PERJURY WHERE IT WAS FILED THE PERJURED DOC in civil case:

G.R. NOS. 173935-38 - ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO v. MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, ET AL.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 173935-38 : December 23, 2008]

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, Petitioner, v. MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, LILY F.

RAQUEÑO, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO, AND AURORA I.
MONTEMAYOR, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueño were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
(petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury
arising from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition
in the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new owner's duplicate copy
of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in
Makati. The Information reads:

On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a New Owner's
Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before Rafael
Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary public in and for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified
and acting as such, and in which Petition said accused subscribed and swore to, among
other things, facts known to them to be untrue, that is: That the Petitioners claim that
the title was lost, which fact was material matter and required by law to be stated in
said Petition, when in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the time
they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a New Owner's Duplicate
Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, that said statement appearing in
paragraph 4 of said Petition:

"4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City, the petitioners had their respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof,
documents were moved from their usual places and thereafter, sometime in the early
part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners were ready to have the
mortgage documents registered, the said owner's duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 could no longer be located at the places where they may and should
likely be found despite earnest and diligent efforts of all the petitioners to
locate the same;"
was false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of the complainant,
Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in order to obtain a
New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, to
the damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

Contrary to law.1 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against
respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before
the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions, also on behalf of LDC,
before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 17010,2 170113 and 170124 covering properties located
in Tagaytay City.

As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the above-mentioned

petitions for issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles over properties located in
Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owner's copies thereof could no longer be found
"despite earnest and diligent efforts" to locate the same.

Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC,5 has in her
possession those titles, filed her opposition to respondents' petitions. 6 Respondents
forthwith amended their respective petitions,7 the amendments reading, according to
petitioner, as follows:

4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owner's duplicate copy of CCT
No. 21578 had been lost and can no longer be recovered, the petitioners filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for the cancellation and issuance of a
new owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the lost copy;

5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been presented before the
said court, the above-named respondents, through their counsel, filed their opposition
to the petition on the ground that the said owner's duplicate copy of Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21578 allegedly is not lost and is actually in their possession and,
thereafter, in a subsequent hearing held on February 10, 2000, said
respondents, through counsel, presented before this Honorable Court the
duplicate copy of said CCT No. 21578;

6. The owner's duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be in the
actual possession of the registered owner thereof and it is indubitable that LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the registered owner entitled to the possession and
control of the evidence of ownership of all corporate properties;

7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and continue to have
possession of said CCT No. 21578, not one of them being a corporate officer of
LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the registered owner of said property;

xxx

9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take possession of CCT
No. 21578, should be ordered by this Honorable Court to surrender the owner's
duplicate copy thereof, which they continue to hold without legal and/or justifiable
reasons, not only for the purpose of causing the registration of the mortgage thereof in
favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for the reason that it
is the corporation, as owner of the property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and
control and therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to law, be kept at the corporation's
principal place of business.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and Tagaytay
RTCs,8 petitioner filed charges of falsification of public documents and perjury against
respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. 9

By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista, with the

imprimatur of the City Prosecutor, dismissed the falsification charges but found
probable cause to indict respondents for perjury.10 Four informations for perjury were
accordingly filed before the MeTC Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner
and Lily F. Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A.
Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; still another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio,
Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents
Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 121496, 121497, 121498 and 121499, respectively.

After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their quashal on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as
the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged character of the
pleadings.11

Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order12 of June 13, 2001, ruled that venue was
properly laid, viz:

To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital point is the
allegations [sic] in the complaint or information of the situs of the offense charged. If
the complaint or information alleges that the crime was committed in the place where
the court has jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
(Colmenares v. Villar, 33 SCRA 186). In other words, what is important is the allegation
in the complaint that the crime was committed in the place which is within the court's
jurisdiction (Mediante v. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).

In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were committed in
Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue
or territorial jurisdiction over these cases. (Underscoring supplied)
cralawlibrary

Nonetheless, finding that respondents' petitions are privileged, the MeTC,

citing Flordelis v. Judge Himalalaon13 and People v. Aquino, et al.,14 granted the Motions
to Quash, viz:

However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of the pleadings]
meritorious. In the case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA 477) which is also a
prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:

"x x x x
Moreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate pleading
filed in court that is relevant to the issues in the case to which it relates is absolutely
priveleged [sic] and it is the law that the same may not be made the subject of a
criminal prosecution. (People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"

Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are contained in a
Petition filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are
relevant to the case the same being for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of
a certificate of title alleged to be lost.

x x x x.

As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the information
contains averments which, if true, would nonetheless constitute a legal excuse or
jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the Information[s] is thus in order.

x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been denied, 15 petitioner

appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch 263 of which, by Decision 16 of January 25, 2006,
affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner filed with this Court the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, 18 contending that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF FLORDELI[S] v.

HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE v. AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING]
THAT STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE
ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino19 cited by the RTC does not apply in the
present controversy as that case involved a libel case and "there is no authority which
states that the rules on absolute privileged statements in pleadings apply to both
crimes of perjury and libel."20

Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan21 apply
wherein the Court sustained the quashal of the therein information for perjury as the
answer to the complaint containing the alleged false allegations did not have to be
under oath.

In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petition's alleged procedural
crack by underscoring the apparent disregard by petitioner of the established policy of
judicial hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the petition should have been first filed
with the Court of Appeals.22

On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the MeTC
and RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel in a pleading are
privileged in nature. Moreover, they contend that since they had amended the original
petitions, there were no more bases for the charges of perjury." 23

A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The present petition is
one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (APPEAL FROM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c) provides that in all cases where only questions
of law are raised, the appeal "shall be to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review in
accordance with Rule 45."24 Indubitably, the issue tendered in this case is a question of
law, hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to the lower
courts' ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid in Pasig.

The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the offense
charged where respondents' petitions were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred
to the "subscribed and sworn" petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there is
no mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The
Complaint-Affidavits,25 which initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional
details. Consider this allegation:

6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly

representing LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for Issuance of a New Owner's
Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

as well as this:

06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA.
CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified
Petitions for Issuance of a New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Tagaytay City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury was
committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has
jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition quoted in each of the
Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati the TCTs of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action
arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.

Perjury is committed as follows:

Article 183, Revised Penal Code.

False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. - The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath,
or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.

x x x x26 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

There are thus four elements to be taken into account "in determining whether there is
a prima facie case" of perjury, viz:
(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent
officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit,
the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.27 (Citation omitted)

It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter,

however, before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which
the law so requires,28 which is imperative in perjury29

Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,30 the action for perjury must be instituted
and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful
statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay. 31

It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether new owner's duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may
issue.

Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional
giving of false statement. So United States v. Cañet 32 teaches, viz:

It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears
from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged
is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of false
evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such
affidavit.33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

While the Court finds that, contrary to the MeTC and RTC ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly laid, and on that score the Court denies the present
petition as priorly stated, it is confronting the sole issue raised by petitioner - whether
the questioned petitions of respondents are, as the MeTC held and which the RTC
affirmed, absolutely privileged on the basis of Flordelis and Aquino.

The issue had already been addressed by the Court in Choa v. People,34 in this wise:

Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases. In Sison, this Court categorically stressed
that the term "absolute privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical
meaning, in connection with civil actions for libel and slander." x x x x.

x x x x.

The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was charged with perjury for
having alleged false statements in his verified answer. This Court held that no perjury
could be committed by Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil
action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that one element of the
crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the sworn statement complained of must
be required by law." 35 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Verily, both the MeTC and the RTC misappreciated this Court's rulings
in Flordelis and Aquino as respondents' petitions-bases of the subject Informations for
perjury are required by law to be under oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, on the ground that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
has no jurisdiction over the Informations for perjury against respondents, DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1
I Records, pp. 1-3.

2
Id. at pp. 4-6.

3
Id. at pp. 7-9.

4
Id. at pp. 10-12.

5
Id. at 644, 647.

6
Id. at 771-772; Exhibit "HH." Not found in the records is the opposition to the
Tagaytay City RTC petition for issuance of new owners' duplicate copy of TCT Nos.
17010, 17011 and 17012.

7
Id. at 774-779. Exhibit "II." Not found in the records are the amended petitions filed
with the Tagaytay City RTC.

8
Id. at 651-666, Exhibit "E" to "H."

9
Id. at 644-650.

10
Id. at 630-635.

11
Id. at 461-476.

12
Id. at 558-561.

13
173 Phil. 616 (1978).

14
124 Phil. 1179 (1966).

15
Records, p. 583.

16
Rollo, pp. 24-28.

17
Id. at 29-30.
18
Id. at 9-23.

19
People v. Aquino, supra note 14.

20
Rollo, p. 17.

21
Flordelis v. Himalalaon, supra note 13.

22
Rollo, p. 103.

23
Id. at 110.

24
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeal.–

x x x x.

(c) Appeal by certiorari .–In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review
on Certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

25
I Records, pp. 15-17; pp. 35-38.

26
Article 183, Revised Penal Code.

27
Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993, 226
SCRA 438, 445 citing Diaz v. People, 191 SCRA 86, 93 (1990).

28
Burgos v. Aquino, 319 Phil. 622 (1995).

29
Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, supra note 27 at 445.

30
People. v. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665 (1938); Alfelor Sr, et al. v. Hon. Intia, et al.., 162
Phil. 596 (1976), citing Lopez v. City Judge, No. L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
616, in turn citing U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265 (1905), People v. Yumang, 120 Phil.
301 (1964), Beltran v. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149 (1954), Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of
Tubod, 109 Phil. 373 (1960).

31
Cudia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998, 284 SCRA 173.

32
30 Phil. 371 (1915).

33
Id. at 378. Also cited in Velez v. Victoriano, 115 Phil. 444, 449 (1962).

34
447 Phil 230 (2003).

35
Id. at 243.
VENUE PERJURY IF DOC. SUBMITTED NOT IN CIVIL OR CRIM CASE:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174168 March 30, 2009

SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY, JOLIE ROSS TAN, ROMER TAN, CHARLIE TAN, and
JESSIE JAMES TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179438 March 30, 2009

SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, Petitioners,

vs.
SY TIONG SHIOU and JUANITA TAN, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

These consolidated petitions involving the same parties. although related, dwell on different issues.

G.R. No. 174168.

This is a petition for review1 assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31
May 2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416.2

On 30 May 2003, four criminal complaints were filed by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses
Sy) against Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan, Romer Tan, Charlie Tan and Jessie
James Tan (Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.) before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. The cases were
later consolidated. Two of the complaints, I.S. Nos. 03E-15285 and 03E-15286, 3 were for alleged
violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. In these complaints, the
Spouses Sy averred that they are stockholders and directors of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the
corporation) who asked Sy Tiong Shiou, et al., officers of the corporation, to allow them to inspect
the books and records of the business on three occasions to no avail. In a letter 4 dated 21 May 2003,
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intra-corporate cases pending in court. 5

In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and 03E-15288, 6 Sy Tiong Shiou was charged with
falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC. According to the Spouses Sy, Sy Tiong Shiou executed under
oath the 2003 General Information Sheet (GIS) wherein he falsely stated that the shareholdings of
the Spouses Sy had decreased despite the fact that they had not executed any conveyance of their
shares.7
Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argued before the prosecutor that the issues involved in the civil case for
accounting and damages pending before the RTC of Manila were intimately related to the two
criminal complaints filed by the Spouses Sy against them, and thus constituted a prejudicial question
that should require the suspension of the criminal complaints. They also argued that the Spouses
Sy’s request for inspection was premature as the latter’s concern may be properly addressed once
an answer is filed in the civil case. Sy Tiong Shiou, on the other hand, denied the accusations
against him, alleging that before the 2003 GIS was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the same was shown to respondents, who at that time were the
President/Chairman of the Board and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that they did not
object to the entries in the GIS. Sy Tiong Shiou also argued that the issues raised in the pending civil
case for accounting presented a prejudicial question that necessitated the suspension of criminal
proceedings.

On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the

suspension of the criminal complaints for violation of the Corporation Code and the dismissal of the
criminal complaints for falsification and perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou.8 The reviewing prosecutor
approved the resolution. The Spouses Sy moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but their
motion was denied on 14 June 2004.9 The Spouses Sy thereupon filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which the latter denied in a resolution issued on 02 September
2004.10 Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the resolution of 20 July
2005.11

The Spouses Sy elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ. The appellate court granted the
petition12 and directed the City Prosecutor’s Office to file the appropriate informations against Sy
Tiong Shiou, et al. for violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code and
of Articles 172 and 183 of the RPC. The appellate court ruled that the civil case for accounting and
damages cannot be deemed prejudicial to the maintenance or prosecution of a criminal action for
violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a finding in the civil
case that respondents mishandled or misappropriated the funds would not be determinative of their
guilt or innocence in the criminal complaint. In the same manner, the criminal complaints for
falsification and/or perjury should not have been dismissed on the ground of prejudicial question
because the accounting case is unrelated and not necessarily determinative of the success or failure
of the falsification or perjury charges. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that there was
probable cause that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed falsification and that the City of Manila where the
2003 GIS was executed is the proper venue for the institution of the perjury charges. Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but their motion was denied. 13

On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 179438 with G.R. No. 174168. 14

Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in affirming, modifying or reversing the
recommendations of the public prosecutor cannot be the subject of certiorari or review of the Court
of Appeals because the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body within the purview of Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners rely on the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R.
Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 wherein he wrote that this Court should not be called
upon to determine the existence of probable cause, as there is no provision of law authorizing an
aggrieved party to petition for such a determination.16 In any event, they argue, assuming without
admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the DOJ has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila. They claim that the Spouses Sy’s request for inspection
was not made in good faith and that their motives were tainted with the intention to harass and to
intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. from pursuing the criminal and civil cases pending before the
prosecutor’s office and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46. Thus, to accede to the
Spouses Sy’s request would pose serious threats to the existence of the corporation. 17 Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. aver that the RTC had already denied the motion for production and inspection and
instead ordered petitioners to make the corporate records available to the appointed independent
auditor. Hence, the DOJ did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
recommendation of the City Prosecutor of Manila.18 They further argue that adherence to the Court
of Appeals’ ruling that the accounting case is unrelated to, and not necessarily determinative of the
success of, the criminal complaint for falsification and/or perjury would unnecessarily indict petitioner
Sy Tiong Shiou for the said offenses he may not have committed but only because of an outcome
unfavorable to him in the civil action.19

Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-
judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor
regarding the presence of probable cause.20 Moreover, it is settled that the preliminary investigation
proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of
trial, is the function of the prosecution.21 This Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against the supposed offender. 22

As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions. Hence, the principle of non-interference
does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person
to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 23

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ gravely abused its discretion when it suspended
the hearing of the charges for violation of the Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question
and when it dismissed the criminal complaints.

A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The reason behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.24

The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve any prejudicial question.

The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case No. 03-106456 pending before the RTC
Manila, Branch 46, seeks the issuance of an order compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full,
complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid to, received and earned by
the corporation since 1993 and to restitute it such amounts, proceeds and funds which the Spouses
Sy have misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that the Spouses Sy were
illegally prevented from getting inside company premises and from inspecting company records, and
that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically the Spouses Sy’s shares in the
corporation. Surely, the civil case presents no prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a
finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will have no effect on the determination of guilt in
the complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code; the civil
case concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shiou’s refusal to allow inspection of the records, while in the
falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the veracity of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou
in the sworn GIS.

Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds that there is enough probable cause to
warrant the institution of the criminal cases.
The term probable cause does not mean ‘actual and positive cause’ nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 25

In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may be arrived at, or in order to engender the
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be
present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which
there should be–at the most–no criminal offense.26

Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:

xxx

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be
open to inspection by any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable
hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or
minutes, at his expense.

Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to allow any director, trustee, stockholder or
member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its records or minutes, in accordance
with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to such director, trustee, stockholder or member for
damages, and in addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall be punishable under Section 144
of this Code: Provided, That if such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the Board of
Directors or Trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the
directors or trustees who voted for such refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a defense to
any action under this section that the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the
corporation's records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior
examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not
acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand.

Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:

Sec. 144. Violations of the Code.—Violations of any of the provisions of this Code or its
amendments not otherwise specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not less than
one thousand (₱1,000.00) pesos but not more than ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos or by
imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a corporation, the same may, after notice and
hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude the institution of appropriate action against the
director, trustee or officer of the corporation responsible for said violation: Provided, further, That
nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a corporation
provided in this Code.

In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang, et al.,27 the Court had the occasion to enumerate the
requisites before the penal provision under Section 144 of the Corporation Code may be applied in a
case of violation of a stockholder or member’s right to inspect the corporate books/records as
provided for under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. The elements of the offense, as laid down in
the case, are:

First. A director, trustee, stockholder or member has made a prior demand in writing for a copy of
excerpts from the corporation’s records or minutes;
Second. Any officer or agent of the concerned corporation shall refuse to allow the said director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy said excerpts;

Third. If such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the board of directors or trustees,
the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who
voted for such refusal; and,

Fourth. Where the officer or agent of the corporation sets up the defense that the person demanding
to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation’s records and minutes has improperly used any
information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or
of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his
demand, the contrary must be shown or proved.28

Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code, the defense of
improper use or motive is in the nature of a justifying circumstance that would exonerate those who
raise and are able to prove the same. Accordingly, where the corporation denies inspection on the
ground of improper motive or purpose, the burden of proof is taken from the shareholder and placed
on the corporation.29 However, where no such improper motive or purpose is alleged, and even
though so alleged, it is not proved by the corporation, then there is no valid reason to deny the
requested inspection.

In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the denial of inspection was predicated on the
pending civil case against the Spouses Sy. This is evident from the 21 May 2003 letter of Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al.’s counsel30 to the Spouses Sy,31 which reads:

Gentlemen:

We write in behalf of our clients, SY SIY HO, INC. ( Guan Yiac Hardware); SY TIONG SHIOU,
JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE ROSS TAN; CHARLIE TAN; ROMER TAN; and JESSE JAMES TAN,
relative to your letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be informed that a case for Accounting and
Damages had already been filed against your clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, denominated as Civil Case No. 03-106456.

We fully understand your desire for our clients to respond to your demands, however, under the
prevailing circumstance this would not be advisable. The concerns that you raised in your letter can
later on be addressed after your clients shall have filed their responsive pleading in the abovesaid
case.

We trust that this response will at the moment be enough.32

Even in their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 23 September 2003,33 Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not make
any allegation that "the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation’s
records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of
the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good
faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand." Instead, they merely reiterated the pendency
of the civil case. There being no allegation of improper motive, and it being undisputed that Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. denied Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy’s request for inspection, the Court rules and so
holds that the DOJ erred in dismissing the criminal charge for violation of Section 74 in relation to
Section 144 of the Corporation Code.

Now on the existence of probable cause for the falsification and/or perjury charges.

The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense of falsification of public documents under
Article 171, paragraph 4; and/or perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The
elements of falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a
legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;34 (c) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent to injure a third person.35 On the other hand, the elements of perjury are: (a) that the accused
made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement
or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that
in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood;
and, (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.

A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be filed within thirty (30) days following the date of
the annual or a special meeting, and must be certified and sworn to by the corporate secretary, or by
the president, or any duly authorized officer of the corporation.36 From the records, the 2003 GIS
submitted to the SEC on 8 April 2003 was executed under oath by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila, in his
capacity as Vice President and General Manager.37 By executing the document under oath, he, in
effect, attested to the veracity38 of its contents. The Spouses Sy claim that the entries in the GIS
pertaining to them do not reflect the true number of shares that they own in the company. They
attached to their complaint the 2002 GIS of the company, also executed by Sy Tiong Shiou, and
compared the entries therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS. The Spouses Sy noted the marked
decrease in their shareholdings, averring that at no time after the execution of the 2002 GIS, up to
the time of the filing of their criminal complaints did they execute or authorize the execution of any
document or deed transferring, conveying or disposing their shares or any portion thereof; and thus
there is absolutely no basis for the figures reflected in the 2003 GIS. 39 The Spouses Sy claim that the
false statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the wrongful intent of injuring them. All the
elements of both offenses are sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavits.

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ holding, citing the case of Fabia v. Court of Appeals,
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction no longer precludes the simultaneous filing of the criminal
case with the corporate/civil case.40 Moreover, the Court finds that the City of Manila is the proper
venue for the perjury charges, the GIS having been subscribed and sworn to in the said place.
Under Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the criminal action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred.41 In Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice,42 the Court held that the
felony is consummated when the false statement is made.43 Thus in this case, it was alleged that the
perjury was committed when Sy Tiong Shiou subscribed and sworn to the GIS in the City of Manila,
thus, following Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the City of Manila is the
proper venue for the offense.

G. R. No. 179438.

This petition assails the decision44 and resolution45 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and
29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897.

On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a
family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a
letter46 to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) stating that the control, supervision and
administration of all corporate funds were exercised by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses
Sy), corporate president and assistant treasurer, respectively. In the same letter, Juanita Tan
disclosed that Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from
1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years were less
than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita
Tan sought to be free from any responsibility
over all corporate funds. The Board granted Juanita Tan’s request and authorized the employment
of an external auditor to render a complete

audit of all the corporate accounting books and records.47 Consequently, the Board hired the
accounting firm Banaria, Banaria & Company. In its Report48 dated 5 April 2003, the accounting firm
attributed to the Spouses Sy ₱67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994
to 2002.49

A demand letter50 was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy on 15 April 2003. On the same date,
the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and
other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and
ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery
against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. 51 A search warrant was
subsequently issued by the Regional Trial Court.52

On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice President and General Manager, called a special
meeting to be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the positions vacated by the Spouses Sy. Sy Tiong Shiou
was subsequently elected as the new president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice
President.53 Despite these developments, Sy Chim still caused the issuance of a Notice of
Stockholders meeting dated 11 June 2003 in his capacity as the alleged corporate president. 54

Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for
Accounting and Damages55 against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete
and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and
for the restitution of the said amount.56 The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the
ground of lack of authority.

By way of Answer,57 the Spouses Sy averred that Sy Chim was a mere figurehead and Felicidad
Chan Sy merely performed clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse, Juanita Tan,
who have been authorized by the corporation’s by-laws to supervise, control and administer
corporate funds, and as such were the ones responsible for the unaccounted funds. They assailed
the meetings called by Sy Tiong Shiou on the grounds that the same were held without notice to
them and without their participation, in violation of the by-laws. The Spouses Sy also pursued their
counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

On 9 September 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party
Complaint,58 praying that their attached Third Party Complaint59 be allowed and admitted against Sy
Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate
funds.

On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and
forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. 60 On 16
January 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not
furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted in their having
been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus, they opted
not to file a motion for reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals.

In its Decision dated 26 May 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan.61 The appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim
Rules), it not being included in the exclusive enumeration of allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule
2 thereof. Moreover, even if such a pleading were allowed, the admission of the third-party complaint
against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan still would have no basis from the facts or the law and
jurisprudence.62 The Court of Appeals also ruled that the respondent judge committed a manifest
error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and in summarily
declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer within the
purported reglementary period. The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s 8 October 2003 Order
admitting the third-party complaint, as well as the 19 December 2003 Order, declaring Sy Tiong
Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer. The trial court was further ordered to
dismiss the third-party complaint without prejudice to any action that the corporation may separately
file against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.63

The Spouses Sy filed a motion for reconsideration, but their motion was denied on 29 August 2007. 64

Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court that a third-party complaint is not excluded
or prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that their third- party
complaint is not actionable because their action is not in respect of the corporation’s claims. They
add that the disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in multiplicity of suits.

The third-party complaint should be allowed.

The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies read:

Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.—The following pleadings are prohibited:

(1) Motion to dismiss;

(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;

(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those
filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and

(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to
clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath.

Rule 2, Sec.2. Pleadings allowed.—The only pleadings allowed to be filed under these Rules are the
complaint, answer, compulsory counterclaims or cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the
answer to the counterclaims or cross-claims.65

There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is
it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-
entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 66 Statutes, including
rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its
leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this
predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly
apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the signification of
others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy
and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible
extent.67 Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. 68

This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:

Sec. 3. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. 69

Now, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is actually a complaint
independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. In fact, were it not for Rule 6,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would have to be filed independently
and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant.
Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid
circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one
litigation all the matters arising from one particular set of facts.70

It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the
allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one objective—the expeditious
disposition of cases. Moreover, following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules,
and taking into consideration the suppletory application of the Rules of Court under

Rule 1, Sec. 271 of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should
not be prohibited in controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this
conclusion are rendered beyond question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
are not complete strangers to the litigation as in fact they are the moving spirit behind the filing of the
principal complaint for accounting and damages against the Spouses Sy. 1avvphi1

The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy should be admitted.

A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be
found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive
right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead another
as third-party defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct

liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to
both the plaintiff and the defendant.72

In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint
and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which
prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.73

The complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers of the corporation, have acted illegally in
raiding its corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render a full, complete and true accounting
of all the amounts, proceeds and funds paid to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993
and to restitute to the corporation all such amounts, proceeds, and funds which they took and
misappropriated for their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff and its
stockholders.74 On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the day-to day operations and
complete control and custody of the funds of the corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for
any shortfall or unaccounted

difference of the corporation’s cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan should render a
full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and earned
by the corporation since 1993, including the amount attributed to the Spouses Sy in the complaint for
accounting and damages. In their prayer, the Spouses Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita
Tan be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of the corporation’s claim for accounting and
damages, and that in the event that they, the Spouses Sy, are adjudged liable to the corporation, Sy
Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all amounts necessary to discharge their liability to
the corporation by way of indemnity or reimbursement.

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the
Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the Spouses Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of the
plaintiff corporation’s claims,75 and thus the allowance of the third-party complaint is warranted.

WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:

G.R. No. 174168

The petition for review is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31
May 2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

G.R. No. 179438

The petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004
and 29 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are SET ASIDE and the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19 December 2003 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member per Raffle dated 25 June 2008 in lieu of J. Arturo D. Brion who inhibited
himself.

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 174168), pp. 10-33.

2
Id. at 37-60; penned by Associate Justice Renato S. Dacudao with the concurrence of
Associate Justice Remedios Salazar Fernando and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.

3
Id. at 85-94.

4
Id. at 83.

5
Civil Case No. 03-106456-00 is for Accounting and Damages pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46. Incidentally, the other petition, G. R. No. 179438 is an
offshoot of this civil case.

6
Id. at 95-104.

7
The 2003 GIS, compared to the 2002 GIS showed a decrease from 33.75 % to only 17.40
% ownership of the outstanding capital stock of the corporation for Sy Chim and a decrease
from 16.88% to 8.70% ownership of the outstanding capital stock for Felicidad Chan Sy.

8
Id. at 111-118; penned by Assistant City prosecutor Bernardino L. Cabiles.

9
Id. at 137-143.

10
Id. at 183-185.

11
Id. at 207-209.

12
Id. at 37-66; Decision dated 31 May 2006.
13
Id. at 71-72; Resolution dated 8 August 2006.

14
Id. at 528-529.

15
324 Phil. 568, 619-620 (1996).

16
Rollo, (G.R. No. 174168), pp. 22-23.

17
Id. at 27.

18
Id. at 28

19
Id. at 29.

20
Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, 19 October 2005, 473 SCRA 350, 360-361.

21
Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 499 (2002).

Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 139912, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA
22

386, 406.

23
Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129 (2002)

24
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460, 470 (1995).

25
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101978, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 349, 360.

G.R. No. 178511, 4 December 2008, citing Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130191,
26

April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721.

27
Id.

28
Id.

29
Id. citing 5A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §. 2220, 2008.

30
Atty. Elvin P. Grana of A. Tan, Zoleta and Associates Law Firm.

31
The law firm of Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako.

32
Rollo, (G.R. No. 174168), p. 83.

33
Id. at 106-108.

"Legal obligation "means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
34

narrated, Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two 210, (15th Ed., Rev. 2001).

35
Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 464 Phil. 102, 115 (2004).

36
Rollo, p. 317; As stated in the instructions on the GIS Form.

37
Id. at 321.
38
Id.; "that the matters set forth in this General Information Sheet x x x are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge," last page of the GIS Standard Form.

39
Supra note 6.

40
Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 397 (2002).

Saavedra, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93173, 15 September 1993, 226 SCRA
41

438, 445 citing Diaz v. People, 191 SCRA 86, 93 (1990); see also Burgos v. Aquino, 319
Phil. 623 (1995). The elements of perjury are:

1.The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter;

2.The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to

receive and administer oath;

3.In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of
a falsehood; and

4.The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.

42
Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 495.

43
Id. at 512 citing U.S. v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).

44
Id. at 386-389.

45
Rollo (G.R. No. 179438), pp. 363-373; Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan v. Hon. Artemio S.
Tipon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Manila, Sy Chim and
Felicidad Chan Sy, penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with the concurrence of
Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz.

46
Id. at 58-59.

47
Id. at 60-63; Minutes of the Special Meeting dated 24 March 2003.

48
Rollo (G.R. No. 179438), pp. 66-74.

49
Id. at 73.

50
Id. at 85.

51
Id. at 75. The complaint was docketed as IS No. 03D-12147.

52
Id. at 76-77.

53
Rollo (G.R. No. 179436), pp. 78-81; Minutes of the Special Meeting dated 6 May 2003.

54
Id. at 84.
55
Id. at 34-49.

56
Id. at 48-49.

57
Id. at 86-113.

58
Id. at 179-185.

59
Id. at 186-197. The third party plaintiffs prayed that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan
directly and solely liable in respect of plaintiff’s claim for accounting and damages.

60
Id. at 229-232.

61
Id. at 363-373.

62
Id. at 368-371.

63
Id. at 363-373; Court of Appeals Decision dated 26 May 2004.

64
Id. at 386-389.

SC-A.M. No. 01-2-04 (2001) Entitled, Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
65

Controversies.

66
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 459, 467.

H.C. Black, Handbook on the Construction on the Construction and Interpretation of the
67

Laws 322, (2nd Ed, 1971).

68
Paras v. COMELEC, 332 Phil. 56, 64 (1996).

69
SC-A.M. No. 01-2-04 (2001), Rule 1, Sec. 3.

70
Tayao v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 162733, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 726, 732-733; Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongco, 137 Phil. 238, 243 (1969);
British Airways v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 379, 394 (1998) citing 67 CJS 1034. In Asian
Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160242, 17 May
2005, the Court had the occasion to declare that "the purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party
which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits."

71
SEC. 2. Suppletory application of the Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court, in so far as they
may be applicable and are not inconsistent with these Rules, are hereby adopted to form an
integral part of these Rules.

Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160242,
72

17 May 2005, 458 SCRA 750, 759.

73
Id.

74
Rollo (G.R. No. 179438), p. 40.
 75
Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85868, 13 October 1989, 178
SCRA 526. The tests to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in
respect of plaintiff's claim." are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the
plaintiffs claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or
different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-
party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability
arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any
defense which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiff s claim.

RECONCILING VENUE FOR PERJURY:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City
1

(RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-
Makati City decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines
(Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.

The Antecedents

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the
Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. 2

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with
prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The
first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay
City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on
March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was
charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was improperly
3

laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted
and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense because: (a) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or
proceeding commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no
other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was filed; and (c)
she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make
out perjury by making a false affidavit.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also
4

ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-
5

Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’ motion for reconsideration. 6

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the
MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and
7 8

jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

The Assailed RTC Decision

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy]
(GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing
view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high court reiterated the
rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to
declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,]
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the
proper venue of the criminal action[.]

xxxx

x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that the city court
of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the
complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely on the act of
subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the charge against the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of
the questioned documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City. (emphasis ours)
9

The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of discretion
since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The
RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of the present
case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners
can later appeal the decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.10

The Petition

The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the Information for
perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the
present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim. They argued that the facts in Ilusorio
11

showed that the filing of the petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential
ingredient that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a
General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).

Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the Comment to the
petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the crime of
perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material. The Solicitor General observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath
only became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City,
where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to
take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.

Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear
the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-
defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed
within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the
12

necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses
and other facilities for his defense are available. 13

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court
which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
 (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be

understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the
court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the requirement for a
Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by
a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also
be in a sworn certification annexed to the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the
affiant is required to execute a statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or
any competent person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his
or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the
material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations
which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. 14

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for making a
false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.

(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for
a legal purpose. (emphasis ours)
15

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper
venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by
Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum
Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the
second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath
before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati
City:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in
the Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.
16

We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to
have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the
Information:

[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of

money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood. (underscoring ours)
17

Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the
false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true.
Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury
case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

Referral to the En Banc

The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict between the
division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong
case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.

The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copies of certificates of title.
The verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City,
but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The question posed was: which court (Pasig City,
Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?

We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places where the
verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to
assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement found
relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v.
Cañet which ruled:
18
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it appears from the
information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the
intentional giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such
affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted]

In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was
subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where the false
statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of
Justice that, in turn, cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris. We ruled in Villanueva that –
19 20

Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury,
and the crime is complete when a witness' statement has once been made.

The Crime of Perjury: A Background

To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical background of
how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and against the
defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil
case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on
the Information filed, the present case involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit
on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the parties in their
respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back
to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took effect. Sy Tiong,
21

on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States
v. Norris, a 1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings
rendered after the present RPC took effect. 22

The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through the presentation in
court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Cañet ruling was rendered,
the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section
3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No.
58 for the procedural aspect.
23

Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, disposition, or
certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and
shall moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in any
court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 and 5393 of the Revised
24 25

Statutes of the United States. Act No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false
26

affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction.

27

In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be the court
of the place where the crime was committed.

As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act of representing a
false document in a judicial proceeding. The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the
28

place where the false document was presented since the presentation was the act that
consummated the crime.

The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the RPC interestingly
29

explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage
between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors: 30

Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s Proposed
Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del
Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of the old Penal
Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in
turn was expressly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act
2718 expressly revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.

It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony, whereas, under
the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish
origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is derived from American
statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on false testimony embrace perjury committed in
court or in some contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of
a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony "are more severe and
strict than those of Act 1697" on perjury. [italics ours]

With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:

The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit,
upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]

in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other
than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer
an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.

As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially involved
perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the
SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil. From this perspective, the situs of the
oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had
the charge involved an actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and accompanied by an
affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no distinction between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which
separately deals with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time
also penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the place where
the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not have been the place
where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense charged in the Information.

The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn petitions
filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited
sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The
Court ruled that the proper venue should be the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where
the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new
owner’s duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of Title]
may issue." To the Court, "whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were
31

subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional
giving of false statement," citing Cañet as authority for its statement.
32

The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue because of its very
categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves
the impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a material consideration,
forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC
likewise applies to false testimony in civil cases.

The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge been Article 182
of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The
Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn statement is used in a civil
case, although no such distinction was made under Cañet because the applicable law at the time
(Act No. 1697) did not make any distinction.

If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling, then only that
portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other
portion refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil
proceeding in court. As a perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality
is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case,
Pasig City.

Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes from the time
General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940.
Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of criminal actions and it
expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any one of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place. This change was followed by the passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
1âwphi1

Procedure, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
33 34

Procedure which all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal
actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the Information that followed, the criminal act
charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction
and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit;
thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and
sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183
of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To
reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the
making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime
of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is
given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the
sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the
submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of
venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime
committed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Leave)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On leave.

1
Dated April 28, 2010; rollo, pp. 137-143.

2
Id. at 11.

3
Id. at 29-37.

4
Order dated March 26, 2009; rollo, pp. 55-56.

5
Id. at 56.

6
Order dated August 28, 2009, pp. 69-70.

7
30 Phil. 371 (1915).

8
G.R. Nos. 173935-38, December 23, 2008, 575 SCRA 272.

9
Rollo, pp. 142-143.

10
Order dated June 9, 2010; id. at 154.

11
G.R. Nos. 174168 and 179438, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 517.

12
United States v. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 (1913).

13
Parulan v. Reyes, 78 Phil 855 (1947).

Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004,
14

433 SCRA 455.

15
Monfort III v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007, 517 SCRA 447, 461.
16
Supra note 2.

17
Ibid.

18
Supra note 7, at 378.

19
G.R. No. 162187, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 512.

300 U.S. 564 (1937). The perjury was based on a false testimony by the defendant at the
20

hearing before the Senate Committee in Nebraska.

The Penal Code for the Philippines which took effect from July 19, 1887 to December 31,
21

1931.

22
Took effect on January 1, 1932.

23
Entitled "The Law on Criminal Procedure" which took effect on April 23, 1900.

Every person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in
24

any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration,
deposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.

25
The law refers to subornation of perjury.

26
United States v. Concepcion, 13 Phil. 424 (1909).

27
Id. at 428-429.

28
People v. Cruz, et al., 197 Phil. 815 (1982).

29
Ramon C. Aquino and Carolina Griño-Aquino, 2 The Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed.

30
Id. at 301-302.

31
Ilusorio v. Bildner, supra note 8, at 283.

32
Id. at 284.

33
Section 14, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. -

(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of
the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.

34
Section 15, Rule 110. Place where action is to be instituted. –

(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.