover. Tr|s |eve| ol sarcl|or cou|d We|| oe cors|dered as adequale.
Voreover, |l |s a|so poss|o|e lo oar lre alorererl|ored proless|ora|s lror exerc|s|rg lre|r
acl|v|ly, Wr|cr |r sore cases r|grl rave rore ser|ous repercuss|ors lrar a pure|y l|rarc|a|
sarcl|or.

V. 60N6LU8|0N8

Z0. lr 3pa|r, recourse lo se|zure ard corl|scal|or ol assels |s ar usua| pracl|ce lor lre po||ce ard
prosecul|or serv|ces. 0ela||ed |ega| prov|s|ors dea||rg W|lr se|zure, corl|scal|or ard
raragererl ol se|zed ard corl|scaled assels are |r p|ace. Recerl |eg|s|al|ve deve|oprerls |r
lre l|e|d ol corl|scal|or ol lre |rslrurerls ard proceeds ol cr|re rave |rlroduced |nrer a||a lre
poss|o|||ly ol us|rg va|ue ard |n rem corl|scal|or. Tre corl|scal|or ol proceeds/|rslrurerls lourd
|r lre possess|or ol a lr|rd parly |s a|so addressed oy lre |aW. Tre 3pec|a| Allorrey 0erera|'s
0ll|ce lor lre Repress|or ol Ecoror|c 0llerces re|aled W|lr Corrupl|or |s slrorg|y supporled oy
spec|a| ur|ls ol experls |r lax ard olrer l|rarc|a| rallers. Tre 0overrrerl |rlerds lo exlerd
lrese spec|l|c capao|||ly ol us|rg spec|a||sed ur|ls lo lre ra|r proseculors' oll|ces |r lre courlry,
|r order lo errarce lre|r operal|ve capac|ly. As lar as puo||c adr|r|slral|or ard elr|cs |s
corcerred, 3pa|r does rol rave ore gerera| erlorceao|e lexl lral cou|d oe cors|dered as a code
22
ol corducl lor |ls puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees |r lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or. Tre currerl
sysler |s oased or d|llererl p|eces ol |eg|s|al|or dea||rg W|lr oo||gal|ors ard r|grls ol puo||c
oll|c|a|s ard lrere |s ro gerera| Wr|ller corp||al|or ol lre cr|r|ra| ard d|sc|p||rary slardards
ava||ao|e lo oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees or lo lre puo||c. As regards |ega| persors ard corrupl|or, lre
3par|sr |ega| sysler does rol prov|de lor corporale ||ao|||ly. Lega| persors ray oe re|d ||ao|e lor
lre darage caused oy corrupl|or or|y W|lr|r lre lrareWor| ol c|v|| |aW prov|s|ors or lorls.

Z1. lr v|eW ol lre aoove, 0REC0 addresses lre lo||oW|rg recorrerdal|ors lo 3pa|r:

|. that a |ega| prov|s|on be |ntroduced spec|f|ca||y prov|d|ng for prov|s|ona| measures
to be taken for the purpose of guarantee|ng the effect|ve conf|scat|on of the
proceeds of corrupt|on (paragrapr 19);

||. to conduct a rev|ew of the |ega| prov|s|ons that prov|de the pub||c w|th r|ghts to
access Covernment |nformat|on and the |mp|ementat|on pract|ces that have been
deve|oped to determ|ne |f the |aw(s} and|or current |mp|ementat|on pract|ces are
|nappropr|ate|y ||m|t|ng the pub||c's access to |nformat|on that wou|d he|p support
the Covernment |n |ts f|ght aga|nst corrupt|on (paragrapr 1);

|||. that a fu|| eva|uat|on of the effect|veness of the current system of
cr|m|na||d|sc|p||nary sanct|ons that subst|tute for an enforceab|e code of conduct
for pub||c off|c|a|s|emp|oyees be conducted and that study be made pub||c. |t
recommends further that 8pa|n comp||e the current cr|m|na||d|sc|p||nary prov|s|ons
and make them ava||ab|e to pub||c off|c|a|s and emp|oyees and pub||sh the
comp||at|on for pub||c |nformat|on (paragrapr 51);

|v. that cons|derat|on be g|ven to draft|ng gu|de||nes for pub||c off|c|a|s|emp|oyees
address|ng s|tuat|ons where |nterests or act|v|t|es of the pub||c off|c|a||emp|oyee are
not proh|b|ted but may st||| create a conf||ct of |nterest w|th h|s|her actua| dut|es and
respons|b|||t|es (paragrapr 52);

v. 1} to |ntroduce an adequate system of ||ab|||ty of |ega| persons for acts of
corrupt|on, |nc|ud|ng effect|ve, proport|onate and d|ssuas|ve sanct|ons, and
subsequent|y, 2} to cons|der to estab||sh a reg|stry of |ega| persons wh|ch have
been subject to corporate sanct|ons (paragrapr 5);

v|. that the 8pan|sh author|t|es encourage through a|| poss|b|e means the 6hamber of
6ommerce to p|ay a more act|ve ro|e |n promot|ng eth|cs |n bus|ness (paragrapr ).

Z2. Voreover, 0REC0 |rv|les lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es lo la|e accourl ol lre ooservar|ons
(paragraprs 20, 23, 21, 13, 53) rade |r lre ara|yl|ca| parl ol lr|s reporl.

Z3. F|ra||y, |r corlorr|ly W|lr Ru|e 30.2 ol lre Ru|es ol Procedure, 0REC0 |rv|les lre 3par|sr
aulror|l|es lo preserl a reporl or lre |rp|ererlal|or ol lre aoove-rerl|ored recorrerdal|ors
oy 30 Noveroer 200.
Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING



Strasbourg, 15 May 2009 Public
Greco Eval III Rep (2008) 3E
Theme I






Third Evaluation Round







Evaluation Report on Spain
Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2)
(Theme I)







Adopted by GRECO
at its 42
nd
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 11-15 May 2009)




2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. Spain joined GRECO in 1999. GRECO adopted the First Round Evaluation Report (Greco Eval I
Rep (2001) 1E) in respect of Spain at its 5
th
Plenary Meeting (11-15 June 2001) and the Second
Round Evaluation Report (Greco Eval II Rep (2004) 7E) at its 23
rd
Plenary Meeting (17-20
May 2005). The afore-mentioned Evaluation Reports, as well as their corresponding Compliance
Reports, are available on GRECOs homepage (http://www.coe.int/greco).

2. GRECOs current Third Evaluation Round (launched on 1 January 2007) deals with the following
themes:

- Theme I Incriminations: Articles 1a and 1b, 2-12, 15-17, 19 paragraph 1 of the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), Articles 1-6 of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191)
and Guiding Principle 2 (criminalisation of corruption).

- Theme II Transparency of party funding: Articles 8, 11, 12, 13b, 14 and 16 of
Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of
Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and - more generally - Guiding Principle 15
(financing of political parties and election campaigns).

3. The GRECO Evaluation Team for Theme I (hereafter referred to as the GET), which carried out
an on-site visit to Spain from 22 to 23 September 2008, was composed of Mr Atle ROALDSY,
Senior Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Police Department (Norway) and Mr Anton TRONIN, Head of
Section on Examination of the Applications on Criminal Matters, Department of the Representative
of the Russian Federation at the European Court on Human Rights, Ministry of Justice (Russian
Federation). The GET was supported by Ms Laura SANZ-LEVIA from GRECOs Secretariat. Prior
to the visit the GET experts were provided with a comprehensive reply to the Evaluation
questionnaire (document Greco Eval III (2008) 3E, Theme I), as well as copies of relevant
legislation.

4. The GET met with officials from the following governmental organisations: the Ministry of Justice
(Secretary of State for Justice, Directorate General of Legislation Policy and Directorate General
of International Legal Co-operation) and the Ministry of the Interior. The GET also met with
representatives of the State Prosecution Service (including, the Special Prosecution Office against
Corruption and Organised Crime), judges and representatives of the General Council of the
Judiciary. Moreover, the GET met with Transparency International, academia, the media and
criminal defence lawyers.

5. The present report on Theme I of GRECOs Third Evaluation Round Incriminations was
prepared on the basis of the replies to the questionnaire and the information provided during the
on-site visit. The main objective of the report is to evaluate the measures adopted by the Spanish
authorities in order to comply with the requirements deriving from the provisions indicated in
paragraph 2. The report contains a description of the situation, followed by a critical analysis. The
conclusions include a list of recommendations adopted by GRECO and addressed to Spain in
order to improve its level of compliance with the provisions under consideration.

6. The report on Theme II Transparency of party funding , is set out in Greco Eval III Rep
(2008) 3E, Theme II.






3
II. INCRIMINATIONS

a. Description of the situation

7. Spain signed the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) on 10 May 2005; it has not
yet been ratified. Spain has neither signed nor ratified the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law
Convention (ETS 191).

Bribery of domestic public officials (Articles 1-3 and 19 of ETS 173)

Definition of the offence
8. Criminalisation of bribery is provided for in Articles 419 to 427, Chapter V of Title XIX of the
Spanish Penal Code (PC). The relevant provisions on passive bribery (cohecho pasivo)
differentiate between five types of situations on the basis of the expected act (lawful/unlawful)
(cohecho propio/impropio) of the public official being bribed; each of these situations is punished
with a different level of sanction depending on whether:
(i) the expected action/omission of the public official constitutes a crime (Article 419):

Article 419, Penal Code: passive bribery (actions/omissions constituting a crime)
The authority or public official that, for his/her own benefit or that of a third party, requests or
receives, directly or through an intermediary, a gift or present, or accepts an offer or promise for
carrying out, in the exercise of his/her duty, an action or omission that may constitute a crime,
will be punished with imprisonment for a period of between two to six years, a fine of up to
three times the value of the said gift and the specific disqualification from any public
employment or post for seven to twelve years, without prejudice to the penalty corresponding to
the crime committed by virtue of the gift or promise.
(ii) the expected action/omission of the public official is an unjust act (Article 420). There is
extensive jurisprudence
1
of the definition of unjust act which has been repeatedly understood as
any act that the public official is not lawfully entitled to perform (contrario a lo que es debido).

Article 420, Penal Code: passive bribery (actions/omissions constituting an unjust act)
The authority or public official that, for his/her own benefit or that of a third party, requests or
receives, directly or through an intermediary, a gift or present, or accepts an offer or promise for
carrying out an unjust act not constituting a crime, related with the exercise of his/her duty, and
does in fact execute it, will be punished with imprisonment for a period of between one to four
years, and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for six to nine years. If
s/he does not execute the unjust act, the prison term will be from one to two years and specific
disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of three to six years. In both
cases, a fine shall also be imposed, ranging from the value to triple the value of the gift.


1
For example, judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 1096/2006 of 16 November 2006, STS 1076/2006
of 27 October 2006, STS 893/2002 of 16 May 2002, STS 1701/2001 of 24 September 2001.



4
(iii) the public official refrains (omission) from carrying out an act s/he should have carried out
(Article 421):

Article 421, Penal Code: passive bribery (omission of acts inherent to the public
officials duties)
When the gift requested, received or promised is aimed at preventing an authority or public
official from fulfilling an act which s/he is to carry out in the exercise of his/her duty, the
punishment will be a fine from the value to double the value of the gift and specific
disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of between one and three
years.
(iv) the public official performs an act inherent to his/her official duty (Article 425); the bribe has
been solicited or accepted before/after the performance of the (lawful or unlawful) official act
(cohecho antecedente/cohecho subsiguiente):

Article 425, Penal Code: passive bribery (performance of acts inherent to the public
officials duties)
1. The authority or public official that requests a gift or present or accepts an offer or promise
to carry out an act inherent to his/her duty, or as a reward for an act already carried out,
will be punished with a fine ranging from the value to triple the value of the gift and
suspension from his public employment or post for a period from six months to three years.
[lawful acts]
2. In the case of reward for an act already performed, if this were to constitute a crime, there
will also be imposed the penalty of imprisonment from one to three years, a fine of six to
ten months and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a period
from ten to fifteen years. [unlawful acts]
(v) the public official accepts a bribe on the basis of her/his public official status (in consideration of
the public officials position) or for an act that is not legally prohibited (Article 426).
Article 426, Penal Code: passive bribery (bribe offered in consideration of the public
officials position or in order for the public official to fulfill a lawful act)
The authority or public official that accepts a gift or present that is offered to him/her in
consideration of his/her position or for the performance of an act that is not forbidden by law,
will be punished with a fine of three to six months.

9. Active bribery (cohecho activo) of domestic public officials is criminalised in Article 423 PC, which
refers to the provisions on passive bribery to establish the level of penalty required (less severe
penalty in those cases where the individual does not take the initiative to bribe the public official,
but rather responds to a public officials demand). The interpretation of the different elements of
passive bribery included in Articles 419 to 421 PC (e.g. directly and indirectly, for himself or for
herself, in return for an official act) therefore applies to the offence of active bribery. Much doctrinal
debate has taken place as to whether Article 423 PC on active bribery, would also cover the
corruption instances under Articles 425 PC (acts inherent to the public officials duties) and 426



5
PC (acts not inherent to the officials duties, but in consideration of his/her function, which are not
prohibited by law). In this connection, case law
2
has confirmed that Article 423 PC would indeed
cover the acts of a public official specified in Articles 425 and 426 PC (cohecho impropio); the
reference of Article 423 PC in fine to its preceding provisions would only serve punitive purposes
in so far as the determination of the applicable sanction is concerned.

Article 423, Penal Code: active bribery
1. Any person who corrupts or attempts to corrupt the public authorities or officials, through
the use of sops, gifts, offers or promises, will be punished with the same custodial and
financial sanctions as the public authorities or officials themselves.
2. Any person who attends to such request from public authorities or officials will be punished
with sanctions one grade lower than those described in the previous paragraph.

10. A reform of the Penal Code is ongoing
3
; it contains a number of important amendments with
respect to corruption offences. In particular, a simplification of the types of conduct giving rise to a
passive bribery offence is foreseen; it is proposed that the five different types of corrupt conducts
described above be reduced to three categories: (i) unlawful official acts; (ii) lawful official acts;
and (iii) bribe accepted on the basis of the public officials position. Likewise, the draft
amendments to the Penal Code provide for an autonomous offence of active bribery which no
longer refers back to the relevant provisions on passive bribery and is unequivocally applicable to
both lawful and unlawful acts.
Elements of the offence

Domestic public official

11. The notion of public official is developed by Article 24 PC as follows:

Article 24, Penal Code: authorities and public officials
1. For penal purposes, the term authority shall refer to whoever, on his/her own or as a
member of a corporation, court or collegiate body, is in command or exercises his/her own
jurisdiction. In any case, have the status of authorities the members of the Congress of
Deputies, the Senate, the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Communities and the
European Parliament. The public officials of the Public Prosecution Service shall also be
considered authorities.
2. Public official shall mean every person that, by immediate provision of the law, or by
election or appointment of the competent authority, takes part in the exercise of public
functions.


2
Judgments of the Supreme Court: STS 545/1998 of 13 January 1999, ATS 1178/1998 of 29 April 1998, STS 692/1997 of 7
November 1997.
3
The authorities indicated that, on 14 November 2008, the Council of Ministers passed the Draft Organic Bill on the Reform of
the Penal Code. The Draft was subsequently transmitted to the General Council of the Judiciary and the Attorney Generals
Office for comments; it will be sent again (in short) to the Council of Ministers and then to Parliament for further consultation
and adoption in due course.



6
12. In particular, the term authority refers to elected authorities, including the members of Parliament
(Congress of Deputies and Senate), the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous Communities
and the European Parliament, as well as members of the judiciary (judges and other holders of
judicial offices
4
, whether elected or appointed) and officials of the State Prosecution Service.

13. The term public official is understood broadly on the basis of a status oriented definition by which
a formal link with public administration is required (every person that, by immediate provision of
the law, or by election or appointment), which is then supplemented with functional elements,
notably, by relying on the public nature of the function performed by the person concerned (takes
part in the exercise of public function).

14. Furthermore, there is extensive jurisprudence
5
(and academic studies) reflecting on the notion of
public official and confirming that, in the framework of penal legislation, this is to be interpreted to
the widest extent possible (beyond administrative law). In this context, it would not only cover
those persons carrying out a public function in the State administration - whether at central,
regional or local level -, but also individuals vested (by law, election or appointment) with public
authority to perform certain duties of State administration (e.g. employees of public enterprises,
employees of companies which have been officially granted particular rights or licenses to perform
public services, etc.), irrespective of their type of contract and the temporary/permanent character
of the functions performed.

15. Finally, the draft amendments to the PC specifically provide for the applicability of the relevant
articles on active and passive bribery provisions of domestic public officials to public officials of the
European Communities and foreign officials of other EU countries with a view to transpose the EU
Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or
officials of Member States of the European Union
6
.

Promising, offering or giving (active bribery)

16. The elements of promising, offering and giving, although not transposed verbatim, are
covered by Article 423 PC, which punishes the corruption or attempt to corrupt a public official
through the use of sops, gifts, offers or promises. The Supreme Court has interpreted the verbs to
corrupt or attempt to corrupt in a very broad manner so as to cover those actions aimed at
inducing the public official to act, either in an unlawful or a lawful manner (cohecho activo
propio/cohecho activo impropio)
7
, through the use of sops, gifts, offers or promises.

Request or receipt, acceptance of an offer or promise (passive bribery)

17. The elements of request, receipt or accept are covered in the relevant provisions dealing with
passive bribery of a public official in return for an unlawful act (cohecho propio), i.e. Articles 419
to 421 PC. While in Articles 419 and 420 PC the aforementioned terms are expressly referred to,
the term acceptance of an offer or promise is not used in Article 421 PC, but is meant to be
covered by the notion of being promised.


4
For example, judgment of the Supreme Court, STS 636/2006 of 8 June 2006.
5
For example, judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 1590/2003 of 22 April 2004, STS 68/2003 of 27
January 2003, STS 537/2002 of 5 April 2002, STS 2361/2001 of 4 December 2001.
6
Council Act of 26 May 1997 drawing up the Convention made on the basis of Article K.3 (2)(c) of the Treaty on European
Union, on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the
European Union [Official Journal C 195 of 25 June 1997].
7
Judgments of the Supreme Court: STS 545/1998 of 13 January 1999, ATS 1178/1998 of 29 April 1998, STS 692/1997 of 7
November 1997.



7
18. The provisions dealing with the exertion of influence in return for a lawful act (cohecho impropio)
do not systematically cover the different corrupt conducts provided for in the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption (ETS 173). In particular, Article 425 PC (commission of acts inherent to
a public duty) does not include a specific reference to the term receive, but this is meant to be
comprised in the notion of acceptance. Article 426 PC (bribe accepted for an act that is not
legally prohibited or on the basis of the public official status) only refers to the acceptance of gifts
or presents. It has nevertheless been understood by the courts that the acceptance of an
offer/promise would also be covered by Article 426 PC
8
; again, the term receive, although not
expressly transposed, would be comprised in the notion of acceptance.

19. According to well established jurisprudence, it is possible to punish not only instances where
corrupt pacts
9
have been agreed (bilateral character of the offence), but also unilateral requests
10
,
independently of whether the officials request is effectively accepted by the individual, whether the
bribe is received, or whether the illegal act/omission materialises at a later stage. Moreover, since
the legal interest that the Spanish Penal Code aims to safeguard in bribery offences is the
confidence of citizens in the fairness of public administration, it is immaterial the final use made of
the bribe (for example, whether the public official keeps it for him/herself or gives it to charity)
11
.

Any undue advantage

20. The relevant provisions of the Penal Code concerning bribery do not use the term undue.
Jurisprudence has generally established a limit on gifts which is not to exceed what would be
considered as a social courtesy; nevertheless, the criterion for determining whether a gift or
present could be considered as acceptable is to be left to the courts and assessed on a case-by-
case basis (for example, a recent adjudicated case dealt with a bribe to a driving test examiner
consisting of some boxes containing wine bottles
12
). In any event, the representatives interviewed
by the GET confirmed that it is understood that any gift or present (whether due or undue) may
come under the scope of the offence if it has a rewarding nature which purpose is to influence a
public officials action in service
13
.

21. The term gift or present is commonly understood as any material benefit, which can be valued in
quantifiable pecuniary terms. The economical assessment of the benefit appears also to be the
principle lying behind the determination of the penalty when this consists of a fine, i.e. the fine is to
be fixed by the relevant court on the basis of the value of the gift/present. The draft amendments
to the Penal Code incorporate a reworked definition of the terms used to define the advantage so
that it refers to both material and immaterial benefits (gift, favour or reward of any nature).
Moreover, the reference to monthly fines in the sanctions eliminates any allusion to a purely
economic assessment of the bribe.

Directly or indirectly

22. These notions (and thus, for example, corruption through intermediaries) are explicitly referred to
in Articles 419 and 420 PC. Although Articles 423, 425 and 426 PC do not specifically contain the
terms directly or indirectly, the courts have interpreted the latter provisions in a broad manner so

8
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 636/2006 of 8 June 2006.
9
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 504/2003 of 2 April 2003.
10
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 1096/2006 of 16 November 2006, STS 636/2006 of 8 June 2006,
STS 2052/2001 of 7 November 2001, STS 776/2001 of 8 May 2001, STS 20/2001 of 28 March 2001, STS 1114/2000 of 12
June 2000.
11
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: ATS 20637/2006 of 1 June 2007 and 27 September 2007.
12
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 513/2008 of 23 July 2008.
13
See also judgment of the High Court of Andalusia: STJ 6/2007, of 20 March 2007.



8
as to cover such instances. This was further confirmed by the practitioners met by the GET during
the on-site visit.

23. The draft amendments to the Penal Code explicitly refer to the notions of directly or indirectly in
all the different provisions concerning bribery to avoid any risk of misinterpretation in the future,
which would limit the scope of the relevant bribery offences.

For himself or herself or for anyone else

24. Bribery offences also apply where the gift benefits a third party (for his/her own benefit or that of a
third party). As above, although third party beneficiaries are only explicitly referred to in Articles
419 and 420 PC, jurisprudence has interpreted Articles 423, 425 and 426 PC as also covering
such instances
14
.

25. The draft amendments to the Penal Code explicitly refer to third party beneficiaries in all the
different provisions concerning bribery to avoid any risk of misinterpretation in the future, which
would limit the scope of the relevant bribery offences contrary to the legislators intent.

To act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions

26. The bribery offences expressly cover acts and omissions committed in the past or in the future
(cohecho subsiguiente
15
) by the public official. More specifically, they concern acts committed in
connection with the exercise of official duties/functions. This connection is understood broadly: it
includes acts that form part of the officials express powers and authority (even if these are not
explicitly laid down in legislation), as well as those instances lying outside of the officials formal
authorities (e.g. discretionary and political acts)
16
. It further expands to those situations where the
bribe is offered in consideration of the public officials position (Article 426 PC). The decisive
element of the offence is not whether the official has any discretion to act as requested by the
briber, but whether he has been offered, given or promised a bribe in order to obtain something
from him/her and therefore, to compromise his/her impartiality
17
. The briber may not even be
aware whether the official has discretion or not
18
. According to the jurisprudence in this area, the
bribery provisions of the Penal Code aim at safeguarding the principles of equality, impartiality and
objectivity of public administration, which would be significantly undermined, even in the official
would have acted in the same way without the bribe.

27. Finally, for a bribery offence to occur, it is not required that the induced act or omission by the
public official involves a breach of duty or be unlawful as such (Articles 425(1) and 426 PC);

14
See for example, judgment of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: ATS 692/1997 of 7 November 1997 where, in respect
to a possible corruption offence falling under Article 426 PC, it is said that it is immaterial the use that is made of the bribe,
whether the benefit is enjoyed by the bribed person or by, for instance, charity purposes.
15
The authorities explained that the introduction of bribery a posteriori - so-called cohecho subsiguiente (i.e. bribery
instances where bribe is solicited or accepted after the performance of the official act) serves a procedural purpose as it
allows a penalty to be imposed proving the handling over of the money and the public officials behaviour, without having to
prove the prior offer, request or acceptance (i.e. the so-called pactum sceleris). In any event, the reward creates a link
between the public official which puts at risk the principle of impartiality of public administration. The important nexus is that, in
an imprecise way, the public officials impartiality in relation to unspecified future acts is jeopardised.
16
For example, judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 440/2007 of 21 May 2007, STS 1096/2006 of 16
November 2006, STS 636/2006 of 8 June 2006, STS 504/2003 of 2 April 2003, STS 20/2001 of 28 March 2001, STS
2052/2001 of 7 November 2001, STS 701/1994 of 4 April 1994.
17
For example, judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 440/2007 of 21 May 2007, STS 1076/2006 of
27 October 2006.
18
Judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber: STS 293/2007 of 10 April 2007, STS 587/2007 of 28 June 2007.



9
however, the commission/omission of an unlawful official act entails more severe sanctions
(Articles 419, 420 and 425(2) PC which are considered aggravated cases).

Committed intentionally

28. A basic principle of the Penal Code is that negligently committed acts are not punishable unless
specifically provided for in the relevant offence (Article 12 PC). Therefore, as the provisions on
bribery do not mention that they can be caused by negligence, it can be inferred that they can only
be committed intentionally.

29. The acceptability or non-acceptability of the gift/present in a bribery situation is assessed
depending on whether the benefit was intended to influence the acts of the public servant (and
therefore to compromise the necessary impartiality and objectivity of public administration),
independently of whether the benefit did indeed have an influence in reality on the service
rendered by the official in question. By contrast, if the offer or promise is not intended to influence
the official to act illegally, the individual cannot be held responsible for offering, promising or giving
a bribe
19
.

Sanctions

30. The severity of the penalties available for passive bribery depends of the unlawful/lawful nature of
the act (action/omission) of the public official bribed:
- if the expected action/omission of the public official constitutes a crime: imprisonment between
two and six years, a fine of up to three times the value of the bribe, and disqualification from
public office for a period between seven and twelve years (Article 419 PC);
- if the expected action/omission of the public official is an unjust act not constituting a crime:
i) if the public official executes the unjust act: imprisonment between one and four years
and disqualification from public office for a period between six and nine years,
ii) if the public official does not execute the unjust act: imprisonment from one to two years
and disqualification from public office for a period between three and six years.
In both cases, the fine to be imposed in conjunction with the abovementioned penalties ranges
from the value to triple the value of the gift (Article 420 PC);
- if the public official refrains (omission) from carrying out an act s/he is required to carry out: a
fine from the value to double the value of the bribe, and disqualification from public office for a
period between one and three years (Article 421 PC);
- if the public official performs an act inherent to his/her duty (Article 425 PC):
i) if the bribe is received in order for the public official to carry out an act inherent to his/her
duty or as a reward for an act already carried out: a fine of up to three times the value of
the bribe and disqualification from public office for a period between six months and three
years (Article 425(1) PC);
ii) if the reward is offered in relation to an act already performed which constitutes a crime:
imprisonment between one and three years, a fine of six to ten months
20
, and
disqualification from public office for a period between ten and fifteen years (Article
425(2) PC);
- if the public official accepts a bribe for an act that is not legally prohibited or on the basis of
her/his public official status: fine of six to ten months (Article 426 PC).

19
Judgments of the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber STS 636/2006 of 8 June 2006, STS 188/1994 of 2 February 1994.
20
Fines in Spain are based on a system of day-fines, the number of days being determined on grounds such as the offender's
degree of guilt and the circumstances of the offence, and the amount on the basis of the offender's financial situation. In
practical terms, a fine of six to ten months consists of 90 to 180 daily rates; daily rates range between 2 and 400 euros (Article
50(4) PC).



10

31. Active bribery is generally punished with the same level of sanctions as passive bribery (the
exception of disqualification from a public post or employment is not applicable here). However, in
those cases where the bribe is given/offered/promised in response to a request of a public official,
penalties one grade lower to the ones required for passive bribery would apply (Article 423(2) PC
mitigating circumstance). According to Article 70 PC the maximum would be the previous
minimum penalty less a day; the minimum penalty would be one half of the previous minimum
21
.

32. The following table illustrates in a schematic manner the available sanctions for active and passive
bribery:

Sanction (cumulative) Article
PC
Offence
Imprisonment Fine Professional
disqualification
Extradition
possible
Passive bribery
Art. 419 Official act constitutes crime 2 - 6 yrs 1- 3 times value
of bribe
7 12 yrs Yes
Official act is unjust act
- executed 1 4 yrs 1- 3 times value
of bribe
6 9 yrs Yes
Art. 420
- not executed 1 2 yrs 1- 3 times value
of bribe
3 6 yrs Yes
Art. 421 Refrain from performing a
required official act
No 1- 2 times value
of bribe
1 3 yrs No
Official act inherent to duties (bribe solicited or accepted before/after performance official act)
(1) does not constitute crime No 1- 3 times value
of bribe
6 months 3 yrs No
Art. 425
(2) constitutes crime 1 3 yrs 90 180 daily
rates
10 15 yrs Yes
Art. 426 Bribe offered in consideration
of official position or in order to
perform act not forbidden by
law
No 90 180 daily
rates
No No
Active bribery
(1) Corrupt or attempt to
corrupt through gifts, offers or
promises
Same penalties as in passive bribery Not applicable Yes/No (See
above
passive
bribery, i.e.
Arts. 421,
425(1) and
426)
Art. 423
(2) If responding to solicitation
by public official
Penalties one grade lower than
those established for passive bribery
Not applicable Yes/No (See
above
passive
bribery, i.e.
421, 425(1)
and 426 &
420, 425(2))


21
For example, for calculation purposes, if the imprisonment penalty consists of 4-8 years imprisonment, the corresponding
one grade lower penalty would be 2-4 years imprisonment.



11
33. By way of comparison, fraud against a public body carries out a prison sentence of one to three
years imprisonment (Article 436 PC). Misappropriation of public funds is punished with
imprisonment for a period between three to six years; in aggravated cases, the imprisonment term
could increase to a maximum of eight years (Article 432 PC).

34. The draft amendments to the Penal Code propose a different sanctioning system exclusively
based on day-fines (i.e. sanctions are no longer established in relation to the economic
assessment of the bribe). In addition, there is an aggravation of the minimum imprisonment
sentences applicable to passive bribery offences, i.e. three years imprisonment for unlawful
official acts (instead of two) and two years imprisonment for lawful official acts (instead of one or
none). As far as active bribery is concerned, the available sanctions are the same that can be
applied to passive bribers (with the exception of disqualification from a public post or employment),
as well as disqualification from public tenders, contracts with public administration and tax rebates.

Court decisions and statistics

35. There is a vast corpus of court decisions dealing with bribery of several categories of public
officials (e.g. judges and holders of judicial office, mayors, doctors and nurses, employees of
private companies carrying out tasks of a public nature, etc). The interpretation of the key
elements (e.g. definition of public official, object of corruption, scope of official act) contained in the
relevant bribery offences has been largely developed in the light of those decisions, as illustrated
by the paragraphs above.

36. The annual reports of the Attorney Generals Office indicate that, in 2006, preliminary
investigations were carried out in connection with 89 cases concerning bribery (a 50% increase as
compared to 2005 data); in 2007, 47 preliminary investigations had been initiated for trading in
influence offences. The latest report of the Attorney Generals Office (2008) underlined that, since
the establishment of the Special Prosecution Office against Corruption and Organised Crime in
1996, a total of 64 corruption-related judgments had been issued (54 convictions and 10
acquittals).

Bribery of members of domestic public assemblies (Article 4 of ETS 173)

37. Pursuant to Article 24(1) PC, those persons who, on his/her own or as a member of a corporation,
court or collegiate body, are in command or exercise his/her own jurisdiction, are considered
authorities and therefore fall under the relevant provisions on bribery. The Penal Code further
refers, in particular, to elected members of legislative assemblies, including the members of
Parliament (Congress of Deputies and Senate), the legislative assemblies of the Autonomous
Communities and the European Parliament. There is no explicit reference to members of other
public domestic assemblies, such as public assemblies at local level (including in the autonomous
cities of Ceuta and Melilla) or public assemblies not exercising legislative powers. However, the
authorities affirm that the definition of the term authorities provided by Article 24(1) PC, is wide
enough to also cover members of any other public representative body, including those at local
level, whose members are elected or appointed and which exercise legislative or administrative
powers. The elements of the offence and the applicable sanctions detailed under bribery of
domestic public officials apply accordingly to bribery of members of domestic public assemblies.

38. An increasing number of court decisions have dealt with corruption of members of domestic public
assemblies, in particular, concerning decisions taken by members of local councils in the planning,
licensing and regulatory areas, as well as instances of political turn coating (transfuguismo
poltico), as for example in Case 1125/2007 of 12 December 2007, Case 1617/2005 of 7



12
December 2005 and Case 1952/2000 of 19 December 2000. The latter cases were adjudicated in
relation to Article 420 PC (actions/omissions of public officials constituting an unjust act), the
penalties applied consisted of prison sentences ranging from one to three years, fines up to
180,300 EUR and professional disqualification.

Bribery of foreign public officials (Article 5 of ETS 173)

39. With a view to implement the obligations under the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
22
, a new provision, i.e. Article 445,
was introduced under Chapter X, Title XIX of the Spanish Penal Code.

Article 445, Penal Code: bribery in international commercial relations
1. Whoever that, through presents, gifts, offers or promises, bribes or tries to bribe, whether
directly or through intermediaries, authorities or public officials whether foreign or from
international organisations in the exercise of their post to the advantage of them or of a
third party, or complies with their demands in respect to this, in order that they act or
refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business, will
be punished with the penalties set forth in Article 423 in each respective case.
2. Should the guilty person belong to a corporation, organisation or association, including
those of a provisional nature, dedicated to carry out these activities, the judge or court shall
be able to impose some of the consequences set forth in Article 129 of this Code.

Elements of the offence

Foreign public official

40. The Spanish Penal Code does not provide an autonomous definition of the term foreign official.
In this connection, the authorities have indicated that the definition of public official in Article 24 PC
cannot be extrapolated to foreign public officials.

41. The draft amendments to the Penal Code incorporate an autonomous definition of foreign public
officials, which comprises any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public
international organisation (i.e. a verbatim transposition of the OECD Convention).

Promising, offering or giving (active bribery)

42. The elements of promising, offering and giving are covered by Article 445 PC, which punishes
the bribing or attempt to bribe a foreign public official through the use of presents, gifts, offers or
promises. The offence is also committed where an individual complies with the demands of a
foreign public official to bribe him/her as described above (in such a case of solicitation by the
public official, the individual would be subject to a reduced penalty in accordance with Article
423(2) PC see also paragraph 31 for details). However, active bribery of foreign public officials is
only criminalised if the official act (whether lawful or unlawful) is committed in the context of
international business transactions (in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
the conduct of international business).

22
Spain signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
on 17 December 1997, and deposited the instrument of ratification on 14 January 2000.



13
Request or receipt, acceptance of an offer or promise (passive bribery)

43. Passive bribery of foreign public officials is not criminalised in Spain.

Directly or indirectly

44. These notions (and thus, for example, corruption through intermediaries) are explicitly referred to
in Article 445 PC.

For himself or herself or for anyone else

45. Bribery offences also apply where the gift benefits a third party (to the advantage of them or of a
third party).

Other elements

46. What is described concerning other specific elements/concepts of the offence (undue advantage,
to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her functions, committed intentionally) in
respect of bribery of domestic public officials applies also in respect of bribery of foreign public
officials.

Sanctions

47. Pursuant to Article 445 PC, the penalties set forth in Article 423 PC on active bribery of public
officials apply to active bribery of foreign public officials in the context of international business
transactions. In this connection, Article 423 PC refers back to the relevant provisions on passive
bribery to establish the required sanction (for details see paragraphs 30 to 32).

48. Some debate has taken place as to whether Article 423 PC can be also applied in connection, not
only to its precedent provisions on bribery: Articles 419, 420 and 421 PC (official acts constituting
a crime or an unjust act), but also to Articles 425 and 426 PC (lawful official acts). Legal
commentators appear to share contradictory views in this respect (which have been highlighted by
the relevant OECD reports on Spain
23
), but the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
24
has
confirmed that Article 423 PC would indeed be applicable when the briber aims at obtaining both
an unlawful (Articles 419, 420, 421 PC) and a lawful (Article 425 and 426 PC) official act.

49. The draft amendments to the Penal Code establish an autonomous offence of active bribery of
foreign public officials which sanction consists of imprisonment between three and six years, a fine
of 12 to 24 months, and disqualification from public tenders/contracts. The fine could be increased
to take into account the benefit obtained from the commission of the offence.

Court decisions

50. There are no court decisions concerning bribery of foreign public officials.



23
Spain: Phase 1 and Phase 2 Reports on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions.
24
Judgments of the Supreme Court: STS 545/1998 of 13 January 1999, ATS 1178/1998 of 29 April 1998, STS 692/1997 of 7
November 1997.



14
Bribery of members of foreign public assemblies (Article 6 of ETS 173)

51. Members of foreign public assemblies are not covered by the relevant provisions on bribery of the
Spanish Penal Code.

Bribery in the private sector (Articles 7 and 8 of ETS 173)

52. The Spanish Penal Code does not criminalise private corruption. Since there is no private bribery
offence, the definition of public official has proven to be key to criminalise the broadest possible
types of situation giving rise to a bribery offence; it would allow, for example, to punish bribery
instances within undertakings which are strictly private, but which continue to be controlled by the
State (e.g. Case No. 2052/2001). The safest punitive strategy with regard to private bribery is
probably that represented by the offences of misappropriation/mismanagement, in cases where
the employee (or the manager receiving the bribe) enters into a contract which harms the
undertaking financially. In the civil-law field, private bribery is prohibited by the Law on Unfair
Competition, which expressly prohibits the inducement of workers, suppliers and other persons
under contract to breach basic contractual duties that they have agreed to with competitors.
Although the Law on Unfair Competition provides exclusively for instruments of a civil nature, the
possibility would exist of imposing an administrative penalty (Article 7 of the Law for the Protection
of Competition) in those cases where the unfair practice consisting in the payment of bribes was
sufficient in scale to seriously distort competition on the market and if that distortion affected the
public interest.

53. The draft amendments to the Penal Code introduce the offence of bribery in the private sector with
a view to complying with the EU requirements emanating from Council Framework Decision
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector.

Bribery of officials of international organisations (Article 9 of ETS 173)

54. Active bribery of officials of international organisations is criminalised in Article 445 PC; passive
bribery of these categories of officials is not criminalised in the Spanish Penal Code. The elements
of the offence and the applicable sanctions detailed under bribery of foreign public officials apply
accordingly to bribery of officials of international organisations. There are no court decisions/case
law concerning bribery of officials of international organisations.

Bribery of members of international parliamentary assemblies (Article 10 of ETS 173)

55. The Spanish Penal Code only criminalises active and passive bribery of members of the European
Parliament, who are explicitly covered by the term public authorities according to Article 24(1)
PC. Therefore, the elements of the offence and the applicable sanctions detailed under bribery of
domestic public officials apply. There are no court decisions/case law involving members of the
European Parliament.

56. Members of other international parliamentary assemblies are not covered by the relevant
provisions of bribery.

Bribery of judges and officials of international courts (Article 11 of ETS 173)

57. Bribery of judges and officials of international courts is not criminalised by the Spanish Penal
Code, with the sole exception of bribery of officials of the International Criminal Court. In this
connection, pursuant to Article 471bis of the Penal Code, active and passive bribery of officials of



15
the International Criminal Court is punished with imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine of up to
three times the value of the bribe.

Trading in influence (Article 12 of ETS 173)

Definition of the offence

58. Trading in influence is covered in Articles 428 430, Chapter VI, Title XIX of the Penal Code. The
relevant provisions on passive trading in influence (accepting or requesting an advantage to exert
an improper influence) differentiate between two main types of conduct:

(1) the exertion of an improper influence. In this case the Penal Code establishes a distinction
based on the public/private nature of the influence peddler (a) an authority or public official (Article
428 PC) and (b) a particular (Article 429 PC);
Article 428, Penal Code: Exertion of improper influence by an authority/public official
The authority of public official that influences another authority of public official, by taking
advantage of his/her post or of any other hierarchical or personal relationship with this person
or with any other authority or public official so as to obtain a decision which may directly or
indirectly generate an economic benefit for such himself/herself or for a third party, will be
punished with a prison sentence of six months to one year, a fine of up to double the value of
the said benefit, and specific disqualification from any public employment or post for a period of
three to six years. When the benefit sought is in fact obtained the sanctions to be applied will
be will be in the upper half of the scale.

Article 429, Penal Code: Exertion of improper influence by particular
The individual that influences an authority of public official taking advantage of his/her personal
relationship with this person, or with any other authority or public official, so as to obtain a
decision which may directly or indirectly generate an economic benefit for himself/herself or for
a third party, will be punished with a prison sentence of six months to one year, a fine of up to
double the value of the said benefit, and specific disqualification from any public employment or
post for a period of three to six years. When the benefit sought is in fact obtained the sanctions
to be applied will be in the upper half of the scale.

(2) the request or acceptance of gifts/presents and any other type of remuneration in order to exert
an improper influence (Article 430 PC).

Article 430, Penal Code: Request/acceptance of gifts/presents/other types of
remuneration to exert improper influence
Those that offer to carry out the actions described in the previous articles, requesting sops,
gifts or any other remuneration, from third parties, or accept offers or promises, will be
punished with a prison sentence of six months to one year.
In any of the cases that this article refers to, the judicial authority may also impose the
suspension of activities of the society, company, organisation or office and the closure of its
facilities open to the public for a period of six months to three years.

59. Active trading in influence (i.e. the promising, giving or offering of an undue advantage to the
influence peddler) is not criminalised as a principal offence.



16

Elements of the offence

Asserts or confirms that s/he is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making of [public
officials]

60. This concept is not transposed as such, i.e. the influence peddler does not specifically have to
assert or confirm that s/he is not able to exert an improper influence. In this connection, Spanish
legislation punishes those instances where the influence peddler takes advantage
(prevalimiento, i.e. in English: prevalent position) of his/her personal/hierarchical relationship with
the public official so as to exert an improper influence over the decisions of the latter. The
protected legal interests are the same as for in bribery offences: transparency and impartiality in
the decision-making process of public administration.

61. For the offence of trading in influence to occur, it is not necessary that the influence is actually
exerted and leads to the intended result, the mere assertion of the trader in influence that s/he
could exercise such influence would be sufficient for the criminal offence to be committed.

62. More controversial are the cases of alleged influence. In this context, earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court stressed the need for the influence to be real and effectively enable the influence
peddler to have the power of intervention or improper influence on the decision-making process;
otherwise, the perpetrator would be prosecuted for fraud (e.g. Case 8900/1992 of 4 December
1992). However, a more recent judgment of the Supreme Court confirms that cases of pretended
influence would also be covered under the relevant provisions of trading in influence (Case
335/2006 of 24 March 2006).

Other concepts/elements

63. The constitutive elements of bribery offences largely apply with regard to Articles 428-430 PC. In
particular, intentionality is an implicit component of the various offences. The directly or indirectly
nature of the intermediation is explicitly covered. The beneficiary of the undue advantage may be
the influence peddler him or herself or a third party.

64. The relevant provisions of the Penal Code concerning trading in influence do not use the term
undue to qualify the advantage. In this connection, it is understood that any sop, gift or other
type of remuneration (Article 430 PC) or any economic benefit (Articles 428-429 PC), whether
due or undue, may come under the scope of the offence if its purpose is to influence the decision-
making process of public officials. The Supreme Court has interpreted in a recent judgement that
the concept other type of remuneration goes beyond the economic nature of the benefit received.
In particular, in Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, the benefit received by the influence peddler
was a working contract for his wife. It appears nevertheless that, in accordance with the other
bribery-based offences, it should be possible at the end to value the benefit in quantifiable
pecuniary terms.

Sanctions

65. The penalties established for passive trading in influence are a) imprisonment from six months to
one year; b) a fine of up to double the value of the benefit; and c) specific disqualification from any
public employment or post for a period of three to six years (this latter penalty does not apply in
those cases where the influence peddler is a private person). The sanctions to be applied will be in
the upper half of the scale when the intended benefit was indeed achieved.



17
Court decisions

66. Several court decisions have clarified the provisions on trading in influence laid out in the Spanish
Penal Code as illustrated above (e.g. Case 335/2006 of 24 March 2006, Case 480/2004 of 7 April
2004, etc.)

67. The annual reports of the Attorney Generals Office indicate that, in 2006, preliminary
investigations were carried out in connection with 24 cases concerning trading in influence (a
100% increase as compared to 2005 data); in 2007, 82 preliminary investigations had been
initiated for trading in influence offences.
Bribery of domestic arbitrators (Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 and Articles 2 and 3 of ETS 191)

68. Pursuant to Article 422 PC, domestic arbitrators are explicitly covered by the provisions on passive
bribery covered by Articles 419 to 421 PC (unlawful official acts). The elements of the offence and
the applicable sanctions detailed under bribery of domestic public officials apply accordingly.
Article 422, Penal Code
The foregoing provisions [Articles 419, 420, 421 PC] will be equally applicable to jurors,
arbitrators, experts, or any other person who takes part in the exercise of a public function.

69. The provisions on passive bribery for lawful official acts (e.g. discretionary acts), i.e. Articles 425
and 426 PC are not applicable in respect of domestic arbitrators. Active bribery of arbitrators is
punishable in so far this category of persons would be considered public officials exercising public
functions in the context of Article 24 PC.

70. There has been one case of bribery of a domestic arbitrator leading to conviction, i.e. Case No.
1096/2006 of 16 November 2006 where a bankruptcy trustee, and his intermediary, were found
guilty of a passive bribery offence (Article 420 PC: unjust acts) for demanding and accepting an
amount between 3,600 and 5,000 EUR. They were both sentenced to one year imprisonment,
disqualification for a period of three years and a fine of 3,606 EUR. The individual charged with
active bribery (Article 423 PC in relation to Article 420 PC) was sentenced to six months
imprisonment and a fine of 1,202 EUR.
Bribery of foreign arbitrators (Article 4 of ETS 191)

71. Bribery of foreign arbitrators is not explicitly criminalised by the Spanish Penal Code. However, the
authorities indicate that a sensu contrario, nothing prevents a wider interpretation of the concept of
arbitrator so as to include foreign persons. This would, moreover, be possible pursuant to the
notion of arbitrator developed by Law 60/2003 on Arbitration, which provides for both national and
foreign persons to act as arbitrators.
Bribery of domestic jurors (Article 1, paragraph 3 and Article 5 of ETS 191)

72. Pursuant to Article 422 PC, domestic jurors are explicitly covered by the provisions on passive
bribery covered by Articles 419 to 421 PC (unlawful official acts). The elements of the offence and
the applicable sanctions detailed under bribery of domestic public officials apply accordingly.
Article 422, Penal Code
The foregoing provisions [Articles 419, 420, 421 PC] will be equally applicable to jurors,
arbitrators, experts, or any other person who takes part in the exercise of a public function.



18
73. The provisions on passive bribery for lawful official acts (e.g. discretionary acts), i.e. Articles 425
and 426 PC are not applicable in respect of domestic arbitrators. Active bribery of arbitrators is
punishable in so far this category of persons would be considered public officials exercising public
functions in the context of Article 24 PC.

74. There are no court decisions/case law involving domestic jurors.

Bribery of foreign jurors (Article 6 of ETS 191)

75. Bribery of foreign jurors is not criminalised by the Spanish Penal Code.

Other questions

Participatory acts (Article 15 of ETS 173):

76. According to Article 27 PC, principal offenders and accomplices are responsible for crimes and
misdemeanours. Moreover, pursuant to Article 28 PC principal offenders include (a) those who
abet directly or indirectly others to commit an offence, and (b) those who cooperate in the
committing of an offence by performing an action, without which the crime could not have been
perpetrated (Article 28 PC). Accomplices are those persons, who not being included in Article 28
PC, cooperate in the execution of a crime through previous or simultaneous actions (Article 29
PC)

77. Joint perpetrators are liable to the same sentences as perpetrators (Article 28 PC) while
accomplices are liable to the sentence immediately below the one they would have received if they
had been the perpetrators (Article 63 PC).

Jurisdiction (Article 17 of ETS 173)

78. The rules of Spanish jurisdiction are laid down in Title I of the Organic Act on the Judicial Power
(Articles 21 to 25). In particular, Article 23 establishes jurisdiction over acts committed within the
territory of Spain (principle of territoriality); although it is not specified whether offences need to be
committed in full or in part in the Spanish territory, it is generally understood that territorial
jurisdiction is established over offences that are committed both wholly or partially within the
national territory.

79. Moreover, Spanish jurisdiction covers criminal acts committed abroad in which Spanish nationals
(or foreign nationals who have acquired the Spanish nationality after the offence was committed)
are either the offenders or the subjects of the offence (principle of nationality). Spanish jurisdiction
also covers acts of Spanish nationals who are at the same time officials of an international
organisation, members of an international parliamentary assembly or officials of an international
court. Moreover, the authorities confirmed that Spanish jurisdiction applies to domestic public
officials and members of domestic public assemblies who are not Spanish nationals, by virtue of
their professional/functional link with the Spanish public administration. Finally, Spanish courts
have also jurisdiction to know from criminal acts affecting Spains national interests, regardless of
whether they are committed by Spanish nationals or foreigners.

80. Dual criminality is required to establish jurisdiction in respect of acts committed abroad. Therefore,
the perpetrator of a criminal offence maybe prosecuted insofar as his/her conduct constitutes a
criminal offence in the country where the offence is committed (Article 23(2)a, Organic Act on the
Judicial Power). However, pursuant to Article 23(4)i, Organic Act on the Judicial Power, universal



19
jurisdiction over acts committed outside the territory of Spain is possible if the punishability of the
act arises from an international treaty ratified and promulgated by Spain.

Extradition

81. In Spain, extradition is available for offences punishable by a deprivation of liberty of at least one
year.

Statute of limitations

82. The period of limitation depends on the maximum term on the sanctions which can be imposed for
the offence in question as well as its serious/less serious character. In particular, a limitation
period of ten years is provided for offences punishable by a maximum period of
imprisonment/disqualification of more than five years and less than ten years. Offences that are
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment/disqualification of more than three years and less
than five years have a limitation period of five years. All other less serious offences have a
limitation period of three years (Article 131 PC).

83. The following table illustrates the applicable limitation periods for bribery and trading in influence
included in the Penal Code:

Article
PC
Offence Imprisonment Disqualification Relative statute
of limitation
Bribery in the public sector
Art. 419 Official act constitutes crime 2 - 6 yrs 7 12 yrs 15 yrs
Official act is unjust act
- executed 1 4 yrs 6 - 9 yrs 10 yrs
Art. 420
- not executed 1 2 yrs 3 6 yrs 10 yrs
Art. 421 Refrain from performing a required official act No 1 - 3 yrs 3 yrs
Official act inherent to duties (bribe solicited or
accepted before/after performance official act)

(1) does not constitute crime No 6 months 3yrs 3 yrs
Art. 425
(2) constitutes crime 1 3 yrs 10 -15 yrs 15 yrs
Art. 426 Bribe offered in consideration of official
position or in order to perform act not forbidden
by law
No No 3 yrs
Trading in influence
Art. 428
Exertion of improper influence by public official
Art. 429
Exertion of improper influence by individuals
3 6 yrs 10 yrs
Art. 430
Request/acceptance of advantage to exert
improper influence
6 months 1 yr
6 months 3 yrs 3 yrs

84. These periods are presumed to run from the time of the commission of the offence. In the case of
a continuous offence the period is calculated from the date on which the last offence took place,
and in the case of a permanent offence it is calculated from the date on which the illegal activity
ceased (Article 132(1) PC). The limitation period is interrupted where the criminal proceedings are
initiated, and the term beings to run anew when the proceedings are stayed or conclude without a
conviction (Article 132(2) PC).



20
Defences

85. A person who has committed active bribery may seek recourse to a defence of effective regret. To
this end, Article 427 PC provides:

Article 427, Penal Code
The individual who consents occasionally to a request for a gift or present from an authority or
public official, and who reports this fact to that authority which has the duty to make enquiries,
before the commencement of any corresponding procedure, will be exempt from punishment,
provided that no more than ten days passed since the date of the facts.

86. This defence is only possible when (1) the bribe was solicited; (2) the bribe-giver voluntarily
reports the fact to the responsible investigative authority; (3) the report is made within ten days of
the date of the facts. If the effective regret defence is successfully invoked, the offender will be
exempted from punishment.

III. ANALYSIS

87. Spain is one of the few GRECO members which have not ratified the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173) (hereafter: the Convention). With respect to the Additional Protocol thereto
(ETS 191), this has not been signed nor ratified by Spain. Nevertheless, Spain, like any other
member of GRECO, is subject to peer review according to the standards of the Convention and its
Additional Protocol which are under examination in the Third Evaluation Round (for details see
paragraph 2). The GET notes that Spain was one of the founding members of GRECO; however,
it only signed the Convention on 10 May 2005. The GET further notes that Spain ratified, on
19 June 2006, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which regarding the
corruption offences covers very much the same ground and is inspired by the same underlying
philosophy as the Council of Europe Convention. As the GET explored the outstanding issue of
ratification of the Convention, as well as the signature and subsequent ratification of its Additional
Protocol, the authorities expressed their intention to become a Party to these instruments, but a
clear time frame for doing so was not indicated. The GET recommends to proceed swiftly with
the ratification of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) as well as the
signature and ratification of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191). In this context, attention is
drawn to the formal Appeal by the Committee of Ministers to States, made at its 103rd Ministerial
Session on the occasion of the adoption of the text of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(4 November 1998), to limit as far as possible the reservations that they declare pursuant to the
Convention, when expressing their consent to be bound by the Convention. On the same occasion
the Committee of Ministers appealed to States which nevertheless find themselves obliged to
declare reservations, to use their best endeavours to withdraw them as soon as possible. The
recommendations contained in paragraphs 93, 94, 95, 96 and 98 of this report are without
prejudice to the right of Spain to enter declarations and reservations pursuant to Article 37 of the
Convention.

88. In Spain, the legislative framework providing for the incrimination of corruption offences suffers
from a number of important shortcomings, the details of which will be examined below. Moreover,
despite the various revisions of the relevant provisions in the Penal Code concerning corruption
offences and despite considerable improvements reported by both governmental and non-
governmental sources with regard, for example, to the establishment of the Special Prosecution
Office against Corruption and Organised Crime (and its corresponding sub-national units), it would
appear that corruption still remains a noticeable problem, especially at local level (e.g. urban



21
planning, licensing), and that further efforts are needed to reduce its occurrence significantly. That
said, a non-negligible number of corruption cases have been prosecuted in Spain in the last two
decades on the basis of the existing Penal Code; not only have practitioners acquired significant
expertise in this type of cases, but they have also greatly added to the interpretation of the criminal
provisions in force in a broad and pragmatic manner. The subsequent role of the Supreme Court
to further expand and consolidate a flexible interpretation of the existing corruption-related
provisions (which in many instances goes beyond their strict literal wording) has enabled extensive
jurisprudence to emerge in this area. In this connection, the GET wishes to acknowledge the
valuable explanatory contribution provided by the practitioners met during the evaluation visit, who
clearly demonstrated their in-depth understanding of the relevant criminal provisions on corruption
and the related jurisprudence on the basis of their practical experience of prosecuting and
adjudicating this category of offences.

89. Furthermore, the Penal Code is subject to ongoing review, which involves a number of changes
with a major impact on corruption-provisions. The GET was advised that these changes have
been proposed to, inter alia, align domestic legislation with European/international requirements in
the anti-corruption arena. At the time of the on-site visit, the GET was made aware, in general
terms, of certain developments that were expected to happen in the context of the envisaged
reform of the Penal Code. The authorities provided the GET, after the visit, with the relevant text of
the draft amendments, which have been outlined in the descriptive part of this report and which
appear to go in the right direction. However, as these amendments have not as yet been approved
by Parliament, the present report can only be based on the legislation in force at the time of the
reports adoption. The GET is confident that the issues raised in this report will be taken into
account by the authorities and be promptly reflected in the ongoing reform of the Penal Code.

90. Concerning the category of persons covered by bribery/trading in influence offences, it was
repeatedly stressed during the on-site visit that the concept of public official/authority which is
defined in Article 24 of the Penal Code (PC) is extremely wide and flexible. The term authority in
Article 24(1) PC refers to members of a corporation, court or any other collegiate body exercising
jurisdiction (i.e. official powers of decision-making); the definition encompasses members of
domestic public assemblies (whether exercising legislative or administrative powers), as well as
holders of judicial office (including prosecutors). It was explained to the GET, on the basis of
numerous examples developed by case law, that the notion of public official defined in Article
24(2) PC would comprise any person who performs public functions whether at State,
Autonomous Community or local level. Unlike in other areas of the legal order, the criminal law
concept of public official does not require incorporation or permanence in public service, but rather
participation in public life to which access must be gained in any of the three manners prescribed
by law, i.e. by immediate provision of the law, by election or by appointment. The authorities
highlighted that the courts have been interpreting the term public official in a very broad manner
since they have taken the view that what is important in corruption offences is to afford effective
protection to public office, as well as to the interests of public administration in its different facets
and modes of operation; for this reason, numerous categories of persons would come under the
provisions relating to bribery in the public sector, including, for example, examiners of driving tests,
doctors fulfilling public duties, employees of companies operating public services under a
concession, employees of public enterprises, etc. The GET welcomes the flexible approach taken
and concludes that the concept of public official/authority as understood in criminal legislation
and relevant jurisprudence is in line with Article 1(a) and (b) (public official) and Article 4
(members of domestic public assemblies) of the Convention.

91. The definition of the relevant offences concerning bribery in the public sector at domestic level is
contained in Articles 419, 420, 421, 425 and 426 PC dealing with passive bribery and Article 423



22
PC concerning active bribery. With respect to passive bribery, there are five central provisions
based on the different types of expected actions/omissions of the public official concerned and
their lawful or unlawful nature. If the public official performs an act which is against the law or omits
to perform an act that s/he is to do in the exercise of the his/her duties, the offence is to be
punished according to Articles 419, 420 or 421 PC (cohecho propio). If the official accepts the
bribe to perform an act which is not legally prohibited, Articles 425 or 426 PC would apply
(cohecho impropio). The basic comprehensive definition of the bribery offence is contained in
Articles 419 (criminal act) and 420/421 PC (unjust act/unjust omission) on passive bribery in return
for an unlawful act, which incorporate the different material components required by the
Convention, i.e. criminalisation of the request or receipt, acceptance of an offer or promise, direct
or indirect commission, beneficiaries (including third parties), intent, corrupt acts/omissions
performed in the exercise of official duties. The GET was informed that all other bribery provisions,
and in particular, their constitutive elements (which are sometimes missing on paper) are to be
understood on the light of Articles 419 and 420 PC; the authorities provided supporting
jurisprudence confirming this in extenso interpretation. The GET noted that the Spanish PC goes
beyond the requirements of the Convention since it also criminalises the reception of a benefit
after the act has been performed by the public official, without prior offer, request or acceptance,
i.e. so-called bribery a posteriori (cohecho subsiguiente). With respect to active bribery, the GET
notes that there is no self-determining definition of active bribery in the Spanish Penal Code: the
active bribery offence under Article 423 PC is designed as a mirror offence based on the
corresponding passive bribery provisions. This, in turn, has generated significant discrepancies in
interpretation. Much debate has emerged, for example, as to whether Article 423 PC would also
cover instances where the bribe is offered to the official for acts not involving a breach of duty, as
laid out in Articles 425 and 426 PC; legal doctrine and practitioners have traditionally been divided
in this respect. The issue appears to have been settled through a number of Supreme Court
decisions confirming the applicability of Article 423 PC (and consequently of Article 445 PC on
active bribery of foreign public officials in the context of international business transactions which
refers to Article 423 PC), not only to all the conduct referred to in Articles 419-421 PC (unlawful
official acts; cohecho propio), but also those of Articles 425 and 426 PC (lawful official acts, e.g.
acts of discretion; cohecho impropio). A large number of interlocutors suggested that the
provisions on bribery could be restructured and reworded to create a simpler and more coherent
framework; the draft amendments to the Penal Code go in this direction by classifying passive
bribery offences into three provisions dealing with unlawful official acts, lawful official acts and
situations in which the bribe is accepted on the basis of the public officials position, and by
providing for autonomous offences (fully spelling out the different constitutive elements of the
offence) in all cases. The GET can only encourage the authorities to proceed with their reported
plans to simplify the classification of bribery offences and to harmonise their wording as such a
move would further assist to enhance legal certainty vis--vis practitioners and the public at large.

92. Concerning the undue advantage, the relevant bribery provisions refer to the terms gift or
present, whether due or undue, in so far as their acceptance has a bearing on the future/past
conduct of the public official. As far as the material/immaterial nature of the advantage is
concerned, the GET was confronted with contradictory views during the evaluation visit. Although
the concept of advantage (gift or present) which appears in the bribery provisions does not
literally exclude immaterial advantages, the determination of the sanction when this consists of a
fine is based on quantifiable economic terms. While some practitioners considered that this
issue could be further developed through court interpretation, others (including academia) were of
the opinion that non-pecuniary benefits would not be covered. The GET tested numerous
examples of immaterial/intangible advantages, e.g. sexual favours, honorific titles, membership of
clubs or closed social networks, horizontal transfers of posts in an organisation, etc., but it could
not obtain an unequivocal response confirming that all such advantages would indeed be covered



23
by the relevant bribery provisions. Some examples were provided after the on-site visit concerning
adjudicated bribery offences where the bribe consisted of sexual favours. In order to clarify the
matter, the proposed amendments to the Penal Code introduce a broader definition of the notion
of advantage (gift, favour or reward of any nature); likewise, the incorporation of a system of
monthly fines in the draft eliminates any reference to a purely economic assessment of the bribe.
The GET welcomes this approach and consequently recommends to clarify beyond doubt that
immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant bribery provisions in the Penal Code.

93. As regards the international dimension of bribery, bribery of foreign public officials and officials of
international organisations is criminalised under a specific provision, i.e. Article 445 PC. However,
this provision is restricted to active bribery (therefore, under Spanish law it is not possible to
prosecute offences of passive bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international
organisations), and to the extent to which these are committed in the context of international
business transactions; this is certainly not in line with the Convention whose scope is much
broader. In this connection, although it is likely that a number of cross-border corruption cases
involve business transactions, there are situations where this offence would not apply (for
example, bribing of a member of a foreign traffic police force in order to avoid the payment of a
fine). Moreover, it was not clear to the GET which categories of foreign public officials would be
covered by Article 445 PC, since the authorities signalled that the definition of public official as
contained in Article 24 PC could not be used in this respect. Some interlocutors suggested that the
definition of foreign public official is to be developed through judicial interpretation. Other
interlocutors argued that Article 4(a) of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions would be directly applicable. Until now,
there has been no case law/jurisprudence that would support these points of view. To improve the
current uncertainty of terms, the proposed amendments to the Penal Code incorporate a verbatim
transposition of the definition of foreign public official used in the OECD Convention (and would
therefore cover any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public
international organisation). Finally, members of foreign public assemblies are not covered by the
relevant bribery provisions of the Penal Code. The same gap exists with respect to bribery of
members of international parliamentary assemblies other than members of the European
Parliament who are explicitly covered by bribery provisions, and judges and officials of
international courts with the sole exception of those serving in the International Criminal Court
who would be punishable for bribery offences according to Article 471bis of the Penal Code.
Based on the aforementioned findings, the GET recommends to (i) clarify the notion of foreign
public official; (ii) enlarge the scope of Article 445 PC concerning active bribery of foreign
officials and officials of international organisations beyond situations involving
international business transactions; (iii) criminalise passive bribery of foreign officials and
officials of international organisations; and (iv) ensure that bribery of members of foreign
public assemblies, international parliamentary assemblies (other than members of the
European Parliament), as well as judges and officials of international courts (other than
those serving in the International Criminal Court) is criminalised.

94. Turning to bribery of domestic jurors and arbitrators, these categories of persons are covered
under Article 422 PC which specifically refers to Articles 419, 420 and 421 PC on passive bribery
for unlawful official acts. Therefore, Article 422 PC does not cover situations in which these
categories of persons are bribed in order to commit acts in the exercise of their functions, which do
not entail a breach of duty (e.g. discretionary acts), as established in Articles 425 and 426 PC.
Moreover, active bribery of jurors and arbitrators would also fall outside the scope of
Article 422 PC (since Article 423 PC is not explicitly referred to in the list of applicable offences



24
under Article 422 PC). Some interlocutors argued that the relevant provision on active and passive
bribery of public officials would be fully applicable to jurors and arbitrators in so far as they are
considered to be public officials exercising public functions. The GET finds it difficult to accept this
reasoning, especially since it would appear that the Spanish legislator has opted to regulate
bribery of jurors and arbitrators through a specific separate provision in the PC (Article 422). The
GET further notes that even if admitting such reasoning, Spanish legislation would not cover the
full scope of the Convention as it would, for instance, leave outside the ambit of application of
bribery provisions arbitrators acting on the basis of an arbitration agreement between private
persons (commercial arbitration). Contradictory views were expressed regarding the latter issue:
the authorities initially indicated that bribery of domestic jurors and arbitrators is criminalised if
committed in the exercise of public functions, but not when they are only collaborating in the
exercise of such functions or when they are just acting within the field of private relations; the
authorities subsequently argued that even cases of commercial arbitration would be covered. For
the sake of legal certainty, the GET considers it appropriate to provide explicitly for the
criminalisation of active bribery of domestic jurors and arbitrators. Furthermore, bribery of foreign
jurors and arbitrators is not covered specifically. However, some interlocutors indicated that
nothing would prevent a wider interpretation of the concept of arbitrators/jurors in Article 422 PC
so as to include foreign persons. They further added that, in the case of arbitrators, such an
interpretation would be possible pursuant to the definition of arbitrator included in Law 60/2003 on
Arbitration which provides for both national and foreign persons to act as arbitrators. These views
were not unanimously shared by the different representatives interviewed by the GET during the
evaluation visit and there was no jurisprudence which could bring greater light to the issue. For
this reason, the GET remains unconvinced that it would be possible, under the current legislative
framework, to charge these categories of persons with bribery. Moreover, the GET notes that with
respect to the specification made by the authorities concerning foreign arbitrators, these would
only be covered to the extent that they apply Spanish law. In view of the above, the GET
recommends to (i) review Article 422 (bribery of jurors and arbitrators) of the Penal Code to
ensure that the criminalisation of bribery of jurors and arbitrators is in line with the
Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191); and (ii)
criminalise bribery of foreign arbitrators and jurors. This would certainly facilitate the
ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191), as
recommended in paragraph 87.

95. Bribery in the private sector is not criminalised in Spain. In the view of the GET, criminalising
private sector bribery in accordance with Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention is essential as public
and private functions seem to be, to an increasing degree, intertwined with each other and the
distinction between the sectors is becoming more and more blurred. In this connection, the GET
acknowledges the fact, which was repeatedly stressed by the authorities, that in Spain the notion
of public officials is of such a broad nature that it covers a very large number of persons who in
other countries would be considered as belonging to the private sector sphere. That said,
criminalisation of bribery in the private sector remains crucial especially since this form of
corruption may cause significant damage to society at large given the value of the sums (and
potential bribes) often involved in business transactions. Furthermore, the GET notes that the draft
amendments to the Penal Code introduce the offence of bribery in the private sector with a view to
complying with the EU requirements emanating from Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA
of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector. The GET welcomes the intention of
the authorities to regulate this area and therefore recommends to criminalise bribery in the
private sector in accordance with Articles 7 and 8 of the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173).




25
96. Trading in influence is criminalised in Articles 428, 429 and 430 PC. While recognising the strong
features of the Spanish system, as developed by jurisprudence, with respect to trading in influence
(e.g. possibility to punish even in those cases where the influence is not exerted, coverage of both
real and alleged influence), the GET identified three shortcomings. Firstly, all interlocutors
concurred that although the concept of undue advantage is described in broader terms than in
connection with bribery offences (i.e. the trading in influence provisions refer to sop, gift or other
type of remuneration), it is generally understood as any benefit (whether due or undue) of an
economic nature or at least, which could be quantifiable in economic terms; doubt was
nevertheless cast as to whether immaterial advantages would be covered. Some examples were
provided, after the on-site visit, concerning court decisions where the benefit consisted of a certain
type of immaterial advantage, i.e. sexual favours. Secondly, the GET noted that while the Spanish
penal system criminalises passive trading in influence, it does not mention instances of active
trading in influence. In this connection, it would appear that the relevant trading in influence
provisions in the PC are geared towards punishing the exertion of influence, rather than the
trading in influence itself. In particular, the promising, giving or offering of an undue advantage to
the influence peddler is not criminalised as a principal offence. The authorities explained that, in
principle, it would be possible to punish any individual who promises, gives or offers an undue
advantage as an instigator, according to the general rules on participation contained in Article 28
PC. The GET noted, however, that no case was cited to demonstrate the prosecution of an active
trading in influence offence in the latter instance; in this respect, the GET is of the opinion that the
Spanish system would benefit, in terms of legal certainty, if active trading in influence were to be
criminalised as a principal offence. Thirdly, the relevant trading in influence provisions are not
applicable to foreign public officials, members of foreign public assemblies, officials of international
organisations, members of international parliamentary assemblies, and judges and officials of
international courts. In the light of the shortcomings identified with respect to trading in influence,
the GET recommends to (i) criminalise active trading in influence as a principal offence; (ii)
criminalise trading in influence in relation to foreign public officials, members of foreign
public assemblies, officials of international organisations, members of international
parliamentary assemblies and judges and officials of international courts; and (iii) clarify
beyond doubt that immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant trading in influence
provisions in the Penal Code.

97. In Spain, the types of sanctions for bribery/trading in influence offences include: imprisonment,
fines and disqualification; the PC provides for their cumulative application. The severity of the
penalties available for bribery in the public sector depends on the unlawful/lawful nature of the act
of the public official bribed. The maximum sanction applicable for a bribery offence is six years
imprisonment when the expected action/omission of the official constitutes a crime
(Article 419 PC); when the expected action of the official constitutes an unjust act, the maximum
imprisonment sanction is four years imprisonment (Article 420 PC). The GET noted, nevertheless,
that Articles 421 (omission of acts inherent to the public officials duties), 425(1) (performance of
acts inherent to the public officials duties) and 426 PC (bribe offered in consideration of the public
officials position or in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act) do not carry sanctions of
imprisonment. Breaches of the latter provisions are only subject to sanctions consisting of fines
and professional disqualification. As regards Article 421 PC, in particular, it is questionable
whether refraining from performing a required official act is indeed less punishable than not
executing an official act under Article 420 PC. The damaging effects of the criminal acts might well
be similar in these different circumstances. The GET finds it difficult to understand why the
legislator has chosen this solution. More generally, the absence of the possibility to sanction the
conduct referred to in Articles 421, 425(1) and 426 PC with imprisonment, makes extradition
impossible since, in Spain, extradition is only available for offences punishable by a deprivation of
liberty of at least one year. The GET recalls that Article 19 of the Convention involves the



26
obligation to attach to the commission of bribery/trading in influence offences by natural persons
penalties of imprisonment of a certain duration which can give rise to extradition. It should be
mentioned that the draft amendments to the Penal Code propose an increase in the minimum
imprisonment sentences applicable to bribery offences, i.e. three years imprisonment for unlawful
official acts (instead of two) and two years imprisonment for lawful official acts (instead of one or
none); this would make extradition possible in respect of all bribery offences. With respect to the
available imprisonment sanctions for trading in influence, these range from six months to one year.
The GET notes that the level of sanctions for trading in influence is lower than those for other
comparable offences under Spanish criminal law (cf. bribery in the public sector for unlawful acts,
fraud, misappropriation of public funds, see paragraphs 30 and 33 for details); this may well lead
to the presumption that trading in influence is a less serious offence, contrary to the intention of
the drafters of the Convention. For this reason, the GET has serious doubts as to whether the
sanctions for trading in influence can be regarded as effective, proportionate and dissuasive in the
meaning of the Convention. In the light of the foregoing, the GET recommends to (i) increase the
sanctions for the bribery offences under Articles 421 (omission of acts inherent to the
public officials duties), 425(1) (performance of acts inherent to the public officials duties
and 426 PC (bribe offered in consideration of the public officials position or in order for the
public official to fulfil a lawful act) in order to ensure that these offences can give rise to
extradition and (ii) increase the sanctions for trading in influence.

98. The jurisdictional principles of territoriality and nationality apply to all bribery and trading in
influence offences, but Article 23(2)a of the Organic Act on the Judicial Power requires dual
criminality for offences committed abroad by (or involving) Spanish nationals. This means that, in
these cases, prosecution would only be possible if the act were punishable in the foreign State as
well, which would involve a clear restriction as compared to the requirements under Article 17,
paragraph 1, littera b) of the Convention. That said, Article 23(4)i of the Organic Act on the Judicial
Power provides for the abolition of the dual criminality requirement for all international treaties
ratified and promulgated by Spain. The GET recommends to abolish the requirement of dual
criminality with respect to offences of bribery and trading in influence committed abroad.
As indicated above, compliance with this recommendation would be automatic once the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) are ratified, in line
with recommendation i (paragraph 87).

99. Finally, the GET is concerned about the possible effects of the special defence of effective regret
contained in Article 427 PC which exempts the bribe giver from punishment in cases of active
bribery in the public sector if (1) the bribe was solicited; (2) the bribe-giver voluntarily reports the
fact to the responsible investigative authority; and (3) the report is made within ten days of the
date of the facts. The GET explored with the interlocutors interviewed both the advantages of the
provisions on effective regret (detection of bribery cases) and the potential risks of misuse (e.g.
blackmailing the bribed persons, abuse of a false defence). It was indicated to the GET that, in
practice and until now, this provision has been of little relevance as a means of uncovering acts of
corruption. It was explained that Article 427 was introduced in the PC in 1995 as a tool to bring
forward complaints; however, the authorities were of the opinion that a much more useful and
reliable source of information on acts of corruption is information provided by public officials
themselves. According to the interlocutors met, the provision has only been used once since it was
introduced in 1995 (Judgement of the High Court of Madrid of 29 November 2006 confirming the
Judgment of the Provincial Court of Madrid of 2 March 2006 which provides interpretative
guidelines as to what is to be considered a responsible investigative authority and the possible
reporting channels). Furthermore, some interlocutors suggested that Article 21(6) PC, which
provides a legal basis for taking into account confessions and reparation of damages for giving
reduced sentences, was a more practical way forward. In the GETs view, Article 427 PC goes too



27
far in exempting the informant from punishment. In principle, very serious cases of active
corruption could go totally unpunished by reference to this article. There is a danger that the
provision might lead to unreasonable results, since the offender (active briber) in fact has an
undisputable legal right to be exempted from punishment if the very strict and formal
requirements are fulfilled; in this connection, the GET is concerned about the automatic nature of
this defence. Moreover, Article 427 PC is reportedly very difficult to apply in practice. One of the
reasons for this is the absolute requirement that the information has to be given within ten days
from the occurrence of the act. From the discussions held during the on-site visit, including those
of the practitioners who are to apply the law, it was not made unambiguously clear to the GET
what would be the added value in the fight against corruption of Article 427 PC in its present form.
The GET therefore recommends to keep the application of Article 427 PC on effective regret
under review in order to ascertain the potential use and misuse of this defence in the
investigation and prosecution of corruption and, if need be, to take appropriate measures.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

100. Spain has not ratified the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), nor has it
signed/ratified the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191).
This remains a pressing need, in order to ensure a coordinated criminalisation of national and
international corruption, as prescribed by Resolution (97) 24 of the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe on the Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption (Guiding Principle 2).

101. The incrimination of bribery and trading in influence in the Spanish Penal Code suffers from
several substantial inconsistencies and deficiencies as compared to the standards established by
the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191). With
respect to bribery in the public sector, the complex legal framework is particularly deficient with
respect to its international dimension. Likewise, shortcomings exist in relation to the trading in
influence provisions, for example, under the current rules, active trading in influence is not
criminalised as a principal offence. Bribery in the private sector is not criminalised at all; this is an
important lacuna since this form of corruption may cause significant damage to society at large
given the value of the sums (and potential bribes) involved in business transactions. Moreover, the
available sanctions for bribery and trading in influence need to be raised to allow for extradition.
Finally, the possibility provided by the special defence of effective regret to exempt the bribe-giver,
who, if solicited by the public official, declares the offence before it is uncovered, needs to be
reviewed to assess its potential for use and abuse.

102. In the last years, despite the various amendments to the relevant provisions in the Penal Code
concerning corruption offences which have been introduced over the years and despite major
improvements with regard to the establishment of the Special Prosecution Office against
Corruption and Organised Crime (and its corresponding sub-national units), it would appear that
corruption still remains a noticeable problem, especially at local level, and that further efforts are
needed to significantly reduce its occurrence. That said, a notable number of corruption cases
have been prosecuted in Spain; this has been possible, to a large extent, through the proactive
attitude of prosecutors and judges alike who have acquired extensive expertise in prosecuting and
adjudicating this category of offence and have assisted in developing far-reaching jurisprudence in
this area. In this particular context and on the basis of the experience gained by practitioners in
dealing with corruption offences, the ongoing reform of the Penal Code, which includes
amendments to corruption-related provisions, is very much needed; the present report and its
recommendations should be seen as a timely contribution to this reform process.




28
103. In view of the above, GRECO addresses the following recommendations to Spain:

i. to proceed swiftly with the ratification of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 173) as well as the signature and ratification of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191)
(paragraph 87);

ii. to clarify beyond doubt that immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant
bribery provisions in the Penal Code (paragraph 92);

iii. to (i) clarify the notion of foreign public official; (ii) enlarge the scope of Article 445 PC
concerning active bribery of foreign officials and officials of international
organisations beyond situations involving international business transactions; (iii)
criminalise passive bribery of foreign officials and officials of international
organisations; and (iv) ensure that bribery of members of foreign public assemblies,
international parliamentary assemblies (other than members of the European
Parliament), as well as judges and officials of international courts (other than those
serving in the International Criminal Court) is criminalised (paragraph 93);

iv. to (i) review Article 422 (bribery of jurors and arbitrators) of the Penal Code to ensure
that the criminalisation of bribery of jurors and arbitrators is in line with the Additional
Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191); and (ii) criminalise
bribery of foreign arbitrators and jurors (paragraph 94);

v. to criminalise bribery in the private sector in accordance with Articles 7 and 8 of the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) (paragraph 95);

vi. to (i) criminalise active trading in influence as a principal offence; (ii) criminalise
trading in influence in relation to foreign public officials, members of foreign public
assemblies, officials of international organisations, members of international
parliamentary assemblies and judges and officials of international courts; and (iii)
clarify beyond doubt that immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant trading
in influence provisions in the Penal Code (paragraph 96);

vii. to (i) increase the sanctions for the bribery offences under Articles 421 (omission of
acts inherent to the public officials duties), 425(1) (performance of acts inherent to
the public officials duties and 426 PC (bribe offered in consideration of the public
officials position or in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act) in order to
ensure that these offences can give rise to extradition and (ii) increase the sanctions
for trading in influence (paragraph 97);

viii. to abolish the requirement of dual criminality with respect to offences of bribery and
trading in influence committed abroad (paragraph 98);

ix. to keep the application of Article 427 PC on effective regret under review in order to
ascertain the potential use and misuse of this defence in the investigation and
prosecution of corruption and, if need be, to take appropriate measures (paragraph
99).

104. In conformity with Rule 30.2 of the Rules of Procedure, GRECO invites the authorities of Spain to
present a report on the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendations by
30 November 2010.



29

105. Finally, GRECO invites the authorities of Spain to authorise, as soon as possible, the publication
of the report, to translate the report into the national language and to make this translation public.
GRECO
Grupo de estados contra la corrupcin
Consejo de Europa


Direccin General de Derechos Humanos y Asuntos Jurdicos
Direccin de Control

Estrasburgo, 15 de Mayo de 2009









Tercera Ronda de Evaluacin





Informe de evaluacin relativo a Espaa
Incriminacin (ETS 173 y 191, GPC 2)
(Tema 1)




Adoptado por el GRECO
En su 42 Reunin Plenaria
(Estrasburgo, 11-15 Mayo 2009)


I. INTRODUCCIN

1. Espaa se adhiri al GRECO en 1999. El GRECO adopt el Informe de la
Primera Ronda de Evaluacin (Greco Eval I Rep (2001) 1E) relativa a Espaa en
su 5 Reunin Plenaria (11-15 Junio 2001) y el Informe de la Segunda Ronda de
Evaluacin (Greco Eval II Rep (2004) 7E) en su 23 Reunin Plenaria (17-20
Mayo 2005). Dichos informes, as como sus correspondientes Informes de
Cumplimiento, estn disponibles en la pgina del GRECO
(http://www.coe.int/greco).

2. La actual Tercera Ronda de Evaluacin del GRECO) iniciada el 1 de Enero de
2007) trata de los siguientes temas:

- Tema I Incriminaciones: Artculos 1a y 1b, 2-12, 15-17, 19 prrafo 1 del
Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 173), Artculos 1-6 de su Protocolo
Adicional (ETS 191) y Principio Director 2 (criminalizacin de la corrupcin)

- Tema II Transparencia en la financiacin de partidos: Artculos 8, 11,
12, 13b, 14 y 16 de la Recomendacin Rec (2003)4 sobre Normas Comunes
contra la Corrupcin en la Financiacin de los Partidos Polticos y las
Campaas Electorales y, de manera ms general, Principio Director 15
(financiacin de partidos polticos y campaas electorales).

3. El equipo de evaluacin del GRECO para el Tema I (en adelante denominado
EEG), que visit Espaa del 22 al 23 de septiembre de 2008, estaba compuesto
por D. Atle ROALDSY, Consejero (Senior Adviser), Ministerio de Justicia,
Departamento de Polica (Noruega) y D. Anton TRONIN, Jefe de la Seccin de
Verificacin de Aplicaciones en materia penal, Departamento del Representante
de la Federacin Rusa en el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Ministerio
de Justicia (Federacin Rusa). El EEG cont con el apoyo de Da. Laura SANZ-
LEVIA del Secretariado del GRECO. Antes de la visita se facilit al EEG una
detallada respuesta al cuestionario de evaluacin (documento GRECO Eval III
(2008) 3E, Tema I), as como extractos de la legislacin pertinente.

4. El EEG se reuni con funcionarios de las siguientes instituciones
gubernamentales: Ministerio de Justicia (Secretara de Estado de Justicia,
Direccin General de Poltica Legislativa y Direccin General de Cooperacin
Jurdica Internacional), y Ministerio del Interior. El EEG tambin se reuni con
representantes del Ministerio Fiscal (incluida la Fiscala Especial anticorrupcin y
contra el crimen organizado), jueces y representantes del Consejo General del
Poder Judicial. Por otra parte, el EEG tambin se reuni con Transparency
International, representantes del mundo acadmico, los medios de comunicacin
y abogados criminalistas.

5. El presente informe sobre el Tema I de la Tercera Ronda de Evaluacin del
GRECO Incriminaciones- se ha elaborado en base a las respuestas al
cuestionario y a la informacin proporcionada durante la visita. El principal
objetivo del informe es evaluar la eficacia de las medidas adoptadas por las
autoridades espaolas con el fin de cumplir con las exigencias derivadas de las
disposiciones indicadas en el prrafo 2. El informe contiene una descripcin de la
situacin, seguida de un anlisis crtico de la misma. Las conclusiones incluyen
una lista de recomendaciones efectuadas por el GRECO y dirigidas a Espaa a fin
de mejorar su nivel de cumplimiento con las disposiciones estudiadas.

6. El informe sobre el Tema II Transparencia en la financiacin de partidos se
expone en el documento Greco Eval III Rep (2008) 3E, Tema II.


II. INCRIMINACIONES

a. Descripcin de la situacin

7. Espaa firm el Convenio Penal sobre Corrupcin (ETS 173) el 10 de mayo de
2005; an no ha sido ratificado. Espaa no ha firmado ni ratificado el Protocolo
Adicional al Convenio Penal sobre Corrupcin (ETS 191).

Corrupcin de empleados pblicos nacionales (Artculos 1-3 y 19 del ETS 173)

Definicin del delito

8. La tipificacin de la corrupcin est contemplada en los artculos 419 a 427,
Captulo V del Ttulo XIX, del Cdigo Penal espaol (CP). Las disposiciones
relativas al cohecho pasivo distinguen cinco tipos de situaciones segn la clase de
acto (lcito/ilcito) que se espera del empleado pblico sobornado (cohecho
propio/cohecho impropio); cada una de dichas situaciones se castiga con un grado
de sancin diferente dependiendo de si:

(i) la accin/omisin que se espera del empleado pblico es constitutiva de
delito (artculo 419):


Artculo 419, Cdigo Penal: cohecho pasivo (acciones/omisiones
constitutivas de delito)

La autoridad o funcionario pblico que, en provecho propio o de un tercero, solicitare o
recibiere, por s o por persona interpuesta, ddiva o presente o aceptare ofrecimiento
o promesa para realizar en el ejercicio de su cargo una accin u omisin constitutivas
de delito, incurrir en la pena de prisin de dos a seis aos, multa del tanto al triplo del
valor de la ddiva e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de
siete a doce aos, sin perjuicio de la pena correspondiente al delito cometido en razn
de la ddiva o promesa.



(ii) la accin/omisin que se espera del empleado pblico es un acto
injusto (Artculo 420). Existe una extensa jurisprudencia
1
sobre la definicin de
acto injusto que ha sido repetidamente entendido como cualquier acto realizado
por un empleado pblico contrario a lo que es debido.


1
Por ejemplo, sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Criminal: STS 1096/2006 de 16 de noviembre
2006, STS 1076/2006 de 27 octubre 2006, STS 893/2002 de 16 mayo 2002, STS de 24 septiembre 2001.



Artculo 420, Cdigo Penal: cohecho pasivo (acciones/omisiones que suponen
un acto injusto)
La autoridad o funcionario pblico que, en provecho propio o de un tercero, solicite o
reciba, por s o por persona interpuesta, ddiva o promesa por ejecutar un acto injusto
relativo al ejercicio de su cargo que no constituya delito, y lo ejecute, incurrir en la
pena de prisin de uno a cuatro aos e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo
pblico por tiempo de seis a nueve aos, y de prisin de uno a dos aos e
inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de tres a seis aos, si
no llegara a ejecutarlo. En ambos casos se impondr, adems, la multa del tanto al
triplo del valor de la ddiva.



(iii) el empleado pblico deja de realizar (omisin) un acto que debera haber
hecho (artculo 421):


Artculo 421, Cdigo Penal: cohecho pasivo (omisin de actos inherentes a las
funciones del empleado pblico)
Cuando la ddiva solicitada, recibida o prometida tenga por objeto que la autoridad o
funcionario pblico se abstenga de un acto que debiera practicar en el ejercicio de su
cargo, las penas sern de multa del tanto al duplo del valor de la ddiva e
inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de uno a tres aos.



(iv) el empleado pblico realiza un acto inherente a sus funciones oficiales
(artculo 425); el soborno ha sido solicitado o aceptado antes/despus de realizar
el acto oficial (lcito o ilcito)(cohecho antecedente/cohecho subsiguiente):


Artculo 425, Cdigo Penal: cohecho pasivo (comisin de actos inherentes a las
funciones de empleado pblico)
1. La autoridad o funcionario pblico que solicitare ddiva o presente o admitiere
ofrecimiento o promesa para realizar un acto propio de su cargo o como recompensa
del ya realizado, incurrir en la pena de multa del tanto al triplo del valor de la ddiva y
suspensin de empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de seis meses a tres aos. (actos
lcitos)
2. En el caso de recompensa por el acto ya realizado, si ste fuera constitutivo de
delito se impondr, adems, la pena de prisin de uno a tres aos, multa de seis a
diez meses e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de diez a
quince aos.(actos ilcitos)



(v) el empleado pblico acepta un soborno en base a su status de funcionario
pblico (en consideracin a su cargo) o por un acto que no est prohibido
legalmente (artculo 426)


Artculo 426, Cdigo Penal: cohecho pasivo (soborno ofrecido en consideracin
a su cargo o por la realizacin de un acto lcito)
La autoridad o funcionario pblico que admitiere ddiva o regalo que le fueren
ofrecidos en consideracin a su funcin o para la consecucin de un acto no prohibido
legalmente, incurrir en la pena de multa de tres a seis meses.



9. El cohecho activo de empleados pblicos nacionales viene tipificado en el
artculo 423 del Cdigo Penal, el cual se remite a las disposiciones sobre cohecho
pasivo para determinar el grado de las sanciones (penas menos severas en los
casos en que el particular no toma la iniciativa de sobornar al empleado pblico
sino que responde a la solicitud de ste). La interpretacin de los diferentes
elementos del cohecho pasivo incluidos en los artculos 419 a 421 (es decir,
directa o indirectamente, en provecho propio, como recompensa por un acto
oficial) ser, por lo tanto, de aplicacin para el cohecho activo. Ha habido mucho
debate a nivel doctrinal sobre si el artculo 423 del Cdigo Penal, relativo al
cohecho activo, contemplara los casos de corrupcin de los artculos 425 (actos
inherentes a las funciones del empleado pblico) y 426 (actos no inherentes a las
funciones del empleado pblico pero en consideracin a su cargo no prohibidos
legalmente). A este respecto, la jurisprudencia
2
ha venido a confirmar que el
artculo 423 del Cdigo Penal s contemplara los actos de un empleado pblico
especificados en los artculos 425 y 426 CP (cohecho impropio); la referencia
del artculo 423 CP in fine a las disposiciones precedentes solo servira a efectos
punitivos para la determinacin de la sancin aplicable.


Artculo 423, Cdigo Penal: cohecho activo
1. Los que con ddivas, presentes, ofrecimientos o promesas corrompieren o
intentaren corromper a las autoridades o funcionarios pblicos sern castigados con
las mismas penas de prisin y multa que stos.
2. Los que atendieren las solicitudes de las autoridades o funcionarios pblicos, sern
castigados con la pena inferior en grado a la prevista en el apartado anterior.




2
Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo: STS 545/1998 de 13 de enero 1999, ATS 1178/1998 de 29 de abril
1998, STS 692/1997 de 7 de noviembre 1997.
10. Est en marcha una reforma del Cdigo Penal
3
que contiene importantes
modificaciones en relacin con los delitos de corrupcin. En particular, se prev
una simplificacin de los tipos de conducta que dan lugar al delito de corrupcin
pasiva; se propone que los cinco diferentes tipos de conducta arriba descritos
queden reducidos a tres categoras: (i) cohecho impropio (actos ilcitos); (ii)
cohecho propio (actos lcitos); y (iii) soborno aceptado en base al cargo del
empleado pblico. De igual forma, las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal
propuestas prevn un delito de cohecho activo autnomo que ya no remite a las
disposiciones pertinentes sobre cohecho pasivo y que es inequvocamente
aplicable tanto a los actos lcitos como a los ilcitos.


Elementos del delito

Empleado pblico nacional

11. El concepto de empleado pblico se desarrolla en el artculo 24 CP de la
siguiente manera:


Artculo 24, Cdigo Penal: autoridades y empleados pblicos
1. A los efectos penales se reputar autoridad al que por s solo o como miembro de
alguna corporacin, tribunal u rgano colegiado tenga mando o ejerza jurisdiccin
propia. En todo caso, tendrn la consideracin de autoridad los miembros del
Congreso de los Diputados, del Senado, de las Asambleas Legislativas de las
Comunidades Autnomas y del Parlamento Europeo. Se reputar tambin autoridad a
los funcionarios del Ministerio Fiscal.
2. Se considerar funcionario pblico todo el que por disposicin inmediata de la Ley o
por eleccin o por nombramiento de autoridad competente participe en el ejercicio de
funciones pblicas.



12. En concreto, el trmino autoridad se refiere a autoridades elegidas, incluyendo
a los miembros del Parlamento (Congreso de los Diputados y Senado), de las
Asambleas Legislativas de las Comunidades Autnomas y del Parlamento
Europeo, as como a los miembros de la judicatura (jueces y otros titulares de
cargos jurdicos
4
, ya sea mediante eleccin o nombramiento) y funcionarios del
Ministerio Fiscal.

13. El trmino empleado pblico se entiende en sentido amplio en base a una
definicin basada en el estatus, segn la cual es necesario que exista una relacin
formal con la administracin pblica (todo el que, por disposicin inmediata de la

3
Las autoridades indicaron que, el 14 de noviembre de 2008, el Consejo de Ministros aprob el
Anteproyecto de Ley Orgnica sobre la Reforma del Cdigo Penal. A continuacin, dicho anteproyecto
fue enviado al Consejo General del Poder Judicial y a la Fiscala General del Estado para que hicieran sus
observaciones; despus (en breve) ser devuelto al Consejo de Ministros y, luego, ser enviado al
Parlamento para posteriores consultas y para su aprobacin a su debido tiempo.
4
Por ejemplo, sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, STS 636/2006 de 8 de junio 2006.
Ley o por eleccin o nombramiento), que se complementa con elementos
funcionales, sobre todo, basndose en el carcter pblico de la funcin realizada
por la persona en cuestin (participe en el ejercicio de la funcin pblica).

14. Adems, existe una extensa jurisprudencia
5
(y mltiples estudios acadmicos) que
reflexionan sobre la nocin de empleado pblico y confirman que, en el marco de
la legislacin penal, este trmino debe interpretarse en su sentido ms amplio
(aparte del derecho administrativo). En este contexto, no slo incluira a aquellas
personas que desempean una funcin pblica en la administracin del Estado
tanto en la administracin central como en la autonmica o la local sino
tambin a los particulares investidos (por ley, por eleccin o por nombramiento)
de autoridad pblica para desempear ciertas funciones dentro de la
administracin del Estado (por ejemplo, empleados de empresas pblicas,
empleados de empresas a las que se haya concedido oficialmente determinados
derechos o licencias para realizar servicios pblicos, etc.), independientemente
del tipo de contrato que tengan o del carcter temporal/permanente de las
funciones que realicen.

15. Finalmente, las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas prevn
especficamente que los artculos correspondientes relativos a las disposiciones
sobre corrupcin activa y pasiva de empleados pblicos nacionales sern de
aplicacin a los funcionarios de las Comunidades Europeas y a los empleados
pblicos extranjeros de otros pases de la Unin Europea a los efectos de
trasponer el Convenio relativo a la lucha contra los actos de corrupcin en los que
estn implicados funcionarios de las Comunidades Europeas o de los Estados
miembros de la Unin Europea
6
.

Prometer, ofrecer u otorgar (cohecho activo)

16. Los elementos prometer, ofrecer y otorgar, aunque no traspuestos
textualmente, estn incluidos en el artculo 423 CP que sanciona la corrupcin o
el intento de corromper a un empleado pblico mediante ddivas, presentes,
ofrecimientos o promesas. El Tribunal Supremo ha interpretado los verbos
corromper o intentar corromper en un sentido amplio de forma que incluya las
acciones dirigidas a inducir al empleado pblico a actuar, ya sea de manera lcita
o ilcita (cohecho activo propio/cohecho activo impropio)
7
mediante ddivas,
presentes, ofrecimientos o promesas.

Solicite o reciba, acepte la oferta o promesa (cohecho pasivo)

17. Los elementos solicite, reciba o acepte estn incluidos en las disposiciones
pertinentes relativas a la corrupcin pasiva de un empleado pblico por la
realizacin de un acto ilcito (cohecho propio), es decir, en los artculos 419 a

5
Por ejemplo, sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 1590/2003 de 22 abril 2004, STS
68/2003 de 27 enero 2003, STS 537/2002 de 5 abril 2002, STS 2361/2001 de 4 diciembre 2001.
6
Acto del Consejo de 26 de mayo de 1997 por el que se establece, sobre la base del artculo K.3 (2) (c),
del Tratado de la Unin Europea, la Convencin sobre la lucha contra la corrupcin de funcionarios de las
Comunidades Europeas o funcionarios de los Estados miembros de la Unin Europea [Diario Oficial C
195 de 25 de junio de 1997].
7
Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo: STS 545/1998 de 13 enero 1999, ATS 1178/1998 de 29 abril 1998,
STS 692/1997 de 7 noviembre 1997.
421 CP. Mientras que en los artculos 419 y 420 CP se hace referencia expresa a
dichos trminos, el trmino acepte la oferta o promesa no se utiliza en el
artculo 421 CP, pero est incluido en la nocin de estar prometida.

18. Las disposiciones relativas a la influencia que se ejerce para la realizacin de un
acto lcito (cohecho impropio) no incluyen de manera sistemtica las diferentes
conductas de corrupcin contempladas en el Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin
(ETS 173). En concreto, el artculo 425 CP (comisin de actos inherentes a una
funcin pblica) no se refiere especficamente al trmino recibir sino que ste
se considera comprendido en la nocin de admitir. El artculo 426 CP (soborno
aceptado por la realizacin de un acto que no est prohibido legalmente o en
consideracin a la condicin de empleado pblico) se refiere nicamente a
admitir ddivas o presentes. Sin embargo, los tribunales han entendido que la
admisin de un ofrecimiento/promesa tambin estara incluida en el artculo 426
CP
8
; aqu, una vez ms, el trmino recibir, aunque no traspuesto de manera
expresa, estara incluido en la nocin de admitir.

19. Segn jurisprudencia muy consolidada, es posible sancionar no slo los supuestos
en que la corrupcin sea consecuencia de un pacto
9
(carcter bilateral del delito),
sino tambin aquellos en que la solicitud sea unilateral
10
, con independencia de
que la solicitud por parte del empleado pblico llegue a ser aceptada por el
particular, de que llegue a recibirse el soborno, o de que la accin/omisin llegue
a materializarse posteriormente. Adems, puesto que el inters jurdico que el
Cdigo Penal espaol pretende proteger en los delitos de corrupcin es la
confianza de los ciudadanos en la imparcialidad de la administracin pblica, el
destino final del soborno resulta irrelevante (por ejemplo, si el empleado pblico
se lo queda o si lo dona para obras de caridad
11
).

Cualquier ventaja indebida

20. Las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a la corrupcin no utilizan el
trmino indebida. Por lo general, la jurisprudencia fija un lmite para las
ddivas que no debe exceder lo que podra considerarse como un detalle de
cortesa; sin embargo, sern los tribunales quienes fijarn los criterios para
determinar si una ddiva o presente es aceptable en cada caso concreto (por
ejemplo, un caso recientemente juzgado trataba del soborno a un examinador para
la obtencin del permiso de conducir consistente en varias cajas de botellas de
vino
12
). En cualquier caso, los representantes entrevistados por el EEG
confirmaron que se entiende que cualquier ddiva o regalo (tanto debido como
indebido) puede quedar dentro del mbito del delito si tiene un carcter de
recompensa cuyo propsito es influir en la actuacin del empleado pblico de
servicio
13
.

8
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 636/2006 de 8 junio 2006
9
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 504/2003 de 2 abril 2003
10
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 1096/2006 de 16 noviembre 2006, STS
636/2006 de 8 junio 2006, STS 2052/2001 de 7 noviembre 2001, STS 776/2001 de 8 mayo 2001, STS
20/2001 de 28 marzo 2001, STS 1114/2000 de 12 junio 2000
11
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: ATS 20637/2006 de 1 de junio 2007 y 27 septiembre
2007
12
Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 513/2008 de 23 de julio 2008
13
Ver tambin Sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Andaluca: STJ 6/2007 de 20 de marzo 2007
21. El trmino ddiva o presente es comnmente interpretado como cualquier
beneficio material que puede cuantificarse en trminos pecuniarios. La valoracin
econmica del beneficio tambin parece ser el principio para la determinacin de
la pena cuando sta consista en una multa; es decir, la multa ha de ser fijada por el
tribunal competente en base al valor de la ddiva/presente. Las modificaciones del
Cdigo Penal propuestas incorporan una nueva definicin de los trminos
utilizados para definir el provecho obtenido de forma que se refiera tanto a un
beneficio material como inmaterial (ddiva, favor o recompensa de cualquier
naturaleza). Adems, la referencia a multas mensuales en las sanciones elimina
cualquier alusin a una valoracin puramente econmica del soborno.

Directa o indirectamente

22. Estas nociones (y por lo tanto, por ejemplo, la corrupcin a travs de
intermediarios) se mencionan explcitamente en los artculos 419 y 420 CP.
Aunque los artculos 423, 425 y 426 CP no contienen especficamente los
trminos directa o indirectamente, los tribunales han interpretado las ltimas
disposiciones de una manera amplia a fin de incluir tales supuestos. Esto fue
posteriormente confirmado por los profesionales de la abogaca entrevistados por
el EEG durante la visita.

23. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas hacen mencin explcita de las
nociones directa o indirectamente en todas las disposiciones que se refieren al
cohecho a fin de evitar el riesgo de que se malinterpreten en el futuro, lo que
limitara el alcance de los delitos de cohecho en cuestin.

Para s mismo o para algn otro

24. Los delitos de cohecho tambin son de aplicacin cuando la ddiva beneficia a un
tercero (para su propio beneficio o para el de terceros). Como en el caso anterior,
aunque solo se hace mencin expresa de los terceros beneficiarios en los artculos
419 y 420 CP, la jurisprudencia interpreta que los artculos 423, 425 y 426 CP
tambin incluyen tales supuestos.
14


25. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas se refieren explcitamente a
terceros beneficiarios en todas las disposiciones relativas al cohecho con el fin de
evitar cualquier riesgo de mala interpretacin en el futuro, lo que limitara el
alcance de los delitos de cohecho en contra de la intencin del legislador.

Con el fin de que realice o se abstenga de realizar un acto en el ejercicio de sus
funciones

26. Los delitos de cohecho incluyen de forma expresa tanto las acciones como las
omisiones cometidas por el empleado pblico en el pasado o en el futuro

14
Ver, por ejemplo, sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: ATS 692/1997 de 7 de noviembre
1997 donde, respecto a un posible delito de corrupcin del artculo 426 CP, se dice que es irrelevante el
uso que se haga del soborno; si el beneficio lo disfruta la persona sobornada o si, por ejemplo, lo dona
para obras de caridad.
(cohecho subsiguiente
15
). Ms concretamente, se refieren a actos cometidos en
relacin con el ejercicio de sus obligaciones/funciones oficiales. Esta relacin se
entiende en un sentido amplio: incluye actos que forman parte de las facultades
especficas y de la autoridad del funcionario (aunque no estn explcitamente
establecidas en la legislacin), as como los supuestos ajenos a la autoridad
formal del funcionario (por ejemplo, actos discrecionales y polticos)
16
. Se
extiende, adems, a aquellas situaciones donde el soborno se ofrece en
consideracin al cargo del empleado pblico (artculo 426 CP). El elemento
decisivo del delito no es si el empleado pblico tiene o no discrecin para actuar
segn lo solicitado por quien lo soborna, sino si se ha propuesto, ofrecido u
otorgado un soborno a fin de obtener algo de l/ella y, por lo tanto, para
comprometer su imparcialidad
17
. Puede que incluso el que soborna no sepa si el
funcionario tiene o no discrecin para actuar como aqul desea
18
. Segn la
jurisprudencia, en este campo, las disposiciones sobre cohecho del Cdigo Penal
tratan de salvaguardar los principios de igualdad, imparcialidad y objetividad de
la administracin pblica que se veran significativamente socavados aun cuando
el empleado pblico hubiera actuado de la misma manera sin mediar soborno.

27. Finalmente, para que se d un delito de cohecho no es preciso que el acto o la
omisin inducidos supongan un incumplimiento de las funciones del empleado
pblico o un acto ilegal como tal (artculo 425(1) y 426 CP); sin embargo, la
comisin/omisin de un acto ilcito conlleva sanciones ms severas (artculos
419, 420 y 425(2) CP), pues se considera un agravante.

Cuando se cometa intencionalmente

28. Un principio bsico del Cdigo Penal es que los actos cometidos por negligencia
no son punibles a no ser que as se especifique expresamente en la tipificacin del
correspondiente delito (artculo 12 CP). Por lo tanto, como las disposiciones sobre
cohecho no mencionan que puedan producirse por negligencia, se puede inferir
que solo podrn cometerse intencionalmente.

29. La aceptabilidad o no-aceptabilidad de la ddiva o presente en una situacin de
cohecho se valora dependiendo de si el beneficio pretenda influir en los actos del
funcionario (y, por tanto, comprometer la necesaria imparcialidad y objetividad
de la administracin pblica), independientemente de si el beneficio lleg a influir
realmente en el servicio prestado por el funcionario en cuestin. Por el contrario,

15
Las autoridades explicaron que la introduccin del cohecho a posteriori, el denominado cohecho
subsiguiente (es decir, supuestos de cohecho donde se solicita o se acepta un soborno despus de la
realizacin del acto oficial) sirve a un propsito procesal puesto que permite imponer una sancin con la
prueba del manejo del dinero y del comportamiento del agente pblico sin tener que probar el
ofrecimiento, solicitud o aceptacin previos (es decir, el denominado pactum sceleris). En cualquier caso,
la recompensa establece una conexin entre el agente pblico que pone en riesgo el principio de
imparcialidad de la administracin pblica. El nexo fundamental es que, de una manera imprecisa, se
pone en peligro la imparcialidad del agente pblico en relacin con futuros actos sin determinar.
16
Por ejemplo, sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 440/2007 de 21 mayo 2007, STS
1096/2006 de 16 noviembre 2006, STS 636/2006 de 8 de junio 2006, STS 504/2003 de 2 de abril 2003,
STS 20/2001 de 28 marzo 2001, STS 2052/2001 de 7 noviembre 2001, STS 701/1994 de 4 abril 1994.
17
Por ejemplo, sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 440/2007 de 21 mayo 2007, STS
1076/2006 de 27 octubre 2006.
18
Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 293/2007 de 10 abril 2007, STS 587/2007 de
28 junio 2007.
si el ofrecimiento o la promesa no pretenden influir en el funcionario para que
acte ilegalmente, el particular no puede ser considerado responsable de
proponer, ofrecer u otorgar un soborno
19
.


Sanciones

30. La gravedad de las penas disponibles para los supuestos de cohecho pasivo
depende de la naturaleza legal o ilegal del acto (accin/omisin) realizado por el
empleado pblico sobornado:
- si la esperada accin/omisin del empleado pblico es constitutiva de delito:
de dos a seis aos de prisin, multa del tanto al triplo del valor del soborno, e
inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de siete a doce
aos (artculo 419 CP);
- si la accin/omisin esperada del empleado pblico es un acto injusto no
constitutivo de delito:
i) si el empleado pblico ejecuta el acto injusto: de uno a cuatro aos de
prisin e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo
de seis a nueve aos,
ii) si el empleado pblico no ejecuta el acto injusto: de uno a dos aos de
prisin e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo
de tres a seis aos.
En ambos casos, la multa a imponer junto con las mencionadas penas va del
tanto al triplo del valor de la ddiva (artculo 420 CP);
- si el empleado pblico deja de realizar (omisin) un acto que debe realizar:
multa del tanto al duplo del valor del soborno e inhabilitacin especial para
empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de uno a tres aos (artculo 421 CP);
- si el empleado pblico realiza un acto inherente a sus funciones (artculo 425
CP):
i) si el soborno se recibe para que el empleado pblico realice un acto
inherente a sus funciones o como recompensa por un acto ya realizado:
multa del tanto al triplo del valor del soborno e inhabilitacin especial
para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de seis meses a tres aos
(artculo 425(1) CP);
ii) si la recompensa se ofrece en relacin con un acto ya realizado que
constituye un delito: de uno a tres aos de prisin, multa de seis a diez
meses
20
e inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo
de diez a quince aos (artculo 425(2) CP);
- si el empleado pblico acepta un soborno por un acto no prohibido
legalmente o en consideracin a su condicin de empleado pblico: multa de
seis a diez meses (artculo 426 CP).

31. El cohecho activo generalmente se castiga con el mismo nivel de sanciones que el
cohecho pasivo (aqu no se aplica la excepcin de la inhabilitacin especial para

19
Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Penal: STS 636/2006 de 8 de junio 2006, STS 188/1994
de 2 de febrero de 1994.
20
En Espaa las multas se basan en un sistema de das-multa; el nmero de das se determina en funcin
del grado de culpabilidad del autor y de las circunstancias del delito, y la cantidad en funcin de la
situacin econmica del autor. En la prctica, un multa de seis a diez meses se traduce en 90 a 180 cuotas
diarias; las cuotas diarias varan desde 2 a 400 euros (artculo 50(4) CP)
empleo o cargo pblico). Sin embargo, en los casos en que el soborno se
da/ofrece/promete en respuesta a una solicitud de un empleado pblico, se
impondrn las penas inferiores en un grado a las sealadas para el cohecho pasivo
(artculo 423(2) CP circunstancia atenuante). De conformidad con el artculo 70
CP el lmite mximo de la pena inferior en grado ser el mnimo de la pena
sealada por la ley reducido en un da; el lmite mnimo ser la mitad de dicho
mnimo
21
.

32. La siguiente tabla ilustra de manera esquemtica las sanciones previstas para el
cohecho activo y pasivo:

Sancin (acumulativa) Artculo
CP
Delito
Prisin Multa Inhabilitacin
profesional
Posible
extradicin
Cohecho pasivo
Art 419 Acto oficial
constitutivo de delito
2 6 aos 1-3 veces el valor
del soborno
7 -12 aos Si
El acto oficial es un acto injusto
- ejecutado 1 -4 aos 1-3 veces el valor
del soborno
6 -9 aos Si
Art 420
- no ejecutado 1 -2 aos 1-3 veces el valor
del soborno
3 -6 aos Si
Art 421 Abstenerse de realizar
un acto oficial
No 1-2 veces el valor
del soborno
1 -3 aos No
Acto oficial inherente a las funciones (soborno solicitado o aceptado antes/despus de la
realizacin del acto oficial)
(1) No constitutivo de
delito
No 1-3 veces el valor
del soborno
6 meses 3
aos
No
Art 425
(2) Constitutivo de
delito
1 -3 aos 90-180 cuotas
diarias
10 -15aos Si
Art 426 Soborno ofrecido en
consideracin a cargo
oficial o para realizar
un acto no prohibido
por la ley
No 90-180 cuotas
diarias
No No
Cohecho activo
(1) Corromper o
intentar corromper por
medio de ddivas,
ofrecimientos o
promesas
Mismas penas que cohecho
pasivo
No aplicable Si/No (Ver
arriba cohecho
pasivo: Arts
425(1) y 426)
Art 423
(2) En respuesta a
solicitud del empleado
pblico
Pena inferior en un grado a las
establecidas para cohecho
pasivo
No aplicable Si/No (Ver
arriba cohecho
pasivo: Arts
421, 425(1) y
426; 420,
425(2)


21
Por ejemplo, a efectos de clculo, si la pena es de 4 a 8 aos de prisin, la correspondiente pena inferior
en grado ser de 2 a 4 aos de prisin.
33. Como comparacin, el fraude contra un organismo pblico conlleva una pena de
prisin de uno a tres aos (artculo 436 CP).La malversacin de fondos pblicos,
pena de entre tres y seis aos; en los casos agravados, el tiempo de prisin podra
incrementarse hasta un mximo de ocho aos (artculo 432 CP)

34. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal proponen un sistema punitivo diferente
basado exclusivamente en multas-da (es decir, las sanciones ya no se determinan
en funcin del valor econmico del soborno). Adems, se agravan las penas
mnimas de prisin establecidas para los delitos de cohecho pasivo: tres aos de
prisin para actos oficiales ilcitos (en lugar de dos) y dos aos de prisin para
actos oficiales lcitos (en lugar de uno o ninguno). En lo que se refiere al cohecho
activo, las sanciones previstas son las mismas que las establecidas para aquellos
que comenten cohecho pasivo (con la excepcin de la inhabilitacin especial para
empleo o cargo pblico), as como inhabilitacin para licitaciones pblicas,
contratos con la administracin y rebajas fiscales.


Resoluciones judiciales y estadsticas

35. Existe un vasto corpus de resoluciones judiciales en relacin con el cohecho de
varias categoras de empleados pblicos (por ejemplo; jueces y personas que
desempean cargos judiciales, alcaldes, mdicos y enfermeras, empleados de
empresas privadas que desempean funciones de naturaleza pblica, etc.). La
interpretacin de los elementos clave (por ejemplo, definicin de empleado
pblico, objeto de corrupcin, alcance del acto oficial) contenidos en los
correspondientes delitos de cohecho se ha ido desarrollando en dichas
resoluciones segn se ha descrito en los prrafos anteriores.

36. Los informes anuales de la Fiscala General del Estado indican que, en el ao
2006, se instruyeron 89 diligencias previas relacionadas con supuestos de
cohecho (un 50% ms que en el ao 2005); en el ao 2007, se incoaron 47
diligencias previas por delitos de trfico de influencias. El ltimo informe de la
Fiscala General del Estado (2008) destaca que, desde la creacin de la Fiscala
Especial contra la Corrupcin y el Crimen Organizado en 1996, se han
pronunciado 64 sentencias relacionadas con casos de corrupcin (54 condenas y
10 absoluciones).


Corrupcin de miembros de asambleas pblicas nacionales (Artculo 4 del ETS
173)

37. De acuerdo con el artculo 24(1) CP, aquellos que por s solos o como miembros
de alguna corporacin, tribunal u rgano colegiado tengan mando o ejerzan
jurisdiccin propia sern considerados autoridades y, por lo tanto, les afectarn
las correspondientes disposiciones sobre corrupcin. El Cdigo Penal tambin se
refiere, concretamente, a los miembros elegidos de las asambleas legislativas,
incluyendo a los miembros del Parlamento (Congreso de los Diputados y
Senado), de las Asambleas Legislativas de las Comunidades Autnomas y del
Parlamento Europeo. No hay referencia expresa a los miembros de otras
asambleas pblicas nacionales tales como las asambleas pblicas en el mbito
local (incluidas las de las ciudades autnomas de Ceuta y Melilla) o de asambleas
que no tengan facultades legislativas. Sin embargo, las autoridades afirman que la
definicin del trmino autoridades del artculo 24(1) CP es lo suficientemente
amplia como para incluir tambin a los miembros de cualquier otro rgano
representativo, incluso en el mbito local, que hayan sido elegidos o nombrados y
que ejerzan funciones legislativas o administrativas. Los elementos del delito y
las sanciones previstas para los delitos de corrupcin de empleados pblicos
nacionales sern, por lo tanto, de aplicacin a los delitos de corrupcin de
miembros de asambleas pblicas nacionales.

38. Un nmero cada vez mayor de resoluciones judiciales tratan sobre corrupcin de
miembros de asambleas pblicas nacionales; concretamente, sobre las decisiones
tomadas por miembros de ayuntamientos locales en relacin con la planificacin,
concesin de licencias y ordenacin del territorio, as como sobre supuestos de
transfuguismo poltico, como, por ejemplo, Caso 1125/2007 de 12 diciembre
2007, Caso 1617/2005 de 7 diciembre 2005 y Caso 1952/2000 de 19 diciembre
2000. Los ltimos casos se dictaron en relacin con el artculo 420 CP
(acciones/omisiones de empleados pblicos que constituyen un acto injusto), y
las sentencias impuestas consistieron en penas de prisin de uno a tres aos,
multas de hasta 180.300 Euros e inhabilitacin especial para cargo o empleo
pblico.


Corrupcin de empleados pblicos extranjeros (artculo 5 del ETS 173)

39. Con el fin de aplicar las obligaciones contradas por la firma del Convenio OCDE
de lucha contra la corrupcin de empleados pblicos extranjeros en las
transacciones comerciales internacionales
22
, se introdujo una nueva disposicin,
el artculo 445, en el Captulo X, Ttulo XIX del Cdigo Penal espaol.


Artculo 445, Cdigo Penal: corrupcin en relaciones comerciales internacionales
1. Los que con ddivas, presentes, ofrecimientos o promesas, corrompieren o intentaren
corromper, por s o por persona interpuesta, a las autoridades o funcionarios pblicos
extranjeros o de organizaciones internacionales en el ejercicio de su cargo en beneficio de
stos o de un tercero, o atendieran a sus solicitudes al respecto, con el fin de que acten o se
abstengan de actuar en relacin con el ejercicio de funciones pblicas para conseguir o
conservar un contrato u otro beneficio irregular en la realizacin de actividades econmicas
internacionales, sern castigados con las penas previstas en el artculo 423, en sus
respectivos casos.
2. Si el culpable perteneciere a una sociedad, organizacin o asociacin, incluso de carcter
transitorio, que se dedicare a la realizacin de estas actividades, el juez o tribunal podr
imponer alguna o algunas de las consecuencias previstas en el artculo 129 de este Cdigo.




22
Espaa firm el Convenio OCDE de lucha contra la corrupcin de agentes pblicos extranjeros en las
transacciones comerciales internacionales el 17 de diciembre de 1997, y deposit el instrumento de
ratificacin el 14 de enero de 2000.

Elementos del delito

Empleado pblico extranjero

40. El Cdigo Penal espaol no establece una definicin independiente del trmino
empleado extranjero. A este respecto, las autoridades indicaron que la
definicin de empleado pblico del artculo 24 CP no puede extrapolarse a los
empleados pblicos extranjeros.

41. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas incorporan una definicin
autnoma de empleado pblico extranjero que comprende cualquier persona que
desempee un cargo legislativo, administrativo o judicial en un pas extranjero,
bien por nombramiento o por eleccin; cualquier persona que ejerza una funcin
pblica para un pas extranjero, incluidos los organismos pblicos y las empresas
pblicas; y cualquier funcionario o empleado de un organismo internacional
pblico (es decir, una trasposicin literal del Convenio OCDE).


Proponer, ofrecer u otorgar (cohecho activo)

42. Los elementos proponer, ofrecer y otorgar estn incluidos en el artculo
445 CP, que sanciona la corrupcin o el intento de corrupcin de un empleado
pblico extranjero mediante ddivas, presentes, ofrecimientos o promesas.
Tambin delinquir el particular que satisfaga las demandas de soborno de un
empleado pblico extranjero segn lo descrito anteriormente (en el caso de que
fuera el empleado pblico quien solicitara el soborno, el particular tendr una
pena reducida de conformidad con el artculo 423(2) CP ms detalles en el
prrafo 31). Sin embargo, el cohecho activo de un empleado pblico extranjero
slo est tipificado en el caso de que el acto oficial (tanto legal como ilegal) se
cometa en el contexto de transacciones comerciales internacionales (con el fin de
obtener o retener algn negocio o cualquier otra ventaja indebida en la gestin de
negocios internacionales).


Solicitar o recibir, aceptar una oferta o promesa (cohecho pasivo)

43. El cohecho pasivo de empleados pblicos extranjeros no est tipificado como
delito en Espaa.


Directa o indirectamente

44. Estas nociones (y por lo tanto, por ejemplo, la corrupcin por medio de
intermediarios) se mencionan explcitamente en el artculo 445 CP.


Para s mismo o para algn otro

45. Los delitos de cohecho tambin son de aplicacin cuando la ddiva beneficia a
terceros (en beneficio de stos o de un tercero).

Otros elementos

46. Lo descrito en relacin con otros elementos/conceptos especficos del delito
(ventaja indebida, realizar o abstenerse de realizar un acto en el ejercicio de
sus funciones, cometido intencionalmente) referidos a la corrupcin de
empleados pblicos nacionales tambin ser de aplicacin en lo concerniente a la
corrupcin de empleados pblicos extranjeros.


Sanciones

47. Conforme al artculo 445 CP, las penas que se contemplan en el artculo 423 CP
para el cohecho activo de empleados pblicos valdrn tambin para el cohecho
activo de empleados pblicos extranjeros en el contexto de transacciones
comerciales internacionales. A este respecto, el artculo 423 CP remite a las
disposiciones pertinentes relativas al cohecho pasivo para determinar la sancin
requerida (para ms detalles, ver prrafos 30 a 32).

48. Ha habido cierta controversia sobre si el artculo 423 CP puede tambin aplicarse
en relacin no slo a las precedentes disposiciones sobre cohecho: artculos 419,
420 y 421 CP (actos oficiales constitutivos de delito o un acto injusto), sino
tambin a los artculos 425 y 426 CP (actos oficiales lcitos). Los juristas parecen
tener puntos de vista contradictorios a este respecto (que se han puesto de relieve
en los correspondientes informes de la OCDE sobre Espaa
23
), pero la
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo
24
.ha confirmado que el artculo 423 CP s
sera aplicable, tanto cuando la persona que soborna pretende conseguir un acto
oficial ilcito (artculos 419, 420, 421 CP), como lcito (artculos 425 y 426 CP).

49. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas establecen un delito autnomo
para la corrupcin activa de empleados pblicos extranjeros cuya sancin consiste
en penas de prisin de entre tres y seis aos, una multa de 12 a 24 meses, e
inhabilitacin para contratos/licitaciones pblicas. La multa puede aumentarse
para tomar en cuenta el beneficio obtenido de la comisin del delito.


Resoluciones judiciales

50. No hay resoluciones judiciales relativas a supuestos de corrupcin de empleados
pblicos extranjeros.





23
Espaa: Informes de la Fase I y Fase 2 relativos a la Aplicacin del Convenio de lucha contra la
corrupcin de agentes pblicos extranjeros en las transacciones comerciales internacionales.
24
Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo: STS 545/1998 de 13 de enero 1999, ATS 1178/1998 de 29 abril
1998, STS 692/1997 de 7 noviembre 1997.
Corrupcin de miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras (artculo 6 del ETS
173)

51. Los miembros de las asambleas pblicas extranjeras no estn incluidos en las
disposiciones sobre corrupcin del Cdigo Penal espaol.


Corrupcin en el sector privado (artculos 7 y 8 del ETS 173)

52. El Cdigo Penal espaol no criminaliza la corrupcin en el mbito privado.
Puesto que no existe el delito de corrupcin privado, la definicin de empleado
pblico se ha convertido en el factor clave para criminalizar la mayor parte de
las situaciones que dan lugar a un delito de corrupcin; permitira, por ejemplo,
sancionar supuestos de corrupcin dentro de empresas estrictamente privadas
pero que continan estando controladas por el Estado (por ejemplo, Caso No.
2052/2001). La estrategia punitiva ms segura en relacin con la corrupcin en el
mbito privado es, probablemente, la representada por los delitos de
malversacin/mala administracin, en los casos en que el empleado (o el gerente
que recibe el soborno) formaliza un contrato que daa financieramente a la
empresa. En el mbito del derecho civil, la corrupcin privada est prohibida por
la Ley de Competencia Desleal, que prohbe expresamente la induccin a
trabajadores, proveedores, clientes y dems obligados, a infringir los deberes
contractuales bsicos que han contrado con los competidores. Aunque la Ley de
Competencia Desleal proporciona exclusivamente instrumentos de naturaleza
civil, existe la posibilidad de imponer una sancin administrativa (artculo 7 de la
Ley de Proteccin a la competencia) en los casos en que la prctica desleal
consistente en el pago de un soborno tenga la suficiente importancia como para
distorsionar gravemente la competencia en el mercado y que dicha distorsin
afecte el inters pblico.

53. Las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas introducen el delito de
corrupcin en el sector privado con el fin de adaptarse a las exigencias de la
Unin Europea que emanan de la Decisin Marco 2003/568/JAI del Consejo, de
22 de julio 2003, relativa a la lucha contra la corrupcin en el sector privado.


Corrupcin de funcionarios de organismos internacionales (artculo 9 del ETS 173)

54. La corrupcin activa de funcionarios de organismos internaciones se tipifica en el
artculo 445 CP. La corrupcin pasiva de esta categora de funcionarios no est
tipificada como delito en el Cdigo Penal espaol. Los elementos del delito y las
sanciones aplicables que se detallan para la corrupcin de empleados pblicos
extranjeros sern, por consiguiente, de aplicacin para la corrupcin de
funcionarios internacionales. No hay sentencias judiciales ni jurisprudencia sobre
corrupcin de funcionarios internacionales.




Corrupcin de miembros de asambleas parlamentarias internacionales (artculo 10
del ETS 173)

55. El Cdigo Penal espaol slo tipifica como delito la corrupcin activa y pasiva de
miembros del Parlamento Europeo, quienes estn explcitamente incluidos en el
trmino autoridades pblicas segn el artculo 24(1) CP. Por lo tanto, sern de
aplicacin los elementos del delito y las sanciones previstas para la corrupcin de
empleados pblicos nacionales. No hay sentencias judiciales ni jurisprudencia
relativa a miembros del Parlamento Europeo.

56. Los miembros de otras asambleas parlamentarias internacionales no estn
incluidos en las disposiciones pertinentes relativas a delitos de corrupcin.


Corrupcin de jueces y empleados de tribunales internacionales (artculo 11 del
ETS 173)

57. La corrupcin de jueces y empleados de tribunales internacionales no est
tipificada como delito en el Cdigo Penal espaol, con la nica excepcin de la
corrupcin de los empleados de la Corte Penal Internacional. A este respecto, de
conformidad con el artculo 471.b. del Cdigo Penal, el cohecho activo y pasivo
de empleados de la Corte Penal Internacional se castiga con penas de prisin de 2
a 5 aos y multa de hasta el triplo del valor del soborno.


Trfico de influencias (artculo 12 del ETS 173)

Definicin del delito

58. El trfico de influencias est contemplado en los artculos 428 430 del Captulo
VI, Ttulo XIX del Cdigo Penal espaol. Las disposiciones relativas al trfico de
influencias pasivo (aceptar o solicitar una ventaja para ejercer una influencia
indebida) distinguen dos principales tipos de conductas:

(1) ejercer una influencia indebida. En este caso el Cdigo Penal establece
una distincin basada en la naturaleza pblica/privada del que ejerce el trafico de
influencias: (a) una autoridad o empleado pblico (artculo 428 CP) y (b) un
particular (artculo 429 CP);


Artculo 428, Cdigo Penal: Influencia indebida ejercida por autoridad o
empleado pblico
El funcionario pblico o autoridad que influyere en otro funcionario pblico o autoridad
prevalindose del ejercicio de las facultades de su cargo o de cualquier otra situacin
derivada de su relacin personal o jerrquica con ste o con otro funcionario o
autoridad para conseguir una resolucin que le pueda generar directa o indirectamente
un beneficio econmico para s o para un tercero, incurrir en las penas de prisin de
seis meses a un ao, multa del tanto al duplo del beneficio perseguido u obtenido, e
inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de tres a seis aos. Si
obtuviere el beneficio perseguido se impondrn las penas en su mitad superior.


Artculo 429, Cdigo Penal: Influencia indebida ejercida por un particular
El particular que influyere en un funcionario pblico o autoridad prevalindose de
cualquier situacin derivada de su relacin personal con ste o con otro funcionario
pblico o autoridad para conseguir una resolucin que le pueda generar, directa o
indirectamente, un beneficio econmico para s o para un tercero, ser castigado con
las penas de prisin de seis meses a un ao, y multa del tanto al duplo del beneficio
perseguido u obtenido. Si obtuviere el beneficio perseguido se impondrn las penas en
su mitad superior


(2) la solicitud o aceptacin de ddivas/presentes y cualquier otro tipo de
remuneracin a fin de ejercer una influencia indebida (artculo 430 CP).


Artculo 430, Cdigo Penal: Solicitud/aceptacin de ddivas/presentes/otro tipo
de remuneracin por ejercer una influencia indebida
Los que, ofrecindose a realizar las conductas descritas en los artculos anteriores,
solicitaren de terceros ddivas, presentes o cualquier otra remuneracin, o aceptaren
ofrecimiento o promesa, sern castigados con la pena de prisin de seis meses a un
ao.
En cualquiera de los supuestos a que se refiere este artculo, la autoridad judicial
podr imponer tambin la suspensin de las actividades de la sociedad, empresa,
organizacin o despacho y la clausura de sus dependencias abiertas al pblico por
tiempo de seis meses a tres aos


59. El trfico de influencias activo (por ejemplo, prometer, dar u ofrecer una ventaja
indebida al que ejerce el trfico de influencias) no est tipificado como delito
principal.


Elementos del delito

que afirme o confirme ser capaz de ejercer influencia sobre las decisiones de
[empleados pblicos]

60. Este concepto no est traspuesto tal cual, es decir, el que ejerce el trfico de
influencias no tiene que afirmar o confirmar especficamente que no es capaz de
ejercer una influencia indebida. A este respecto, la legislacin espaola penaliza
los supuestos en que el que ejerce el trfico de influencias se aprovecha
(prevalimiento) de su relacin personal/jerrquica con el empleado pblico a fin
de ejercer una influencia indebida sobre las decisiones de ste. El inters jurdico
protegido es el mismo que en los delitos de corrupcin: la transparencia e
imparcialidad de las decisiones de la administracin pblica.


61. Para que se produzca un delito de trfico de influencias no es necesario que dicha
influencia llegue a ejercerse realmente y que produzca el resultado esperado; la
mera afirmacin del que ejerce el trfico de influencias de que es capaz de ejercer
tal influencia bastar para cometer el delito.

62. Ms controvertidos son los casos de presunta influencia. En este contexto,
anteriores sentencias del Tribunal Supremo han insistido en la necesidad de que la
influencia sea real y que, de hecho, permita al que ejerce el trfico de influencias
tener el poder de intervenir o influir indebidamente en las decisiones; de otro
modo, el autor sera procesado por fraude (por ejemplo, Caso 8900/1992 de 4 de
diciembre 1992). Sin embargo, una sentencia ms reciente del Tribunal Supremo
confirma que los supuestos de presunta influencia tambin estaran incluidos en
las disposiciones pertinentes sobre trfico de influencias (Caso 335/2006 de 24 de
marzo 2006).


Otros conceptos/elementos

63. Los elementos constitutivos de los delitos de corrupcin son, en gran parte,
aplicables a los artculos 428 a 430 CP. Concretamente, la intencionalidad es un
componente implcito de los diversos delitos. La naturaleza directa o indirecta de
la intermediacin se incluye implcitamente. El beneficiario de la ventaja indebida
puede ser el propio que ejerce el trfico de influencias o un tercero.

64. Las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas al trfico de influencias no utilizan
el trmino indebida para calificar la ventaja. A este respecto, se entiende que
cualquier ddiva, presente o cualquier otra remuneracin (artculo 430 CP) o
cualquier beneficio econmico (artculos 428-429 CP), ya sean debidos o
indebidos, pueden estar dentro del mbito del delito si su propsito es influir en
las decisiones de algn empleado pblico. El Tribunal Supremo ha interpretado
en una reciente sentencia que el concepto cualquier otra remuneracin
trasciende la naturaleza econmica de la ventaja recibida. En concreto, en el Caso
335/2006 de 24 de marzo de 2006, la ventaja recibida por el que ejerce el trfico
de influencias fue un contrato de trabajo para su mujer. Parece, sin embargo, que,
al igual que con los otros delitos de corrupcin, al final se podra valorar
cuantitativamente la ventaja en trminos pecuniarios.


Sanciones

65. Las penas establecidas para el trfico de influencias pasivo son: a) pena de prisin
de seis meses a un ao; b) multa del tanto al duplo del valor del beneficio; y c)
inhabilitacin especial para empleo o cargo pblico por tiempo de tres a seis aos
(esta ltima pena no se aplica cuando quien ejerce el trfico de influencias es una
persona particular). Las penas se aplicarn en su mitad superior cuando el
beneficio esperado se consiga realmente.




Resoluciones judiciales

66. Diversas resoluciones judiciales han clarificado las disposiciones sobre trfico de
influencias del Cdigo Penal espaol segn se ha ilustrado anteriormente (por
ejemplo, Caso 335/2006 de 24 marzo 2006, Caso 480/2004 de 7 abril 2004, etc.)

67. Los informes anuales de la Fiscala General del Estado indican que, en el ao
2006, se incoaron 24 diligencias previas relativas a casos de trfico de influencias
(un aumento del 100% en comparacin con datos del ao 2005); en el ao 2007,
se incoaron 82 diligencias previas sobre delitos de trfico de influencias.


Corrupcin de rbitros nacionales (artculo 1, prrafos 1 y 2 y artculos 2 y 3 del
ETS 191)

68. De conformidad con el artculo 422 CP, los rbitros nacionales est expresamente
incluidos en las disposiciones sobre corrupcin pasiva de los artculos 419 y 420
CP (actos oficiales ilcitos). En consecuencia, los elementos del delito y las
sanciones aplicables que se detallan para la corrupcin de empleados pblicos
nacionales les sern de aplicacin.


Artculo 422, Cdigo Penal
Lo dispuesto en los artculos precedentes [artculos 419, 420 y 421 CP] ser tambin
aplicable a los jurados, rbitros, peritos, o cualesquiera personas que participen en el
ejercicio de la funcin pblica


69. Las disposiciones sobre corrupcin pasiva para actos oficiales lcitos (por
ejemplo, actos discrecionales), es decir, los artculos 425 y 426 CP, no son
aplicables respecto de los rbitros nacionales. La corrupcin activa de rbitros se
castiga en cuanto que esta categora de personas tiene la consideracin de
oficiales pblicos que ejercen una funcin pblica al amparo del artculo 24 CP.

70. Ha habido un caso de corrupcin de rbitro nacional que ha dado lugar a una
condena: en el Caso N 1096/2006 de 16 noviembre 2006, un sndico de quiebra y
su intermediario fueron hallados culpables de un delito de corrupcin pasiva
(artculo 420 CP: actos injustos) por solicitar y aceptar una cantidad de entre
3.600 y 5.000 Euros. Ambos fueron condenados a un ao de prisin,
inhabilitacin por un periodo de tres aos y multa de 3.606 Euros. El particular
acusado de cohecho activo (artculo 423 CP en relacin con el artculo 420 CP)
fue condenado a seis meses de prisin y multa de 1.202 Euros.


Corrupcin de rbitros extranjeros (artculo 4 del ETS 191)

71. La corrupcin de rbitros extranjeros no est expresamente tipificada como delito
en el Cdigo Penal espaol. Sin embargo, las autoridades indican que a sensu
contrario, nada impide hacer una interpretacin ms amplia del concepto de
rbitro de forma que incluya a personas extranjeras. Esto, adems, sera posible
de conformidad con la nocin de rbitro que establece la Ley 60/2003 sobre
Arbitraje, donde se estipula que personas tanto nacionales como extranjeras
pueden actuar como rbitros.


Corrupcin de jurados nacionales (artculo 1, prrafos 3 y 5 del ETS 191)

72. Conforme al artculo 422 CP, los jurados nacionales estn expresamente incluidos
en las disposiciones sobre corrupcin pasiva de los artculos 419 y 420 CP (actos
oficiales ilcitos). En consecuencia, los elementos del delito y las sanciones
aplicables que se detallan para la corrupcin de empleados pblicos nacionales les
sern de aplicacin.


Artculo 422, Cdigo Penal
Lo dispuesto en los artculos precedentes [artculos 419, 420, 421 CP] ser tambin
aplicable a los jurados, rbitros, peritos, o cualesquiera personas que participen en el
ejercicio de la funcin pblica


73. Las disposiciones sobre corrupcin pasiva para actos oficiales lcitos (por
ejemplo, actos discrecionales), es decir, los artculos 425 y 426 CP, no son
aplicables respecto de los rbitros nacionales. La corrupcin activa de rbitros se
castiga en cuanto que esta categora de personas tiene la consideracin de
oficiales pblicos que ejercen una funcin pblica al amparo del artculo 24 CP.

74. No hay resoluciones judiciales ni jurisprudencia relativas a jurados nacionales.


Corrupcin de jurados extranjeros (artculo 6 del ETS 191)

75. La corrupcin de jurados extranjeros no est tipificada como delito en el Cdigo
Penal espaol.


Otras cuestiones

Actos de participacin (artculo 15 del ETS 173)

76. Segn el artculo 27 CP, son responsables criminalmente de los delitos y faltas los
autores y los cmplices. Adems, segn el artculo 28 CP, se incluye entre los
autores: a) los que inducen directa o indirectamente a otro u otros a cometer un
delito, y b) los que cooperan a la ejecucin de un delito con un acto sin el cual no
se habra cometido (artculo 28 CP). Los cmplices son los que, no hallndose
comprendidos en el artculo 28 CP, cooperan a la ejecucin del delito con actos
anteriores o simultneos (artculo 29 CP).

77. Los que cometen un delito conjuntamente con los autores estarn sujetos a las
mismas penas que stos (artculo 28 CP), mientras que a los cmplices se les
impondr la pena inferior en grado a la que hubieran recibido de haber sido los
autores (artculo 63 CP).


Competencia (artculo 17 del ETS 173)

78. Las normas sobre la jurisdiccin espaola se establecen en el Ttulo I de la Ley
Orgnica del Poder Judicial (artculos 21 a 25). En concreto, el artculo 23
establece la jurisdiccin espaola sobre los actos cometidos en territorio espaol
(principio de territorialidad); aunque no se especifica si los delitos deben haberse
cometido total o parcialmente en territorio espaol y, por lo general, se entiende
que la jurisdiccin territorial rige para los delitos que se cometan tanto total como
parcialmente en territorio nacional.

79. Adems, la jurisdiccin espaola ser competente en los actos delictivos
cometidos en el extranjero cuando ciudadanos espaoles (o ciudadanos
extranjeros que hayan adquirido la nacionalidad espaola con posterioridad a la
comisin del hecho) sean los autores o las vctimas del delito (principio de
nacionalidad). La jurisdiccin espaola ser competente en los actos cometidos
por nacionales espaoles que sean, al mismo tiempo, funcionarios de
organizaciones internacionales, miembros de alguna asamblea parlamentaria
internacional o empleados de algn tribunal internacional. Por otra parte, las
autoridades confirmaron que la jurisdiccin espaola rige para los empleados
pblicos nacionales y para los miembros de asambleas pblicas nacionales que no
sean espaoles en virtud de su vnculo profesional/funcional con la
administracin pblica espaola. Finalmente, los tribunales espaoles tambin
sern competentes para conocer de los delitos que afectan a los intereses
nacionales espaoles, independientemente de si los que los cometen son
nacionales espaoles o extranjeros.

80. Para ser competente en aquellos actos cometidos en el extranjero es preciso que
exista doble incriminacin. Por lo tanto, el autor de un delito podr ser enjuiciado
siempre y cuando su conducta constituya un delito en el pas en que se haya
cometido (artculo 23(2)a de la Ley Orgnica del Poder Judicial). Sin embargo, de
conformidad con el artculo 23(4)i de la Ley Orgnica del Poder Judicial, es
posible una jurisdiccin universal sobre actos cometidos fuera del territorio
espaol si la incriminacin del acto es consecuencia de un tratado internacional
ratificado y promulgado por Espaa.


Extradicin

81. En Espaa los delitos castigados con al menos un ao de privacin de libertad
podrn dar lugar a extradicin.




Prescripcin

82. El plazo de prescripcin depende del tiempo mximo de sancin que puede
imponerse para el delito en cuestin as como de su carcter grave/menos
grave. En concreto, los delitos sancionados con un periodo mximo de
prisin/inhabilitacin de ms de cinco aos y menos de diez prescribirn a los
diez aos. Los delitos sancionados con un periodo mximo de
prisin/inhabilitacin de ms de tres aos y menos de cinco prescribirn a los
cinco aos. Todos los dems delitos menos graves prescribirn a los tres aos
(artculo 131 CP).

83. La siguiente tabla ilustra los plazos de prescripcin aplicables a los delitos de
corrupcin y trfico de influencias incluidos en el Cdigo Penal:

Artculo Delito Prisin Inhabilitacin Prescripcin

Corrupcin en el sector pblico
Art 419 Acto oficial constitutivo de
delito
2 6 aos 7 -12 aos 15 aos
El acto oficial es un acto
injusto

- ejecutado 1 -4 aos 6 -9 aos 10 aos
Art 420
- no ejecutado 1 -2 aos 3 -6 aos 10 aos
Art 421 Abstenerse de realizar un acto
oficial
No 1 -3 aos 3 aos
Acto oficial inherente a sus
funciones (soborno solicitado o
aceptado antes/despus realizar
acto oficial)

(1) No constitutivo de delito No 6 meses 3
aos
3 aos
Art 425
(2) Constitutivo de delito 1 -3 aos 10 -15aos 15 aos
Art 426 Soborno ofrecido en
consideracin a cargo oficial o
para realizar un acto no
prohibido por la ley
No No 3 aos
Trfico de influencias
Art 428 Influencia indebida ejercida por
empleado pblico
Art 429 Influencia indebida ejercida por
particulares
3 6 aos 10 aos
Art 430 Solicitud/aceptacin de ventaja
para ejercer influencia indebida
6 meses 1 ao
6 meses 3 aos 3 aos

84. Estos periodos empiezan a contar desde el momento que se comete el delito. En el
caso de un delito continuado, el periodo se calcula desde el momento en que
tuvo lugar el ltimo de ellos, y, en el caso de un delito permanente, se calcula
desde la fecha en que ces la actividad ilegal (artculo 132(1) CP).


Eximentes

85. Una persona que haya cometido un delito de corrupcin activa puede acogerse al
eximente de arrepentimiento real. Para ello, el artculo 427 CP dispone lo
siguiente:


Artculo 427, Cdigo Penal
Quedar exento de pena por el delito de cohecho el particular que haya accedido
ocasionalmente a la solicitud de ddiva o presente realizada por autoridad o
funcionario pblico y denunciare el hecho a la autoridad que tenga el deber de
proceder a su averiguacin, antes de la apertura del correspondiente procedimiento,
siempre que no hayan transcurrido ms de diez das desde la fecha de los hechos.


86. Este eximente slo ser posible si: (1) el soborno fue solicitado; (2) el sobornador
denuncia voluntariamente los hechos a la autoridad responsable de su
investigacin; (3) la denuncia se hace antes de transcurridos diez das desde la
comisin de los hechos. Si la eximente de arrepentimiento real se admite, el autor
quedar exento de castigo.


III. ANLISIS

87. Espaa es uno de los pocos miembros del GRECO que no han ratificado el
Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 173) (en adelante: el Convenio). En lo
que se refiere al Protocolo Adicional al Convenio (ETS 191), tampoco ha sido
ratificado por Espaa. A pesar de ello, Espaa, como cualquier otro miembro del
GRECO, est sujeta a evaluacin por sus iguales de conformidad con los criterios
del Convenio y su Protocolo Adicional, que estn siendo examinados en la
Tercera Ronda de Evaluacin (ver ms detalles en prrafo 2). El EEG seala que
Espaa fue uno de los miembros fundadores del GRECO; sin embargo, no lleg a
firmar el Convenio hasta el 10 de mayo de 2005. El EEG tambin seala que
Espaa ratific, el 19 de junio de 2006, el Convenio de Naciones Unidas contra la
Corrupcin (UNCAC) que, en lo relativo a los delitos de corrupcin, abarca
aproximadamente el mismo terreno y est inspirado en la misma filosofa que el
Convenio del Consejo de Europa. Cuando el EEG indag sobre el tema pendiente
de la ratificacin del Convenio, as como de la firma y posterior ratificacin de su
Protocolo Adicional, las autoridades expresaron su intencin de convertirse en
estados parte de dichos instrumentos, pero no se concret una fecha para ello. El
EEG recomienda proceder urgentemente a la ratificacin del Convenio Penal
contra la Corrupcin (ETS 173), as como a la firma y ratificacin de su
Protocolo Adicional (ETS 191). En este sentido, se quiere llamar la atencin
sobre el Llamamiento formal efectuado por el Comit de Ministros a los Estados,
durante su 103 Sesin Ministerial, en ocasin de la adopcin del texto del
Convenio Penal contra la Corrupcin (4 de noviembre de 1998), para que
limitaran en lo posible las reservas declaradas conforme al Convenio, cuando
expresaran su consentimiento a quedar obligados por el mismo. En esa misma
ocasin, el Comit de Ministros apel a aquellos Estados que a pesar de todo se
ven obligados a formular reservas, para que procuren por todos los medios
retirarlas lo antes posible. Las recomendaciones contenidas en los prrafos 93,
94, 95, 96 y 98 de este informe se hacen sin perjuicio del derecho que asiste a
Espaa a formular declaraciones y reservas de conformidad con el artculo 37 del
Convenio.

88. En Espaa, el marco legislativo que posibilita criminalizar los delitos de
corrupcin presenta algunas deficiencias importantes, cuyos detalles se
examinarn a continuacin. Adems, a pesar de las diferentes revisiones de las
pertinentes disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a los delitos de corrupcin y,
aunque se han logrado considerables mejoras- de las que se han hecho eco tanto
fuentes gubernamentales como no-gubernamentales con respecto, por ejemplo,
a la creacin de la Fiscala Especial contra la corrupcin y el crimen organizado
(y sus correspondientes unidades territoriales), da la impresin de que la
corrupcin sigue siendo un problema perceptible, especialmente a nivel local (en
cuestiones, por ejemplo, de ordenamiento urbano y concesin de licencias), y que
se necesita un esfuerzo mayor para reducir su incidencia de manera significativa.
Dicho esto, hay que admitir que un nmero no desdeable de casos se han
enjuiciado en Espaa en las dos ltimas dcadas sobre la base del Cdigo Penal
existente; los profesionales del derecho no slo han adquirido una buena
experiencia en este tipo de casos, sino que, de forma general y pragmtica,
tambin han hecho grandes aportaciones a la interpretacin de las disposiciones
penales en vigor. El posterior papel desempeado por el Tribunal Supremo a la
hora de ampliar y consolidar una interpretacin an ms flexible de las
disposiciones existentes sobre corrupcin (que en muchos casos va ms all de su
estricto sentido literal) ha permitido que prolifere la jurisprudencia en esta
materia. En este sentido, el EEG desea agradecer la valiosa contribucin aportada
por los profesionales del derecho entrevistados durante la visita de evaluacin,
quienes, con sus explicaciones, demostraron claramente su profundo
conocimiento de las disposiciones penales sobre corrupcin y de la
jurisprudencia al respecto fruto de su experiencia prctica procesando y
enjuiciando esta categora de delitos.

89. Por otra parte, el Cdigo Penal est siendo objeto de una revisin que incluye una
serie de cambios de gran calado en las disposiciones sobre corrupcin. El EEG
fue informado de que uno de los propsitos de dichos cambios es adaptar la
legislacin nacional a las exigencias internacionales/europeas en el mbito de la
lucha contra la corrupcin. Durante la visita, el EEG tuvo conocimiento, en
trminos generales, de varios acontecimientos que se esperaba tuvieran lugar en el
contexto de la reforma del Cdigo Penal prevista. Las autoridades proporcionaron
al EEG, despus de la visita, el texto de las modificaciones propuestas, que ha
sido esbozado en la parte descriptiva de este informe y que parece ir en la
direccin correcta. Sin embargo, puesto que el Parlamento an no ha aprobado
tales modificaciones, el presente informe slo puede basarse en la legislacin
vigente en el momento de la adopcin del informe. El EEG confa en que las
autoridades tendrn en cuenta los asuntos tratados en este informe y que stos se
vern reflejados prximamente en la reforma del Cdigo Penal en curso.

90. En lo que se refiere a la categora de personas incluidas en los delitos de
corrupcin/ trfico de influencias, se insisti repetidamente durante la visita que
el concepto de empleado pblico/autoridad definido en el artculo 24 del
Cdigo Penal (CP) es extremadamente amplio y flexible. El trmino autoridad
del Artculo 24(1) CP se refiere a los miembros de una corporacin, tribunal o
cualquier otro rgano colegiado que ejerza jurisdiccin propia (es decir, que
tenga la facultad oficial de tomar decisiones); la definicin incluye a los
miembros de las asambleas pblicas nacionales (que ejerzan tanto funciones
legislativas como administrativas) as como a los que desempeen funciones
jurdicas (incluidos los fiscales). Segn las explicaciones dadas al EEG, sobre la
base de numerosos ejemplos desarrollados por la jurisprudencia, la nocin de
empleado pblico definida en el artculo 24(2) CP comprendera a cualquier
persona que desempeara funciones pblicas tanto a nivel estatal como de
comunidad autnoma o local. A diferencia de otras reas del ordenamiento
jurdico, el concepto de empleado pblico en el derecho penal no requiere su
incorporacin o permanencia en el servicio pblico, sino, ms bien, su
participacin en la vida pblica, a cuyo acceso se puede llegar por una de las
tres formas previstas en la ley: por disposicin legal, por eleccin o por
nombramiento. Las autoridades resaltaron el hecho de que los tribunales han
venido interpretando el trmino empleado pblico de manera muy amplia
puesto que han llegado a la opinin de que lo importante en los delitos de
corrupcin es conseguir una eficaz proteccin de la funcin pblica, as como de
los intereses de la administracin pblica en sus diferentes facetas y modos de
funcionamiento. Por este motivo, muy diversas categoras de personas entraran
dentro de las disposiciones relativas a la corrupcin en el sector pblico. Se
incluira, por ejemplo, los examinadores del permiso de conducir, mdicos que
desempean funciones pblicas, empleados de empresas que proporcionan
servicios pblicos mediante concesin, empleados de empresas pblicas, etc. El
EEG aplaude este enfoque flexible y concluye que el concepto de empleado
pblico/autoridad tal y como se entiende en la legislacin penal y en la
jurisprudencia al respecto es conforme con el artculo 1(a) y (b) (empleado
pblico) y con el artculo 4 (miembros de asambleas pblicas nacionales) del
Convenio.

91. La definicin de los delitos relativos a la corrupcin en el sector pblico a nivel
nacional est contenida en los artculos 419, 420, 421, 425 y 426 CP referidos al
cohecho pasivo y en el artculo 423 que habla del cohecho activo. En relacin al
cohecho pasivo, hay cinco disposiciones centrales basadas en los diferentes tipos
de acciones/omisiones que se esperan del empleado pblico involucrado y en su
naturaleza lcita o ilcita. Si el empleado pblico realiza un acto contrario a la ley
o, por el contrario, omite llevar a cabo un acto al que est obligado debido a sus
funciones, el delito debe castigarse segn los artculos 419, 420 o 421 CP
(cohecho propio). Si acepta el soborno para realizar un acto que no est
prohibido legalmente, se aplicarn los artculos 425 o 426 CP (cohecho
impropio). La definicin bsica del delito de corrupcin est contenida en el
artculo 419 (acto criminal) y en los artculos 420 /421 CP (acto injusto/omisin
injusta) sobre cohecho pasivo como recompensa por un acto ilcito, donde se
incorporan los diferentes elementos constitutivos que el Convenio requiere, es
decir: criminalizacin de la solicitud o admisin, aceptacin de un ofrecimiento o
promesa, comisin directa o indirecta, beneficiarios (terceros incluidos),
intencin, actos/omisiones corruptos realizados en el ejercicio de funciones
oficiales. El EEG fue informado de que todas las dems disposiciones sobre
corrupcin y, en particular, los elementos constitutivos (que a veces no estn
sobre el papel) han de entenderse de conformidad con los artculos 410 y 420 CP;
las autoridades facilitaron abundante jurisprudencia que confirmaba esta
interpretacin in extenso. El EEG advirti que el Cdigo Penal espaol va ms
all de lo exigido por el Convenio puesto que tambin criminaliza la recepcin de
un beneficio despus de que el empleado pblico haya realizado el acto, sin
ofrecimiento, solicitud o aceptacin anterior, es decir, el denominado cohecho a
posteriori (cohecho subsiguiente). Con respecto al cohecho activo, el EEG
observa que no hay una definicin auto-determinante de cohecho activo en el
Cdigo Penal espaol; el cohecho activo del artculo 423 CP se considera una
falta sobre la base de las disposiciones correspondientes relativas al cohecho
pasivo. Esto, a su vez, ha generado mltiples discrepancias de interpretacin. Ha
habido mucho debate, por ejemplo, sobre si el artculo 423 CP tambin
contemplara los casos en que se ofrece un soborno a un empleado pblico por
actos que no suponen un incumplimiento del deber, tal y como se expone en los
artculos 425 y 426 CP; el derecho positivo y los profesionales del derecho
siempre han estado divididos a este respecto. El asunto parece haber quedado
zanjado mediante un nmero de decisiones del Tribunal Supremo donde se
confirmaba la aplicabilidad del artculo 423 CP (y, consecuentemente, del artculo
445 CP sobre corrupcin activa de empleados pblicos extranjeros en el contexto
de transacciones comerciales internacionales que se refiere al artculo 423 CP), no
slo a todas las conductas a las que se refieren los artculos 419-421 CP (actos
oficiales ilcitos; cohecho propio), sino tambin a las de los artculos 425 y 426
CP (actos oficiales lcitos; es decir, actos discrecionales; cohecho impropio).
Gran nmero de interlocutores sugirieron que las disposiciones sobre corrupcin
podran volver a estructurarse y redactarse de nuevo, a fin de crear un marco ms
sencillo y coherente; las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas van en esa
direccin puesto que clasifican los delitos de corrupcin pasiva en tres
disposiciones que tratan de actos oficiales ilcitos, actos oficiales lcitos y de las
situaciones donde se acepta el soborno en atencin al cargo del empleado publico,
y puesto que clasifica a todos ellos como delitos autnomos (detallando los
diferentes elementos constitutivos en cada caso). Al EEG slo le resta animar a
las autoridades a que continen con sus planes de simplificar la clasificacin de
los delitos de corrupcin y de armonizar su redaccin, puesto que con ello se
contribuir a reforzar la seguridad jurdica en relacin con los profesionales del
derecho y del pblico en general.

92. Con respecto a la ventaja indebida, las disposiciones pertinentes sobre corrupcin
se refieren a los trminos ddiva o presente, tanto debidos como indebidos, en
tanto en cuanto su aceptacin tiene relacin con la futura/pasada conducta del
empleado pblico. En cuanto a la naturaleza material/inmaterial de la ventaja, el
EEG se encontr con puntos de vista enfrentados durante la visita de evaluacin.
Aunque el concepto de ventaja (ddiva o presente) que aparece en las
disposiciones sobre corrupcin no excluye literalmente las ventajas inmateriales,
la determinacin de la sancin cundo sta consiste en una multa se basa en
su cuantificacin en trminos econmicos. Mientras algunos profesionales del
derecho consideraban que este asunto podra tener un mayor desarrollo mediante
la interpretacin de los tribunales, otros (incluido el mundo acadmico) sostenan
la opinin de que no se deberan incluir los beneficios no pecuniarios. El EEG
comprob numerosos ejemplos de ventajas inmateriales/intangibles, por ejemplo,
favores sexuales, ttulos honorficos, pertenencia a alguna red o club social
restringido, transferencias horizontales de puestos en una organizacin, etc., pero
no pudo obtener una respuesta inequvoca que viniera a confirmar que todas esas
ventajas estuvieran realmente contempladas en las disposiciones pertinentes.
Despus de la visita se facilitaron algunos ejemplos de decisiones sobre delitos de
corrupcin donde el soborno consista en favores sexuales. Para aclarar el asunto,
las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas introducen una definicin ms
amplia de la nocin de ventaja (ddiva, favor o recompensa de cualquier
naturaleza); de igual modo, la incorporacin de un sistema de multas mensuales
en el borrador elimina cualquier referencia a una valoracin puramente
econmica del soborno. El EEG aplaude este enfoque y, por lo tanto, recomienda
aclarar definitivamente que las ventajas inmateriales estn contempladas en
las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a corrupcin.

93. En cuanto a la dimensin internacional de la corrupcin, la corrupcin de
empleados pblicos extranjeros y de funcionarios de organismos internacionales
est definida como delito en una disposicin especfica; el artculo 445 CP. No
obstante, esta disposicin se limita al cohecho activo (por lo tanto, en el derecho
espaol no es posible procesar los delitos de corrupcin pasiva de empleados
pblicos extranjeros ni de funcionarios internacionales); y, dado que stos se
cometen en el contexto de transacciones comerciales internacionales, en realidad
no se estara conforme al Convenio cuyo mbito de aplicacin es mucho mayor.
A este respecto, aunque es posible que algunos casos de corrupcin
transfronteriza impliquen transacciones comerciales, hay situaciones donde este
delito no sera de aplicacin (por ejemplo, el soborno de un empleado de polica
de trfico extranjero para evitar pagar una multa). Por otra parte, no le qued
claro al EEG qu categoras de empleados pblicos extranjeros estaran
contempladas en el artculo 445 CP, puesto que las autoridades sealaron que la
definicin de empleado pblico contenida en el artculo 24 CP, no podra usarse a
ese respecto. Algunos interlocutores sugirieron que la definicin de empleado
pblico extranjero debera desarrollarse mediante la interpretacin de los
tribunales. Otros interlocutores arguyeron que el artculo 4(a) del Convenio de la
OCDE de lucha contra la corrupcin de empleados pblicos extranjeros en las
transacciones comerciales internacionales podra ser directamente aplicable.
Hasta el presente, no ha habido jurisprudencia que avale estos puntos de vista.
Para superar la presente incertidumbre terminolgica, las modificaciones del
Cdigo Penal propuestas incorporan una trasposicin literal de la definicin de
empleado pblico extranjero utilizada en el Convenio de la OCDE (y, por lo
tanto, incluira a cualquier persona que desempee un cargo legislativo,
administrativo o judicial en un pas extranjero, bien por nombramiento o por
eleccin; cualquier persona que ejerza una funcin pblica para un pas
extranjero, incluidos los organismos pblicos y las empresas pblicas; y cualquier
funcionario o empleado de un organismo internacional pblico). Finalmente, los
miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras no estn contemplados en las
disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a corrupcin. El mismo vaco existe con
respecto a la corrupcin de miembros de asambleas parlamentarias
internacionales aparte de los miembros del Parlamento Europeo, que s estn
expresamente contemplados en las disposiciones sobre corrupcin - y de los
jueces y empleados de tribunales internacionales, con la nica excepcin de
aquellos que sirven en la Corte Penal Internacional que podran ser sancionados
por delitos de corrupcin de conformidad con el artculo 471 bis del Cdigo
Penal. En base a todo lo anterior, el EEG recomienda (i) clarificar la nocin de
empleado pblico extranjero; (ii) ampliar el mbito de aplicacin del artculo
445 CP relativo a la corrupcin activa de empleados pblicos extranjeros y
funcionarios de organismos internacionales de forma que abarque no slo las
situaciones que impliquen transacciones comerciales internacionales; (iii)
criminalizar la corrupcin activa de empleados pblicos extranjeros y
funcionarios de organismos internacionales; y (iv) asegurar que se
criminaliza la corrupcin de miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras,
asambleas parlamentarias internacionales (aparte de los miembros del
Parlamento Europeo), as como la de jueces y empleados de tribunales
internacionales (adems de los que sirven en la Corte Penal Internacional).

94. Por lo que se refiere a los jurados y rbitros nacionales, estas categoras de
personas estn contempladas en el artculo 422 CP que se refiere expresamente a
los artculos 419, 420 y 421 CP para la corrupcin pasiva por actos oficiales
ilcitos. Por lo tanto, el artculo 422 CP no contempla situaciones donde estas
categoras de personas son sobornadas para cometer actos en el ejercicio de sus
funciones, que no suponen un incumplimiento del deber (actos discrecionales,
por ejemplo), segn lo establecido en los artculos 425 y 426 CP. Por otra parte,
la corrupcin activa de jurados y rbitros quedara fuera del mbito de aplicacin
del artculo 422 CP (puesto que no se hace mencin expresa al artculo 423 CP
en la lista de delitos aplicables del artculo 422 CP). Algunos interlocutores
arguyeron que la pertinente disposicin relativa a la corrupcin activa y pasiva
de empleados pblicos sera totalmente aplicable a los jurados y rbitros puesto
que se los considera empleados pblicos en el ejercicio de funciones pblicas. El
EEG encuentra difcil aceptar este razonamiento, especialmente debido a que
parece que el legislador espaol hubiera optado por regular la corrupcin de
jurados y rbitros mediante una disposicin especfica independiente en el
Cdigo Penal (el artculo 422). El EEG tambin apunta que, incluso si se
admitiera dicho razonamiento, la legislacin espaola no contemplara todo el
mbito de aplicacin del Convenio puesto que, por ejemplo, dejara fuera a los
rbitros que actan en base a un acuerdo de arbitraje entre particulares (arbitraje
comercial). Se expresaron puntos de vista contradictorios con respecto a este
ltimo asunto: las autoridades inicialmente indicaron que la corrupcin de
jurados y rbitros nacionales est tipificada como delito si se comete en el
ejercicio de funciones pblicas, pero no cuando slo estn colaborando en el
ejercicio de dichas funciones o cuando slo actan en el mbito de las relaciones
privadas; posteriormente, las autoridades arguyeron que tambin estaran
contemplados incluso los casos de arbitraje comercial. En aras de la seguridad
jurdica, el EEG considera que sera conveniente disponer de forma explcita la
criminalizacin de la corrupcin activa de jurados y rbitros nacionales.
Adems, la corrupcin de jurados y rbitros extranjeros no est especficamente
contemplada. No obstante, algunos interlocutores indicaron que no hay nada que
impida hacer una ms amplia interpretacin del concepto de rbitro/jurado del
artculo 422 CP de forma que incluya a personas extranjeras. Aaden, adems,
que, en el caso de los rbitros, tal interpretacin sera posible de conformidad
con la definicin de rbitro que se incluye en la Ley 60/2003 de Arbitraje, donde
se estipula que personas tanto nacionales como extranjeras pueden actuar como
rbitros. Estas opiniones no fueron unnimemente compartidas por los diferentes
representantes entrevistados por el EEG durante la visita de evaluacin y no hay
jurisprudencia que pueda aportar ms luz sobre esta cuestin. Por este motivo, el
EEG sigue sin estar convencido de que, con el actual marco legislativo, sea
posible imputar a estas categoras de personas delitos de corrupcin. Adems, el
EEG apunta que, con respecto a la aclaracin hecha por las autoridades en
relacin con los rbitros extranjeros, stos slo estaran incluidos en el caso en
que aplicaran la ley espaola. En vista de lo anterior, el EEG recomienda (i)
revisar el artculo 422 (corrupcin de jurados y rbitros) del Cdigo Penal
para asegurar que la criminalizacin de la corrupcin de jurados y rbitros
es conforme al Protocolo Adicional al Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin
(ETS 191); y (ii) criminalizar la corrupcin de rbitros y jurados
extranjeros. Esto, con toda seguridad, facilitara la ratificacin del Protocolo
Adicional al Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 191), segn lo
recomendado en el prrafo 87.

95. La corrupcin en el sector privado no est tipificada como delito en Espaa.
Desde el punto de vista del EEG es esencial criminalizar la corrupcin en el
sector privado de conformidad con los artculos 7 y 8 del Convenio puesto que
las funciones pblicas y privadas parecen interrelacionarse cada vez ms y cada
da resulta ms difusa la distincin entre estos sectores. Con respecto a esto, el
EEG reconoce el hecho, repetidamente subrayado por las autoridades, de que en
Espaa la nocin de empleados pblicos es de una naturaleza tan amplia que
incluye a muchas personas que, en la mayora de los dems pases, estaran
consideradas como pertenecientes al sector privado. Dicho esto, criminalizar la
corrupcin en el sector privado sigue siendo crucial, especialmente debido a que
esta forma de corrupcin puede causar importantes daos a la sociedad en su
conjunto dado el valor de las cantidades (y potenciales sobornos) que suelen
manejarse en las transacciones comerciales. Adems, el EEG advierte que las
modificaciones del Cdigo Penal propuestas introducen el delito de corrupcin
en el sector privado con el propsito de adaptarse a las exigencias de la UE que
emanan de la Decisin marco 2003/568/JAI del Consejo, de 22 de julio de 2003,
relativa a la lucha contra la corrupcin en el sector privado. El EEG aplaude la
intencin de las autoridades de regular esta rea y, por lo tanto, recomienda
criminalizar la corrupcin en el sector privado de conformidad con los
artculos 7 y 8 del Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 173).

96. El trfico de influencias est tipificado como delito en los artculos 428, 429 y
430 CP. Aun reconociendo la solidez del sistema espaol, segn lo desarrollado
por la jurisprudencia, con respecto al trfico de influencias (por ejemplo, la
posibilidad de sancin incluso en los casos en que no se ha ejercido la influencia,
la inclusin de la influencia tanto real como presunta), el EEG identific tres
deficiencias. En primer lugar, todos los interlocutores coincidieron en que,
aunque el concepto de ventaja indebida se describe en trminos ms amplios
que en lo que concierne a los delitos de corrupcin (la disposicin sobre trfico de
influencias se refiere a ddivas, presentes o cualquier otra remuneracin), por
lo general se entiende como cualquier ventaja (tanto debida como indebida) de
ndole econmica o que, al menos, pueda ser cuantificada en trminos
econmicos; sin embargo exista la duda de si incluira ventajas no materiales. Se
proporcionaron algunos ejemplos, despus de la visita, relativos a resoluciones
judiciales donde el beneficio consista en cierto tipo de ventajas no materiales,
como, por ejemplo, favores sexuales. En segundo lugar, el EEG observ que
mientras que el sistema penal espaol criminaliza el trfico de influencias pasivo,
no menciona ejemplos de trfico de influencias activo. A este respecto, da la
impresin de que las disposiciones del CP relativas al trfico de influencias estn
ms dirigidas a castigar el hecho de ejercer influencia, que el propio trfico de
influencias en s mismo. Concretamente, prometer, ofrecer u otorgar una ventaja
indebida a quien ejerce el trafico de influencias no est criminalizado como delito
principal. Las autoridades explicaron que, en principio, sera posible sancionar a
un individuo que prometiera, ofreciera u otorgara una ventaja indebida como
instigador, de conformidad con las normas generales sobre participacin
contenidas en el artculo 28 CP. El EEG observ, sin embargo, que, en ltima
instancia, no se cit ningn caso que ilustrara el enjuiciamiento de un delito de
trfico de influencias activo. A este respecto y, en opinin del EEG, el sistema
espaol se beneficiara, en trminos de seguridad jurdica, si el trfico de
influencias activo estuviera criminalizado como delito principal. En tercer lugar,
las disposiciones sobre trfico de influencias no son aplicables a los empleados
pblicos extranjeros, a los miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras, a los
funcionarios de organismos internacionales, a miembros de asambleas
parlamentarias internacionales, ni a jueces y empleados de tribunales
internacionales. En vista de las deficiencias identificadas en relacin con el trfico
de influencias, el EEG recomienda (i) criminalizar el trfico de influencias
activo como delito principal; (ii) criminalizar el trfico de influencias en
relacin con empleados pblicos extranjeros, miembros de asambleas
pblicas extranjeras, funcionarios de organismos internacionales, miembros
de asambleas parlamentarias internacionales y jueces y empleados de
tribunales internacionales; y (iii) aclarar definitivamente cuales son las
ventajas no materiales contempladas por las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal
relativas al trfico de influencias.

97. En Espaa, los tipos de sanciones para los delitos de corrupcin/trfico de
influencias incluyen: prisin, multas e inhabilitacin; el CP contempla su posible
acumulacin. La gravedad de las penas establecidas para la corrupcin en el
sector pblico depende de la naturaleza lcita/ilcita del acto del empleado pblico
sobornado. La sancin mxima aplicable para un delito de corrupcin es de seis
aos de prisin cuando la accin/omisin esperada por parte del empleado
pblico sea constitutiva de delito (artculo 419 CP). Cuando la accin esperada
sea un acto injusto, la mxima sancin ser la de cuatro aos de prisin
(artculo 420 CP). El EEG observ, sin embargo, que los artculos 421 (omisin
de actos inherentes a las funciones del empleado pblico), 425(1) (realizacin de
actos inherentes a las funciones del empleado pblico) y 426 CP (soborno
ofrecido en consideracin al cargo del empleado pblico o a fin de que realice un
acto lcito) no contemplan penas de prisin. Las infracciones de estas
disposiciones slo podrn ser sancionadas mediante multas e inhabilitacin
profesional. En lo referente al artculo 421 CP, en concreto, es cuestionable que
abstenerse de realizar un acto oficial requerido sea en verdad menos sancionable
que no ejecutar un acto oficial segn el artculo 420 CP. Los efectos perjudiciales
de los actos criminales pueden muy bien ser similares en estas diferentes
circunstancias. El EEG no logra comprender la razn por la que el legislador ha
optado por esta solucin. En general, la imposibilidad de sancionar la conducta a
la que se refieren los artculos 421, 425(1) y 426 CP con penas de prisin hace
que la extradicin sea imposible, puesto que, en Espaa, slo son susceptibles de
extradicin aquellos condenados a penas de, al menos, un ao de privacin de
libertad. El EEG recuerda que el artculo 19 del Convenio implica la obligacin
de atribuir a la comisin de delitos de corrupcin/trfico de influencias por parte
de personas fsicas penas de prisin de una cierta duracin que d lugar a
extradicin. Debe mencionarse que las modificaciones del Cdigo Penal
proponen un aumento de las penas mnimas de prisin aplicables a los delitos de
corrupcin, es decir, tres aos de prisin para los actos oficiales ilcitos (en lugar
de dos) y dos aos de prisin para actos oficiales lcitos (en lugar de uno o
ninguno). Esto posibilitara la extradicin en todos los casos relacionados con
delitos de corrupcin. Con respecto a las penas de prisin previstas para los
delitos de trfico de influencias, varan de seis meses a un ao. El EEG advierte
que las sanciones para el trfico de influencias son menores que las
correspondientes a otros delitos comparables en el derecho penal espaol (como
corrupcin en el sector pblico por actos ilcitos, fraude, malversacin de
caudales pblicos; ms detalles en los prrafos 30 y 33). Esto puede llevar a la
idea de que el trfico de influencias es un delito menos grave, lo que es contrario
a la intencin de aquellos que elaboraron el Convenio. Por este motivo, el EEG
tiene serias dudas sobre si las sanciones para el trfico de influencias pueden
considerarse efectivas, proporcionales y disuasorias en el sentido del Convenio.
En vista de lo anterior, el EEG recomienda (i) aumentar la sanciones para los
delitos de corrupcin de los artculos 421 (omisin de actos inherentes a las
funciones del empleado pblico), 425(1) (realizacin de actos inherentes a las
funciones del empleado pblico) y 426 (soborno ofrecido en consideracin al
cargo o para que el empleado pblico realice un acto lcito) con el fin de
garantizar que estos delitos puedan dar lugar a extradicin y (ii) aumentar
las sanciones para el trfico de influencias.

98. Los principios jurisdiccionales de territorialidad y nacionalidad son de aplicacin
para todos los delitos de corrupcin y de trfico de influencias, pero el artculo
23(2) de la Ley Orgnica del Poder Judicial exige que exista doble incriminacin
en el caso de los delitos cometidos en el extranjero por nacionales espaoles (o en
los que estn implicados nacionales espaoles). Esto significa que, en estos casos,
slo se podr enjuiciar si el acto estuviera tambin tipificado en el estado
extranjero, lo que supone una clara restriccin en comparacin con los requisitos
del artculo 17, prrafo 1, letra b) del Convenio. Dicho esto, el artculo 23(4)i de
la Ley Orgnica del Poder Judicial prev la abolicin del requisito de la doble
incriminacin en todos los tratados internacionales ratificados y promulgados por
Espaa. El EEG recomienda abolir el requisito de la doble incriminacin en
relacin con los delitos de corrupcin y trfico de influencias cometidos en el
extranjero. Tal y como se ha indicado anteriormente, el cumplimiento de esta
recomendacin sera automtico una vez ratificado el Convenio Penal sobre la
Corrupcin (ETS 173) y su Protocolo Adicional (ETS 191), de conformidad con
la recomendacin i (prrafo 87).

99. Finalmente, el EEG est preocupado por los posibles efectos de la eximente
especial de arrepentimiento del artculo 427 CP que exime de castigo al que
soborna en casos de corrupcin activa en el sector privado si (1) el soborno fue
solicitado; (2) el que soborna denuncia voluntariamente los hechos a la autoridad
encargada de investigarlos; y (3) la denuncia se efecta antes de transcurridos
diez das desde la fecha en ocurrieron los hechos. El EEG estudi con los
interlocutores entrevistados tanto las ventajas de las disposiciones sobre
arrepentimiento (la deteccin de casos de corrupcin) como los posibles riesgos
de su mala utilizacin (por ejemplo, chantajear a la persona sobornada, abusar de
una falsa eximente). El EEG fue informado de que, en la prctica y hasta el
presente, esta disposicin ha tenido poca relevancia como medio para descubrir
actos de corrupcin. Se les explic que el artculo 427 fue introducido en el
Cdigo Penal en 1995 como herramienta para atraer denuncias; sin embargo, las
autoridades opinaron que una fuente de informacin mucho ms eficaz y fiable
sobre los actos de corrupcin es la informacin proporcionada por los propios
empleados pblicos. Segn los interlocutores entrevistados, la disposicin slo se
ha utilizado una vez desde su creacin en 1995 (Sentencia del Tribunal Superior
de Justicia de Madrid de 29 de noviembre de 2006 confirmando la Sentencia de la
Audiencia Provincial de Madrid de 2 de marzo de 2006 donde se proporcionan
unas directrices para interpretar qu es lo que puede considerarse autoridad
encargada de la investigacin y los posibles canales para efectuar la denuncia).
Adems, algunos interlocutores sugirieron que el artculo 21(6) CP, que
proporciona una base legal para tomar en cuenta las confesiones y la reparacin
de los daos a la hora de dictar sentencias reducidas, es un camino ms prctico.
En opinin del EEG, el artculo 427 CP va demasiado lejos a la hora de eximir de
castigo al informante. En principio, casos muy serios de corrupcin activa podran
quedar totalmente impunes por referencia a este artculo. Existe el peligro de que
esta disposicin produzca resultados indeseados, puesto que el autor (el
responsable del cohecho activo) tendra en realidad el derecho legal a ser eximido
de castigo si se cumplen los muy estrictos y formales requisitos para ello; a
este respecto al EEG le preocupa la naturaleza automtica del eximente. Por otra
parte, parece que el artculo 427 CP es muy difcil de aplicar. Uno de los motivos
para ello es el requisito categrico de que la informacin ha de ser facilitada antes
de que hayan transcurrido diez das desde que ocurrieron los hechos. De las
discusiones mantenidas durante la visita, incluidas las mantenidas con los
profesionales del derecho que deben aplicar la ley, al EEG no le qued nada claro
que el artculo 427 CP, en su forma actual, suponga un valor aadido en la lucha
contra la corrupcin. El EEG, por lo tanto, recomienda someter a revisin la
aplicacin del artculo 427 CP sobre arrepentimiento a fin de determinar los
potenciales usos y abusos de este eximente en la investigacin y
enjuiciamiento de casos de corrupcin y, si es necesario, tomar las medidas
oportunas.


IV. CONCLUSIONES

100. Espaa no ha ratificado el Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 173),
tampoco ha firmado ni ratificado el Protocolo Adicional al Convenio Penal sobre
la Corrupcin (ETS 191). Esto sigue siendo una necesidad acuciante, a fin de
garantizar una criminalizacin coordinada de la corrupcin nacional e
internacional, segn lo prescrito por la Resolucin (97) 24 del Comit de
Ministros del Consejo de Europa relativa a los Principios Directores para la
Lucha contra la Corrupcin (Principio Director 2).

101. La incriminacin de la corrupcin y del trfico de influencias en el Cdigo Penal
espaol presenta algunas inconsistencias y deficiencias importantes en
comparacin con los criterios establecidos por el Convenio Penal sobre la
Corrupcin (ETS 173) y su Protocolo Adicional (ETS 191). Con respecto a la
corrupcin en el sector pblico, el complejo marco legal es especialmente
deficiente por lo que respecta a su dimensin internacional. De igual modo, hay
deficiencias en las disposiciones sobre trfico de influencias; por ejemplo, en las
normas actuales, el trfico de influencias activo no est tipificado como delito
principal. La corrupcin en el sector privado no est tipificada en absoluto; se
trata de una importante laguna puesto que este tipo de corrupcin puede causar
mucho dao a la sociedad en su conjunto debido al importe de las cantidades (y
potenciales sobornos) que se manejan en las transacciones comerciales. Por otra
parte, las sanciones previstas para los delitos de corrupcin y trfico de
influencias deben elevarse para poder dar lugar a extradicin. Finalmente, la
posibilidad que ofrece la eximente especial de arrepentimiento de eximir de
castigo a la persona que da un soborno siempre que ste haya sido solicitado por
el empleado pblico y lo denuncie antes de que se descubra, debe ser objeto de
revisin a fin de valorar sus posibilidades en cuanto a uso y abuso.

102. En los ltimos aos, a pesar de las diversas modificaciones que se han ido
introduciendo con los aos en las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a
delitos de corrupcin y a pesar de las grandes mejoras que ha supuesto la creacin
de la Fiscala Especial contra la corrupcin y el crimen organizado (y sus
correspondientes unidades territoriales), parece que la corrupcin sigue siendo un
problema evidente, especialmente a nivel local, y que son necesarios mayores
esfuerzos para reducir su incidencia de manera significativa. Dicho esto, hay que
admitir que en Espaa se ha enjuiciado un notable nmero de casos de
corrupcin; esto ha sido posible, en gran medida, por la proactiva actitud de
fiscales y jueces por igual, quienes han adquirido una amplia experiencia a la hora
de enjuiciar y juzgar este tipo de delitos y han contribuido a desarrollar una
jurisprudencia de mucho mayor alcance en esta materia. En este contexto
concreto y sobre la base de la experiencia lograda por los profesionales de
derecho que se han ocupado de los delitos de corrupcin, la reforma del Cdigo
Penal en curso, que incluye modificaciones en las disposiciones relativas a
corrupcin, resulta muy necesaria. El presente informe y sus recomendaciones
deben tomarse como una oportuna contribucin a este proceso de reforma.

103. En vista de lo expuesto anteriormente, el GRECO hace a Espaa las siguientes
recomendaciones:

i. proceder urgentemente a la ratificacin del Convenio Penal contra la
Corrupcin (ETS 173) as como a la firma y ratificacin de su Protocolo
Adicional (ETS 191) (prrafo 87);

ii. aclarar definitivamente que las ventajas inmateriales estn
contempladas en las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas a
corrupcin (prrafo 92);

iii. (i) clarificar la nocin de empleado pblico extranjero; (ii) ampliar el
mbito de aplicacin del artculo 445 CP relativo a la corrupcin activa
de empleados pblicos extranjeros y funcionarios de organismos
internacionales de forma que abarque no slo las situaciones que
impliquen transacciones comerciales internacionales; (iii) criminalizar
la corrupcin activa de empleados pblicos extranjeros y funcionarios
de organismos internacionales; y (iv) asegurar que se criminaliza la
corrupcin de miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras, asambleas
parlamentarias internacionales (aparte de los miembros del Parlamento
Europeo), as como la de jueces y empleados de tribunales
internacionales (adems de los que sirven en la Corte Penal
Internacional).(prrafo 93);

iv. (i) revisar el artculo 422 (corrupcin de jurados y rbitros) del Cdigo
Penal para asegurar que la criminalizacin de la corrupcin de jurados
y rbitros es conforme al Protocolo Adicional al Convenio Penal sobre la
Corrupcin (ETS 191); y (ii) criminalizar la corrupcin de rbitros y
jurados extranjeros (prrafo 94);

v. criminalizar la corrupcin en el sector privado de conformidad con los
artculos 7 y 8 del Convenio Penal sobre la Corrupcin (ETS 173)
(prrafo 95);

vi. (i) criminalizar el trfico de influencias activo como delito principal; (ii)
criminalizar el trfico de influencias en relacin con empleados pblicos
extranjeros, miembros de asambleas pblicas extranjeras, funcionarios
de organismos internacionales, miembros de asambleas parlamentarias
internacionales y jueces y empleados de tribunales internacionales; y
(iii) aclarar definitivamente cules son las ventajas no materiales
contempladas por las disposiciones del Cdigo Penal relativas al trfico
de influencias (prrafo 96);

vii. (i) aumentar la sanciones para los delitos de corrupcin de los artculos
421 (omisin de actos inherentes a las funciones del empleado pblico),
425(1) (realizacin de actos inherentes a las funciones del empleado
pblico) y 426 (soborno ofrecido en consideracin al cargo o para que el
empleado pblico realice un acto lcito) con el fin de garantizar que
estos delitos puedan dar lugar a extradicin y (ii) aumentar las
sanciones para el trfico de influencias (prrafo 97);

viii. abolir el requisito de la doble incriminacin en relacin con los delitos
de corrupcin y trfico de influencias cometidos en el extranjero (prrafo
98);

ix. someter a revisin la aplicacin del artculo 427 CP sobre
arrepentimiento a fin de determinar los potenciales usos y abusos de este
eximente en la investigacin y enjuiciamiento de casos de corrupcin y,
si es necesario, tomar las medidas oportunas (prrafo 99).

104. De conformidad con la Norma 30.2 del Reglamento de Procedimiento, el GRECO
invita a las autoridades espaolas a presentar un informe sobre el cumplimiento
de las recomendaciones mencionadas anteriormente, antes del 30 de noviembre
de 2010.

105. Finalmente, el GRECO invita a las autoridades espaolas a autorizar, lo antes
posible, la publicacin del informe, a traducir el informe a su idioma nacional y a
hacer pblica dicha traduccin.

Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING



Strasbourg, 8 October 2009 Public
Greco RC-II (2007) 10E
Addendum






Second Evaluation Round







Addendum
to the Compliance Report on Spain







Adopted by GRECO
at its 44
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 6-8 October 2009)
2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. GRECO adopted the Second Round Evaluation Report on Spain at its 23
rd
Plenary Meeting
(20 May 2005). This report Greco Eval II Rep (2004) 7E, which contains 6 recommendations
addressed to Spain, was made public on 5 July 2005.

2. Spain submitted the Situation Report required under the GRECO compliance procedure on
14 June 2007. On the basis of this report, and after a plenary debate, GRECO adopted the
Second Round Compliance Report (RC-Report) on Spain at its 34
th
Plenary Meeting
(19 October 2007). This last report was made public on 19 October 2007. The Compliance
Report (Greco RC-II (2007) 10E) concluded that recommendations iv and vi had been
implemented satisfactorily and recommendations i, ii, iii and v had been partly implemented;
GRECO requested additional information on their implementation. This information was provided
on 30 April 2009.

3. The purpose of this Addendum to the Second Round Compliance Report is, in accordance with
Rule 31, paragraph 9.1 of GRECO's Rules of Procedure, to appraise the implementation of
recommendations i, ii, iii and v in the light of the additional information referred to in paragraph 2.

II. ANALYSIS

Recommendation i.

4. GRECO recommended that a legal provision be introduced specifically providing for provisional
measures to be taken for the purpose of guaranteeing the effective confiscation of the proceeds
of corruption.

5. GRECO recalls that it was not sufficiently convinced at the time of adoption of the RC-report that
the reported measures concerning seizure guaranteed the effective confiscation of the proceeds
of corruption. It therefore assessed recommendation i as partly implemented.

6. The Spanish authorities now stress that the application of Article 127 of the Penal Code
(confiscation), in conjunction with Articles 334 to 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code (seizure)
allow judges, ex officio or upon request of the relevant prosecutor, to effectively seize corruption
proceeds. Even though, as recognised in the Second Round Evaluation Report, a specific
provision does not exist in the Penal Code tackling seizure in relation to corruption offences, as
may be the case in Article 374 of the Penal Code in so far as drug offences are concerned; this
has reportedly not hampered, in practice, the attachment of corruption proceeds at very early
stages of the investigation. Several examples of seizure orders (concerning the freezing of bank
accounts, the attachment of both tangible and intangible property, etc.) in ongoing cases are
furnished to support this point. The authorities further report on a number of legislative measures
introduced or ongoing to transpose the EU acquis in this area, which would allow for extended
confiscation and a certain apportionment of the burden of proof (for offences related to organised
crime), as well as a more effective execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or
evidence.

7. GRECO takes note of the explanations provided by the authorities; it would appear, from the
information submitted concerning the effective seizure of proceeds in corruption cases, that the
competent law enforcement authorities do not encounter any obstacle in practice to order, on the
3
basis of the available legislative tools at their disposal, preventive attachment, at early stages of
the investigation, to subsequently guarantee confiscation.

8. GRECO concludes that recommendation i has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation ii.

9. GRECO recommended to conduct a review of the legal provisions that provide the public with
rights to access Government information and the implementation practices that have been
developed to determine if the law(s) and/or current implementation practices are inappropriately
limiting the publics access to information that would help support the Government in its fight
against corruption.

10. GRECO recalls that, while acknowledging the steps taken in the area of e-government, it
concluded in the RC-report that, in the absence of concrete information as to implementation
practices concerning the right to access Government information, recommendation ii was partly
implemented.

11. The Spanish authorities recall the legislative provisions in this field, notably Article 105b of the
Constitution as well as Article 37 of Law 30/1992 on the Legal Regime governing Public
Administrations and Common Administrative Procedures. The authorities add that amendments
to the latter law are envisaged in order to improve access to information (e.g. by strengthening
internal control of public administration and thereby assessing denials or omissions to respond to
information requests, procedures based on communication rather than authorisation channels,
principle of silence consent, etc.). Likewise, in the framework of the Spanish Presidency of the
European Union in the first half of 2010, the authorities intend to further explore this matter in the
Councils Group on Transparency and Access to Documents; data is being gathered to assess
the implementation in practice of the relevant access to information provisions in Spanish
legislation.

12. GRECO can only conclude that very limited action has been taken to date to comply with
recommendation ii and takes note of the reported plans to carry out an assessment of the
implementation practices concerning the right to access Government information. GRECO is
hopeful that this survey will allow the identification of patterns, including by determining whether
the publics right to access information is being inappropriately limited in practice (at present,
access to information is subject to several conditions, including that of having a direct and
legitimate interest in the information being requested
1
) and by assessing which measures would
need to be developed to improve the current system. In this connection, GRECO wishes to draw
the attention of the Spanish authorities to the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official
Documents (CETS n 205), which sets forth some minimum standards to be applied in the
processing of requests for access to official documents and lays down a general right of access
to information. In particular, according to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the aforementioned
Convention, an applicant for an official document shall not be obliged to give reasons for having
access to the official document.

13. GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has been partly implemented.


1
For further details, see paragraphs 29, 45 and 46 of the Second Round Evaluation Report.
4
Recommendation iii.

14. GRECO recommended that a full evaluation of the effectiveness of the current system of
criminal/disciplinary sanctions that substitute for an enforceable code of conduct for public
officials/employees be conducted and that the study be made public. It recommended further that
Spain compile the current criminal/disciplinary provisions and make them available to public
officials and employees and publish the compilation for public information.

15. In its RC-report, GRECO welcomed the introduction of ethical guidance for high ranking members
of the Government, as well as the adoption of a common legal framework for public officials and
employees concerning their rights and duties. However, it noted that no steps had been taken to
conduct a full evaluation of the effectiveness of the system of criminal/disciplinary sanctions in
respect of misbehaviour of public officials/employees. Moreover, a compilation of the
criminal/disciplinary provisions in force had not been developed. Consequently, GRECO
assessed recommendation iii as partly implemented.

16. The Spanish authorities refer to Act 7/2007 on the Basic Statute of Public Employment, which
contains provisions on the types of misconduct that may give rise to disciplinary proceedings and
lays down procedural rules for disciplinary sanctions. Moreover, the General Secretariat for Public
Administration (Secretara General para la Administracin Pblica) issued a resolution on
21 June 2007 to provide additional interpretative guidance to the responsible human resources
services across public administration which are to apply the Basic Statute of Public Employment.
Further provisions, encompassing disciplinary sanctions when infringements occur, are laid out in
insofar conflicts of interest of members of the Government and high officials are concerned.
Finally, the authorities indicate that, in Spain, disciplinary powers rest both at central and
Autonomous Community levels; currently, the Autonomous Communities are in the process of
developing their corresponding disciplinary frameworks. For this reason, the authorities state that
the development of a compilation of the existing criminal/disciplinary provisions (in line with the
last part of recommendation iii) depends on the completion of the relevant regulatory action being
taken at Autonomous Community level.

17. The authorities also refer to a number of training seminars provided for public officials in 2009,
which deal, specifically, with ethics within public administration, including practical examples on
corruption risks, good practice and malpractice in the public sector, situations giving rise to
conflicts of interest, misconduct and applicable (disciplinary/penal) sanctions in case of
infringements. The authorities add that training on deontological principles within public
administration is an ongoing exercise intended to better address the concerns raised by
recommendation iii, notably, by increasing awareness of public officials and employees as to their
obligations and the sanctions that may apply in the event of breaches of the relevant
administrative/penal provisions in this area.

18. GRECO welcomes the efforts made by the authorities to raise awareness on, and thereby
promote, ethical principles within public administration. GRECO nevertheless notes that a full
evaluation of the effectiveness of the current system of criminal/disciplinary sanctions in respect
of misbehaviour of public officials/employees has not been conducted. Moreover, a general
written compilation of the existing criminal and disciplinary standards is yet to be developed.

19. GRECO concludes that recommendation iii has been partly implemented.

5
Recommendation v.

20. GRECO recommended 1) to introduce an adequate system of liability of legal persons for acts of
corruption, including effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, and subsequently, 2) to
consider to establish a registry of legal persons which have been subject to corporate sanctions.

21. GRECO recalls that it concluded in the RC-report that the recommendation was partly
implemented since the reported legislative initiatives to introduce corporate liability for acts of
corruption had not been adopted. GRECO also urged the authorities to give consideration to the
establishment of a registry of convicted legal persons.

22. The Spanish authorities report that, due to the dissolution of Parliament preceding the last
general elections in March 2007, the adoption of the draft amendments to the Penal Code is still
pending. In this connection, on 14 November 2008, the Council of Ministers passed the Draft
Organic Bill on the Reform of the Penal Code; the aforementioned draft was then transmitted to
the General Council of the Judiciary and the Attorney Generals Office for comments and is now
to be sent to the Council of State. The Draft Bill contains provisions allowing the establishment of
corporate criminal liability for a numerus clausus of offences, which include corruption-related
offences. In particular, legal persons (companies, associations and foundations) can be held
liable for crimes committed, on their behalf or for their benefit, by any natural person, who has a
leading position within the legal person, based on a power of representation of the legal person;
or the authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or the authority to exercise control
within the legal person. Corporate criminal liability would also apply in those cases where lack of
supervision within the legal person makes it possible to commit the offence. Liability of the legal
person does not exclude criminal liability of the physical perpetrator. Sanctions for corruption-
related offences include fines (which may be increased depending on the financial advantage
gained or intended to be gained through the criminal act), dissolution of the legal person,
suspension of its activities for a maximum period of five years, winding-up of the legal entity for a
maximum period of five years, permanent or temporary prohibitions for up to 10 years on
activities similar to those that gave rise to the conviction, exclusion from public tender procedures,
etc.

23. GRECO takes note of the draft amendments to the Penal Code designed to introduce corporate
liability. In this connection, it is obvious that the adoption of the aforementioned amendments is
taking longer than initially expected; it is to be hoped that the process will be promptly concluded,
so that the reported legislative initiatives become enforceable measures in this area of concern.
Moreover, once the draft amendments are effectively adopted, active consideration should be
given to the establishment of a registry of legal persons which have been subject to corporate
sanctions.

24. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has been partly implemented.

III. CONCLUSION

25. In addition to the conclusions contained in the Second Round Compliance Report on Spain and in
view of the above, GRECO concludes that recommendation i has been dealt with in a satisfactory
manner; recommendations ii, iii and v remain partly implemented. With the adoption of this
Addendum to the Second Round Compliance Report, GRECO concludes that out of the six
recommendations issued to Spain, half of them have been implemented or dealt with in a
satisfactory manner. GRECO urges the authorities to increase the transparency and
6
accountability of public administration, in particular, by reviewing the existing provisions on
access to information and the corresponding implementation practice, as well as by assessing the
effectiveness of the criminal and disciplinary sanctions in the public service. Furthermore,
GRECO hopes that the envisaged amendments to the Penal Code, providing, inter alia, for a
system of liability of legal persons for acts of corruption, will be promptly adopted.

26. The adoption of this Addendum to the Compliance Report concludes the Second Evaluation
Round compliance procedure concerning Spain. The authorities of Spain may, however, wish to
inform GRECO of further developments with regard to the implementation of recommendations ii,
iii and v.

27. Finally, GRECO invites the Spanish authorities to authorise, as soon as possible, the publication
of the Addendum, to translate it into the national language and to make the translation public.
Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING



Strasbourg, 19 October 2007 Public
Greco RC-II (2007) 10E






Second Evaluation Round







Compliance Report
on Spain







Adopted by GRECO
at its 34
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 16-19 October 2007)

2
|. |NTR00U6T|0N

1. 0REC0 adopled lre 3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or Reporl or 3pa|r al |ls 23
rd
P|erary Veel|rg (20
Vay 2005). Tr|s reporl (0reco Eva| ll Rep (2001) ZE) Was rade puo||c oy 0REC0, lo||oW|rg
aulror|sal|or oy lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r, or 5 Ju|y 2005.

2. lr accordarce W|lr Ru|e 30.2 ol 0REC0's Ru|es ol Procedure, lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r suor|lled
lre|r 3|lual|or Reporl (R3-Reporl) or lre reasures la|er lo |rp|ererl lre recorrerdal|ors or
11 Jure 200Z.

3. Al |ls 2
lr
P|erary Veel|rg (5-9 0eceroer 2005), 0REC0 se|ecled, |r accordarce W|lr Ru|e 31.1
ol |ls Ru|es ol Procedure, Po|ard ard Porluga| lo appo|rl Rapporleurs lor lre corp||arce
procedure. Tre Rapporleurs appo|rled Were Vr Cezary V|cra|czu| or oera|l ol Po|ard ard
Vr Jorge Verezes Fa|cao or oera|l ol Porluga|. Tre Rapporleurs Were ass|sled oy lre 0REC0
3ecrelar|al |r drall|rg lre Corp||arce Reporl (RC-Reporl).

1. Tre oojecl|ve ol lre RC-Reporl |s lo assess lre reasures la|er oy lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r, lo
corp|y W|lr lre recorrerdal|ors corla|red |r lre Eva|ual|or Reporl.

||. ANALY8|8

5. ll Was reca||ed lral 0REC0 |r |ls eva|ual|or reporl addressed s|x recorrerdal|ors lo 3pa|r.
Corp||arce W|lr lrese recorrerdal|ors |s dea|l W|lr oe|oW.

Recommendat|on |.

. SRE0D recommenoeo rnar a |ega| prov|s|on oe |nrroouceo spec|l|ca||, prov|o|ng lor prov|s|ona|
measures ro oe raken lor rne purpose ol guaranree|ng rne ellecr|ve conl|scar|on ol rne proceeos
ol corrupr|on.

Z. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r slress lral lre Cr|r|ra| Code |rc|udes a gerera| prov|s|or or
corl|scal|or, |.e. Arl|c|e 12Z, lral |s app||cao|e lo a|| ||rds ol cr|re, |rc|ud|rg lrose re|aled lo
corrupl|or. Trey re|lerale lral dela||ed |ega| prov|s|ors corcerr|rg lre se|zure ard raragererl
ol se|zed assels are |a|d doWr |r Arl|c|es 331 lo 338 ol lre Code ol Cr|r|ra| Procedure. lr
add|l|or, lre 3lale Allorrey 0erera| ras |ssued lWo c|rcu|ars (1/2005 ard 2/2005), Wr|cr prov|de
lurlrer |rlerprelal|or ol lre |ega| prov|s|ors goverr|rg corl|scal|or. lr lre lrareWor| ol severa|
or-go|rg corrupl|or-re|aled cases (e.g. Dperac|on Va|a,a) prov|s|ora| reasures rave oeer
la|er al ear|y slages ol |rvesl|gal|or; lrese reasures |rc|ude lreez|rg ol oar| accourls ol oolr
prys|ca| ard |ega| persors, se|zure ol larg|o|e ard |rlarg|o|e properly, elc.

8. Furlrerrore, |r lre lrareWor| ol lre orgo|rg relorr ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code
1
, arerdrerls rave
oeer rade lo Arl|c|e 12Z lo |rlroduce exlerded corl|scal|or ard lre poss|o|||ly ol r|l|gal|rg lre
orus ol prool regard|rg lre source ol assels re|d oy a persor corv|cled ol ar ollerce re|aled lo
orgar|sed cr|re. lr lr|s corlexl, |l |s cors|dered lral ary properly, lre va|ue ol Wr|cr |s
d|sproporl|orale lo lre |aWlu| |rcore ol lre corv|cled persor, der|ves lror orgar|sed cr|r|ra|
acl|v|ly. Tre ourder Wou|d lrerelore oe or lre ollerder lo derorslrale lral lre assels Were
oola|red |aWlu||y Wr||e oe|rg |rvo|ved |r lre acl|v|l|es ol lre cr|r|ra| orgar|sal|or.

1
0rall LaW ol 15 Jaruary 200Z or arerdrerls lo lre Cr|r|ra| Code (80E, No. 119-1).
3
9. F|ra||y, lre recerl|y adopled LaW 21/200Z arerd|rg lre 3lalule ol lre 3lale Allorrey
2
re|rlorces
lre ro|e ol lre 3pec|a| Allorrey 0erera|'s 0ll|ce lor lre Repress|or ol Ecoror|c 0llerces re|aled
lo Corrupl|or, Wr|cr crarges |ls rare lo Prosecul|or 0ll|ce lor lre Repress|or ol Corrupl|or ard
0rgar|sed Cr|re |r lre ||grl ol |ls exlerded corpelerces |r correcl|or W|lr orgar|sed cr|re.

10. 0REC0 la|es role ol lre |rlorral|or prov|ded corcerr|rg corl|scal|or, sore ol Wr|cr rad
a|ready oeer la|er |rlo accourl Wrer adopl|rg lre 3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or Reporl. 0REC0
We|cores lre erv|saged arerdrerls re|al|rg lo exlerded corl|scal|or ard lre apporl|orrerl ol
lre ourder ol prool |r lrose cases Wrere lre perpelralor |s parl ol a cr|r|ra| orgar|sal|or.
0REC0 |s a|so p|eased lo |earr lral lre 3lale Allorrey 0erera| ras |ssued lurlrer gu|darce or
lre use ol corl|scal|or.

11. loWever, 0REC0 |s rol corv|rced lral lre reasures relerred lo aoove sull|c|erl|y address lre
corcerr expressed |r recorrerdal|or |. 0REC0 reca||s lral lre 3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or
Reporl roled lre co-ex|slerce ol ru|l|p|e prov|s|ors, Wr|cr are d|spersed |r d|llererl |ega|
|rslrurerls, dea||rg W|lr se|zure deperd|rg or lre ralure ol lre assels. 0REC0 a|so po|rled al
lre spec|l|c prov|s|or corla|red |r Arl|c|e 3Z1, paragrapr 1.2 ol lre Cr|r|ra| Code a||oW|rg
prov|s|ora| reasures lo oe la|er al ear|y slages ol lre |rvesl|gal|or |r order lo guararlee lre
ellecl|veress ol a corl|scal|or order |r re|al|or lo drug re|aled ollerces. Al lre l|re ol lre
adopl|or ol lre 3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or Reporl, 0REC0 loo| lre v|eW lral lre |rlroducl|or ol a
s|r||ar prov|s|or |r lre corlexl ol corrupl|or-re|aled ollerces cou|d prove va|uao|e |r lurlrer
lac|||lal|rg ard oeller guararlee|rg lre ellecl|ve corl|scal|or ol corrupl|or proceeds. Tr|s corcerr
|s sl||| va||d.

12. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or | ras oeer parl|y |rp|ererled.

Recommendat|on ||.

13. SRE0D recommenoeo ro conoucr a rev|eu ol rne |ega| prov|s|ons rnar prov|oe rne puo||c u|rn
r|gnrs ro access Sovernmenr |nlormar|on ano rne |mp|emenrar|on pracr|ces rnar nave oeen
oeve|opeo ro oererm|ne |l rne |au{sj ano/or currenr |mp|emenrar|on pracr|ces are |nappropr|are|,
||m|r|ng rne puo||cs access ro |nlormar|on rnar uou|o ne|p supporr rne Sovernmenr |n |rs l|gnr
aga|nsr corrupr|on.

11. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r re|lerale lral lre r|grl lo access adr|r|slral|ve docurerls |s ersrr|red |r
Arl|c|e 105 o ol lre Corsl|lul|or ard deve|oped |r Arl|c|es 35 ard 3Z ol LaW 30/1992 or lre Lega|
Reg|re goverr|rg Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors ard Corror Adr|r|slral|ve Procedures. Furlrer
reasures are |r lre process ol oe|rg |rlroduced lo |rcrease lre lrarsparercy ard ell|c|ercy ol
puo||c adr|r|slral|or, |rc|ud|rg lre prorol|or ard |rp|ererlal|or ol lre corcepl ol e-goverrrerl
al a|| |eve|s (cerlra|, Aulororous Corrur|l|es, rur|c|pa||l|es). lr lr|s corlexl, LaW 11/200Z ol
22 Jure or E|eclror|c Access ol C|l|zers lo Puo||c 3erv|ces eslao||sres a reW calegory ol
c|l|zer's r|grls, lre so-ca||ed 'd|g|la| r|grls. Tre alorererl|ored |aW a||oWs c|l|zers lo access oy
e|eclror|c rears a|| lre serv|ces de||vered oy puo||c adr|r|slral|ors ard oo||ges a|| puo||c
adr|r|slral|ors lo sel up lre crarre|s ard rears lo guararlee sucr e|eclror|c access.
Voreover, lre V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or ras crealed NelWor| 00, Wr|cr erao|es lre
|rleracl|or ol c|l|zers W|lr puo||c adr|r|slral|or |r lrree d|llererl Ways: over 2,800 |rlorral|or
po|rls, rore lrar 500 Weos|les, ard 1,000 le|eprore ||res. Tre lrlerrel porla| ol NelWor| 00
3
,
Wr|cr corpr|ses a c|l|zer ard a ous|ress secl|or, preserls |rlorral|or or adr|r|slral|ve

2
LaW 21/200Z arerd|rg 'lre 3lalule ol lre 3lale Allorrey (80E, No. 213)
3
WWW.00.es
1
procedures (e.g. puo||c erp|oyrerl, scro|arsr|ps, grarls ard suos|d|es elc). ll a|so prov|des a
lorur lor puo||c corsu|lal|or ard d|scuss|or ol |eg|s|al|or ard adr|r|slral|ve dec|s|ors urder
preparal|or (e.g. uroar p|arr|rg, erv|rorrerl elc).

15. 0REC0 la|es role ol lre reasures reporled |r lre area ol e-goverrrerl, Wr|cr are u|l|rale|y
geared loWards |rcreas|rg lrarsparercy ard ell|c|ercy ol puo||c adr|r|slral|or. Tre orgo|rg
deve|oprerls |r lre area ol e-goverrarce, |r parl|cu|ar, lre lrareWor| prov|ded oy LaW 11/200Z
or E|eclror|c Access ol C|l|zers lo Puo||c 3erv|ces, are pos|l|ve sleps lo |rlroduce a rore
proacl|ve |rlorral|or po||cy Wr|cr errarces access lo puo||c |rlorral|or.

1. loWever, 0REC0 reca||s |ls corcerr lral a rarroW |rlerprelal|or ol lre |ega| prov|s|ors
address|rg lre re|ease ol 0overrrerl adr|r|slral|ve |rlorral|or (rare|y, Arl|c|es 35 ard 3Z ol
LaW 30/1992 or lre Lega| Reg|re goverr|rg Puo||c Adr|r|slral|ors ard Corror Adr|r|slral|ve
Procedures) Wou|d rarper lre oola|r|rg ol |rlorral|or lral |s rol a parl ol spec|l|c adr|r|slral|ve
proceed|rgs or s|rp|y gerera| adr|r|slral|ve |rlorral|or (3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or Reporl,
page 15, paragraprs 15 ard 1). lr lr|s parl|cu|ar corlexl, 0REC0 roles lral ro corcrele acl|or
ras oeer urderla|er lo address lre suoslarce ol lre recorrerdal|or, |.e. |r parl|cu|ar, lo
corducl a rev|eW ol lre |rp|ererlal|or pracl|ces corcerr|rg lre r|grl lo access 0overrrerl
|rlorral|or lo delerr|re Wrelrer lre |ega| prov|s|ors are read |r a reslr|cl|ve rarrer ard,
lrerelore, lre c|l|zers' r|grl lo access puo||c |rlorral|or |s oe|rg ||r|led |r pracl|ce. 0REC0
Wou|d rave We|cored rore corcrele |rlorral|or (e.g. cases ol der|a|s ol requesls lor
|rlorral|or) |r order lo oe ao|e lo lorr a c|ear v|eW regard|rg lre |rp|ererl|rg pracl|ces ol lre
0overrrerl. 0r lre oas|s ol lre |rlorral|or al |ls d|sposa|, 0REC0 cors|ders lral lre corcerrs
expressed |r |ls 3ecord Rourd Eva|ual|or rave rol yel oeer lu||y addressed.

1Z. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or || ras oeer parl|y |rp|ererled.

Recommendat|on |||.

18. SRE0D recommenoeo rnar a lu|| eva|uar|on ol rne ellecr|veness ol rne currenr s,srem ol
cr|m|na|/o|sc|p||nar, sancr|ons rnar suosr|rure lor an enlorceao|e cooe ol conoucr lor puo||c
oll|c|a|s/emp|o,ees oe conoucreo ano rnar rne sruo, oe maoe puo||c. lr recommenoeo lurrner rnar
$pa|n comp||e rne currenr cr|m|na|/o|sc|p||nar, prov|s|ons ano make rnem ava||ao|e ro puo||c
oll|c|a|s ano emp|o,ees ano puo||sn rne comp||ar|on lor puo||c |nlormar|on.

19. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r reporl lral Acl Z/200Z or lre 8as|c 3lalule ol Puo||c Erp|oyrerl Was
adopled or 12 Apr|| 200Z. lls scope ol app||cal|or covers oolr puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees
r|red urder corlracl. ll |rc|udes prov|s|ors dea||rg W|lr recru|lrerl ard proless|ora| career
advarcererl, r|grls ard oo||gal|ors, corl||cls ol |rleresl, acceplarce ol g|lls, |r|l|a| ard orgo|rg
lra|r|rg, d|sc|p||rary reasures elc. lr parl|cu|ar, T|l|e lll, Crapler vl or 0ul|es ol puo||c oll|c|a|s
ard erp|oyees - Code ol Elr|cs, |s exc|us|ve|y devoled lo lre elr|ca| slardards, Wr|cr are lo oe
lo||oWed Wrer carry|rg oul puo||c lurcl|ors (|rparl|a||ly, puo||c accourlao|||ly, ror-d|scr|r|ral|or,
ell|c|ercy, proless|ora| |oya|ly elc). T|l|e vll spec|l|es lre lypes ol r|scorducl lral ray g|ve r|se
lo d|sc|p||rary proceed|rgs ard |ays doWr procedura| ru|es lor d|sc|p||rary acl|or.

20. lr add|l|or, a Code ol 0ood 0overrarce ol Veroers ol lre 0overrrerl ard l|gr 0ll|c|a|s W|lr|r
lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or Was adopled or Z Varcr 2005. ll app||es lo a|| reroers ol lre
0overrrerl, 3ecrelar|es ol 3lale ard ary olrer r|gr-rar||rg oll|c|a|s |r puo||c adr|r|slral|or, as
We|| as pres|derls, d|reclors ard raragers ol puo||c erl|l|es. ll a|rs al eslao||sr|rg c|oser l|es
oelWeer lre c|l|zers ard lre 0overrrerl (|r parl|cu|ar r|grer pos|l|ors W|lr|r lre 0overrrerl)
5
oy prorol|rg: (|) |rdeperdercy (corl||cl ol |rleresls' saleguards, |rc|ud|rg reslr|cl|ors corcerr|rg
para||e| pr|vale acl|v|l|es, pror|o|l|or lo accepl g|lls, elc); (||) lrarsparercy (e.g. oo||gal|or lo
prorpl|y rep|y lo c|l|zers' requesls lor |rlorral|or); ard (|||) |ega| equa||ly (e.g. relusa| ol
pr|v||eged lrealrerl, |rc|ud|rg suppress|or ol rororary l|l|es lo or|rg reroers ol lre puo||c
adr|r|slral|or c|oser lo lre puo||c). Tre V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or |s lo reporl arrua||y lo
lre Courc|| ol V|r|slers corcerr|rg lre |rp|ererlal|or ol lre Code ol 0ood 0overrarce,
|rc|ud|rg polerl|a| |rlr|rgererls ol |ls elr|ca| pr|rc|p|es, |r order lo ascerla|r lre reasors lor sucr
oreacres ard suosequerl|y lo propose ellecl|ve Ways lo ersure a correcl lurcl|or|rg ol lre
sysler. Tre V|r|slry ol Puo||c Adr|r|slral|or ras |rd|caled lral |l ras rol yel reporled or
|rp|ererlal|or ol lre Code ol 0ood 0overrarce, s|rce ro |rlr|rgererl ol |ls prov|s|ors ras
oeer delecled lo dale.

21. Tre alore-rerl|ored |ega| |rslrurerls rave oeer/are |r lre process ol oe|rg proroled lrrougr
d|llererl crarre|s: puo||cal|or |r lre 0ll|c|a| Jourra|, corlererces ard syrpos|a, press re|eases,
largeled lra|r|rg everls, elc.

22. 0REC0 We|cores lre |rlroducl|or ol elr|ca| gu|darce lor r|gr rar||rg reroers ol lre
0overrrerl |r lre perlorrarce ol lre|r dul|es. ll lurlrer ac|roW|edges lre pos|l|ve deve|oprerls
reporled lo prov|de a corror ard corso||daled lrareWor| lor puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees
corcerr|rg lre|r respors|o|||l|es ard r|grls, as We|| as lre d|sc|p||rary acl|or lral lo||oWs
r|soerav|our. Trese are oolr sleps |r lre r|grl d|recl|or lor Wr|cr lre aulror|l|es rusl oe
correrded. 0REC0 reverlre|ess reca||s lral |r |ls 3ecord Eva|ual|or Rourd Reporl, |l po|rled
oul lre reed lo deve|op ard W|de|y d|sser|rale a gerera| Wr|ller corp||al|or ol lre cr|r|ra| ard
d|sc|p||rary slardards. 0REC0 |s ol lre op|r|or lral sucr a corp||al|or Wou|d prove oerel|c|a| |r
order lo reel 0u|d|rg Pr|rc|p|e 10 ard |r parl|cu|ar, lo eslao||sr srared expeclal|ors oelWeer
lrose |r lre puo||c serv|ce ard lre puo||c lrey serve regard|rg lre elr|ca| slardards lo oe
lo||oWed, W|lr a v|eW lo slrerglrer|rg c|l|zers' corl|derce |r puo||c adr|r|slral|or. Tr|s corcerr
ras rol yel oeer addressed.

23. Voreover, 0REC0 roles lral ro sleps rave oeer la|er lo corducl a lu|| eva|ual|or ol lre
ellecl|veress ol lre sysler ol cr|r|ra|/d|sc|p||rary sarcl|ors |r respecl ol r|soerav|our ol puo||c
oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees as recorrerded. 0REC0 cors|ders lral sucr ar eva|ual|or |s sl||| perl|rerl
|r lre lrareWor| ol lre recerl|y |rlroduced |ega| lrareWor| lor puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees as
|l W||| erao|e lo |derl|ly |r ar oojecl|ve ard prec|se rarrer polerl|a| Wea|resses ard proo|ers
lral ray ex|sl |r corcrele spreres ol puo||c adr|r|slral|or. Tre reed lo ara|yse lrerds |r lre
lypes ol |rappropr|ale oerav|our ard lo see| crarre|s lor correcl|ve acl|or ras so lar or|y oeer
addressed W|lr respecl lo r|gr-rar||rg reroers ol lre 0overrrerl lrrougr lre reporl|rg
recrar|srs eslao||sred oy lre Code ol 0ood 0overrarce, a|lrougr lre sysler ras rol yel
oeer lesled.

21. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or ||| ras oeer parl|y |rp|ererled.

Recommendat|on |v.

25. SRE0D recommenoeo rnar cons|oerar|on oe g|ven ro oralr|ng gu|oe||nes lor puo||c
oll|c|a|s/emp|o,ees aooress|ng s|ruar|ons unere |nreresrs or acr|v|r|es ol rne puo||c
oll|c|a|/emp|o,ee are nor pron|o|reo our ma, sr||| creare a conl||cr ol |nreresr u|rn n|s/ner acrua|
our|es ano respons|o|||r|es.


2. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r slale lral lre 8as|c 3lalule ol Puo||c Erp|oyrerl |rc|udes gu|darce lor
puo||c oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees corcerr|rg s|lual|ors lral ray creale a corl||cl ol |rleresl |r puo||c
serv|ce. For exarp|e, |l |s recorrerded lral puo||c oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees relra|r lror
acl|rg/dec|d|rg |r ary raller Wrere lrey ray ro|d a persora| or lar|||a| |rleresl ard, lrerelore,
lre|r |rparl|a||ly cou|d oe ca||ed |rlo quesl|or. Puo||c oll|c|a|s/erp|oyees rusl rol accepl g|lls
(olrer lrar soc|a||y or cuslorar||y acceplao|e g|lls), lavours or serv|ces |r advarlageous
cord|l|ors, Wr|cr ray |rl|uerce lre perlorrarce ol lre|r puo||c lurcl|ors.

2Z. Furlrerrore, LaW 5/200 or Corl||cls ol lrleresl ol Veroers ol lre 0overrrerl ard l|gr
0ll|c|a|s W|lr|r lre 0erera| 3lale Adr|r|slral|or |rc|udes dela||ed prov|s|ors lo preverl s|lual|ors
lral ray g|ve r|se lo corl||cls ol |rleresl. Trese |rc|ude recusa| ard roul|re W|lrdraWa| lror
puo||c duly Wrerever lrere |s a polerl|a| corl||cl ol |rleresl, ||r|lal|ors lo ergage |r cerla|r lypes
ol acl|v|l|es or ro|d|rg cerla|r pos|l|ors |r lre pr|vale seclor lral ray g|ve r|se lo a polerl|a|
corl||cl ol |rleresl, aoso|ule reslr|cl|or or arc|||ary erp|oyrerl, dec|aral|ors ol persora| |rcore
ard assels, dec|aral|ors ol pr|vale |rleresls, reslr|cl|ors ard corlro| ol posl-erp|oyrerl ous|ress
acl|v|l|es (lWo-year 'coo||rg-oll per|od), pror|o|l|or lo accepl g|lls, elc. 3arcl|ors lor
|rlr|rgererls ol lre |aW rarge lror repr|rard, suspers|or ol sa|ary ard oars or ro|d|rg a puo||c
pos|l|or lor a per|od ol 5 lo 10 years lo d|sr|ssa|. Voreover, ous|ress corlraclors Wro r|re a
lorrer r|gr-rar||rg oll|c|a| dur|rg lre lWo-year 'coo||rg-oll per|od cou|d oe oarred lror puo||c
procurererl procedures.

28. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or |v ras oeer |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y.

Recommendat|on v.

29. SRE0D recommenoeo 'j ro |nrroouce an aoequare s,srem ol ||ao|||r, ol |ega| persons lor acrs ol
corrupr|on, |nc|uo|ng ellecr|ve, proporr|onare ano o|ssuas|ve sancr|ons, ano suosequenr|,, 2j ro
cons|oer ro esrao||sn a reg|srr, ol |ega| persons un|cn nave oeen suoecr ro corporare sancr|ons.

30. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r reporl lral arerdrerls lo lre Cr|r|ra| Code rave oeer proposed W|lr a
v|eW lo eslao||sr|rg corporale cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly lor a numerus c|ausus ol ollerces, Wr|cr |rc|ude
corrupl|or-re|aled ollerces. lr parl|cu|ar, a reW Arl|c|e 31 o|s ro|ds |ega| persors (corpar|es,
assoc|al|ors ard lourdal|ors) ||ao|e lor cr|res corr|lled, or lre|r oera|l or lor lre|r oerel|l, oy
ary ralura| persor, Wro ras a |ead|rg pos|l|or W|lr|r lre |ega| persor, oased or a poWer ol
represerlal|or ol lre |ega| persor; or lre aulror|ly lo la|e dec|s|ors or oera|l ol lre |ega| persor;
or lre aulror|ly lo exerc|se corlro| W|lr|r lre |ega| persor. Corporale cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly Wou|d a|so
app|y |r lrose cases Wrere |ac| ol superv|s|or W|lr|r lre |ega| persor ra|es |l poss|o|e lo
corr|l lre ollerce. L|ao|||ly ol lre |ega| persor does rol exc|ude cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly ol lre prys|ca|
perpelralor.

31. Pursuarl lo lre proposed arerdrerls lo lre Cr|r|ra| Code, sarcl|ors lor corrupl|or-re|aled
ollerces |rc|ude l|res (Wr|cr ray oe |rcreased deperd|rg or lre l|rarc|a| advarlage ga|red or
|rlerded lo oe ga|red lrrougr lre cr|r|ra| acl), d|sso|ul|or ol lre |ega| persor, suspers|or ol |ls
acl|v|l|es lor a rax|rur per|od ol l|ve years, W|rd|rg up lre |ega| erl|ly lor a rax|rur per|od ol
l|ve years, perrarerl or lerporary pror|o|l|ors lor up lo 10 years or acl|v|l|es s|r||ar lo lrose
lral gave r|se lo lre corv|cl|or, exc|us|or lror puo||c lerder procedures, elc.

Z
32. Tre alore-rerl|ored proposed arerdrerls Were puo||sred |r lre 0ll|c|a| Jourra| or 15 Jaruary
200Z
1
ard lrey rave oeer suor|lled lo Par||arerl lor corsu|lal|or (lre|r deoale |r lre Corgress
ol 0epul|es loo| p|ace or 13 3epleroer 200Z, lurlrer d|scuss|or |r lre 3erale |s lo la|e p|ace |r
lre |asl quarler ol 200Z).

33. 0REC0 We|cores lre |r|l|al|ves reporled lo arerd lre Cr|r|ra| Code oy, |nrer a||a, |rlroduc|rg
cr|r|ra| ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors ard la|es lre v|eW lral 3pa|r ras core a |org Way |r order lo
corp|y W|lr recorrerdal|or v. loWever, as lre drall |eg|s|al|or ras rol yel oeer adopled,
0REC0 carrol al lr|s slage arl|c|pale lre l|ra| resu|l. Furlrerrore, 0REC0 urges lre 3par|sr
aulror|l|es lo g|ve cors|deral|or lo lre eslao||srrerl ol a reg|slry ol corv|cled |ega| persors, |r
||re W|lr recorrerdal|or v.

31. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or v ras oeer parl|y |rp|ererled.

Recommendat|on v|.

35. SRE0D recommenoeo rnar rne $pan|sn aurnor|r|es encourage rnrougn a|| poss|o|e means rne
0namoer ol 0ommerce ro p|a, a more acr|ve ro|e |n promor|ng ern|cs |n ous|ness.

3. Tre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r reporl lral lre Craroer ol Correrce ras oeer ercouraged lo prorole
elr|cs |r ous|ress, W|lr lre resu|l ol a |arge ruroer ol ser|rars or lrarsparercy ard soc|a|
respors|o|||ly ol lre pr|vale seclor oe|rg re|d s|rce lre adopl|or ol lre 3ecord Eva|ual|or Rourd
Reporl. Tre ||sl ol ser|rars |rc|udes, oul |s rol ||r|led lo, lre lo||oW|rg:

- 21-22 Feoruary 200Z '0ood 0overrarce |r 8us|ress ard Corporale L|ao|||ly (Vadr|d);
- 9-10 0clooer 200 '0ood 0overrarce |r 8us|ress ard Corporale L|ao|||ly (Cd|z);
- 2- 0clooer 200 'Corporale 0overrarce ard L|ao|||ly (8arce|ora);
- 1 Jure 200 'Corporale soc|a| respors|o|||ly ard ous|ress elr|cs (8arce|ora, 0a||c|a,
Vadr|d, va|erc|a);
- 1Z-21 Vay 2001 'Corporale 0overrarce: soc|a| respors|o|||ly, good goverrarce ard
lrarsparercy |r lre pr|vale seclor (8arce|ora).

3Z. 0REC0 la|es role ol lre ser|es ol ser|rars or corporale goverrarce co-orgar|sed oy lre
Craroer ol Correrce ard lre 3par|sr aulror|l|es. 0REC0 earresl|y ropes lral lre prorol|or
ol elr|cs |r ous|ress corl|rues lo oe acl|ve|y pursued |r 3pa|r ard W||| |ead lo pos|l|ve resu|ls |r
lre preverl|or ol, ard lre l|grl aga|rsl, corrupl|or.

38. 0REC0 corc|udes lral recorrerdal|or v| ras oeer |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y.

|||. 60N6LU8|0N8

39. |n v|ew of the above, CRE60 conc|udes that 8pa|n has |mp|emented sat|sfactor||y one
th|rd of the recommendat|ons conta|ned |n the 8econd Round Eva|uat|on Report.
Recorrerdal|ors |v ard v| rave oeer |rp|ererled sal|slaclor||y. Recorrerdal|ors |, ||, ||| ard
v rera|r parl|y |rp|ererled. lr lr|s correcl|or, 0REC0 very rucr ropes lral spec|l|c
prov|s|ors corcerr|rg prov|s|ora| reasures lo oe la|er lor lre purpose ol lurlrer lac|||lal|rg ard
guararlee|rg lre ellecl|ve corl|scal|or ol corrupl|or proceeds W||| oe |rlroduced |r lre rear
lulure. Furlrer, 3pa|r ras recerl|y adopled a ruroer ol |aWs a|red al slrerglrer|rg lre
lrarsparercy ol puo||c adr|r|slral|or (e.g. e-goverrarce, corror ard corso||daled lrareWor|

1
0rall LaW ol 15 Jaruary 200Z or arerdrerls lo lre Cr|r|ra| Code (80E, No. 119-1).
8
lor puo||c oll|c|a|s ard erp|oyees corcerr|rg lre|r r|grls ard respors|o|||l|es, largeled elr|ca|
gu|darce lor r|gr-rar||rg oll|c|a|s); lrese are sleps |r lre r|grl d|recl|or lor Wr|cr lre 3par|sr
aulror|l|es srou|d oe correrded. Tral sa|d, 0REC0 urges lre aulror|l|es lo pers|sl |r lre|r
ellorls lo |rcrease lrarsparercy ard accourlao|||ly ol puo||c adr|r|slral|or oy rev|eW|rg lre
|rp|ererlal|or pracl|ces corcerr|rg lre r|grl lo access 0overrrerl |rlorral|or, as We|| as oy
deve|op|rg a gerera| Wr|ller corp||al|or ol lre cr|r|ra| ard d|sc|p||rary slardards |r lre puo||c
lurcl|or coup|ed W|lr a lu|| eva|ual|or ol lre ellecl|veress ol lre sysler. F|ra||y, lrere rera|rs a
c|ear reed lor lre aulror|l|es lo pursue acl|ve|y lre erv|saged arerdrerls lo lre Cr|r|ra| Code
W|lr a v|eW lo eslao||sr|rg ar adequale sysler ol ||ao|||ly ol |ega| persors lor acls ol corrupl|or.

10. 0REC0 |rv|les lre lead ol lre 3par|sr de|egal|or lo suor|l add|l|ora| |rlorral|or regard|rg lre
|rp|ererlal|or ol recorrerdal|ors |, ||, ||| ard v oy 30 Apr|| 2009.

11. F|ra||y, 0REC0 |rv|les lre aulror|l|es ol 3pa|r lo lrars|ale lre reporl |rlo lre ral|ora| |arguage
ard lo ra|e lr|s lrars|al|or puo||c.

Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING



Strasbourg, 1 April 2011 Public
Greco RC-III (2011) 5E







Third Evaluation Round



Compliance Report
on Spain

Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2)

***

Transparency of Party Funding






Adopted by GRECO
at its 50
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 28 March 1 April 2011)

2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present Compliance Report assesses the measures taken by the authorities of Spain to
implement the 15 recommendations issued in the Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain (see
paragraph 2), covering two distinct themes, namely:

- Theme I Incriminations: Articles 1a and 1b, 2-12, 15-17, 19 paragraph 1 of the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), Articles 1-6 of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191)
and Guiding Principle 2 (criminalisation of corruption).

- Theme II Transparency of party funding: Articles 8, 11, 12, 13b, 14 and 16 of
Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of
Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and - more generally - Guiding Principle 15
(financing of political parties and election campaigns).

2. The Third Round Evaluation Report was adopted at GRECOs 42
nd
Plenary Meeting
(15 May 2009) and made public on 28 May 2009, following authorisation by Spain (Greco Eval III
Rep (2008) 3E Theme I / Theme II).

3. As required by GRECO's Rules of Procedure, the Spanish authorities submitted a Situation
Report on measures taken to implement the recommendations. This report was received on
22 December 2010 and served as a basis for the Compliance Report.

4. GRECO selected Estonia and Italy to appoint Rapporteurs for the compliance procedure. The
Rapporteurs appointed were Ms Paloma-Krt TUPAY, Advisor, Legislative Policy Department,
Ministry of Justice, Estonia and Mrs Anna PAGOTTO, Judge, Ministry of Justice, Italy. They were
assisted by GRECOs Secretariat in drawing up the Compliance Report.

5. The Compliance Report assesses the implementation of each individual recommendation
contained in the Evaluation Report and establishes an overall appraisal of the level of the
members compliance with these recommendations. The implementation of any outstanding
recommendation (partially or not implemented) will be assessed on the basis of a Situation
Report to be submitted by the authorities 18 months after the adoption of the present Compliance
Report.

II. ANALYSIS

Theme I: Incriminations

6. It was recalled that GRECO in its evaluation report addressed 9 recommendations to Spain in
respect of Theme I. Compliance with these recommendations is dealt with below.

7. The authorities of Spain explain that the Penal Code was amended by virtue of Organic Law
5/2010, adopted on 22 June 2010. The amended Penal Code (PC) entered into force on
23 December 2010; it includes a number of important reforms in the anti-corruption arena
providing for, inter alia, the criminalisation of bribery in the private sector, a simplified
classification of bribery in the public sector (lawful acts, unlawful acts and situations in which the
bribe is accepted on the basis of the public officials position), explicit criminalisation of capital
laundering, corporate liability, increased levels of sanctions, etc. Additional details as to the
particular content of the relevant legislative changes are described below.
3
Recommendation i.

8. GRECO recommended to proceed swiftly with the ratification of the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173) as well as the signature and ratification of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191).

9. The authorities of Spain indicate that the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) was
ratified on 28 April 2010; it entered into force in respect of Spain on 1 August 2010.

10. The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191) was ratified on
17 January 2011; it will enter into force in respect of Spain on 1 May 2011.

11. GRECO is pleased to note that Spain has now ratified the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191).

12. GRECO concludes that recommendation i has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation ii.

13. GRECO recommended to clarify beyond doubt that immaterial advantages are covered by the
relevant bribery provisions in the Penal Code.

14. The authorities of Spain explain that the new formulation of bribery offences (Articles 419
and 421 PC) explicitly refers to gifts, favours or rewards of any nature. Moreover, the applicable
sanctions (Article 421 PC) are no longer determined on the basis of an economic assessment of
the bribe, but rather on a system of day-fines.

15. GRECO welcomes the amendments introduced in this field and the provision made in the PC to
explicitly cover any kind of advantage, whether material or immaterial. GRECO also notes that
the incorporation of a system of day-fines in the amended PC eliminates any reference to a
purely economic assessment of the bribe.

16. GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation iii.

17. GRECO recommended to (i) clarify the notion of foreign public official; (ii) enlarge the scope of
Article 445 PC concerning active bribery of foreign officials and officials of international
organisations beyond situations involving international business transactions; (iii) criminalise
passive bribery of foreign officials and officials of international organisations; and (iv) ensure that
bribery of members of foreign public assemblies, international parliamentary assemblies (other
than members of the European Parliament), as well as judges and officials of international courts
(other than those serving in the International Criminal Court) is criminalised.

18. The authorities of Spain stress that pursuant to the latest amendments of the PC, the
criminalisation of bribery of a foreign public official is set out as an autonomous offence through
the new wording of Article 445 PC and there is, therefore, no need to refer to the relevant
provisions on domestic bribery to determine the applicable penalty, as was previously the case.
An autonomous definition of the notion of foreign public official has been provided, which
encompasses any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
4
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public
international organisation. The formulation of the offence of bribery of foreign officials closely
follows the wording of the OECD Convention and, therefore, refers solely to active bribery
committed in the case of international commercial relations. However, the authorities stress that
for passive bribery of foreign officials, the provisions of passive bribery of domestic officials apply.
In addition, the authorities refer to Article 427 PC extending the applicability of Articles 419 to 426
PC (active and passive bribery of domestic public officials) to officials of the European Union, as
well as foreign officials of EU Member States.

19. GRECO takes note of the action taken to provide for an autonomous definition of foreign officials
(including officials or agents of a public international organisation) which comprises the different
categories of persons covered by the Convention. This meets the concerns raised by parts (i) and
(iv) of recommendation iii. However, GRECO notes that the definition of the offence provided by
Article 445 PC continues to make reference only to active bribery in the context of international
transactions. As the Third Round Evaluation Report recognised (paragraph 93), although a large
number of cross-border corruption cases may involve business transactions, there could well be
situations where this offence would not apply (e.g. bribing a member of a foreign traffic police
force in order to avoid the payment of a fine). Likewise, nothing is said in Article 445 PC about
passive bribery of foreign officials. GRECO acknowledges the fact that, pursuant to Article
427 PC, both active and passive bribery (not limited to international business transactions) of
some international officials (i.e. officials, agents, seconded persons working in any of the
institutions/agencies of the European Union), as well as foreign officials from EU Member States
would be covered. However, GRECO has difficulties in accepting that the provisions on bribery of
domestic officials apply in all other cases (foreign officials from countries which are not members
of the EU and agents of other international organisations) since the offence of bribery of foreign
officials is construed, in the Spanish PC, as an autonomous offence; no case-law/jurisprudence
has been provided by the authorities to prove otherwise. Therefore, GRECO concludes that parts
(ii) and (iii) of recommendation iii have not been fully addressed.

20. GRECO concludes that recommendation iii has been partly implemented.

Recommendation iv.

21. GRECO recommended to (i) review Article 422 (bribery of jurors and arbitrators) of the Penal
Code to ensure that the criminalisation of bribery of jurors and arbitrators is in line with the
Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191); and (ii) criminalise
bribery of foreign arbitrators and jurors.

22. The authorities of Spain explain that, the formulation of bribery offences in the amended PC has
been reworked and thereby simplified; the relevant provisions on both active and passive bribery
of domestic officials apply to jurors and arbitrators who are specifically referred to in Article
423 PC (as also confirmed by jurisprudence in this domain)
1
.

23. There is no explicit reference in the PC to the criminalisation of bribery of foreign jurors and
arbitrators. The ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention (ETS 191) in January
2011 has paved the way for further action in this area; in this connection, the authorities refer to
the possibility of introducing further legislative changes to criminalise bribery of foreign jurors and
arbitrators as an autonomous offence.


1
For example, judgment of the Supreme Court, STS of 2 April 2009.
5
24. GRECO takes note of the information provided by the authorities as to the coverage of active and
passive bribery of domestic jurors and arbitrators in the reworked provisions of the PC, in line with
jurisprudence in this field. This meets the concerns raised in the first part of recommendation iv.
GRECO is pleased to note that the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention
(ETS 191) will bring about additional developments with respect to implementation of the second
part of recommendation iv referring to the criminalisation of bribery of foreign arbitrators and
jurors. GRECO looks forward to receiving further details in this respect.

25. GRECO concludes that recommendation iv has been partly implemented.

Recommendation v.

26. GRECO recommended to criminalise bribery in the private sector in accordance with Articles 7
and 8 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173).

27. The authorities of Spain explain that bribery in the private sector has been criminalised in
Article 286bis PC. Concerning active bribery, Article 286bis (1) PC refers to whoever, directly or
through an intermediary, promises, offers or gives to directors, managers, employees and
collaborators of a company or of a corporation, association or foundation or organisation an
undue benefit or advantage of any kind, for his/her own benefit or that of a third party, against
others, failing to fulfil his/her obligations regarding acquisitions or sale of goods or in the hiring of
professional services, will be punished with the penalty of imprisonment from six months to four
years, specific disqualification from practicing any industry or trade for a period of between one to
six years and a fine ranging from the value to three times the value of the benefit or advantage.

28. As far as the construction of the passive bribery offence is concerned, Article 286bis (2) PC
provides that the same penalty will be imposed on directors, managers, employees and
collaborators of a company or of a corporation, association or foundation who directly or through
an intermediary receives requests or accepts an undue benefit or advantage of any kind with the
aim to favour, over a third party, the person that gives or from whom he expects the undue benefit
or advantage in breach of his duties regarding acquisitions or sale of goods or in the hiring of
professional services.

29. GRECO welcomes the important move made by the authorities to criminalise bribery in the
private sector, an area where specific provisions were lacking in the past. The aforementioned
criminalisation, provided by Article 286bis PC, is generally in line with the Convention, in
particular, with respect to the scope of perpetrators (which covers virtually all types of persons
who direct or work for private sector entities) and the material elements of the offence
(direct/indirect commission, third party beneficiaries, breach of duties). There is, however, one
outstanding issue, namely, the coverage of the request, receipt or acceptance of the promise of
an advantage. GRECO calls for additional legislative measures to remedy this shortcoming and
thereby fully align domestic provisions with Article 8 of the Convention concerning passive bribery
in the private sector, as recommended.

30. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has been partly implemented.

6
Recommendation vi.

31. GRECO recommended to (i) criminalise active trading in influence as a principal offence;
(ii) criminalise trading in influence in relation to foreign public officials, members of foreign public
assemblies, officials of international organisations, members of international parliamentary
assemblies and judges and officials of international courts; and (iii) clarify beyond doubt that
immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant trading in influence provisions in the Penal
Code.

32. The authorities of Spain reiterate that the offence of active trading in influence is punishable as
aiding or inciting passive trading in influence; the general rules on participation contained in
Articles 28 and 65 (3) PC apply.

33. As regards the scope of perpetrators, the authorities state that foreign and international officials
are covered by Article 445 PC.

34. With respect to the material element of trading in influence offences, both material and immaterial
advantages are covered. The authorities further substantiate the latter fact by referring to
jurisprudence confirming that advantages could be of any type, not necessarily monetary.

35. GRECO notes that the explanation provided by the authorities concerning the criminalisation of
active trading in influence only reiterates the position of the authorities already taken into
consideration in the Third Round Evaluation Report, and therefore, does not add any new
element of analysis in this respect, as compared to the situation assessed at that time. GRECO
notes that no case has been cited to demonstrate, that even though active trading in influence is
not construed as an autonomous offence in the PC, the prosecution of an active trading in
influence offence is still possible. Moreover, GRECO remains dubious as to the question of how
to deal with cases where an offer is rejected by the person who has or is presumed to have some
influence, i.e. when there is no principal offender. Therefore, GRECO considers that part (i) of the
recommendation has not been satisfactorily addressed.

36. With respect to part (ii) of the recommendation, GRECO notes, that following the latest
amendments to the PC, the definition of Article 445 PC on foreign and international officials has
been reworked to provide for a broader coverage of this category of person. However, as
described in paragraph 19 of the present report, Article 445 PC only refers to active bribery
committed in the course of business transactions. No case/court decision has been cited to
corroborate the argumentation of the authorities in this regard, notably, that trading in influence
provisions are applicable to foreign and international officials.

37. With respect to part (iii) of the recommendation, GRECO accepts that, on the basis of
consolidated jurisprudence, both material and immaterial advantages are considered to be
covered by legislation.

38. GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has been partly implemented.

Recommendation vii.

39. GRECO recommended to (i) increase the sanctions for the bribery offences under Articles 421
(omission of acts inherent to the public officials duties), 425(1) (performance of acts inherent to
the public officials duties and 426 PC (bribe offered in consideration of the public officials
7
position or in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act) in order to ensure that these offences
can give rise to extradition and (ii) increase the sanctions for trading in influence.

40. The authorities of Spain reiterate that a simplification of bribery provisions has taken place
through the latest amendments of the PC. In particular, passive bribery offences are now
classified into three (instead of five) provisions dealing with unlawful official acts (Article 419 PC),
lawful official acts (Article 420 PC) and situations in which the bribe is accepted on the basis of
the public officials position (Articles 420 PC and 422 PC). The aforementioned reorganisation of
bribery offences has lead to a better adjustment of the applicable sanctions, including by resorting
to imprisonment penalties in all cases. With respect to bribery to omit acts inherent to the public
officials duties (ex-Article 421 PC), this is now dealt with in Article 419 PC concerning unlawful
official acts, which provides for imprisonment ranging from 3 to 6 years, fines and professional
disqualification. With respect to bribery for the performance of acts inherent to the officials duties
(ex-Article 425(1) PC) and bribery in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act (ex-Article
426 PC), these are now dealt with in Article 420 PC concerning lawful official acts, which provides
for imprisonment ranging from 2 to 4 years, fines and professional disqualification. With respect to
bribery in consideration of the public officials position (ex-Article 426 PC), this is now dealt with in
Article 422 PC, which provides for imprisonment from 6 months to 1 year and temporary
suspension from public office for a period ranging between 1 and 3 years.

41. Concerning the applicable sanctions for trading in influence, these have been increased:
imprisonment now ranges from 6 months to 2 years (before, imprisonment ranged from 6 months
to 1 year); if the undue advantage pursued by the corrupt deal is obtained, the sanctions to be
applied will be in the upper half of the scale. In addition, fines and temporary disqualification from
public office (from 3 to 6 years) apply.

42. GRECO welcomes the developments reported. GRECO noted in its Third Round Evaluation
Report (paragraph 97) that breaches of ex-Articles 421, 425(1) and 426 PC were only subject to
sanctions consisting of fines and professional disqualification, making extradition impossible.
Resorting to imprisonment sentences appears now to be possible in all the aforementioned
cases. Moreover, the amendments to the PC have increased the minimum imprisonment
sentences applicable to bribery offences, i.e. three years imprisonment for unlawful official acts
(instead of two) and two years imprisonment for lawful official acts (instead of one or none).
Consequently, GRECO notes that its previous concerns, as expressed in the first part of the
recommendation, have now been adequately addressed. Furthermore, Spain has not only
increased the applicable penalties for the aforementioned breaches, as recommended, but has
also restructured and reworded the relevant provisions concerning bribery in order to create a
simpler and more coherent legal framework. It is recalled that, while departing from issuing a
formal recommendation in this respect, GRECO had encouraged the authorities to move in this
direction (paragraph 91, Third Round Evaluation Report).

43. With respect to the second part of the recommendation, GRECO notes that the applicable
penalties for trading in influence have also been increased.

44. Therefore, GRECO concludes that recommendation vii has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation viii.

45. GRECO recommended to abolish the requirement of dual criminality with respect to offences of
bribery and trading in influence committed abroad.
8
46. The authorities of Spain explain that they have entered a reservation with respect to Article 17,
paragraph 1.b of the Convention at the time of depositing the instrument of ratification.
Accordingly, dual criminality applies for the prosecution of bribery and trading influence offences
committed abroad. That said, in the context of the ongoing amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Code, further consideration will be given to the issue of dual criminality and the
possibility to withdraw the relevant reservation to the Convention.

47. The Third Round Evaluation Report (paragraph 87) acknowledged the possibility for the Spanish
authorities to introduce reservations to the Convention at the time of ratification, and the impact
that such reservations may have on several recommendations, including recommendation viii.
For this reason, GRECO accepts at this stage that the PC continues to provide for dual criminality
in respect of corruption offences. That said, GRECO still encourages the authorities to reconsider
their position; in this connection, GRECO welcomes the indications provided by the authorities
that new developments may take place in this area in the framework of the ongoing reform of the
Criminal Procedure Code. The abolishment of the dual criminality requirement would undoubtedly
strengthen Spains possibilities to fight corruption committed abroad. The authorities may wish to
keep GRECO informed of such developments.

48. In light of the new legal situation set out above, GRECO concludes that recommendation viii has
been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation ix.

49. GRECO recommended to keep the application of Article 427 PC on effective regret under review
in order to ascertain the potential use and misuse of this defence in the investigation and
prosecution of corruption and, if need be, to take appropriate measures.

50. The authorities of Spain report that they have reviewed the (very limited) experience with the
application of effective regret and have come to the conclusion that the existing legislative
safeguards in its application sufficiently prevent any potential for misuse of this type of defence. It
has been concluded that the defence of effective regret has never been misused and that there is
consequently no need to modify Article 427 PC.

51. GRECO accepts that the authorities have looked into the, so far limited, application of the
defence of effective regret in practice and have concluded that up to now there have been no
indications of abuse. GRECO wishes to stress, however, that more importance could have been
given in the analysis of Article 427 PC itself and its possible inherent risks of misuse. The
Spanish authorities may therefore wish to keep this issue under review.

52. GRECO concludes that recommendation ix has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Theme II: Transparency of Party Funding

53. It is recalled that GRECO, in its Evaluation Report, addressed 6 recommendations to Spain in
respect of Theme II.

54. The authorities of Spain report on a number of recommendations raised by the Court of Audit, the
main institution responsible for the control of party funding, and addressed to the relevant
Committee/Commission of Parliament for due consideration and possible remedial action
9
(Resolution of the Court of Audit of 22 June 2010). It is recalled that the recommendations of the
Court of Audit have a non-binding nature.

Recommendation i.

55. GRECO recommended to take appropriate measures to ensure that loans granted to political
parties are not used to circumvent political financing regulations.

56. The authorities of Spain reiterate that Organic Law 8/2007 on Political Parties Funding allows
political parties to contract commercial loans which do not deviate from the habits and customs
of the usual commercial traffic; loans do not fall under the applicable restrictions on donations.
The conditions of contracted loans must be specified in financial reports of political parties; any
irregularity detected by the Court of Audit, must be published. In the first auditing performed by
the Court, following enactment of Organic Law 8/2007), no irregularities were detected in the
reported loans.

57. The authorities further indicate that, in view of the situation of indebtedness of political parties vis-
-vis credit institutions, the Court of Audit has recommended that political parties set in place the
necessary measures and mechanisms to better rationalise and manage their resources in order
to limit their debts and financial dependence on commercial banks. It is envisaged that future
reports from the Court of Audit will include information concerning the level of indebtedness of
political parties.

58. GRECO recalls that, in its Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain (paragraph 74), it raised two
particular issues in this area. Firstly, GRECO voiced concerns as to the situation of indebtedness
of political parties and the fact that this situation could make parties more vulnerable
to/dependent on credit institutions. In this connection, the authorities now report on a
recommendation made by the Court of Audit to political parties to better manage their finances
and reduce their debts. While this action is to be welcomed, GRECO notes that the
recommendations of the Court of Audit have a non-binding nature. No update has been received
as to whether the level of indebtedness of political parties has effectively been reduced in
practice. The reported plans of the Court of Audit to publicise in its future reports on party
financing information concerning indebtedness levels of political parties is a positive measure
which should assist in bringing further light into this area of concern.

59. Secondly, GRECO pointed at the lack of specific regulations concerning the terms and conditions
for granting loans for party/campaign funding purposes (such as the maximum value of loans,
permissible lenders, terms of repayment, etc.); other than a general provision included in Organic
Law 8/2007 stating that the political parties may agree with credit institutions on the conditions of
contracted loans, which are, in any event, to respect the habits and customs of the usual
commercial traffic. This lack of specific regulation acquires particular significance in Spain where
loans are an important source of political financing, which do not fall under the thresholds on
contributions from individual donors. In this connection, GRECO has repeatedly stressed, in the
course of its Third Round Evaluation, that loans granted under particularly advantageous or
preferential terms deviating from general market conditions, as well as written-off loans which are
not reimbursed, do in fact amount to donations. GRECO notes that the authorities now refer
again to Law 8/2007; nothing new has been added in this respect. More decisive measures are
required in this field to effectively ensure that loans granted to political parties are not used to
circumvent political financing regulations.

10
60. GRECO concludes that recommendation i has not been implemented.

Recommendation ii.

61. GRECO recommended to take measures to increase the transparency of income and
expenditure of (i) political parties at local level; (ii) entities, related directly or indirectly, to political
parties or otherwise under their control.

62. The authorities of Spain stress that, pursuant to Organic Law 8/2007, a political party is a single
economic/financial unit, whose accounts are to consolidate any sub-branch/organisation. The
Court of Audit has recently emphasised, in the framework of its document Conceptual
Framework of Financial Information of Political Parties (24 June 2010), that party accounts are to
include financial data of its local branches, as well as related entities. The aforementioned
document points at the need for consolidation of political accounts and encourages political
parties to take action to this end.

63. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It welcomes the recommendation made by the
Court of Audit to political parties to provide for consolidated reports, including local branches and
related entities. The action taken by the Court of Audit seems to point at outstanding challenges
in this field; that said, no particular example has been provided as to whether political parties are
effectively providing consolidated accounts in practice. The Third Round Evaluation Report
(paragraph 75) reflected on malpractice occurring in this respect; notably, regarding the accounts
of local branches, where risks of corruption are particularly high given the important volume of
economic operations performed at local level, e.g. procurement and licensing procedures, urban
planning. Moreover, foundations and associations linked to political parties are not required to
report on their expenditure; GRECO remains concerned as to the risk of related entities indirectly
shouldering expenditure by the political parties. Overall, the measures taken with respect to
implementation of recommendation ii appear to be rather limited; there is no evidence that the
transparency of the income and expenditure of local branches and related entities has effectively
been increased.

64. GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has not been implemented.

Recommendation iii.

65. GRECO recommended to establish a common format for parties accounts and returns (at both
head office and local level) with a view to ensuring that the information made available to the
public is consistent and comparable to the greatest extent possible, and that it is disclosed in a
timely manner within the deadlines prescribed in Law 8/2007 on Political Parties Funding, thus
allowing a meaningful comparison both over time and between parties.

66. The authorities of Spain explain that Organic Law 8/2007 establishes an obligation for the Court
of Audit to develop a specific accounting plan for political parties. On 24 June 2010, the Court of
Audit adopted a Conceptual Framework of Financial Information of Political Parties, which
provides guidance for the subsequent establishment of an accounting plan. A draft accounting
plan is currently being prepared in close coordination with the Accountancy and Auditing Institute;
a cooperation agreement between the latter institution and the Court of Audit was signed in
January 2011 with a view to issuing an accounting plan for political parties in 8 months time (i.e.
by the second semester of 2011). The aforementioned plan is meant to constitute the common
framework for recording and reporting (annual/electoral) parties accounts and returns; it will
11
reportedly include detailed rules (e.g. on accounting definitions, recording and assessment of
financial details, chart of accounts) aimed at ensuring homogeneity in the financial information
provided by political parties, which should ultimately facilitate comparisons over time and
amongst parties themselves. It will have a mandatory nature for all political parties.

67. GRECO takes note of the information reported. A draft account plan for political parties is being
prepared; if and when adopted, it may facilitate the uniform reporting of operational and electoral
finances, in line with the first part of the recommendation. In addition to the fact that financial
reports of political parties varied greatly in their contents, the Third Round Evaluation Report
(paragraph 76) also highlighted that such reports were not being released in a timely manner.
Nothing has been reported as to current publication practice of the Court of Audit in this respect
(and any possible improvement to the situation assessed in the Third Round Evaluation Report).
GRECO underlines that both comparability of financial reports and their timeliness are decisive
factors in assuring transparency of political funds.

68. GRECO concludes that recommendation iii is partly implemented.

Recommendation iv.

69. GRECO recommended to take measures to enhance the system of internal audit of political
parties in order to ensure the independence of this type of control.

70. The authorities of Spain reflect on the legal obligation for political parties to set-up a system of
internal control, as established by Organic Law 8/2007. Moreover, the Law provides that the
outcome of such control is to be documented through a report of the internal auditor, which is to
be attached to the relevant financial reports. The Court of Audit indicates that the aforementioned
attachment on internal audit is generally lacking in the financial reports submitted by political
parties. For this reason, the Court of Audit has recommended political parties, in its Resolution of
22 June 2010, to effectively establish internal audit systems.

71. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It notes that very limited action has been taken to
enhance the system of internal audit of political parties. Although the Court of Audit has contacted
political parties to encourage them to set in place internal control mechanisms, no indication has
been provided as to whether any particular action has been taken by political parties in this
regard.

72. GRECO concludes that recommendation iv has not been implemented.

Recommendation v.

73. GRECO recommended to increase the financial and personnel resources dedicated to the Court
of Audit so that it is better equipped to perform effectively its monitoring and enforcement tasks
concerning political financing, including by ensuring a more substantial supervision of political
parties financial reports.

74. The authorities of Spain explain that, in a context of serious economic and financial crisis in the
country, the Court of Audit resources have remained largely stable. In fact, an increase of one
person has been secured since the adoption of the Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain:
there are currently 19 senior civil servants responsible for monitoring/supervising parties
finances.
12
75. GRECO takes note of the information provided. While it understands the current difficult
economic situation in Spain, it notes that the resources of the Court of Audit were deemed to be
insufficient to perform its new responsibilities (monitoring/supervisory/enforcement role) under
Organic Law 8/2007 (paragraphs 78 and 79, Third Round Evaluation Report). The reported
increase, of only one more person, falls short of the aim pursued by the recommendation,
notably, to be able to ensure a more substantial (and timely) supervision of political parties
financial reports. The authorities will have the opportunity to report on future improvements in the
framework of the Second Compliance Report, which will deal with the action subsequently taken
by the Spanish authorities in response to the current report.

76. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has been partly implemented.

Recommendation vi.

77. GRECO recommended to clearly define infringements of political finance rules and to introduce
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for these infringements, in particular, by
extending the range of penalties available and by enlarging the scope of the sanctioning
provisions to cover all persons/entities (including individual donors) upon which Organic Law
8/2007 imposes obligations.

78. The authorities of Spain state that the Court of Audit presented, on 24 June 2010, several
proposals to the Constitutional Commission of Parliament in order to better regulate penalties for
infringements of party funding rules. Moreover, amendments to Organic Law 5/1985 on the
General Election Regime were adopted in February 2011 providing, inter alia, for an upgraded
sanctioning regime for violations of campaign rules.

79. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It welcomes the amendments to Organic Law
5/1985 on the General Election Regime to provide for additional sanctions for, inter alia, breaches
of campaign funding regulations. GRECO is pleased to note that the Court of Audit has raised the
concerns expressed in recommendation vi to the relevant Commission in Parliament, so that
amendments are made in Organic Law 8/2007 to enlarge the scope of its sanctioning provisions.
The steps taken so far in respect of this recommendation are going in the right direction, but more
determined action, followed by concrete results, is still needed to extend the range of penalties
and enlarge the scope of the sanctioning provisions to cover all persons/entities (including
individual donors) upon which Organic Law 8/2007 imposes obligations.

80. GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has been partly implemented.

III. CONCLUSIONS

81. In view of the above, GRECO concludes that Spain has implemented satisfactorily or dealt
with in a satisfactory manner five of the fifteen recommendations contained in the Third
Round Evaluation Report. With respect to Theme I Incriminations, recommendations i, ii and
vii have been implemented satisfactorily; recommendations viii and ix have been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner. Recommendations iii, iv, v and vi have been partly implemented. With
respect to Theme II Transparency of Party Funding, recommendations iii, v and vi have been
partly implemented; recommendations i, ii and iv have not been implemented.

82. Spain has introduced significant improvements concerning the criminalisation of corruption
offences, as regulated by the latest amendments to the Penal Code which were introduced by
13
Organic Law 5/2010. Moreover, Spain ratified the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Accession to
these two pivotal instruments in the fight against corruption has paved the way to proceed with
further adjustments in domestic legislation, including with respect to bribery of foreign officials,
bribery of foreign jurors and arbitrators and jurisdiction issues. Although the current
criminalisation of corruption offences in Spain largely meets the requirements of the Convention,
some additional legislative adjustments will still be needed with respect to the offences of trading
in influence and bribery in the private sector.

83. The progress reported with respect to transparency of party funding, is much more modest. While
GRECO welcomes the attention paid by the Court of Audit to the issues raised in the Third
Evaluation Report on Spain, it takes the view that more decisive action is to be taken in Spain in
this area, including (but not limited to) legislative changes, to effectively increase transparency of
party and campaign accounts, and thereby decrease possibilities for corruption in a sector which
is identified as particularly prone to malpractice. Such changes must touch upon those areas
where GRECO has identified clear challenges including the regulation of loans, the consolidation
of party accounts (which must comprise details on the income and expenditure of local branches
and connected entities), the strengthening of internal control of political parties, the development
of a more comprehensive system of sanctions and the upgrading of the resources of the Court of
Audit so that it is better equipped to perform its key supervisory and enforcement responsibilities.

84. In the light of what has been stated in paragraphs 81 to 83, GRECO notes that Spain has made
tangible efforts to comply with the recommendations issued in respect of Theme I
Incriminations; the authorities must be commended for their action in this field. Rather limited
steps have been taken to meet the concerns raised in respect of Theme II Transparency of
Party Funding; much more clearly needs to be done in this area. GRECO invites the Head of the
delegation of Spain to submit additional information regarding the implementation of
recommendations iii, iv, v and vi (Theme I Incriminations) and recommendations i to vi
(Theme II Transparency of Party Funding) by 31 October 2012 at the latest.

85. GRECO invites the authorities of Spain to authorise, as soon as possible, the publication of the
report, to translate the report into the national language and to make this translation public.
Secrtariat du GRECO
Conseil de lEurope
www.coe.int/greco
GRECO Secretariat
Council of Europe
F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex +33 3 88 41 20 00 Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55



DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
DIRECTORATE OF MONITORING



Strasbourg, 1 April 2011 Public
Greco RC-III (2011) 5E







Third Evaluation Round



Compliance Report
on Spain

Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2)

***

Transparency of Party Funding






Adopted by GRECO
at its 50
th
Plenary Meeting
(Strasbourg, 28 March 1 April 2011)

2
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present Compliance Report assesses the measures taken by the authorities of Spain to
implement the 15 recommendations issued in the Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain (see
paragraph 2), covering two distinct themes, namely:

- Theme I Incriminations: Articles 1a and 1b, 2-12, 15-17, 19 paragraph 1 of the Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173), Articles 1-6 of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191)
and Guiding Principle 2 (criminalisation of corruption).

- Theme II Transparency of party funding: Articles 8, 11, 12, 13b, 14 and 16 of
Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of
Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and - more generally - Guiding Principle 15
(financing of political parties and election campaigns).

2. The Third Round Evaluation Report was adopted at GRECOs 42
nd
Plenary Meeting
(15 May 2009) and made public on 28 May 2009, following authorisation by Spain (Greco Eval III
Rep (2008) 3E Theme I / Theme II).

3. As required by GRECO's Rules of Procedure, the Spanish authorities submitted a Situation
Report on measures taken to implement the recommendations. This report was received on
22 December 2010 and served as a basis for the Compliance Report.

4. GRECO selected Estonia and Italy to appoint Rapporteurs for the compliance procedure. The
Rapporteurs appointed were Ms Paloma-Krt TUPAY, Advisor, Legislative Policy Department,
Ministry of Justice, Estonia and Mrs Anna PAGOTTO, Judge, Ministry of Justice, Italy. They were
assisted by GRECOs Secretariat in drawing up the Compliance Report.

5. The Compliance Report assesses the implementation of each individual recommendation
contained in the Evaluation Report and establishes an overall appraisal of the level of the
members compliance with these recommendations. The implementation of any outstanding
recommendation (partially or not implemented) will be assessed on the basis of a Situation
Report to be submitted by the authorities 18 months after the adoption of the present Compliance
Report.

II. ANALYSIS

Theme I: Incriminations

6. It was recalled that GRECO in its evaluation report addressed 9 recommendations to Spain in
respect of Theme I. Compliance with these recommendations is dealt with below.

7. The authorities of Spain explain that the Penal Code was amended by virtue of Organic Law
5/2010, adopted on 22 June 2010. The amended Penal Code (PC) entered into force on
23 December 2010; it includes a number of important reforms in the anti-corruption arena
providing for, inter alia, the criminalisation of bribery in the private sector, a simplified
classification of bribery in the public sector (lawful acts, unlawful acts and situations in which the
bribe is accepted on the basis of the public officials position), explicit criminalisation of capital
laundering, corporate liability, increased levels of sanctions, etc. Additional details as to the
particular content of the relevant legislative changes are described below.
3
Recommendation i.

8. GRECO recommended to proceed swiftly with the ratification of the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173) as well as the signature and ratification of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191).

9. The authorities of Spain indicate that the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173) was
ratified on 28 April 2010; it entered into force in respect of Spain on 1 August 2010.

10. The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191) was ratified on
17 January 2011; it will enter into force in respect of Spain on 1 May 2011.

11. GRECO is pleased to note that Spain has now ratified the Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption (ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191).

12. GRECO concludes that recommendation i has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation ii.

13. GRECO recommended to clarify beyond doubt that immaterial advantages are covered by the
relevant bribery provisions in the Penal Code.

14. The authorities of Spain explain that the new formulation of bribery offences (Articles 419
and 421 PC) explicitly refers to gifts, favours or rewards of any nature. Moreover, the applicable
sanctions (Article 421 PC) are no longer determined on the basis of an economic assessment of
the bribe, but rather on a system of day-fines.

15. GRECO welcomes the amendments introduced in this field and the provision made in the PC to
explicitly cover any kind of advantage, whether material or immaterial. GRECO also notes that
the incorporation of a system of day-fines in the amended PC eliminates any reference to a
purely economic assessment of the bribe.

16. GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation iii.

17. GRECO recommended to (i) clarify the notion of foreign public official; (ii) enlarge the scope of
Article 445 PC concerning active bribery of foreign officials and officials of international
organisations beyond situations involving international business transactions; (iii) criminalise
passive bribery of foreign officials and officials of international organisations; and (iv) ensure that
bribery of members of foreign public assemblies, international parliamentary assemblies (other
than members of the European Parliament), as well as judges and officials of international courts
(other than those serving in the International Criminal Court) is criminalised.

18. The authorities of Spain stress that pursuant to the latest amendments of the PC, the
criminalisation of bribery of a foreign public official is set out as an autonomous offence through
the new wording of Article 445 PC and there is, therefore, no need to refer to the relevant
provisions on domestic bribery to determine the applicable penalty, as was previously the case.
An autonomous definition of the notion of foreign public official has been provided, which
encompasses any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public function for a foreign
4
country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public
international organisation. The formulation of the offence of bribery of foreign officials closely
follows the wording of the OECD Convention and, therefore, refers solely to active bribery
committed in the case of international commercial relations. However, the authorities stress that
for passive bribery of foreign officials, the provisions of passive bribery of domestic officials apply.
In addition, the authorities refer to Article 427 PC extending the applicability of Articles 419 to 426
PC (active and passive bribery of domestic public officials) to officials of the European Union, as
well as foreign officials of EU Member States.

19. GRECO takes note of the action taken to provide for an autonomous definition of foreign officials
(including officials or agents of a public international organisation) which comprises the different
categories of persons covered by the Convention. This meets the concerns raised by parts (i) and
(iv) of recommendation iii. However, GRECO notes that the definition of the offence provided by
Article 445 PC continues to make reference only to active bribery in the context of international
transactions. As the Third Round Evaluation Report recognised (paragraph 93), although a large
number of cross-border corruption cases may involve business transactions, there could well be
situations where this offence would not apply (e.g. bribing a member of a foreign traffic police
force in order to avoid the payment of a fine). Likewise, nothing is said in Article 445 PC about
passive bribery of foreign officials. GRECO acknowledges the fact that, pursuant to Article
427 PC, both active and passive bribery (not limited to international business transactions) of
some international officials (i.e. officials, agents, seconded persons working in any of the
institutions/agencies of the European Union), as well as foreign officials from EU Member States
would be covered. However, GRECO has difficulties in accepting that the provisions on bribery of
domestic officials apply in all other cases (foreign officials from countries which are not members
of the EU and agents of other international organisations) since the offence of bribery of foreign
officials is construed, in the Spanish PC, as an autonomous offence; no case-law/jurisprudence
has been provided by the authorities to prove otherwise. Therefore, GRECO concludes that parts
(ii) and (iii) of recommendation iii have not been fully addressed.

20. GRECO concludes that recommendation iii has been partly implemented.

Recommendation iv.

21. GRECO recommended to (i) review Article 422 (bribery of jurors and arbitrators) of the Penal
Code to ensure that the criminalisation of bribery of jurors and arbitrators is in line with the
Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 191); and (ii) criminalise
bribery of foreign arbitrators and jurors.

22. The authorities of Spain explain that, the formulation of bribery offences in the amended PC has
been reworked and thereby simplified; the relevant provisions on both active and passive bribery
of domestic officials apply to jurors and arbitrators who are specifically referred to in Article
423 PC (as also confirmed by jurisprudence in this domain)
1
.

23. There is no explicit reference in the PC to the criminalisation of bribery of foreign jurors and
arbitrators. The ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention (ETS 191) in January
2011 has paved the way for further action in this area; in this connection, the authorities refer to
the possibility of introducing further legislative changes to criminalise bribery of foreign jurors and
arbitrators as an autonomous offence.


1
For example, judgment of the Supreme Court, STS of 2 April 2009.
5
24. GRECO takes note of the information provided by the authorities as to the coverage of active and
passive bribery of domestic jurors and arbitrators in the reworked provisions of the PC, in line with
jurisprudence in this field. This meets the concerns raised in the first part of recommendation iv.
GRECO is pleased to note that the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention
(ETS 191) will bring about additional developments with respect to implementation of the second
part of recommendation iv referring to the criminalisation of bribery of foreign arbitrators and
jurors. GRECO looks forward to receiving further details in this respect.

25. GRECO concludes that recommendation iv has been partly implemented.

Recommendation v.

26. GRECO recommended to criminalise bribery in the private sector in accordance with Articles 7
and 8 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 173).

27. The authorities of Spain explain that bribery in the private sector has been criminalised in
Article 286bis PC. Concerning active bribery, Article 286bis (1) PC refers to whoever, directly or
through an intermediary, promises, offers or gives to directors, managers, employees and
collaborators of a company or of a corporation, association or foundation or organisation an
undue benefit or advantage of any kind, for his/her own benefit or that of a third party, against
others, failing to fulfil his/her obligations regarding acquisitions or sale of goods or in the hiring of
professional services, will be punished with the penalty of imprisonment from six months to four
years, specific disqualification from practicing any industry or trade for a period of between one to
six years and a fine ranging from the value to three times the value of the benefit or advantage.

28. As far as the construction of the passive bribery offence is concerned, Article 286bis (2) PC
provides that the same penalty will be imposed on directors, managers, employees and
collaborators of a company or of a corporation, association or foundation who directly or through
an intermediary receives requests or accepts an undue benefit or advantage of any kind with the
aim to favour, over a third party, the person that gives or from whom he expects the undue benefit
or advantage in breach of his duties regarding acquisitions or sale of goods or in the hiring of
professional services.

29. GRECO welcomes the important move made by the authorities to criminalise bribery in the
private sector, an area where specific provisions were lacking in the past. The aforementioned
criminalisation, provided by Article 286bis PC, is generally in line with the Convention, in
particular, with respect to the scope of perpetrators (which covers virtually all types of persons
who direct or work for private sector entities) and the material elements of the offence
(direct/indirect commission, third party beneficiaries, breach of duties). There is, however, one
outstanding issue, namely, the coverage of the request, receipt or acceptance of the promise of
an advantage. GRECO calls for additional legislative measures to remedy this shortcoming and
thereby fully align domestic provisions with Article 8 of the Convention concerning passive bribery
in the private sector, as recommended.

30. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has been partly implemented.

6
Recommendation vi.

31. GRECO recommended to (i) criminalise active trading in influence as a principal offence;
(ii) criminalise trading in influence in relation to foreign public officials, members of foreign public
assemblies, officials of international organisations, members of international parliamentary
assemblies and judges and officials of international courts; and (iii) clarify beyond doubt that
immaterial advantages are covered by the relevant trading in influence provisions in the Penal
Code.

32. The authorities of Spain reiterate that the offence of active trading in influence is punishable as
aiding or inciting passive trading in influence; the general rules on participation contained in
Articles 28 and 65 (3) PC apply.

33. As regards the scope of perpetrators, the authorities state that foreign and international officials
are covered by Article 445 PC.

34. With respect to the material element of trading in influence offences, both material and immaterial
advantages are covered. The authorities further substantiate the latter fact by referring to
jurisprudence confirming that advantages could be of any type, not necessarily monetary.

35. GRECO notes that the explanation provided by the authorities concerning the criminalisation of
active trading in influence only reiterates the position of the authorities already taken into
consideration in the Third Round Evaluation Report, and therefore, does not add any new
element of analysis in this respect, as compared to the situation assessed at that time. GRECO
notes that no case has been cited to demonstrate, that even though active trading in influence is
not construed as an autonomous offence in the PC, the prosecution of an active trading in
influence offence is still possible. Moreover, GRECO remains dubious as to the question of how
to deal with cases where an offer is rejected by the person who has or is presumed to have some
influence, i.e. when there is no principal offender. Therefore, GRECO considers that part (i) of the
recommendation has not been satisfactorily addressed.

36. With respect to part (ii) of the recommendation, GRECO notes, that following the latest
amendments to the PC, the definition of Article 445 PC on foreign and international officials has
been reworked to provide for a broader coverage of this category of person. However, as
described in paragraph 19 of the present report, Article 445 PC only refers to active bribery
committed in the course of business transactions. No case/court decision has been cited to
corroborate the argumentation of the authorities in this regard, notably, that trading in influence
provisions are applicable to foreign and international officials.

37. With respect to part (iii) of the recommendation, GRECO accepts that, on the basis of
consolidated jurisprudence, both material and immaterial advantages are considered to be
covered by legislation.

38. GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has been partly implemented.

Recommendation vii.

39. GRECO recommended to (i) increase the sanctions for the bribery offences under Articles 421
(omission of acts inherent to the public officials duties), 425(1) (performance of acts inherent to
the public officials duties and 426 PC (bribe offered in consideration of the public officials
7
position or in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act) in order to ensure that these offences
can give rise to extradition and (ii) increase the sanctions for trading in influence.

40. The authorities of Spain reiterate that a simplification of bribery provisions has taken place
through the latest amendments of the PC. In particular, passive bribery offences are now
classified into three (instead of five) provisions dealing with unlawful official acts (Article 419 PC),
lawful official acts (Article 420 PC) and situations in which the bribe is accepted on the basis of
the public officials position (Articles 420 PC and 422 PC). The aforementioned reorganisation of
bribery offences has lead to a better adjustment of the applicable sanctions, including by resorting
to imprisonment penalties in all cases. With respect to bribery to omit acts inherent to the public
officials duties (ex-Article 421 PC), this is now dealt with in Article 419 PC concerning unlawful
official acts, which provides for imprisonment ranging from 3 to 6 years, fines and professional
disqualification. With respect to bribery for the performance of acts inherent to the officials duties
(ex-Article 425(1) PC) and bribery in order for the public official to fulfil a lawful act (ex-Article
426 PC), these are now dealt with in Article 420 PC concerning lawful official acts, which provides
for imprisonment ranging from 2 to 4 years, fines and professional disqualification. With respect to
bribery in consideration of the public officials position (ex-Article 426 PC), this is now dealt with in
Article 422 PC, which provides for imprisonment from 6 months to 1 year and temporary
suspension from public office for a period ranging between 1 and 3 years.

41. Concerning the applicable sanctions for trading in influence, these have been increased:
imprisonment now ranges from 6 months to 2 years (before, imprisonment ranged from 6 months
to 1 year); if the undue advantage pursued by the corrupt deal is obtained, the sanctions to be
applied will be in the upper half of the scale. In addition, fines and temporary disqualification from
public office (from 3 to 6 years) apply.

42. GRECO welcomes the developments reported. GRECO noted in its Third Round Evaluation
Report (paragraph 97) that breaches of ex-Articles 421, 425(1) and 426 PC were only subject to
sanctions consisting of fines and professional disqualification, making extradition impossible.
Resorting to imprisonment sentences appears now to be possible in all the aforementioned
cases. Moreover, the amendments to the PC have increased the minimum imprisonment
sentences applicable to bribery offences, i.e. three years imprisonment for unlawful official acts
(instead of two) and two years imprisonment for lawful official acts (instead of one or none).
Consequently, GRECO notes that its previous concerns, as expressed in the first part of the
recommendation, have now been adequately addressed. Furthermore, Spain has not only
increased the applicable penalties for the aforementioned breaches, as recommended, but has
also restructured and reworded the relevant provisions concerning bribery in order to create a
simpler and more coherent legal framework. It is recalled that, while departing from issuing a
formal recommendation in this respect, GRECO had encouraged the authorities to move in this
direction (paragraph 91, Third Round Evaluation Report).

43. With respect to the second part of the recommendation, GRECO notes that the applicable
penalties for trading in influence have also been increased.

44. Therefore, GRECO concludes that recommendation vii has been implemented satisfactorily.

Recommendation viii.

45. GRECO recommended to abolish the requirement of dual criminality with respect to offences of
bribery and trading in influence committed abroad.
8
46. The authorities of Spain explain that they have entered a reservation with respect to Article 17,
paragraph 1.b of the Convention at the time of depositing the instrument of ratification.
Accordingly, dual criminality applies for the prosecution of bribery and trading influence offences
committed abroad. That said, in the context of the ongoing amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Code, further consideration will be given to the issue of dual criminality and the
possibility to withdraw the relevant reservation to the Convention.

47. The Third Round Evaluation Report (paragraph 87) acknowledged the possibility for the Spanish
authorities to introduce reservations to the Convention at the time of ratification, and the impact
that such reservations may have on several recommendations, including recommendation viii.
For this reason, GRECO accepts at this stage that the PC continues to provide for dual criminality
in respect of corruption offences. That said, GRECO still encourages the authorities to reconsider
their position; in this connection, GRECO welcomes the indications provided by the authorities
that new developments may take place in this area in the framework of the ongoing reform of the
Criminal Procedure Code. The abolishment of the dual criminality requirement would undoubtedly
strengthen Spains possibilities to fight corruption committed abroad. The authorities may wish to
keep GRECO informed of such developments.

48. In light of the new legal situation set out above, GRECO concludes that recommendation viii has
been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Recommendation ix.

49. GRECO recommended to keep the application of Article 427 PC on effective regret under review
in order to ascertain the potential use and misuse of this defence in the investigation and
prosecution of corruption and, if need be, to take appropriate measures.

50. The authorities of Spain report that they have reviewed the (very limited) experience with the
application of effective regret and have come to the conclusion that the existing legislative
safeguards in its application sufficiently prevent any potential for misuse of this type of defence. It
has been concluded that the defence of effective regret has never been misused and that there is
consequently no need to modify Article 427 PC.

51. GRECO accepts that the authorities have looked into the, so far limited, application of the
defence of effective regret in practice and have concluded that up to now there have been no
indications of abuse. GRECO wishes to stress, however, that more importance could have been
given in the analysis of Article 427 PC itself and its possible inherent risks of misuse. The
Spanish authorities may therefore wish to keep this issue under review.

52. GRECO concludes that recommendation ix has been dealt with in a satisfactory manner.

Theme II: Transparency of Party Funding

53. It is recalled that GRECO, in its Evaluation Report, addressed 6 recommendations to Spain in
respect of Theme II.

54. The authorities of Spain report on a number of recommendations raised by the Court of Audit, the
main institution responsible for the control of party funding, and addressed to the relevant
Committee/Commission of Parliament for due consideration and possible remedial action
9
(Resolution of the Court of Audit of 22 June 2010). It is recalled that the recommendations of the
Court of Audit have a non-binding nature.

Recommendation i.

55. GRECO recommended to take appropriate measures to ensure that loans granted to political
parties are not used to circumvent political financing regulations.

56. The authorities of Spain reiterate that Organic Law 8/2007 on Political Parties Funding allows
political parties to contract commercial loans which do not deviate from the habits and customs
of the usual commercial traffic; loans do not fall under the applicable restrictions on donations.
The conditions of contracted loans must be specified in financial reports of political parties; any
irregularity detected by the Court of Audit, must be published. In the first auditing performed by
the Court, following enactment of Organic Law 8/2007), no irregularities were detected in the
reported loans.

57. The authorities further indicate that, in view of the situation of indebtedness of political parties vis-
-vis credit institutions, the Court of Audit has recommended that political parties set in place the
necessary measures and mechanisms to better rationalise and manage their resources in order
to limit their debts and financial dependence on commercial banks. It is envisaged that future
reports from the Court of Audit will include information concerning the level of indebtedness of
political parties.

58. GRECO recalls that, in its Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain (paragraph 74), it raised two
particular issues in this area. Firstly, GRECO voiced concerns as to the situation of indebtedness
of political parties and the fact that this situation could make parties more vulnerable
to/dependent on credit institutions. In this connection, the authorities now report on a
recommendation made by the Court of Audit to political parties to better manage their finances
and reduce their debts. While this action is to be welcomed, GRECO notes that the
recommendations of the Court of Audit have a non-binding nature. No update has been received
as to whether the level of indebtedness of political parties has effectively been reduced in
practice. The reported plans of the Court of Audit to publicise in its future reports on party
financing information concerning indebtedness levels of political parties is a positive measure
which should assist in bringing further light into this area of concern.

59. Secondly, GRECO pointed at the lack of specific regulations concerning the terms and conditions
for granting loans for party/campaign funding purposes (such as the maximum value of loans,
permissible lenders, terms of repayment, etc.); other than a general provision included in Organic
Law 8/2007 stating that the political parties may agree with credit institutions on the conditions of
contracted loans, which are, in any event, to respect the habits and customs of the usual
commercial traffic. This lack of specific regulation acquires particular significance in Spain where
loans are an important source of political financing, which do not fall under the thresholds on
contributions from individual donors. In this connection, GRECO has repeatedly stressed, in the
course of its Third Round Evaluation, that loans granted under particularly advantageous or
preferential terms deviating from general market conditions, as well as written-off loans which are
not reimbursed, do in fact amount to donations. GRECO notes that the authorities now refer
again to Law 8/2007; nothing new has been added in this respect. More decisive measures are
required in this field to effectively ensure that loans granted to political parties are not used to
circumvent political financing regulations.

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60. GRECO concludes that recommendation i has not been implemented.

Recommendation ii.

61. GRECO recommended to take measures to increase the transparency of income and
expenditure of (i) political parties at local level; (ii) entities, related directly or indirectly, to political
parties or otherwise under their control.

62. The authorities of Spain stress that, pursuant to Organic Law 8/2007, a political party is a single
economic/financial unit, whose accounts are to consolidate any sub-branch/organisation. The
Court of Audit has recently emphasised, in the framework of its document Conceptual
Framework of Financial Information of Political Parties (24 June 2010), that party accounts are to
include financial data of its local branches, as well as related entities. The aforementioned
document points at the need for consolidation of political accounts and encourages political
parties to take action to this end.

63. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It welcomes the recommendation made by the
Court of Audit to political parties to provide for consolidated reports, including local branches and
related entities. The action taken by the Court of Audit seems to point at outstanding challenges
in this field; that said, no particular example has been provided as to whether political parties are
effectively providing consolidated accounts in practice. The Third Round Evaluation Report
(paragraph 75) reflected on malpractice occurring in this respect; notably, regarding the accounts
of local branches, where risks of corruption are particularly high given the important volume of
economic operations performed at local level, e.g. procurement and licensing procedures, urban
planning. Moreover, foundations and associations linked to political parties are not required to
report on their expenditure; GRECO remains concerned as to the risk of related entities indirectly
shouldering expenditure by the political parties. Overall, the measures taken with respect to
implementation of recommendation ii appear to be rather limited; there is no evidence that the
transparency of the income and expenditure of local branches and related entities has effectively
been increased.

64. GRECO concludes that recommendation ii has not been implemented.

Recommendation iii.

65. GRECO recommended to establish a common format for parties accounts and returns (at both
head office and local level) with a view to ensuring that the information made available to the
public is consistent and comparable to the greatest extent possible, and that it is disclosed in a
timely manner within the deadlines prescribed in Law 8/2007 on Political Parties Funding, thus
allowing a meaningful comparison both over time and between parties.

66. The authorities of Spain explain that Organic Law 8/2007 establishes an obligation for the Court
of Audit to develop a specific accounting plan for political parties. On 24 June 2010, the Court of
Audit adopted a Conceptual Framework of Financial Information of Political Parties, which
provides guidance for the subsequent establishment of an accounting plan. A draft accounting
plan is currently being prepared in close coordination with the Accountancy and Auditing Institute;
a cooperation agreement between the latter institution and the Court of Audit was signed in
January 2011 with a view to issuing an accounting plan for political parties in 8 months time (i.e.
by the second semester of 2011). The aforementioned plan is meant to constitute the common
framework for recording and reporting (annual/electoral) parties accounts and returns; it will
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reportedly include detailed rules (e.g. on accounting definitions, recording and assessment of
financial details, chart of accounts) aimed at ensuring homogeneity in the financial information
provided by political parties, which should ultimately facilitate comparisons over time and
amongst parties themselves. It will have a mandatory nature for all political parties.

67. GRECO takes note of the information reported. A draft account plan for political parties is being
prepared; if and when adopted, it may facilitate the uniform reporting of operational and electoral
finances, in line with the first part of the recommendation. In addition to the fact that financial
reports of political parties varied greatly in their contents, the Third Round Evaluation Report
(paragraph 76) also highlighted that such reports were not being released in a timely manner.
Nothing has been reported as to current publication practice of the Court of Audit in this respect
(and any possible improvement to the situation assessed in the Third Round Evaluation Report).
GRECO underlines that both comparability of financial reports and their timeliness are decisive
factors in assuring transparency of political funds.

68. GRECO concludes that recommendation iii is partly implemented.

Recommendation iv.

69. GRECO recommended to take measures to enhance the system of internal audit of political
parties in order to ensure the independence of this type of control.

70. The authorities of Spain reflect on the legal obligation for political parties to set-up a system of
internal control, as established by Organic Law 8/2007. Moreover, the Law provides that the
outcome of such control is to be documented through a report of the internal auditor, which is to
be attached to the relevant financial reports. The Court of Audit indicates that the aforementioned
attachment on internal audit is generally lacking in the financial reports submitted by political
parties. For this reason, the Court of Audit has recommended political parties, in its Resolution of
22 June 2010, to effectively establish internal audit systems.

71. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It notes that very limited action has been taken to
enhance the system of internal audit of political parties. Although the Court of Audit has contacted
political parties to encourage them to set in place internal control mechanisms, no indication has
been provided as to whether any particular action has been taken by political parties in this
regard.

72. GRECO concludes that recommendation iv has not been implemented.

Recommendation v.

73. GRECO recommended to increase the financial and personnel resources dedicated to the Court
of Audit so that it is better equipped to perform effectively its monitoring and enforcement tasks
concerning political financing, including by ensuring a more substantial supervision of political
parties financial reports.

74. The authorities of Spain explain that, in a context of serious economic and financial crisis in the
country, the Court of Audit resources have remained largely stable. In fact, an increase of one
person has been secured since the adoption of the Third Round Evaluation Report on Spain:
there are currently 19 senior civil servants responsible for monitoring/supervising parties
finances.
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75. GRECO takes note of the information provided. While it understands the current difficult
economic situation in Spain, it notes that the resources of the Court of Audit were deemed to be
insufficient to perform its new responsibilities (monitoring/supervisory/enforcement role) under
Organic Law 8/2007 (paragraphs 78 and 79, Third Round Evaluation Report). The reported
increase, of only one more person, falls short of the aim pursued by the recommendation,
notably, to be able to ensure a more substantial (and timely) supervision of political parties
financial reports. The authorities will have the opportunity to report on future improvements in the
framework of the Second Compliance Report, which will deal with the action subsequently taken
by the Spanish authorities in response to the current report.

76. GRECO concludes that recommendation v has been partly implemented.

Recommendation vi.

77. GRECO recommended to clearly define infringements of political finance rules and to introduce
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for these infringements, in particular, by
extending the range of penalties available and by enlarging the scope of the sanctioning
provisions to cover all persons/entities (including individual donors) upon which Organic Law
8/2007 imposes obligations.

78. The authorities of Spain state that the Court of Audit presented, on 24 June 2010, several
proposals to the Constitutional Commission of Parliament in order to better regulate penalties for
infringements of party funding rules. Moreover, amendments to Organic Law 5/1985 on the
General Election Regime were adopted in February 2011 providing, inter alia, for an upgraded
sanctioning regime for violations of campaign rules.

79. GRECO takes note of the information provided. It welcomes the amendments to Organic Law
5/1985 on the General Election Regime to provide for additional sanctions for, inter alia, breaches
of campaign funding regulations. GRECO is pleased to note that the Court of Audit has raised the
concerns expressed in recommendation vi to the relevant Commission in Parliament, so that
amendments are made in Organic Law 8/2007 to enlarge the scope of its sanctioning provisions.
The steps taken so far in respect of this recommendation are going in the right direction, but more
determined action, followed by concrete results, is still needed to extend the range of penalties
and enlarge the scope of the sanctioning provisions to cover all persons/entities (including
individual donors) upon which Organic Law 8/2007 imposes obligations.

80. GRECO concludes that recommendation vi has been partly implemented.

III. CONCLUSIONS

81. In view of the above, GRECO concludes that Spain has implemented satisfactorily or dealt
with in a satisfactory manner five of the fifteen recommendations contained in the Third
Round Evaluation Report. With respect to Theme I Incriminations, recommendations i, ii and
vii have been implemented satisfactorily; recommendations viii and ix have been dealt with in a
satisfactory manner. Recommendations iii, iv, v and vi have been partly implemented. With
respect to Theme II Transparency of Party Funding, recommendations iii, v and vi have been
partly implemented; recommendations i, ii and iv have not been implemented.

82. Spain has introduced significant improvements concerning the criminalisation of corruption
offences, as regulated by the latest amendments to the Penal Code which were introduced by
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Organic Law 5/2010. Moreover, Spain ratified the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(ETS 173) and its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Accession to
these two pivotal instruments in the fight against corruption has paved the way to proceed with
further adjustments in domestic legislation, including with respect to bribery of foreign officials,
bribery of foreign jurors and arbitrators and jurisdiction issues. Although the current
criminalisation of corruption offences in Spain largely meets the requirements of the Convention,
some additional legislative adjustments will still be needed with respect to the offences of trading
in influence and bribery in the private sector.

83. The progress reported with respect to transparency of party funding, is much more modest. While
GRECO welcomes the attention paid by the Court of Audit to the issues raised in the Third
Evaluation Report on Spain, it takes the view that more decisive action is to be taken in Spain in
this area, including (but not limited to) legislative changes, to effectively increase transparency of
party and campaign accounts, and thereby decrease possibilities for corruption in a sector which
is identified as particularly prone to malpractice. Such changes must touch upon those areas
where GRECO has identified clear challenges including the regulation of loans, the consolidation
of party accounts (which must comprise details on the income and expenditure of local branches
and connected entities), the strengthening of internal control of political parties, the development
of a more comprehensive system of sanctions and the upgrading of the resources of the Court of
Audit so that it is better equipped to perform its key supervisory and enforcement responsibilities.

84. In the light of what has been stated in paragraphs 81 to 83, GRECO notes that Spain has made
tangible efforts to comply with the recommendations issued in respect of Theme I
Incriminations; the authorities must be commended for their action in this field. Rather limited
steps have been taken to meet the concerns raised in respect of Theme II Transparency of
Party Funding; much more clearly needs to be done in this area. GRECO invites the Head of the
delegation of Spain to submit additional information regarding the implementation of
recommendations iii, iv, v and vi (Theme I Incriminations) and recommendations i to vi
(Theme II Transparency of Party Funding) by 31 October 2012 at the latest.

85. GRECO invites the authorities of Spain to authorise, as soon as possible, the publication of the
report, to translate the report into the national language and to make this translation public.