1.

Introduction

On April 20, 2010 the Deepwater Horizon offshore rig, operated by British energy company BP

exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. This incident has been viewed as one of the worst offshore oil

disasters in the United States (Lustgarten, 2010; Weisman, 2010). Eleven human lives were lost.

The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig toppled, and an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil spilled

out into ocean waters (New York Times,2012; US Environmental Protection Agency, 2013). It is

estimated that in addition to the reputation damage suffered, this incident cost about

USD65billion in payouts from BP (Bousso,2018). The then US President Obama described the oil

spill as the nation's "worst environmental disaster" and an "epidemic" with damage that would

have to be fought for months or even years (Lee, 2010; Weisman,2010). Undoubtedly, it was

one of the most expensive manmade corporate disasters that nonetheless could have been

avoided (Bendell, 2010; Jacobs, 2016).

Drawing on relevant corporate governance and ethical literature, this essay critically discusses

the key failings that led to this disaster. It is anticipated that by examining BP's ethical and

corporate governance framework ante and during the Deepwater Horizon disaster, some key

failings will be revealed.

2. BP's Ethics and Corporate Governance- Ante and Amid Deepwater Horizon Disaster
It is not unusual that BP was perceived as a company with an inclusive and admirable ethics

and corporate governance stance (Blumberg and Lin-Hi, 2011). In the wake of consumer

boycotts in 2000, the company rebranded with a "Beyond Petroleum" tagline and the logo of a

fresh sunburst (ibid). These were launched to position BP as an environmentally-friendly

company. The BP Annual report (2005) also documented a series of policies like a governance

process policy, a board executive linkage policy, a board goals policy and an executive

limitations policy. Furthermore, a critical look at BP's Sustainability Review (2009) detailed a

series of corporate governance efforts to internally support responsible and sustainable

behaviour.

Excerpts from this document are provided below:

"we are committed to the safety and development of our people and the
communities and societies in which we operate. We aim for no accidents, no
harm to people and no damage to the environment".
(BP, 2009a, p.2)

"BP is committed to exploring...we aim to do this while operating safely, reliably

and in compliance with the law".
(BP, 2009b, p.2)

Notably, Tony Hayward, the then Group Chief Executive unequivocally reiterated the company's

resolute commitment to ethical business practice by considering the triple bottom line concept

in operations (BP,2009). He emphasized the importance of considering the "how" in achieving

excellent financial and operational results. He further explained how the focus on this "how"

was central to building the trust and accountability required for BP's long term success (ibid).

This affirms that ethics is an essential component of good governance (Solomon, 2013; Perry et

al, 2015).
Some key internal control mechanism adapted from BP Sustainability Review (2009) are:

Internal Control Scope Accountable Role/Function

Mechanism

Safety, Ethics and Global Non Executive Advises the board and monitors

Environment Directors non-financial risks which include

Assurance regular reviews of information and

Committee (SEEAC) reports from the safety and

operations function.

Operations Risk Global Headed by Monitors key safety and

Committee (ORC) Group Chief environmental figures.

Executive

Operating Operational All Operations Reduce risk and drives continuous

Management System Staff improvement in operations.

(OMS)

Table 1:Other Internal Control Mechanism, Adapted from BP Sustainability Review (2009)

Independent bodies also lauded BP's introspective and evaluative reporting standards. In

particular, while the Cadbury Report (1992) encourages a voluntary "comply or explain"

approach to promote compliance in spirit rather than in letter, BP's annual report often

provided far more disclosures than required (Solomon, 2013).

Evidently, the aforementioned paragraphs highlights BP's corporate governance from a broader

and inclusive stakeholder perspective (Solomon, 2013; Driver and Thompson, 2018). Following

this stakeholder theory, corporate governance can be visualized as:

"a toolkit that enables... businesses have appropriate decision-making processes

and controls in place so that the interests of all stakeholders (shareholders,
employees, suppliers, customers and the community) are balanced".
(Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, 2018)

"the system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies,
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business
activity" .
(Solomon, 2013, p.7)

The stakeholder theory emphasizes that an organization's success is often dependent on how

well it manages its relationships with a range of groups who hold a stake rather than only a

share (Freeman, 1984; Bonnafous-Boucher and Rendtorff, 2016). It should be noted from this

theory that management's responsibility is to support and balance the long term interests of

stakeholders (Solomon, 2013; Driver and Thompson,2018).

Since the stakeholder theory approach has been established for BP's corporate governance

stance, it can be implied that BP's code of ethics and other policies provides guidance to

choosing actions that are beneficial to stakeholders and long term sustainability (BP, 2009).

This projects a principle based approach as depicted in BP's comprehensive set of best practice

policies (ACCA, 2008).

Likewise, this essay will also consider the philosophical branch of ethics called normative ethics.

As normative ethics prescribes standards for the rightness or wrongness of actions, inferences

will be drawn largely from the teleological and deontological ethical theories(Deigh, 2010;
Crane and Matten, 2016). Additionally, from an applied ethics perspective, business ethics will

be highlighted.

From a business ethics stance, the irony of "appearing" to be ethical through well worded code

of ethics and policies rather than "being" ethical reiterates the pragmatic question; Can

businesses be ethical? (Fisher and Lovell,2006; Dimmock and Fisher,2018). While Bauman

(1993) and Bevan and Corvellec (2007) argue that it is impossible to translate ethics into

organizations, Dimmock and Fisher (2018) explain why many businesses chose to "appear"

ethical rather than "be" ethical using the arguments below:

 A business aims to make profit;

 A business will make profit if it can attract customers;

 A business will attract most customers (at least in the West) if it appears to be ethical;

 Thus, a business will make more profit if it appears ethical than actually being ethical

because it costs more to be ethical than appear ethical.

Luk Bouckaert conceptualised this as the paradox of ethics management. He simplified this

concept as, the more ethics management, the less ethics in management (Bouckaert, 2015).

Bouckaert further encapsulates this paradox as:

"...Preaching moral concepts such as trust, responsibility or democracy on the

basis of calculative self-interest or as conditions of systemic functionality is not
wrong but ambiguous. It opens the door for suspicion and distrust because
calculations and systemic conditions can easily be manipulated. When the fox
preaches, guard your geese".
(Bouckaert, 2006, p. 201)
In the context of BP, we can deduce that the paradox of ethics management was the case. Also,

competitive pressures often made it "trendy" to be perceived as ethical as against being

actually ethical (Blumberg and Lin-Hi, 2011).

Shortly after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, a joint investigation team comprising members of

the US Coastguards and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and

Enforcement (BOEMRE) presented preliminary findings. These findings pointed to several

systems deficiencies and acts of omission or negligence by the Deepwater Horizon crew, clearly

pinpointing the absence of an effective safety management system and safety culture

(BOEMRE, 2010). While Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig, Halliburton cemented

the oil well with BP owning the well, it was concluded by this joint task force that BP was

"ultimately responsible" for this incident (ibid).

3. BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster- Key Failings

Where then was the lacuna? Why did a robust and extensive ethical and corporate governance

framework on paper neither guide corporate behaviour nor translate into practice?

Generally, there is a consensus that top management's myopia and excessive risk appetite

driven by the prioritization of financial considerations over stakeholder considerations were at

the heart of this disaster (Bendell, 2010; Blumberg and Lin-Hi, 2011; Kay Review, 2012; Thamo-

theram and Le Floc'h, 2012; Solomon, 2013).

A close examination of top management's morality to pursue financial wins over other social

and environmentally factors, resonates Ethical Egoism. Ethical Egoism is a form of teleological

or consequentialist theory. Crane and Matten (2016) point out that in ethical egoism, an action

is morally right if one decides to pursue either their short-term or long term interests. A key
supporter Adam Smith highlights that in the economic sphere, the pursuit of self interest is

acceptable. He affirms:

“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address
ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
our own necessities but of their advantages”
(Smith, 1776)

It is worth mentioning that pursuit of self interest does not connote the same meaning as

selfishness. As Crane and Matten (2016) clarifies:

"The egoist can be moved by pity for others in seeking to remove his own
distress caused by their plight [whereas] the selfish person is insensitive to the
other”.
(Crane and Matten, 2016)

In BP's case, we can infer that in pursuit of: financial emoluments, company profits, earnings

per share and other probable self interests, top management clashed with other stakeholder

interests like employee safety, environmental concerns, regulatory guidelines and so on. This

conflict of interests resulted in poor decisions. This portrays a major drawbacks of ethical

egoism.

Subsequently, five key failings of these decisions are discussed.

3a. Short Termism or Myopia of top management

Independent and extensive investigations/reports uncovered internal documents that revealed

top management were well informed about the safety risks on the oil well and chose to

proceed "as usual" (Casselman and Gold, 2010; Urbina, 2010; Congress of the United States,
2010). Clearly, several of BP's decisions suggested that these safety risks were shoved aside and

necessary risk avoidance measures were not considered (Congress of the United States, 2010).

This clearly infers that such decisions were driven by short term goals to reduce cost and save

time as the rig operations were already over budget and behind schedule (Blumberg and Lin-Hi,

2011). Solomon(2013) advocates a holistic view of governance to combat myopia and deliver

long term growth and value creation.

Conversely, the case for an "enlightened shareholder" approach addresses this drawback, as it

considers the long term impact or sustainable profits while prioritizing shareholder interests

(Solomon, 2013). The third King Report (2009) highlights:

"In the enlightened shareholder approach the legitimate interests and

expectations of stakeholders only have an instrumental value. Stakeholders are
only considered in as far as it would be in the interests of shareholders to do so" .
(King Report, 2009, p.12)

3b. Absence of Regulatory Independence

Overall, it can also be induced that BP's internal regulatory committees (like earlier mentioned

Safety, Ethics and Environment Assurance Committee (SEEAC) and Operations Risk Committee)

and external regulatory body called the Minerals Management Service (MMS) were "captured".

In business ethics, social capture is a term used to describe the mechanism by which a

"watchdog" - committee or regulatory body, becomes heavily influenced by the very sectional

interest this "watchdog" was intended to monitor or control (Fisher & Lovell, 2006; Potter et al,

2014).
Crucially, a salient point from the oval office address by the then President Obama, was the

prevalent behaviour of oil companies showering regulators like MMS - an agency of the US

Department of Interior saddled with offshore drilling regulations and permit issuance; with

gifts and favours essentially allowing these companies write their own regulations and conduct

their own safety inspections (Weisman, 2010). This clearly implies an even broader systemic

failure where corporations were allowed to play by their own rules and police themselves.

3c. Prevalence of Pervasive Culture

Prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident, BP had a history of unethical practices. Some past

safety and health violations in BP resulted in an explosion and fire in Texas and Ohio refineries

in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

records from 2007 to 2010 revealed that BP's safety and health violations comprised 97% of

"deliberate" violations (Thomas et al,2010). This intentional negligence is often too difficult to

change once enshrined in an organization.

Similarly, past employees and contractors attested that colleagues who often escalated issues

were blacklisted or fired (Lustgarten,2010). Undoubtedly, this instilled fear and led to the

absence of true transparency and accountability key drivers of good governance (Solomon,

2013). It is recommended that a bottom up ethics is used. As it creates an environment where

staff are encouraged to challenge and hold management responsible (Crane and Matten, 2016;

Fryer, 2011).
3d. Prioritization of financial considerations over other stakeholder considerations
Zeroing in on this failing, Kay Review (2012) explicitly points out:

"BP became at this time one of Britain's most admired companies...After the
millennium, however, it became apparent that the pressure on costs had led
the company to devote insufficient attention to environmental and
health and safety issues.
(Kay Review, 2012, p.20)
As revealed by internal documents retrieved from BP, the company saved about USD7million to

USD10million by opting for a riskier well casing (Congress of the United States,2010). BP also

decided not to repair the blowout preventer's rubber seal which was reported as damaged a

month before the explosion (Casselman and Gold,2010). It is worth highlighting that the oil spill

could have been prevented but for the failure of the "fail safe" devices like the blow out

preventer and the blind shear ram (Bendell,2010). All these clearly indicate that financial

performance were prioritized over the rig workers safety.

This is anticipated though, as a controversial and debateable drawback in stakeholder theory

remains the aspect of prioritization of which stakeholder group over the other (Freeman, 1994).

Similarly, Donaldson (2002) highlights :

"Advocates of traditional stakeholder theory...hand managers a theory that

makes purposeful decisions impossible. And, with no way to keep score,
stakeholder theory forces managers to be unaccountable for the very actions
through which they were to be evaluated".
(Donaldson, 2002, p.110)

3e. Non-effective Board of Directors and Institutional Investors

The ACCA (2008) framework and UK Corporate Governance Code (2018) emphasize the

responsibilities of board members in setting the direction of an organisation for long term
sustainable impact. While there was an obvious lapse on the part of BP's board members in

igniting the admirable policies into action, it was also observed that the Group Chief Executive

also held the position of Chairman of the Operations Risk Committee (BP, 2009). This created a

conflict of interest, as the same person was held accountable for company safety and profits

(Lustgarten, 2010; Solomon, 2013).

Needless to say, neither institutional investors nor non-executive directors were actively

involved in monitoring BP's ethics and corporate behaviour (Solomon,2013). It is worth

highlighting that in examining the need for independence of non-executive directors(NEDs), The

Higgs Report (2003) stipulates that NEDs must be and willing to challenge and probe issues.

that non-executive directors also needed to challenge and probe on issues.

Notably, there is a divergence and convergence on the role of NEDs. While there is a consensus

on their contribution to good governance (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Byrd and Hickman,

1992; Higgs Report, 2003; Tyson Report, 2003), there is a divergence on the usefulness of their

role; especially in comparison to their executive directors(ED) counterparts (Rosenstein and

Wyatt, 1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The ACCA (2008) framework advocates a balance of

both NEDs and EDs to promote good governance.

4. Conclusion and Recommendation

This essay indicates that corporate governance is not an end in itself. It is rather a means that

promotes integrity of organisations. Also, it highlights that good ethical and corporate

governance practice transcends well-worded policies and documents. Correspondingly, it

emphasizes the need for a holistic governance approach as this approach ultimately promotes

the Triple Bottom Line by fusing social and environmental issues with traditional financial

performance issues. It also re-iterates active participation of non-executive directors and

institutional investors whose roles must influence good corporate governance and provoke

bottom up ethics.

Most importantly, the exponential growth in clamours for good corporate governance and

ethics have ushered academic studies and research. An early introduction to this discipline is

critical, as it stimulates the need for accountability, transparency and readiness for transitioning

into professional practice.

Lastly, as BP continues to remain a going concern years after this debacle. Further

comprehensive empirical studies is proposed to compare transformations in BP's corporate

governance and ethical framework ante and post the Deepwater Horizon explosion.

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FEEDBACK

This essay is an excellent piece of work, it is well structured, and the argument
flows very well. The reference list is adequate and the citing is correct. Some
paragraphs could use better transition or length and the use of bullet points and
quotes may seem excessive. Nevertheless, it is an excellent essay, well
structured, with good sections, a good flow of argument, a good analysis of
theories and referencing.