REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA

G.R. No. L-10659 Jan. 31, 1958

LEONARDO PALAFOX, et. al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, versus PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE, THE
DISTRICT ENGINEER AND THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER, Defendants and Appellees.

The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissed plaintiffs' claim against the above appellees for
damages arising from the death of their father Proceto Palafox, who had been run over by a freight
truck driven by Sabas Torralba on September 30, 1948. The latter was a chauffeur of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte detailed to the office of the District Engineer; and on the said date he drove
the motor vehicle along the National Highway in compliance with his duties as such. Prosecuted for
homicide through reckless imprudence, Sabas Torralba pleaded guilty and was accordingly sentenced.
Having reserved their right to file civil action, the heirs subsequently began these proceedings against
the employer the province, the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Torralba. Upon a
motion to dismiss, the Hon. Fidel Villaneuva, Judge, quashed the case against the defendants, except
Sabas Torralba. Hence, this appeal. There being no allegation, His Honor explained, that said province
and officers had been “engaged in some kind of industry” as provided in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, no cause of action exists against them. For purposes of clarification said article is quoted
herewith. “ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.” Appellants insist that the basis of their demand for indemnity is not the
above Art. 103, but Art. 1903 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

“ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. x x x. The State is
liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused by
the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. x x x.” It will be observed that to attach liability to
the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a declaration must be made that he was a “special agent,”
- and not one upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion. Such ruling
may not be made, because in Merrit v. Government of the Philippines, 34 Phil. 311, this Court absolved
the Government from liability for damages caused through the negligence of the driver of a Philippine
General Hospital's ambulance that collided with and injured a motorcycle rider (Merrit) holding
(contrary to claimants claimant's contention) that the driver was not a special agent of the Government
within the scope of Art. 1903 of the Civil Code. And let it not be argued that the principle applies only to
the Insular, as distinguished from the provincial or municipal governments; because this Court has
interpreted “the State” to mean “Government of the Philippines,” and these words include both central
and the local governments. (Sec. 2 Revised Administrative Code.) As an alternative, the appellants
invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior as illustrated in the case of Mendoza v. De Leon, 33 Phil. 508,
concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent acts of their employees. Two quotations from
said decision will offer sufficient guidance for adjudication. “The municipality is not liable for the acts of
its officers or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose
their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact that
such duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the
municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of
the community and so on to administer government, whether it be done by the central government
itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private
individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the
municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.”
(Mendoza vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 508; 511)

“A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary
or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its
contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of
its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the
same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principles of
responde at superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the
courts.” (Mendoza v. De Leon, 33 Phil. 508; 513-514) Here we see that if the negligent employee was
engaged in the performance of governmental duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or
business functions – the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance of roads in which
the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.
Wherefore, the death of Palafox - tragic and deplorable though as it may be – imposed on the province
no duty to pay monetary compensation. The reason for the exemption according to Mr. Justice Story is
that the Government “does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and loses which would be subversive of the public interest.” (U.S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat.,
720; 6 L. ed., 199; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L. ed., 991.) The judgment will be affirmed with
costs against appellants. (SGD.) CESAR BENGZON WE CONCUR: (SGD.) RICARDO PARAS (SGD.)
MARCELIANO R. MONTEMAYOR (SGD.) FELIX BAUTISTA ANGELO (SGD.) JOSE B.L. REYES (SGD.) SABINO
PADILLA (SGD.) ALEX. REYES (SGD.) ALEJO LABRADOR (SGD.) PASTOR M. ENDENCIA (SGD.) ALFONSO
FELIX I reserve my vote – (SGD.) ROBERTO CONCEPCION