Unhcr Omun

2023
United Nations High

Commissioner
for Refugees
(UNHCR)
BACKGROUND GUIDE
1
Table of contents
Agenda A: Protection for Stateless People ........................................................................................... 3
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................... 3
History of the Problem................................................................................................................................. 6
Current Situation ......................................................................................................................................... 7
Bloc Positions............................................................................................................................................... 8
Europe .................................................................................................................................................... 8
The United States................................................................................................................................... 9
Relevant UN Actions .................................................................................................................................... 9
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights................................................................................ 9
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons .......................................................... 9
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness ..................................................................... 10
1994 General Assembly Resolution ..................................................................................................... 10
1995 General Assembly Resolution & 1995 Conclusion on Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness
and Protection of Stateless Persons ..................................................................................................... 10
Questions the Committee Should Consider ................................................................................................ 11
Suggestions for Further Research.............................................................................................................. 12
Agenda B: Improvement of Refugee Integration Strategies.............................................................. 12
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................. 12
History of the Problem............................................................................................................................... 14
Current Situation ....................................................................................................................................... 16
Relevant UN Actions .................................................................................................................................. 18
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol:......................................... 18
According to the UNHCR’s Guide to Refugees’ Access to Jobs and Financial Services:..................... 18
General Assembly’s Global Compact and Global Refugee Forum:...................................................... 18
Questions the Committee Should Consider / A resolution Must Answer ................................................. 19
Given by the UNHCR’s Guide to Refugees’ Access to Jobs and Financial Services ............................ 19
Suggestions for Further Research.............................................................................................................. 19
2
Agenda A: Protection for Stateless People
Statement of the Problem

A stateless person is one who is not recognised as a citizen or national under the laws of any
country - and as such, cannot enjoy the rights associated with citizenship1. A person can be born
stateless, or can become stateless. They can also be de jure stateless - legally stateless, because they
are not recognised as a citizen by any state. Or they can be de facto - effectively stateless, by not
being recognised as a citizen even if they have a claim to citizenship2.
It is a more common phenomenon than is often discussed - at the end of 2022, the UN Refugee
Agency reported more than 4.4 million people were stateless or of undetermined nationality3.
UNHCR data reported for 95 countries indicates a total of 4.3 million - but the real figure is likely
much higher, as around half the countries in the world do not report stateless statistics 4.
There are stateless populations in almost every country, but measures are difficult considering
they are often undocumented and excluded from census data. About one third of them are
estimated to be children, and about 30% of stateless populations are also displaced - especially the
Rohingya5. At the end of 2022, Bangladesh had over 950,000 stateless, Côte d’Ivoire had over
931,000, Myanmar 630,000 and Thailand over 574,000.
For most, nationality is determined by place of birth, parentage or long-term residence in a

country. Statelessness can come from discrimination against a minority group (from race,
ethnicity, religion, language or gender); gaps in nationality laws or conflicts or law between
countries (such as if countries do not pass nationality through family ties, and a child is born in a
foreign country); changes in territorial sovereignty (creation of new countries, territory transfers
between countries, or changed in borders make it difficult to prove links to a country); lack of birth
registrations (no proof of place of birth and parentage) or denationalisation (losing nationality for
living outside their country for a long period)6.
Statelessness has many dangerous consequences since they have no legal protection and are often
denied their basic rights. That includes education, healthcare, housing, marriage and more. They
are also particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and abuse on that basis. The
UNHCR demonstrates this with the story of Olena Miryasheva - she was left stateless after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. While living in Ukraine, she was not a citizen, and when
she developed cancer and was denied access to healthcare that would have been free for Ukrainian
citizens7.
1 https://www.unrefugees.org/news/statelessness-explained/
2 https://www.state.gov/other-policy-issues/statelessness/
4 https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/635a578f4/mid-year-trends-2022.html
3
Their population is also especially prone to forced displacement, making them stateless refugees -
they can be deprived of their nationality and forced to leave, or else are forced to flee because of
other persecution. This is one of the reasons the UNHCR emphasises protecting the stateless
particularly.
Stateless people routinely face the risk of their rights being violated, and this can occur without
procedures to identify them and give them a route out of there. For example, most but not all
European states have signed up to international law standards on the protection of the stateless,
but most do not have national frameworks to put those commitments into practice8.
Political will is the start of the solution. States need statelessness determination procedures as a
regularisation route for stateless people, in respect of international norms and good practice:
procedural safeguards, evidentiary assessment, appeal rights, protection status and acquisition of
nationality9. Moves towards this are being taken in some countries - as demonstrated by the
Statelessness Index, which shows good practice and where more work needs to be done.
Work needs to be done to ensure more countries should accede to the 1954 Convention, and those
who have done so with reservations should withdraw them.
Additionally, statelessness determination procedures (SDP) should be introduced in states in line

with UNHCR guidance and good practice, to fulfil their obligations under the 1954 Convention.
In the meantime, temporary grant residence permits should be granted upon applying stateless
status. This should be in addition to a route to permanent residence, with a path to facilitated
naturalisation so statelessness can be a temporary issue.
Protection from arbitrary detention, especially through an SDP, because otherwise they end up
caught with no country to return to or a route to regularise their stay. With an SDP, improved
identification of statelessness, and more access to effective remedies to challenge immigration
detention, it can be avoided.
Officials in charge of statelessness decision-making should be trained to ensure the SDP in works
as intended and the 1954 Convention is upheld. They should also have resources needed to make
good decisions, which needs regular independent audits on their decision-making.
The European Network on Statelessness has a pan-European campaign for improved stateless
protections. In 2014, this campaign was run to bring together stakeholders in the issue, and
highlight the voices of those affected by statelessness in Europe. That emphasises the impact of
being left in limbo because of insufficient protection mechanisms. The online petition attracted
over 7000 signatures, and caused a day of action against statelessness on the 14th of October 2014
across Europe when the petition was handed to European leaders.
They advocate to national governments and regional institutions, such as the Council of Europe.
However, this has yet to result in consistent, clear or comprehensive approaches to deal with
8 https://www.statelessness.eu/issues/protecting-rights-stateless-people
9 https://www.statelessness.eu/issues/protecting-rights-stateless-people
4
statelessness. This is compounded by the difficulty of statelessness people to find up-to-date, clear
information on the issue.
The European Statelessness Index lists a few of their measures of statelessness, as ways to
demonstrate how effectively a country is dealing with the issue. Evaluating a country against these
measures can be good starting points to demonstrate whether a country is committed to solving
the problem of stateless people within its borders.
The first of these criteria is being party to relevant international and regional instruments 10. For
example, that could check whether reservations impact Statelessness there, and whether
international instruments are incorporated into domestic law. The international statelessness
treaties that are given particular importance are the 1954 and 1961 conventions.
The second is having accurate and available population data on statelessness 11. That includes the
data being disaggregated, recent, mapped onto the country as well as having self-assessed
reliability. The data can come from multiple sources, such as the census, population registries, and
migration databases. Ideally, it should show stateless people stateless people in detention too.
Thirdly, it measures how statelessness is determined and what status a stateless person has in the
country12. This should be such that the national law defines a stateless person as the 1954
Convention does, and should have a statelessness determination procedure (SDP) to grant the
statelessness status. Without an SDP, there ought to be other procedures to identify statelessness
or for stateless people to access their rights and regularise their stay, assessed against international
norms of good practice. If not, the statelessness status, even when conferred, may offer no clear
mechanism to access protection. Specifically, stateless people fleeing war should be able to access
temporary protection.
Fourth, it is important to have protections to prevent arbitrary detention of the stateless, especially
during removal and deportation13. This is linked to broader immigration policy and practice. Sub
themes are the identification of statelessness, assessing whether removal is a possibility, and what
rights are granted to the previously detailed stateless to prevent re-detention. There is a need for
procedural safeguards like time limits, judicial oversight and effective remedies.
Finally, it asks whether safeguards in nationality law prevent and reduce statelessness 14. That
includes routes to naturalisation for the stateless, and protections for otherwise stateless children
born on territory, or to nationals abroad, foundlings and adopted children. This requires good law
and practice access to late birth registration, and reduction measures to prevent and reduce
statelessness. It also necessitates safeguards and limitations on the deprivation of nationality, to
prevent statelessness.
10 https://index.statelessness.eu/themes/international-and-regional-instruments
11 https://index.statelessness.eu/themes/statelessness-population-data
12 https://index.statelessness.eu/themes/statelessness-determination-and-status
13 https://index.statelessness.eu/themes/detention
14 https://index.statelessness.eu/themes/prevention-and-reduction
5
History of the Problem
Statelessness informed theories of “rights, sovereignty, international legal order, and cosmopolitan
justice”15. The history of statelessness can be traced through the origin of international agreements
- specifically the 1954 adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in 1954, defining a stateless person as anyone “who is
not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”. However, Siegelberg, in
her history of statelessness, shows multiple other actors including a cast of international lawyers16.
Pre-1914, it was deemed inconceivable for a ‘civilised’ society to deprive someone of a nationality,
but the concept figured nonetheless, as a sort of legal ‘loose cannon’. When Romania deprived its
Jewish subjects of citizenship, European powers at the Congress of Berlin resulted that this ought
not to be accepted. However, such a concern did not extend to colonial subjects, who were often
‘nationals’ but not full citizens.
In the pre-World War I era, there was mobility for those who could afford it, without reference to
national status. However, that ended abruptly with the outbreak of war, and brought the concept
of being stateless into the spotlight. In British common law, a court’s decision on the case of Max
Stoeck embedded this concept of statelessness. He was German-born, but interred by the British
during the war as an ‘enemy alien’. After the end of the war, he asked a British court to declare him
not a German national, as Prussia had done earlier, and with the status of stateless - an
advantageous status in this situation.
Prior to World War II, a case of statelessness was noted in the 1930 League of Nations Codification
Conference: "In a State whose nationality is not conferred by the mere fact of birth in its territory,
a person born in its territory of a mother possessing the nationality of that State and of a father
without nationality or of unknown nationality shall have the nationality of the said State” 17. Many
signatories eventually adjusted their laws so this would remain true, such as in Australia.
Many cases still remained ambiguous because people did not always receive their parents’
nationality, or were not born in places that would provide citizenship.
The Nansen International Office for Refugees were the League of Nations’s organisation in charge
of war refugees in the 1930s. They issued Nansen passports to stateless refugees, which were
internationally recognised identity cards. In 1942, they were honoured by 52 governments. This
was particularly important in the case of Russian refugees, due to the Soviet decision to de-
nationalise them. However, to some, it was a reminder that the UN could still not override the
sovereignty of the state to confer a nationality18.
Fridjtof Nansen, the League’s High Commissioner for Refugees, saw this as a humanitarian
problem with technical solutions - such as repatriation, whereas international lawyers argued the
League should address their fundamental statelessness. This latter solution became less likely as
time went on.
15 https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/2431
17 https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain
6
Exclusionary policies from former Soviet satellite states continued the complexity - and Russian
and Armenian refugees were treated better than former imperial subjects who had been deprived
of their citizenship without leaving their country.
Questions began to arise of whether it was simply a matter of providing material support for the
stateless, or whether it was of guaranteeing their human rights beyond the sovereign state 19. A
group of internationalist Russian jurists were of the latter opinion. They tried to keep statelessness
on the agenda - either by including it in the 1933 Refugee Convention or making separate
provision through another international body. This was important as some groups of refugees
could claim asylum, but the stateless overall lost all diplomatic protection without no international
body preventing states from arbitrarily depriving citizenship (such as Nazi Germany depriving
German Jews of citizenship).
In the 1940s, the statist approach to the international lawyers fought against gained more ground -
reaffirmation of state sovereignty was seen as the way to solve statelessness, institutionalised in
the Atlantic Charter. This promoted the view that securing human rights came through securing
membership in a state. Other theories were floated - such as a dedicated state for the stateless, or a
European citizenship from the European Union, international organisations tended to the statist
approach, including the UNHCR.
UN member states have also been accused of linking the overall problem of statelessness with
refugee crises in the post-war world, enabling them to minimise obligations to the stateless by
focusing on the former. However, refugees and the stateless were never conflated legally as it
meant states would lose the chance to decide who entered their country.
Siegelberg, in her history of the issue, notes how nationality has transformed from a legal status to
something with ‘socially concrete substance’, and as a consequence statelessness is seen as a
social-psychological phenomenon rather than a legal one20. This is embodied in the commonality
of attempts to help them that focus on the practical consequences of statelessness, rather than
affecting the legal status itself.
Theoretically, statelessness has been used as an appeal to world citizenship. It was a time, for
critical thinkers such as Gandhi, to theorise on what political community other than the state
would look like. This is vital because the presence of statelessness could force sovereign states to
resolve it at their own level, or could embody a new order, where ‘non state entities’ were
recognised. This would be a transformation from the current system, where the individual is an
object of international law, rather than a subject. This idea of ‘legal personality’ is critical to the
Vienna School of Law, and might argue that a stateless person is primarily an individual, rather
than a legal anomaly. This theory may guide how we choose to approach practice in the area.
Current Situation
Countries have a critical role to play here - between 2003 and 2013, their actions led to more than
4 million stateless people acquiring or confirming a nationality. 12 countries have taken steps to
7
remove gender discrimination in nationality laws - so children are not left stateless with stateless
fathers. There have been 49 accessions to the two statelessness conventions.
In 2014, a 10-year Global Action Plan to End Statelessness was set up21. It was coordinated by
UNHCR and with the participation of orbiter UN and international agencies, regional
organisations, civil society and stateless people.
In 2022, a number of countries had introduced initiatives under this. This includes acceding to
relevant international instruments, establishing SDPs, facilitating birth registration for newborns,
facilitating access to protection services, and organising informational campaigns 22.
Despite this progress, certain issues are increasing the prevalence of statelessness. Climate-
induced displacement is combining with statelessness to create climatic statelessness, wherein
there is statelessness due to the overall disappearance of habitats - especially in small island states
that are threatened by rising sea levels.
It cannot be addressed by existing legislation, since that focuses on rights of individuals and the
corresponding duties of states23. For example, there is a binary between statelessness as the
undesirable state and citizenship of the host country as desirable - but affected populations may
want to keep their nationality after their country disappears. This is particularly important for
those who leave the country before complete loss of the country’s territory occurs.
Bloc Positions
Europe
The European Statelessness Index assesses how countries in Europe protect stateless people, or
prevent the phenomenon24.
The European Convention on Nationality is a Council of Europe that is open for signature to the
member states and non-member states that participated, as well as accession for other non-
member states. It came into force on the 1st of March 2000, and has been signed by 29 countries
and ratified by 21 of them, as of 202125.
Article 4(d) provides that marriage and divorce do not affect the nationality of the spouses
automatically, improving the ability of married women to access legal provisions and maintain a
nationality. Article 5 provides that no discrimination shall exist within nationality law, nor shall
distinction be made between nationality by birth and acquired nationality. Article 6 allows for
naturalisation and other acquisition of nationality, through birth by descent or birth in state.
Article 7 regulates involuntary loss of nationality, only through voluntary acquisition of another,
fraud, voluntary foreign military service, or adoption by a foreign national - with a few exceptions.
Article 8 provides rights to renounce their nationality, providing they do not become stateless.
21 https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/
22 https://www.refworld.org/docid/6273a83a4.html
23 https://www.refworld.org/docid/6273a83a4.html
24 https://index.statelessness.eu/
25 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=signatures-by-treaty&treatynum=166
8
The Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State
Succession is a treaty that builds upon this. It has detailed rules, designed to prevent cases where
individuals lose the nationality of the replaced state, but do not acquire those of a replacing state
so people are left without a nationality.
The European Network on Statelessness’s Stateless Journeys campaign calls upon European
governments and the EU to provide the full rights and support to the stateless, and to prioritise
them in immigration policy.
The United States

The US is the largest single donor to the UNHCR26. They are also a member of the Geneva-based
“Group of Friends” of the #IBelong campaign.
The State Department also advocates on behalf of stateless people with foreign governments and
civil society organisations, including funding non-governmental organisations.
At the midpoint of the #IBelong campaign, the UNHCR convened a High-Level Segment on
Statelessness in its Executive Committee meeting in 2019 to make pledges and reaffirm
commitments to the plan. The US pledged to engage in diplomacy and advocacy for the stateless,
and provide humanitarian assistance. They also agreed to conduct an external evaluation of the
efforts by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. They
focused on promoting nationality law reforms in the 25 countries that do not allow mothers to
confer citizenship on an equal basis to their children.
At the 2021 UNHCR High-Level Officials Meeting, the US committed to improving protections of
US stateless people by adopting a definition of statelessness for immigration purposes, and making
statelessness determinations consistent with US law.
Relevant UN Actions
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 15 states that “everyone has the right to a nationality” and should not be arbitrarily
deprived of the same - created on the basis of a surge of stateless populations after World War II
and the reconfiguration of nation states.
The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
This convention, with 96 states party to it - Madagascar having renounced its accession in 1996 -
protects the stateless worldwide. It defines a stateless person as one “who is not considered as a
national by any state under operation of its law”.
Article 7 suggests states should accord stateless person the same treatment as for aliens generally,
including rights of property in Article 13 and in employment. Article 16 asks stateless persons to
not be discriminated against in courts. Articles 20-24 say they should be treated no less favourably
than nationals for rationing, housing, public education, public relief, labour legislation and public
26 https://www.state.gov/other-policy-issues/statelessness/
9
security. Article 31 says stateless persons should not be expelled except on grounds of national
security or public order, and Article 32 suggests states should facilitate their assimilation and
naturalisation.
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
The General Assembly mandated UNHCR to provide assistance to statelessness individuals. 78

countries are party to that. Specifically, Article 11 entrusts the UNHCR with certain
responsibilities.
Article 1 states that birth on the territory of contrasting states attracting the granting of their
nationality. Article 2 states that otherwise they should take the nationality of the place of their
birth or where they are found, or the nationality of a parent. This provides international standards
for nationality law. Article 10 states transfer of territory between states should avoid the
occurrence of statelessness of people residing in the territory. Article 8 states that in normal cases,
deprivation of citizenship can only occur when a person has another nationality. Some of the
nationality provisions may require a period of residence, according to Article 1(2).
Additionally, the UNHCR committed to issuing travel documents evidencing nationality to those
with a claim of nationality under the convention.
1994 General Assembly Resolution

This was the beginning of a series of resolutions in which the General Assembly gave the UNHCR
its formal mandate to identify the stateless, prevent and reduce global statelessness through
promoting accession and implementing international instruments, and protect the rights of the
stateless.
1995 General Assembly Resolution & 1995 Conclusion on Prevention and Reduction of
Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons
This states that statelessness can result in displacement, and protecting the stateless is therefore
important to prevent refugee situations. In particular, it asks the UNHCR to promote accession to
the 1954 and 1961 Conventions since limited countries had done so. That includes providing
services on preparing and implementing relevant nationality legislation.
The UNHCR’s focus on this front is securing nationality for the currently stateless, and preventing
more people from becoming stateless. The UNHCR works to address a Global Action Plan aiming
to end statelessness by 2024.
The UNHCR works with governments, other UN agencies and civil society on four primary
functions27.
● The first is identification of statelessness, through statistics on their population, first-hand

information on the causes of statelessness, and characteristics and problems of the
population. This is made more difficult by the fact that many stateless are undocumented,
27https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ending-statelessness/how-unhcr-helps-stateless-
people#:~:text=4.-,Protection,along%20with%20basic%20human%20rights
10
so support needs to be given to the government, other UN agencies and population censuses
and more. This can help to craft a response and solutions, based on loved experience. It
requires working with other stakeholders that can influence the situation, and is critical for
the prevention, reduction and protection of statelessness.
● The second is prevention of statelessness, the most effective way to deal with it. That
includes legal advice for governments to make internationally compliant nationality laws
with the necessary safeguards. It also means the country's provisions for dealing with
nationality matters are improved - by strengthening civil registration systems, promoting
the importance of documenting the population, and providing advice to authorities to make
fair decisions on nationality.
● Third, reducing statelessness is finding solutions for those who do not have a nationality.
That can include acquisition of nationality, where the stateless has the strongest ties, by
changing country legislation where necessary. To publicise the changes for stateless people
and help promote better advice for stateless people, the UNHCR collaborated with NGOs,
civil society organisations, UN partners, the media and organisations that provide legal
advice and representation.
● Finally, protecting stateless people means they can exercise their human rights until
acquiring a nationality. That means assistance to governments on procedures recognising
stateless people and giving them legal status and basic human rights, as on the 1954
Convention and other human rights instruments. Working with NGOs, human rights
groups and other UN partners helps ensure the stateless can access education, health care
and other basic rights - and to protect them from detention, trafficking and violence.
The UNHCR also ensures birth registration and nationality confirmation for stateless minority
groups that reside in a territory, when they meet birth or residence requirements, as well as
familial requirements.
They also emphasise advocacy campaigns, such as the #IBelong campaign, to raise awareness and
help end statelessness.
Other UN agencies also play critical roles - UNICEF works on improving birth registration and
civil registries and UNFPA helps governments design and implement national censuses. The
OHCHR supports monitoring human rights of stateless people28.
Questions the Committee Should Consider

● What measures become additionally necessary to prevent statelessness in war torn areas or
unstable regimes?
● How can those measures be promoted in spite of the situation, which often may promote
political instability?
28 https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/about-statelessness/
11
Suggestions for Further Research
https://index.statelessness.eu/sites/default/files/ENS-List_of_norms-good_practices-2020.pdf -
details criteria for dealing with statelessness, such as abiding by certain UN conventions, and what
good practices for this would look like
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/statelessness-modern-history - on the modern history of

statelessness
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/ - the Global Action Plan
Agenda B: Improvement of Refugee Integration Strategies

Statement of the Problem
Refugees are those who have been forced to flee their homes due to a fear of war, violence being
persecuted for an identity or political opinion, and have crossed international borders to find
safety in foreign countries29. They are a protected category of people under international law, and
as such should have legal recourse for seeking asylum, though the process may take them a while.
Refugee integration is based on the idea that the situation of a refugee should not be permanent. It
may be that the refugee is able and willing to return to their original country once the conditions
moving them out have been reversed. However, if this cannot occur – and that is not uncommon
especially with ongoing civil strife – the refugee will have to find a lasting solution in a new
community within country of first refuge, or another country30.
The design of refugee integration, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, is to widen the social and economic rights granted to the refugees as their ties to the host
state strengthen, allowing them to restore their independence and continue living fruitful lives.
Refugees often leave in extreme circumstance, leaving behind homes, possessions, jobs and loved
ones, and may thus be ill-equipped to return to normalcy without governmental help. In more
recent times, integration can be a potential solution to marginalisation of refugees within host
countries – though this comes with its own host of issues. Critical to this integration is allowing the
refugees to adapt to the host society without forgoing their own distinct identities.
The UNHCR has advocated for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to be accorded the same level
of integration facilities as those recognised as refugees, since their international protection is often
for similarly compelling reasons and for as long a duration as that of a refugee. This is another
facet of integration – to whom will states grant the facilities and rights it requires. For the most
part, some integration facilities are assumed to be more important for those who are not current
students or families who are migrating31. Those facilities might be expected to be provided at the
household or educational level, though it is worth considering whether that should be the case.
Moreover, for the purposes of research, it is often worth extrapolating from what are the well-
29 https://www.unhcr.org/hat-refugeew
30 https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-
content/uploads/sites/41/2018/02/integration_discussion_paper_July_2014_EN.pdf
31 https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/policy-primer-integration/
12
known issues migrants face – and how best to tackle them – but it is always worth asking what is
unique to the situation of refugees.
Another question is when integration programmes should begin, with possible options being when
an application for refugee status is submitted; when refugee status is recognised; or when
citizenship is granted. If this begins early in the process, it might involve a reception policy that
prevents refugees from being kept isolated for long periods of time. Evidence seems to suggest that
both shortening the time it takes for asylum applications to be processed, and for the integration
services to be made available to them, helps with integration32. Norway, for example, provides up
to 250 hours of language training for asylum seekers in reception centres.
We must also ask who the burden of refugee integration falls on. Some may consider asking the
refugee themselves to adapt to the host society – a process that might include language classes,
social relations and more – but this can be burdensome on those who are likely to be living with
the trauma of fleeing their home country. On the other hand, the host communities and public
institutions may be expected to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse population. This means
integration at its best would be a two-way street.
In particular, they may need help with barriers to citizenship, and even past this may find
bureaucratic barriers to basic needs. They may struggle to access subsidised housing, might not be
able to find work without adequate recognition of their academic and professional qualifications,
and might need help with family reunification or naturalisation. Moreover, the nature of refugees
means they may need legal and psychological help to begin again.
This is especially true in the early stages of asylum seeking. For example, in the United Kingdom,
asylum seekers may need to wait until they receive a Leave to Remain status from the Home
Office, asylum seekers are unable to work, access healthcare, housing, and most public services33.
Those who are advocating for integration to begin earlier than approval of asylum applications
includes Stephen Hale, CEO of Refugee Action, who launched a campaign uniting 65 non-
governmental organisations, trade unions and community groups with the purpose of pressuring
the UK government into giving asylum seekers the right to work34. This could be limited to those
regarded as likely to be granted asylum, though that opens up its own discussions. In addition, it is
worth considering whether mental and physical health assessments should occur during asylum
applications, so as to facilitate healthcare for them long-term, and be better equipped to undertake
the other aspects of integration.
Moreover, it should be considered carefully what scale of time integration should take.
Comparably to other types of rehabilitation, it seems that most integration will be in the long-term,
especially for the least educated35. The support does pay off in the long run, and over generations –
for example, with children of the refugees. As an example, Denmark’s ‘Stepmodel’ policy gradually
leads longer-term immigrants into regular employment via methods such as subsidised initial
employment, in combination with on-the-job language training and up-skilling.
It may also be that the structure of their asylum is affected by what is the best integration strategy
for them. For example, in Sweden, migrants are matched to localities based on overall profiles,
32 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/10-ways-countries-can-help-refugees-integrate/
33 https://www.migrateful.org/2021/01/28/what-refugee-integration-strategies-work-in-the-uk/
34 https://www.tpw.org/refugee-integration-in-the-uk-a-case-study/
35 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/06/refugees-economic-integration/
13
such that the jobs available in the region they are settled in match their skill sets36. This helps
mitigate the economic difficulties and social isolation that can come with being out of work, or
unable to find fulfilling work. for longer periods of time.
History of the Problem

Historically, assimilation has often been the goal of integration. This would be a one-way
trajectory, with the burden falling entirely on the refugees, who are expected to adapt to the host
country and culture entirely. However, evidence has shown that the success of this method is
highly dependent on the responses of other residents encountered, as well as the opportunities or
barriers they face37.
A two-way approach is more similar to what we normally consider now, wherein both the refugee
and the community surrounding them make adjustments so as to better facilitate the refugee’s
economic integration (e.g., as measured by participation in the labour market), social integration
(e.g., as measured by community or cultural participation), and civic integration (as measured by
civic participation)38. All of these are interconnected and associated with a sense of belonging and
identity in migrants.
Nowadays, refugee integration tends to be more focused on individualised and specific

circumstances of refugees, accounting for the different obstacles they may face. This might involve
what resettlement schemes they are involved in, their educational and employment history, and
any gender-specific considerations39. One way to work on this is to ensure projects are co-designed
by migrant communities and collaborative – this tends to make them tailored to their specific
needs, securing long-term inclusion40, according to UK Home Office reporting. It might look
something like Denmark, where official induction programme lasts three years, but can provide
language training for up to give years for illiterate refugees41.
Moreover, it is worth noting the moral element of assimilation. Modern arguments put the
pressure on host countries to adapt to the refugee, rather than the other way around – considering
there is a legal and international obligation upon the host countries to take in and accommodate
for refugees. It is worth considering whether we consider this stronger in the event of an
increasingly globalised economy.
The unemployment rate of migrants who had resided in OECD countries for more than five years
is 50% higher than for native-born residents, in large part because many of them are low-skilled42.
For example, the employment rate of refugees in the UK is 51%, as opposed to a 73% employment
40
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/812891/intergr
ating-refugees-2019.pdf
42
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/812891/intergr
ating-refugees-2019.pdf
14
rate of UK-born individuals43 – and they are similarly likely to have lower-paid jobs44. This comes
from an understanding of the factors that can contribute to needing to seek refuge and being
unable to find safety within one’s own country, such as poverty. The time it takes for a refugee to
close the employment gap, as estimated by the OECD and European Commission, is around 20
years.
Programmes that help refugees adapt their skills and enter the workforce are thusly especially
important – the Thistles and Dandelions Project is in partnership with cultural institutions in
Glasgow to help female refugees and other asylum seekers to develop transferable skills in the
heritage sector45. This can help deal with the severity of the phenomenon where highly trained
professionals are forced to take refuge out of their country of origin, where their qualifications are
not always recognised.
This is especially problematic for those who fled with no proof of their qualifications. Countries
can assess and document newcomers’ education and experience to help with this – such as in
Germany’s ‘early intervention’ scheme, where they assess asylum seekers’ professional skills and
competencies through samples of their work in combination with their declared work history46.
Additionally, employers are often unaware that refugees have been granted the right to work and
are hesitant to consider them further. This leads to a compounding problem as the gaps in the CVs
widen47.
Furthermore, changing public opinion is seen as vital to ensuring safe integration of refugees in
many countries. This can be done by public institutions – such as the Migration Museum, which
provides educational resources on the stories of UK migrants – or private companies that set up
employment schemes, publish awareness campaigns or create pledges to help refugees 48.
This can help mitigate community – and especially employer – fears about the integration of
refugees. Most evidence seems to suggest that refugee resettlement support comes from having a
growth mind-set (as opposed to a fixed mind-set). However, this seems to be changeable in an
experimental setting49, since it is primarily in reference to the ‘anxious middle’ rather than those
with fixed extreme opinions. Moreover, communication over social media that focuses on the
threat posed to refugees (such as in the photo of Aylan Kurdi, a young refugee boy who was in
danger), rather than the threat posed by them, seems to encourage solidarity with refugees 50.
Employer fears can also be prevented in other ways. Breaking Barriers, a social enterprise, has
produced research showing refugees have higher than average retention rates when recruited 51.
When presented to businesses, this evidence could help incentivise organisations to recruit
refugees.
43 https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/project/the-economic-integration-of-refugees-in-the-uk-econref/
44https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/new-plans-smooth-long-road-employment-refugees-
uk#:~:text=In%20a%20recent%20study%2C%20the,lower%20than%20for%20other%20groups.
47https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/stories/new-plans-smooth-long-road-employment-refugees-
uk#:~:text=In%20a%20recent%20study%2C%20the,lower%20than%20for%20other%20groups.
49 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0956797618813561
15
This goes hand in hand with increased funding for and pressure on local governments to maintain
crucial services for refugee integration. For example, Migrateful reports that when the UK
government is held accountable, this allows grassroots initiatives to effect change at a policy and
legislative level52.
Moreover, language skills of the country of refuge can be very beneficial for refugees. It allows
migrants to understand the UK labour market, negotiate job prospects, communicate healthcare
needs and utilise the service industry53. Most importantly, it is the foundation of access to basic
human rights. In the UK, many community centres and charities run free English to Speakers of
Other Languages (ESOL) classes, run by volunteers. These can improve migrants’ chances to
practice and gain confidence in English. These classes, as well as others provided by community
centres, can be valuable chances for refugees to build support networks amongst others with
similar experiences. This is especially important for those without existing friends, family and
loved ones in the refuge country. It is also extremely relevant given that language is now
considered a prerequisite of, rather than outcome of, integration of refugees54.
A 2016 lecture by Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, suggested the importance of integration.
He focused on the importance of international cooperation to the end of migrant integration.
Firstly, domestic issues that arise from a lack of integration – such as economic, political and
social costs – have knock-on international effects.
Current Situation
Academic interventions might include reframing and utilising the media. Narratives emphasising
refugees’ strength, resourcefulness and ability to thrive can counteract more stigmatising
narratives, making people more confident and willing in their ability to overcome academic
challenges55.
Moreover, dealing with the trauma and stress of life post-migration is something that is debated.
Firstly, it requires a thorough understanding of what psychological barriers might exist that
prevent integration, as well as their needs and concerns. A model of this might look something like
the Psychological Antecedents of Refugee Integration, which accounts for the differences between
refugee and voluntary migration. The distinctive psychological factors of being a refugee include
perceived forcedness (coercion through push factors) and ensuing perils (during migration) 56. For
the refugees, this might result in preoccupation with restoring basic needs, but other residents
understanding this could enhance their empathy or feelings of threat with the refugees.
Furthermore, we need analysis of what can improve the psychological condition of refugees so they
feel capable of returning to normalcy. Medication, therapy and mindfulness-based group
intervention may be helpful for this. Clearly, these methodologies will vary in efficacy depending
on situation and locale, and good integration strategies will take that into account. As an example
of what can be done well, mindfulness-based trauma recovery for refugees (MBTR-R) is a trauma-
56 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1745691619898838?journalCode=ppsa
16
sensitive and sociocultural adapted group intervention57. That involved cultural mediators from
the refugee community working alongside instructors, translating discussions into native
languages.
It is also worth considering whether expanding the definition of refugee integration would be
beneficial to their wellbeing. Potentially, this could include working on media framing and
perceptions of the general populace to immigrants. Common negative perceptions of immigrants
include the cultural and economic. Negative cultural perceptions of immigrants are especially
prevalent against non-European refugees, such as those from the Middle East, from Western
countries of refuge. This can be combatted by discussions of research showing that those who
migrate to the West tend to be least likely to endorse Islamist extremism or have negative
sentiments towards the West58. Many of these are rooted in a feeling that refugees are unwilling to
integrate into communities, so lack of refugee integration and negative perceptions of refugees can
thus create a vicious cycle59.
Certain categories of people may need specific and tailored integration strategies. For example,
unaccompanied minors who arrive around the age of the end of compulsory schooling (14-17),
especially those who have minimal formal education, need specific support. The US, for example,
has the US Unaccompanied Refugee Minors programme, including intensive case management by
social workers, educational support, language training, career counselling, mental health care and
social support60.
The Philanthropy Workshop provided a case study of UK refugee integration, from the Southwark
Day Centre for Asylum Seekers in London. Ali, a lawyer from Syria, gave his experience of how the
centre helped him build important social networks and receive services such as legal advice,
language classes and more61. Around 70% of the visitors to the centre experienced mental health
issues, in keeping with much available evidence that the experiences of what forces refugees to flee,
as well as the fleeing itself and reception as a refugee, can often be trauma-inducing. He
emphasised that more funding was necessary, given UK government austerity policies reducing
resources to the centre.
The UK - Parliament’s All Party Policy Group on Social Integration stated in 2017 that the ‘UK’s
policy approach in this regard has been remarkably non-interventionist – especially when
compared to those of most European countries’; this largely due to the fact that the ‘tangled
division of responsibility for integration policy between central government departments and
agencies has been compounded by the lack of an agreed view as to the role of local government in
this policy area.’ 62
57 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2167702621998641
17
Relevant UN Actions
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol:
The Convention enumerates social and economic rights designed to assist integration, and in its
Article 34 calls on States to facilitate the “assimilation and naturalization” of refugees. The
Convention also lists who is a refugee, “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their
country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”
According to the UNHCR’s Guide to Refugees’ Access to Jobs and Financial Services63:
UNHCR works to ensure that refugees have access to affordable and suitable financial services. For
example, together with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency and the
Grameen Credit Agricole Foundation, UNHCR launched a programme to promote access to
financial and non-financial services for refugees and host communities in Uganda. The programme
provides selected financial service providers with debt-financing and technical assistance to enable
them to expand their lending operations and access to entrepreneurial training to over 100,000
refugees and host communities.
UNHCR has been expanding its cash-based interventions (CBI) programme, giving refugees a
choice in how they spend the money and benefitting local economies. It also enables them to pay
their rent, pay off debts and start businesses. UNHCR delivers cash assistance through banks or
mobile money accounts. In 2016, access to bank accounts and other digital payments for refugees
in places where UNHCR operates was limited to only a few countries. In 2020, as a result of the
implementation of UNHCR’s CBI policy, 47 countries have managed to negotiate such access, of
which 32% have set up mobile money mechanisms.
UNHCR advocates for refugees’ access to jobs, education and other services in their country of
asylum and works with partners to help refugees make a living. For example, UNHCR works with
ILO and UNDP on micro-financing programmes to increase refugees’ self-reliance.
General Assembly’s Global Compact and Global Refugee Forum64:

The Global Compact on Refugees, affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in 2019, put
in place a new and comprehensive refugee response model. Its four key objectives are to ease the
pressures on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country
solutions and support conditions in countries of origin for return to safety. Through the Global
Compact on Refugees, 193 countries committed to improving refugees’ self-reliance and easing
pressure on host countries.
Guided by the Global Compact on Refugees, the Global Refugee Forum is the world's largest
gathering in support of refugees and the communities that host them. It provides space for States
and stakeholders to announce new pledges and share good practices to inform and inspire burden
and responsibility-sharing. It represents the political will and ambition of the international
63 https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/background-guide-challenge-3-refugees-access-to-jobs-and-
financial-services.pdf
18
community as a whole for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected host
countries.
Questions the Committee Should Consider / A resolution Must
Answer
Given by the UNHCR’s Guide to Refugees’ Access to Jobs and Financial Services 65
● How can we expand the rights of refugees to access financial services, including opening
bank accounts or contracting loans to start a business?
● How can we convince the private sector to play their part in supporting the economic
inclusion of refugees?
● What are the obstacles and how can they be overcome?
● How can governments hosting large numbers of refugees balance the need to support
refugees with the needs of their own citizens when it comes to employment and business?
● How can we tackle the unfounded fear that refugees present an economic threat? How can
we counter political narratives that perpetuate this?
● What are the differences when it comes to supporting the economic inclusion of refugees in
wealthy resettlement countries (such as Germany or the US) versus supporting them in less
wealthy host countries (such as Lebanon or Bangladesh)?
● In host countries, what are the priorities for supporting the economic inclusion of refugees
living in camps as opposed to urban areas?
● How can we better link up schools / universities where refugees are studying with future
employers?
Suggestions for Further Research

https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/background-guide-challenge-3-refugees-
access-to-jobs-and-financial-services.pdf (this focuses on economic integration, and mentions
both why the topic is so important, and what key issues are to be considered)
https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-
content/uploads/sites/41/2018/02/integration_discussion_paper_July_2014_EN.pdf
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/policy-primer-integration/
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/812891/intergrating-refugees-2019.pdf
https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/refugee-integration-well-being
19

Unhcr Omun

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Unhcr Omun

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2023

United Nations High

Statement of the Problem

For most, nationality is determined by place of birth, parentage or long-term residence in a

Additionally, statelessness determination procedures (SDP) should be introduced in states in line

The United States

The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

The General Assembly mandated UNHCR to provide assistance to statelessness individuals. 78

1994 General Assembly Resolution

● The first is identification of statelessness, through statistics on their population, first-hand

Questions the Committee Should Consider

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/statelessness-modern-history - on the modern history of

https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/ - the Global Action Plan

Agenda B: Improvement of Refugee Integration Strategies

History of the Problem

Nowadays, refugee integration tends to be more focused on individualised and specific

General Assembly’s Global Compact and Global Refugee Forum64:

Suggestions for Further Research

You might also like