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Virtues, Values, and the Good Life:
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics

and Its Implications for Counseling
Joseph A. Stewart-Sicking
The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of modern ethics and his
virtue-centered alternative suggest that counseling can be considered a
form of applied virtue ethics, helping clients cultivate the qualities necessary
to live the good life. Although similar to developmental theory and positive
psychology, this perspective also questions whether counseling is value
neutral and suggests that counseling should account for the (often hidden)
traditions, virtues, and practices of the good life it promotes. Comparison
with spiritual direction suggests ways counseling can apply the insights of
this model ethically within a pluralistic setting.
A
lasdair MacIntyre’s (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory and its
sequels (MacIntyre, 1988, 1990, 2006) hold important consequences
for both counseling theory and practice, suggesting significant new
ways to understand the relationship between counseling and ethics. This
communitarian virtue ethicist is one of the most important philosophers of
the past 50 years, yet his provocative work has had little impact on counsel-
ing. This project is ambitious, technical, and often polemical, qualities that
might explain its absence in the counseling literature despite its stature among
philosophers, but it is also rewarding when given a patient hearing.
MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics

Imagine a world shaken by catastrophe, where only fragments of humanity’s
scientific knowledge remain, and people are struggling to piece this knowledge
together (MacIntyre, 1984). With this disquieting image begins one of the most
influential and thought-provoking works of philosophy to have appeared in
the last 50 years: MacIntyre’s (1984) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. In
his work, MacIntyre advances the thesis that “in the actual world which we
inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder which
I described” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 2) because modern philosophy abandoned
the perspective of virtue to construct context-independent ethics.
Diagnosing a Catastrophe
In After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, MacIntyre (1984) pointed to the
disarray in modern ethics by highlighting society’s inability to conduct
Joseph A. Stewart-Sicking, Department of Pastoral Counseling and Spiritual Care, Loyola College in
Maryland. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Joseph A. Stewart-Sicking,
Loyola College in Maryland, Pastoral Counseling Department, 8890 McGaw Road, Suite 380, Columbia,
MD 21045 (e-mail: jastewartsicking@loyola.edu).
© 2008 by the American Counseling Association. All rights reserved.
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rational arguments about ethical concerns. On many important ethical is-
sues, contemporary society seems intractably divided, with opposing sides
showing little interest in engaging one another in reasoned debate. Instead,
partisans seem merely to cheer for their own preferences and demonize
those who disagree with them. MacIntyre (1984) claimed that, regardless of
whether they know it, the participants in such confrontations exhibit the logic
of emotivism, a theory that moral judgments are nothing more than matters
of personal like or dislike. According to emotivism, right and wrong have
no real meaning; ethical judgments are simply attempts by people to get
others to agree with them through cheering or expressing disgust. By this
logic, ethical debates have no reason or purpose. Instead, emotivist societ-
ies tend to reduce ethical questions about what is right and just to issues of
utility—what makes something good is its effectiveness for this person at
this time. But in doing so, these societies neglect important ethical problems
such as how can people reconcile their own needs with those of others and
how can people’s choices lead to a coherent good life.
MacIntyre (1984) indicted therapists as collaborators in this ethical
viewpoint: Because the effect of emotivism is to see all ethical statements as
expressions of personal preference, the therapist exists to help clients pursue
whatever goals those clients see fit—regardless of how these goals affect
others. In this view of therapy, all that matters is effectiveness and feeling
good; counselors and clients are absolved of moral growth and communal
responsibility. Emotivism can degenerate into the sort of community cari-
catured in an episode of the animated television series The Simpsons (Meyer
& Anderson, 1993) in which Springfielders, heeding the advice of the town
psychiatrist to mimic Bart’s inner child, have a “do what you feel” festival
that results in a riot because people “doing what they feel” end up fighting
and neglecting their responsibilities.
What Happened?
MacIntyre (1984) traced the source of modernity’s ethical failure to the loss
of the ancient approach to ethics. Ancient philosophers considered both hu-
man nature as it is and human nature as it could be if it were to achieve its
purpose (MacIntyre, 1984). This approach centered on cultivating excellence
and striving to achieve the fullness of what human beings could be. Ancient
ethics was thus a system of tutoring, where people engaged in learning and
self-discipline to develop those qualities that were considered to be the goal of
human life (MacIntyre, 1984; Nussbaum, 1994). Ancient philosophers believed
that with guidance and practice, people could realize their potentials and
grow in goodness, becoming more fully what human beings are supposed
to be. But talking about the purpose of human nature became increasingly
contentious as modern thought emerged. In a quest to be objective, modern
philosophy eliminated the concept of a goal for human nature because such
a concept was based on excessive speculation and failed to separate ques-
Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 157

tions of fact and value (MacIntyre, 1984). Separating talk about how things
are from speculation on how they are meant to be became important with
modern philosophy, and the ancient worldview died.
MacIntyre (1984) argued that this new system of ethics was doomed to
fail. Where once existed a coherent sense of what signified the good life,
humanity instead follows its own sense of what life should be, and society
establishes rules to keep people from interfering with each other (MacIntyre,
1984). Without some overarching purpose toward which they shape people,
however, rules do not work (MacIntyre, 1984). Intractable arguments will
occur about where and how to apply the rules, and people will be unable
to articulate why these rules should be followed, creating exactly the condi-
tions that lead to a de facto emotivism; and soon someone such as Nietzsche
(1887/1967) would come along and suggest that all rules are arbitrary exer-
cises of power and that no one need follow them.
Restoring the Concept of Virtue
MacIntyre (1984) believed that the only way out of this mess was to restore the
ancient Aristotelian approach to ethics. However, he also noted that Aristotle’s
(trans. 1925) The Nicomachean Ethics relied on three assumptions that are no
longer considered to be valid. First, Aristotle naïvely derived the goal of human
life from his biology; science proved this to be flawed. Second, Aristotle’s ethical
system needed the Greek city-state as the setting in which to practice it; therefore,
his system was highly culturally encapsulated. Finally, Aristotle assumed that
conflict was a sign of a moral flaw; however, conflict and opposition could help
individuals know and progress toward the goals for their lives.
To address these problems, MacIntyre (1984) began by recovering the con-
cept of virtue and then placing it in a framework that was independent from
universal statements or specific cultural attributes. According to MacIntyre
(1984), virtues are qualities that both enable and predispose a person to live a
good life. Virtues such as hope, courage, and prudence allow people to pursue
their full potentials as human beings and incline them to do the right thing
in any given situation. Building on this basic definition, MacIntyre (1984)
refined his definition of virtue by relating it to three successive concepts:
practices, life narratives, and traditions.
Practices are the ways one builds and exhibits virtue. As the name implies,
practices are human activities that take practice. MacIntyre (1984) defined
them as cooperative, complex activities in which people strive to achieve
standards of excellence, to gain the “internal goods” that can only be achieved
through the practice, and to expand their abilities and wisdom. As examples,
MacIntyre (1984) pointed to games such as football or chess. To be great in
such games takes practice and knowledge of the rules. Moreover, great players
revolutionize the game, expanding its possibilities. Finally, great players do
not play for external benefits such as money or fame, but primarily for love
of the game and the things only the game can give them. This definition is

not limited only to games; all areas of life have practices that organize them,
from healing to scientific research to prayer to metalworking.
The good life, however, is not just about pursuing good practices. Not
every practice is meant for every person, and not every practice is meant
for every moment in life. The idea of virtue requires a goal for a life as a
whole and not just the practices that compose it. MacIntyre (1984) suggested
that these demands can be answered through thinking of life as the story of
a person’s search for the good life. This story or life narrative tells people
which practices are right for them and how those practices all fit together.
According to MacIntyre (1984), the good life is the quest for the good life,
and virtues sustain human beings on their journeys.
Finally, people can know what practices and virtues constitute the good
life only from within a community and tradition that identifies them.
MacIntyre (1984) stated that what counts as virtue depends on tradition,
“an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument
precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (p. 222).
Traditions are dynamic and evolving, passing along wisdom through time.
As classic visions of what life is meant to be, traditions give people places
to start in their pursuits of the good life and places to be accountable to in
how they have lived their lives. Individuals do not have to agree with the
conclusions of the tradition(s) in which they partake (traditions are argu-
ments, after all), but people cannot avoid traditions as their starting points.
Every culture has multiple traditions that provide the setting for living and
understanding the good life. In engaging them, people learn what virtues
they need to cultivate in order to pursue the practices that are the building
blocks of those traditions’ ways of living.
In identifying these four elements of ethical thinking (virtue, practice, life
narratives, and tradition) in After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, MacIntyre
(1984) claimed that he had recovered the structure of ancient ethics and sepa-
rated it from its limitations. In his structure, there is room for the idea of a
goal for a human life, but this goal does not depend on any universal claims
about human nature or the requirements of any specific culture. Instead,
the goal of a human life is to grow in virtue as one pursues the practices
of the good life that fit with one’s life story and that are identified by one’s
tradition. In focusing on virtues, practices, and life narratives, MacIntyre
restored the idea of ethics as tutoring; with the concept of tradition, he was
able to address cultural differences.
Implications
MacIntyre’s (1984) detailed account of virtue has many implications for

counseling. Some authors (e.g., Hill, 2004; Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996)
have noted that virtue ethics can allow counseling to move beyond merely
providing rules for ethical practice into discussions of the essential quali-
ties that a good counselor should have. Applying the concept of virtue to

counselor ethics is an important topic worthy of more discussion in the
literature. A more intriguing possibility, however, is to consider counseling
itself as an exercise in virtue ethics. Counseling could be seen as a way to
help people develop those qualities that would enable them to live the good
life. If it were to adopt this stance, counseling would be able to articulate
its ethical vision more clearly and avoid MacIntyre’s (1984) charge that it
does not help society.
Counseling for the Development of Virtue
Counseling as virtue ethics is not as foreign a concept as it first might appear.

If the social sciences tell ways that people can move from their untutored
starting points to realizing their full potentials (all of which are interdepen-
dent with accounts from biology, philosophy, and theology of what these
potentials are), then counseling is remarkably similar to what MacIntyre
(1984) envisioned ethics to be (Murphy, 2005). Such a vision is consistent
with counseling’s roots in the traditions of soul care practiced in ancient
philosophy and Christian and Jewish spirituality (Foucault, 1984/1986;
Hadot, 1995; Nussbaum, 1994) and seems timely as the field continues to
investigate questions of values, meaning, and holistic well-being.
Elements of this perspective are already present within theories of human
development. The concept of development itself implies some idea about
the goal of human life, and many developmental theories include not only
biological perspectives but also candid ethical questions of what makes a
good life and a good society. Most prominently, Erikson’s (1998) stages of
psychosocial development explicitly identified virtues that are to be devel-
oped at each stage of life: hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love,
care, and wisdom. Other developmental theories, such as Kohlberg’s (1991)
stages of moral development, Gilligan’s (1993) moral voices, and Fowler’s
(1995) stages of faith, also incorporated concepts of virtue such as autonomy,
courage, justice, universal benevolence, or care. Elements of developmental
theory are, therefore, important for how counselors understand the virtues
they seek to cultivate.
Whereas developmental theory provides some articulation of the concept
of virtue in counseling, the profession must consider the emerging field of
positive psychology. Embracing themes of humanistic counseling, psycholo-
gists now are focusing on issues of prevention, well-being, and flourishing.
In a landmark article—which strongly recalls Murphy’s (2005) discussion
of social science as virtue ethics—Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000)
argued that “the social and behavioral sciences . . . can articulate a vision
of the good life that is empirically sound while being understandable and
attractive. They can show what actions lead to well-being, to positive in-
dividuals, and to thriving communities” (p. 5). Psychology is not just the
study of pathology and counseling is not just fixing what is broken. Because
virtue ethics are concerned with the good life, virtue ethics could become

a central construct in positive psychology because both are concerned with
human flourishing (Sandage & Hill, 2001). Continuing this theme, virtue
ethics would help counseling rediscover its roots and define its identity as a
profession that focuses on prevention, health, and strengths (Kleist & White,
1997). Already, some counselors are beginning to interface with the positive
psychology movement to suggest ways in which counseling can include the
concept of virtue (e.g., Lopez et al., 2006).
In comparison to MacIntyre’s (1984) account in After Virtue: A Study in
Moral Theory, these steps toward renewing the concept of virtue fall into
the exact pitfalls he sought to avoid so that his philosophy would not be
culture-bound. Positive psychology runs into problems by defining virtue
through universal statements about human nature (e.g., Is well-being uni-
versally the same? Are Erikson’s [1998] stages the only way to see healthy
development?) or utility (e.g., Is satisfaction the only measure of the good
life?), rather than in terms of the practices of the good life that such virtues
enable one to pursue. The followers of this new movement assume that
their virtues should apply to all healthy people rather than fitting into each
person’s life story. These followers ignore the situation of every account of
virtue in specific cultural and linguistic traditions.
But Whose Virtue?
Once the erroneous assumptions are uncovered, some vexing ethical questions
arise. As the discussions of human development and positive psychology have
hinted, the profession, if counseling intends to help clients grow in virtue,
must answer the question: Whose virtue? In a pluralistic society, making
broad and sweeping statements about the good life without attention to how
that life is lived in different cultures and communities is naïve. Moreover,
ethical principles such as autonomy require considering how counselors can
affirm any notion of the good life at all and prevent the convictions they
embrace from becoming dogmatism (Richardson, 2003).
One response might be to argue for more objectivity; perhaps current
projects recovering virtue are not critical enough. Maybe researchers need
to disentangle themselves from their culture-specific biases through using
more rigorous scientific methods, studying more populations, or controlling
for more variables. Whose virtue should be promoted? One answer is em-
pirically sound virtue. This approach, characteristic of many in the positive
psychology movement (e.g., Seligman & Peterson, 2003), merely dodges the
question, assuming that science will disprove pluralism.
The results of such inquiries are not very satisfying. For instance, one study
by proponents of positive psychology (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman,
2005) looked at lists of virtues from different cultures to see whether the
virtues converged in a useful list valued across cultures. The authors found
that some convergences occurred, perhaps representing some evolutionary
adaptation. In making this conclusion, the authors seem to discount evidence

to the contrary: Convergence occurred, but much variability existed. No two
lists were identical, some virtues seemed exotic, and some virtues expected
to fit across time and culture did not make the cut. Moreover, how virtues
fit together within each culture’s way of life was not considered. Instead, the
authors assumed from their positions as cultural outsiders that the virtues
easily translated among the traditions they were studying.
Similar criticisms could be made of other such studies (e.g., Chang & Page,
1991). Although some merit to looking for cross-cultural convergences to
develop useful measures for researching virtue certainly exists (cf. Peter-
son & Seligman, 2004), researchers must recognize that such measures do
not eliminate the need to relate findings to specific cultural groups. In fact,
researchers should question the underlying assumption that the most im-
portant virtues are those that converge across cultures instead of those that
are deeply embedded in a culture and resist translation. Instead of relying
on scientific method to overcome cultural bias in how the good life is un-
derstood, researchers might follow MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988, 1990) proposals,
which introduced the concept of an ethical tradition precisely to account for
cultural and ethical pluralism.
Social Science and Values
Similar to constructivist thinking in counseling (Hayes & Oppenheim,

1997; Neimeyer, 1995), MacIntyre (1984) insisted that no inquiry is value
free and that a large obstacle to recovering the concept of virtue is modern
philosophy’s illusion of value-free social science. MacIntyre (1984, 1988, 1990)
was strongly critical of philosophical foundationalism or the claim “that the
observer can confront a fact face-to-face without any theoretical interpreta-
tion interposing itself” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 79). Foundationalism holds that
there are certain scientific methods that allow researchers to arrive at objec-
tive reality separate from their own construction of it. MacIntyre believed
that modern social science is especially tied to this approach, assuming that
foundationalism gives its practitioners some value- and theory-free way of
predicting human behavior as if they had a God’s-eye view of reality. This
myth of objectivity absolves social scientists of ethical responsibility for how
social science is used.
Instead, MacIntyre (1988) insisted that all reasoning is embedded in specific
traditions’ accounts of what is good and true. From within his self-identified
tradition of Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, MacIntyre (1988) issued a chal-
lenge to other traditions: “There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry,
no way to engage in the practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting, and
rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some tradi-
tion” (p. 350). MacIntyre (1988) offered a strongly context-dependent view of
philosophy: it is impossible to step outside one’s traditions, and there is no
way to judge between traditions outside of their own standards. Moreover,
rival traditions are fundamentally different ways of encountering the world;

one cannot translate them in entirety into each other’s terms (MacIntyre,
1988). Although outsiders can become familiar with another tradition, they
must recognize that the only way to encounter another tradition’s depths is
to immerse oneself in it and learn it from within as another language.
MacIntyre’s arguments for pluralism are not to convince his readers to
become nihilists, skeptics, or radical relativists (Stout, 2001). Rather, he is
concerned with showing that rationality and ethics are inseparable from
language and culture (MacIntyre, 1988, 1990). This perspective does not
entail a laissez-faire attitude toward other traditions. Aberrant ethical tradi-
tions (e.g., Nazism) must be challenged; but such traditions can be identified
and challenged only from within one’s own traditions, with the hope that
an outsider’s perspective will illuminate the problems of a tradition to its
insiders (MacIntyre, 2006) or that a consensus among many traditions can
be found to discourage or inhibit that aberrant way of life. In fact, MacIntyre
(1990) contrasted his concept of tradition with the radical relativism of
postmodernism, noting that tradition encourages debate and accountability
where radical relativism sees both as unnecessary.
Ethical Traditions in Counseling
MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988, 1990) conclusions about the tradition-dependent

nature of ethics have echoes in constructivist theories of counseling and
social science. Similar to MacIntyre, constructivists focus on a pluralistic,
contextual, linguistically based construction of experience and action (Nei-
meyer, 1995), considering science a value- and language-laden enterprise that
creates knowledge (Hayes & Oppenheim, 1997). An approach informed by
MacIntyre and constructivism would encourage counselors to move beyond
the myth of objectivity to identify the traditions of the good life in which
such traditions are embedded and to recognize how these traditions shape
how they approach working with their clients.
Many of the counseling’s fundamental ideas of the good life are dictated
by the standard construction of mental health in Western and historically
European medical traditions. The ethical scope of these traditions is limited
in that they focus more on dysfunction than on flourishing and they provide
only the very basic picture of health upon which other ideas about what
makes life worth living can be built. These traditions are not self-evident
or universal; the nature of mental health problems is socially constructed
(Raskin & Lewandowski, 2000). Nonetheless, these traditions are deeply
involved in the training and role of professional counselors and are often
mandated by funding for treatment.
Counseling also carries visions of the good life in its theories. Counseling theo-
ries have strong ethical implications in their understandings of human nature,
health, change, and helping (cf. Browning & Cooper, 2004; Jones & Butman,
1991). Often these values are covered by a façade of scientific neutrality. For
this reason, developing a self-critical attitude toward its theories as traditions

of the good life is important for counseling (Tjeltveit, 2003). MacIntyre’s (1984)
approach suggests that researchers examine not only theories’ philosophical
underpinnings, but also the virtues such theories uphold (e.g., humanist
self-actualization, rational emotive behavior therapy [REBT], stoicism and
imperturbability, feminist reciprocity and empowerment) and the practices
by which such theories enter the lives of clients and can even become part of
daily living (such as counseling skills, interventions, and exercises).
Finally, counseling derives its ideas of the good life from the individual
counselor and those traditions outside the profession to which the counselor
is committed. These traditions can come from the counselor’s religion, spiri-
tuality, philosophical traditions, culture, class, literature, or any place where
the counselor looks for guidance about what it means to live life fully. As with
the other sources of counseling’s ethical worldview, counselors must recognize
the importance of being aware of and critical of these commitments.
Is Counseling Really Spiritual Direction?
As is often the case in any philosophical argument, stepping back to see the
big picture is a worthwhile endeavor. Drawing on the philosophy of MacIntyre
(1984, 1988, 1990), I have argued that counseling is itself a kind of applied
virtue ethics, helping clients cultivate the good life, and that even though it
is based in social science, counseling is not value neutral. Thus, counseling
must account for the (often hidden) traditions of the good life it espouses,
the virtues it encourages, and the practices through which it suggests the
good life is lived. But what are counseling’s limits? Is it spiritual direction?
Many authors have provided ways to distinguish the two.
Sperry (2004, 2005) noted the similarity of functions between spiritual
direction and counseling or psychotherapy. Both include listening, evaluat-
ing, identifying pathology, transforming, a healing relationship, advising,
collaborating, identifying resistance, and exploring transference. He noted
that the differences between the two are based on the relative health of the
client, the explicit integration of God as a party in the relationship, and the
embeddedness within a particular tradition of spiritual practices, some of
which are practiced together in the session. Similarly, Benner (2002) distin-
guished between counseling and spiritual direction in three ways: counsel-
ing is problem centered, whereas spiritual direction is focused on the Spirit;
counselors seek to attune themselves to clients’ experiences, whereas spiritual
directors seek to attune themselves to the Spirit of God; and counseling
routinely includes professional record keeping, whereas spiritual direction
is not likely to do so.
Some scholars (e.g., May, 1992) recommend a strong boundary between
the two disciplines, arguing that not enough time exists in a single relation-
ship to do both well and that switching back and forth is difficult. Sperry
(2004), however, suggested that some aspects of spiritual direction may be
ethically and profitably incorporated into counseling, given appropriate

training, and that spiritual direction is often unavoidable. Given the above
discussion of counseling as virtue ethics, sealing off counseling from spiri-
tual direction seems impossible, nor is that likely to be the practice on the
ground. Thus, counseling and spiritual direction can be considered as two
ends of a continuum of care for the soul (Coughlin, 2005; Tisdale, Doehring,
& Lorraine-Poirier, 2004), wherein counseling focuses on problem solving
and spiritual direction focuses on spiritual flourishing.
This difference in focus suggests ways to address the ethical challenges of
viewing counseling as a form of virtue ethics. By focusing on problem solv-
ing, counseling engages ethical traditions ad hoc for what such traditions
have to say for one specific problem. Counseling seeks their wisdom and
where they might lead but does not aim to engage their depths. Thus, the
counselor does not need to be an expert in the traditions the client brings;
rather, the counselor needs to know only enough of the client’s tradition to
engage its help regarding the problem at hand. The counselor and client are
not required to share commitment to the same ethical traditions or to come
to agreement on an entire set of deep questions. In fact, the ad hoc nature
of counseling allows it to benefit from the encounter of multiple traditions,
because much of therapeutic change occurs when the counselor introduces
concepts foreign to the client (Gordon & Efran, 1997). In the context of
respect for the client’s tradition, the client can emerge from this encounter
even stronger in his or her own tradition, having found ways to incorporate
the counselor’s insights into that tradition’s language.
At the spiritual direction end of the continuum, the function of ethical
traditions is different. By focusing on spiritual flourishing, spiritual direc-
tion seeks to help the client explore the depths of specific traditions in the
presence and interaction with the Ultimate those traditions posit. Spiritual
direction often focuses on the practices of traditions and achieving their
internal goods, engaging in them for their own sake and not as a way to
help relieve a problem. Thus, whereas spiritual direction does not require
its participants to share commitment to all of its traditions, it does require a
shared commitment to the tradition being explored, and the spiritual direc-
tor must have deep knowledge of that tradition.
Therefore, in counseling and spiritual direction, traditions are unavoidable
but they are used differently. Even though it is focused on solving problems,
counseling is still an exercise in helping people build virtue so that they may
live the good life. Moreover, few practitioners operate solely at either end of
the counseling–spiritual direction continuum. For instance, in working with
a client with alcoholism, counselors initially will spend more time toward
the problem-solving end of the continuum: building motivation for change
through identifying the client’s idea of the good life and how drinking in-
terferes with it (Miller & Rollnick, 2002), exploring issues of dual diagnosis,
addressing legal or family problems, and changing thought patterns to control
cravings or prevent relapse. As treatment progresses, many clients will also
commit more strongly to the specific tradition of Alcoholics Anonymous

(1976), a tradition in which counselors are fluent and to which many are
also strongly committed. Sessions will increasingly explore the 12 steps and
the practices and virtues those steps embody. A similar path toward a more
spiritual direction-like relationship could be traced as clients engage in ex-
tended humanistic counseling, Jungian analysis, REBT, or any other specific
approach to therapy. In fact, although awkward, to consider counseling as
occupying a large swath of the continuum with its specialties more or less
limited in scope might be helpful (e.g., mental health counseling focuses
almost solely on problem solving, and pastoral counseling is comfortable
across the entire spectrum). Counselors must be able to know where they sit
with their clients on this continuum and that they have received appropriate
consent to move further in the direction of spiritual direction.
Recommendations
If counseling is a form of virtue ethics that is influenced by multiple ethical

traditions and focuses primarily on problem solving, then what implica-
tions does this hold for counselor education and practice? For clarity, the
discussion is framed using the format of the Association for Multicultural
Counseling and Development’s multicultural counseling competencies, which
divides each domain of competency into three levels: beliefs and attitudes,
knowledge, and skills (Arredondo et al., 1996).
Beliefs and Attitudes
Following MacIntyre’s (1984) recommendation that principles should be

derived from the virtues they are meant to uphold, identifying virtues from
within the traditions of counseling for the principles that follow is necessary.
To engage in counseling as virtue ethics, counselors must be disposed to
encounter others’ ethical traditions and examine their own. This suggests
two primary virtues. First, counselors should display openness to award
others (Fowers & Davidov, 2006). Openness allows conversations about
traditions to be productive because participants expect to be enriched by
the conversation and so are less likely to dismiss other views. This open-
ness virtue is strongly implied in counseling’s code of ethics and lists of
multicultural and spiritual competencies (cf. American Counseling As-
sociation, 2005; Arredondo et al., 1996; Association for Spiritual, Ethical,
and Religious Values in Counseling, n.d.) all of which recommend that
counselors see intrinsic value in viewing the world in other ways. Open-
ness does not imply that counselors automatically agree with their clients
nor that they are inclined to support aberrant behavior that is contrary to
counseling ethics. Rather, in encountering the client’s worldview, open
counselors expect to find something of value. Openness is the fundamental
virtue of multiculturalism and requires counselors to engage in continual
self-transformation (Fowers & Davidov, 2006).

The second key virtue necessary to practice counseling as intertraditional
virtue ethics is reflexivity. Counselors need to have the habit of scrutinizing
counseling’s unarticulated assumptions in its theories, what it studies, and
how it conceives of science (cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), both individu-
ally and collectively. Whereas openness increases one’s sensitivity to others’
traditions, reflexivity increases one’s sensitivity to one’s own traditions,
even when those traditions are hidden. Reflexivity prevents counselors
from accepting the myth of value neutrality and makes them responsible
for counseling’s effects on clients and society.
Knowledge
Counselors should know their own ethical traditions in depth (Tjeltveit,

2003) and be familiar with the ethical traditions of the populations they
serve. This knowledge should be specific rather than generic, recognizing
how traditions are embedded within concrete communities and histories
(Dueck & Reimer, 2003). If practitioners are not as knowledgeable as they
think they are about a culture’s values, they may promote distorted versions
of that culture’s virtues (Vasquez, 1996). For this reason, counselors ought
to consider learning about the traditions and cultures they serve as if they
were learning a language, which is impossible to do without a native speaker
as a guide. Counselors need to interface with members of the communi-
ties they serve in order to be accountable for their understanding of those
cultures. When clients are not affiliated with explicit ethical communities,
the counselor should ascertain the client’s values and mentors and look to
the client’s settings and communities for ethical traditions that can serve as
starting points for conversation. Care should be taken to identify not only the
virtues these traditions uphold but also the practices the traditions consider
as key elements of the good life. Finally, counselors should remember that
traditions are not monoliths. Instead, traditions have porous boundaries
and tend to blur into one another. Gaining knowledge of clients’ traditions
is not for the purpose of imposing artificial boundaries on clients’ choices,
but rather for the purpose of enabling conversation.
The suggestion that counselors engage clients’ cultural traditions presup-
poses that counselors have given similar attention to their own. However,
feminists and persons of color have stated that they already know two
cultures and have given the culture of the dominant group credibility over
their own, which they suppress (Miller-McLemore, 2005). Thus, counselors
should be encouraged not only to encounter other ethical traditions but also
to affirm their own as worthy of respect.
Focusing on traditions also entails a greater degree of specificity in talking
about spirituality and values. Although it is important to affirm spirituality
and values as essential aspects of human existence (Association for Spiritual,
Ethical, and Religious Values in Counseling, n.d.), it is also important to be
specific about them when dealing with actual clients. In counseling, spiritual-

ity and values are often more useful concepts when modified by adjectives
(e.g., African American Pentecostal spirituality or American Buddhist values)
than when taken by themselves. Otherwise, counselors risk obscuring the very
ways in which these concepts are lived in concrete communities and the lives
of people who inhabit them. This problem is compounded by the finding that
counseling program leaders have minimal preparation in spiritual and religious
diversity and that religious and spiritual diversity seems to be considered
not as important as other kinds of diversity in multicultural training (Hage,
Hopson, Siegel, Payton, & DeFanti, 2006). Counselors need more training in
the spiritual and religious diversity that they are likely to encounter.
To reach this goal, counseling could engage in training along the lines pro-
posed by Ochs (2006) for teaching religious studies as “comparative religious
traditions.” Ochs suggested a program that provides thick, emic perspectives
on different religious traditions’ beliefs and practices and then honing these
perspectives through dialogue. Although they are not pursuing degrees in re-
ligious studies, counselors could benefit from introductions to different ethical
traditions, focusing on those parts of different traditions with which they need
to be familiar: views of human nature, health, and personal transformation.
Skills
Counselors need to be able to engage others’ ethical traditions to help solve

their clients’ problems as they move these individuals toward the good life as
understood by that tradition. While this process seeks to articulate the goals
of the counseling relationship from the perspective of the client’s tradition,
it inevitably will involve the perspective of the counselor’s own tradition.
Thus, counselors should inform their clients about their ethical commitments
as they intersect with the client’s problems and obtain the client’s consent to
bring them to bear on the relationship (Dueck & Reimer, 2003). The counselor
and client can then work together in assessing and cultivating the virtues
that will enable the client to reach these goals and live life more fully.
The counselor must also use interviewing skills to open conversations
about ethics and engage the client in this discussion in a respectful way
that builds trust. Doherty (1995) suggested that counselors might do this
through validating language of moral concern when clients spontaneously
use it, introducing language to make the moral horizon of the clients’ con-
cerns more explicit, and asking questions about the clients’ perceptions of
the consequences of their actions on others thereby exploring the personal,
familial, and cultural sources of their moral sensibilities.
Engagement with the client’s ethical tradition and community need not
be limited to the counseling session. With the client’s consent, counselors
should be skilled at engaging indigenous resources, networks, and helpers
(Arredondo et al., 1996, III.A.2) who will help the client flourish according
to the traditions of the community. To do so will require not only a network
of contacts and relationships, but also a strong enough understanding of the

ethical tradition (e.g., a client’s religious community) to be able to engage
indigenous resources on those resources’ own terms.
These recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive nor to replace
other recommendations about ethical practice in dealing with issues of
values (e.g., Richards & Bergin, 1997; Tan, 2004). However, they are meant
to indicate the first steps counseling can take toward actively embracing its
role in helping clients flourish in a pluralistic society.
Conclusion
MacIntyre’s system of virtue ethics is rich in implications for counseling,

only some of which have been explored in this article. His system focuses
disparate perspectives (positive psychology, constructivism, multiculturalism,
developmental psychology, spiritual direction, and counselor ethics) into a
coherent picture. It reinforces the ethical nature of social science. It crystal-
lizes the ethical nature and challenges of counseling in a pluralistic society.
It also suggests new competencies and virtues for counselors to cultivate
in order to fulfill their potentials. By engaging MacIntyre’s model of virtue
ethics, counseling can become more reflexive about the virtues it cultivates,
the practices it teaches, and the visions of the good life it promotes. With
this self-knowledge, counseling can approach with an open spirit the diverse
range of clients who come to it for care, building a society that is not merely
therapeutic but flourishing in its many traditions.
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Virtues, Values, and the Good Life:

Alasdair MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics

MacIntyre’s Virtue Ethics

© 2008 by the American Counseling Association. All rights reserved.

156 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 157

Restoring the Concept of Virtue

158 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

MacIntyre’s (1984) detailed account of virtue has many implications for

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 159

Counseling for the Development of Virtue

Counseling as virtue ethics is not as foreign a concept as it first might appear.

160 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

But Whose Virtue?

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 161

Social Science and Values

Similar to constructivist thinking in counseling (Hayes & Oppenheim,

162 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

Ethical Traditions in Counseling

MacIntyre’s (1984, 1988, 1990) conclusions about the tradition-dependent

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 163

Is Counseling Really Spiritual Direction?

164 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 165

If counseling is a form of virtue ethics that is influenced by multiple ethical

Beliefs and Attitudes

Following MacIntyre’s (1984) recommendation that principles should be

166 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

Counselors should know their own ethical traditions in depth (Tjeltveit,

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 167

Counselors need to be able to engage others’ ethical traditions to help solve

168 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

MacIntyre’s system of virtue ethics is rich in implications for counseling,

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 169

170 Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52

Counseling and Values ■ January 2008 ■ Volume 52 171

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