Arato - Constitutional Learning

Berghahn Books
Constitutional Learning
Author(s): Andrew Arato
Source: Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, No. 106, Fundamentalism,
Authority and Globalization (April 2005), pp. 1-36
Published by: Berghahn Books in association with the Faculty of Humanities, Development and
Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
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Constitutional Learning
Andrew Arato
From Baghdad to Philadelphia
Constitutional politicshas returnedin our timein a trulydramatic

way. In the last 25 years,notonlyin thenew or restoreddemocracies
of Southand East Europe,LatinAmericaand Africa,butalso in the
establishedliberalor not so liberaldemocraciesof Germany,Italy,
Japan,Israel,New Zealand,Canada and GreatBritain,issues of con-
stitution-making, constitutional revisionand institutional design or
redesign have been put on the politicalagenda. Even in the United
States,given the new or renewed problems of our versions of presi-
dentialism, federalismand electoralregime,ArticleV has come to be
experiencedas a veritableprisonhouse, and judicial constitution-
making(thinkof Buckleyv Valejo) is oftenseen as muchas a threat
to,as theprotection of,democraticmechanisms.And,mostrecently,
in countriescurrently experiencingexternallyimposedrevolutions1,
namelyAfghanistan and Iraq, constitution-making has turnedout to
be a centralstakein theongoingpoliticalprocess.We are livingin an
epoch in whichthenationsseem to be slouching,or beingprodded,
towardPhiladelphiaand Americans,as the heirs of Madison and
MacArthur, are sorelytemptedto tryteachingothersthesecretsof its
success as a supposedly continuous 200-year-oldconstitutional
democracy.But to be an effective teacher,it is notenoughto be in a
of
position political-military superiority. One mustfirstrelearnto
learnand evento re-learn.
It is astonishinghow unpreparedAmericanswere forthejob of
constitutional pedagoguesthatthegovernment unilaterallyassumed
in Iraq, if notin Afghanistan (where thereis a relativelycogentUN
and EU led processagreeduponin Bonna year-and-a-half ago). After
severalvariantsof top-down,imposed,non-consensualprocessesof
constitution-making wereadvancedbySecretaryRumsfeldand Civil-
ianAdministrator Bremer,itwas a FatwahoftheAyatollahAli al-Sis-
tanilastJunedemandingfreeelectionsto a constituent assemblythat
shouldhave(butofcoursehad not)implicitly reminded Americansof
ThomasPaine's well-knowndictumthat,'the constitution of a coun-
Theoria, 2005
April

2 Andrew
Arato
tryis not the act of its government, but of thepeople constituting a

It is
government'. painfully obvious moreover, thatthe government's
supposed specialists advising the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority
havebeen quiteunawareofmorerecentlessonsofa dramaticwave of
constitution-makingculminatingin the new constitutionof the
Republic of SouthAfrica.
Undoubtedly,the failureis also of legal theoryand politicalsci-
ence. Constitutionaltheoristsin the United States, with very few
exceptions,have littleinterest in comparativepolitics.Thus,manyof
the American legal advisorsto recentconstitutionmakers abroad,
have had littleacademic trainingin the politics of the areas where
theybecame,involved.The rathermonstrous,ineffectiveand rigid
Dayton formulawas one outcomeof such efforts. On theotherside,
thenowvastcomparativeliterature on democratictransitions has paid
relatively littleattention to constitution-making; undoubtedly theanti-
of
legal prejudices contemporary politicalscience play a role in this2.
Withoutusinglegal categories,anduninvolvedin thenormative prob-
lems of theactors,even a sophisticatedanalystlike JonElsterman-
ages to see onlytheparadoxesfacingconstitution makersattempting
to fixtheirboats in open sea (or pullingthemselvesfromquicksand,
Miinchausen-like, bytheirownhair)ratherthantheinnovative dimen-
sions of their solutions. Ultimately,his work is more about the
aestheticsthanthepoliticsofconstitution-making. More deeplycom-
mittedto democraticoutcomes,threecontributionsby American
authorsstandout as themostinteresting effortsto addressin a cre-
ativewaytheproblems,successesand failuresofconstitution-making
in thenew democracies.3
BruceAckerman,relyingon thepreliminary resultsofhis ongoing
effortto bringtogetherrepublicanand liberalinterpretations of con-
stitutional democracy, addressesinparticularthelegitimacyproblems
ofbothpiecemealparliamentary constitution-making and constituent
assemblies dominatedby formercommunists.4 StephenHolmes on
theotherhand is extremely criticalofpremature attemptsto establish
constitutional closure,and especiallyon an earlyemphasison human
rightsjurisprudencethatallegedlylimitstheabilityof governments to
act, or to build new legitimacy for theiractions by appeals to sub-
stantivejustice.5Finally,moreinterested in substancethaninprocess,
JuanLinz and his followershavemade a determined attempt to influ-
ence thepoliticalchoicesofconstitution makersconcerningthestruc-
tureof government mosthospitableto democraticstabilityand,for
some of them,a higherqualityof democracyas well.6

Constitutional
Learning 3
In whatfollows,in searchof a synthetic position,I tryto explore

the complementarystrengthsand weaknesses of these three
approaches.I will tryto showthatwhileAckermanneglectstheneed
fora processopento learningandreflexiveself-correction, Holmesis
remarkably littleconcerned about the requirements of democratic
legitimacy.Neithersees thelinkbetweenprocessand substance,and
Ackermanin particularrecommendsa presidentially led procedure
obviously inconsistent with his reservations regardingpresidential
government in normal,non-constitutional politics.Similarly,I will
arguethatLinz (and Sartori)polemicizeagainstpresidential govern-
mentwithoutexploringtheparameters ofprocessesand contextswith
electiveaffinities forthisor its rivalparliamentary formof govern-
ment.Thus Linz andAlfredStepanoptedfora parliamentary recom-
mendationin Brazil,wheresemi-presidentialism would have been a
morelikelyobjective.7Not understanding thestatestrengthening role
of hyper-presidentialism thathe rightly fearson normativegrounds,
Linz could not pose the questionof its gradualtransformation in a
democraticdirection,probablyinto a versionof semi-presidential-
ism.Curiouslyenough,finally, noneofthethreeapproachesdiscover
thegreatinnovation ofroundtableconstitution-making inthecontext
ofrealor fictionallegalcontinuity, and theirabilityofsimultaneously
solvingproblemsof legitimacy, learningas well as structure.8This
achievementbecomes fullyvisibleonlyfromthepointof view that
combinesthethreeapproaches.
Assemblies and courts
Constitutions can be made by extraordinary or ordinarypowers,by

thepouvoirconstituant orbyvariouspouvoirsconstitutés .9In thelat-
tercase, accordingto theclassical doctrineof theseparationofpow-
ers, the main role will be played by legislativeassemblies,or by
powerfulexecutiveswho can manipulateassembliesor even bypass
themthroughplebescites.10 While especiallyin the countriesof the
commonlaw,courtscertainly do playa majorrolein shapingthecon-
stitutionin Kelsen's materialsense,11constitutionalcourtsare irrele-
vant, for almost logical reasons,to the original establishment of a
This is so because withinanyplausibleschemeof the
constitution.12
modernseparationof powerscourtscan play theirconstituent role
onlyundertheguise of adjudicationor interpretation. Whenthereis
nothingto interpret, because theold constitutionis dead and thenew

4 Andrew
Arato
one has notbeen createdconstitutional courtshavenothingto do, and

indeedtheirexistencebecomestemporarily questionable.13
At leastthisis thecase in theclassical Europeantheoryof consti-
tution-makingthat emphasizes revolutionaryrupture,as well as
entirelynew and purelydemocraticbeginnings.14 What is therefore
quite astonishing is the role constitutional courts actuallyplayed in
the constitution-making processes of several new democracies in
CentralEurope (Hungary,Poland,Bulgaria),LatinAmerica (Chile)
and SouthAfrica.The commonpresupposition forsuch an original
role is thelegal continuity characteristic of theseverydifferent tran-
sitionsthatrepresented revoltsnotonlyagainstspecificdictatorships,
but againstthe veryidea of dictatorship linkedby definitionto the
dominanceof will and discretionoverlaw.15Evidently, legal continu-
ityrequiresenforcement, and the onlyplausible mode of enforcement
the
against political branches of power could be a court, moreover
one
endowedwithspecial institutional prestige, and even charisma.Thus,
when the South AfricanConstitutional Court set up by the interim
constitution soughtto defendpreviouslyagreedupon constitutional
principlesagainstthe draftof the Constituent(National) Assembly
dominatedby the powerfulAfricanNational Congress, it had the
authority to enforceits decision.
The new role of constitutional courtstendsto surprisenot only
advocates of European theory,but even Americans more used to
activistjurisprudence.Both Ackermanand Holmes are very suspi-
cious of activistconstitutional courtsduringtheearlydevelopmentof
new democracies,but forapparently different reasons.Accordingto
Ackerman,given the 'softness' of thelegitimacyoftheconstitutional
background in the case of elite negotiatedroundtablesand thepiece-
meal creationof constitution by a varietyof instances,a Constitu-
tionalCourtlike theone in Hungaryin theperiodbetween1990 and
1998,formally one ofthemostpowerfulin theworld,has weak demo-
craticjustificationforits repeatedexerciseof counter-majoritarian
review.16To the extent,moreover,the constitutionalbackground
remainsincomplete,an activecourtwindsup assumingdemocrati-
callyillegitimate quasi-constituent powers.As faras Holmes was con-
cerned,the human rightsjurisprudenceof such a court (which he
likenedto the unelectedPolitburo)was suspiciousbecause it inter-
fereswiththe freedomof action and the legitimationneeds of new
and stilluncertainparliamentary governments. Both were obviously
awareof thefactthattheU.S. SupremeCourtdeclaredonlytwofed-
eral statutesunconstitutional in itsfirst70 years:withthegreatestof

Constitutional
Learning 5
cautionand subtletyin Marburyv Madison and, rashlyand disas-

trously,in Dread Scott. In Hungary,dozens of statutesor part of
statuteswereinvalidatedin a periodof onlysevenyears!
Interestingly,bothAckermanand Holmes reliedon aspectsof the
originalprocessof constitution-making in theUnitedStatesin their
searchformodels.Ackermanfocusedon thespatialdualismof sepa-
ratingconstitutional assembly('convention') and ordinarylegisla-
tures,and what he takes to be the charismaticproto-presidential
leadershipof the constitution-making effort.Holmes mentionedthe
temporal dualism of two constitution-making efforts, theone in 1781
thatproducedtheArticlesofConfederation andthePhiladelphiaCon-
ventionof 1787 thatclearlylearnedfromtheexperienceof six years
of failedconstitutional government.17
In spite of the Americanexperienceof two earlyconstitutional
syntheses,Ackermanfearedthatwhen a new constitution does not
emerge from the originalrevolutionary setting,the window of oppor-
tunityforlegitimateconstitution-making mayclose altogether. This
leads to eitherongoingconstitutional tinkering through parliamentary
amendments, or thefreezingof illegitimate constitutions, depending
on theamendmentrule thatis in place. Holmes,who evidentlysup-
portsparliamentary constitution-making and consideredattemptsto
separateconstitutional andnormalpoliticsunrealistic, and evenunde-
sirable,fearedinsteadany earlyinsulationof constitutional settle-
mentsfromchange,throughdifficultamendmentrules or vigorous
constitutional reviewor both,whetheror notthe constitutions were
legitimately produced.
Bothanalystsweremakingobviouslyimportant arguments. In the
nameofinstitutionalizing a legitimate constitution thatcouldbecome
thereferencepointfora futureconstitutional patriotism, Ackerman
recommended AmericanlessonsthatallowedtheU.S. constitution to
become an objectofpubliccelebrationalreadyin itsowntime,at the
very latest afterthe ratificationof the Bill of Rights.18Thus he
stresseda separateassemblyin whicheverydaypoliticalconsidera-
tionsand institutional interests of alreadyestablishedpoliticalbodies
werenotpresent,opportunities forpublicmobilizationandparticipa-
tionintheratification process, well as charismatic
as leadershipofthe
greatest hero of the revolution (presumably, if there was such a
leader). But Holmes, who stressed constitution-making as partand
of
parcel ordinary politics, was surelyright to stress the institutional-
izationof constitutional learningespeciallyforpopulations(unlike
theAmericans)largelywithouttheexperienceof anypreviousdemo-

6 Andrew
Arato
craticgovernment. For thesereasons,thefactthattheirpoliticalrec-

ommendationswere almost the opposite seems ratherdisturbing.
Open endedparliamentary constitution-making withlittlelegal super-
vision and control,fora considerabletimeat least,was theproposal
of Holmes.19Relativelyearly,dualisticconstitution-making under
presidentialleadershipwas whatAckerman recommended. The latter
of coursecould nothave objectedto at least 'preservationist'or 'syn-
thetic'exercisesof countermajoritarianreviewin the contextof a
'harder' constitutionalbackgroundof sufficientdemocraticlegiti-
macy.Theirdivergingproposalsseem to suggestthatthereis appar-
entlyno waythento combinethevirtuesofinstitutionalized learning
and legitimacyboth.20
From Philadelphia to Budapest
ReadingtheAmericanproposalswiththeeyes of theirpotentialad-
dresseesin recentor futurenew democraciescould easily lead to a
skepticism blindto theirrespectiveemphaseson legitimacy and learn-
ingthatshouldhavebeenwelcome.Butitwouldbe hardto blameskep-
ticslivingin thecountrieswherenew constitutions had to be made,in
view ofbothhistoricalexperienceand theoretical considerations.
To beginwith,Holmes'srecommendations do notholdup too well
fromthepointof view of the needs of countriesin transitionfrom
longperiodsofarbitrary government.2' In thecountriesofprovisional
constitutionswhereprocessesof constitution-making wereleftindef-
-
initelyopen namely Poland and -
Hungary preciselybecause ofthe
constantintermingling of constitutional and ordinarypoliticalissues
thatHolmes considersharmlessor even beneficial,despiterepeated
eifortsithas been inordinately to bringtheprocessto a legit-
difficult
imate conclusion.22Meanwhile,however,the amended textsfrom
1989 to 1990, in parttheproductsof non-freely electedparliaments
and unelectedroundtables,were constantly underattackand every
parliamentarysuper-majority capable of constitution-making was
immediately denounced as a 'constitutionaldictatorship'in the mak-
ing.And indeed,givenelectoralsystemswithhugepotentialdispro-
portionalityand flimsy constitutionamendmentrules, such a
'dictatorship'thatmightimposea constitution ofa harderdemocracy
would have been possible at the moment that a new super-majority
consideredits supposed popular-plebescitary supportsufficientto
bypass parliamentaryconsensus-building.Finally,Holmes, along

Constitutional
Learning 7
withhisco-author, Cass Sunstein,acceptedtheidea thata normalpar-

liamentshouldbe a quasi-constituent assemblyratherlightly, notreal-
izing thatwiththe open-endednesstheypromote,this model can
easilydegenerateintothekindofpermanent constitutional revolution
thatis unableto foundanysystemof authority.23
At thesame time,therewas littleevidencethatwouldsuggestthat
Constitutional Courtshavereallyinterfered withthefreedomof gov-
ernments to act in whatreallymatters, orto buildpoliticallegitimacy
in supportoftheiractions.Projectsofre-privatization and retroactive
justice were in fact quiteunpopular Hungary, example,where
in for
thecourtdid interfere withsuchattempts emanatingfromparliament,
efforts thatHolmes claimedto be potentially usefulforlegitimation
building. As far the freedom of action of governments is concerned,
even in theone case, in Hungary,wherethecourtattempted to inter-
ferewiththeeconomicstabilizationefforts of thesocial liberalgov-
ernmentin 1995, in theend,thefinancialdamage was minimaland
thegreater'social sensitivity' imposedon thegovernment mayper-
haps be beneficial in the long term.Arguably,the courtdecisions
(whichwere theoretically hardlydefensible)helped to channeland
reduce more extreme forms of social discontentthatcould have
broughtdownthewhole stabilizationprogramme.
Thereis a deeperobjectionstillto an argument thatso hugelypriv-
ilegeslearningovernormativity. In legalandconstitutional matters one
mustlearnnotonlyto learn,butalso hownotto learnas Niklas Luh-
mann so oftenargued.24In orderthatnormativestructures be ever
takenseriously, theymustbe guardedagainstfacilechangeintheface
ofdisappointment. In thisrespecttheessenceofa moderndictatorship,
especiallyof theSoviettype,based on theabsolutepriority of discre-
tionarypower,25 is thatit is unableto learnhow notto learn;in other
words,hownotto alternormsin thefaceof everchangingpolicycon-
siderations.To breakwithsucha regimemostfundamentally is to learn
how notto learnin one verycrucialdimension - thatof constitution-
alism!Admittedly, Soviet-type regimesalso had 'learningdisabilities'
in thearea ofpolicy,wherethepointof economicreformis in a sense
learninghow to learn.But thepoliticalinstitutions capableof making
thistypeoflearningpossiblecan emergeonlyifactorsdeveloprespect
fornormative rules,whichis notpossiblewithoutinstitutionally safe-
guarded structures of self-limitation.That is the pointof human rights
jurisprudence andjudicial reviewfroma functional pointofview.26
The lastpointwas well capturedby Holmes's own important arti-
cle on pre-commitments.27 In general,self-limitation makesgovern-

8 Andrew
Arato
mentstronger, not weaker.Undoubtedlyhe could answerthatthere

are bothdisablingand enablinglimits,whichmeanspreciselywhatI
claimed:thatgovernments mustlearnbothhow to learnand how not
to learn.Thereare areas wheretheymustbe strong(forexample,the
initiationand carryingout of a determinedeconomicreform,where
evende-statization presupposesstronggovernment), and areas where
theymustnotbe allowedto become strongifforno otherreasonthan
to be able to fullyconcentratetheirresourceson theessentials.But
thisdifferentiation and distinction cannotspontaneously be made by
executivesand evenparliaments, who in generalseek to extendtheir
strength in all areas important to them,and especially,by politicians
who have been socialized underarrangements wherepoliticalpower
knewno formalizedlimitations. In post-Communist stateswhatmust
be learned,forthesake of a genuinelynew legal identity, is therule
of law and this learningcannot be delayed withoutgrave conse-
quences forhow democracyis going to be understood.Even parlia-
mentmustnotbe allowedto stepintotheshoes ofthemodernprince,
and thiscan be preventedonlyby establishingcounter-powers from
theveryoutset.Often,just whenparliament does claimabsolutepow-
ersis thetimewhentheloss of itslegitimacy has to be feared,and not
when it is forcedto share power.28There are only two imaginable
counter-powers thatcan accomplishthetaskoflimitingparliament, a
constitutionalcourtand the presidency,and of these two possible
'defendersof theconstitution' theconstitutionalcourtis certainlythe
'less dangerous'.29Onlythisformof thelimitation of parliamentary
rule can be understoodwithintheframework of constitutionalism as
an enablingratherthandisablinglimit.
Latin America of course had traditionally strongpresidents,and
weak courts.Constitutionalism has been notablethroughitsabsence.
This is why,in a countrysuch as Mexico, thesettingup of constitu-
tionalreviewhas been widelyconsideredessentialforcurrent reform
attempts. It is, I think,undeniablethatthenewconstitutional courtsof
East and CentralEuropehave been on thewhole(withtheexception
of the vastlyover-politicizedRussian Court of JusticeZorkinthat
became a directplayerin politicalconflicts)successfulin helpingto
turnconstitutions intogenuinenormativelimitson power.Thereare
several spectacularcases fromHungary,Slovakia and Bulgaria-
countrieswhereconstitutional reviewhas been active- bearingthis
out. But even withoutsimilarlydramaticcases in Poland, Czech
Republic,and Romania,we havereasonto believethatthemereexis-
tence of even relativelyweakerformsof constitutional reviewhave

Constitutional
Learning 9
had a discipliningand civilizingeffecton the holdersof legislative

and executivepower.Yetas I arguedthecase is notso strong, however,
thatthelimitsto governmental powertheyestablishedweredisabling
limitsin termsof Holmes'sown important distinction.Withthissaid,
however,the very success of constitutionalcourts in the face of
Holmes's objections,seems to expose themto Ackerman's.
Even grantingthatin theprocess of transition fromthe dictator-
ships, it is not parliamentary sovereignty butthe rule of law thatsig-
nifies the most fundamentaldimensionof the change of political
regimes,theverysuccess of constitutional courtsbecomesespecially
difficult tojustifyfromthenormative pointofview in thefaceof soft
or insufficiently legitimateconstitutional backgrounds. Constitutional
reviewby a courtcan be made compatiblewithdemocraticlegiti-
macy onlywhenthe constitution itselfis democratically made. The
courtcan be a vehicleof theruleof law onlyon thefoundations of a
constitution thatis notprimarily itsown product.The ruleof a court
is theruleof humanbeings.The courtas itselfthemajorconstituent
poweris a usurpation,even if cleverpoliticalmanoeuvring - as in
-
Hungary disguisedconstituentactivityby avoiding it when both
public opinion and elected officials could be antagonized. Such
manoeuvering wouldhave certainlyfailedor led to a compromiseof
legalityitselfifthecourtone dayfacedbothembodiments ofthewill
ofthemajority. Even ifAckerman'swarningsofthepossiblecollapse
of constitutional courtshas been positivelyconfirmedonlyby Russ-
ian and Albanian developmentsso far,the shiftfromactivismto a
more quiescentmode in Hungary,wherethe prestigeof the Court
was preserved,shouldbe considereda negativeconfirmation of the
same thesis.30
But Ackerman'smoreaccuratediagnosisof potentialproblemsis
linkedwitha setof solutionsthatare farmoreproblematic thanthose
of Holmes.31The idea of a dualisticprocessof constitution-making,
in whicha special conventionfocuseson constitutional and onlycon-
stitutional politics,has almost never been triedin non-federal states.32
In thecase of a freelyelected,politicallypowerfulnormallegislature
thatmaynotwantto deferto anotherassembly,thismodelcomesper-
ilouslyclose to thedangersof dual powerand civilwar.Such was the
actual experienceof Russian constitution-making in 1993. Acker-
man's second best option,a sovereignconstitutional assembly,actu-
ally (probablyunavoidably) tried in Romania, has littlechance of
avoiding a constitution thatis a
imposedby provisionalgovernment
in the name of popular,revolutionary legitimacy.Thus thismodel

10 Andrew
Arato
risks the sovereignor revolutionary dictatorshipthatCarl Schmitt

analyzed and Hannah Arendt desperately warned against.33Acker-
man rightlynoticesthelegitimation problems of the Romaniancon-
stitution, in
but, myview,wrongly ascribesthese to the predominant
role of ex-Communistsin theprocesswho weretheliberatorsof the
countryas requiredbyrevolutionary legitimacy.As Arendthas shown
in herpolemic againstSieyès (and Carl Schmitt),itis therevolution-
ary-populistmodel itselfthatproduces legitimation problemsin a
liberaldemocracy.
Presidents or assemblies?
Finally,Ackerman'sidea thata charismatic presidentshouldplay the

centralrole in mobilizingfortheconstitution, does notseem to be an
accurateassessmentof therole of Washington, nordoes it show suf-
ficientawarenessof the dangerthata greatrole fora pre-existent
presidency(Washingtonhad no publicofficein 1787) maystrongly
prejudice the new constitutiontowarda presidentialgovernment,
whichhas thebuilt-inweaknessesand dangersso eloquentlystressed
by JuanLinz and his collaborators.
Let us consider Linz's argument,and the debate around them,
which,together, representthemainpoliticalscience contribution to
substantiveproblemsfaced by constitution makers.34 Accordingto
Linz, presidentialgovernment definedby theseparatepopularelec-
tionsof the chiefexecutive(the head of government and state)and
the legislatureforrigidterms,suffersfromtwo fundamental prob-
lems: dual democraticlegitimacyand rigiditywhenfacingdysfunc-
tionand crisis.
The firstproblem,familiarfromtheanalysesofMarx,Tocqueville
and Schmitt,35 leads to fundamentaland dangerousconflictscon-
cerningtherightto speak in thenameofthepeople thatthepresident
is likelyto win,butoftenextra-constitutionally sincethereis no third
democraticprincipleto mediatebetweenthebranches.36 This is espe-
cially so because of the second problem: the rigidity termsthat
of
deprives the electoratefrom the to
ability replacedysfunctional pres-
identsand deadlockedparliamentsforpotentially longperiods.Upon
analysis it becomes clear thatboth the idea of a weak and thatof
overlystrongexecutiveare impliedby Linz, who unfortunately has
not analyzed the relationbetweenthe two possibilitieswithinthe
same structure.37 Thereis no contradiction involved,however, because

Constitutional
Learning 11
thisstructure can be describedas the combinationof constitutional

weakness,coupledwithpotentialextra-constitutional strength.
Linz's criticshavemadetheirmosttellingobjectionsregarding the
idea of constitutional weakness.38Presidenciesaccordinglycan be
strongwithoutextraor illegal proceduresbecause of eithergreater
partypoliticalor constitutional powersthanadmittedby Linz. Party
politicalpowers, however, mean thecontrolof thelegislatureby the
president's party, possibility is notlikelyto havebeenunnoticed
a that
byLinz, ourbestcomparativist. This outcome,however,can be guar-
anteedonlyby one-partysystemssuch as Mexico untilrecently, i.e.,
a
by dictatorship. Even in two-party systems, there is a one out of two
(ifmonocameral)orthreeoutoffour(ifbicameral)chanceofdivided
government thatcan be onlypartiallyimprovedifelectionsareheldat
thesame time.39 Analogously,constitutional powersbeyondwhatare
assumedbyLinz can certainly reducetheproblemsofstructural rigid-
ity and weakness (assuming of course, what cannot be always
assumed,namely,competentpresidentialuse of these). Extensive
decreepowers,theabilityto initiatelegislation,unique appointment
powers,the absence of impeachmentand absolute vetoes can, of
course,existin variouscombinations withvaryingstrength. But they
reliably point beyond the dilemmas of constitutionalweakness/
plebiscitary strength whenpresidentscan in effectgovernalone even
when theyface a hostileparliament.In thatcase howeverwe have
transcendedpresidentialismin the directionof what Carlos Nino
rightly called hyper-presidentialism, representative democracyin the
directionof PhilippeSchmitter's dictablandaor GuillermoO'Don-
nel's delegativedemocracy.40
Linz's critiqueofpresidentialism thusremainsstandingas a warn-
ing to all thosewho would establish a regimeoftheU.S. typewithits
particular model of a weak
constitutionally plebiscitary presidency. If
he can be faulted,it is forneglectingto linkmethodsof constitution-
makingwithalternativeoutcomesin governmental structures. The
omissionhas bearingon theproblemof reform, since historically no
directly elected presidency has ever been successfullychanged into a
parliamentary executive, even after a hiatusof a dictatorship. This is
so, I think,forlogicalreasons,and is nota mereempiricalregularity.
Directlyelectedpresidencieshavea normative surplusfromthepoint
ofviewofpopularsovereignty overparliamentarism wheretheactual
choice(and removal)oftheexecutivemaybe a function ofad hoc and
opaque negotiations within or amongpoliticalparties.Thus,reform-
ers in Brazil,wherethere was a genuineopportunity to replacepres-

12 Andrew
Arato
identialismboth duringconstitution-making in 1988 and subse-

quently in theprocessleadingup to a referendum on thismatter, made
a mistakein fightingforparliamentarianism insteadof a rationalized
and improvedversionof Frenchsemi-presidentialism.41
On bothoccasions in Brazil theprocesswas deformedby therole
of a presidencyfullyin place duringconstitutionalnegotiations.
Along withthecase of theYeltsinconstitution in Russia in 1993, this
exampleshowshowwrongAckerman'ssuggestionwas to concentrate
on strongpresidentialleadershipin thedemocraticconstitutional pol-
itics.42
Admittedly, thelinkbetweentheroleofa presidential figurein
constitution-making, and a presidentialistoutcome may not be
absolute.The Americanframers, by reducingtheexecutivepreroga-
tiveinheritedfromBritainand throughtheinstitution of theelectoral
as
college originallyintended, aimed to produce a weak presidency.43
Itwas onlywhenpartypoliticstransformed electionsand theelectoral
college thatthe characteristiccombinationof constitutional weak-
ness,plebiscitarystrength began emerge.44 fact,however,that
to The
theconventionwas not deformedby charismawas due above all to
Washington'sgreatself-restraint, his refusalto playtherole assigned
to himbyAckerman.He hardlyspoke at theconvention, and hisVir-
ginia delegation (unlike Hamilton, for example) never spoke on
behalfof a strongexecutive.While each historicalperiod,however,
mayhave a Washington,a San Martin,a Havel or a Mandela- capa-
ble of greatself-limitation in constitutional politicsor state-making,
therealwaysseem to be manymoreBonapartes,Bolivars,De Gaulles,
Walesas,Yeltsins,Illiescus, Menems,Fujimorisand Berishaswhose
ideas of democracyare equivalentto the expansion of theirown
plebescitarypower.4S
Once a presidentialor semi-presidential constitutional structureis
institutionalized,however,it is very difficultto reverse. Even fine
tuningsuch a systemmay be difficultif protectedby a difficult
amendmentrule,even in the face of dysfunctions thatmayinconve-
nientlyreappear afterany election thatproduces 'divided govern-
ment'. A presidentiallyled, plebescitaryprocess of constitution-
makingwhere constitutionmakers are imbuedwith a very strong
sense of theirdemocraticmandateand legitimacy, as in Ackerman's
reading of American history and in his recommendation fornew
is to
democracies, likely produce a difficultamendment rule likeArti-
cle V.Whileitis truethatactorsofdoubtftd also
legitimacy may try to
to freezetheir'premature'constitutional synthesesfortheirfuture
self-protection,a democratically mobilizedsociety,as Ackermanwell

Constitutional
Learning 13
knows,wouldhave a muchbetterchanceto protectitsconstitutional

creationagainstnumerically or qualitatively majorities.Such
inferior
an outcomeseems to confirmthepositionof Holmes,who has insis-
tentlywarnedabouttheinsufficient learningpotentialof a premature
Thatobjection,however,cannotbe counteredsim-
constitutionalism.
plybyinsistingon theillegitimate beginningsofthetwoconstitutions
(Bulgaria and Romania) that actually were made according to a
timetablethatresemblesthatofAckerman.Even constitutional legit-
imacy,whichwas in factconsiderablein Bulgaria,could not fully
compensateforsubsequentfunctional problems.Justas Holmeswho
is concernedwiththeinstitutionalization of learningcannotdeal with
theproblemof legitimacyor guaranteethatconstitutionalism would
be amongthethingslearned,Ackerman 's pursuitof democraticlegit-
imacyand constitutionalism is incapableof takingintoaccountthe
learningproblemsof constitutional government.46
From [Madrid and] Budapest to Johannesburg and beyond
The call to 'go back to thedrawingboard'afterthefirstflushofpost-

89 constitution-making was justified. But subsequent results
dependedon gettingridofthewidelysharedprejudicethattherecent
transitions to democracywere only 'catch-uprevolutions'thathad
muchto learnbutlittleto teach.47HannahArendt,who did have the
sensitivityfortheoriginality ofhistoricalruptures,has warnedagainst
locatingtheconstituent powerin juridicaland institutional statesof
nature.48 But findingonlytheAmericanexperienceon the positive
side of theledger,she could nottellus how sucha stateof affairscan
be avoided,especiallyin the case of old regimesfarless attractive
thantheAmericancolonies,and in theface ofthetraditional prestige
in Europeof revolutionary-democratic constitution-making.49 It was
leftto theSpaniardsandtheEast CentralEuropeans,whoalreadyhad
too manyrevolutions, to graduallydiscovertheanswerin themidstof
theirradical but non-revolutionary change of regimes:roundtable
ledparliamentary constitution-making withinlegal continuity .50
The greatadvantageof parliamentary constitution-making is that
it de-dramatizesconceptions of the constituentpower,linked to
mythologicaland dangerousnotionsof total ruptureand the full
embodimentof thewill of thepeople. Insteadof assimilatingconsti-
tutionalrevisionto revolutionary constitution-making as does Acker-
man,parliamentary constitution-making allows us to do thereverse

14 Andrew
Arato
and conceive democratic,legal revisionas the model forthe very

creationof constitutions.
We can speak of parliamentary constitution-making wherea par-
liament, elected for ordinarylegislativepurposes is the subject of
constitutional design. Neither parliament, nor thegovernment rooted
in it,is provisionalforthedurationof constitution-making. Constitu-
tion-making by two separatechambersis a sign,thoughnot a neces-
saryone, of this type of process. Admittedlya normalparliament
whose.two chambersmeettogetherexceptionally as the 'constituent
assembly'is one boundarycase forthisideal type,reminiscent of the
formation of thefirstsovereignconstituent assemblyfromthethree
ordersof theEstatesGeneral.But theConstituent Assemblyof 1789
to 1791 cuttheumbilicalchordto thelegal orderoftheold regime,a
move thatdoes not fitintothe ideal typeof parliamentary constitu-
tion-makingdeveloped here.51 Another boundary case is a normal
parliament that itselfdecides to dissolveitself
when it has produceda
constitution.52But we shouldnotbe misledbymerenomenclature, an
ordinaryparliamenthavingconstitution-making among its tasks can
be labelleda constituent assembly,duringtheprocessorbyhistorians
afterward. The centralmarkof whatis called parliamentary constitu-
tion-making hereis operatingundertheconstitutional amendingrules
ofan existingregime.Whensuchrulesarefirstused topass newrules
of amendmentor ratificationwe are again facinga boundarycase
withinthetype.
Obviouslythe type of parliamentary constitution-making as for-
mulatedhere presupposeslegal continuity, or the absence of legal
rupturebetweentwo succeedinglegal orders.A legallyelectedpar-
liamentmaycarryoutan 'autogolpe',andpass individualrevisionsof
theconstitution or even establisha new legal orderviolatingall exist-
ingrules of constitutional change.In termsof myconceptionsuch a
marginalcase of parliamentary constitution-making fallsoutsidethe
type. Legal continuity,however,is itself difficultto formulate,
because thereare undoubtedlyinstanceswhen,especiallyunderthe
threatof force,parliamentsratifychangesthattheycannotresist.We
shouldspeak of legal continuity onlywhenthecruciallegal rule,the
amendmentrule actuallyconstrainsand limitsthe mutualexpecta-
tionsand actionsof actors.An operationaltestforsuch actual legal
constraintconsists of asking (at least as a thoughtexperiment)
whetheror notitmade anydifference fortheoutcomethatan assem-
in
bly engaged constitution-making, includinga sittingparliament,
was usingan existingamendmentrule,ratherthanoperatingaccord-

Constitutional
Learning 15
ing to rules of its own choice: generallysimple majoritydecision

makingin thecase of sovereignconstituent assemblies.(Wherethe
existingruleof changeis simplemajorityvoting,thisparticulartest
cannotbe applied). I shouldalreadynote,however,thatusinga rule
thatwas neverautonomouslyused before,like the amendmentrule
fora previouslynon-operative Soviettypeconstitution satisfies,but
again as a marginal case, the of
requirement legal continuity ifusing
thatrule constrainedrelevantparliamentary and extra-parliamentary
actors(as itdemonstrably did in all theEast CentralEuropeancases).
So defined(and keepingin mindtheideal typicalcharacterof the
model) we have had a verylargenumberof cases of parliamentary
constitution-making since the mid 1970s: Spain (but not Portugal),
Brazil (butnotArgentina),Poland,Hungary,Czech Republic,Slova-
kia, (but not Romania and probablynot Bulgaria),the ex-Yugoslav
Republics,and Russia in 1988 to 1992 (butnotfinallyin 1993), and
mostoftheotherex-Sovietrepublics.Similarefforts entirely failedin
theGDR and in Czechoslovakia,in thesense thatparliamentswere
unableorunwillingto producenewconstitutions fortheunitsin ques-
tion,bothof whichturnedout to be unviableas states.53 But, obvi-
ously,notall ofthecases wherea workingconstitution was produced
should be countedas 'successful' in the normativesense of con-
tributing to the emergenceof a cultureof 'constitutionalism'. Thus
whileparliamentary constitution-making surelyexistswe needto ask
whatcan make thismethodlegitimate. The well groundedsuspicion
thatit helpsus avoid otherevils,thespectreof dual powerand con-
stitutionaldictatorshipby a sovereignconstituentassemblyis of
coursenormatively of littlerelevance,especiallyin lightofcriticisms
thatparliamentary constitution-making itselfis merelya species of
governmental impositioncapable producingneitherlegitimacyor
of
stability[Arendt].
The questionconcerning theconditionsoflegitimacy hidesat least
threeotherquestions:(1) whichparliaments can legitimately produce
new constitutions, and (2) on the foundationsof whichlegalitycan
and oughttheydo so? And finally,and most importantly, (3) how
shouldparliaments proceed to achieve constitutionallegitimacy?
Whichparliament?
Thereis alwaysa choice in relationto thefirstquestion.In Spain it
could havebeen thelastFranquistCortesthatdid in factpass a com-
prehensiveLaw ofReformthatwas overwhelmingly ratifiedin a pop-
ularreferendum,orthefirstdemocratically electedparliament thatin

16 Andrew
Arato
factproducedthenew constitution. In Hungaryitcouldhavebeenthe

firstdemocratically electedparliamentas thedemocraticopposition
wanted,or thelast Kadaristparliamentas thestate-party wished.In
the
effect, materially new constitution, thatnever was accepted as
ultimateor fullylegitimate,was theproductof tworoundsin which
speakingformally each parliamentwas dominant, as well as ofa pop-
ularreferendum inNovemberof 1989 thatdetermined thattheregime
would be parliamentary and not semi-presidential. In Poland there
were as manychoices as Parliaments(namelyfour)and threefailed
beforethefourthsucceeded. Unlike in Hungaryand theGDR, here,
thelastCommunistparliamentwas neverseriouslysuggestedforthis
role, and the firstpost-Communist one- the 'ContractualSejm'-
failedbecause it was onlyin partfreelyelected,and had insufficient
legitimacyto actuallyvoteon thefinedocumentitsdrafting commit-
teeproduced.In thethird, thefirstfreelyelectedSejm (or in theSejm
and Senate together)no one had a constitution-making majority
because of extremepoliticalfragmentation.54 In SouthAfricafinally,
multi-party negotiationsat KemptonParkdraftedan interimconsti-
tutionthatwas passed bythelastapartheidparliament. This was iden-
ticalto theHungarianpattern, and in bothcases (as againstSpain) the
democraticforcesin thetransition did notsucceed in restricting rule
making beforefreeelections to the organicregulations necessaryfor
theseelections.But whatmakes SouthAfricadistinctive is thathere
the process was so structuredfromthe outsetthatthe firstpost-
apartheidparliamenthad to replace theinterimconstitution withthe
finalone.55
Whatseemsto be clearfromall theseexamplesis thatonlya freely
electedparliamenthas thelegitimacyto producea new constitution.
But even thisconditionseems insufficient in lightof Serbian,and
Croatianexperiences.Whena formally freeelectiontakesplace under
electoralrulescalculatedto give thewinneran enormoussurplusof
seats,and/orunderconditionsof competition (timing,media access)
thatgive incumbentsall theadvantages,a parliamentmaynotsuffi-
cientlyrepresentall thenew politicalforcesto have its constitution
fullyaccepted by them.Almost all authoritarian governments with
sufficientreal or imagined legitimacytend to tryat one point or
anothertheroad of manipulatedelectionsto conservesome of their
power,and perhapsfreezethe process of democratization in some
kind of softdictatorshipor hard democracy.56 The Mexican case
demonstrates even the long termviabilityof thisapproach,at least
underconditionsof high initialregimelegitimacy.But therewere

Constitutional
Learning 17
failedattemptsof thistypein Spain, Brazil,Chile, Russia, Hungary

and even SouthAfrica.57
The greatinnovationthatpointedbeyondthe dominantrole of
undemocratic parliaments to draftnew constitutions or to controlthe
electionsby whichthenew drafters would be chosenwas theround
tablenegotiation, pioneeredin Poland and perfectedin Hungaryand
SouthAfrica.58 Round tablesresembleU.S.-typeconstitutional con-
ventionsin thattheyare negotiating foraoutsideregularparliaments
thatcontinueto functionas such duringconstitution-making. Their
concernis primarilyconstitutional legislation,though other issues
havingto do withtheconditionsof freeelectionsare also negotiated.
(Attemptsto restrict theconstitutional workof roundtablesto a few
organic rules have been more often than notunsuccessfulfromthe
point of view of theneeds of free,competitive elections.)Unlikethe
Philadelphia Convention, round tablessubmit theirproductto a fully
legalprocessofratification bytheexistingparliament, whichis, how-
ever,informally underthefullcontrolof one of thenegotiating part-
ners,the governingforcesof the old regime.Finally,claimingno
democraticlegitimacyforthemselvesor the undemocraticparlia-
ment,roundtables differfromconventionsin thattheirproductis
typicallyonlyan interimconstitution. In thismodel,thecreationof
the 'final' constitution is thejob of a freelyelected parliamentor
constituent assembly.59
In orderto work,roundtablesmustpresupposeeitheran effective
equalityof forceson bothsides, as in Hungary,or an orientation to
democraticconsensuson thestrongerside, as in thecases of Spain,
Czechoslovakia and South Africa. Under such conditions,fairly
strongconstitutional protections,includingcourts,tendto emerge
fromroundtables. Characteristically, roundtables tendto produce
proportional or mixedelectoralsystemsenablingthepresenceof all
relevantforceson theterrainof constitution-making ratherthanthe
majoritarian voting rules preferred by the Communist partieswhere
they could not imposepartiallynon-competitive rulesas in theSoviet
Union in 1988, and even at thePolish RoundTable of 1989 (which
was exceptionalbecause thefirstin theSovietimpérium).Generally,
roundtables reject(Poland was an exception,and Hungaryalmost
was) models of presidential governmentsauthoritarianforces
demandas a meansof conservingsome of theirearlierpowers.(See
tablebelow.)

18 Andrew
Arato
Types of transition,constitution-makingand governmental

structurein Eastern Europe and South Africa,1989 to 1997
ElectoralRoad Roundtablenegotiated
path Rupture
TYPES
OF Hegemonic strong + government
pop. government - collapse
+ government or
TRANSITION - opposition
Forces opposition + insurrection
+ opposition
COUNTRIES
Serbia,
Croatia,
Baltic, Poland, Hungary,GDRCzech-Slovak
Romania
Russia
(I), Slovenia Bulgaria South AfricaRepublicRussia
ex-SU II)
(phase
CONSTIT.Russia, Slov;Lith.: Poland: Hungary:Cz-S:RT and constitutional
MAKINGUkraine: new Round
pari.pari, Table RT 2parlTs
and Pari: and
fail assembly
amendm.Estonia: and RT Cz:pari,
am.; [GDR:
pari, informal
new strong
Croat constassem.
Serb, 97:nat new] new role
South S:pari, of
New Latvia:
pari. 1922 assemblyAfricaRT
and presidency
RT 'National
Bulgaria:
con.
and ass. 'Cons1
Assemb.
STRUCTURE
Presidential
Lithuania:
semi-presid.; parliamentary
parliamentary presidential
OF Poland
semi-pres; pari.
GOVERNM. others After
1997
parliamentary
STRUCTURE butSlovenia:Poland: Hungary:Slovakia:
Unicameral uni bicameral
OF inRussia assym. bicameral; Cz:initially
unicameral; Russia
also
LEGISLAT. for bicameralBulgaria:South
expanded Africa:
unicameral,federal
issues Baltic: unicameral
some bicameral
bicameral?
unicameral
CONSTIT.Serb; none Poland:
Croat;Latvia: weak,Strong weak Romania:
Cz-S:
ADJUDIC.
Ukraine:
weakEstonia:
weakafter
97med.; Slovakia:weak
Russia: Lithuania:
strong med
Bulgaria: med-str.Russia:
(onpaper) medium (on medium
Cz:med. (on
str
Slovenia: paper) paper)
ELECTORAL PR Poland: Hungary
Russia: Slovenia: mixed
PRwith
5%forRussia:
mixed;
RULE free;Lithuania:
partially partially 4then parties,
free,with higherRomania
PR,
Croatia,
maj. Germ.typ4% PR
later+ 5%, for
coalitions no
initially
Serbia for GDR;
Est.: plurality
Latv.,
initially PR
S.A. later
threshold,
maj. PR&4+5% twohouses; 3%
after
93:5%;
Bulgaria:
later
mixed, PR
&4%
CONSTIT.Serb;
Russia,Slov:pari.Poland
2/3 2/3
of Hungary: 3/5
2/3 Cz-S: of Russia:
many
REVISION
Ukraine ref parlas
qual. poss. Nat ofparliament;
lower
house,levelled,
parts
RULE parliament Baltic:
pari Ass.; GDR:part 3/5 ofeach
nalstrongly
w.o.
majoritygenerallyBulgaria:unchangeable in house;
upper entrenched;
Croatia:
pari referendum con.ass.
Part ofpari.
2/3
part S:?; Romania:
pres.
init.,
pres. Part 3/5
pari. SA:2/3
each Cz:3/5ofpariinit;of
2/3
of
poss ch each
(some [of house] each; of
poss
referendum unch.ble) ref.
byAndrew
Compiled Arato

Constitutional
Learning 19
Thus thepatternthatcan producea parliamentcapable of legiti-

mateconstitution-making in a previouslyauthoritarian regimeseems
to be somethinglikethefollowing:(1) roundtable-type negotiations;
(2) creationof organicrulesfora freeelection,or an interimconsti-
tutioncontainingsuch rules,by the last non-democratic parliament
undertheguidanceof theroundtable; (3) freeelectionunderPR or
at least mixedrules;(4) constitution-making by thenew parliament.
This schematicconceptionis also a diagnostictool (in thesense of
prudentialjudgements,and not causal analysis,forwhichwe have
muchtoo fewcases thatdiffer in too manydimensions)forempirical
cases of constitution-making. Wheresteps(2) and (3) cannotbe sat-
isfied,as in Poland, it will be difficultto produce a constitution.
Where(1) and (3) are violated,as in Serbiaand Croatia,onlya con-
stitutionof doubtfullegitimacywill likelybe produced.But even
whereonlyone of theconditionscannotbe sustained,as in Hungary
wherethefirstfreelyelectedparliament neverevenconsidersmaking
a new constitution,thecompletionand/orthelegitimacyof thepro-
ject will remainin doubt.As the similarSouthAfricancase shows,
renewedconstitution-making in the freelyelected parliamentcan
erase the birthdefectof an interimconstitution thatwas produced
withoutdemocraticlegitimacy.60 Similarly,as theSlovenianexample
demonstrates, one missingconditionlike formalroundtablenegoti-
ations in thatcase can be compensatedforby informal,multiple
negotiationsor simplyan orientation of powerholdersnot to use a
positionof advantageto institute self-serving rules.Such orientation
seems to have played a role in Spain, too, when Suarez offeredto
negotiateand compromisewithforceshe hadjust roundlydefeatedin
a popularreferendum.
WhichLegality?
Can we say,however,thatcountriesin thepathof Spain,wherefour
conditionsweresatisfied, willbe in a good initialpositionto succeed?
Not reliably,because otherthingscan go wrong,as theCzechoslovak
transition theseconditionsindicates.JanosKis who froma
fulfilling
juridicalpointofview providedan outstanding analysisofthestructure
of 'regimechange' (in distinctionto both revolutionand reform),
pointsto thelegitimation vacuumthatcharacterizes thistype.61 I am
in
convinced, spite of the of
singlepossible counter-example Spain,
thatas longas theauthoritarian systemor authoritarian leadersretain
sufficientlegitimacy,they will tend the
to prefer top-down,manipu-
latedelectoralroad of slow,evolutionary change.In spiteof another

20 Andrew
Arato
singlecounter-example, namelyCzechoslovakia,wheretheroundtable
was more formalthanreal, but withsome important consequences,
whereoppositionalforcesalone werelegitimateand theabilityof the
government to represscrumbled, one had reasonto expectthatthenew
forceswouldnotnegotiatewithholdoversfromtheold regime.
But in thecontextof a breakin legitimacy, whentheold forcesare
no longerand thenew ones do notyethave a formof supportthatis
linkedto a beliefin theirjustificationto exercisepower,namelylegit-
imacy,thepoliticalsituationbecomes extremely unstable,withpoten-
tiallygreatdangersforall organizedforces.Accordingto Kis, only
consensuallyagreed upon rules of the game can stabilize such an
unpredictably explosive situation.I believe thatthemostimportant
ruleis adherenceto legality.In Kis's schemeregimechange(or: nego-
tiatedtransition)whichis distinguishedfromreformbecause of the
breakin legitimacy, is different fromrevolutionpreciselybecause of
legal continuity.There can be no doubttherefore thattheinitialphases
of thistypeof transformation musttake place on thegroundof the
legalityof theold regime,and thatthenew legal ordermustemerge
fromtheold by usingthelatter'sruleof change.
Thus thereis no real choice regardingthe second questionthat
concernslegality.A law thatdoes not yetexistcannotbe used. The
existinglaw mustbe used,even if onlyto transform itself.This how-
everis a difficult pointto swallow in the case of lawless regimesin
whichthereis no ruleof law at all. In factthemodeldoes notseemto
be applicableto authoritarian regimesthatare nothypocritical enough
to establishformalwrittenconstitutions or at leasthave some formal
appearanceof parliamentary sovereignty.Certainlywherethereis a
written with
constitution, a formal amendment ruleas in all Commu-
niststatesthereis a loopholethroughwhichtheinitiallyessentialele-
mentsof the rule of law can be introduced.It can be objected,of
course,thatlegal continuity using such an amendmentrule will be
based upona fiction,sincetheruleofchangeoftheconstitution in the
materialsense62of Communistregimesis theunwritten one accord-
ingto whichthewill of thepoliticalbureauof thecentralcommittee
is thesourceofall changesin thelegal order.Nevertheless, thefiction
can immediatelyacquire legal force63as soon as powerholdersand
theiropponentsagree thattheyimplicitlyadhereto thesine qua non
of constitutional regimes:thesupremacy(hierarchicalsuperiority) of
the constitution in the formalsense. Withthisagreement,the legal
systemundersuch regimesbegins forthe firsttimeto stabilizethe
mutualexpectationsof actorsin thepubliclaw domain.

Constitutional
Learning 21
But thefactthatthereis no choice regarding thelaws used to steer

non-revolutionary changes of regimesdoes not mean thatany pre-
existinglaws whichincludea law of changeare compatiblewithsuc-
cess. Even when an inheritedamendmentrule can be used to
negotiatetheorganicrulesfora democratictransition, itdoes notfol-
low thatsucha law will also servethepurposesofparliamentary con-
stitution-making. Such a rule may involve too many concessions to
authoritarian participation in democratic development as in Chile,
wheretheoutgoingmilitaryregimeforcedthedemocraticpartiesto
accept governmentunder an authoritarianconstitutionpassed in
1980, along withnotonlydifficult amendmentprocedures,butalso
ninesenatorsappointedforlongtermsby Pinochetwho could block
proposedamendments.64 It mayhave overlyhighconsensusrequire-
mentsamong new forces,as in the case of Czechoslovakiawhere
constitutional amendments could be passed onlywiththeconsentof
3/5of Czech and 3/5of Slovakdeputiesin theupperchamber,giving
2/5+ 1 of eithernationality, or 1/5+ 1 ofthechambervetopower.Of
coursethe CommunistPartypreviouslycould establishsuch a rule,
because itcontrolledall thedeputiesin anycase. Usingtheruleseri-
ouslywas, however,an entirely different matter.
Finally,rulesof amendment mayalso be overlyeasy ones to use,
invitingcontinuousdemocratictinkering withsupposedlyfinished
constitutions. Ongoingconstitutional learningmaybe a good thing,
butin a periodof quasi-revolutionary changeit is equallyimportant
to give a settledstructure to theinstitutional lifeof a new regime.65
Such a stepis all themorecrucial,whentheold regime,on thedeep-
estlevel,was characterized bylegal nihilismand theaim is to replace
itwiththeruleof law.
The answerto thesedifficulties seems to be thatlaws of change
unsuitablefordemocraticconstitution-making oughtthemselvesbe
the
changed,using original rule of change. Whether ornotthisis logi-
callypossible and whether such a method is compatiblewiththeaimof
producing a new legalorder,66 there are formidable politicaldifficulties
inthefaceoftheprocedure. We havereasontoassumethatincases like
Chile and Czechoslovakiarespectively, actorsthatexpectto be in the
weakerpositionunderdemocraticregimewouldoppose changingthe
ruleof changeforthesame reasonsthattheywouldlateruse itsbuilt-
in minority vetoprovisions. And in thecontextoftheoriginalrevision
ruletheyhavethemeansofresisting itsownrevision.In thecontextof
thethirddifficulty, parliaments would have a good reasonto use the
ruleto changetherule; in thiscase, to make it moredifficult, and to

22 Andrew
Arato
protectthereby theirconstituentworkagainstfutureparliaments. But

whentheydo wishto do so67theyrunintotheproblemfacedbyBritish
parliaments howtojustifytyingthehandsofa future
traditionally: par-
liamentlike thepresentone by a majoritysignificantly less qualified
thanthatrequiredby thefutureamendment rule.Let us notethatpar-
liamentary constitutionmakers cannot take anysolace fromtheexpe-
rienceoftheUnitedKingdomwherea constitution changeablethrough
simplyparliamentary majoritieshas shownremarkable stability.Given
thetraditionally inheritedconstitutionin thematerialsense,parliament
in Westminster is neverin a positionwhereit mustassume thecon-
stituentrole.Parliaments of new democracieshoweverfindno ready-
made structures withtraditionallegitimacythattheymustrespectfor
even
political, ifnot narrowly legal,reasons.In manyplaces,easyrules
of changehave indeedmeanta greatdeal of constitutional tinkering
(Austria,apparentlyhundredsof amendmentssince 1945).68 In
democracies,wherea new orderofpubliclaw has to be produced,and
wherethereis a good deal of contingency regardingthestructure this
order is to have, parliamentary constitution-making underan easy
amendmentrule means thatthe constituentprocess mightremain
indefinitely open,as in Hungaryin the 1990s.
Whatprocedure?
It is Ackerman'simportant implicitinsightthatclosingtheprocessof
constitution-making requiresenhanceddemocraticlegitimacy.This
enhancement, however,cannotbe achievedby theimpositionof con-
cretemodels.Nor will flightto abstraction help,ifthismeansthatwe
seek to directlyinstitutionalize
an abstractnormativeconceptionlike
the 'veil of ignorance'or 'deliberativedemocracy'.How wrongwe
can go is indicatedbytheextremely heterogeneous listofsevenpoints
proposedby JonElster,hithertothe leastnormative oftheanalystsof
constitutions. These points,accordingto him,belongto a designthat
is to 'createoptimalconditionsfordeliberation'forprocessesofcon-
stitution-making. The characteroftheliston thewholeis indicatedby
one of itspoints,'theprinciplethattheconstitution shouldnotcome
intoforceuntil,say,20 yearsafterit is adopted'. This idea satisfies
one of theparametersof theveil of ignoranceonlyat thecost oftotal
political(and empirical)irrelevance.69
We can do betterby focusingon a pluralityof principlesthatcan
be publiclyused to legitimatea givenprocessof constitution-making
only if some, inevitablyimperfectprocedures can be reasonably
claimedtobe orientedto them.Elsewhere,I haveemphasizedlegality,

Constitutional
Learning 23
publicity,the pluralityof democraticchannels,consensus,(partial)

empiricaltranslations of a veil of ignorance(in a limitedempirical
as suchprinciples.70
sense) and reflexivity These desiderataaremore-
overinterconnected, a pointthatI insufficientlystressed.
Legality(withpublicityand consensus)
Even ifbased on a fiction,legal continuity can do whatitis supposed
to do froma functional point of view,namelyhelpingactorsco-ordi-
natetheirexpectations. The matteris notso simplefroma normative
pointof view,wherethelegalityof a hatedold regime,even its fic-
tionallegalitycannotcarrymuchweightexceptto thenarrowest law
and ordermentality.71 FrankMichaelmanhas been rightto stressthat
democratic(or: 'republican')politicscan be fullyjustifiedonlyifall
actorsare 'alwaysunderlaw'.72In hisviewthisprincipleapplieseven
to the momentof the originalconstitution of the democraticorder.
But in thislattercontextit is notclearto whatlaw he is referring: to
naturallaw, the principlesof a dialogic ethics,a pre-existing legal
identity, or to the fortunatejuridical circumstancethatAmericans
foundthemselveseven beforetherevolutionunderthecommonlaw
and in partunderconstitutional charters? The fictionalconstitutional
legalityof an authoritarianstateis bothless substantialand moredif-
ficultto applythanwhattheAmericansin 1776 or 1787 and espe-
cially 1867 had to workwith.Yetadherenceto evensucha law (until
itis changed)can help stabilizetheidentity and securityof individu-
als in the midst of dramatic change. Moreover, even this law
announcesto populationsthattheeliteswho takechargeof theirfate
are subjectto rules,and cannotmerelyimposetheirarbitrary will.
But all rules,and especiallythefictionallegalityof an authoritar-
ian statethatwas notdesignedforuse in anycase, requireinterpreta-
tionthatcan of coursebecome theveil of reneweddiscretion.Only
processesof consensualdecisionmakingcan guaranteethatone elite
is notimposingitswill on theothersunderthecoveroflaw,whilethe
publicityoftheproceedingsofroundtables,forexample,is neededto
avoid theagreementof self-chosenelitesto takeon thecharacterof
arbitrary imposition.It seems to me thatthefictionof legal continu-
ity can carrytheburdenof legal legitimacyonlywhentheinterpreta-
tionof law is consensualand is supervisedin a publicprocess.
Publicity(withpluralityofdemocracies)
But,of course,publicitycannotmean fulltransparency,
nora purely
deliberativeinstitutional
design.When an assembly fullyopen to
is

24 Andrew
Arato
publicscrutiny, itsabilityto deliberatecan be easilyimpaired.In any

case, as we have seen in thecase ofthePolishRoundTable whichwas
fullypublic, in the case of Spanishparliamentary constitution-mak-
ing, as well as the
during formally publicnegotiations in SouthAfrica
at KemptonPark,key actorscannotbe preventedfrommeetingand
negotiating in private.73The PhiladelphiaConventionhas shownthe
wayhere,bymeetingin secretand callingforwhatturnedoutto be a
highlypublicprocess of ratification, in whichboththe culturaland
politicalpublicspheresof thestatescould participate. Thus theCon-
ventionhad to be able to justifyits decisionsin termsof arguments
thatcouldbe publiclyadvocated:publicregarding arguments typified
for
by, example, the FederalistPapers. Even thiswould not have suf-
ficedhowever,if thepublic discussionoutsidecould nothave a pal-
pable effecton theoutcome.In theU.S. suchan effectwas structurally
difficultto guarantee,and calls fora 'second convention'werepri-
marily obstructionist. Fortunately,however,therewas a keyinstance
wherethe federalists(and the main authorof the Federalist)were
forcedto back down:thepassingof theBill ofRightsunderArticleV
Fromthis historicalexample threerequirements follow: (1) the
need to havetwointerrelated discussions,withdifferent structuresof
publicity,one emphasizingdeliberation in a unifiedsettingevenat the
cost of secrecy,and theotheremphasizingopennessin a pluralityof
settingsevenat thecost of deliberation.In thecase ofparliamentary
constitution-making, ofcourse,theformsofthesewouldbe quitedif-
ferent thanin theAmericancase. Elsterrightly mentionsthedifferen-
tiationbetweenthedrafting committeeandtheparliamentary plenum;
(2) discussionbythepublicof civil societyas inAmericaimpliesthe
need to provideenoughtimefora societal debate of proposalsand
drafts;(3) a need fora ratifying processthatcan actuallymakea dif-
ferencein theoutcome.
Pluralityofdemocracies(withconsensus)
Thusreferenda are crucialforparliamentary constitution-making,but
it is unclearto me whyin federalstatesat leastratifying conventions
could notplaytheroleof a seconddemocraticchannel.Eitherway,of
course,thereis theriskof failure,especiallysince in thecase ofpar-
liamentary constitution-making theremaybe ordinarypoliticalrea-
sons fortrying to embarrassa parliamentary majority. Hereprocesses
of priorconsensusbuildingbecome especially important. If major
political forces must agree to a draftbeforeit is proposed ratifi-
for
cation, the likelihood of failure is verymuch reduced. By consensus,

Constitutional
Learning 25
followingLijphart,I meanproceduresthatfavourminority participa-

tionin majoritydecisions.74Proportional preparesthe
representation
ground for almost all formsof consensus democracy,since the
minoritiesmustbe madepresentbeforetheycan participate.75Parlia-
mentarydecision rules as in Hungaryrecently, or informalagree-
mentsas in Spain, thatrequirethe agreementof certainnumberof
partiesin the draftingcommittee,are, howeverthe formsthatcan
introducesignificantlyhigherconsensusrequirements intoa parlia-
mentary amendment rule.
Consensus(withreflexivity)
But consensusrequirements may also lead to failureof otherwise
promising drafts. More generally,in a givencase (say thereare six
the
parties), requirements maybe seteithertoo low (fourpartiesequal
simplemajority as well as 2/3!) to add to legitimacy, or too high(five
out of six is onlyone shortof unanimity, and maygive a politically
highlyexploitablevetoto possiblysmallminorities). It is reputedthat
in Israelthewritingofa constitution has failedhistorically because of
thesmall religiouspartieswho wouldnotagreeto anydraftthatdid
notestablisha statereligionin thefullsense. Most recently, in Hun-
garyand Poland,a vetopotentialofsmalloppositionpartiesled tothe
loading of draftswithall kindsof symbolicand dysfunctional ele-
ments.In bothcountries,potentialconstitution-making majoritiesof
rulingcoalitionsrightly avoidedimposingconstitutions, butthecon-
sensusrequirements agreedto couldhaveled to resultsthatthemajor-
itycould no longeraccept.76
In orderthatconsensusrequirements notbe incompatible withpro-
ducinga constitution, theactorsmustlearnto use consensusin con-
structive ways.And thisbringsus back to Holmes's emphasison the
institutionalization oflearning,orwhatI havecalled (followingTeub-
nerand Preuss)constitutional reflexivity, meaningthata constitution
containsits own constitutionalmeans of self-correction and self-
development. One might of course say that such a learningdevice,
such a dimensionof reflexivity of constitutions is the amendment
rule,whichmustnotbe too difficult ifit is to allow learningnortoo
easy ifit is to be an amendment rule at all. Butas Holmesargued,dur-
ing the constitution-making period one maywishforgreaterflexibil-
ity than under a settledconstitution. His answerwas thata settlement
shouldbe delayed,whileone relieson a relatively easyruleofchange
of a temporary constitution. This suggestion,however,can meanthat
thewindowof opportunity forconstitution-making can be shut,and

26 Andrew
Arato
thatitcan be reopenedonlyat thecostofunacceptableconcessionsto

obstructionistminorities.Most importantly,delaycan mean thatthe
initiallyhigh, symbolically based supportfor a new democratic
is
regime dissipated. What must be is how to use
learned,therefore,
and
consensusforthegenerationof legitimacy, to use legitimacyto
reduceconsensusrequirements.
The institutionalization
of learning:theSouthAfricancase
Obviouslylearningfromelsewhere,and facinga politicalsituationof
greatcomplexity, theSouthAfricanconstitution-makers respondedto
the problemof consensusbuildingand institutional learningin an
original, and highly instructive manner. As in Spain and Central
Europe, here too the basic method followed was parliamentary con-
stitution-making within Here
legal continuity.77 too, formalized nego-
tiations(two majorrounds:Codesa and theMulti-party Negotiating
Forumat KemptonPark) solved theproblemof havingto enactrules
of changethrougha parliamentof theold regime,withouttheneces-
sary political legitimacy.Using the existingamendmentrule, the
introduction of these rules turnedthe constitution of the apartheid
regimeintotheinterimconstitution of a democraticone. Up to this
point the process showed an uncannyresemblanceto otherrecent
cases, in particular, Hungary.
Beyondthesecases, however,theSouthAfricannegotiators made
theirgreatestcontributionto the institutionalizationof learning
withintheconstitution-making processwhileavoidingthetwindan-
gers of the excessive normalization of constitutionalpoliticsand the
of
logic permanent revolution. These options did have supportamong
some of thecontendingparties,butwhatthenegotiators of theANC
and theNationalPartycame up withwas theestablishment of a two-
stage process of constitution-making wherebythe interimconsti-
tutionand constitutionalprinciplesestablishedin comprehensive
negotiations,and enacted throughthe last apartheidparliament,
providedonlythe legal framework withinwhichthe newlyelected
parliament could create the definitive post-apartheid democraticcon-
stitution.The negotiatorsat KemptonPark establishednot only a
rigidtimetablewithinwhichthe new constitution would have to be
produced, but enacted a series of selective incentives and fail-safe
mechanismsthatmade itimpossibleforthenewparliamentto evade
its constituent task. Quite unusually,the new Constitutional Court
as
(established part of the interim constitution) was empoweredto
supervisecompliance of the constitution makers with theprinciples

Constitutional
Learning 21
(and indeedthepenultimate draftwas rejected,and sentback forrevi-

sions,beforepopularratification).
Severalimportant thingsweregainedin thiselaborateprocedure.
First,thetwostagesallowedfora periodoftestingoftheoperationof
theprovisionalconstitution and learningfromthisexperience.Sec-
ond, the highest consensus requirementsfor draftingcould be
reservedforthe abstractprinciples,whilethe finaldocument'spas-
sage requiredonlya parliamentary supermajority. Third,elementsof
consociationaldemocracy,so important forthe stabilizationof the
initialcontextof thetransition could be keptfromfreezingand could
be replacedin thefinaldraftby constitutional formsofprotection of
minorities. the resources of the'
Finally, legitimation ruptura pactada,
' theact of liberationfromtheold
reforma pactada generatedthrough
regimewereincorporated in theconstitutional principleswhose per-
sistencein the finaldraftmakes clear thatthenew basic law is the
constitutionof the 'regime change' and is neithera document
imposedbythenewmajoritynorsimplyanotherlegislationproduced
by parliamentforordinarypoliticalreasons.Agreeingto constitu-
tionalprinciplesat the outset,when normalpoliticsunderthe new
institutionshas notyetbegun,indeedsaves somethingof theidea of
theveil of ignoranceduringtheconstituent process.
Criticscould,of course,chargethattheagreementto the interim
constitution and to constitutional principlesamountedto the funda-
mentaldecisionconcerning thecharacter ofthenewregime,a decision
thatthefreelyelectedparliament could onlyrefineand elaborate,but
not fundamentally change.78Since neitherthepartiesat thenegotia-
tions,nor the last apartheidparliamentthatformallyenactedtheir
workhad full democraticlegitimacy,defendersof a revolutionary
democraticprocessof constitution-making can easilypointto theele-
mentof non-democracy at the foundationsof the new constitution.
Butthiselementofnon-democracy inthenarrowlegalsenseis equally
present in the case of the model of sovereignconstituent assemblies,
whererevolutionary is
legitimacy ultimately presupposed.79
In SouthAfricatoo theprocesscould workforsome of theactors
only because of an elementof revolutionary and even charismatic
legitimacy, embodied in the ANC and Nelson Mandela. However,for
otheractors,itwas theelementof legal legitimacy, i.e., legal continu-
itythatobviouslymattered. The non-democratic partof theprocess
createdno legitimation problems,because themajoractors,and the
groupsbehindthem,could identifywith it fordifferent reasons.80
And whileitmaybe in generalpreferableto limitthenon-democra-

28 Andrew
Arato
tic instancesto theproductionof organicrules,the needs of threat-

ened minorities(notonlytheold rulers!)in thecontextof quasi-rev-
olutionary change in the end could not be protected without
comprehensiveconstitutional legislation.Finally,it is not truethat
the freelyelectedparliamentwas deprivedof its autonomousability
to shape thenew regime.In particular,whiletheinterimconstitution
establishedconsociationaldemocracy,thenew parliamentcould (but
was not bound to) replace consociationalinstitutions withconstitu-
tionalformsof protection.81
Granted,it is all thesame unusualto allow a Constitutional Court,
a merepouvoir constitue , to be a partof thepouvoir constituant , to
play,in otherwords,a definingrole in constitution creation.The step
was, of course,important in SouthAfricaiftheconstitutional princi-
ples wereto be takenseriously,and if thetwo stageprocessof using
consensusto reduceconsensuswas to work.But thisprocedureloses
its strangenessin the contextof parliamentary constitution-making
withinlegal continuity. Parliamenttoo is a constituted power,and as
always,its being 'alwaysunderlaw' mustbe guaranteedby another
instance.Thus,withtheirmostunusualinnovation, theSouthAfrican
constitutionmakersteachus thattheplace ofthepouvoirconstituant ,
and
sovereign unbound, must be an emptyplace if we are to success-
fullyinstitutionalize constitutional democracy.
NOTES
1. Seemyessay,'TheOccupation ofIraqandtheDifficult Transitionfrom Dicta-

inConstellations
torship', , 10(2),June2003.
2. Onepartial
exceptionisProblems ofDemocraticTransitionandConsolidation
byJ.LinzandA. Stepan,JohnsHopkins Press,1996.
University
3. Tomyknowledge, themost importantauthor whobrought
abroad, together legal
andcomparative
theory is Ulrich
analysis anoutstanding
Preuss, legaltheorist
whowasanimportant WestGerman advisortotheroundtableoftheGerman
Democratic Under
Republic. theimpact oftheEastGerman regime change, he
waswellonthewaytodeveloping [see:Constitutional
Revolution, Atlantic
N.J.:
Highlands Humanities Press,1995]a genuinely
fruitful ofthe
interpretation
meaning inourtime.Butapparently
ofconstitution-making thefailureofthis
inGermany
project (theround tableconstitution
hehelped todesign wasnot
thepromise
enacted; 146oftheGrundgesetz
ofarticle togivetheunified coun-

Constitutional
Learning 29
tryanentirely newconstitution wasviolated) madePreuss backawayfrom his

more original insights. Hisco-authored article with Elster('Constitutional Poli-
ticsinEastern Europe', inElster, Offe,andPreuss (eds),InstitutionalDesign in
Post-communist Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998)has
given upallhisearlier, original perspectives andisplagued bynumerous errors
offactandinterpretation besides.
4. TheFuture oftheLiberal Revolution byBruce Ackerman, NewHaven: YaleUni-
versityPress, 1992.
5. Stephen Holmes. 'BacktotheDrawing Board', EastEuropean Constitutional
Review, 2(1). Theargument is almostcompletely incorporated in Stephen
Holmes andCassSunstein, 'ThePolitics ofConstitutional Revision inEastern
Europe', inS. Levinson (ed.),Responding toImperfection: TheTheory andPrac-
ticeofConstitutional Amendment, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Thejointarticle, however, hasdeepinternal contradictions, both between thethe-
oreticalunderstanding ofconstitutional amendment andtheanalysis oftheEast
European problems, as wellas between thisanalysis andspecific recommenda-
tions.Whileonepartofthetextisextremely critical ofimitating German con-
stitutionalism,themethod ofamendment that another partgenerally proposes is
identicaltothat oftheFederal Republic, andiscertainly nottheflexible parlia-
mentary model thearticle elsewhere argues for.SinceHolmes's original article
inanycaseseemstorepresent a consistent position, inthefollowing, I will
mainly refer tohimeventhough thejointarticle attimes significantly expands
thisposition.
6. TheyarejoinedbyGiovanni Sartori whoseworkComparative Constitutional
Engineering, NewYork University Press,1996, isexactly whatitstitle reveals-
a work insocialengineering thatreveals little
interest intheinevitably normative
question ofwhat makes a process ofinstitutional design capable ofjustification.
7. Similarly,Sartori fought forsemi-presidentialism inItaly,where a rationalized
parliamentarism oftheGerman typewould havebeenmore plausible and,prob-
ably,desirable.
8. SeemybookCivilSociety, Constitution andLegitimacy, Lanham, Md:Rowman
andLittlefield, 2000.
9. See 'Forms ofConstitution-making andDemocratic Polities',inCivilSociety,
Constitution andLegitimacy. Infacttheideaoftheconstituent power toohides
multiplepossibilitiesasCarlSchmitt recognized inVerfassungslehre . Evenifwe
bracket hismyth ofthepeopleas a unified constituent power, andfocus onthe
constituentgroup as C.J.Friedrich suggests, wewillinevitably runintoa power
organized around the(extra-ordinary) executive orthe(revolutionary) assembly,
andoften theircombination.
10. According tothedoctrine ofthedivision powers, thepower tomake constitutions
mayliewith either central orprovincial legislatures, or,possibly, ineachcase,
executives.However, I bracket thisconsideration that remains relevant when the
question ofcentral, federal orconfederal state remains open.
11. General Theory ofLawandState.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945,
p.124.Woodrow Wilson's depiction ofthecourt as 'a constituent assembly in
permanent session' wasa polemical wayofpointing tothisstate ofaffairs dur-
ingtheheyday ofthesubstantive dueprocess oftheLochner courts.
12. Whenindeed there is(unlike inGreat Britain) anoriginal moment ofconstitu-
tionalcreation.

30 Andrew
Arato
13. ThusPresident HugoChavez wasonlyacting inthespirit ofthetraditional Euro-

peantheory when hedissolved theSupreme Court during theperiod ofhiscon-
stituentassembly. It is another matter thatheearlier usedthesamecourt to
establishthisassembly as sovereign, inthefaceoftheAmerican convention
modelthat ismore traditional inLatin America.
!4. SincetheArticles ofConfederation of1781didnotestablish federalcourts, the
issuecouldnotcomeupduring thePhiladelphia Convention. ButsinceCongress
under theArticles remained insession during theperiod oftheConvention, we
mayassume that thesamewouldhavebeentrueforanyfederal courts as well,
hadthey existed. Hadthere then beena constitutional court, itcouldandshould
havefound someoftheactions oftheConvention unconstitutional under the
Articles.
15. SeeA.Arato, 'Good-bye toDictatorships?' inSocialResearch »Winter 2000.
16. TheFuture oftheLiberal Revolution waswritten beforethedrafting oftheSouth
African interim constitution, anditis hardtoknowwhat Ackerman wouldsay
abouta rolefortheConstitutional Courtevenmorepronounced thanthatof
Hungary. TheSouth African process wasnotfragmented tobe sure,andwas
characterized byhighdemocratic involvement under charismatic leadership.
However, theinterim constitution, constitutional principles andcourt combina-
tionarrived atthrough eliteagreement bound democratic constitution makers to
a highlyunusual degree.
17. See 'BacktotheDrawing Board', p.25.Itisnotquitelogical inthepresent con-
texttocompare thesecond American of1787andthefirst
effort French effort of
1789-1791. Bothfirst efforts produced highly inflexible constitutions. Thesec-
ondFrench effort oftheNational Convention however completely failed when
theConstitution of1793wasnotputintoeffect. Infact theFrench patternineach
revolutionary epochseemstohavebeenexactly theoneHolmes proposes (1791
and1793;1848and1852;1874;1945and1958).Buttheserepeated French
effortsat constitution-making, linked tomanypolitical disasters, wouldnot
inspiremuch confidence today, inspiteofwideadmiration fortheinstitutions of
theFifth Republic.
18. Leonard W.Levy'BillofRights', inL.W.Levy(ed.),EssaysontheMaking of
theConstitution , NewYork: Oxford University Press,1969.
19. Itmaybe thecasethat Holmes andSunstein wouldsupport a somewhat more
insulatedconstitution alongwitha moreactive judicialreview ata much later
stage.Butthey arenotconsistent onthispoint, perhaps because they slightlycon-
fuseconstitution-making through amendments, andthekindofamendment rule
they wishtoestablish ina newconstitution. Perhaps thisisthereason why onthe
onehandthey argue foraneasyamendment ruleandagainst tryingtoseparate
constitutionalandordinary politics,andontheother side,propose a moderately
difficult
amendment rulethat inthecontext ofevena court ofmedium powers,
wouldindeed the
promote separation ofthetwo kinds ofpolitics.Buttheanswer
tothepuzzlemaylieinthefactthat thearticle seemstobebasedonthework of
twoormore authors with somewhat differentviewsonconstitutional politics.
20. Oneordinarily triestopromote bothvirtues through a moderately difficult
amendment rule.ForEastEurope, Holmes andSunstein specifically deny this
option,eveniftheamendment rulethey support would bequite consistentwith it.
21. Itis hardtoknow infactwhat wearetomakeoftheexample ofKhasbulatov's
cavalieruseofconstitutional amendments Holmes andSunstein bring up(op.

Constitutional
Learning 31
sincethat
cit.,28Iff.), patterninRussiaplayed a crucial roleinthedisaster of
1993.
22. Seetheseries ofarticles byWiktor Osiatinsky forPoland andmyself forHun-
garyinEastEuropean Constitutional Review. IntheendthePolish effort was
successful,theHungarian onewasnot.Forthereasons anda comparative analy-
sis,seemy'Refurbishing theLegitimacy oftheNewregime: Constitution-mak-
ingEndgame in Hungary andPoland',in CivilSociety, Constitution and
Legitimacy.
23. Holmes andSunstein op.cit.,283.1suppose what they think isthat littleharm
cancomefrom ordinary politicsinvading theconstitutional domain. Theprob-
lemisthat inthecaseoftheindefinite fusionofthetwoassemblies theprocess
canalsogotheother way, with a pseudo-revolutionary politics invading every-
daydecision making. Thisiswhyitis important toclosetheconstitution-mak-
ingperiod, eveniftheperiod ofconstitution amending must beleft indefinitely
open.
24. ASociological Theory ofLaw,London: Routledge, 1972,pp.31ff.
25. SeeErnst Fraenkel TheDualState andA.Arato, 'Critical Sociology andAuthor-
itarian StateSocialism', inFromWestern Marxism toDemocratic Theory,
Armonk, N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe, 1993.
26. SeeLuhmann, Grundrechte alsInstitutio;Elster,Ulysses andtheSirens.
27. 'Precommitment andtheParadox ofDemocracy', inElster andSlagstad (eds),
Constitutionalism andDemocracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988.Theargument is present inthepartoftheHolmes-Sunstein study that
dealswith themeaning ofconstitutional amendments ingeneral, butitisspecif-
icallydiscounted intheparts dealing with EastEurope.
28. According to Arendt, too,theseparation ofpowers enhances rather than
decreases power.
29. TheKelsen versus Schmitt debate onthispoint wasdecided inthecourt ofhis-
tory,when President Hindenburg offeredthechancellorship totheFuehrer ofthe
NSDAP.SeeC. Schmitt, DerHueter derVerfassung [1931],Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1969andH. Kelsen, 'JudicialReview ofLegislation: A Comparative
Study oftheAustrian andtheAmerican Constitution', Journal ofPolitics, 1942
(4).
30. Seetheinterview with Ackerman inFundamentum (inHungarian), 2003/2.
31. Theobjection alsoapplies tomyownarticle, 'Dilemmas ofConstitution-making
inEastEurope', originally inCardozo LawReview, 1992.
32. Massachusetts in1780seemstobetheonlyexception where therewasnocon-
stitutionalstabilityguaranteed bycontinuous sub-units liketheU.S.orGerman
statesin1787and1948respectively, orbytheU.S.Federal Stateinthecaseof
laterstateconstitutional conventions. TheLatinAmerican statesthattendto
follow thismodelare(oraresupposed tobe)federal and,generally, as inthe
recent Argentinean case,thesamepower dominated bothassemblies. Itmight
beinteresting toexplore howmany civilwarsinLatin America werelinked to
actualduality oflegislative andconstituent powers. Civilwarwasnarrowly
avoided recently inVenezuela where a traditional LatinAmerican convention
wastransformed, byitsownfiatanda favourable court decision,intoa sover-
eignassembly.
33. SeeDieDiktatur, 1921andOnRevolution, 1962.

32 Andrew
Arato
34. See inparticular LinzandValenzuela, TheFailure ofPresidential Democracy,

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994,twovolumes; A. Lijphart(ed.),Presidentialví
Parliamentary Government ,Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,1992;M.S.Shugart
andJ.M.Carey, Presidents andAssemblies, Cambridge: Cambridge University
1992;Shugart
Press, andS.Mainwaring, PresidentialismandDemocracy inLatin
America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997;andSartori, op.cit.
35. Linzrefers tothe18th ofBrumaire , butseealsoTocqueville 'sRecollectionsand
Schmitťs Legalität undLegitimität, with thelatter's
evocative imageofa horse-
racebetween parliamentary andplebiscitary sovereigns.
36. Notreally dealing with theUnited States, Linz,aswellashiscritics, neglectthe
roleofa Supreme Court that doesnotalways refuse todealwithsuchpolitical
questions. SeeLouisFisher's finebook,Constitutional Conflicts between Pres-
identandCongress , Kansas:University PressofKansas,1997.
37. Thiscorresponds tothedualintellectual background ofthemodern presidency:
thedoctrine oftheseparation ofpowers ofMontesquieu andtheroyal preroga-
tiveas analyzed byLocke.Thus, while BritishandAmerican critiquesofpresi-
dentialgovernment focus onweakness andimmobility, EastEuropean opponents
ofthisform always feared itspotentialforarbitrary rule.Inmyview, thetwopos-
sibilities
areinherent inthesamestructure.
38. I willhereneglect thecriticism thatonecannot strictlyprove thatpresidential
government is moredangerous fordemocracy inspiteofmuchapparent evi-
dencetothiseffect because presidential republicsexistmostly inpoorer Latin
America withitssupposedly unique political culture, whereas parliamentary
governments belong toEurope andtheAnglo-Saxon world,which arericherand
havebetter political traditions.Theabsence ofdictatorship inthepresidential
U.S.is saidtosupport thisargument, which, however, doesnotadequately deal
withthelogical issues raisedbyLinz.Theproblem ofdualdemocratic legitimacy
andplebiscitary democracy are,astonishingly enough, entirely neglectedby
Mainwaring andShugart inparticular.
39. Splitticketvoting canworsen thesituation, andonlya single ballotforpresident
andparty ina singlenational districtPR wouldeliminate thepossibilityof
divided government. Thisoption doesnotcurrently existanywhere, andwould
beopposed byallthose whoprefer presidential government because ofitschecks
andbalances.
40. Indeed almost allexamples ofSuccessful' presidentialism discussed inthevol-
umeeditedbyMainwaring andShugart aredelegative hyper-presidentialist
democracies. See,forexample, thearticle onArgentina which pronounces asone
example ofsuchsuccessa period whenCarlosMenem managed topackthe
Supreme Court thatwastosustain hisunconstitutional useofdecree powers.The
oneexception inthebooktothistrend ofanalysis isrepresented byCostaRica
witha presidency so weakas toyieldassembly government. Analogously,the
choiceofpresidential government inthecountries oftheex-Soviet Unionwas
generally ofhyper-presidentialism rather thantheAmerican type, orFrench
semi-presidentialism inspiteoftheestablishment ofprime ministers.Today
thesecountries range from harddemocracies oftheRussian orUkrainian types
tothenotverysoftdictatorships ofByelorus andUzbekistan.
41. I agreewithGiovanni Sartorias against bothLinzandStepan thatsemi-presi-
dentialismcanbefreed oftheproblem ofa dualexecutive thatcouldproduce dif-
ficulties
fortheFrench modelanalogous tothedualdemocratic legitimacyof

Constitutional
Learning 33
parliamentary government. Mysolution, however, is different from Sartori 's

which is astonishingly reminiscent ofthedisastrous Weimar model.See his
Comparative Constitutional Engineering andmy4TheNewDemocracies andthe
American InstitutionalDesign' in Constellations.
42. As thegreatworkofC. Rossiter - Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1948)shows, theepisodes Ackerman stresses
as suc-
cessful, presidentially ledextra-Article V revisions oftheUS. Constitution,
associated withthefigures ofLincoln andRoosevelt, wereexamples ofemer-
gency government bordering ondictatorship. Suchprecedents, as JusticeDavis
warned inexparteMilligan in1865,canbecome dangerous instruments inthe
hands ofpresidents andstaffs lessloyaltoconstitutional democracy.
43. SeeLowi,ThePersonal President, Power InvestedPromise Unfulfilled.Cornell
University Press,1986.
44. Asalready noticedbyJ.C.Calhoun tohisgreat chagrin. See'ADiscourse onthe
Constitution andGovernment oftheUnited inUnion
States', andLiberty, Indi-
anapolis, LibertyPress, 1992,pp.259-260.
45. Thesefigures were,ofcourse, plebiscitary democrats tovery different
degrees.
Onlysomeofthem wereinterested indictatorship. Bolivar, forexample, who
assumed dictatorship' three times inthree different
countries returned thatoffice
toelected assemblies inRoman style eachtime when themilitary emergency was
overinhisestimation.
46. Hisneo-Jeffersonian preference forlearning through constitutional revolutions
mayocclude thevery problem oftheinstitutionalization oflearning.
47. Habermas, DieNachholende Revolution , Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1990.A patron-
izingattitude ispresent intheHolmes andSunstein article as well,andisbased
onthefallacious thesis that theEastandCentral European transformations were
fundamentally heteronymous andexternally caused, pp.286ff. Thisthesisis
untenable forseveral countries atleast, evenifinallcasesthetransformation of
Sovietforeign policy played a crucial role.
48. See,ofcourse, OnRevolution.
49. JustlikeAckerman, whomsheso greatly influenced, Arendt rehabilitatedthe
concept ofrevolution onthebasesoftheoneexceptional revolution.
50. NotethatArendt ambiguously supported thefirstprinciple, butspecifically
rejectedthesecond. Itwasprecisely thiscombination that couldbe institution-
alizedinterms oftheduality ofassemblies thatcouldwork onlyinAmerica.
51. SeeElster, 'Arguing andBargaining inTwoconstituent Assemblies' .
52. SeeBonime-Blanc.
53. IntheCzechandSlovak caseI always thought thattheinadequate constitutional
structure hada causalroleinthedissolution ofthestate. Thisinterpretation is
nowsupported intheexcellent article byAllison K. Stanger, 'Czechoslovakia as
anunintended Consequence oftheVelvet ConstitutionalRevolution', inEast
European Constitutional Review, 5(4).
54. Party fragmentation is,however, nota general condition inEastEuropeas
Holmes andSunstein assert; neither thefirst northesecond freely-elected par-
liament inHungary, northelastelected inPoland couldbesocharacterized.
55. Seethetwofirst-rate articles byDoreen Atkinson, 'Brokering a Miracle: the
Multi-party Negotiating Forum', and'Principle BornofPragmatism? Central
Government intheConstitution', inSteven Friedman andDoreenAtkinson
(eds),TheSmallMiracle. Pretoria: SigmaPress, 1994.

34 Andrew
Arato
56. InO'Donnell andSchmitter 's vividterminology democradura ordictablanda.

SeeTransitions from Authoritarian Rule,Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987.
57. Itwillnotdo,therefore, topronounce thatliberalizationmustfail,as doesA.
Przeworski, Democracy andMarket, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,
1990,without taking intoaccount thiscontrolled electoral
road,anditslong-term
success,atleastinMexico.
58. FortheHungarian case,seeAndrew Arato andZoltanMiklosi, 4Constitution-
in
makingHungary', submitted to theworkshop ofthe USIP and UNDP oncon-
stitution-making.
59. Effortstohaveanundemocratic parliament (GDR)ora partially democratic one
(Poland) toproduce constitutions failed,
among otherthings,becauseofthis
problem oflegitimacy.
60. Ofcourse, theinterim South African constitution undoubtedlybenefited from
therevolutionary charismatic legitimacy oftheANCanditsremarkable leader.
Buttheroleofa welldesigned, legitimate second stageofconstitution-making
wasimportant as well,bothforthestability andthestructure ofthefuture con-
stitution.Inanycase,onlythesecond ofthese sources oflegitimacyisavailable
ingeneral.
61. 'Between Reform andRevolution: Three Hypothesis abouttheNature ofRegime
Change', Constellations , 1(3).
62. SeeHansKelsen, General Theory ofStateandLaw,Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versityPress,1945.
63. SeeHenry S. Maine, Ancient Law,1861, onthelegalroleoffictions.
64. Seethechapter onChileinJ.LinzandA.Stepan, Problems ofDemocratic Tran-
sitionsandConsolidation , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996.
65. Arendt's arguments against permanent revolution remain butitshould
decisive,
be noted that they applytoa parliament thatindefinitely remains a quasi-con-
stituentassembly. Onthispoint seeArato, 'Revolution, RestorationandLegiti-
macy', inM. Kennedy, Envisioning Eastern Europe , AnnArbor: Universityof
Michigan Press, 1995.
66. There is a largeliterature onthesequestions: whether ornotsucha useofan
amendment rulecanbevalid(withC. Schmitt, A.Rossarrayed againstH.L.A.
HartandP.Sugar) andwhether ornottheresulting system would bea newlegal
order(seeKelsen versus Finnis, Raz,Kis).
67. Andtheyinfactmight notunder someconditions. Giventheuncertainties of
elections, someactors mayhopetobe ina stronger positionina futureparlia-
ment andaretherefore opposed tocompleting theproject.Others maynotwish
tolimit constitutional learning, interms ofconsiderations similartothoseof
Holmes, orperhaps strengthen judicial review interms ofa difficult
amendment
rule.Under suchconditions, usingevena relatively easyamendment ruleto
change itself maybedifficult.
68. Therelationship hasbeenquantified byDonaldLutzin'Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Amendments', inResponding toImperfection andonefinds
almost noexample (outside ofGreat Britain)where lowindexofdifficulty of
amendment islinked torelatively lowrateofamendment.
69. 'Deliberation andConstitution-making', pp.33-34. Sincethere areequallygood
reasons forarguing thatthere should be a constitutional convention every20
years,perhaps what Elster means tosuggest isthenotvery originalthesis
thatit
is futiletoproduce constitutions altogether.Indeed, itis hardtotellinfact

Constitutional
Learning 35
whether Elster istrying toactually develop a design forconstitution-making, or

toshowtheabsurdity ofanyattempt toguidesucha procedure through norma-
tiveassumptions like'theveilofignorance'. I donotclaimofcourse thatallhis
sevenpoints aresimilarly irrelevant. I myself havestressed theneedto link
public andnon-public forms ofdeliberation, theuseofreferenda, andtheimpor-
tanceofPRforconstitution-making assemblies. (See 'Forms ofConstitution-
making andTheories ofDemocracy', pp.224-227) In daysofmodern mass
transportation though, when evencrowds canassemble anywhere ina country
(nottospeak ofthemobility ofthearmed forces), I would nothavestressed hold-
ingconstitutional assemblies farawayfrom large population centres.
Andwedis-
agreeaboutthefeasibility andeventhedesirability oftrying toexclude atall
costsexisting institutions
from constitution-making. Thismove cannot ofcourse
guarantee a veilofignorance regarding theinterests ofpartiesandclasses, and
involves moreover thedangers ofdualpower andsovereign constituentassem-
bliesexplored above.
70. See'Forms ofConstitution-making andTheories ofDemocracy'.
71. Theissueisdifferent inSouth Africa where thelegality oftheapartheid regime
wasconsidered validfrom thepoint ofviewofthebulkofthewhite population.
Evenananti-apartheid party liketheDemocratic Partytookthisstand. More-
over, thislegalsystem, unlike those ofmost dictatorships, operatedasa modern
legalorder, againinrelationship tothedominant minority ofthepopulation.
72. 'CanConstitutional Democrats beLegalPositivists? orWhy Constitutionalism?'
inConstellations, 2(3).
73. Thepractice ofrepeated secret negotiations wascalledbosberaad inSouth
Africa, andthesettings wereappropriately picturesque. SeeAtkinson, 'Broker-
inga Miracle?', p.24.Thesamepractice wascalledmagdalenka inPoland after
thevillawhere theleadersofthetwosidesmet.
74. Democracies, NewHaven: YaleUniversity Press, 1984.
75. AnnPhillips, ThePolitics ofPresent, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1995.
76. Itseems that theconstructive attitude oftwoPolish opposition theUnion
parties,
ofFreedom andtheUnion ofLabour hasallowed theproduction andpassing of
a draftthat canbesubmitted toa referendum probably inMay.InHungary some
oftheopposition partieswhoseconsent wasneeded haveturned obstructionist
and,atanearlier stage,sodidamazingly enough theleadership ofthedominant
parliamentary party- thesocialists. Theadvantage ofthePolesis duetotwo
contingent factors:a more modern leadership inthecaseofthedominant social-
ists,andthefactthat because ofthefailed political adaptationofnewelectoral
rules, mostoftheright hasfound itself
outside parliament.Thislatter factmay
stillleadtosuccessful obstruction intheforthcoming referendum.
77. While someradical forces andevenoriginally theANC(as inSpain)calledfor
a constitutional break involving a provisional government anda sovereign con-
stituentassembly, negotiations soonproduced a consensus ontheissueoffull
legalcontinuity. Although a Transitional Executive Council withallparty par-
ticipationwascreated, thelegalgovernment remained inplaceand,formally, the
TEChadonlythevery important roleofpolicing theprocess offree elections.
See IvorSarakinsky, 'Rehearsing Jointrule, TheTransitional Executive Coun-
cil',inTheSmallMiracle. Theissueofparliamentary constitution-makingseems
morecontroversial, becausethefreely electedparliament wasreferred to
(legally?) as theConstituent Assembly. Nevertheless, thisassembly wasbicam-

36 Andrew
Arato
eral.Evenif,initsconstituentrole,thechambers mettogether, itwasbound to

theconstitutional
principlesaswellastotheinterim constitution
bothratified
by
theprior andwasunder
parliament, thesupervision oftheConstitutional
Court
establishedbytheinterim constitution.Thenewconstitution couldbe passed
onlyaccording torulesestablished inthenegotiations,andratifiedbytheprior
parliament,namely 2/3oftheassembly (alongwith deadlock-breaking
devices.)
Government wasprovisional neitherinthetechnical sensenorinnomenclature,
anditsterm, alongwith thatofparliament, wasforfiveyears iftheconstitution-
making deadlineofthree yearswasmet.Tobesure, dissolution at
uponfailure
constitution-makingthatwasalsoagreed uponisatypical forthepurelyparlia-
mentary model. SeeAtkinson, 'Principle BornofPragmatism: CentralGovern-
ment intheConstitution'.
78. SeeAtkinson, forexample, op.cit.,p.102,who,however, ishappy aboutthisout-
come,avoiding both puremajoritarianism andconsociationalism.
79. SeeArato, 'Forms ofConstitution-making andTheories ofDemocracy'.
80. Forthisreason theambiguity aboutsomeissues, suchas whether ornotthere
wasa provisionalgovernment, whether ornotthedrafting bodywasa constituent
assembly oranordinary parliament, wascalculated andftinctional.
SeeSarakin-
skyonthispoint, 88-89.
op.cit.,82ff.;
81. Itcouldofcourse besaidthat theinterim constitution-cum-constitutional
prin-
ciplesalreadyinvolveda choiceforconstitutionalism,
andonly aninterimconso-
ciational
arrangement thatwasnotinstitutionalizedinsucha wayastoguarantee
itsownpreservation.Neither the2/3voting ruleoftheassembly, northeconsti-
tutional as interpreted
principles bythecourt couldpreserve consociationalism
infuture decision
making.


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Berghahn Books

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.104 on Wed, 11 Jun 2014 11:31:16 AM

From Baghdad to Philadelphia

Constitutional politicshas returnedin our timein a trulydramatic

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tryis not the act of its government, but of thepeople constituting a

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In whatfollows,in searchof a synthetic position,I tryto explore

Assemblies and courts

Constitutions can be made by extraordinary or ordinarypowers,by

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one has notbeen createdconstitutional courtshavenothingto do, and

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cautionand subtletyin Marburyv Madison and, rashlyand disas-

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craticgovernment. For thesereasons,thefactthattheirpoliticalrec-

From Philadelphia to Budapest

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withhisco-author, Cass Sunstein,acceptedtheidea thata normalpar-

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mentstronger, not weaker.Undoubtedlyhe could answerthatthere

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had a discipliningand civilizingeffecton the holdersof legislative

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risks the sovereignor revolutionary dictatorshipthatCarl Schmitt

Finally,Ackerman'sidea thata charismatic presidentshouldplay the

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thisstructure can be describedas the combinationof constitutional

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identialismboth duringconstitution-making in 1988 and subse-

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knows,wouldhave a muchbetterchanceto protectitsconstitutional

From [Madrid and] Budapest to Johannesburg and beyond

The call to 'go back to thedrawingboard'afterthefirstflushofpost-

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and conceive democratic,legal revisionas the model forthe very

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ing to rules of its own choice: generallysimple majoritydecision

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factproducedthenew constitution. In Hungaryitcouldhavebeenthe

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failedattemptsof thistypein Spain, Brazil,Chile, Russia, Hungary

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Types of transition,constitution-makingand governmental

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Thus thepatternthatcan producea parliamentcapable of legiti-

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But thefactthatthereis no choice regarding thelaws used to steer

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protectthereby theirconstituentworkagainstfutureparliaments. But

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publicity,the pluralityof democraticchannels,consensus,(partial)

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publicscrutiny, itsabilityto deliberatecan be easilyimpaired.In any

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followingLijphart,I meanproceduresthatfavourminority participa-

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thatitcan be reopenedonlyat thecostofunacceptableconcessionsto

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(and indeedthepenultimate draftwas rejected,and sentback forrevi-

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tic instancesto theproductionof organicrules,the needs of threat-