Case Digests On Articles 217 To 246

CRIMINAL LAW II
CASE DIGESTS on
Article 217 of The Revised Penal Code,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. 7659, and
Article 246 of The Revised Penal Code
SUBMITTED TO:
PROSECUTOR BENEDICT R. PICHAY, III
DON HONORIO VENTURA STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
2023
Article 217
Malversation of Public Funds or Property
NAVARRO, MARIA LOURDES M.
G.R. No. 241383, June 08, 2020
NIDA P. CORPUZ, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
All that is necessary for conviction of malversation of public funds is proof that
the accountable officer had received the public funds and that such officer
failed to account for the said funds upon demand without offering a justifiable
explanation for the shortage.
FACTS: Petitioner Nida Corpuz, then a Revenue Officer I of the BIR, was
charged with malversation through negligence under Art. 217 RPC for allowing
one Rolinda Bantawig to take and appropriate the public funds amounting to
P2,873,669.00. Despite demands for return of the said amount, Corpuz failed
to do so.
This case stemmed from a Special Audit conducted on Corpuz’s cash and
collection accounts to confirm reported irregularities. 26 official receipts were
tampered in such that the taxpayer’s copies were different from the original
ones. Demand letters were sent to Corpuz requiring her to produce the said
amount and informing her of the cash shortage in the amount of P188,671.40.
Despite demands, Corpuz did not restituted nor accounted the amount.
RTC convicted Corpuz of the crime charged and found that all of its elements
were established. Furthermore, it held that even though the misappropriated
for Corpuz’s personal use, she is still liable for malversation through negligence
for her failure to explain the cash shortage to which she was accountable. The
CA affirmed the decision with modification on the penalty. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari seeking for the reversal of Corpuz’s conviction
by asserting that the elements of the crime charged are not established.
ISSUE: WON Corpuz is guilty of malversation of public funds through

negligence?
RULING: YES, Corpuz is guilty of malversation of public funds through

negligence. The elements of malversation under said provision of law are:
1) that the offender is a public officer;
2) that he or she had custody or control of funds or property by reason of
the duties of his or her office;
3) that those funds or property were funds or property for which he or she
was accountable; and
4) that he or she appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.
All that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had
received the public funds and that such officer failed to account for the said
funds upon demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage.
In this case, all of the elements were sufficiently established:
1) Corpuz was then a revenue collection officer of BIR.
2) The P188,671.40 cash shortage is public in character as the amount
were public funds remitted to the Government.
3) She is an accountable officer because, as revenue officer, she had the
control and responsibility of her collections, including the cash shortage.
4) She failed to return the amount of the cash shortage upon demand – a
prima facie evidence that such public funds were put to her personal
use, which she failed to rebut and overturn.
Therefore, she is guilty of malversation of public funds through negligence
since all of the elements were sufficiently established.
Note: Malversation is committed in two modes: intentionally or by negligence
– these are only modalities in the perpetration of such crime. Thus, even if the
mode charge differs from the mode proven, the same involves the crime of
malversation and warrants the conviction thereof.
G.R. No. L-6781 November 6, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. F. WICKERSHAM, Defendant-
Appellant.
The abstraction of funds from a safe by a clerk without the consent of the
person charged with their custody, with the intent to convert them to his own
use, is held to be theft and not estafa or misappropriation of public funds.
FACTS: Defendant F. Wickersham was a chief clerk entrusted with the

combination and key to quartermaster’s safe in the office of the Quartermaster
of the US Army in Iloilo. He was charged with theft for abstracting various
checks and coins amounting to P3,041.56. Such checks were drawn by
Wickersham on the Treasury of the Phiippine Islands.
Wickersham’s only duty, however, was to keep safely the combination and key,
and to open and close the safe at the direction of his superior officer, the
quartermaster, who has the immediate control over the safe and its contents;
thus, Wickersham had no control over the contents of the safe and no authority
with the withdrawal of its funds, checks and other property kept therein.
During the absence of his superior officer and while in a state of intoxication,
Wickersham opened the safe and abstracted its cash and checks. The court
recovered the all of the items, except for 3 checks which were allegedly sold
by Wickersham.
Wickersham contended that the nature of the act he committed in abstracting
money and checks from the safe of which he carried the key and which are
according to him “under his control” is not theft, but rather estafa, or
misappropriation or defalcation of public funds.
ISSUE: WON Wickersham’s contention that the nature crime committed

constitutes misappropriation of public funds is correct?
RULING: NO, Wickersham’s contention that the nature crime committed

constitutes misappropriation of public funds is correct.
Based from the facts in this case, Wickersham did not have control over the
funds and property contained in the safe, and he had no authority of his own
volition to withdraw the funds therein. His possession of the combination and
key of the safe gave him no control over the contents therein, as his only duty
to the safe’s contents was to guard them and see to it that only his superior
has access to them, like watchman of a warehouse to whom the key is
entrusted the right to dispose of its contents.
Furthermore, the Court noted that a check is in a very real sense personal
property, and that when abstracted with the intention of converting it to the
use of the person taking it, the abstraction of the check constitutes a taking of
personal property from the possession of another, defined and penalized as the
crime of hurto (theft) in the Penal Code. In this case, Wickersham took the
checks of this character from the constructive possession of its owner with the
intention of converting it to his own use. Therefore, he is liable for theft, and
not estafa or misappropriation of public funds.
G.R. No. L-10935 February 1, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CASIMIRO E. VELASQUEZ,
defendant-appellant.
FACTS: As a consequence of appellant Casimiro Velasquez’s conviction of

misappropriation of public funds, he was sentenced by the court in addition to
the penalty imposed by the trial court, to indemnify the province to which the
money misappropriated belongs in the sum of P597, which is the amount he
misappropriated.
Velasquez prayed for the removal of such portion of the judgment which
required him to return the misappropriated sum. He contended that Act No.
1740, the law which he was convicted and sentenced, does not authorize what
is termed in the Penal Code an indemnity by way of the restriction to the
municipality injured of the sum of which is has been illegally deprived.
ISSUE: WON Velasquez’s contention that Act No. 1740 does not authorize an
indemnity by way of the restriction to the municipality injured of the sum of
which is has been illegally deprived is correct?
RULING: NO, his contention is incorrect. Act No. 1740, which is "An Act
providing for the punishment of public officers and employees who fail or refuse
to account for public funds or property or who make personal use of such funds
or property, etc.", in relation to articles 119, 120, 121 of the Penal Code
requires the accused to repair the damage caused the province and to make
good the loss which it has sustained by reason of his illegal acts.
In US v Meneses, the accused misappropriated public funds belonging to the
Province of Albay, was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment, payment of fine,
and ordered to indemnify the province of the misappropriated sum.
In this case, the fact the Velasquez is a public officer, or in any way connected
with the Government, and he misappropriated the public funds of Rizal, does
not preclude him from indemnifying the province of the money belonging to it.
Therefore, such motion was denied.
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee, vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants.
A private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing

malversation is also guilty of malversation.
FACTS: In 1969, Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan,

in conspiracy with Juan Samson, an employee of a lumber and hardware store
in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from
the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts: upper part, to be
signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative; the middle part which contains 5 paragraphs: Paragraph 1, by
the creditor; Paragraph 2, by the provincial engineer; Paragraph 3, by the
provincial treasurer; Paragraph 4, by the auditor; Paragraph 5, by the
provincial treasurer. In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed
presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public
works projects. And following paragraph 5, is the receipt of the signed by the
creditor.
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six
vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan
Samson."
Samson had hand-carried the vouchers and followed up their processing in the
offices of the provincial government the construction materials described in the
six vouchers and received the cash payments.
The lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and
Samson guilty of a complex crime of malversation through falsification of public
or official documents. Thus, Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
However, Sendaydiego died; hence, his appeal as to his criminal liability was
dismissed but his civil liability survived because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the CFI, which convicted him of three complex
crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
ISSUES:
1. WON the appellants are guilty of the complex crime of malversation
through falsification of public or official documents?
2. What is the liability of appellant Samson in such crime?
RULING:
1. NO, the crime committed in these three cases is not a complex crime of
malversation through falsification of public or official documents.
Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were committed.
These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two
grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a
means to commit malversation.
- In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the
malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for
the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses
- In the instant cases, the provincial treasurer, as the custodian of the
money forming part of the road and bridge fund, could have
malversed or misappropriated it without falsifying any voucher. The
falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the
malversation.
- The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing
offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
- Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification
of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People
vs. Madrigial-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
- And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher
constitutes a separate offense. The six misappropriations evidenced
by the six vouchers constitute six distinct offenses (U.S. vs.
Sacramento, 53 Phil. 639).
- The overall result is that in these three cases, six separate offenses
of falsification and six separate crimes of malversation were
committed.
2. As to his liability, Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve

offenses.
- He is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was
in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to
receive public monies from the provincial treasurer. He is a co-
principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with
the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court
correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable
public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.
Therefore, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public
document and six crimes of malversation.
G.R. No. 175074. August 31, 2011.*

JESUS TORRES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense
of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Torres, who was then the Principal of Viga Rural
Development High School in Viga, Catanduanes, was charged with intentional
malversation by encashing PNB checks amounting to P196,654.54 which were
entrusted to and received by him by reason of his office and duties, and by
using the same for his own benefit.
The prosecution alleged tat Torres directed Edmundo Lazado, the school’s
collection and disbursing officer, to prepare the checks representing the
teachers and employees’ salaries, ACA, and PERA; thus, Lazado prepared 3
checks with the total of said amount. It was the custom of the school for Lazado
to endorse the checks and for Torres to encash them to PNB, and deliver the
cash to Lazado for distribution to the teachers. The following day, Torres
encashed the 3 checks and never returned to the school to deliver the cash to
Lazado.
In his defense, Torres interposed an alibi and alleged that after he encashed
the checks, he availed of a flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his
chest pain. 2 days after, while waiting for a ride, he and his nephew got
involved in a hold-up incident where 3 armed men took his bag containing the
checks and other personal belongings; he failed to recover the money.
RTC convicted Torres for malversation of public funds and ruled that all its
elements were established. He appealed to the CA, but the same was denied
due to erroneous mode of appeal. Hence, this petition. He contended, among
others, that his constitutional right to be informed was violated by the
accusations against him alleged in the information. He maintained that he was
charged with intentional malversation and not malversation thru negligence,
which was the actual nature of malversation which he was convicted by RTC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Torres, as school principal, is an accountable officer under Art.
217, thus guilty of malversation?
2. WON his constitutional right to be informed was violated due to
difference in the charges against him in the Information and the actual
nature of his conviction?
RULING:
1. YES, he is an accountable officer within the contemplation of Article 217.
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office.
The determinative factor whether or not malversation is committed by
the public officer or employee is the nature of their duties – the fact that
as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it. Hence, a school principal in a public
high school like Torres, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she
is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.
2. NO, his constitutional right to be informed was not violated.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of
misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through
negligence. While the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both
are equally punishable under Article 217.
Therefore, the petition was denied and Torres was found guilty of malversation
through negligence.
G.R. Nos. 186659-710. October 19, 2011.*

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondents.
FACTS: COA conducted and Expanded Special Audit of the ORG-ARMM. Its
team leader was State Auditor Heidi Mendoza who was accompanied by State
Auditor Jaime Roxas under the supervision of Jaime Naranjo, State Auditor V.
Thereafter, it was found that illegal withdrawals were made thru the issuance
of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel Haron.
Chairman Pascasio Banaria sent a demand letter to Haron to immediately
produce and restitute to ARMM-Regional Treasurer the full amount of
P21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within 72hrs with the official
receipt.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed in Sandiganbayan charges of violation
of Art. 217 against petitioners Zacaria Candao (Regional Governor), Haron
(Disbursing Officer II), Abas Candao (Executive Secretary), and Pandical
Santiago (Cashier).
The prosecution’s lone witness, Heidi L. Mendoza, testified that their expanded
audit disclosed the illegal withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury
accounts of ORG- ARMM involving 52 checks issued without the required
disbursement vouchers.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that that the subject checks were
covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted
and received by the COA Central Office.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty of malversation of public
funds in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria Candao and Abas Candao. It found
no merit in petitioners’ claim and said that had those vouchers really existed
at the time of the 52 withdrawals petitioners made, petitioner Haron could
have readily produced them when required to do so by the special audit team.
Moreover, on the respective liabilities of Zacaria and Abas, the Sandiganbayan
held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, Haron was able to
consummate the illegal withdrawals. Thus, by their collective acts, petitioners
conspired to the illegal withdrawals of public funds which, when required by
the COA to be properly accounted for, they failed to do so.
ISSUE: WON SB erred in convicting the accused petitioners for the crime of
malversation of public funds despite proof positive that there were
disbursement vouchers except that the COA refused to accept much less
examine the same?
RULING: NO, SB did not err in the conviction of petitioners.

In malversation, prima facie evidence arises that the accused put missing
funds or property to his/her personal use when he/she fail to produce such
funds upon demand by any duly authorized officer.
In this case, all of the elements were satisfactorily established. Petitioners have
not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Haron’s failure to account for
the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the subject checks when
demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said funds for their
personal benefit.
As to the charge of conspiracy, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that
petitioners acted in conspiracy to effect the illegal withdrawals and
misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds. Zacaria and Abas were co-signatories
in the subject checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers. Their
signatures in the checks, as authorized officials for the purpose, made possible
the illegal withdrawals and embezzlement of public funds in the staggering
aggregate amount of P21,045,570.64.
They are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217. No
checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their
signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. I.e., any
disbursement and release of public funds require their approval, as in fact
checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had to be countersigned by them.
Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to effect
illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the
prosecution; hence, the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in
conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such
funds.
Republic Act 3019, as amended
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
MENDOZA, CRISTELLE JOY M.
Sec. 3(c): Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or

other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person
for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained,
or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for
the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
G.R. No. 238815, March 18, 2019
RAQUIL-ALI M. LUCMAN, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN 2ND DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
● Raquil-Ali M. Lucman (Lucman) was charged with violation of Section 3

(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
● The charge stemmed from an accusation that Lucman, a public officer
holding the position of OIC-Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII,
demanded and received money from private individuals in exchange for
assisting in the processing and approval of their applications for Free
Patent title.
● The prosecution alleged that Lucman demanded Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00) and actually received One
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the private
complainants, who sought his help in obtaining government permits for
their land applications.
● Lucman pleaded not guilty to the charges, denying any wrongdoing.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan (SB) correctly convicted Lucman for the
crime of violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019. (YES)
Ruling:
The court affirmed the SB's decision, finding Lucman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019. The court upheld the
conviction based on the following elements of the crime:
1. The offender is a public officer.

2. The public officer has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain,
for a person any government permit or license.
3. The public officer directly or indirectly requested or received from the
person any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit for
himself or for another.
4. The public officer requested or received the gift, present, or other
pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to be
given.
The court noted that Lucman, as the OIC-RED of DENR, Region XII, met all
these elements. The court found no reason to overturn the SB's findings, as
there was no evidence that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the
facts of the case. Therefore, Lucman's conviction stood.
Sec. 3(e): Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020
JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
● The petitioner is challenging the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (SB)

dated November 17, 2016, which found him guilty of nine counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), also known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentenced him to
imprisonment.
● The case involves the issuance of extraction permits by the petitioner,
who was the Mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, to quarry operators
within the municipal jurisdiction. The Designated Area Supervisor of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) received
reports of quarry operations without the required permits. Cease-and-
Desist Orders (CDOs) were issued by the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer against these operators, citing the authority
of the Provincial Governor to issue extraction permits.
● The petitioner contested this, arguing that the municipal government
had regulatory powers under the Local Government Code (LGC) and
should be allowed to issue permits. He also questioned the legality of
certain provisions of the Provincial Tax Ordinance.
● A complaint was filed against the petitioner, alleging Usurpation of
Authority, Violation of Section 138 of RA 7160 (LGC), Grave Abuse of
Authority in Office, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, and Violation of RA 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
● The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause for criminal liability,
resulting in the filing of Informations against the petitioner. One of the
Informations was withdrawn, but nine remained.
● The petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all charges.
● After trial, the SB found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in all nine cases, sentencing him to imprisonment and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019? (NO)
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The burden of proof in criminal actions lies with the
prosecution, and conviction demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The elements required to establish a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

include:
1. The offender must be a public officer.

2. The act must have been done in the discharge of the public officer's
official, administrative, or judicial functions.
3. The act must have been done through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
4. The public officer must have caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference.
The presence of the first two elements (public officer and act done in the
discharge of official functions) was not disputed in the case. The court found
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner acted with
evident bad faith.
The court noted that the petitioner had a legitimate belief, albeit mistaken,
that he had the authority to issue the extraction permits. There was no showing
that the petitioner personally gained from the issuance of the permits. The
applications for extraction permits went through a regular process, and there
was no evidence of favoritism or ulterior motives.
The court emphasized the importance of the presumption of innocence and the
prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court ruled
that the prosecution failed to prove the charges against the petitioner beyond
a reasonable doubt.
It was also noted that the Informations filed against the petitioner only alleged
evident bad faith and not gross inexcusable negligence. Convicting the
petitioner based on gross inexcusable negligence would violate the petitioner's
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Therefore, the petitioner was acquitted of all charges.

G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019
SIMEON GABRIEL RIVERA, MARILOU FARNACIO CANTANCIO, CESAR

V. PRADAS, AND EDUARDO A. CLARIZA, PETITIONERS, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
● The case involves several individuals, including Simeon Gabriel Rivera,

Marilou Farnacio Cantancio, Cesar V. Pradas, and Eduardo A. Clariza
(petitioners), who were charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The charges stem from their involvement in the procurement process
for sports equipment for the national athletes participating in the 24th
Southeast Asian Games (SEA Games).
● The Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) was tasked with procuring
sports equipment for the national athletes competing in the 24th SEA
Games.
● The PSC's Bids and Awards Committee (PSC-BAC), composed of the
petitioners and other individuals, initiated a bidding process for the
supply and delivery of sports training equipment for the SEA Games
cycling event.
● Elixir Sports Company submitted the only bid in response to the
invitation to bid issued by the PSC-BAC.
● Despite Elixir Sports Company being the sole bidder, the PSC-BAC
awarded the contract to Elixir.
● It was alleged that the PSC-BAC did not comply with certain
procurement rules, particularly the requirement to publish the invitation
to bid in a newspaper of general circulation and the requirement that
bidders must have existed for at least three consecutive years.
● Subsequently, an investigation was conducted, and the Office of the
Ombudsman filed charges against the accused, including the petitioners,
for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners should be held criminally liable under Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. (NO)
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
The elements required to establish a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

include:

preference.
There are, therefore, three modes of committing the violation of Section 3(e),
that is, through manifest partiality, or with evident bad faith, or through gross
inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited
acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant conviction.
The Sandiganbayan concluded that certain individuals had conspired to favor

a particular party, but the ruling questions the adequacy of evidence to support
these conclusions.
The ruling argues that non-publication of certain information may have

resulted from confusion or misunderstanding rather than evident bad faith or
gross negligence.
The fact that only one party submitted a bid does not necessarily imply
advance notice or unfair advantage. Other suppliers attended the pre-bid
conference and could have submitted bids.
The Commission on Audit (COA) had audited the procurement process and
found no irregularities, which supports the regularity and validity of the
process.
Declarations made during post-qualification proceedings may not be sufficient

evidence of manifest partiality, especially when supported by other facts.
Mere allegations or suppositions of preferential treatment are not enough to

prove guilt under Section 3(e). The prosecution must establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The accused enjoy the presumption of innocence, and they can only be
convicted if their guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Based on the standards of proof required, the Court acquitted the petitioners
because the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987
ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Facts:
● Arturo A. Mejorada was employed as a public officer, initially as a

temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works and later as a
right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig,
Metro Manila, from February 1974 to December 31, 1978.
● His role as a right-of-way agent involved negotiating with property
owners affected by highway projects, compensating them for the
damages caused by these projects.
● The widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road, part of
the 2nd IBRD Project in Binangonan, Rizal, affected several property
owners, including Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin,
Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S.
Mallari, and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
● Between October 1977 and February 1978, Mejorada approached these
property owners, claiming he could assist them in securing
compensation for the damages caused by the highway project.
● Mejorada had the property owners sign blank copies of documents titled
"Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real
Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct
improvements" related to their claims.
● These documents allegedly inflated the value of the properties and
improvements beyond what the property owners had initially claimed.
● Declarations of Real Property in the property owners' names, with
assessed values identical to those stated in the agreements, were used
as supporting documentation, but they were later found to be registered
in the names of other individuals, indicating falsification.
● After processing the claims, Mejorada accompanied the property owners
to the Office of the Highway District Engineer to receive payments.
● Mejorada personally assisted them in signing vouchers and encashing
checks, certifying their identities and guaranteeing payment.
● However, after receiving the proceeds, Mejorada allegedly accompanied
the property owners to his car and forcibly took a significant portion of
the money, leaving only a fraction of the amount due to each property
owner.
● The property owners, fearing Mejorada and his armed companion, did
not initially complain but later filed complaints with the Provincial Fiscal's
Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, detailing the events and testifying to the
same in court.
Issue:
Whether the essential elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of RA 3019
were proven by the prosecution. (YES)
Ruling:
The Court affirmed that to establish a violation of Section 3(e), the following
elements must be present:

preference.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that Section 3(e) only applies to
public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits, or other
concessions. It affirmed that the provision encompasses all public officers and
even employees of government corporations, as specified in Section 3, without
any distinction or qualification.
The Court found that both the government and private parties suffered undue
injury. The government suffered because the petitioner inflated the true claims
of complainants, which became the basis for government payments. The
private parties were deprived of just compensation as they were divested of a
significant portion of their claims and received lower payments than the actual
damage they incurred.
The Court determined that there was evident bad faith on the part of the
petitioner. He took advantage of his position as a right-of-way agent, making
the claimants sign agreements and sworn statements that contained falsified
declarations of property values. His actions, including inflating values and
divesting claimants of rightful compensation, demonstrated evident bad faith.
The Court rejected the argument that the evidence presented by the
prosecution proved a different offense (robbery) rather than a violation of
Section 3(e). It emphasized that there was no variance between the offense
charged in the information and the offense proved. The evidence clearly
established a violation of Section 3(e) through evident bad faith causing
damage to both claimants and the government.
Delito continuado or continuous crime:
G.R. Nos. 233443-44, November 28, 2018
ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
Facts:
● The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Amadeo, Cavite, issued Resolution No.

57 designating Balite Falls as a tourist spot and reserved area to
preserve potable water.
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cavite approved Resolution No.
57.
● Simplicio S. Lumandas owns land near Balite Falls, inherited by Revina
C. Lumandas.
● Councilor Ambion informed Revina about renting their ancestral house.
● The Mayor called a meeting to discuss a project near Balite Falls; Calixto,
Revina's cousin, attended.
● The SB approved guidelines for Balite Falls eco-tourism area.
● The house on Simplicio's land was demolished, and construction began
on Revina's and Calixto's properties.
● During a meeting, Revina asked why the house was demolished, and
staff replied "tao lamang sya na nagkakamali." Calixto handed a letter
demanding construction cessation.
● Calixto declined a 25-year land lease proposed by the Mayor.
● A meeting was held on road expansion, and property owners opposed
it.
● Revina filed complaints for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and misconduct.
● The Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the misconduct but charged the
petitioner with Section 3(e) violation.
● The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner in two cases with penalties.
● The Sandiganbayan denied motions for reconsideration from both
parties.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner should only be charged with a single offense? (YES)
Ruling:
Delito continuado refers to a single criminal act that consists of a series of acts
arising from a single criminal resolution or intent that cannot be divided into
separate offenses. To exist, delito continuado should involve a plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time, unity of the penal provision
violated, and unity of criminal intent and purpose.
The court found that the acts alleged in the two Informations constituted a
continuous crime because they were driven by a singular purpose—the
realization of the Balite Falls development project. The acts violated the same
penal provision, and they occurred on the same day or were closely related.
The implication of recognizing the offense as a continuous crime is that the

accused should not face double jeopardy, as there is only one offense involved.
Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioner should be meted with a penalty
for a single offense.
The court also addressed the petitioner's arguments regarding the elements of
the crime charged, stating that the Informations sufficiently alleged the
elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, including the acts
related to the discharge of official functions, undue injury, and evident bad
faith.
The court upheld the petitioner's conviction.

Power to intervene into contract or transaction:
G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984
HILARIO JARAVATA petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
Hilario Jaravata was accused of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The accusation was related to his
actions as the Assistant Principal of Leones Tubao, La Union Barangay High
School.
The prosecution alleged that between April 30, 1979, and May 25, 1979,
Jaravata used his influence and moral ascendancy over classroom teachers to
demand and receive payments from them. These payments were made by the
classroom teachers to reimburse Jaravata for his expenses incurred in
facilitating the release of their salary differentials. The total amount of
payments received by Jaravata from the teachers amounted to P338.00. He
was charged with violating the anti-graft law.
After a trial, the Sandiganbayan found Jaravata guilty of violating Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019 and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year, as a minimum, to four (4) years, as a maximum. Additionally, he was
perpetually disqualified from holding public office. The court noted that
Jaravata had already refunded the money he received from the teachers.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019. (NO)
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the public officer in question, an assistant
principal, did not have the legal authority or power to intervene in the contract
or transaction for the payment of salary differentials to classroom teachers. As
a result, he could not be held liable for violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act
No. 3019, which prohibits public officers from requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit in connection with contracts or
transactions where their official intervention is required by law.
The ruling established that Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 applies to
public officers who have a legal obligation or authority, prescribed by law, to
intervene in specific contracts or transactions between the government and
other parties. Public officers who do not possess such legal authority or power
to intervene in a contract or transaction cannot be held criminally liable under
this provision of the anti-graft law.
Manifest partiality, evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence:
G.R. No. L-50691 December 5, 1994
EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and

FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL

PAMARAN, BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the
TANODBAYAN CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and
PROSECUTORS RODOLFO AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA,
respondents.
Facts:
The cases revolve around allegations of a "ghost project" that occurred in 1978
under the Benguet Highway Engineering District.
Santiago G. Paragas, Eusebio V. Fonacier, Joseph U. Gonzales, Rogelio R.

Ramos, Francisco M. Villanueva, Jr., Apolinario T. Padilla, Francisco T. del Moral,
Arnulfo B. Sarmiento, and Remedios B. Almoite were accused individuals in
this case.
These individuals were charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and estafa through the falsification of public documents.
It is alleged that they took advantage of their official positions for personal
gain. They were accused of entering into a pre-arranged contract with a private
contractor, Francisco T. del Moral, for the delivery of aggregate subbase (Item
108) for a specific section of the Baguio-Bontoc road known as Halsema
Highway.
Despite the awarding of the contract, it is claimed that no actual delivery of

the subbase material took place. Payments were allegedly made to Francisco
T. del Moral based on falsified documents, including vouchers, purchase orders,
and other questionable paperwork.
The Sandiganbayan found that there was no legitimate program of work for
the specific project item in question (Item 108). The accused officials
implemented a portion of a discarded program of work without proper
approval, and this action was described as a machination.
It was determined that the bidding process was irregular and pre-arranged,
with evidence suggesting that the initial bidding was canceled to pursue a
specific outcome.
There was doubt regarding the actual deliveries of the materials in question,
with a lack of clear evidence supporting these deliveries.
The accused individuals were found to have violated COA Circular No. 76-41,
which prohibited the splitting of requisitions, purchase orders, and goods
vouchers.
The Sandiganbayan found that the accused officials acted in conspiracy to

defraud the government, resulting in undue injury.
Issue:
Whether the accused individuals were guilty of violating Section 3, paragraph

(e), of Republic Act No. 3019 (YES)
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the accused public officials were convicted under
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for committing the offense of causing
undue injury to the government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) include that the accused is a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; they
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and their actions must have caused undue injury to
any party, including the government, or given an unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference.
The use of the phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross
inexcusable negligence" in the same information does not mean that the
indictment charges three distinct offenses but implies that the offense could
have been committed through any of these modes.
The third element of the offense does not require proof of the exact extent of
damage; it is enough that substantial injury or benefit is perceived.
The convictions were upheld based on the specific actions and negligence of
the accused officials in the case, including the knowing ordering of an
unapproved program of work, conducting an irregular bidding process, signing
documents leading to payments for non-existent deliveries, and failing in their
duty to ensure compliance with government standards.
The Supreme Court found that some of the accused officials had violated
Commission on Audit circulars and engaged in improper splitting of requisitions
and payments, which added to their culpability.
The penalty imposed on the convicted officials included imprisonment and
perpetual disqualification from public office, along with an order to indemnify
the government for the financial loss incurred.
Bad faith not required; committed by negligence:
G.R. No. 192591 June 29, 2011
EFREN L. ALVAREZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
Facts:
● Efren L. Alvarez, former Mayor of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, faced charges for
violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
● The charges related to the construction of the "Wag-wag Shopping Mall"
under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) arrangement with Australian-
Professional, Inc. (API).
● Alvarez was accused of awarding the contract to API without competitive
bidding and despite API's alleged lack of qualifications for the project.
● API commenced construction but stopped after a few months, resulting
in significant damage to government structures.
● In 2009, the Sandiganbayan found Alvarez guilty, sentencing him to
prison, perpetual disqualification from public office, and ordering him to
indemnify the government.
● Alvarez appealed, seeking to reverse his conviction and the imposed
penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not bad faith is required to meet the third element? (NO)
Ruling:
The third element of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three
ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict. Damage or
injury caused by petitioner's acts though alleged in the information, thus need
not be proven for as long as the act of giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference either through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence was satisfactorily established.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the prosecution was able to successfully
demonstrate that he acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable
negligence in awarding the BOT contract to an unlicensed and financially
unqualified private entity.
When no manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence:
G.R. No. 221418, January 23, 2019
JOSE T. VILLAROSA, CARLITO T. CAJAYON AND PABLO I. ALVARO,

Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN AND ROLANDO C.
BASILIO, Respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Rolando C. Basilio filed criminal and administrative

complaints against the petitioners for various offenses, including Malversation
of Public Funds, violations of R.A. No. 3019, grave abuse of authority, grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
Basilio alleged that the petitioners approved the use of the municipality's "Trust
Fund" derived from tobacco excise taxes (Tobacco Fund) to finance regular
municipal operations, which he believed was not within the fund's intended
purpose. He also alleged that petitioners misappropriated funds by procuring
"reconditioned" multi-cab vehicles without proper documentation.
Petitioners denied the charges and asserted that their actions were supported
by public documents, the expenses were for the municipality's public purpose,
and there were no specific legal restrictions on the use of the Tobacco Fund.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge the petitioners with Technical
Malversation and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman
also found them guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, resulting in their dismissal from
service.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners are liable for Technical Malversation (YES) and
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA No. 3019 (NO)?
Ruling:
The court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman
when it found probable cause to indict the petitioners for the crime of Technical
Malversation. The court points out that the Ombudsman based its findings on
the strength of the evidence submitted by the private complainant and the
weak defense of the petitioners. The Ombudsman found that the petitioners,
who were public officers, used funds earmarked for specific agricultural
purposes for various unrelated expenses, which contravened their duties and
the law. As a result, there was probable cause to believe they were guilty of
Technical Malversation.
However, the court disagrees with the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause
for the charge of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The court
emphasizes that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not
elements of Technical Malversation. Alleging these modes is insufficient to
establish probable cause for the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. To
establish these elements, evident bad faith, palpably fraudulent, and dishonest
purposes must be demonstrated, which were not present in this case.
In conclusion, the court partially grants the petition. It affirms the

Ombudsman's decision regarding probable cause against the petitioners for
Technical Malversation but disagrees with the probable cause finding for the
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
CARBONIDA, JENARO P.
ABUBAKAR VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 202408, JUNE 27, 2018
FACTS:
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani, public officials of the Department of Public
Works and Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM), were charged with violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict the officials.
They were charged in Criminal Case No. 24970 for awarding excessive
mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services, advancing P14,400,000.00 to
contractors for sub-base aggregates, and causing overpayment on several
projects due to bloated accomplishment reports. Upon arraignment, they
entered a plea of not guilty, but seven of their co-accused remained at large.
Accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for
causing the disbursement of 30% of the mobilization fees or advance payment
to Arce Engineering Services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the right of petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S.
Baraguir to the equal protection of the laws was violated due to “selective
prosecution”.
RULING:
No, the prosecution of offenses is typically handled by the fiscal discretion. A
"selective prosecution" claim can only succeed if there is clear evidence of
intentional discrimination. This concept, originating from the 1996 case United
States v. Armstrong, arises when a prosecutor charges defendants based on
constitutionally prohibited standards like race or religion. The prosecution of
one person to the exclusion of others does not automatically violate the equal
protection clause. Although not formally adopted in this jurisdiction, some
cases recognize the possibility of unduly discrimination through the
prosecutorial process. The burden lies on the defendant to show discriminatory
intent through extrinsic evidence.
CANLAS VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NOS. 236308-09, FEBRUARY 17, 2020
Facts:
This Petition for Certiorari is filed against Efren M. Canlas, a private individual
and representative of Hilmarc's Construction Corporation, in relation to the
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building. The case involves two
Information filed against the petitioner and other public officers in Criminal
Case Nos. SB-16-CRM-0080 and SB-16-CRM-0084. The Information charged
the petitioner and his co-accused, former Mayor Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,
with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 related to the
construction of the building. The petitioner filed two Motions to Quash
Information, arguing that the facts alleged did not constitute the charged
offense due to the fact that RA 3019 explicitly applies only to public officers,
and that the Information did not allege that he induced or caused any public
officer to commit a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 to render him liable
under Section 415 thereof.
The prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition to Accused Canlas' Separate
Motions to Quash Information on August 4, 2017, and petitioner filed his Reply
to "Consolidated Opposition to Accused Canlas' Separate Motions to Quash
Information" on August 11, 2017. In its Resolution dated September 25, 2017,
the Sandiganbayan denied the two motions to quash information. Petitioner
argues that as a private individual, he can only be held liable under Section
4(b) of RA 3019 and should be quashed under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. The People argue that a private individual, acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and held liable for pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of RA 3019.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioners as private individuals, can not be liable for R.A.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan court ruled that private individuals can be held liable under
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 if they act in conspiracy with public officers. This ruling
aligns with the anti-graft law's policy to repress acts of public officers and
private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices. The court reiterated the
elements of Section 3(e) in PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman, including the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence, and caused undue injury to any party, including the government.
The court has also affirmed the indictment and conviction of a private individual
acting in conspiracy with public officers for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019,
particularly paragraph (e) thereof. The court discussed the criminal liability of
Edelbert C. Uyboco, a private individual who acted in conspiracy with his co-
accused public officer in the procurement of overpriced dump trucks. The
petition, along with the prayer to refer the case to the Court En Banc and issue
a TRO, should be denied.
LACAP VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 198162, JUNE 21, 2017
Facts:
Corazon was indicted for violating Section 3(f) of RA 3019, which allegedly
neglected or refused to act within a reasonable time on the application of
complainant Fermina Santos for a business permit in Masantol, Pampanga for
the years 1999 and 2000. Santos owns the Fersan Variety Store in Masantol,
Pampanga, which has been operating since 1975. In 1999, she filed an
application for a Mayor's Permit and submitted the required documents.
However, Mayor Corazon Lacap denied her application due to
misunderstandings.
In 1998, Santos filed a complaint against her husband, Epifanio Lacap, and
was ordered to close her store. She claimed her documents were complete
when she applied for a permit in 1998, but the store was closed again in 1998.
Santos claimed that she had a permit in 1998 but was forcibly padlocked by
policemen and a bodyguard. Corazon claimed that she did not order the closure
of the store because her husband had already closed it in 1997, and she was
not issuing official receipts to customers. The Sandiganbayan found the
prosecution's evidence sufficient for conviction and held Corazon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(f) of RA 3019.
Issues:
The Sandiganbayan is examining whether they misunderstood facts in finding
the accused guilty of official inaction under Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft Law,
whether the accused's referral of Atty. Calderon's letter to her lawyer is a
felony, and if they mistakenly assumed the accused acted with criminal intent
to discriminate against the complainant.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there is no merit in Corazon's petition. The issues
raised by Corazon in her petition essentially show that she disputes the
existence of the elements of the offense penalized under Section 3(f) of RA
3019, to wit:
1. The offender is a public officer.
2. The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient
justification after due demand or request has been made on him.
3. Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the
public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and
4. Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party or
discriminating against another.
The resolution of the three issues, therefore, rests upon the existence of
sufficient proof to establish the four elements enumerated above. The first
element is not disputed. As the then Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga,
who assumed office on June 30, 1998, Corazon was, at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, a public officer. The second issue raised by
Corazon disputes the presence of the second and third elements, while the
third issue puts in doubt the fourth element.
GO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 172602, SEPTEMBER 3, 2007
Facts:
Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman
and President of PIATCO, were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Go, in relation
to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered by the government with Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
Petitioner Go contended that it was an error to charge him with the violation
given that he was not a public officer, a necessary element of the offense under
Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further asserts that conspiracy by a private party with
a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation
of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.
Ruling:
The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private
persons. Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under
Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-
graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act, or which may lead thereto.
The case of Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Go’s case. In the
former, Dans, the public officer and with whom Marcos had allegedly conspired
with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been acquitted.
Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the
said offense.
The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the
Ombudsman is a function duly belonging to the latter. The exercise of such
function cannot be meddled with by the courts by virtue of the doctrine of non-
interference except for compelling reasons.
GARCIA-DIAZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 193236, SEPTEMBER

17, 2018
Facts:
In 1976, Flora L. Garcia applied for registration of a 16,589.84-hectare
property in Laur and Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The Republic of the Philippines
opposed her application, claiming it formed part of Fort Magsaysay per
Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Despite the Republic's opposition, Garcia's
application was granted by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Garcia-
Diaz agreed to settle with the Republic through a draft Compromise Agreement
dated May 16, 1997.
The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)
conducted a preliminary evaluation survey, finding that the Bureau of Lands
Location Monuments remained in the position as previously computed and
plotted in the topographic map. The Republic, through Solicitor General Galvez,
and Garcia-Diaz jointly filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999. In the Compromise Agreement, Garcia-Diaz agreed to
withdraw her application for registration of the property covered by BL Plan II-
6752 within Fort Magsaysay in exchange for the Republic's withdrawal of its
opposition to the registration of the portion outside the reservation.
In 2004, public officers Solicitor General Galvez, NAMRIA officials Solis, Fabian,
Bonnevie, Valencia, and Viernes, and private person Garcia-Diaz were charged
for violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
3019) before the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Garcia-Diaz, a private person, may be charged and
convicted of violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
2. Whether or not conspiracy exists even if the public officer (Solis) is not
a party to the contract or transaction that caused a gross and manifest
disadvantage to the government.
3. Whether or not Solis violated a legal obligation to disclose the truth
when he executed his February 12, 1998, Letter, thus making him liable
for falsification of public document.
Ruling:
1. Yes, in Criminal Case No. 27974, public officers Solicitor General Galvez,
NAMRIA Administrator Solis, Officer-in-Charge Bonnevie, Assistant
Director Fabian, and Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia and
Viernes, along with private Florencia Garcia-Diaz, executed a
Compromise Agreement declaring a part of Fort Magsaysay as outside
the technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, allegedly
involving conspiracy against Garcia-Diaz.
2. Yes. The common scheme involved claiming that part of BLPlan II-6752
property outside Fort Magsaysay was alienable and disposable, allowing
compromise. Petitioner Solis' recommendation in his February 12, 1998,
Letter served as the basis for the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. The segregation of 4,689 hectares of public domain land,
registered in the name of a private person, was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Solis remains liable as the
engagement in a transaction or contract is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
3. Yes, the court ruled that petitioner Solis made an untruthful statement
in his February 12, 1998, Letter, claiming that the military reservation
was not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the
technical description in Proclamation No. 237. The Summary Report did
not indicate that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the
military reservation as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237.
The court argued that Solis had a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts, as NAMRIA Administrator, responsible for conducting
geophysical surveys and managing resource information. The court also
found that it was never established that a subordinate prepared the
letter, and that Solis testified on direct examination that he examined it
and its attachments. Therefore, Arias does not apply.
TRIESTE, SR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 70332-43, NOVEMBER

13, 1986
Facts:
Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the
Municipality of Numancia purchased construction materials from Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of said
corporation. Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act particularly for willfully and unlawfully having financial or
pecuniary interest in a business, contract, or transaction in connection with
which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which
he is prohibited by law from having any interest.
Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the
corporation when he took his office as mayor; that he sold his shares to his
sister; he presented evidence to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said
sale because it was not registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Moreover, the advertisement of Trigen in the local rotary club shows that
Trieste is the president of the corporation.
As time passed, the old Solicitor General was replaced by a new one. The new
Sol-Gen gave credit to the arguments presented by Trieste as it recommended
the dismissal of the case on the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from
the corporation by virtue of his selling his shares to his sister; that said sale
cannot be doubted simply because it was not reported to the SEC; that sales
of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is proper and
legally sound.
Ruling:
Yes, the Solicitor General is well within his rights to make such
recommendation. A public prosecutor should not hesitate to recommend to the
court the accused’s acquittal if the evidence in his possession shows that the
accused is innocent. If on appeal by the accused from a conviction by the trial
court he finds no legal basis to sustain the conviction, he should not also
hesitate to recommend that the accused be acquitted.
Republic Act 7080, as amended by Republic Act 7659
Anti-Plunder Act
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19,

2001
Facts:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by
RA 7659. On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions
of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness.
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions.
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under
the Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Information against petitioner. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds
of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses
and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied. Later, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense.
Same was denied. The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague.
Ruling:
No, if the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
Nothing is discerned in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the term’s “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to
the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right
to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in free speech.
Revilla vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan charged Revilla, Cambe,
and Napoles with the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. (RA) 7080. They
were arrested on 19 June 2014 and voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine
National Police (PNP). Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam, Cambe filed
an Application for Bail, and Napoles filed a Joint Petition for Bail. The
Sandiganbayan denied the separate applications for bail, stating that the
prosecution had strong evidence that they, in conspiracy, committed the crime
of plunder.
In July 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Transfer the Place
of Detention of Accused Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) facility in Camp Bagong Diwa or similar
facilities. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for failure to advance
justifiable grounds for Revilla and Cambe's transfer, finding that detention in
facilities other than a jail is sanctioned in their jurisdiction.
On 27 October 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Attachment/Garnishment against Revilla's
money and properties to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount
alleged as ill-gotten wealth. The Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's
motion and issued an Alias Writ of Preliminary Attachment, which included the
properties under known aliases or other names of Revilla and his spouse, Lani
Mercado. Revilla filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan
denied in a resolution dated 28 May 2015.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying the applications for bail of Napoles and Cambe (Revilla withdrew
his petition on this question).
2. Whether or not, as Cambe further alleged, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in relying on the concept of totality of evidence,
which only applies in writ of amparo cases.
3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of Revilla and Cambe from
the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility.
4. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's monies and
properties.
Ruling:
1. No, The Sandiganbayan denied bail to Cambe and Napoles due to strong
evidence of plunder in conspiracy. The SC cited the Sandiganbayan's
ruling, stating that it exercised its judicial discretion within the bounds
of the Constitution, law, rules, and jurisprudence after appreciating and
evaluating the evidence submitted by the parties. The Sandiganbayan
found strong evidence of guilt against Cambe, considering PDAF
documents and whistleblowers' testimonies. It found that Cambe
received P103,000,000.00 in return for Revilla's endorsement of
Napoles' NGOs. The Sandiganbayan also found strong evidence of guilt
against Napoles, considering the AMLC Report and the COA report,
which confirmed that Revilla's PDAF projects failed to comply with the
law, Napoles' NGOs were fake, no projects were implemented, and the
suppliers selected were questionable.
2. No, In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the court ruled that the issuance of amparo
writ may not be the same as standard court procedures. In People v.
Cabral, the court held that if there is strong evidence of guilt, bail should
be refused. The Sandiganbayan's factual findings were not set aside, but
the court did not exercise its discretion out of whim, caprice, or outright
arbitrariness. The charge against Cambe and Napoles was conspiracy to
commit plunder, not that they agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling or misappropriate tobacco excise tax. The court did not
try the merits or inquire about the weight of evidence against the
accused for bail purposes.
3. No, the case involves Revilla and Cambe, who voluntarily surrendered
to the Sandiganbayan, and the arresting officer's duty to deliver them
to the nearest police station or jail is not mentioned. Section 3 of Rule
113 and Section 63 of RA 6975 do not specify the place of detention or
the supervision of provincial jails. The law clearly states that there are
places of detention for the accused outside the BJMP's control and
arguing that Revilla and Cambe's detention in the PNP Custodial Center
provided special treatment is like arguing for special treatment in a
provincial jail.
4. No, the prosecution accused Revilla of converting Php515,740,000.00
worth of public funds from his PDAF through 'ghost' projects for his own
use or unauthorized use. The court agreed with the Ombudsman's
finding of probable cause and established a prima facie case for plunder
against Revilla. Contrary to Revilla's allegations, there is a prima facie
factual foundation for the attachment of his testimonies and properties.
A writ of preliminary attachment may issue without a hearing, and there
is no need for a final judgment of ill-gotten wealth.
Article 246
Parricide
BAUTISTA, FEVELYN B.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ADRIAN GUTING Y. TOMAS

GR No. 205412 September 9, 2015
FACTS: On a rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around 5 o’clock, PO1 Fidel
Torre and PO1 Alexis Macusi were standing in front of the Camiling Police
Station when the accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed
weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had
stabbed his father. Hearing such statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the
bladed weapon from the accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi
for proper disposition. The accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was
already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed the victim. The
accused-appellant answered, “Sinaksak ko po yung Tatay ko! Napatay ko po!”
PO1 Torre then got the knife from the accused-appellant and gave to PO1
Macusi who placed the same in the police station’s custodian cabinet.
Thereafter, several officers went to the residence of Jose Guting to verify the
reported crime while other police officers informed Flora Guting, the victim’s
wife about the incident. SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody
had witnessed the crime but no one did. Subsequently, Jose was brought to
the nearest hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. A complaint
against accused-appellant was then filed for Parricide. On cross-examination,
PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for
safekeeping, he did not ask the accused-appellant if it was the knife he used
to kill his father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to him that it was the
knife he used in stabbing the victim. The RTC promulgated its decision on June
24, 2020 finding the accused-appellant guilty of Parricide based on his verbal
admission that he killed his father. Even assuming that the accused appellant’s
admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution
was able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
In the CA, the appeal was denied and the decision of the RTC was affirmed.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused is properly charge of Parricide under Art.
246 of the RPC.
HELD: Yes. The court correctly charged the accused of the crime Parricide.
In Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in Parricide - other
than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim. All the
elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-
appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was
presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the
legitimate son of Jose and Flora.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DIONISIO CALONGE y VERANA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On December 1, 2001 at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, the

Villaverde Police Station received a radio call from the barangay captain of
Cabuluan that a massacre took place in their locality. By 7:30 a.m., the
responding team led by PO3 Alfelmer Balut arrived at the area. Rosita’s
bloodied body was found lying on the ground about fifteen (15) meters away
from their house. Her right hand was loosely clasping a knife. Lying on his back
near the stairs was appellant who was also wounded but still conscious. Beside
him were a bolo and a flashlight, both stained with blood. While the windows
of the house were locked with a piece of tie wire, the door was already opened,
its metal lock was found three (3) to five (5) meters from the door and seven
(7) to ten (10) meters from the body of Rosita. Inside the two (2) "bedrooms"
of the house separated only by a curtain, they found the lifeless bodies of the
two (2) young girls, Kimberly and Dony Rose. The other child, Melody, was also
bloodied but alive and conscious. They brought Melody to the Veterans
Regional Hospital where she was treated and confined for seventeen (17) days.
Melody testimony’s: she recalled that her parents quarrelled on the night of
November 30, 2001. Before they went to sleep, she saw her father sharpening
his bolo. When she asked appellant what he was doing, he replied that he will
kill Uncle Santy and his family. Melody said that she pretended to be still asleep
when she woke up the next morning because she had seen appellant placed
that bolo under his pillow. As to the exact time the quarrel took place, it can
be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes that Melody initially could
not estimate with reference to the night before they slept, but she eventually
declared that her parents quarrelled from 6:00 o’clock until 7:00 o’clock in the
evening of November 30, 2001.
The Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and frustrated parricide. The CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court with modification in its penalty. Hence the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide
HELD: Yes. All the elements of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 were
present in the case whereas;
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant,
or the legitimate spouse of accused.37 The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim.38 All the elements of the crime
were clearly and sufficiently proved by the prosecution.
With regard to the frustrated felony, Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that –
ART. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. – The courts,
in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the
frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the
preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be
imposed under the provisions of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one
degree the penalty which under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt
to commit any of such crimes.
Appellant simply raises the defense of denial, which is inherently weak and
cannot prevail over the positive identification made by Melody that he was the
one (1) who hacked her, her mother and her sisters. Moreover, an affirmative
testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes
from the mouth of a credible witness, as in this case, the child of the assailant
who survived his murderous rampage.
Wherefore, the accused is guilty of parricide and frustrated parricide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PACANA, JR.
FACTS: Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged with the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City.
He pleaded not guilty and admitted that the victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana
(Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife. On 26 November 2002, at around 6:30 in the
morning, accused, who worked as a butcher, came home from the slaughter
house carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. His wife was
preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from
his work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times.
Tito, whose house is at back of appellant’s house, heard his daughter shouting
for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door
and her feet were trembling. But seeing accused, who was armed, he stepped
back. Angelina told Tito by the window that accused had held her mother’s
neck and stabbed her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion.
RULING: YES. The court convicted the accused of complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven (7)-month pregnant wife.
The crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or
other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. The testimony of the
accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an
admission against penal interest.
As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are
as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon
such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies,
either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of
infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is,
capable of independent existence. However, even if the child who was expelled
prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to
the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. In the
present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed
Lilybeth several times. The case is governed by the first clause of Article 48
because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the
grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional
abortion. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
HONORIO TIBON Y DEISO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FACTS: On or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, Honorio Tibon, murdered KEEN GIST TIBON, 3 years of age and
REGUEL ALBERT TIBON, 2 years of age, both his legitimate children, by
stabbing them several times on the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby
inflicting upon KEEN GIST and REGUEL ALBERT stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter. HonorIo libon accused-
appellant) and his common-law wife Gina sumingot (Gina) lived together as
husband and wife. They had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel
Albert (Reguel). Gina went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper, leaving
their children to Tibon's custody. After some time, it was revealed that Gina
was apparently having an affair in Hong Kong, Tibon rvan started drinking a
lot and seen hitting his two children At around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant's
mother and his siblings discovered the wounded and lifeless bodies of the
children, Tibon stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife and jumped
out of the window of their house. He confessed to stabbing their children and
begged for forgiveness to his wife. In court, Tibon denied the charges against
him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could not recall what
happened on the night he allegedly stabbed his two children; could not
remember being taken to the hospital and that he was only informed by his
siblings that he had killed his two children, causing him to jump off the window
of their house.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity applies to the

accused-appellant's case?
RULING: No. Under Article 12 of the RPC "An imbecile or an insane person,
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval" is exempted from criminal
liability. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Testimony or proof of
insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the ottense. The medical records of Tibon with the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) is inapplicable for such refers to his condition
to stand trial and not to his mental state immediately before or during the
commission of the crimes. The court considered Parricide as the applicable law
in this case. Under Article 264 Parricide is committed when: (i) a person is
killed; (i) the deceased is killed by the accused; (i) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Tibon
was found guilty by this Court with the punishment of reclusion perpetua.
Tibon's behavior was triggered by jealousy because of the revelation that his
wife was having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not
equivalent to insanity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
WILLIAM SABALBERINO Y ABULENCIA, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: William Sabalberino, a painter, was found guilty of parricide in a

murder case involving his wife, Delia Fernandez-Sabalberino. The accused-
appellant, a painter, claimed the stabbing was accidental and accidentally hit
his wife while attempting to stab him. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua imprisonment. The court
ordered him to pay damages to Delia's heirs, P75,000 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000 for moral damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied the accused-
appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC ruled that the stabbing was accidental, based on contradicting
evidence and testimonies from the victim's daughters. The accused-appellant
appealed to the CA for acquittal and reversal of the RTC decision. The CA
reiterated his defense, citing Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and
mitigating circumstances. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the RTC
judgment, increasing moral damages to ₱75,000, indemnifying the victim's
heirs for ₱50,000, and imposing interest at 6% per annum on all damages
awarded.
The CA ruled that the prosecution proved all elements of parricide, and the
accused-appellant failed to prove his defenses. The accused-appellant filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it. The Office of the Solicitor
General adopted the accused-appellant's Appellee's Brief, arguing it sufficiently
affirms his guilt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of herein

accused-appellant, William Sabalberino, for parricide.
RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative that parricide occurs when a person
is killed, the accused kills the deceased, and the deceased is the father, mother,
child, or other legitimate descendants or spouse of the accused. In this case,
Delia Sabalberino was killed by a stab wound to the heart, which was admitted
by the RTC. The prosecution successfully established that the appellant was
responsible for the stabbing, based on eyewitness accounts and testimony
from the victim's daughter, Angela. The defense did not object to the
admissibility of the Certificate of Death.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is crucial, distinguishing
parricide from homicide. In this case, the spousal relationship between Delia
and the appellant is beyond dispute. The prosecution produced a copy of the
couple's Certificate of Marriage, which the defense did not oppose. All elements
of the crime of parricide, as defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
are present in this case. The accused-appellant cites Article 247 of the RPC as
an absolutory and exempting cause, which states that any legally married
person who surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person shall kill any of them or both in the act or immediately
thereafter or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury.
Appeal is dismissed.

vs.
ANTERO GAMEZ Y BALTAZAR, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: The accused-appellant was accused of killing his father, Apolinario

Gamez, in 2004 in Burauen, Philippines. He was accused of willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attacking, assaulting, hacking, and wounding Apolinario with a
long bladed weapon and sickle. The trial was inverted due to the accused-
appellant's invocation of self-defense. Apolinario's daughter, Maura Anadia,
testified that Apolinario was attacked by his brother, carrying a long bolo and
a scythe. Apolinario suffered two fatal wounds and died at the crime scene.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that Apolinario's act was retaliation,
leading to his intentional death. The CA affirmed the RTC's findings, awarding
civil indemnity and an additional award of moral damages for Apolinario's heirs.
ISSUE: Accused appellant argued that his guilt for the crime of parricide was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ruling
that he failed to prove self-defense.
RULING: The court upheld the accused-appellant's conviction, stating that

self-defense cannot relieve the accused from criminal liability. The court argued
that self-defense requires proving unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity
of means, and lack of provocation. The accused-appellant failed to prove this
when he killed Apolinario, as the aggression was not continuous, and the
perceived threat was no longer present. The court also upheld the RTC's
findings, stating that the accused-appellant's actions contradicted the self-
defense theory.
The trial court ruled that Antero Gamez y Baltazar, the accused-appellant, was
guilty of parricide, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
victim tried to run away from the accused-appellant, but the accused-appellant
ran after him. The victim was hacked on the right side of his head and slashed
his neck with a scythe until the victim's father died. The accused-appellant
continued to chase his 69-year-old father and hacked several times, making
self-defense ineffective. The courts a quo correctly convicted him for parricide,
as it is the crime of killing a person, and the deceased is the father, mother, or
child. The accused-appellant was not eligible for parole under Republic Act No.
9346, which prohibits the imposition of death penalty. The court awarded
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The court also imposed an interest rate of 6% per
annum on all monetary awards for damages.

vs.
MANUEL MACAL y BOLASCO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Marital violence leading to spousal killing is common, and penal laws
impose harsher penalties for those found guilty of parricide compared to
homicide. Manuel Macal y Bolasco was convicted of parricide in 2003 for
allegedly killing his wife, Auria Ytac Macal. The prosecution presented
witnesses, but the defense argued that the stabbing was accidental. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Bolasco, sentenced him to imprisonment,
civil indemnity, moral damages, and costs. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the RTC decision, stating that all elements of parricide were present, and the
prosecution had sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain the conviction.
The CA also held that the act of the accused-appellant cannot be covered under
the exempting circumstance of accident or absolutory cause found in the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
RULING: The court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant with

modifications. Parricide is committed when a person is killed, the deceased is
killed by the accused, and the deceased is the offender's spouse. The
relationship between the offender and the victim is crucial, and the best proof
is their marriage certificate. In this case, the spousal relationship between
Auria and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. The fact of Auria's death is
incontestable, and the prosecution presented her Certificate of Death as
additional proof. The accused-appellant acknowledged the stabbing incident
during his direct examination.
The accused-appellant admitted to delivering Auria's fatal stabbing,
establishing his guilt. The defense invoked Article 12 paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code to release him from criminal liability. The prosecution's
testimony and witnesses' testimony negated the defense's claim of accident.
The court ruled that the defense must prove guilt in the act of sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter, establishing the guilty-appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Digests On Articles 217 To 246

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Case Digests On Articles 217 To 246

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CRIMINAL LAW II

Article 217 of The Revised Penal Code,

R.A. No. 3019, as amended,

R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. 7659, and

Article 246 of The Revised Penal Code

PROSECUTOR BENEDICT R. PICHAY, III

DON HONORIO VENTURA STATE UNIVERSITY

Malversation of Public Funds or Property

NAVARRO, MARIA LOURDES M.

G.R. No. 241383, June 08, 2020

NIDA P. CORPUZ, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ISSUE: WON Corpuz is guilty of malversation of public funds through

RULING: YES, Corpuz is guilty of malversation of public funds through

G.R. No. L-6781 November 6, 1911

FACTS: Defendant F. Wickersham was a chief clerk entrusted with the

ISSUE: WON Wickersham’s contention that the nature crime committed

RULING: NO, Wickersham’s contention that the nature crime committed

G.R. No. L-10935 February 1, 1916

FACTS: As a consequence of appellant Casimiro Velasquez’s conviction of

A private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing

FACTS: In 1969, Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan,

2. As to his liability, Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve

G.R. No. 175074. August 31, 2011.*

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

G.R. Nos. 186659-710. October 19, 2011.*

RULING: NO, SB did not err in the conviction of petitioners.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

MENDOZA, CRISTELLE JOY M.

Sec. 3(c): Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or

G.R. No. 238815, March 18, 2019

RAQUIL-ALI M. LUCMAN, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

● Raquil-Ali M. Lucman (Lucman) was charged with violation of Section 3

1. The offender is a public officer.

G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

● The petitioner is challenging the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (SB)

The elements required to establish a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

1. The offender must be a public officer.

Therefore, the petitioner was acquitted of all charges.

G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019

SIMEON GABRIEL RIVERA, MARILOU FARNACIO CANTANCIO, CESAR

● The case involves several individuals, including Simeon Gabriel Rivera,

The appeal is meritorious.

The elements required to establish a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

1. The offender must be a public officer.

The Sandiganbayan concluded that certain individuals had conspired to favor

The ruling argues that non-publication of certain information may have

Declarations made during post-qualification proceedings may not be sufficient

Mere allegations or suppositions of preferential treatment are not enough to

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 June 30, 1987

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

● Arturo A. Mejorada was employed as a public officer, initially as a

1. The offender must be a public officer.

Delito continuado or continuous crime:

G.R. Nos. 233443-44, November 28, 2018

ALBERT G. AMBAGAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

● The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Amadeo, Cavite, issued Resolution No.

The implication of recognizing the offense as a continuous crime is that the

The court upheld the petitioner's conviction.

Power to intervene into contract or transaction:

G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984

HILARIO JARAVATA petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and

Manifest partiality, evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence: