MEDIA SUMMARY ________________________________________________ ________________________
The following explanatory note is provided to assist the media
in reporting this case and is not binding on the Constitutional Court or any member of the Court.
This matter was an application for leave to appeal against
an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) which overturned a decision of the High Court, Pretoria. The application concerned the powers exercised by the Advertising Regulatory Board NPC (ARB) over entities who are not members of the ARB and have not agreed to be bound by the ARB’s memorandum of incorporation (MOI) or the Code of Advertising Practice (Code).
The applicant was Bliss Brands (Pty) Ltd (Bliss), a
company which sells cleaning and hygiene products. The applicant was not a member of the ARB. The first respondent was the ARB, a non-profit company which tookover the regulation of advertising from the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (ASA). This is in terms of section 55 of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (ECA). The second respondent is Colgate- Palmolive (Pty) Ltd, a South African company. The third respondent is Colgate-Palmolive Company, an American company that distributes its products in South Africa through the second respondent. The applicant and the second and third respondents, at the time of the litigation, were competitors in the soap bar market.
The ARB made certain disciplinary rulings against Bliss
arising from complaints by Colgate in relation to the packaging of Bliss’s Securex soap bar, which bears similarities to Colgate’s competing Protex soap bar. Bliss was successful at the first leg of the adjudication of Colgate’s complaint, but failed in two internal appeals thereafter. The effect of the ARB’s final ruling was that Bliss may no longer sell its soap using its then current packaging. After exhausting the ARB’s internal appeal process, Bliss approached the High Court for relief.
In sum: the High Court found in favour of Bliss Brands;
while the Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the High Court on appeal, holding in favour of the ARB. Bliss Brands then appealed to the Constitutional Court. Bliss Brands levelled a number of arguments in challenging the ARB’s imposition of indirect jurisdiction over non- members, ranging from its participation of as non-member of the ARB in ARB processes not amounting to “true” consent to the ARB’s jurisdiction, through to infringements of the fundamental rights to freedom of association, freedom of expression and access to courts enshrined in the Constitution.
In a unanimous judgment, penned by Madlanga J (and
concurred in by Zondo CJ, Kollapen J, Madlanga J, Majiedt J, Makgoka AJ, Mathopo J, Potterill AJ, Rogers J and Theron J), the Constitutional Court recognised that the matter concerned issues of a constitutional and administrative law nature that reach beyond the role players in the dispute, but adopted a minimalist approach as articulated by the Court in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation [2010] ZACC 4.
Bliss Brands’ correctly conceded during the hearing that
that if the Constitutional Court were to hold that Bliss Brands did consent to the ARB’s jurisdiction, that would be dispositive of the matter. The springboard for all the grounds of appeal is the idea that the ARB was not entitled to exercise its jurisdiction over Bliss Brands. On this score, Bliss Brands contended that it could not have consented to the jurisdiction of the ARB in any true sense, as the effect of an ad-alert was that ARB members may not accept the advertisement in issue from the non-member concerned or, if the advertisement has already been accepted and published, must withdraw the publication. Thus, any refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the ARB would have no effect: Bliss Brands would have been adjudged and suffered the consequences either way.
On the existing law, and without upsetting the factual
findings made by the Supreme Court of Appeal in line with Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZACC 13, the Court determined that this argument by Bliss Brands did not hold up to scrutiny. Madlanga J held, in the first place, that non- submission by a nonmember to the ARB’s jurisdiction does have a “result” which is materially different to that which would flow from submission to the ARB’s jurisdiction: if there is no submission, the ARB’s members may not carry the impugned advertisement but there is nothing to stop the non-member from continuing to advertise in media belonging to nonmembers and from continuing to use the impugned packaging. Where the non-member submits to the ARB’s jurisdiction, by contrast, the ARB can make directions which are binding on the non-member.
Secondly, the judgment pointed out that one cannot
discount the possibility that some nonmembers participate in the proceedings willingly, thus submitting to the ARB’s jurisdiction. The question whether a non-member has submitted to the ARB’s jurisdiction depends on the facts: what did the non-member do or not do? In this case, as the Supreme Court of Appeal held (premised on its factual findings), the letter that advised Bliss Brands of the complaint “requested it to ‘inform us if you do not consider yourself to be bound by the ARB’, and advised that Bliss Brands was not obliged to respond or furnish a defence”. Bliss Brands rendered a detailed response to the merits of the complaint without any objection to the ARB’s jurisdiction. The letter from Bliss Brands’ attorneys not only fully addressed the merits of the complaint but also concluded with a request that, if the Directorate found that Securex was in contravention of the Code and directed Bliss Brands to withdraw or amend its product packaging, Bliss Brands be permitted six months from the date of the ruling in which to do so. The Constitutional Court pronounced that this was an unambiguous intimation by Bliss Brands that it was submitting itself to the ARB’s jurisdiction. Madlanga J, for the Court, reasoned further that the conclusion that Bliss Brands had subjected itself to the ARB’s jurisdiction was borne out by its conduct: (a) it participated in all stages of the ARB proceedings without a whimper of protest; (b) it was content with the Directorate’s finding (the first instance finding) which was in its favour; (c) when the AAC upheld Colgate’s appeal, Bliss Brands appealed on the merits to the FAC; and (d) in the review application, Bliss Brands, inter alia, sought remittal to the FAC in the event of the prayer for a substituted decision being unsuccessful.
The Constitutional Court concluded that Bliss Brands
cannot succeed on its consent to jurisdiction argument – as it plainly did accept the jurisdiction of the ARB in this case. Its consent to jurisdiction point was dispositive of the dispute; and because the point was not arguable, leave to appeal was refused. The following order was made: “Leave to appeal is refused with costs, including the costs of two counsel.”