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Test Bank For Fundamentals of Human Resource Management 11Th Edition by David A. Decenzo, Stephen P. Robbins, Susan L. Verhulst
Test Bank For Fundamentals of Human Resource Management 11Th Edition by David A. Decenzo, Stephen P. Robbins, Susan L. Verhulst
DeCenzo, St
4. When off the job, an employer cannot legally control an employee’s behavior by prohibiting
such things as riding a motorcycle, skydiving, smoking, or drinking alcohol.
Ans: False
Difficulty: Hard
Response: See page 9
Ref: Ethical Issues in HRM – Invasion of Privacy?
Ans: False
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 10
Ref: WORKFORCE DIVERSITY
6. Many Gen Xers and Gen Yers, while passionate about their careers, will not sacrifice family
and leisure for their career.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 13
Ref: What IS a Work/Life Balance?
7. Given the population and technology shifts occurring today, the authors foresee an end to the
labor shortage within the next year or two.
Ans: False
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 14
Ref: Do We Have a Shortage of Skilled Labor?
8. Employees who work fewer than 40 hours a week are called part-time employees.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Easy
Response: See page 16
Ref: EXHIBIT 1-3 – The Contingent Workforce
Ans: True
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 18
Ref: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
10. Continuous improvement programs aim at constantly improving the quality of products and
services.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Easy
Response: See page 18
Ref: CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
11. Radical changes in an organization are the focus area of work process engineering.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 19
Ref: Work Process Engineering
12. When managers make clear, forceful decisions for subordinates, employee involvement
increases.
Ans: False
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 21
Ref: How Organizations Involve Employees
13. Recent corporate scandals have created a lack of trust for management.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Easy
Response: See page 22
Ref: A LOOK AT ETHICS
14. Because contract workers’ labor cost is unknown and their service is usually poor as
compared to full-time employees, organizations prefer not to use them.
Ans: False
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 16
Ref: Exhibit 1 – 3
15. According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), an employee is an individual who performs
work for you, and you have the right to control or direct the result of the work but not the means
and methods of accomplishing the result.
Ans: False
Difficulty: Hard
Response: See page 17
Ref: Exhibit 1 – 5
16. Mergers are a common way for businesses to enter new or global markets, acquire new
technology, or gain a financial advantage by achieving economies of scale.
Ans: True
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 22
Ref: Mergers
17. A process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of
different nations, driven by international trade and investment, accelerated by information
technology.
Ans: o
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 4
Ref: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTS
Ans: a
Difficulty: Easy
Response: See page 4
Ref: UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTS
19. The varied personal characteristics that make the workforce heterogeneous.
Ans: k
Difficulty: Medium
Response: See page 11
Ref: WORKFORCE DIVERSITY
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The Confederacy once dissolved, the Federal party entered upon
the enjoyment of full political power, but it was not without its
responsibilities. The government had to be organized upon the basis
of the new constitution, as upon the success of that organization
would depend not alone the stability of the government and the
happiness of its people, but the reputation of the party and the fame
of its leaders as statesmen.
Fortunately for all, party hostilities were not manifested in the
Presidential election. All bowed to the popularity of Washington, and
he was unanimously nominated by the congressional caucus and
appointed by the electoral college. He selected his cabinet from the
leading minds of both parties, and while himself a recognized
Federalist, all felt that he was acting for the good of all, and in the
earlier years of his administration, none disputed this fact.
As the new measures of the government advanced, however, the
anti-federalists organized an opposition to the party in power.
Immediate danger had passed. The constitution worked well. The
laws of Congress were respected; its calls for revenue honored, and
Washington devoted much of his first and second messages to
showing the growing prosperity of the country, and the respect which
it was beginning to excite abroad. But where there is political power,
there is opposition in a free land, and the great leaders of that day
neither forfeited their reputations as patriots, or their characters as
statesmen by the assertion of honest differences of opinion.
Washington, Adams, and Hamilton were the recognized leaders of
the Federalists, the firm friends of the constitution. The success of
this instrument modified the views of the anti-Federalists, and
Madison of Virginia, its recognized friend when it was in
preparation, joined with others who had been its friends—notably,[1]
Doctor Williamson, of North Carolina, and Mr. Langdon, of Georgia,
in opposing the administration, and soon became recognized leaders
of the anti-Federalists. Langdon was the President pro tem. of the
Senate. Jefferson was then on a mission to France, and not until
some years thereafter did he array himself with those opposed to
centralized power in the nation. He returned in November, 1789, and
was called to Washington’s cabinet as Secretary of State in March,
1790. It was a great cabinet, with Jefferson as its premier (if this
term is suited to a time when English political nomenclature was
anything but popular in the land;) Hamilton, Secretary of the
Treasury; Knox, Secretary of War, and Edmund Randolph, Attorney-
General. There was no Secretary of the Navy until the administration
of the elder Adams, and no Secretary of the Interior.
The first session of Congress under the Federal constitution, held
in New York, sat for nearly six months, the adjournment taking place
September 29th, 1789. Nearly all the laws framed pointed to the
organization of the government, and the discussions were able and
protracted. Indeed, these discussions developed opposing views,
which could easily find separation on much the same old lines as
those which separated the founders of constitutional government
from those who favored the old confederate methods. The
Federalists, on pivotal questions, at this session, carried their
measures only by small majorities.
Much of the second session was devoted to the discussion of the
able reports of Hamilton, and their final adoption did much to build
up the credit of the nation and to promote its industries. He was the
author of the protective system, and at the first session gave definite
shape to his theories. He recommended the funding of the war debt,
the assumption of the state war debts by the national government,
the providing of a system of revenue from the collection of duties on
imports, and an internal excise. His advocacy of a protective tariff
was plain, for he declared it to be necessary for the support of the
government and the encouragement of manufactures that duties be
laid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported.
The third session of the same Congress was held at Philadelphia,
though the seat of the national government had, at the previous one,
been fixed on the Potomac instead of the Susquehanna—this after a
compromise with Southern members, who refused to vote for the
Assumption Bill until the location of the capital in the District of
Columbia had been agreed upon; by the way, this was the first
exhibition of log-rolling in Congress. To complete Hamilton’s
financial system, a national bank was incorporated. On this project
both the members of Congress and of the cabinet were divided, but it
passed, and was promptly approved by Washington. By this time it
was well known that Jefferson and Hamilton held opposing views on
many questions of government, and these found their way into and
influenced the action of Congress, and passed naturally from thence
to the people, who were thus early believed to be almost equally
divided on the more essential political issues. Before the close of the
session, Vermont and Kentucky were admitted to the Union.
Vermont was the first state admitted in addition to the original
thirteen. True, North Carolina and Rhode Island had rejected the
constitution, but they reconsidered their action and came in—the
former in November, 1789, and the latter in May, 1790.
The election for members of the Second Congress resulted in a
majority in both branches favorable to the administration. It met at
Philadelphia in October, 1791. The exciting measure of the session
was the excise act, somewhat similar to that of the previous year, but
the opposition wanted an issue on which to rally, they accepted this,
and this agitation led to violent and in one instance warlike
opposition on the part of a portion of the people. Those of western
Pennsylvania, largely interested in distilleries, prepared for armed
resistance to the excise, but at the same session a national militia law
had been passed, and Washington took advantage of this to suppress
the “Whisky Rebellion” in its incipiency. It was a hasty, rash
undertaking, yet was dealt with so firmly that the action of the
authorities strengthened the law, and the respect for order. The four
counties which rebelled did no further damage than to tar and
feather a government tax collector and rob him of his horse, though
many threats were made and the agitation continued until 1794,
when Washington’s threatened appearance at the head of fifteen
thousand militia settled the whole question.
The first session of the Second Congress also passed the first
methodic apportionment bill, which based the congressional
representation on the census taken in 1790, the basis being 33,000
inhabitants for each representative. The second session which sat
from November, 1792, to March, 1793, was mainly occupied in a
discussion of the foreign and domestic relations of the country. No
important measures were adopted.
The Republican and Federal Parties.
This contest broke the power of the Federal party. It had before
relied upon the rare sagacity and ability of its leaders, but the contest
in the House developed such attempts at intrigue as disgusted many
and caused all to quarrel, Hamilton having early showed his dislike
to Adams. As a party the Federal had been peculiarly brave at times
when high bravery was needed. It had framed the Federal
Government and stood by the powers given it until they were too
firmly planted for even newer and triumphant partisans to recklessly
trifle with. It stood for non-interference with foreign nations against
the eloquence of adventurers, the mad impulses of mobs, the
generosity of new-born freemen, the harangues of demagogues, and
best of all against those who sought to fan these popular breezes to
their own comfort, It provided for the payment of the debt, had the
courage to raise revenues both from internal and external sources,
and to increase expenditures, as the growth of the country
demanded. Though it passed out of power in a cloud of intrigue and
in a vain grasp at the “flesh-pots,” it yet had a glorious history, and
one which none untinctured with the better prejudices of that day,
can avoid admiring.
The defeat of Adams was not unexpected by him, yet it was greatly
regretted by his friends, for he was justly regarded as second to no
other civilian in the establishment of the liberties of the colonies. He
was eloquent to a rare degree, possessed natural eloquence, and
made the most famous speech in advocacy of the Declaration.
Though the proceedings of the Revolutionary Congress were secret,
and what was said never printed, yet Webster gives his version of the
noted speech of Adams, and we reproduce it in Book III. of this
volume as one of the great speeches of noted American orators.
Mr. Jefferson was inaugurated the third President, in the new
capitol at Washington, on the 4th of March, 1801, and Vice-President
Burr took his seat in the Senate the same day. Though Burr distinctly
disavowed any participancy in the House contest, he was distrusted
by Jefferson’s warm friends, and jealousies rapidly cropped out.
Jefferson endeavored through his inaugural to smooth factious and
party asperities, and so well were his words chosen that the
Federalists indulged, the hope that they would not be removed from
office because of their political views.
Early in June, however, the first question of civil service was
raised. Mr. Jefferson then removed Elizur Goodrich, a Federalist,
from the Collectorship of New Haven, and appointed Samuel Bishop,
a Republican, to the place. The citizens remonstrated, saying that
Goodrich was prompt, reliable and able, and showed that his
successor was 78 years old, and too infirm for the duties of the office.
To these remonstrances Mr. Jefferson, under date of July 12th,
replied in language which did not then, as he did later on, plainly
assert the right of every administration to have its friends in office.
We quote the following:
“Declarations by myself, in favor of political tolerance,
exhortations to harmony and affection in social intercourse, and
respect for the equal rights of the minority, have, on certain
occasions, been quoted and misconstrued into assurances that the
tenure of office was not to be disturbed. But could candor apply such
a construction? When it is considered that, during the late
administration, those who were not of a particular sect of politics
were excluded from all office; when, by a steady pursuit of this
measure, nearly the whole offices of the United States were
monopolized by that sect; when the public sentiment at length
declared itself, and burst open the doors of honor and confidence to
those whose opinions they approved; was it to be imagined that this
monopoly of office was to be continued in the hands of the minority?
Does it violate their equal rights to assert some rights in the majority
also? Is it political intolerance to claim a proportionate share in the
direction of the public affairs? If a due participation of office is a
matter of right, how are vacancies to be obtained? Those by death are
few, by resignation none. Can any other mode than that of removal
be proposed? This is a painful office; but it is made my duty, and I
meet it as such. I proceed in the operation with deliberation and
inquiry, that it may injure the best men least, and effect the purposes
of justice and public utility with the least private distress, that it may
be thrown as much as possible on delinquency, on oppression, on
intolerance, on ante-revolutionary adherence to our enemies.
“I lament sincerely that unessential differences of opinion should
ever have been deemed sufficient to interdict half the society from
the rights and the blessings of self-government, to proscribe them as
unworthy of every trust. It would have been to me a circumstance of
great relief, had I found a moderate participation of office in the
hands of the majority. I would gladly have left to time and accident to
raise them to their just share. But their total exclusion calls for
prompter corrections. I shall correct the procedure; but that done,
return with joy to that state of things when the only questions
concerning a candidate shall be: Is he honest? Is he capable? Is he
faithful to the constitution?”
Mr. Adams had made few removals, and none because of the
political views held by the incumbents, nearly all of whom had been
appointed by Washington and continued through good behavior. At
the date of the appointment of most of them, Jefferson’s Republican
party had no existence; so that the reasons given in the quotation do
not comport with the facts. Washington’s rule was integrity and
capacity, for he could have no regard for politics where political lines
had been obliterated in his own selection. Doubtless these office-
holders were human, and adhered with warmth to the
administration which they served, and this fact, and this alone, must
have angered the Republicans and furnished them with arguments
for a change.
Mr. Jefferson’s position, however, made his later conduct natural.
He was the acknowledged leader of his party, its founder indeed, and
that party had carried him into power. He desired to keep it intact, to
strengthen its lines with whatever patronage he had at his disposal,
and he evidently regarded the cause of Adams in not rewarding his
friends as a mistake. It was, therefore, Jefferson, and not Jackson,
who was the author of the theory that “to the victors belong the
spoils.” Jackson gave it a sharp and perfectly defined shape by the
use of these words, but the spirit and principle were conceived by
Jefferson, who throughout his life showed far greater originality in
politics than any of the early patriots. It was his acute sense of just
what was right for a growing political party to do, which led him to
turn the thoughts of his followers into new and popular directions.
Seeing that they were at grave disadvantage when opposing the
attitude of the government in its policy with foreign nations;
realizing that the work of the Federalists in strengthening the power
of the new government, in providing revenues and ways and means
for the payment of the debt, were good, he changed the character of
the opposition by selecting only notoriously arbitrary measures for
assault—and changed it even more radically than this. He early saw
that simple opposition was not progress, and that it was both wise
and popular to be progressive, and in all his later political papers he
sought to make his party the party favoring personal freedom, the
one of liberal ideas, the one which, instead of shirking, should
anticipate every change calculated to enlarge the liberties and the
opportunities of citizens. These things were not inconsistent with his
strong views in favor of local self-government; indeed, in many
particulars they seemed to support that theory, and by the union of
the two ideas he shrewdly arrayed political enthusiasm by the side of
political interest. Political sagacity more profound than this it is
difficult to imagine. It has not since been equalled in the history of
our land, nor do we believe in the history of any other.
After the New Haven episode, so jealous was Jefferson of his good
name, that while he confided all new appointments to the hands of
his political friends, he made few removals, and these for apparent
cause. The mere statement of his position had proved an invitation to
the Federalists in office to join his earlier friends in the support of his
administration. Many of them did it, so many that the clamorings of
truer friends could not be hushed. With a view to create a new
excuse, Jefferson declared that all appointments made by Adams
after February 14th, when the House began its ballotings for
President, were void, these appointments belonging of right to him,
and from this act of Adams we date the political legacies which some
of our Presidents have since handed down to their successors. One of
the magistrates whose commission had been made out under Adams,
sought to compel Jefferson to sign it by a writ of mandamus before
the Supreme Court, but a “profound investigation of constitutional
law” induced the court not to grant the motion. All commissions
signed by Adams after the date named were suppressed.
Jefferson’s apparent bitterness against the Federalists is mainly
traceable to the contest in the House, and his belief that at one time
they sought a coalition with Burr. This coalition he regarded as a
violation of the understanding when he was nominated, and a
supposed effort to appoint a provisional office he regarded as an
usurpation in fact. In a letter to James Monroe, dated February 15th,
speaking of this contest, he says:
“Four days of balloting have produced not a single change of a
vote. Yet it is confidently believed that to-morrow there is to be a
coalition. I know of no foundation for this belief. If they could have
been permitted to pass a law for putting the government in the hands
of an officer, they would certainly have prevented an election. But we
thought it best to declare openly and firmly, one and all, that the day
such an act passed, the Middle States would arm, and that no such
usurpation, even for a single day, should be submitted to.”
It is but fair to say that the Federalists denied all such intentions,
and that James A. Bayard, of Delaware, April 3, 1806, made formal
oath to this denial. In this he says that three States, representing
Federalist votes, offered to withdraw their opposition if John
Nicholas, of Virginia, and the personal friend of Jefferson, would
secure pledges that the public credit should be supported, the navy
maintained, and that subordinate public officers, employed only in
the execution of details, established by law, should not be removed
from office on the ground of their public character, nor without
complaint against their conduct. The Federalists then went so far as
to admit that officers of “high discretion and confidence,” such as
members of the cabinet and foreign ministers, should be known
friends of the administration. This proposition goes to show that
there is nothing very new in what are called our modern politics; that
the elder Bayard, as early as 1800, made a formal proposal to
bargain. Mr. Nicholas offered his assurance that these things would
prove acceptable to and govern the conduct of Jefferson’s
administration, but he declined to consult with Jefferson on the
points. General Smith subsequently engaged to do it, and Jefferson
replied that the points given corresponded with his views and
intentions, and that Mr. Bayard and his friends might confide in him
accordingly. The opposition of Vermont, Maryland and Delaware
was then immediately withdrawn, and Mr. Jefferson was made
President. Gen’l Smith, twelve days later, made an affidavit which
substantially confirmed that of Bayard. Latimer, the collector of the
port of Philadelphia, and M’Lane, collector of Wilmington, (Bayard’s
special friend) were retained in office. He had cited these two as
examples of his opposition to any change, and Jefferson seemed to
regard the pledges as not sacred beyond the parties actually named
in Bayard’s negotiations with Gen’l Smith.
This misunderstanding or misconstruction of what in these days
would be plainly called a bargain, led to considerable political
criticism, and Jefferson felt it necessary to defend his cause. This he
did in letters to friends which both then and since found their way
into the public prints. One of these letters, written to Col. Monroe,
March 7th, shows in every word and line the natural politician. In
this he says:
“Some (removals) I know must be made. They must be as few as
possible, done gradually, and bottomed on some malversation or
inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between all
and none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our
administration together; and perhaps even then we shall proceed ā
talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we
perceive them to make. This may give you a general view of our
plan.”
A little later on, March 28, he wrote to Elbridge Gerry:
“Officers who have been guilty of gross abuses of office, such as
marshals packing juries, etc., I shall now remove, as my predecessor
ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few, and
governed by strict rule, not party passion. The right of opinion shall
suffer no invasion from me.”
Jefferson evidently tired of this subject, and gradually modified his
views, as shown in his letter to Levi Lincoln, July 11, wherein he says:
“I am satisfied that the heaping of abuse on me personally, has
been with the design and the hope of provoking me to make a general
sweep of all Federalists out of office. But as I have carried no passion
into the execution of this disagreeable duty, I shall suffer none to be
excited. The clamor which has been raised will not provoke me to
remove one more, nor deter me from removing one less, than if not a
word had been said on the subject. In the course of the summer, all
which is necessary will be done; and we may hope that, this cause of
offence being at an end, the measures we shall pursue and propose
for the amelioration of the public affairs, will be so confessedly
salutary as to unite all men not monarchists in principle.” In the
same letter he warmly berates the monarchical federalists, saying,
“they are incurables, to be taken care of in a madhouse if necessary,
and on motives of charity.”
The seventh Congress assembled. Political parties were at first
nearly equally divided in the Senate, but eventually there was a
majority for the administration. Jefferson then discontinued the
custom established by Washington of delivering in person his
message to Congress. The change was greatly for the better, as it
afforded relief from the requirement of immediate answers on the
subjects contained in the message. It has ever since been followed.
The seventh session of Congress, pursuant to the recommendation
of President Jefferson, established a uniform system of
naturalization, and so modified the law as to make the required
residence of aliens five years, instead of fourteen, as in the act of
1798, and to permit a declaration of intention to become a citizen at
the expiration of three years. By his recommendation also was
established the first sinking fund for the redemption of the public
debt. It required the setting apart annually for this purpose the sum
of seven millions and three hundred thousand dollars. Other
measures, more partisan in their character, were proposed, but
Congress showed an aversion to undoing what had been wisely done.
A favorite law of the Federalists establishing circuit courts alone was
repealed, and this only after a sharp debate, and a close vote. The
provisional army had been disbanded by a law of the previous
Congress. A proposition to abolish the naval department was
defeated, as was that to discontinue the mint establishment.
At this session the first law in relation to the slave trade was
passed. It was to prevent the importation of negroes, mulattoes and
other persons of color into any port of the United States within a
state which had prohibited by law the admission of any such person.
The penalty was one thousand dollars and the forfeiture of the vessel.
The slave trade was not then prohibited by the constitution, nor was
the subject then generally agitated, though it had been as early as
1793, when, as previously stated, an exciting sectional debate
followed the presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania to abolish
the slave trade.
Probably the most important occurrence under the first
administration of Jefferson was that relating to the purchase and
admission of Louisiana. There had been apprehensions of a war with
Spain, and with a view to be ready Congress had passed an act
authorizing the President to call upon the executives of such of the
states as he might deem expedient, for detachments of militia not
exceeding eighty thousand, or to accept the services of volunteers for
a term of twelve months. The disagreement arose over the
southwestern boundary line and the right of navigating the
Mississippi. Our government learned in the spring of 1802, that
Spain had by a secret treaty made in October, 1800, actually ceded
Louisiana to France. Our government had in 1795 made a treaty with
Spain which gave us the right of deposit at New Orleans for three
years, but in October, 1802, the Spanish authorities gave notice by
proclamation that this right was withdrawn. Excitement followed all
along the valley of the Mississippi, and it was increased by the belief
that the withdrawal of the privilege was made at the suggestion of
France, though Spain still retained the territory, as the formalities of
ceding it had not been gone through with. Jefferson promptly took
the ground that if France took possession of New Orleans, the United
States would immediately become allies of England, but suggested to
Minister Livingston at Paris that France might be induced to cede the
island of New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. It was
his belief, though a mistaken one, that France had also acquired the
Floridas. Louisiana then comprised much of the territory west of the
Mississippi and south of the Missouri.
The Federalists in Congress seized upon this question as one upon
which they could make an aggressive war against Jefferson’s
administration, and resolutions were introduced asking information
on the subject. Jefferson, however, wisely avoided all entangling
suggestions, and sent Monroe to aid Livingston in effecting a
purchase. The treaty was formed in April, 1803, and submitted by
Jefferson to the Senate in October following. The Republicans rallied
in favor of this scheme of annexation, and claimed that it was a
constitutional right in the government to acquire territory—a
doctrine widely at variance with their previous position, but
occasions are rare where parties quarrel with their administrations
on pivotal measures. There was also some latitude here for
endorsement, as the direct question of territorial acquisition had not
before been presented, but only hypothetically stated in the
constitutional disputations then in great fashion. Jefferson would not
go so far as to say that the constitution warranted the acquisition to
foreign territory, but the scheme was nevertheless his, and he stood
in with his friends in the political battle which followed.
The Federalists claimed that we had no power to acquire territory,
and that the acquirement of Louisiana would give the South a
preponderance which would “continue for all time (poor prophets
they!), since southern would be more rapid than northern
development;” that states created west of the Mississippi would
injure the commerce of New England, and they even went so far as to
say that the “admission of the Western World into the Union would
compel the Eastern States to establish an eastern empire.” Doubts
were also raised as to the right of Louisianians, when admitted to
citizenship under our laws, as their lineage, language and religion
were different from our own. Its inhabitants were French and
descendants of French, with some Spanish creoles, Americans,
English and Germans—in all about 90,000, including 40,000 slaves.
There were many Indians of course, in a territory then exceeding a
million of square miles—a territory which, in the language of First
Consul Napoleon, “strengthens forever the power of the United
States, and which will give to England a maritime rival that will
sooner or later humble her pride”—a military view of the change fully
justified by subsequent history. Napoleon sold because of needed
preparations for war with England, and while he had previously
expressed a willingness to take fifty million francs for it, he got sixty
through the shrewd diplomacy of his ministers, who hid for the time
their fear of the capture of the port of New Orleans by the English
navy.