ra Neiee, Weer eer ty L, 4955 Rewer d'ctody de plus phe Dweseun et Medewol Coffiet Ss Mowsnsawe / Manin on), D. J. ALLAN The practical syllogism tions of character. Thi ism, None of these passages can be said to provide a full and factory account of it; and moreover it does not appear in qui the same shape in the De motu as in the other passages. Some scholars yply something hitherto lacking in Aris ‘of movement in the universe (see 700b 4-15) and his endeavour is to be done by you her int of action in accordance with. principles, S se326 D. J. ALLAN to show that animals, whether in their deliberate choice or it live movements, exemplify those general principles of movement which he has discovered i himself the more from which mover centrating upon human action, and parti boration between reason and d tain cases; but he does this, least from book VI onwards, with some reference to his more general psychology of living beings. Let us start from the De anima. The question raised is, from what power does movement-in-place originate ? Qualitative change is not considered. The answer proves to be that the motive force is the desiring faculty (10 dgexrixév) and that it is qua endowed with this power that animals can move themselves (fj Sgexttxiv tb Gov, raiiry Eavtod xivqtuxdy). The ultimate principle of movement, how- ever, is to be sought in the object by which the faculty of desire is stimulated, i. cither the pleasant or the “apparent good”. And it is only by alliance with imagination that desire is capable of appre- hending such an object. Corresponding to the distinction between the good and the pleasant, one may distinguish two forms of imagi- nation, the reflective or deliberative and the sensuous, of which the latter alone extends to the lower animals, imagination is, Aristotle gives a brief outline of the practical syllogism. Tt is here said to consist of (a) a universal judgment of the form “such a man ought to do such an action”; and (b) a twofold particular application “I am (or, he is) such a man, and the present act is such an act”. The conclusion is, of course, not another judgment, but the performance of the action; and this follows from the fact, upon which Aristotle does not enlarge, that the major premiss is a command and is the expression of a certain emotional disposition. What he says here is that the affirmation of the minor premiss is the immediate pre- Jiminary to movement, but that the movement in a sense results from both premisses. The major premiss, however, is “stationary” and the disposition expressed in it remains fixed, whereas the minor - Some comparison is intended here between the operation of the two premisses and the mechanism of the joints of the limbs, ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM. a7 In the Ethics, the theory is outlined in very similar fashion in the seventh book, 11472 4 foll. But, by some fault in the structure of the central books which we can no longer explain, the theory has been surreptitiously introduced into the sixth book long before it is thus openly explained in the seventh (see esp. and 1143a35-b 5). This is a defec le would pre- sumably have removed in a final revision, and we know beyond controversy that these books, which are common to both versions of the Ethics In book VII, then, he mentions as a possible explanation of dexgaoia (ie, 18 to passion although one knows what is right), that a man may possess all the requirements of knowledge, both concerning himself and concerning a present object, except the crucial judgment of perception, that ¢his is an object of a certain kind. His power to make this general premiss, But he may st is of such a kind”, (While, therefore, his knowledge &y' éavrod is complete, his knowledge txt ro® xgiyuaros is only three-quarters complete, and remains at the level of 1 ‘oidvde). So far, the analysis ‘calls the De anima, There follows a passage (1147a 24-31) which is of much interest for the reconstruction of the theory, and, as will be seen later, is echoed in the De mot. “Further, the cause (of éovola) may be viewed in this way. One judgment is universal, the other bears upon particulars which belong, to the sphere of perception. When these judgments coalesce into one, i is necessary chat, just as lewhere (sc, in the sphere of theory], the mind assents to a conclusion, so here, when the premisses are‘ practical, it should at once act. E.g. if ‘one ought to taste every thing sweet’ and ‘here is a particular sweet thing’, it is necessary that one who has the power, and is not [sc. physically] hindered, should at once proceed to act”. E I must reserve, for the present, my comment on the necessity which is ewice asserted here. It may be noticed at-this point that cc eaea8 D. J. ALLAN the expression in this passage is somewhat loose, sin gest that in demonstration, as well a: premisses which have a part know, is not Aristotle's doctrine. But the general sense is clear, To see the context in which this analysis is given, a retrospect over the argument of the E/bics is necessary, and we ought here to take some account of both the Eudemian and the Nicomachean books? In the third lysis of the process of distinction between the pr (in book I ch. 1 also, Seems to me to avoid any premature use of this distinction.) De- liberation he regards as a process whereby we discover means of attaining an end, select one chain of means in preference to an- ind since it is preceded by wish for the end, it ed by desire for the means. The deliberation itself, how- inctive operation of the practical reason, In book VI ch. 9 he locates it more precisely by saying that most deasic where his doctrine hhad undergone the most radical change. (La gendse de Fawore PA. depres les ‘travaux récents, Rev. néo-scol. de philoophie, Louvain, 1927, p. 443). Some such hypothesis seems necessary and it is supported by the fact, long ago ob- ‘many duplicate pasages, For our present int oue that books VI logism, which first appears in VI ch. § and 11, plays part in book VIL. (i) The contrast between pedynats ‘now taken for granted (VI ch. main division of the whole 5 §5, we sce the first sign of 1e of owpeoainn whereby it becomes in a sense the paramount moral virese, This is abo a feature of book ‘VIL In this book, coppostvn and dxolaola represent dgers and xaxia. 28 2 whole. ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM 39 is “one species of search”; and for his concept of “search” we refer to the Posterior Analytics. (Ethics 1142 a 31: vb tyreiv 68 wai xd odeveodar Stapéper xd yae PoukeieoBar tnteiv x. torly, Com- pare Post. An, II ch. and 2. n contemplative and practical reasoning and es is imade for the first time in book VI, Both aim at truth, but the truth of practical t function of true reason and right desire. » for the appetitive faculty, what true af- ligence. There is accordingly an analogy firmation is for the between the internal structure of the reasoning of theoretical scien- ce, which starts from self-evident principles and ends with the demonstration of the properties of its subject, and that of the ‘Gebmnos who starts from the highest practical ‘good aprehended by him and converted by 1d dgex and who brings his reasoning down to the particular. (For the ques. tion of priotity which arises here, I may perhaps refer to my own discussion, Aristotle's account of the origin of moral principles, Pro- ceedings of the XI" International Congress of Philosophy, (1953), Vol. XII, pp. 120-27.) This analogy is one of the main themes of the account of intellectual virtue in the sixth book; and it is here that the practical syllogism is assumed before its overt appearance in the seventh book. To such a comparison there is this obvious objection: No singular terms enter into scientific reasoning in its finished form. All action, ‘on the other hand, is particular, and the terms which enter into the minor premisses of practical syllogisms are necessarily singular, Aris- totle tries to turn aside this objection, and even to derive from it, some confirmation of his theory. There is, after all, a correspondence | between the intuition of the particular by the ge6iios, and that of the indemonstrable first premisses of the sciences; in the one case in order to start the discursive reasoning, in the other to bring it to an end. (VI 1142.425-30 and 1143 a35 foll. The word dvel- vevrat in 1142425 means not so much “is opposed to” as “corres, ponds to, thought with a difference”.) ‘Thus the practical syllogism appears here, not primarily becauise is required in order to throw light on particular problems about action, or about the method of political science,-but because an = ae330 D. J. ALLAN analogy between the two intellectual virtues is part of the plan of the treatise. But, once introduced for this reason, it can hardly fail to have important consequences for the analysis of moral actiot and thus we find that Aristotle is led, in the chapter on riow! (VI9) and the disc modify and deepen his earlier acco between intellectual and moral this revision will be considered later. ‘The statement of the theory in the De motu anit generally similar to that in the Ethics, has some peculiar features. ‘Aristotle says that, having explained the sources of unvarying move- ment, he must take account of those intermittent moyements which proceed from living beings, and that this involves an inquiry into Ss influence of the soul upon the body. There follows a discus- in three parts, () He says that all the emotions are accom- fasied by incu of Kat or of coldlfa' some pare ofthe body, which occurs under the influence agination. (ii) He compares the movement of conscious beings, or their decision not to move, to “the operation of our thought when occupied with invariable facts”. (iii) He endeavours to derive the above-mentioned changes of temperature fom the operation of pnewma in the body, and so to make qualitative change dependent on a spatial movement. The second phase alone concerns us. In terms closely similar to those used in Ethics, book VII (p. 327 above), he says (701 a 10 foll.): “There, the end is the truth seen, (for when one conceives th ppremisses, one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion) but here the two premisses result in a conclusion which is an action —for example, one conceives that every man ought to walk, one is a man oneself: straightway one walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightway one remains at rest. And one so acts in the two cases provided that there is nothing in the one case to compel of in the other to prevent”. After examples which, apparently, are meant to illustrate different kinds of inference parallel to’ the moods of the theoretical syllogism, Aristotle con- cludes “Now that the action is the conclusion is clear. But the pre- misses of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible”. (English version by A.S. L. Farquharson). ‘More examples are then given, which show that a premiss “of the ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM aan possible” starts from the desirability of some End, and leads to the performance of an action as a means, whereas a premiss “of the good” starts rather from the noti in a series of of a general rule to be realized ference is not absolute, since the End the observance of such a rule is the Enc s differs in the two cases “this is an example of a is is a means to the end”, and a distinction such as De motu 701a23-5 is therefore justified. It would have been helpful to Aristotle in the Erbics, I return to this point later.) Te seems obvious that Aristotle has in mind, in all these passages, the remarkable analysis of the operation of techné which Plato gives in the Pheedrus, 268a foll. Bare theoretical knowledge, says Plato, is to be ranked among the preliminaries of art, rather than as a need to classify in scientific fashion the forms (a) of ‘the human soul and (b) of speech, and thence propound general rules showing how one thing is naturally acted upon by another. “Such men are exsily persuaded to such kind of action for such reasons, others are hard to persuade, ete.” But if unaccompanied by intui ‘useless, A thetorician must also be skilled mn under the known rule He must judge the right moment for action”. When he can do this, he will be the master of an art which is a veritable ywzayoyla. The verbal resemblance is so close that it is hardly possible to doubt that Aristotle had the Phaedrus passage consciously in mind. In the De anime 434216, he says: "Exel 8 § nev xaddlov Sxdhyyns sual Mby0s, #88 x05 vad” Bxaora (F wey yg Adyer Bx Bet tv rowoiroy 1B rovbvBe moderey, f 88 Gre e6be wb viv roubvbe, add rovbe, fbn / the application of both to particulars, That this last requires of perception (alodnois) is emphasi in and again in the Eth interesting therefore that this is just how Plato describes it, . Betws rf alodhoe dévacda txaxohovdety . . ~braV"8E elaciy te « oa2 D. J. ALLAN ixaviis Exp, olog bp” ofwy neler, aapayryvouevdy te Buvards f Suawode- vénevos Eavrd evBelxwooda, br otis kort val atiey H qpioic, aeQl is tore Foav of Abyot, x. .A. 271¢-272a, Finally, both Plato and Aris- totle say that when the conditions are realised the effect follows necessarily from the cause On the other hand, the purpose of the analysis is widely different in the two cases, Plato is concerned with the thinking, partly discursive and partly fe, which leads to action. Aristotle's analysis is offered, not in order to show how we discover the appro- priate action, but as an explanation of action itself: and he pro- ceeds on a basis foreign to Plato, namely the view that practical reasoning is allied to, or expressed in, al desire. He should not be understood to maintain that a process of inference, a re~ arrangement of ae ‘our minds, can summon into existence issued to oneself.) Aristotle says that “the conclusion is an action”, and might have said, though he in fact leaves it to be understood, that the major premiss is a dis- Position to act, brought to light and expressed in words®. Now some rea . been perplexed, not merely by the brevity and les statements, but by the can one who says that “vis i ‘our power” also say that “when the premisses coalesce into one, the action will * Te is pare of his programme to maintain against Socrates chat there it 4 vse in which bad action is no les rational than good; and that the self-indulgent man ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM a3 necessarily follow, assuming that the agent has the power and is not [physically] hindered” ? (Ethics, VII 1147426-31). And how can he have regarded this as comparable to the necessity with which a fact in theoretical science is demonstrated ? ‘The subject is too large a one to be treated in parenthesis, and I 1g some results attained in R.Loening’s Zurechnungslebre des Aristoteles (1903), Aristotle's main concern is with imputation or responsibility, both moral and Te was not until long after his day that the concept of res- d with that of free will, and he is able to faa acy aelle aa Et power of choice, He does not try to decide what forces are at work in the formation of character (in B.N. II 1114231-14 b30, the alternatives are left open), but only, when is an a ly regarded as an expression is importance, since the modern theory of legal responsibility goes back to Pufendorf’s Elemente jurisprudentiae universais (1660), which was based on the stil current Aristotelian moral philosophy. Aristotle consistently main- tains whit, from our point of view, would be ranked as a deter- ministic psychology of action; although the adjective is hardly appropriate, it would imply thac he considered and rejected an alternative view. All action proceeds from desire, which has two main objects, the good and the pleasant. Desire of both kinds, how- ever, needs to be interpreted by “imagination” and the imaginative pictures vary in degree of strength and vivacity. When a conflict of desires arises it will be decided, perhaps after an interval of hesitation, by the strength of the contending “imaginative pictu: and this applies to the conflict between the heterogeneous motives of the good and the pleasant, no less than to that between motives fon the same level. Presumably if the @avedéoun were equal in strength, action would be inhibited, as in the sophistic paradox quoted in the De Caelo 295 b31: a man who is equally hungry | and thirsty, and placed at an equal distance between equal amounts ( ‘of food and drink, would remain stationary. The statement re~ garding the practical syllogism is merely one among many + aaa pi oven GY ee waia, waéreg bv wis ty adrats aqds tdi lozweds Etier Via D. J. ALLAN tions of this doctrine, and the appearance of the word “necessity” there should not surprise us. Those who ascribe indeterminism to Aristotle give widely dif- ferent accounts of the way in which it is to be fiteed into his system. Some, starting from the assertion that reason is the true self, re- present him as saying that a man is free in so far as he is governed by rational desire. In other words, they equate will with otinous. But it is o6vious without discussion that this is the Socratic belief, which Aristotle challenges. Others, and this is the only form in which a belief in free will could be plausibly ascribed to him, sup- pose him to take for granted a power which, until the last moment, stand neutral among the desires for the pleasant or the good, and can prompt us to action, whether assisted by gets or not. On this interpretation, xpoaigens is elevated into a faculty of When we inguire whether this is Aristotle's doctrine, a distine- tion must be made. (1) Did he, or the writers of the E.E. and ‘MM, actually state such a belief ? I. jenoted by any or all ions applied to voluntary actions or actions which are in our power ? Or (2) is the belief rather one which he has taken for granted without deliberately reserving ‘terms in which to express it ? Loening shows conclusively that neither view is tenable, and the result of his survey of most instructive. None of the expressions which at first seem to indicate an undetermined choice on the part of: human agents, and which have sometimes been translated accordingly, means more than that the acts proceed from desire, at one of its different levels; and the introduction of the notion of free choice by certain modern scholars sets the whole Aristotelian doctrine askew. “Voluntary” ac~ tion, as defined by Aristotle (xd fxomov) means action performed with knowledge of the circumstances, and not under physical com- pulsion, but from an inner “source” (doy) of movement. What is this dgy ?Simply the faculty of desire, operating in the way more fully analysed in the De anima. In the Ethics, Aristotle, in- stead of speaking of BgeEic, borrows from popular usage the words txdy and Exovaoy. These we may translate, if we like, as “willed” or “voluntary”, so long as these words are not taken to refer to some separate function of the soul, but are regarded as names for facts which might be equally well described without them. As for xooai- direct or indirect action. The process of nature, or other infl ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM. sas jot something different from desire, but the form of ‘follows upon deliberation. If, and only if, the action is regarded as a manifestation of virtue and vice; + is not the indispensable condition of praise and blame (Ethics V ch. 6). Another expression in frequent use in the treatise is that some actions “depend- upon the man himself (&1° atréy Ethics 1114619, Rhetoric 136837 and 1369b18, etc.), To say this is only to apply to man what Aristotle says of that they have the power of selfmovement, and aitds is not here, as in some other contexts, the rational self as opposed to the pas- sions. The desire by which the action is stimulated is taken as re- resentative of the whole self of the man. And the action, viewed apart from him, is regarded as an effect, of which he is the cause. Te is in this sense that “a man” (as a wl Exdemian Ethics, to be an dgy) vv mode Elsewhere certain actions, and virtue and vice themselves, are said to “depend on us”, or to lie in our power (iq siv elva). But this again refers not to some special power by will modify our desires, but to the whole complex igi ‘iv has its primary application when deliberation is progress, and the question is asked what we ourselves c: facts, are not ig! left aside. As an extension of this use, the single act which was in fact done may retrospectively be said to have been in our power. (In this sense the phrase is of course not the ee action which is “in our power", but “to do this or not to do it”. Once more, there is here no reference to a self which can intervene to curb or deflect the desires, and there is nothing to suggest that the psychology of the De anime is abandoned in the; Eshics. Elsewhere, again, Aristotle distinguishes between irrational powers which from the first produce a single effect, and rational power which are said to be capable of producing opposites. (Buvinerc’ Goyor, Suvipers pert hoyou = duviqnerc vév évavelwv), But whit is meant here is chat in the potential state, such powers are capable of development in either of two opposite directions; ng. (pade Zale336 D. J. ALLAN, ler) that the power has been already developed by training and is now to be exercised in concrete circumstances, can still be turned to two contrasted uses by the possessor. ‘These arguments will, I hope, be sufficient upon a subject which is merely incidental to the present essay. ‘As has been observed above, the practical syllogism may take either of two forms, according as what is expressed in the major remiss is a rule or an end (see Sir Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, (1874), vol. 1, pp. 264-5). In some contexts, actions are subsumed by intuition under general rules, and performed or avoided accordingly; not, it may be added, only by the wise man, but also by the gaiios, and in a certain sense by the dgarig. In other contexts, it is said to be a distinctive feature of practical sms that they start from the announcement of an end (Ethics VI, 1144231: of yg ovihovrouol vv eaxdv doxiv Hxovrts low, bxeibi xoubvde in VIL, 1151.4 15-19 and in EE. 1227 b 28-32). A particular action is chen performed because it is a means, or th ink in a chain of means, leading to the end. Such a means is si term” in the practical syllogism, and it seems to be termed “false” istaken in thinking that it will conduce y nari, md Bgov sivat. The word Bet must ae bbe used in this sentence in a ‘moral, not ina prudential sense.) In the De motu, Aristotle begins with an example of the former type (Srdv vojioy Sx navel Padioriov avopday, adtds 8° GyDqaos, Baditer eis), but includes among other examplesone of the latter type (xgceres 8 de’ Gays. et iudénov Fora, dvieyin t6Be: apGroy, et BE x6de, v6de° wal xoiico agdeee eithis*) and he adds that the premisses 8 This should not be understood as an example of deliberation, but of the procedure by which the agent, having found the means by deli see p. 329 above), proceeds to its accomplishment. The speaker is not here meant to be considering how to make « coat, but rumming up the result of his deli- beration on that subjects and this summary forms the minor syllogism, Sit A. Grant is surely wrong in supposing "THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM good, or how it is ble, it is hardly possible to see what relation is intended between these two analyses of practical reasoning; and the question might be left here, save for the fact that it has an important bearing on the understanding of the Etbics. ‘There is, perhaps, a sense in which every rule of action may be regarded also as the statement of an end. In endeavouring to ob- serve the rule whenever an occasion presents itself, one i certain sense, making the rule real, although, since the rule is universal, this process is never-ending. But (a) one can hardly reverse this, and argue that whenever several steps conduce to an End, the End is a universal of which they are particulars. Some Ends are universal, but others are not so, and are not made so by the fact that elaborate steps may be required in order to achieve them. I am, of course, aware chat the me: of “universal” here requires definition, And (b) the same thing to perform an act because deemed to be good, and to do so because Let us apply this to the ethical system of lowed to other things, in so far as these are productive of Eudaimonia, remove hindrances to its tence, ete. Particular acts, in order to be qualified as virtuous, must be deli- berately chosen because they conduce to the End (according to Aris- first analysis of choice, in E.N. III chapter 4) ot because of th presently that the two statements are not inconsistent. ‘Axoiitic for Aristotle is no mere outward movement, but 2 deliberate act, and accordingly there are two sides to the valuation of almost any act, whether in retrospect by a critic, or by the in book I of the proces of deliertiog springs another erroneous view, that the syllogiara soning which precedes action and informe uu what we have to do. re i insic goodness (as he says elsewhere; and I shall argue * 4a8 D. J. ALLAN agent himself at the time of choice, First, it will initiate conse- quences, and second is a part of the agent's ion of his character. There are, no doubt, be valued for the outward result alone, others for the intention But those actions to which the Aristotelian qgévyios will normally give his approval will have value for both reasons. E.g. a brave act per~ formed in resistance to tyranny, and crowned by succes Iuable both to others, on account of its consequences, and agent, because virtuous activity is itself the goal at which he ai In this latter sense, the act is a constituent part of Eudaimoni ‘not a step towards its attainment, and would be to stretch that word beyo Aristotle deal with this problem ? His, is that all virtuous action involves choice, that all choice follows upon ration, and that deliberation is concerned with the selection of means, As the treatise proceeds, he seems to become increasingly aware that in the sphere of conduct “means” and “en are not separable in this mechanical fashion ®. He therefore subse- quently widens his view of the procedure of choice, and from book VI onwards introduces the practical syllogism, which comprehends deliberate choice in the two distinct forms to which we have al- ready referred, performance of the act (a) as an instance of a rule and (b) as a step towards an end. The second of these corresponds to deliberate action as characterized in E.N. book III. ‘The analysis of If is unaffected by this change, for the practical syllogism brings it no new account of that process’. It is the connection between “choice” and “deliberation” that is loosened from the sixth book onwards. The resule is that Aristotle, in speaking of choice, uses expressions which are at least ver actions are performed with knowledge, are deliberately chosen, and chosen for their own sake, and done from a firm and unvarying disposition. VI. 1144219: Just actions may proceed from someone who does not choose them, and lacks the disposition of justice. It * CE Joncums, opcit, p. 218. 1 Ch, p.336 above, note 5. ‘THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM 39) is the performance of them in a certain frame of mind, namel from choice with no ulterior end in view (Suit xgoaigeaw sal aids Eveua vi xgarroptva) And it is [moral] virtue by another power that means of realizing the choice are found. [This does not make sense unless agoaigcois is the man's general aim or policy, reflecting his disposition of character.) : Here the brave man is suid to face danger voi later sometimes replaced by Sx xaliy, wal bu alogdv wo yj, (1116 ‘And this is explained by the reflection, already to be found in the Profrepticus (ed. Pisret1 39.20), that the aim of a virtuous man is to persevere in virtuous activity. In book IX, 1169.20.22 we have: xgofvera yg [6 exovbaiog] nal otwara xal ryas nat Gog vd xeQndznva deyadé, aeprrovo%pevos faut’ to uakiy. Evidently this expression denotes the intrinsic goodness of the act, apart from its consequences. J. A. Stewart's paraphrase ‘for the sake of glorious achievement’ introduces a reference to reputa~ tion which is not suitable to the context, The use of this expression, T would suggest, is as follows. It denotes the same type of choice asa syllogism with a premiss bé vod &yaod, but, in the relatively popular sections of the Ethics, Aristotle finds it convenient to borrow a phrase from popular usage, ‘Aristotle is in these passages trying to do justice to certain hold views about moral choice, and if there is any inconsistency, proceeds from a laudable desire to take account of a wide range of facts. He avoids the onesidedness of those forms of utilitarianism which cannot find room for rightness of intention. But is there in ly fact an inconsistency ? As appears from the passage just quoted ; about bravery, Aristotle thinks he can show that the choice of an act “for its own sake” does not exclude its being also chosen as conducive to an end; and, if so, the vireuous man’s choice, having for an end the exhibition of his €ts, can be brought mula advanced in book IIE. But apart from this po intention to limit himself to that first an in the plan of the Etbics, is of voluntary action, Brin formula of the practical sy ‘only as one of two main varieties of deliberate action;.arfid many See40 D. J. ALLAN igeots_must be read with this wider sense sly have been obliged to make his inten- tion plainer if he had lived to prepare for publication the section represented by our three disputed books; but, even as it is, he says in book VI, 1144b 1, that a change is necessary, because obras and ager} are more intimately related than had previously been supposed (for the sake of simplicity in exposition). Some critics have here shown a remarkable want of insight. H.W. B. Joseph devotes an essay to showing that the analysis of choice in terms of end and means is a cardinal mistake in the Ethics, and treats the departures from the means-end scheme as inconsisten- cies of which the philosopher was not aware (Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1935), pp. 179-87). J.Cook Wilson not only maintained that “Aristotle uses xgouigeois elsewhere in a sense quite different from that which he gives it in book III”, but found that the solutions of the problem of éxgaota in book VII are inconsistent with the “normal view of choice” in both the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics, and so reached the preposterous conclusion that book VII is the work neither of Aristotle nor of Eudemus (Aristotelian Studies, 1879, reissued with postscript in 1912). If Plato had been treated in this fashion, these critics would have been the first to protest. Why must Aristotle be fastened down to his first analysis of choice, when the progressive movement within his treatise is as obvious as it is in any dialogue of Plato ? To conclude: the theory we have discussed is the product of ‘Aristotle's Keenness in the perception of analogies and his interest in the continuity of nature. Practical reasoning, by which must be ‘understood the thought displayed in action, not that which pre- cedes action, has affinities both with theoretical reasoning—which as aiming at a purer form of truth—and with impulsive is simpler and lower. But it is of course intended by Aristotle that the theory shall stand or fall with its successful ap- plication to particular problems of psychology.